The Futility of Capability Arguments and the Army Approach to the 2014 Force Structure Review
Abstract
The traditional Army capability-based approach to the 2014 Force Structure Review (FSR), no matter how coherent, is likely to continue to see Army as comparatively worse off than the other Services. For greater success, Army requires a long-term strategy, over a number of years, to break down decades of strategic culture and defence policy trends. Most importantly, Army needs to redefine the current (albeit undeclared) defence policy priority of providing niche combat forces to United States-led expeditionary operations, based on the perceived North Asian risk, to a near-region focus.
In 2011 Major General Caligari pursued what he referred to as the ‘golden thread of logic’ in developing Army’s force structure.1 In doing so, he was one of many who sought to justify Army’s force structure primarily through logical capability- based arguments, particularly through the Force Structure Review (FSR) process. However, strategic logic has not always been a major trend in Australian defence policy, and Army’s attempts to work within FSR frameworks have resulted in poor resource allocation to achieve declared tasking priorities, particularly when compared with the other services.
This article contends that Army should prioritise its 2014 FSR effort towards establishing a credible basis of near-region threat and risk rather than focusing on capability arguments. This will produce a more balanced defence force structure based on declared priorities. This is no trivial task, and a change to risk and threat perception would represent a dramatic break in decades of defence policy continuity and ambiguity. Significant change will not be achieved in a single FSR, and Army’s approach would need to be part of a long-term strategy. This article will highlight the history of significant departmental impetus to maintain force structures primarily to allow niche combat contributions to United States (US)-led expeditionary operations, a feature of defence policy identified consistently over time by numerous commentators.2 Army faces the possibility of being under- resourced (compared with Air Force and Navy) for declared tasks if it continues to focus on the standard capability-based FSR input.
To break this longstanding continuity in defence policy, Army should consider developing a long-term ‘strategy’ for FSR 2014 and beyond, with primacy of effort placed on redefining the threat rather than justifying capability. Such a strategy should seek to move the focus away from niche combat capabilities aligned to US-led operational scenarios, and may include gaining external assessments of the contemporary threat, developing measures of effectiveness, influencing classified context scenarios, highlighting the inconsistencies within the current declared maritime strategy, adding a threat component to Army Capability Needs Documents (ACND), and learning lessons from previous attempts to redefine the threat assumptions underlying defence policy.
Army’s disadvantage in the FSR process
FSRs have periodically been undertaken to provide force structure options to the Australian government. For example, the aim of the 2012 FSR, led by Major General Crane, was to establish costed force structure requirements in the period until 2035.3 FSRs are not the only tool used to determine defence force structure — defence policy formulation is a complex process involving a broad mix of stakeholders. In the past, FSRs have been primarily focused on ‘capability- based planning’ rather than responding to specific threats and have generated inputs to White Papers.
FSRs often represented a continuation of previous policy and have rarely been a ‘revolutionary’ activity. Major General Crane acknowledged that the 2012 FSR was not a ‘clean sheet’ review given its focus on ‘refining’ existing policy, and was heavily influenced by the 2009 White Paper.4 Indeed, single FSRs are unlikely to be able to make significant changes to existing major procurement plans. It is possible, however, that significant changes could be made across a number of FSRs, although that would require a consistent approach over time.
Comparative disadvantage
FSRs have traditionally been riven by inter-service rivalry. Given contemporary budget pressures, there are indications that such rivalry will again feature in 2014 FSR discussions.5 This augurs badly for Army, which has historically suffered a comparative disadvantage compared to the other services when procurement decisions were made. Policy documents have consistently relegated Army capability to a level below that of the other two services. For example, the Chief of the Defence Force and Secretary introductory letter from the 1991 FSR stated: ‘we propose a long term restructuring program [to convert] some combat capabilities – particularly in Army, to the Reserves’.6 The 1986 Dibb Review similarly sought to reduce Army capability, prioritising air strike, anti-submarine warfare and maritime surface forces as headline capabilities. In the ‘incredible event’ of armed incursion into Australia, Army would need to secure vital assets to allow air and maritime projection.7 These priorities and tasks were generally reconfirmed in 1991.8
The headline combat capabilities foreshadowed in the 2013 White Paper again highlight this comparative disadvantage — Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Air Warfare Destroyers, submarines, amphibious ships, strike capability and airborne electronic attack. The major Army-specific initiatives highlighted in this White Paper comprised a partially completed restructuring of the brigades and vehicle fleet replacement with reference to the enhancement of Army’s force projection through Navy’s amphibious vessels.9 Planned acquisitions identified in the 2013 White Paper were heavily skewed towards maritime and air capabilities, often with tenuous links to declared priorities.10 For example, the Growler, optimised for electronic suppression of air defences, is only likely to be employed to maximum capacity as a niche contribution to US-led high intensity operations. Such expensive and arguably unnecessary hardware involves an opportunity cost for both Army and Defence.11 The expenditure required for advanced technology has historically led policymakers to cut back in other areas.12 While the likelihood of Army’s suffering some disadvantage in the 2014 FSR has not been foreshadowed as clearly as it was in 1991, the intention to seek preferred resourcing of Air Force and Navy is already apparent.
