Only the Strong Survive — CSS in the Disaggregated Battlespace

Abstract

Recent operations would have us believe that Combat Service Support (CSS) personnel have not previously been required to protect themselves. On closer examination it seems that throughout history, support services of armies have been targeted by enemy forces. These lessons are somewhat conveniently forgotten as armies only equip and train their fighting echelons for close combat while largely ignoring the requirement in CSS units. Contemporary and past operations have demonstrated that danger is everywhere not just on the front lines. Sadly, the ADF continues to equip its fighting echelons with modern equipment, while expecting CSS units to operate with equipment that is aging and not fit for purpose. There is also a lack of close combat training across CSS units within the ADF at both the individual and collective levels. This does not prepare soldiers to operate within a highly lethal disaggregated battlespace.

You have not forgotten to remember; you have remembered to forget. But people can forget to forget. That is just as important as remembering to remember — and generally more practical.

- Idries Shah¹

Introduction

The first principle of logistics must be survivability, for if logistic units are destroyed there is no point to the remaining principles. Throughout history, survivability of logistics is a lesson relearned and then promptly forgotten or ignored until the next conflict. The lure of a soft target has always encouraged belligerents to strike lightly armed logistic units, often resulting in high casualties and a shortage of supplies for combat operations.

The increased disaggregation of the battlespace, coupled with multiple casualties during recent operations, has driven our coalition partners to redefine the nature of the logistician. However, the ADF continues to largely ignore the requirement to train and equip Combat Service Support (CSS) soldiers and officers to fight to protect themselves and their precious supplies. These requirements are often neglected by commanders in the mistaken belief that there will be sufficient combat units to allocate as escorts and protection parties.

This article will analyse the effectiveness of contemporary foundation warfighting training in preparing CSS personnel for operations within a disaggregated battlespace. Contemporary and historical examples will be used to provide evidence of the requirement to train CSS personnel in close combat and equip them to predict, prevent and protect themselves from enemy action. While all logistic activities within contemporary operating environments carry risk, the greatest risk to logistic operations has consistently occurred in distribution. As such, this article will focus primarily on distribution operations.

The disaggregation of the battlespace

With the evolution of the battlespace into a non-linear area with no defined front or rear, logistic units have become increasingly vulnerable. The growing lethality of modern sensors and weaponry has forced combatants to operate below detection thresholds within complex terrain. Combatants attempt to defeat this modern technology by manoeuvring in smaller force packages capable of sheltering within both physical and human terrain.² This presents a significant threat to CSS convoys moving through such complex terrain, a fact highlighted in Iraq in 2004 when more purple hearts were awarded to troops operating along the lines of communication than to combat forces.³ It is through this complex terrain that the almost continuous flow of logistics must traverse to their often dispersed dependencies.

With the disaggregation of the battlespace, logistic personnel have been faced with the requirement to predict, prevent and protect themselves from threat force actions within complex terrain. Coalition forces in the Middle East learnt that insurgents, frequently equipped with the ability to generate highly lethal effects, regularly targeted logistic operations at the small-team level in fleeting surprise engagements.⁴ The resulting casualties led to the acquisition of enhanced distribution equipment and the development of new training and procedures to repel such attacks. 

Lessons from operations

The casualty toll from both Iraq and Afghanistan prompted recognition of the requirement to equip and train logistic units to protect themselves and their valuable supplies. The lure of soft logistic convoys and the asymmetrical nature of contemporary conflict are highlighted in statistics reported by CNN: ‘Over 3000 American soldiers or contractors were killed in fuel supply convoys between 2003 and 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan.’5 During Operation Iraqi Freedom, US Army logistic units lost 126 soldiers to enemy action — the equivalent of 17% of all US Army casualties over the same period.6 It was clear that insurgents had learnt that logistic units did not possess the concentration of weapons found in combat units or the ability to coordinate the same level of response.⁷ Casualty rates, coupled with the continual loss of supplies, produced the need to innovate and reinvent the way logistic units were equipped and trained.

