‌The Value of Generic Cultural Training

Abstract

Military organisations struggle with defining culture, a problem exacerbated by the lack of agreement on when cultural training should occur and what it should consist of. In the Australian Army cultural training is typically delivered to personnel during operational force preparation. This paper argues that cultural skills need to be developed much earlier, preferable at points throughout a soldier’s entire career. This paper uses the seemingly unrelated issues of mental health, insider threat and gender equality to argue for the relevance of ongoing generic cultural training. After outlining the Army’s current cultural training process the paper explains how a tailored generic cultural training can overcome its existing shortfalls and become a viable training methodology - if placed early in both the soldier and officer training continuum. Generic cultural training can therefore address a number of key issues facing the army as well as enhancing the Army’s ability to adapt across a broad spectrum of operations.

The more one is capable of experiencing new and different dimensions of human diversity, the more one learns of oneself. Such learning takes place when a person transcends the boundaries of ego, culture and thinking.¹

- Peter S. Adler, 1975 

Introduction

The Australian Army’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has clearly shown that a lack of cultural understanding can have tactical and strategic effects. One tragic example occurred on 30 August 2012 when Australian soldiers were killed by a member of the Afghan National Army — a result of cultural insensitivity rather than direct enemy action.² Closer to home, inappropriate behaviour and sexual harassment incidents have seen the Army’s organisational culture subjected to intense scrutiny.³ While these instances are significantly different — the former a tactical failure and the latter an internal organisational problem — they both share a common thread of cultural relevance. This raises the question of whether some form of generic cultural training could provide a mechanism for addressing both tactical and strategic objectives.

Army has both the means and the opportunity to improve the way it delivers its cultural training. Such an improvement would not only reduce the risk of cultural ‘incidents’ at both the tactical and strategic level, but also increase the capacity for its people to understand and deal with change. This article will argue that a more effective ‘generic’ cross-cultural package can be tailored to meet the needs unique to Army than that presented by the current cultural training regime. Such training, however, will need to be an element of the general soldier/officer training continuum as opposed to the mission-specific force preparation cycle where it currently resides.

There is no denying that cultural training is important to Army in both the operational and organisational environment. However this training can be significantly improved. This article will begin by examining Army’s current cultural training practices and the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. Second, the ostensibly unrelated topics of insider threat, mental health and gender relationships will be explored.

Common cultural links will be exposed that highlight the applicability of generic cultural training as a training concept. Finally, a recommended pathway forward will be proposed. For the purposes of this article, generic cultural training is defined as the process of enhancing personal self-awareness and interpersonal relationship skills by using culture as a focal point of difference. Within this definition, cultural training becomes less about the specific culture of a region or ethnicity, and more about cultural effects on the individual.

Understanding Army’s current cultural training

The Army’s current delivery of cultural training is concentrated in the mission- specific force preparation phase. Force preparation is focused on preparing personnel (either as teams or individuals) for the specific operation for which they are deploying and typically lasts between one and three weeks. Prior to force preparation it is assumed that foundation military skills have already been delivered through the Army’s generic training continuum. As there is no systematic cultural training delivered within the generic training continuum, the cultural training delivered during force preparation often represents the first occasion on which personnel are exposed to this area and thus the training attempts to cover a broad range of cultural topics (for example, history, religion, language, dress and behaviour, attitudes and beliefs, greetings and lifestyle). As there is no identified unit within the ADF that is the repository of cultural expertise or training capacity, these topics are generally delivered by cultural experts sourced from outside the military organisation.