Senior Army officers have also identified the risk to Army. Lieutenant General Morrison has argued that, ‘peace dividends seldom accrue’ and warned of the ‘serious deficiencies’ in land forces exposed during INTERFET after previous downsizing. Former Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Leahy, asserts that withdrawal from Afghanistan should not result in adoption of ‘a narrow view of Army’s future’ or a view of Army as a ‘strategic afterthought’.13 Mark Thomson, a long-time commentator on the Defence budget, comments that ‘one thing is sure; [government] will have to face up to the perennial question of Australian defence planning: the balance between the Army … and high-tech air and maritime platforms. With the Army returning home to barracks, the natural tendency will be to repeat 1991 and shift resources to investment for the Navy and Air Force.’ Thomson has repeatedly highlighted the large gap between plans and funding, and if major projects such as 100 JSF and 12 submarines are considered immutable, Army will undoubtedly be affected.14 There is a clear risk that, through the 2014 FSR, Army will be under-resourced to achieve land-centric tasks similar to Timor Leste or Solomon Islands in the near region.
Taiwan verses Timor as the primary force structure determinant
Despite consistent policy declarations that Defence is structured primarily for near-region responses, operational actions and procurement decisions demonstrate otherwise. Many commentators have suggested that strategic logic has not driven defence force structure, and that policymakers have primarily sought capabilities that are on, or interoperable with, the US inventory. Such decisions were driven by service motivation, military group-think, a government responsibility to merely ‘endorse’ rather than ‘examine’ capability requirements, and a history of buying equipment that resided on US inventories.15
Policy ambiguity
Defence policy has been characterised by longstanding ambiguity. Cheeseman has been vocal on this issue over several decades, declaring that:
Australia appeared to have two defence policies in place: a secret one … preparing the ADF for war on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea, and a sanitised version which was for … defence of Australia and its interests.16
The declared near-region priority would appear to place a high priority on Army force structure, including capabilities such as land logistics. However, an undeclared US support provision priority is disadvantageous to Army and to the primary declared tasks. Commentators such as Stone have identified the frequent divergence of broader public policy from practice, and a similar trend in defence policy has been detrimental to Army capability.17 Army is encouraged to conform to a declared geographically situated ‘maritime strategy’, but Australia’s actual approach is an ‘alliance strategy’ predicated on the provision of niche combat forces for expeditionary operations. The Chief of Army recently described the extensive Army role in a maritime strategy — Army indeed has a role in a maritime strategy, but such a strategy has not been enacted.18
The most important divergence between defence policy and practice has generally concerned geography. The importance of geography in defence planning has rarely been apparent in Australian military commitments, although policymakers consistently asserted that geography was a defining feature of security.19 While clearly a variable, policy was never fully (or even mostly) determined by geography, and US-led operational scenarios (such as operations in North Asia) have historically dominated defence policy thinking.
The new justification to maintain force structure inertia
The policy approach to China’s growth in military capability is a contemporary example of the enduring defence policy duality, and highlights why FSRs present such difficulties for Army. Declared policy under both Liberal and Labor governments warned of the economic and military rise of China, subtly reinforcing, but not explicitly labelling China as a twenty-first century threat to Australia.20 However, there is compelling evidence that an ability to contribute niche combat capabilities to US-led expeditionary operations in North Asia has primacy for policymakers.
Prior to the 2009 White Paper release, a media leak highlighted a disagreement between policymakers such as Prime Minister Rudd and the White Paper team, who considered China a potential threat of the future, and Australian intelligence community leaders who regarded China as presenting less risk.21 After the release of the 2009 White Paper, a classified diplomatic cable published by Wikileaks also identified Prime Minister Rudd’s concerns over China, alleging that he had encouraged the US to be prepared to use force against China.22 Other actions, such as the recurring refusal to allow major Chinese investment in Australia’s energy, telecommunications and agricultural markets, also implied that China was a security problem.
Some commentators found Australia’s approach to China’s development alarmist.23 In the 2009 White Paper the Rudd government announced its intention to increase sophisticated weaponry which was less suited to declared priorities.24 The 2013 White Paper maintained the intent to develop 12 submarines with an ability to reach North Asia, rather than seek off-the-shelf submarines with reduced range.25 Without being foreshadowed in the 2009 White Paper, the Gillard government agreed to the establishment of a US Marine Corps presence in Darwin. These acquisitions and decisions were ostensibly based on no specific threat, but rather broader security concerns and the US ‘pivot’. The 2013 White Paper described this US basing as ‘a natural development in our bilateral relationship’.26 Heightening threat perception, the 2013 White Paper referred to the ‘challenging’ nature of a 140% increase in Chinese defence spending, but reassured that the US still maintained 41% of global defence spending. Furthermore, while any Australian concern over China’s military expansion was left undeclared, Japan’s alarm at this expansion was highlighted.27
Perception of Chinese threat is not new in defence policy. The 1953 Strategic Basis declared that ‘The rapid rise of Communist China … and its development into a potentially powerful military power’ was a matter for force structure consideration.28 The 1994 White Paper expressed its concern that policymakers did not understand the effect of China’s development on global security.29 O’Keefe deduced from the 2000 White Paper and procurement decisions that the Howard government was planning for the possibility of military containment of China, in alliance with the US, but because such a policy was undiplomatic, presented it ambiguously.30
There is certainly evidence of Chinese action to rapidly militarise with ambiguous motives, and the enormous improvement in Chinese military capability has been regularly highlighted. However some estimates assess that the official Chinese military budget is two to three times smaller than the actual figure due to secrecy and military income accrual from commercial ventures. Aggressive cyber action by China is regarded as further evidence of a belligerent approach.