The mounting casualties and the critical requirement for reliable logistics often resulted in CSS units developing their own procedures to defeat insurgent attacks. In October 2004, 18 National Guard soldiers refused to deliver urgent supplies of fuel, arguing that, without protection from combat units or suitable armour, the risks involved in conducting the mission were far too great.⁸ With casualties mounting and soldiers refusing to complete missions, Australia’s coalition partners were forced to revolutionise resupply convoys from the bottom up by developing unprecedented tactics, techniques and procedures. Bond highlights this rapid change, asserting that the US logistic and, in particular, transport soldier, has evolved into ‘… one of the premier warriors of the nonlinear and nonconventional battlefield.’⁹ The ADF is currently acquiring CSS vehicles capable of firing, communicating and protecting supplies and personnel, yet has not identified the need to train CSS soldiers to the standard of those of other coalition members.

The experiences of our coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan also led to the development of combat logistic patrols (CLP). Many authors believe that the rapid advance of vanguard operations has led to logistics becoming vulnerable along lines of communication that had not been, and arguably could not be secured.¹⁰ This was the environment in which CLPs rose, emerging from the wreckage of destroyed vehicles and lost supplies. Tusa believes that CLPs signal an operational change that has led to logistic units planning to ‘fight’ a convoy to its destination.¹¹ The entry of CLP into logistic nomenclature does not change the fact that a CLP is merely a protected convoy of supplies or personnel. The nomenclature also wrongly implies that the CSS element actively seeks combat, when in reality the CSS convoy attempts to avoid contact whenever possible.

CLPs are a reinvention of lessons lost from previous conflicts. During the first Anglo-Afghan War in 1839, British army supply convoys were attacked continuously by marauding tribesmen. As a result, convoys moving between India and Jalalabad were heavily armed.12 More recently, large convoys and armoured ‘gun trucks’ were employed throughout Vietnam, particularly in movement through the notorious ‘Ambush Alley’ where US forces suffered heavy casualties.¹³ Vietnam certainly proved that there was a requirement to train and equip convoys to repel enemy attacks.

ADF response to coalition lessons

While the ADF has acknowledged the need for increased protection within the disaggregated battlespace, it is yet to incorporate appropriate training for CSS within its individual or collective training. The 2013 Defence White Paper highlights the need for increased survivability:

In response to the increasing complexity and lethality of land operations, the Government is committed to acquiring deployable protected and armoured vehicles offering improved firepower, protection and mobility compared to existing systems. This will include new medium and heavy trucks to replace Army’s existing ageing fleet.¹⁴

The acquisition of ‘hardened’ fleets is only a partial solution to addressing the survivability of logistics. CSS personnel must also be trained to predict, prevent and protect themselves against enemy threats within a disaggregated battlespace. Success within this non-linear battlespace relies on well-trained, educated and conditioned officers and soldiers.¹⁵ While doctrine supports well-trained and well- equipped CSS, the reality does not match the theory.

According to the Defence White Paper, force protection and the provision of appropriate equipment for ADF personnel to enable the conduct of difficult and dangerous tasks is the government’s highest priority.¹⁶ In 2004, Australian Army officer Colonel Condon returned from a deployment to the Middle East and immediately recommended revising doctrine, training and resource allocation to enhance CSS survivability in complex terrain. He was promptly seconded to Coalition Headquarters in Iraq in a move that appeared to promise progress in the enhancement of CSS survivability.¹⁷ However, some years later, the on-line Combat Service Support Team (CSST) continues to train with first generation body armour used in East Timor and does not possess sufficient armour for all its soldiers. Furthermore, drivers are not issued chest webbing, forcing them to remove their webbing before mounting their vehicles.¹⁸ Combat units, however, all have access to the latest body armour and chest webbing — even for training prior to deployment. The lack of suitable personal equipment to train for operations not only hinders training, but also demonstrates to CSS soldiers that there is a view that they are unlikely to require such equipment. If a cultural shift within CSS units is necessary, simply filling the walls of units with posters proclaiming ‘every soldier an expert in close combat’ is clearly insufficient. Resources must be allocated to CSS units to enable the development of specific combat skills designed to protect CSS functions.

