In January 2001, Australia responded to a British request for advisers to assist the International Military Advisory Training Team mission in Sierra Leone (IMATT–SL) in its task of rebuilding the newly raised Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) in West Africa. Codenamed Operation Husky, the Australian commitment lasted for two years and consisted of an infantry captain and an infantry major deployed to act as a battalion and brigade adviser respectively. Each contingent deployed for a six-month tour of duty and, following two years of involvement, the Australian mission concluded in March 2003. Although Operation Husky has been overshadowed by larger contemporary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Australian Army officers played an important role in rebuilding the Sierra Leone military under extremely arduous and at times dangerous conditions.
The use of advisory teams offers an excellent medium for international engagement at relatively little cost and can contribute to the process of conflict management. Australia’s expenditure on defence cooperation with neighbouring countries in 2001–02 was valued at A$79.568 million.1 Despite this expenditure, the training and preparation of military advisers has received insufficient attention within the Australian Defence Force (ADF). For example, at present, there is no dedicated training regime or written ADF doctrine for the conduct of advisory missions. This article uses the author’s experience in Sierra Leone to discuss the characteristics and skills required to fulfil a military adviser’s role. With the demands of an ongoing War on Terrorism likely to lead to increased military liaison globally, it is possible that advisory missions may play an increasingly important role in attempts to shape Australia’s strategic environment. Given these conditions, it is important that the ADF ensure the adequate preparation of its personnel for that responsibility.
Background to Australian Military Advisory Involvement in Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone, a former British colony in West Africa, fell into crisis during the 1990s due to a series of coups d’etat. In April 1992, a 26-year-old soldier, Captain Valentine Strasser, seized power. Control was briefly returned to an elected civilian government under President Kabbah, but in 1997, Major General Johnny Paul Koroma deposed Kabbah and civil war broke out. In 1998, a Nigerian-led West African intervention force stormed the capital Freetown and restored Kabbah to office. However, fighting, fuelled by a struggle over diamond production, between Kabbah loyalists and rebels resumed until a ceasefire was reached in July 1999.
A UN force then entered Sierra Leone but was opposed by the rebel chief, Foday Sankoh, whose forces unleashed a wave of killing, rape and mutilation. Some 300 UN troops were abducted in early 2000 and in mid-June 2000, a British task force intervened to restore law and order, killing twenty members of the main rebel militia force, the Revolutionary United Front, while securing Freetown. In September 2000, eleven British soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment were captured by another militia force known as the West Side Boys and were rescued by a 150-strong British force from the Parachute Regiment. As the civil war petered out, some 400 British troops began training the Sierra Leone military, and in 2002 elections were held. Although fighting has diminished greatly, parts of the country, especially the Sierra Leone – Liberian border remain dangerous in 2003. It was against this background that Australia committed military advisers to IMATT–SL from 2001 until 2003.
Differentiating Between Military Advisory and Military Training Missions: Insights from Sierra Leone
Careful distinction must be made between the roles of military advisers and those of military training personnel because each has different functions. By definition, a training officer is one who instructs other people, usually in a secure base or reserve area. On the other hand, a military adviser may serve on the command staff of an active unit and may deploy with that unit on combat operations. Generally speaking, the difference between training team missions and advisory missions is one of risk. Military advisory roles generally involve greater risk to foreign personnel than military training roles.
In Operation Husky, in Sierra Leone, the Australian approach to an advisory role was influenced by the experience of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATV) in the early 1960s. In Vietnam there was a clear distinction laid down in Australian doctrine between training functions and the delivery of operational advice.2 While the task of providing military training usually precludes an operational advisory role, the reverse does not apply. Military advisers who are embedded in supported units can become involved in helping to facilitate and organise collective training activities.
During his service in Sierra Leone, the author served as a battalion adviser to the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion of the RSLAF while also fulfilling the role as a training adviser for the 5th Brigade. As the Brigade Training Adviser, the author was responsible for the development of a training regime in accordance with the Brigade Commander’s Directive. This appointment demanded gaining a rapid understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Sierra Leone military. In order to define training needs, the author routinely accompanied RSLAF unit patrols and undertook assessments of the soldiers and their operating conditions.