While any perceived military threat from China (like assessed threats from Japan, Indonesia, Vietnamese communism and the Soviet Union in the past) is not independently defendable, there is no credible evidence that China has any adverse military intentions towards Australia or the near region. Given traditional animosity between China and its closer neighbours, and with evolving strategic rivalry, a conflict scenario would almost certainly be based on Australia’s being led into superpower competition. Without doubt, the rise of China challenges countries to formulate political, economic and security responses. The historical response of Australian policymakers has been recurrent, with Chinese development prompting concern and justifying a subsequent defence policy response — an alliance focus that was not aligned to declared priorities. Indeed Babbage predicted that the defence force structure response to the emergence of China would simply be a continuation of longstanding defence policy due to ‘institutional inertia’.31
Based on significant evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that policymakers have placed most weight on the perceived threat from China and maintenance of the US alliance when considering force structure. This focus on perceived threats outside the near region places Army in a position of entrenched strategic disadvantage during FSR negotiations and, more importantly, limits the capability most appropriate to conduct sustained near-region operations. Senior Army officers have regularly argued that Army suffers because air and maritime platform gaps can be simply articulated, whereas the many components of a brigade cannot. While the difficulty in describing Army gaps is clear, this is not Army’s main problem. If policymakers were prepared to increase Army resourcing, the perceived difficulty of capability gap articulation would not be an impediment. Whether it is a declared or an undeclared scenario, a focus on the US alliance and North Asian conflict as the primary force structure determinant will always lead to technologically sophisticated (and highly expensive) air and maritime platform prioritisation.
A force structure for all contingencies
Since World War II, Australian policymakers have maintained continuity in military force structure prioritisation. Stone has identified a trend in public policy in which policymakers develop a solution first and then formulate a problem that requires that solution.32 While policymakers may have considered degrees of self-reliance following the Vietnam War, the inevitable solution since World War II, despite a variety of assessed threats, was maintenance of ANZUS and a supporting force structure.
There have been many instances of perceived or declared threats to Australia since World War II, justifying close US ties. Prime Minister Curtin deviated from the intelligence assessment when presenting the threat to Australia from Japan during World War II, and the inability of Australia to independently respond to this particular threat created an enduring sense of vulnerability and need for alliance.33 The Cabinet-endorsed 1946 Strategic Basis identified the Soviet Union as a ‘potential enemy of the future’.34 The emerging nationalism in Indonesia in the 1960s was viewed with concern, with the proposed mitigation closer US ties.35 Prime Minister Menzies volunteered Australian military involvement in Vietnam due to the declared risk of the spread of communism.36 The policymaker response to different threats was a consistent force structure with niche combat capabilities able to operate with US forces.
Burke writes extensively on the role of fear in Australian defence policy and strategic culture, and asserts that exaggerated fear was at least partly responsible for identification of (and response to) different perceived threats.37 Ball argues that Australians have been historically much more fearful of attack than objective analysis warranted.38 This deep cultural and historical trend presents a problem for Army as it seeks the necessary resources from the 2014 FSR.
The immutable alliance
Despite the post-Vietnam recognition of the merits of greater operational independence, Australian policymakers have consistently emphasised ANZUS as the guarantee of security. The cost associated with maintaining operational independence (particularly for logistic support and technology transfer) was traditionally deemed prohibitively high.39 Military hardware procurements, justified publicly as capabilities suitable to mitigate a range of uncertain threats, were often underwritten by an expectation of US support in US-led missions.40 For example, the commitment to purchase up to 100 JSF aircraft has long-term force structure implications, but low priority has been assigned to projecting and basing these platforms independently (without US support) in the near region, and there is extensive reliance on US global sustainment.41 If a higher level of independence in the near region is the main priority, then this support arrangement is questionable. However given anticipated operational scenarios in support of ANZUS, this lack of ability to force project poses little risk.
Challenges to the US were often associated with challenges to Australia, and ANZUS became deeply embedded in strategic culture. For example, Burke argues that, at one point, Prime Minister Howard linked support for ANZUS to patriotism.42 Former Secretary of Defence Tange observed that bureaucrats in the 1950s could not question the certainty of US support.43 Demonstrative of the deep commitment to the US, Defence acknowledged the existence of ‘several hundred committees and working groups’ conducting interoperability-related activities.44
However support to the US was not necessarily provided because Australian policymakers felt a sense of obligation. For example, Prime Minister Menzies’ anti-communist and forward defence stance and his vision of strategic culture saw Australia become actively involved in the Vietnam War, despite the fact that the Army had recently substantially reduced its inventory.45 Australian policymakers were not reluctant participants with the US, indicating the conscious long-standing decision of prioritising US interoperability over near-region independence.46 Priority for ANZUS was calculated, predicated on the perceived threat of the day.