Contemporary foundation warfighting training for combat service support

Disaggregated battlespaces are not unique to insurgencies; rather, the increased lethality of weapons and the ability to detect targets make a disaggregated battlespace just as likely within conventional operations. The Army Future Land Operating Concept reinforces this likelihood, stating that, ‘While traditionally these trends were thought to apply only to an irregular enemy, it applies equally to combat between peer competitors and/or conventional forces.’¹⁹ While the ADF acknowledges that logistics will face threats from both insurgencies and in near- peer conflicts, the current training regime does not prepare CSS personnel for combat from either source.

The threat of the disaggregated battlespace is clearly described in Army’s keystone doctrine; however, realisation of those training outcomes embedded within foundation warfighting training remains in its infancy. In 2013, only one of the three regular Combat Service Support Battalions (CSSBs) conducted any form of infantry minor tactics, improvised explosive device training or counter-ambush training.²⁰ These elements clearly form part of foundation warfighting which comprises the skills, knowledge and attitudes to successfully conduct the full spectrum of sustained operations, yet were not practised by two of the three CSSBs. It is the execution, frequency and content of training that is under-preparing CSS units for the rigours of modern conflict and thus endangering dependencies’ ability to sustain joint land combat.

The Army Training Continuum for CSS personnel focuses on logistics and not survivability, resulting in the belief that a CSS unit’s role is largely administrative. This produces a focus on supporting dependencies’ training rather than preparing CSS personnel to survive and achieve missions within a highly lethal environment. It is within both individual and collective training that CSS must be prepared to meet threats associated with disaggregated battlespaces. Foundation warfighting is a suitable vehicle for training CSS soldiers; however, the training of these soldiers in specific combat skills must be incorporated within both collective and individual training. Although logistic units primarily support combat units, they do not regularly design or execute training to defeat enemy action against convoys or logistic nodes. Indeed, during a recent 1st Brigade exercise, there were no threat actions against logistic organisations and the Ready Battalion Group’s CSST moved unimpeded throughout the area of operations.

The individual training continuums within logistic streams do not provide the skills or expertise required to conduct logistic operations within disaggregated battlespaces. Convoy operations are most commonly associated with transport units; however, recent observed lessons within contemporary operations have highlighted the fact that any logistician may find him/herself involved in defending a convoy or forward operating base. This was clearly demonstrated when the US 26th Brigade Support Battalion created its ‘Top Flight’ Platoon consisting of fuellers, ammunition handlers, mechanics, welders and medics to provide much-needed security for convoy operations in Iraq.²¹ Having observed US operations in Iraq, Colonel Condon lamented the lack of combat training for ADF logisticians within urban environments.²² Despite this, the ADF has yet to develop a logistics training continuum to meet the threats associated with the disaggregated battlespace.

There is an emerging requirement for CSS soldiers to possess skills usually associated with combat corps. One lesson learnt by our allies in Iraq and Afghanistan was that logistic convoys required heavier weapons such as .50 calibre machine-guns and 40 mm grenade launchers.²³ The British army’s Brigadier Hickson, Director of the Royal Logistic Corps, believes that transportation has become ‘sexy’, with commanders now acquiring links to ISTAR, fast air and other support not previously possessed by logisticians.²⁴ Wood reinforces these sentiments, arguing that personnel conducting CLPs must be trained to the same standard as tank and mechanised scout platoons.²⁵ The US has revolutionised its training for CSS units by integrating convoy defence procedures into its Joint Multinational Readiness Center.²⁶ Somewhat more impressively, US logistic units consistently outperform combat units in motorised fire and manoeuvre exercises.²⁷ If we are to learn from recent Coalition experiences, the ADF must review its logistic training continuum to include selected skills which were previously the domain of combat corps.

