Book Review - Defense Acquisition Reform 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal

Journal Edition

Defense Acquisition Reform 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal

Written by: J. Ronald Fox,

Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2011,

ISBN: 9780160866975, 268 pp.1

Reviewed by: Scott Richardson, Land Warfare Studies Centre

As may be expected, a book entitled Defence Acquisition Reform 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal is unlikely to attract a wide audience of avid readers. An account of United States (US) Department of Defense efforts at procure-ment reform compiled by J. Ronald Fox, a professor of Business Administration and a defence procurement expert who headed two US procurement reviews in the 1970s and 1980s, the subject nonetheless deserves a higher level of reader- ship. Anyone familiar with defence procurement in Australia may find themselves unconsciously nodding their head in agreement within minutes of turning the first page, and may be similarly affected by the author’s conclusions. Fox does a capable job in managing a necessarily dense topic, and the book is written in a frank style that does much to keep the reader engaged.

Among other topics, the author follows the involvement of David Packard, the co-founder of Hewlett Packard, in trying to reform US defense procurement. Spanning a period from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, including both the Blue Ribbon Panel and Blue Ribbon Commission, the attempts by Packard to reform the procurement system highlight the author’s core themes. The experience of Packard also demonstrates the continuing gulf between identifying the core issues and actually effecting meaningful change.

Fox also seeks to capture the broad range of factors that makes defence procurement so difficult, and reform so strongly resisted. These include political interference, as demonstrated by reform initiatives during the Reagan era, and the importance of individual personalities such as William J. Perry, who drove reform during the Clinton presidency and waged a campaign against unnecessary Military Specifications requirements. These examples, along with many others, will be of interest to ADF officers posted to procurement positions, Defence public service employees and managers working (or looking to work) in procurement — or, more broadly, anyone who seeks a better understanding of defence procurement’s inherent complexities.

Fox’s story is one that many in the Australian Defence community should recognise, and it is that point which demonstrates its potential value. Although US procurement is much larger and more complex than Australian, there are parallels. Fox brings into clear focus the spectrum of repetitive issues that continues to compli- cate defence procurement, including Australia’s. The US experience of reform also serves to illuminate the various methods that have been tried, sometimes repeatedly and, more importantly, the reasons they continue to fail.

Direct parallels can and should be drawn from the experiences outlined by Fox. In providing his lessons in an easily accessible form, he offers us an opportunity to learn from the US experience and to frame our own reforms. As a learning tool, Defense Acquisition Reform offers a different and perhaps more useful perspective than that of other defence reviews. It should be read, and its advice heeded, by all those working in procurement.