The potential benefits of ANZUS were sufficient to ensure that, in recent times, no Australian policymaker raised any doubt over the continuation of this close alliance. This is a deeply embedded factor that, if unchallenged, is likely to disadvantage Army in the 2014 FSR. Such ‘alliance dues’ have historically seen resources assigned to air and maritime hardware in order to achieve US interoperability.
Fighting the trends in defence policy
Further policy challenges compound the FSR problem for Army. An altered threat assessment focus would conflict with enduring policy procedures and trends. This article will argue that two key trends, often identified by commentators, reinforce defence policy inertia and give priority to capabilities that can be offered to a US-led coalition. An Army FSR strategy should understand these limitations.
Transition from specific to generalised policy
First, defence policy has transitioned from specific but classified information to broad, ambiguous and publicly available information. Fruhling comments that ‘In the late 1960s [Strategic Basis Papers] became more comprehensive … and significantly longer.’47 There has been a proliferation of policy documents from a single Strategic Basis Paper prior to 1976 to tens of publications in the current era.
Since World War II, defence policy has been articulated in several different formats. Strategic Basis Papers comprised a classified review of strategic circumstances by the Defence Committee focusing on essential elements of defence policy. The classification offered protection for forthright defence assessments.
Peripheral aspects of policy such as supporting concepts were rarely mentioned. White Papers were initiated in 1976 as a government statement to the public, allies and potential adversaries. These were heavily sanitised and evolved to highlight a broad range of non-core issues (such as personnel management initiatives). There is now a detailed hierarchy of classified and unclassified policy and capability development documents.48
The number of defence policy documents has increased markedly over time and, while it is important for policymakers to codify policies, there are risks and advantages from producing multiple policy documents. The ambiguity created by this method of policy articulation has contributed to inertia in defence policy and offered policymakers the ability to obscure or justify a range of different decisions.
The transition from specific to generalised policy has allowed justification of a range of different capability procurements, offering flexibility to policymakers. While this could be seen as an opportunity for Army, the reality is that it has historically worked in favour of Navy and Air Force. There will be significant pressure to maintain longstanding force structures during the 2014 FSR.
Justification of existing policy and hardware
Second, as Stone argues was common in broader public policy, defence policy regularly justified previous actions and decisions, particularly for force structure.49 This was due to factors such as service influence, strategic culture, long equipment procurement periods, and the involvement of both major parties in force structure decisions.50 In addition, institutional design, with ministers appointed to portfolios without specific expertise, potentially compels their focus on the most important and pressing issues and limits their desire to significantly change procurement programs.
The political desire to justify previous policy, particularly expenditure on major military hardware, contributes to inertia and is another 2014 FSR challenge for Army, even with changing geostrategic circumstances. Military hardware acquisitions with long life-cycles are a disincentive to change. For example, the 2013 White Paper highlighted that 200 million dollars had already been invested in analysing options for the new submarine project which was not due for delivery until after 2031.51 The submarine project may be even more difficult to change given its linkage to Australian employment. With historical bipartisan support for military hardware procurement, major political parties generally supported the procurement of combat hardware. The F-111 strategic strike aircraft is an historical example of bipartisan support over many decades, and both parties have flagged their support for the JSF.
New declared threats justified ongoing expenses and the continuation of existing acquisition plans. Despite being presented with a range of different geostrategic scenarios and assessed threats, continuity was historically the key feature of defence policy. For example, the early release of the 2013 White Paper was predicated on the declared need to address ‘significant international and domestic developments’ such as the ‘military shift to the Indo-Pacific’,52 but with few changes to planned hardware acquisition except for the deferral of some projects due to budget reductions.53
Previous threat redefinition
If Army is serious in seeking to reframe the argument away from North Asia, then there is value in examining previous attempts to change underlying threat assumptions in defence policy. The 1986 Dibb Review was the only previous public example in which a fundamental reappraisal of the basis for defence force structure was sought, and this review has been analysed in depth.
Relevant to this article, the Dibb Review was used to inform or justify the 1987 White Paper, but was never fully enacted,54 in part due to its failure to gain the full support of defence policymakers and some commentators.55 Defence often argued against the limitations imposed under a Defence of Australia (DoA) policy, and that force structure was not aligned, with Defence ‘allowed and indeed encouraged to prepare to defend Australia and its interests on too many fronts.’56 Defence procurement did not follow the declared priorities. DoA proved unpopular in Defence because it did not conform to deeply held views of Australia’s strategic culture and expeditionary history. Furthermore, the Hawke government applied no formal measure of effectiveness to determine the success of DoA implementation.