At the time of the author’s deployment to West Africa, the RSLAF was engaged in a rebuilding phase. However, long months on operations, combined with poor living conditions for soldiers and perceptions of corruption and nepotism at the higher command levels, had led to a loss of morale in the Sierra Leone military. The author advised the 5th Brigade of the RSLAF on the establishment of a new unit that focused on developing the leadership qualities of the junior non-commissioned officers. This approach involved the establishment of a training camp with facilities such as rifle ranges, accommodation buildings and classrooms. Administrative personnel were selected and instructed in how to run the training camp.
At the same time, the author also fulfilled the role of adviser to the 3rd Battalion of the Sierra Leone military. In this role, the author provided advice on every aspect of the battalion’s day-to-day activities, including operational matters, morale and discipline, hygiene and sanitation, logistics and resupply, and general leadership issues. The basis for the advice that the author provided to the Commanding Officer was largely drawn from his own professional experiences, tempered by the lessons learnt by other international IMATT–SL personnel.
The author’s experience in Operation Husky highlighted the need for foreign military advisers to be permitted to participate in tactical operations in order to assist in evaluating both the capabilities and the limitations of indigenous troops. Making an operational assessment enables an adviser to provide useful advice where it most matters—in the field. The dual approach of training and advising has not always been accepted within the Australian Army. For instance, in the early 1960s, Australian training advisers in Vietnam were initially restricted from direct operational involvement with their South Vietnamese colleagues. As Ian McNeill has written:
The Australians found themselves in an anomalous position because of their explicit instructions to remain on training activities and not become involved in operations. To do their job properly, they felt a need to accompany units on operations where they could get a good feel for the type of war, and the problems experienced by the ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam].3
In many instances, such a restriction is appropriate, particularly in the case of combat operations. Nonetheless, experience in Sierra Leone suggested that the ability of a military adviser—who might also be involved in training functions—to accompany the troops on operations was an invaluable means of building up a rapport with, and assessing the capabilities of, indigenous troops. However, the two distinct tasks of providing advice and providing training demand different types of support and preparation. In an advisory role, the military adviser needs to consider closely such issues as infrastructure and administrative support, force protection arrangements, reporting, duration of deployment, type of predeployment training, handovers, legal coverage, medical support and conditions of service.
In Sierra Leone, it became evident that the national armed forces were incapable of providing appropriate support to IMATT–SL personnel. As a consequence, medical support, vehicles, weapons and communications were provided by IMATT–SL headquarters commanded by a British Army brigadier, who also acted as the Military Adviser to the President of Sierra Leone.
Characteristics of Military Advisory Operations in Sierra Leone
In many developing Third World armies, leadership is often confined to officers and is based on a barracks-style deference to drill and ceremonial duties, rather than focusing on expertise in training and operations. Sierra Leone was no exception to this rule. There was often a distinct lack of leadership shown by junior officers and non-commissioned officers, a situation complicated further by ethnic differences. Due to nepotism and ethnic rivalries, commanding officers tended to surround themselves with their most trusted lieutenants in the battalion headquarters. This complex ethnic situation often meant that battalion infantry companies were not staffed by suitably trained officers. Because of local military weaknesses and a lack of professionalism in indigenous units, there is always a temptation for foreign military advisers to view matters through the prism of their own experience and training. However, it is always necessary for a military adviser to remember that he is on temporary detachment and his mission is to advise, not to attempt to direct activities.
Managing Expectations with a Sense of Realism
It is important to note that the expectations of military advisers and those of the indigenous military may differ considerably. Foreign advisers from modern armies are likely to seek solutions to problems based on 21st-century military standards. This modern approach may, however, not work in the context of Third World military cultures and may lead to frustration among advisory staff. As one experienced British senior non-commissioned officer put it, a military adviser must possess a sense of realism based on local conditions and ‘set achievable tasks and get the simple things right’.4 Ultimately, the test of a successful advisory mission is whether the indigenous troops adopt and then adapt the procedures and measures learnt. An adviser must seek to persuade members of the unit in which he is serving that his success can only be measured by their own application of his advice.