CSS convoys are particularly vulnerable and often an attractive target in any level of conflict. The current training for Royal Australian Corps of Transport (RACT) drivers does not address the requirements of the modern battlespace, or prepare for training within a combined arms environment. The Army Initial Employment Training (IET) for RACT drivers allocates a mere 60 minutes to motor transport ambush drills which are assessed by written or oral questioning rather than practical testing.²⁸ While the course does include firing the Steyr and Light Support Weapon from a Unimog cupola, range practices are conducted from the shoulder in a light- skinned vehicle.²⁹ Somewhat more encouragingly, the RACT Subject 4 Corporal Course contains improvised explosive training and convoy planning. This training is embryonic in nature and, although its inclusion is cause for optimism, its needs to be further developed and coupled with collective training serials.

The training of logistic officers is also inadequate to prepare them for employment within a CSS unit operating in a disaggregated battlespace. No logistic officer is exposed to convoy command with trucks, protected vehicles or soldiers during the Logistic Officers’ Basic Course. As a result, officers complete their training and are deemed competent in convoy operations having never led a CSS convoy in a threat environment. Logistic officers require training and testing to job standard and, to achieve that job standard, they require vehicles and soldiers to command within a simulated threat environment. This issue can be addressed by the synchronisation of IET courses with logistic officer courses allowing new officers to plan and execute convoys with newly trained IETs and their instructors. This requires the Army School of Transport to provide personnel for logistic officers’ courses — surely not an onerous demand given that such training could save lives. RACT officers will require further training to ensure that they are the experts in convoy operations.

Implications of Plan Beersheba

Plan Beersheba directs the CSSB to provide the combat brigade with the transport capability to move dismounted forces, supplies and equipment where unit mobility is unavailable. In the future, CSSBs will achieve this through the use of both L121 vehicles and the protected mobility vehicle (PMV). The PMV is currently used by 1 CSSB to provide protected mobility to dependencies within the combat brigade, and 3 and 7 CSSB are also establishing a similar capability. The integration of these very capable vehicles within the CSSBs to conduct personnel lift represents a leap forward in the delivery of transport support within the ADF. These vehicles are much more than ‘just a truck’ and represent a very capable platform for the delivery of essential support.

While these highly capable vehicles, coupled with well-trained and equipped CSS soldiers and commanders, will enhance the survivability of CSS, they will not change the role or mission of CSS units. The use of PMVs during contemporary operations and within combat units such as 6 RAR and B 3/4 Squadron has led some manoeuvre commanders to believe that the PMV is a suitable alternative to armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). While the vehicle is well protected from ground blast, it does not have protection, firepower or mobility commensurate with that of the modern AFV. To use the CSSB PMVs in a similar role to AFVs in conventional operations against a near-peer adversary would probably lead to ADF casualties. However, the vehicle does provide CSS with enhanced survivability and the ability to project CSS into medium to high-threat environments where contact with the enemy is either unlikely or not immediately imminent.

In order to equip CSS officers and soldiers to employ these new vehicles in a threat environment, there must be graduated training that encompasses weapons, command and control, communications and defensive tactics. These skills are vital to ensuring CSS can survive on the modern battlefield and support dependency manoeuvre. The challenge is to establish a culture of trust between combat commanders and CSS commanders. While CSS units must develop their skills, the supported combat commander must trust the CSS commander to provide protected mobility and other CSS as far forward as assembly areas.

Historically, manoeuvre commanders have been responsible for commanding any response to enemy action when embarked in soft-skin vehicles. This is no longer practical if there are no escorts allocated to protected mobility convoy operations. Manoeuvre commanders must accept that the transport convoy commander is best placed and equipped to command any initial response to interdiction while mobile. This requires the manoeuvre commander to relinquish a degree of tactical control when embarked. Doctrine, SOPs and habitual training relationships must be developed to ensure that, if required, command of the response can transition to the manoeuvre commander, once his force is adequately positioned to conduct a handover. This trust must be earned through CSS demonstrating competence and tactical acumen during raise, train and sustain activities.