However, DoA concepts were central to all White Papers because the principle of prioritising security interests geographically was either politically attractive or necessary. Indeed, the 1994 White Paper was argued to be a continuation of DoA.57 The geographical basis of DoA remained clearly identifiable in the 2009 and 2013 White Papers.58 However, through reinterpretation in various White Papers and significant commentary, the meaning of DoA became blurred,59 with commentators such as Babbage applying their own interpretation to Dibb’s original concept.60 Such reinterpretation of a politically popular concept may present an opportunity for Army, which has strong justification for continued hardening.61
The risks of threat redefinition are clear. For land forces to become a higher priority, a review as fundamental as Dibb’s may be necessary and, even then, implementation of the recommendations may be challenged. If policymakers declare a new threat but do not act on it, policy ambiguity remains, and sophisticated and interoperable air and maritime hardware will retain priority. There may also be a risk to the broader Defence budget if the most challenging assessment of the threat (combat contributions to US-led expeditionary theatres) is not maintained, and this may meet with opposition from other services. If Army seeks a changed threat assessment, the power of inertia and justification of existing and planned capability will become apparent.
Seek to modify, or work within existing structures?
Army has historically worked within presented risk profiles, often with poor resourcing outcomes, although with possible avoidance of traditional service rivalry.62 The option for Army described in this article is to pursue change to threat and risk perceptions over time. Perceptions and scenarios will be difficult to change, but failure to change them will almost certainly see a repetition of the historically low emphasis placed on Army at a time when there are no major operations being undertaken. A consistent, long-term Army strategy is necessary to change entrenched policy trends.
First, as a priority, Army may seek to develop or contribute to the development of credible near-region threat scenarios, both public and classified, against which each service should justify its force structure. The process of FSR scenario and threat development can be negotiated, but this negotiation must occur at the beginning of the FSR, and may require ministerial support. Accepting a discussion of North Asian risk and US-led contributions as a primary or unstated influence on the FSR is likely to be to Army’s detriment. Despite the declared capability-based approach to the development of defence force structure, the representation of the threat is far more influential in FSR outcomes than capability-based arguments within the standard framework. Army will undoubtedly present a coherent capability plan; however, Army is destined for disappointment if policymakers maintain their current view of the threat to Australia.
In 1986, Dibb gained support in part because he was an external agent contracted to provide a basis for policy. Sourcing external support to develop threat scenarios may be an option for Army. Internally, the intelligence community has also historically been more likely to present near-region threats as the most important factor for force structure.
The opportunities for Army may lie in its ability to reinterpret concepts that already exist within policy in order to advance land force arguments. The blurred definition of DoA may be a good model. For example, with (a genuine) near-region prioritisation declared in all White Papers, force structure decisions for some of Defence’s most expensive combat air and maritime platforms may seem questionable. Conversely, concepts such as the ‘Hardened and Networked Army’ remain valid based on the ease with which the most unsophisticated threat forces could quickly develop lethal capabilities such as improvised explosive devices in the near region. Army can use external and internal threat assessments to reinterpret existing concepts but may have to be forceful in influencing policymakers’ understanding of near- region prioritisation.
This relates to the second recommendation. Army may seek the implementation of public Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for current capabilities against declared defence policy priorities. The important lesson from the Dibb review was that his assessment was not fully enacted, and Army may need a means to ensure that each service complies with an agreed understanding of the threat. The most technologically sophisticated Air Force and Navy platforms have consistently been related to near-region threats, even where there is minimal applicability. For example, a Defence statement on the acquisition of the Growler electronic warfare aircraft explained that the capability ‘will be able to support the full range of Defence tasks from evacuations to major conflicts.’63 Public MOE would at least maintain attention on declared defence priorities allowing an assessment of the relative utility of different platforms. In that context, Growler may be viewed as a 1.5 billion dollar solution looking for a near-region problem. Conversely, capabilities such as land logistics, tenuous during INTERFET and eroded further since then may become a higher priority.64
Third, internally, ACNDs could be altered to ensure that the ‘need’ is not just a capability desired by Army, but rather will mitigate a near-region risk or threat. Prompting Army planners to consider the threat whenever an ACND is developed, can add more discipline to the gap identification process. Support for this process may require the engagement of senior intelligence staff in various Army headquarters.
Finally, as observed during the Dibb review, even if Army were to be substantially successful in reframing the threat, this may not bring the desired result. Partial focus on North Asia and the need to contribute to the US alliance will still be influential. The enduring nature of defence policy ambiguity and the influence of each service will provide the impetus to use any justification to maintain existing force structures. The time horizons for procurements will also work against Army. Genuine adherence to near-region force structure determinants will create different winners and losers among the services.
The appointment of a new Defence Minister may present the opportunity to review procurement plans. As identified earlier, this will be difficult as some of the plans introduced in the 2009 White Paper have not been fully enacted or included in the budget. A change in government may present an opportunity to reconsider the basis for certain procurements. However, this is not a short-term proposition, and a 2014 FSR strategy must seek changes over time.
The path to a more sustainable land force for the most likely operational scenarios is a difficult one. However, the risk to Army (and to Australia’s national security) of not taking this path appears much greater. The maintenance of independent service force structure aims from the 1960s and 1970s is still apparent and this remains a risk for Australian security.65
Conclusion
While structures change over time and should not be viewed as immutable, Australian defence policy has proven to be durable over many decades. A clear Army strategy for the 2014 FSR and beyond appears necessary to allow Defence to achieve its declared priority tasks. A consistent Army strategy over a number of years is necessary to influence or change deeply embedded strategic culture, enduring policy trends, and procurement decisions that can span decades.