The cultural training package currently delivered by contractors is based on two methodologies drawn from the cultural training sector: Hofstede’s ‘Dimensions of Cultural Difference’ (also mentioned in the Army’s leadership pamphlet), and Cultural Intelligence (CQ).⁴ Hofstede’s ‘Dimensions of Cultural Difference’ was developed following research involving over 100,000 IBM employees from over 70 countries in the 1970s.⁵ Hofstede’s dimensions comprise: individualism versus collectivism; power distance; uncertainty avoidance; masculinity versus femininity; and long-term versus short-term orientation. The strength of this framework lies in the depth of cross-country comparison that has been applied to it and, such is its appeal, that other cultural training experts such as Andy Molinsky have since emulated this dimensional approach.⁶ Understanding cultural dimensions assists personnel to map differences in behaviour and attitudes with other cultures across a basic ‘like or unlike’ comparison. Critically, however, Hofstede’s research focuses on an international IT company (IBM) and thus does not appropriately represent attitudes and behaviours unique to the current Australian Army. For example, the dimension of power distance within the Army is significantly different to that of mainstream Australian society and may need stronger focus. Further, the application of these dimensions is time-sensitive. For example, the dimension of masculinity versus femininity fails to acknowledge the considerable cultural shifts in terms of gender relationships that have occurred recently and which will be further discussed below.

The second methodology — cultural intelligence (CQ) — promotes the application of motivational and behavioural training to a knowledge-based curriculum. In recent years, CQ has received significant research attention for military application as it progresses from knowledge through to motivational and behavioural training.⁷ Using the CQ model presents two challenges for Army. First, effectively incorporating CQ into training is a complex and time-consuming process. Researchers note that cross-cultural skills cannot be developed overnight or in short pre-deployment training courses.⁸ Creating time for effective cultural training becomes problematic when competing with other priorities outlined in concepts such as the Army’s Adaptive Campaigning plan.⁹ Cultural competence becomes just another topic under the human dimension chapter along with human terrain analysis; physical, psychological and nutrition components; complex decision-making and human networking. Incorporating these topics into training becomes difficult when soldiers are required to maintain a multitude of specialised warfighting skills in order to achieve effectiveness and survivability on operations. The reality of limited time and training resources has become a significant influence that would most likely preclude the delivery of CQ without a focused priority. Like Hofstede’s framework, CQ also lacks concentrated attention to and understanding of Army’s unique needs.

In an attempt to deliver a ‘best-practice’ cultural framework designed for military requirements, the Multinational Interoperability Council convened a concept development and experimentation working group into cross cultural-training. The result was an approach titled ‘Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence (CCAC)’.¹⁰ CCAC is a combination of various approaches adopted by coalition forces including the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France, Canada and Australia. The framework is consistent with the Australian Army’s Planning Guidance for Cultural Training in advocating the provision of generic cultural training followed by specific culture and language training.¹¹ Both the planning guidance and the CCAC, however, fail to provide any further detail concerning what to include within either the generic or specific training phases.

The Australian Army’s Planning Guidance for Cultural Training, however, provides a working definition for cross-cultural training:

The capacity for active study and understanding of human and cultural influences affecting all decision-making and actions in the operating environment, in order to optimise one’s own decision superiority through empathy. These factors include: behavioural considerations and drivers; power and influence sources; government, political and social grouping structures; tribal/ethnic dispositions; and spiritual, economic and geo-social factors.¹²

While this definition provides scope to allow Army to configure the various dimensions of culture in the operating environment, it fails to acknowledge two important considerations. The first of these is the influence of one’s own culture on the behavioural and decision-making process. Anthropologists and linguists alike agree that cultural influences act more as a ‘lens’ that the observer uses to view the world rather than the behaviour of foreigners.¹³ Agar explains that the understanding of culture is a translation of different practices that is relational to the audience experiencing the difference, a view that is supported by the linguist specialist Deutscher.¹⁴ In any delivery of cultural training in Army, establishing identity and self-awareness within soldiers and officers is an important first step to trying to explain the culture of another group of people. Second, the definition fails to acknowledge the numerous and competing cultures (each of them unique and complex) influencing the operating environment at any given time. The discourse surrounding ‘human security’ and international relations identifies that a growing factor in the complexity of humanitarian intervention is the requirement for holistic approaches to peace enforcement/keeping.¹⁵ This results in an increased level of involvement by the sovereign state, foreign state and NGO organisations each with competing motivations and operating processes, all of which are communicated through unique cultural practices. It is simply impractical to deliver cultural training that focuses on all of these various factions.

