In the future, the use of reconnaissance is likely to be an important feature in the Australian Army’s approach to conducting urban operations. Yet reconnaissance for the urban military environment is underdeveloped in current land-force doctrine. This is a paradox in an army with a heritage of strong patrolling and intelligence gathering stemming from the time of World War I. The aim of this article is to discuss the significance of the art of reconnaissance in modern urban operations and to examine what requirements might be necessary in the future.
Understanding Urban Operations
The Australian Army’s understanding of urban warfare is strongly influenced by a ‘human meat grinder’ mode of analysis that reflects the experience of Stalingrad and Berlin in World War II, of Hue in the Vietnam War and of Grozny in the post–Cold War era. This analytical approach, however, may have limitations for Australian soldiers in the new millennium. As Ralph Peters has pointed out, the complexity of the urban environment in the 21st century means that there are different types of cities that may become battlegrounds: the hierarchical Western-style city such as London; the multi-cultural, factional city such as Jerusalem; and the tribal city such as Mogadishu.1
While much can be learnt from an operational analysis of Grozny and Hue, the future Australian experience of urban operations is more likely to resemble a Dili rather than a Stalingrad. This is because, as a 2002 DSTO Land Operations Division study Urban Operations in the Regional Littoral showed, in South-East Asia and the Pacific, most people reside in urban areas of less than 100 000 people.
Australian soldiers rightly see the urban military environment as representing a highly complex operational area. Urban warfare features include limited line of sight, restrictive rules of engagement, a degraded capability for mobility and reduced situational awareness. The challenge posed is outlined in doctrinal thinking, with urban operations defined as:
Operations planned and conducted, across the full spectrum of conflict, on or within urban and adjacent natural terrain, where the dominant features are the densities of population, structures, potential firing positions, combat and non-combat activity, friendly and enemy forces, line of sight difficulties and compression of time available for military tasks.2
Employing Reconnaissance: Push or Pull?
Essentially there are two basic methods for the employment of reconnaissance assets in an urban operation. The first is to employ reconnaissance in the environment of ‘command push’, in which a commander uses information collection and processing to refine his battle plan. ‘Command push’ is an approach in which the friendly force seeks to shape its own operational posture. It is also an approach that is probably well suited to the Australian Defence Force’s future world of network-centric warfare.
The second approach to the use of reconnaissance is to apply the manoeuvre theory principles of surfaces and gaps in order to exploit an enemy’s dispositions. This approach represents a ‘reconnaissance pull’, in that the emphasis is concentrated on discovering the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy. In a ‘pull’ approach, the friendly force’s planning process is largely based on its perceptions of enemy activity and acceptance of a degree of uncertainty in operations. In the combined arms world of the standing professional army, reconnaissance ‘pull’ tends to remain the preferred method. The use of ‘pull’ is viewed as conferring on commanders greater ability to deal with friction and allows greater latitude to the local commander at all levels. In the clutter of the urban environment, it is likely that ‘reconnaissance pull’ operations will be the preferred method for the Australian Army in the future. Such a method is regarded as being better suited to the tenets of mission-oriented command and conforms to Australian military cultural mores.
Force Configuration in Urban Reconnaissance
For reconnaissance assets to succeed in urban operations, the question of force configuration must be considered and reconciled. One approach is to conduct reconnaissance on the basis of careful force preparation, with a heavy reliance on light forces and stealthy techniques for infiltration. However, the use of light and stealthy reconnaissance elements is risky in that lighter forces may sacrifice combat worth for the sake of intelligence gathering and may not survive in urban combat conditions. A second approach to configuring reconnaissance forces for urban conditions is to make the assigned forces heavy by providing a combined arms component that will allow survival in a combat encounter. Ultimately, any reconnaissance force must possess sufficient protection and firepower to survive in a hostile urban environment. It is possible that a combination of the lighter–stealthier force and of the heavier – combined arms force may be required in future reconnaissance missions.
New technologies may assist in the process of a convergence between light and heavy forces in urban operations. Such technologies include enhanced 3-D mapping, the use of global positioning systems (GPS), more multi-spectral surveillance suites (which may be capable of reliable building or foliage penetration) and sophisticated pattern analysis processors. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with long endurance capabilities are also likely to prove useful, along with thermal imaging and image intensification sensors.
In terms of weapons systems, the likelihood of improved chemical and kinetic energy weapons capable of greater stand-off range are likely to be useful in the urban battlespace. There is also scope in urban operations for manned and unmanned rotary-wing assets and an array of non-lethal technologies to aid in crowd control. It is highly unlikely, however, that remote and stand-off assets will replace the need for deployed forces in close reconnaissance. What new technology really offers reconnaissance forces is a much greater chance of successful deployment and enhanced survivability in high-risk urban areas. In the future, it is likely that sensors will reveal up to 30 or 40 per cent of the battlespace, thus permitting a greater continuum of action between operational reconnaissance and main force activity.
One challenge emanating from such greater transparency will be to reconcile the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)—used by the major English-speaking Western armies—with greater freedom of action. Reconnaissance assets could be used to ‘cue’ multi-spectral analysis of detected urban targets. It should be noted, however, that new technological advances will not occur without friction simply because enemy counter-reconnaissance and deception capabilities are also likely to benefit.
In urban operations, the need for ‘nodal take down’—that is, the neutralisation of enemy leadership, troops or communications systems—to shape the battlespace may require a heavier reconnaissance effort. Covert methods of reconnaissance and greater deployment of stand-off surveillance assets at the operational level may also be necessary. ‘Nodal take down’ operations may occur with a high degree of simultaneity in time, or be staggered over the framework of a campaign.
Clandestine infiltration and the use of stand-off assets and weapons systems tend to involve a mix of close and wider area surveillance, making coordination of information requirements critical. In all but the largest of cities, reconnaissance forces will always need to be aware of the human geography and type of critical infrastructures available in order to establish infiltration routes and to create friendly areas for replenishment.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to raise some of the challenges that the Australian Army may face in the area of future reconnaissance missions in the urban environment, where tactics are always defined by short observation and engagement ranges. None of the challenges discussed in this essay are insurmountable and not all of them require high-technology solutions. It is likely that, for the foreseeable future, reconnaissance ‘pull’ operations, supported by the tenets of mission command, will dominate military thinking about infiltration methods and the collection of intelligence in urban environments. Ultimately, however, land forces have to decide between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ operations and between ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ reconnaissance approaches, and the extent to which a blend between the two force configurations is practical in urban warfare conditions.
Endnotes
1 Ralph Peters, ‘The Human Terrain of Operations’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, vol. XXX, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 4–12.
2 Australian Army, LWD 3-9-4, Urban operations (Draft), 2001, p. 5.