The major component of an Army strategy should be an attempt to change the perception of the risk and threat that underscores defence policy. This may require an external point of view to be presented. In the only example from the last 30 years of an attempt to change the threat perception, the Dibb Review was used to justify policy, but was never fully implemented and policy ambiguity remained.
Policy ambiguity has positive and negative aspects. Importantly for policymakers, the method of defence policy articulation has allowed flexibility, offering an ability to declare the politically acceptable near-region prioritisation while pursuing hardware to contribute to US-led expeditionary operations as a priority. Army has historically had strong justification for greater investment, but air and maritime platforms have been prioritised.
Service rivalry appears to be a reality of the future as the defence budget contracts. With recent 2013 White Paper announcements, a long-term FSR strategy may be the method to ensure that Army is well-placed in the emerging fight.
Endnotes
1 J. Caligari, ‘The Adaptive Army Post Afghanistan’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011, pp. 1–2.
2 For example, G. Cheeseman, Over-Reach in Australia’s Regional Military Policy, Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 71, ANU, August 1989, p. 2.
3 M. Crane, ‘Force Structure Review 2012’, Address to Royal United Services Institute, Western Australia, 8 March 2012
4 Ibid.
5 For example, see N. Stuart, ‘Inter-service rivalry and Defence cuts will mean fireworks’, The Canberra Times, 9 June 2012.
6 Defence, Force Structure Review 1991, letter to Minister.
7 P. Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986, pp. 7–10.
8 Defence, Force Structure Review 1991, pp. 2–3.
9 Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013, pp. 75–87.
10 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, p. 65, stated, ‘The Government does not intend to purpose-design the ADF for those circumstances in which it might choose to make tailored contributions to military coalitions in support of our wider strategic interests.’
11 P. Dibb, Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2006, p. 248, argued that single services bid for expensive platforms with no strategic necessity.
12 Cheeseman, Over-Reach in Australia’s Regional Military Policy, p. 8.
13 P. Leahy, ‘The Army after Afghanistan’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011, p. 7.
14 M. Thomson, ‘The Cost of Defence’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Defence Budget Brief 2013–2014, p. viii.
15 For example, A. Davies, ‘Let’s Test that Idea: The Contestability of Advice in the Department of Defence’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, No. 54, 2010, p. 3.
16 G. Cheeseman, ‘The Howard Government’s Defence White Paper’, The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, July 2001, p. 13.
17 D. Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Norton and Company, US, 2002, p. 11.
18 D. Morrison, ‘Applied Strategy from the Australian Perspective’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. X, No. 1, 2013, p. 27.
19 For example, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century stated that geography is an important element of strategy because it is easier to act militarily at distances closer to home (p. 45).
20 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005, Canberra, p. 6, warned China to limit any strategic misunderstanding caused by a poorly explained or non- transparent military build-up.
21 G. Sheridan, ‘Defence Force Dying for Cure’, The Australian, 18 April 2009.
22 Wikileaks, Secretary Clinton’s March 24, 2009, published at: http://213.251.145.96/ cable/2009/03/09STATE30049.html, para 8.
23 A. Behm, ‘Australian Strategic Policy and the Age of Uncertainty’, Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 1, Canberra, 2009, p. 15, noted that the wording of the White Paper section on China was poor, and appeared to echo a superficial and alarmist view of China’s military growth.
24 Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, pp. 70–81.
25 Thomson, ‘The Cost of Defence’, p. viii.
26 Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 10.
27 Ibid., pp. 9, 12.
28 Defence Committee, The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, Canberra, 1953, part II, para 14.
29 Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, pp. 9–13.
30 M. O’Keefe, ‘Enduring Tensions in the 2000 Defence White Paper’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2003, p. 527.
31 R. Babbage, ‘Learning to Walk Amongst Giants: The New Defence White Paper’, Security Challenges, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2008, pp. 13–15.
32 Stone, Policy Paradox, p. 12.
33 A. Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.73, argues that Prime Minister Curtin emphasised the ‘imminent peril’ of the threat from Japan while strategic assessments downplayed the possibility of full-scale invasion.
34 Defence Committee, An Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia February 1946, Commonwealth of Australia, part I, p. 5.
35 P. Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia Pacific, Macmillan, Sydney, 2000, pp. 123–27.
36 Defence, The Strategic Basis of Australia Defence Policy 1956, paras 8–15, emphasised the importance of anti-communist efforts in South Vietnam.
37 Burke, Fear of Security, pp. 1–23.
38 D. Ball, The US-Australia Alliance: History and Prospects, Working Paper No. 30, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999, p. 19.
39 Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, p. 48.
40 G. Cheeseman, Alternative Defence Strategies and Australia’s Defence, Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 51, ANU, September 1988, pp. 4–6.
41 Defence, Defence Capability Plan 2010-2020, Canberra, pp. 58–60.
42 A. Burke, ‘Australia Paranoid: Security Politics and Identity Policy’ in A. Burke and M. McDonald (eds), Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, Manchester University Press, UK, 2007, p. 130.
43 A. Tange, Defence Policy Making: A Close-Up View 1950-1980, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 19, ANU, 2008, p. 11.
44 Department of Defence, Australia-United States Capability Development Liaison Handbook, Interim Edition, 2006–07, p. 3.