Lacking from both the Army’s planning guidance and the CACC is detail regarding at which point in the soldier/officer training continuum the package should be delivered. This is important as literature critical of cultural training models questions the plausibility of short-term training consistent with the Army’s force preparation courses which devote only a small portion of time to generic and specific cultural training.¹⁶ Abbe argues convincingly that training that expects personnel to absorb cultural understanding tools in a short time-frame and then apply them across a broad range of cross-cultural situations is unrealistic. The problem becomes compounded given the physical and mental stress experienced while on operations. In order to be effective, any cultural training package will require long-term, gradual and progressive implementation outside the force preparation phase.¹⁷

If cultural training is to be effectively utilised by Army, it needs to be tailored to focus on an Australian Army audience. In addition, training outcomes must be synchronised with the challenges faced by the organisation. This will allow personnel to absorb these new skills into their personal attitudes and beliefs.

Tailoring cultural training to Army’s needs

An effective cultural training package will need to focus on self-awareness as much as on the human differences faced on operations. This requirement for internal cultural reflection is identified in the ADF’s cultural change policy:

We cannot be entirely satisfied with all aspects of our current culture; there are parts that serve us poorly, limit our performance, hurt our people and damage our reputation.¹⁸

Thus the ADF implicitly acknowledges that, as well as the requirement for cultural understanding within the operating environment, cultural self-awareness is also a necessity.

Cultural training models commonly regard interpersonal conflict as a measure of failure.¹⁹ In simple terms this means that if soldiers and officers are unable to strike a rapport with host nationals then they are culturally incompetent. Military personnel are regularly placed in highly stressful, conflict/disaster situations in which acceptance and/or popularity may not be possible. An effective generic cultural training package for Army will need to facilitate cross-cultural communication during deployment while also meeting the challenges of organisational change. In order to navigate these challenges and produce an effective cultural training capability within Army, a tailored training package needs to be developed that caters for these complexities and balances practical individual skills with desirable outcomes for the organisation.

In reality, all military culture encourages ethnocentric behaviour or a tendency to view one’s own culture as superior.²⁰ The Army, as part of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) identifies itself as having a strong emphasis on team cohesion, loyalty to the service, competitiveness, pride and discipline/behavioural standards well above those of the civilian population.²¹ This view of military culture as distinct from mainstream society has been explained as a consequence of the enforcement of hierarchy, inequality and conformity, and the production of the military’s own distinct language practices or ‘jargon’.²² Culturally defining the Army is complicated by the fact that the organisation is not homogenous. Instead, it consists of many unique and identifiable sub-cultures that may have a strong or weak influence on the individual depending on trade, rank, experience, education, gender or training. Cultural identity in the workplace is influenced by a number of different dimensions that are presented and reinforced through the behaviour and beliefs of its personnel. Group culture has been proven to become stronger and more tight-knit when the group is subject to suffering and hardship. Within the Army context this is often developed through collective military training and operational experiences.²³ While ethnocentricity can be beneficial to a military when developing team cohesion and loyalty, it can restrict people’s ability to objectively view cultural behaviours and beliefs that are different to their own and can often lead to resentment.²⁴ Cultural training for the Army thus needs to be based on this reality and tailored to address particular ethnocentric challenges that are detrimental to the organisation.²⁵

Mental health

Army personnel unable to rationalise cultural behaviours or views inconsistent with their own often become more susceptible to adverse mental health conditions. While post-traumatic stress (PTS) has traditionally been associated with exposure to acute traumatic or stressful experiences, recent research has associated it with the chronic effects of ongoing exposure to stressful and violent situations experienced by personnel deployed to conflict zones.²⁶ Research focusing on the chronic effects of ongoing exposure to stressful and violent situations has termed this concept in the military context ‘moral injury’.²⁷ Moral injury can otherwise be explained as an individual’s inability to successfully assimilate morally challenging experiences into personal self-knowledge and world view.²⁸ A study of ‘suffering injustice’ promotes this concept of moral injury by presenting mental health as culturally influenced. The cultural link established in such studies is achieved by connecting an individual’s sense of what is normal to what that individual is then exposed to on operations.²⁹ The social network and experiences that construct an individual’s world view create a base-line of normalcy that is significantly challenged by the operational environment. Without the appropriate mental resilience preparation prior to the shock of deploying on operations, the leap between what is new and what was normal may be too great to allow some individuals to adjust.