Unfortunately, the realisation of a CSS capability able to meet the demands of a disaggregated battlespace is being hampered by manning and resource constraints. This is most clearly demonstrated by the failure to consider gunners or co-drivers essential to the operation of the vehicles within 1 CSSB. The 1st Brigade Plan Beersheba unit entitlement does not include PMV co-drivers or crew commanders within the CSSB, despite the fact that the vehicles have weapon systems, battlefield management systems and communications. This ignores operational lessons, as there will be no soldier manning the weapon station when troops are not embarked. In addition, the embarked troops will be required to man the weapon station and may not have the required expertise or close working relationship with the PMV section commander. It seems that the lessons learnt are being largely ignored so as to reduce training burdens and to remain within directed personnel caps. The establishment of positions for co-drivers within the CSSB unit entitlements is critical to the CSSB creating and maintaining a credible capability within the combat brigade.

Recommendations for preparing logistic soldiers for the disaggregated battlespace

The ADF must ensure that CSS can survive within a disaggregated battlespace in order to sustain combat units. Training to predict, prevent and protect CSS must be taught throughout all career development schools and culminate during collective training events. The training of logistic soldiers and officers in foundation warfighting activities must include area and convoy protection. This need was highlighted in Iraq when logisticians unilaterally conducted convoy support and base defence because combat units had other priorities.³⁰ Most CSS units use infantry minor tactics as the primary vehicle for training soldiers in close combat. This training focuses on soldiers conducting infantry training and does not fully prepare CSS officers and soldiers for combat from vehicles or supply bases. Close combat training for CSS units must focus on their own fight, not that of their dependency.

The logistic training continuum must progress through individual and collective training, culminating in force preparation. The optimum outcome is to produce logistic force elements that can successfully conduct operations in disaggregated battlespaces. A modulated logistic individual training continuum with an increased focus on defending logistic nodes and convoys offered during career development courses would also be of immense value. Collective training serials must result in logistic capabilities that can survive within complex terrain against a near- peer enemy. As such, foundation warfighting is the most appropriate training environment for logistic units. In order to realise consistent change it is also essential that CSSBs have common collective mission essential task lists linked to the force generation cycle.

The appropriate training and equipping of logistic units will only occur in the ADF if the ability of combat units to conduct operations remains unconstrained by a lack of mobility, supplies or distribution. Army’s principal role is the organising, training and equipping of forces for operations and contingencies.³¹ If logistic corps are to be prepared for these operations and contingencies, they must be trained to fight while conducting logistic functions. This training needs to be focused and incremental, culminating in combined arms foundation warfighting activities in which logistic lines of communications are regularly interdicted within complex terrain.

Successful interdiction serials must result in a failure to deliver the combat unit’s supplies. This will provide a clear and concrete demonstration to combat units and commanders of the importance of providing effective training, equipment and protection to logistic functions. This realisation is the only way perceptions of logistics, and consequently resource allocations, will change.

Conclusion

Clearly the ADF will continue to encounter a disaggregated battlespace whether it is conducting peacekeeping operations or conventional warfighting. Belligerents will continue to seek high pay-off targets that are considered softer than combat units. If logistics can be successfully targeted then dependencies will be denied freedom of manoeuvre, potentially resulting in mission failure. These attacks must be defeated through command and control, protection and firepower. This requires training and resources not yet evident in ADF logistic units.

The lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are already being forgotten as the ADF builds future force structures in which vehicles are not crewed or equipped appropriately. If it is to learn from its coalition partners, the ADF requires a paradigm change in the way it trains and equips its CSS. All CSS soldiers must be able to fight from their vehicles and defend logistic nodes against attack. If we choose to continue to ignore lessons and do not develop our training and procedures, the next conflict will result in more loss of life and mission-essential supplies as we relearn the same logistic lessons.

The ADF has indentified the need to train soldiers to contend with a disaggregated battlespace, yet still does not train logistic soldiers in the requisite skills. Such a training regime must include individual and collective training that equips soldiers with the ability to fight from their work areas whether it be a Q Store or a convoy. The change is cultural and has begun with the allocation of armoured and enabled vehicles. Alterations in perception and expectation are also required by both CSS and combat units. The risk now is that training and resources will not follow and that a true capability will not be realised. Close combat training for CSS units must focus on their fight, not that of their dependency. 