45 S. Brodie, Tilting at Dominoes, Child and Associates Publishing, Sydney, 1987, p. 20, discusses the idealised memories of Australian military service.
46 G. Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and Howard, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2006, p. 12, argues that ‘the idea … that in the Australian-US alliance the Americans say what they want and the Australians follow suit is absurdly mistaken.’
47 S. Fruhling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, p. 2.
48 Contemporary classified documents include Defence Planning Guidance, Australia’s Military Strategy, the Future Joint Operational Concept, the Defence International Engagement Strategic Plan and the Quarterly Strategic Review. Publicly released unclassified documents include White Papers, the Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, and the Defence 2030 Strategy Planning Framework Handbook. There are also numerous Capability Plans and subordinate roadmaps.
49 Stone, Policy Paradox, p. 12.
50 D. Kilcullen, ‘Australian Statecraft: The Challenge of Aligning Policy with Strategic Culture’, Security Challenges, Vol. 3, No. 4, November 2007, pp. 46–47, argued that strategic culture was one reason that defence policy remained consistent in Australia, as conscious and observable decisions formed only a small part of defence policy, and unobservable characteristics such as history and culture were more influential.
51 Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 83.
52 Ibid., p. ix.
53 Thomson, ‘The Cost of Defence’, p. vi.
54 R. Babbage, ‘Australia’s new defence direction’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1988,
pp. 92–96, highlights the fact that Dibb’s review did not represent government policy, although Defence Minister Beazley tabled the report in Parliament to facilitate preparation of the White Paper.
55 M. Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 1991-2005, Study Paper No. 306, Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005, p. 69, argues that Dibb avoided the reality that deployments were mostly based on strategic culture and geopolitics.
56 R. Huisken and M. Thatcher (eds), History of Australian Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, Working Paper No. 399, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2007, p. 3.
57 Parliamentary Research Service, Defending Australia: Issues in Australia’s Post-Cold War Defence Policy, Research Paper No. 19, 1994/95, p. 1, argues that, ‘In many ways, there is continuity between the new White Paper and its 1987 counterpart.’
58 R. Lyon and A. Davies, Assessing the Defence White Paper 2009, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 7 May 2009, p. 2, argued that the reasoning behind the 2009 White Paper was very similar to DoA.
59 bid., p. 4. Lyon and Davies argued that DoA was a ‘spectrum of different doctrines’.
60 R. Babbage, Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Paper No. 15, February 2011, p. 66.
61 Morrison, ‘Applied Strategy from the Australian Perspective’ p. 31.
62 Babbage, The Pacific Review, p. 92, highlights the consistent rivalry between the services, which were preparing for ‘different wars in different locations and at different times’.
63 Department of Defence, Defence to acquire Growler electronic attack capability, Media Release, 23 August 2012.
64 Smith, S., A Handmaiden’s Tale: An Alternative View of Logistic Lessons Learned from INTERFET, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper Number 65, April 2001, pp. 6–8.
65 Fruhling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, p. 33.
1 J. Caligari, ‘The Adaptive Army Post Afghanistan’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011, pp. 1–2.
2 For example, G. Cheeseman, Over-Reach in Australia’s Regional Military Policy, Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 71, ANU, August 1989, p. 2.
3 M. Crane, ‘Force Structure Review 2012’, Address to Royal United Services Institute, Western Australia, 8 March 2012
4 Ibid.
5 For example, see N. Stuart, ‘Inter-service rivalry and Defence cuts will mean fireworks’, The Canberra Times, 9 June 2012.
6 Defence, Force Structure Review 1991, letter to Minister.
7 P. Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986, pp. 7–10.
8 Defence, Force Structure Review 1991, pp. 2–3.
9 Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013, pp. 75–87.
10 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, p. 65, stated, ‘The Government does not intend to purpose-design the ADF for those circumstances in which it might choose to make tailored contributions to military coalitions in support of our wider strategic interests.’
11 P. Dibb, Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2006, p. 248, argued that single services bid for expensive platforms with no strategic necessity.
12 Cheeseman, Over-Reach in Australia’s Regional Military Policy, p. 8.
13 P. Leahy, ‘The Army after Afghanistan’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2011, p. 7.
14 M. Thomson, ‘The Cost of Defence’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Defence Budget Brief 2013–2014, p. viii.
15 For example, A. Davies, ‘Let’s Test that Idea: The Contestability of Advice in the Department of Defence’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, No. 54, 2010, p. 3.
16 G. Cheeseman, ‘The Howard Government’s Defence White Paper’, The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, July 2001, p. 13.
17 D. Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Norton and Company, US, 2002, p. 11.
18 D. Morrison, ‘Applied Strategy from the Australian Perspective’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. X, No. 1, 2013, p. 27.
19 For example, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century stated that geography is an important element of strategy because it is easier to act militarily at distances closer to home (p. 45).
20 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005, Canberra, p. 6, warned China to limit any strategic misunderstanding caused by a poorly explained or non- transparent military build-up.
21 G. Sheridan, ‘Defence Force Dying for Cure’, The Australian, 18 April 2009.
22 Wikileaks, Secretary Clinton’s March 24, 2009, published at: http://213.251.145.96/ cable/2009/03/09STATE30049.html, para 8.