While the Army and mainstream society can be identified as culturally different, they are also intricately linked. Army personnel are drawn from and live within Australian society. Practices and behaviour within the Army are judged and shaped by public perception. When personnel are deployed overseas into conflict and disaster situations they are exposed to violence, death, stress and suffering that is inconsistent with Australian society’s world view. Ongoing exposure to experiences outside the Australian cultural norm becomes a traumatic event that can be damaging to a soldier’s mental health. In sum, when a soldier’s world view is constructed within a particular culture (Australia) and is reinforced and strengthened through an ethnocentric organisation (Army), exposure to different cultural practices and extreme violent behaviour through operational deployment becomes a traumatic event. Given this rationale, the development of PTS/moral injury can be explained through the ‘culture shock’ that occurs when a soldier’s mind has not been prepared to rationalise what is different.³⁰

Insider threat

Symptoms consistent with culture shock include frustration, anger and distrust of outsiders.³¹ When deployed overseas on operations such as a counterinsurgency, these ‘outsiders’ quickly come to include the local or foreign nationals who are working with or alongside Australian forces. Coalition forces in Afghanistan have been subjected to repeated incidents of insider attacks which have not been restricted to the adversary force. In certain reported cases coalition soldiers have been shot at by Afghan personnel who were attempting to regain ‘face’ after being offended.³² The breakdown in communication that can lead to insider threat has been described as the extreme outcome of cultural gaps or flashpoints — points at which two different cultures collide through conflicting beliefs or practices.³³ According to Hofstede’s Dimensions of Cultural Differences, Australians prefer direct communication. To Australians there is nothing wrong with one individual addressing another directly when expressing dissatisfaction or trying to resolve conflict. In contrast, the Afghan method of communication is more passive and indirect, with ‘face’ and public image considered very important.³⁴ Negative public feedback by an Australian mentor can cause an Afghan to feel dishonour and shame perhaps even triggering a violent reaction at a later point as retribution. The violent venting of frustration often experienced by military personnel possibly generated through a lack of cultural understanding should not be regarded as a threat presented only by host nationals. In March 2012, a US sergeant killed 16 Afghan civilians after suffering a mental breakdown.³⁵ This incident highlights the fact that both mental health and insider threat challenges can occur within any military organisation, regardless of nationality.

Gender

Within the Army organisation, certain cultural attitudes can prevent personnel coping with change. The dimensions and characteristics of Army’s culture create a distinct ‘us versus them’ competitive mentality that struggles to embrace difference particularly among people.³⁶ The dimensions of difference described by Vodjik include race, religion and sexuality and are apparent in certain incidents that have occurred recently within Army.³⁷ In 2011, women comprised 14.5% of the ADF, signalling gender as an obvious point of difference.³⁸ Understanding gender as a dimension of cultural difference acknowledges that women and other minority groups such as homosexuals, ethnic and religious minorities, struggle to gain acceptance in military organisations. A study by Belkin and Evans revealed that, within the US military, women have become the primary target of discrimination, allowing racial issues with African-American men to subside.³⁹ This observation raises an important question: why do females in the military find it harder to gain acceptance than men of ethnic or religious difference? Answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worthy of further investigation in the development of Army’s gender equality policy.

Gender as an influencing dimension of Army culture is established within individuals well before recruitment into the military. Gender-typing is a term that has been used to explain the societal process of conditioning people from childhood to accept and perform certain gender-specific roles.⁴⁰ The beliefs constructed during childhood of what are acceptable masculine and feminine professions reflected through boys’ and girls’ toys are reinforced within the ethnocentric confines of the military. The presentation of toy soldiers as gendered male is an example of such gender-typing. Indeed among most nationalities, soldiering is traditionally seen as a male-oriented role and this has been is reinforced through gender-typing from an early age.