Adapting to Local Conditions: Advise, Do Not Command
For advisers, adaptation to local conditions remains a key issue. It is counterproductive to build expectations in an indigenous force based on an over-reliance on foreign support. Managing expectations is closely related to an understanding of the difference between advising and commanding. One Australian officer recounted his first meeting with the commanding officer of his battalion in Sierra Leone in the following terms:
He [the Sierra Leone commander] leaned back in his chair, put his hands behind his head and said, ‘Yeeees [sic] Captain Tim. Welcome to 10 Battalion. So if you want to run the Battalion ... no problems!’5
On many occasions, military commanders in Sierra Leone were content to allow IMATT–SL advisers to assume command responsibility and then claim the credit for any good results achieved. Complying with such an approach was both patronising and counterproductive in that, by assuming a command role, an adviser fails in his principal task, which is to empower local officers and encourage them to resolve their own military problems. It is necessary for advisers to avoid the temptation to take charge and to work towards ensuring that, when the advisory mission is complete, indigenous commanders possess self-reliance and improved professional knowledge. In essence, a successful military adviser is an officer who facilitates progress by ensuring that the local commanders and their senior staff ‘own the solutions’ reached in the professional administration of a unit.
The Politics of Military Advisory Missions
It is also important to realise that the deployment of a handful of military advisers can have significant political implications. Foreign advisers, who can often be relatively junior officers, may assume enormous responsibilities often under minimal supervision. The level of responsibility in advisory missions places a premium on the selection of officers who possess both maturity of judgment and a self-reliant character. The reality is that advisory missions in Third World countries, while providing a stabilising influence, are also fraught with political risks. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the mere presence of IMATT–SL personnel helped avert an attempted coup in January 2003. Because military advisers were embedded within the regional brigades throughout Sierra Leone, the international training team was able to play a major role in preventing the attempted coup. In particular, the 4th Brigade Advisory Support Team, commanded by Major Paul Kenny of the Australian Army, was able to gain valuable information relating to a coup attempt. Kenny’s intelligence contributed to the formulation of a British contingency plan that succeeded in preventing military intervention in Sierra Leone’s political system.
Developing Appropriate Indigenuous Doctrine
Military advisers to Third World armies should concentrate on establishing doctrine and tactical procedures early in their mission. In the case of Sierra Leone, British doctrine was introduced to the armed forces through the employment of shortterm training teams. British small-unit tactics were based on sections of eight men, broken into two fire teams, each of which was armed with light support weapons. The RSLAF adopted the British platoon and section model in their training; it proved unsuitable, however, largely because the RSLAF did not possess compatible weapon systems. Moreover, Sierra Leone military leadership culture did not seek to entrust responsibility to non-commissioned officers and, as a result, British doctrinal teachings were not followed by the Sierra Leone military when on operations.
In advisory missions, the doctrine and tactics developed must meet indigenous requirements, particularly if advisers are to succeed in synchronising the activities of a local unit. The difficulty, however, arises when missions are multinational in character, leading to different doctrine and tactics being taught by a variety of advisory and training teams. The Australian Army has yet to develop doctrine on the conduct of military advisory operations. Individual advisers are responsible for gathering information for specific missions prior to their deployment. This specialised knowledge is then supplemented through generic country and information briefings as part of standard predeployment training. Yet, as this article has sought to demonstrate, there are enough recurring lessons in advisory missions to form the basis for developing common doctrine. By capturing the lessons learnt from diverse advisory missions and absorbing them into doctrine, the ADF would create a useful database for the future. This doctrinal aspect of military advisory operations requires urgent attention within the ADF so that the loss of valuable corporate knowledge may be avoided.
Selection and Training of Military Advisers
The level of political responsibility frequently encountered in advisory missions places a premium on the selection of officers who possess maturity of judgment, a self-reliant character and a sense of tact and cultural sensitivity. In addition, because of the isolated conditions in which advisers often work, such officers must be capable of using their personal initiative to meet new challenges.
In Sierra Leone, the British soldiers sent to the international training team are posted as Loan Service Personnel for a six- or twelve-month period of service and are managed by the Directorate of Overseas Military Affairs in the British Ministry of Defence. Unfortunately, there is no selection process and in many cases the military personnel prove to be unsuited to advisory work. The British approach differed from that used in the Australian and Canadian militaries. In both the Australian Army and the Canadian Land Forces, officers were nominated for advisory and training missions by their respective career management organisations. As a consequence, Australian and Canadian military personnel were generally better qualified for the type of advisory mission in Sierra Leone than their British counterparts.