23 A. Behm, ‘Australian Strategic Policy and the Age of Uncertainty’, Security Challenges, Vol. 5, No. 1, Canberra, 2009, p. 15, noted that the wording of the White Paper section on China was poor, and appeared to echo a superficial and alarmist view of China’s military growth.
24 Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, pp. 70–81.
25 Thomson, ‘The Cost of Defence’, p. viii.
26 Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 10.
27 Ibid., pp. 9, 12.
28 Defence Committee, The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, Canberra, 1953, part II, para 14.
29 Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra, pp. 9–13.
30 M. O’Keefe, ‘Enduring Tensions in the 2000 Defence White Paper’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2003, p. 527.
31 R. Babbage, ‘Learning to Walk Amongst Giants: The New Defence White Paper’, Security Challenges, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2008, pp. 13–15.
32 Stone, Policy Paradox, p. 12.
33 A. Burke, Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.73, argues that Prime Minister Curtin emphasised the ‘imminent peril’ of the threat from Japan while strategic assessments downplayed the possibility of full-scale invasion.
34 Defence Committee, An Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia February 1946, Commonwealth of Australia, part I, p. 5.
35 P. Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia Pacific, Macmillan, Sydney, 2000, pp. 123–27.
36 Defence, The Strategic Basis of Australia Defence Policy 1956, paras 8–15, emphasised the importance of anti-communist efforts in South Vietnam.
37 Burke, Fear of Security, pp. 1–23.
38 D. Ball, The US-Australia Alliance: History and Prospects, Working Paper No. 30, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999, p. 19.
39 Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century, p. 48.
40 G. Cheeseman, Alternative Defence Strategies and Australia’s Defence, Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 51, ANU, September 1988, pp. 4–6.
41 Defence, Defence Capability Plan 2010-2020, Canberra, pp. 58–60.
42 A. Burke, ‘Australia Paranoid: Security Politics and Identity Policy’ in A. Burke and M. McDonald (eds), Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, Manchester University Press, UK, 2007, p. 130.
43 A. Tange, Defence Policy Making: A Close-Up View 1950-1980, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 19, ANU, 2008, p. 11.
44 Department of Defence, Australia-United States Capability Development Liaison Handbook, Interim Edition, 2006–07, p. 3.
45 S. Brodie, Tilting at Dominoes, Child and Associates Publishing, Sydney, 1987, p. 20, discusses the idealised memories of Australian military service.
46 G. Sheridan, The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and Howard, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2006, p. 12, argues that ‘the idea … that in the Australian-US alliance the Americans say what they want and the Australians follow suit is absurdly mistaken.’
47 S. Fruhling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, p. 2.
48 Contemporary classified documents include Defence Planning Guidance, Australia’s Military Strategy, the Future Joint Operational Concept, the Defence International Engagement Strategic Plan and the Quarterly Strategic Review. Publicly released unclassified documents include White Papers, the Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, and the Defence 2030 Strategy Planning Framework Handbook. There are also numerous Capability Plans and subordinate roadmaps.
49 Stone, Policy Paradox, p. 12.
50 D. Kilcullen, ‘Australian Statecraft: The Challenge of Aligning Policy with Strategic Culture’, Security Challenges, Vol. 3, No. 4, November 2007, pp. 46–47, argued that strategic culture was one reason that defence policy remained consistent in Australia, as conscious and observable decisions formed only a small part of defence policy, and unobservable characteristics such as history and culture were more influential.
51 Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 83.
52 Ibid., p. ix.
53 Thomson, ‘The Cost of Defence’, p. vi.
54 R. Babbage, ‘Australia’s new defence direction’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1988,
pp. 92–96, highlights the fact that Dibb’s review did not represent government policy, although Defence Minister Beazley tabled the report in Parliament to facilitate preparation of the White Paper.
55 M. Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 1991-2005, Study Paper No. 306, Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005, p. 69, argues that Dibb avoided the reality that deployments were mostly based on strategic culture and geopolitics.
56 R. Huisken and M. Thatcher (eds), History of Australian Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, Working Paper No. 399, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2007, p. 3.
57 Parliamentary Research Service, Defending Australia: Issues in Australia’s Post-Cold War Defence Policy, Research Paper No. 19, 1994/95, p. 1, argues that, ‘In many ways, there is continuity between the new White Paper and its 1987 counterpart.’
58 R. Lyon and A. Davies, Assessing the Defence White Paper 2009, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 7 May 2009, p. 2, argued that the reasoning behind the 2009 White Paper was very similar to DoA.
59 bid., p. 4. Lyon and Davies argued that DoA was a ‘spectrum of different doctrines’.
60 R. Babbage, Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Paper No. 15, February 2011, p. 66.
61 Morrison, ‘Applied Strategy from the Australian Perspective’ p. 31.
62 Babbage, The Pacific Review, p. 92, highlights the consistent rivalry between the services, which were preparing for ‘different wars in different locations and at different times’.
63 Department of Defence, Defence to acquire Growler electronic attack capability, Media Release, 23 August 2012.
64 Smith, S., A Handmaiden’s Tale: An Alternative View of Logistic Lessons Learned from INTERFET, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper Number 65, April 2001, pp. 6–8.
65 Fruhling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, p. 33.