In 2012, the Minister for Defence announced the removal of existing gender restrictions from combat roles.⁴¹ While this announcement is representative of ongoing cultural change occurring within the ADF, and the removal of gender discrimination has certainly occurred at the policy level, the lead author of the review into women in the ADF stated on the document’s release that: ‘Our overall finding is that, despite progress over the last two decades, I am not confident that, in all the varied workplaces that comprise the ADF today, woman can and will flourish.’⁴² Eroding gender conditioning in society and in the Army will require concentrated and ongoing cultural awareness and behavioural training that will need to be implemented at the earliest stages of a military career.

A new pathway to Army’s cultural training

The difference between generic cultural training and specific cultural training is significant. Molinsky explains this as the difference between knowing a culture and knowing about culture.⁴³ Studies into effective cross-cultural training for military organisations have continued to identify the distinction between the two.⁴⁴ The benefits of generic cultural training include its ability to cover certain psychological, anthropological and communication subjects that benefit both personnel and the organisation without being limited to any one particular culture.⁴⁵ Jane Boucher identifies five key barriers to communication: cultural biases, lack of awareness of cultural differences, language differences, ethnocentrism and inactive listening.⁴⁶ Of the five, two can be linked to specific cultural training (lack of awareness of cultural difference and language differences), while the remaining three are linked to generic cultural training. Generic cultural training is the primary mechanism for promoting self-awareness, interpersonal relationships and effective communication with broad applicability to a range of situations and environments.

The framework for the delivery of cultural training needs to address those requirements unique to the Army context. Beyond addressing those topics discussed in the first part of this article, Army’s cultural training also needs to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate a complex working environment that includes multiple regions, various combatants and allies, and ‘whole of government’ task forces requiring interagency cooperation. In 1999, Australia led the United Nations- (UN) mandated security force into East Timor (INTERFET) that ultimately involved a total of 22 nations.⁴⁷ The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations reports that currently eight of the top 20 troop contributions made to UN peace operations are from African nations and five are from the Indian sub-continent.⁴⁸ The multinational character of UN operations drives the requirement for Army to focus on developing generic cross-cultural skills in its soldiers well in advance of any culture-specific or language training. In the future, the greatest challenge to Army will be its ability to interact, communicate and operate effectively with a broad spectrum of stakeholders rather than any one particular nationality.

With these factors in mind, what Army’s current cultural training regime requires is not so much an overhaul as a targeted modification and a plan for its earlier inception (prior to the force preparation phase). Both the Hofstede and CQ methodologies promote a focus on generic cultural training as opposed to concentrating on a specific region’s culture or language. However neither has been tailored to suit Army’s specific requirements in terms of prioritising dimensions to be covered. The employment of a dimensional concept entails deciding what components of Army culture are best suited to accurate self-analysis. Through this self-analysis a benchmark can be set to act as the basis for comparison with other cultures (finding similarities and differences). In addition to understanding how culture will affect interpersonal communication and working relations, dimensional cultural training can also assist individuals in understanding their own decision- making process.

As identified above, an educative process alone is insufficient without the opportunity for individuals to ‘test and adjust’ this knowledge in their own world view and the working environment. An effective generic cultural training package would be best placed progressively throughout the professional training continuum. Training centres such as Kapooka, the Australian Defence Force Academy and Duntroon are well situated to deliver introductory cultural training with a focus on promoting awareness of those cultural dimensions prominent in Army life. Promotion courses or a dedicated cultural competence course could then be utilised to strengthen the cultural knowledge base of individuals of all ranks and specialties. Ultimately, this new pathway to creating a culturally competent Army requires the removal of generic cultural training from the force preparation phase and its incorporation in the general training continuum.