Predeployment training is essential in preparing for military advisory missions. In Australia, while the Deployed Forces Support Unit currently provides all predeployment training, there is no specialist training or doctrine available to prepare an Australian officer for service in a foreign country as an adviser. In the past, the Military Adviser Regional Training Assistant Course provided a means for training individuals in the skills required by an adviser. This course was discontinued several years ago, although a proposal is currently being developed to revive it based on four modules. The first module is intended to provide cultural familiarisation; language training; and demographic, geographic and intelligence briefings for officers posted on specific advisory missions. The second component involves a training module that addresses the issue of teaching techniques in a foreign language, or how to use interpreters in training. The third and fourth modules of the proposed Military Advisory Course focus on operational issues and the use of intelligence.
Some Special Requirements for Military Advisory Missions
In preparing for military advisory missions, armies should also give consideration to incorporating several special requirements, notably self-protection skills, advanced driving instruction, instinctive shooting techniques, advanced medical training, escape and evasion techniques, and possibly some counter-interrogation training. Such measures may be necessary because the reality of advisory deployments is that they involve a range of considerations that rarely arise on conventional operations. In the first place, advisers are required to adapt to standards and conditions of personal security that depart from the ADF’s usual modus operandi. In Sierra Leone, force protection was provided initially by a company of Gurkhas in support of the deployed teams, with contingency plans for extraction utilising United Nations or privately contracted helicopters. However, the force protection company was eventually withdrawn and military advisory staff were forced to improvise plans for evacuation based on escape and evasion in the case of mutiny or rebellion. One aspect of these contingency plans involved heading north by vehicle towards the Sierra Leone – Guinea border in the event that extraction by air was not possible. The biggest threat faced by military advisers in Sierra Leone was that of capture by rebel forces in the event of the security situation deteriorating.
A second requirement is the need for efficient medical evacuation procedures in order to maintain the confidence of the advisers who may be working in regions with poor hospital facilities. In the south-east of Sierra Leone, there was a high threat from Lassa fever, a rat-borne disease with symptoms similar to the deadly African Ebola virus. A British medic serving in the area contracted Lassa fever, and only rapid evacuation from Sierra Leone to Britain saved his life.
A third consideration involved in advisory missions concerns the issue of deployment duration. Currently, six months is the accepted duration of deployments in the ADF. However, for advisory operations, it is arguable that twelve-month deployment is required in order to permit an effective relationship to be formed with both indigenous troops and the local populace.
Conclusion
The use of military advisers and training teams represents an effective means of ‘military diplomacy’ and international engagement. Advisory teams also have the potential to provide the Australian Army and the ADF with an improved capacity in the area of cultural knowledge, especially if such missions are employed in the Asia-Pacific region in the future. Given the new conditions of the War on Terror, advisory teams may be an excellent measure of our commitment to the development of improved security in our region.
It needs to be appreciated, however, that advisory missions place heavy demands on deployed personnel. Consequently, there is a need for careful selection based on individual merit. Consideration should also be given to reinvigorating the predeployment training of selected individuals in order to ensure that they are adequately prepared for the rigours of life as an adviser in a foreign country. Although it might be argued that the ADF has succeeded without specialist training for advisory roles in the recent past, the author would contend that we have been fortunate that no major incidents have occurred to test this proposition.
By reinstituting appropriate training such as the military adviser’s course, we can ensure the quality of the adviser while fulfilling our duty of care towards the individuals deployed on such operations. Finally, the issue of doctrine for advisory missions needs to be addressed in order to ensure that we adequately prepare our personnel for future operations. Ultimately, careful selection procedures, advanced training courses and good doctrine will help Australian service personnel deployed in advisory roles. In the context of advisory operations, such measures will assist in maintaining our excellent reputation for military professionalism and promote our influence both globally and regionally.
Endnotes
1 Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2001–02, October 2002, p. 114.
2 Ian McNeill, The Team—Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962–1972, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Qld, 1984, p. 24.
3 McNeill, The Team, p. 24.
4 Author’s discussion with Warrant Officer Class Two Kevin Carlin (Royal Scots, British Army), Adviser 4th Battalion RSLAF in 2003.
5 Personal communication from Major T. Curtis, 4 September 2003.