Endnotes

I. Shah, Reflections, Octagon Press, London, 1968, p. 145.
2    Directorate of Army Research and Analysis – Army, Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, Canberra, 2009, p. 3.
3    Colonel A. Condon, ‘Urban Combat Service Support Operations: Observations and Insights from Iraq’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. III, No. 3, 2006, Canberra, p. 158.
4    Lieutenant Colonel C. Jolly and Lieutenant Colonel C. Madden, ‘Army Capability Requirement; The Modular Engineer Force’, Mobility and Survivability BOS, Force Development Group, Sydney (nd), p. 2.
5    S. Hargreaves, ‘Ambushes prompt military to cut energy use’, CNNMoney, 16 August 2011, p. 4.
6    D.L. Thompson, Convoy Security Shortfalls, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2012, p. 1.
7    Condon, ‘Urban Combat Service Support Operations, p. 156.
8    ‘Iraq boosts demand for logistic solutions’, Janes Defence Weekly, 12 November 2004, p. 1.
9    H.J. Bond, ‘Combat Logistics Patrol Methodology’, Army Logistician, Vol. 39, No. 2, March– April 2007, p. 1.
10    F. Tusa, ‘Wagon train: logistic lessons from operations’, International Defence Review, 2012,
p. 2; N. Brown, Interview with Brigadier Mike Hickson, Director Royal Logistic Corps, British Army, 2011, p. 2; ‘Iraq boosts demand for logistic solutions’, ‘Iraq boosts demand for logistic solutions’, Janes Defence Weekly, p. 2; Jane’s International Defence Review, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 1.
11    Tusa, ibid., p. 2; Brown, ibid., p. 2; ‘Iraq boosts demand for logistic solutions’, Janes Defence Weekly, p. 1.
12    A. Forbes, The Afghan Wars 1839-42 and 1878-80, New York, 1892 (2010 edn), p. 21.
13    P.S. Gardiner, ‘Gun trucks: Genuine examples of American ingenuity’, Defense Transportation Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4, August 2002, p. 10.
14    Department of Defence, Defending Australia and its National Interests – Defence White Paper 2013, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 2013, p. 86.
15    Department of Defence – Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1, Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Canberra, 2008, p. 17.
16    Defending Australia, p. 96.
17    Condon, ‘Urban Combat Service Support Operations, p. 156.
18    Telecon, Major Philip Baldoni, Officer Commanding, Ready Battalion Group Combat Service Support Team, 9 September 2013.
19    See Land Warfare Doctrine 1, Fundamentals of Land Warfare, p. 17.
20    Telecon, A/OPSO 1 CSSB Captain Sally Williamson, OPSO 3 CSSB, Major John Wells and SSM 5 Transport Troop 7 CSSB, Warrant Officer Class Two C. Black, 8 September 2013.
21    Lieutenant Colonel M.J. Weinerth and Captain T.N. Page, ‘Top Flite: How One BSB Secured Logistic Convoys in Iraq’, Army Logistician, Vol. 41, Issue 3, May–June 2009, p. 28.
22    Condon, ‘Urban Combat Service Support Operations’, p. 157.
23    Tusa, ‘Wagon train: logistic lessons from operations’, p. 2; Brown, Interview with Brigadier Mike Hickson, p. 2; Iraq boosts demand for logistic solutions’, Janes Defence Weekly, p. 3.
24    Brown, ibid., p. 1.
25    J.L. Wood, ‘Key to Success in Future Battles: Independent Combat Logistics Patrols’, Armor, Vol. 116, No. 5, 2007, p. 3.
26    F.V. Godfrey, ‘The Keys to a Successful Combat Logistics Patrol’, Army Logistician, Vol. 38, No.4, 2006, p. 1.
27    R.S. Burrell, ‘Combat Logistic Patrols – Leadership, management, and technical proficiency’,
Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 95, 2011, p. 17.
28    Department of Defence, Training Management Package – Army RACT DG, NFE and TAC Ops, 2013, p. 38.
29    Interview with Major S. McMahon, OC Road Transport Wing, ALTC.
30    S.P. Walsh, ‘More Tooth for the Tail: The Right Stuff for CSS Operations’, Army Logistician, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2004, p. 1.
31    Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, p. 11.