Conclusion

The military application of cultural skills is not a new concept. Commentators such as David Kilcullen advocate the importance of cultural training for those who are to be deployed to nations driven by an inherent political struggle and where the support of the local population becomes a measure of success during insurgency- related conflicts.⁴⁹

Uncertainty in planning for future operations means that specific cultural training can only occur once operational planning has commenced, and this training will need to be located within the force preparation phase. Generic cultural training can prepare Army personnel to work with other nationalities and organisations even before it is clear to which operational environment the Army will deploy. Further, generic cultural training has been demonstrated to have application in facilitating strategic and organisational change that will naturally occur with societal changes such as removing gender restrictions in combat roles.⁵⁰ Tailored cultural training with an emphasis on generic cultural skills can provide an avenue for building mental resilience, expectation management and cross-cultural communication skills that can then be applied to specific objectives such as the reduction of insider threat casualties and the improved mental health of personnel.

The Army’s requirement for cultural training is unique in that a balance needs to be achieved between preparation to deploy at short notice and under threat of violence, and cooperation in international and inter-organisational settings. Continued organisational and societal change also demands that Army’s people are trained to understand the effects of cultural influences on their personal thoughts, opinions and behaviour. This necessitates practical steps to develop an individual’s mental resilience and ability to accommodate change. The two models currently used within the Army’s cultural training package are flawed: they provide a limited framework for cultural understanding and neither specifically addresses the Army’s unique needs. Generic cultural training delivered progressively throughout a military career would provide a more efficient and effective mechanism for Army to attain maximum adaptability and achieve its cultural change goals. 

Endnotes

1    P. Adler, ‘The Transitional Experience: An Alternative View of Culture Shock’, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 15(4), 1975, pp. 13-24.
2    M. Dodd and B. Nicholson, ‘Five Australian soldiers die on a “Terrible day” in Afghanistan’, The Australian, 30 August 2012.
3    M. Dodd, ‘Army chief backs Minister on academy’s “ abhorrent” sex film scandal’, The Australian, 15 April 2011; P. Lion and J. Marszalek, ‘Anger and disgust at army sex scandal as “Jedi council” emerges’, News Limited Network, 14 June 2013.
4    LWD 0-2, Leadership, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 2002.
5    Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind
(revised and expanded 2nd ed.), McGraw-Hill, New York, 2005.
6    A. Molinsky, Global Dexterity, Harvard Business Review Press, 2013.
7    Kok Yee Ng and R. Ramaya, ‘Cultural Intelligence: Its Potential for Military Leadership Development’, 47th Annual Conference, International Military Testing Association, 2005, http:// www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2005/2005033P.pdf; K.S. Groves and A.E. Feyerherm, ‘Leader Cultural Intelligence in Context Testing the Moderate Effects of Team Cultural Diversity on Leader and Team Performance’, Group & Organisational Management, 36(5), 2011, pp. 535–66.
8    Ibid.
9    ‘Learning for Adaptive Campaigning: A Training Needs Analysis’, HQFORCOMD, October 2010.
10    Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence: A Guide to Best Practices, Multinational Interoperability Council, 2011.
11    Planning Guidance for Development of a Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army, 19 November 2007.
12    Ibid.
13    G. Deutscher, Through the Language Glass, Scientific American, 2010; M. Agar, ‘Culture: Can you take it anywhere?’, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(2), June 2006.
14    Agar, ‘Culture: Can you take it anywhere?’
15    N. Thomas and T. William, ‘The Utility of Human Security: Sovereign and Humanitarian Intervention’, Security Dialogue, 33(2), 2002, pp. 177–92.
16    M. Blasco, L.E. Feldt and M. Jakobsen, ‘If Only Cultural Chameleons Could Fly Too: A Critical Discussion of the Concept of Cultural Intelligence’, International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 12(1), 2012.
17    A. Abbe, Building Cultural Capability for Full-Spectrum Operations, United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences, January 2008; R.A. Crooks, Cultivating a Cross-Cultural Disposition, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2007.
18    The Defence Committee, Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture, Department of Defence (ADF), 2012.
19    Blasco et al., ‘If Only Cultural Chameleons Could Fly Too’, p. 234.
20    W.G. Sumner, Folkways, Ginn, New York, 1906.
21    Defence, Pathway to Change.
22    D. Halbe, ‘Language in the Military Workplace – Between Hierarchy and Politeness’, Text & Talk: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, Discourse and Communication Studies, 31(3), 1988, pp. 315–34; A. Jaffe, ‘Saluting in Social Context’, The Journal of Applied Behavioural Sciences, 24(3), pp. 263–75.
23    M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Free Press, 1949.
24    Molinsky, Global Dexterity.
25    S. Russell-Farnham, ‘Empathy as a Combat Capability’, Security Challenges, 5(1), 2009, pp. 1–13.
26    S. Joseph and A.P. Linley, ‘Positive Psychological Perspectives on Post-traumatic Stress: An Integrative Psychosocial Framework’, Trauma, Recovery, and Growth: Positive psychological perspectives on posttraumatic stress, John Wiley & Sons, 2008, pp. 3–20
27    B.T. Litz et al., ‘Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy’, Clinical Psychology Review, 29, 2009, pp. 695–706.
28    Ibid., p. 696.
29    J.M. Bernstein, ‘Suffering Injustice: Misrecognition as Moral Injury in Critical Theory’,
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 13(3), 2006, pp. 303–24.
30    P.S. Adler, ‘The Transitional Experience: An Alternate View of Culture Shock’, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 15, 1975, pp. 13–23.
31    Working Amongst Different Cultures, Operational Handbook, Commonwealth of Australia, 2011.
32    Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command, Insider Threat Mitigation Techniques Vignettes, Brunssum, 8 November 2012.
33    Agar, ‘Culture: Can you take it Anywhere?’.
34    G. Hofstede, ‘Dimensions of Cultural Differences’ in D.L. Nelson and J. Quick, Organisational Behaviour (3rd ed.), South-Western Thompson Learning, 2000.
35    B. Stebner and T. Durante, ‘Taliban vows revenge after US Sergeant on SEAL team “shoots dead nine sleeping Afghan children before burning their bodies” in deadly rampage that kills 16’, Mail Online, 2012, www.dailymail.co.uk.
36    V. Vodjik, ‘Invisibility of Gender in War’, The Duke Journal of Gender, Law and Policy, 9, 2002, p. 261.
37    Ibid.
38    D. Watt, ‘New Claims of Inappropriate Behaviour at the Australian Defence Force Academy’,
Parliament Flagpost, 8 April 2011, www.flagpost.blogspot.com.au.
39    A. Belkin and R.L. Evans, The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence, The Centre for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2000.
40    C. Etaugh and M.B. Liss, ‘Home, School, and Playroom: Training Grounds for Adult Gender Roles’, Sex Roles, 26(3–4), 1992, pp. 129–47.
41    Announcement and details as published on the official ADF website: www.defencejobs.gov.au, 30 May 2013.
42    E. Broderick, Review into the treatment of women in the Australian Defence Force (Phase two Report), Australian Human Rights Commission, 2012.
43    Molinsky, Global Dexterity.
44    Abbe, Building Cultural Capability for Full Spectrum Operations; A. Abbe, L. Gulick and
J. Herman, Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation, US Army Research Institute, 2007; Planning Guidance for Development of a Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army; Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence: A Guide to Best Practices.
45    Abbe, Building Cultural Capability for Full Spectrum Operations.
46    G.C. Meyer, Comprehensive Regional Expertise in the US Army, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.
47    M. Dee, ‘Coalitions of the Willing and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia’s Involvement with INTERFET’, International Peacekeeping, 8(3), 2001, pp. 1–20.
48    Ng and Ramaya, ‘Cultural Intelligence’; Groves and Feyerherm, ‘Leader Cultural Intelligence’,
pp. 535–66.
49    D. Kilcullen, ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’, speech delivered to the US government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington DC, 28 September 2006; J. Kipp, L. Grau,
K. Prinslow, D. Smith, The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century, Foreign Military Studies Office (Army), Fort Leavenworth, 2006.
50    M. Wilkinson, M. Fogarty and D. Melville, ‘Organisational Culture Change through Training and Cultural Immersion’, Journal of Organisational Change Management, 9(4), 1996, pp. 69–81.