Battle implies mobility, strategic and tactical. The Army which seeks to fight another must be able to move quickly against it ... Battle also implies immobilisation of the enemy—the paralysis of his powers of movement so that, in the first place, he may not be able to slip away, and second, that he may not be able to counter your strokes.
- B. H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (1944)
In an era of early 21st-century strategic ambiguity, the Australian Army faces the challenge of meeting what the 2003 strategic update called an ‘increased emphasis on readiness and mobility, on interoperability [and] on the development and enhancement of important capabilities’.1 In response to the rise of new operational demands, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, recently outlined a vision for a hardened and networked Army that will possess the ‘capacity to survive, adapt, fight and win against a diverse range of threats in an increasingly complex environment’.2 This article analyses the implications of the development of motorisation for our current concept of operations. Many of the ideas discussed are drawn from the work of the 2003 Motorisation Writing Team in developing doctrine to guide the introduction and use of the Infantry Mobility Vehicle (IMV) or Bushmaster in mid-2004. The article outlines a proposed Motorised Battle Group structure and discusses the considerations that planners will need to consider in employing this new capability. Finally, consideration is given to the role that a modern Motorised Battle Group might perform in the Chief of Army’s ‘Hardening the Army’ initiative.
The Role of Motorised Forces in Modern War
The modern view of motorisation was outlined by the British military theorist, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, in 1943. Fuller noted that there were two types of land forces: those that were motorised and formed a protective shield, and those that were mechanised and acted as a protective sword.3 While a mechanised force fights in and from vehicles, a motorised force manoeuvres into a position of advantage in order to engage in dismounted tactics. However, a motorised force must have support from a mechanised ‘sword’ containing armour, and firepower to destroy an adversary. The basic concept governing motorised operations in the Australian approach to war is one of movement out of the line of fire. When such movement occurs, the motorised force is able to manoeuvre to advantage in both attack and defence.4
In the Australian Army, the idea of motorisation was introduced in the 1994 Force Structure Review, which identified a requirement for increased infantry mobility. Motorisation subsequently became part of the Restructuring of the Army (RTA) process in the mid-1990s. The idea that mobility, protection and firepower would provide a clear advantage in any land operation is now entrenched in the Army’s keystone doctrine, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare.5 The introduction into service of the Australian-designed and locally built IMV, the Bushmaster, in 2004 represents the final stage of a seven-year program to introduce a protected motorised capability to the land force. The Bushmaster capability supports the Army’s need to possess increased infantry mobility as part of Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) concept. Infantry mobility is mechanised, motorised and airmobile in character, and it is unlikely that any motorised force will move on its own in the future. Rather, motorised units will be task-organised with other force elements—including armour, cavalry, mechanised infantry, and armoured reconnaissance helicopters—operating as a Motorised Battle Group.
When the IMV is introduced to the 7th Brigade in late 2004, the vehicle will provide the Australian Army with a capability that is a ‘protected shield’, in terms of its ability to protect and deploy infantry. While the Bushmaster is not a ‘fighting vehicle’, it does provide selected infantry battalions with the necessary protected mobility to exploit tactical advantages. The Bushmaster also allows land forces to disperse quickly, thus negating the effects of an adversary’s fires and lowering the possibility of casualties. However, there is likely to be an ongoing debate within the Australian Army about the virtues of the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV-25) versus the Bushmaster IMV. The ASLAV is often seen as being more useful for reasons of interoperability and increased firepower. Nonetheless, the Army’s decision to adopt the Bushmaster was made on the basis that the Army could either transport a single battalion with ASLAVs or two with Bushmaster IMVs.6
The Bushmaster IMV is designated as a Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV). The IMV is a wheeled armoured vehicle designed to provide protected mobility with an airconditioned interior for an infantry section of nine personnel. The vehicle provides protection from small-arms fire, mines and mortar blasts, and is capable of achieving speeds of up to 110 km per hour and over a range of at least 600 km. The troop-carrying variant of the IMV can mount a 7.62 mm machine-gun with the potential for a grenade launcher system fitted in the future.
In considering the use of the IMV, it is important to realise that a motorised unit is neither a mechanised nor a transport organisation. Rather, a motorised force represents ‘a unit equipped with complete motor transportation that enables all of its personnel, weapons and equipment to be moved at the same time without assistance from other sources’.7 A motorised unit employs organic vehicles for the purpose of conducting dismounted operations. The introduction of improved motorisation in the Army will increase the combat capability of the infantry battalion and enhance its capacities for concentration and survival. In addition, once integrated as part of a wider network of sensors and information management processes, a motorised force will possess greater situational awareness. Motorisation also contributes to a manoeuvrist philosophy of operations by increasing infantry mobility, protection and sustainability.
Motorised Forces and the Concept of Manoeuvre Operations in a Littoral Environment
The ADF’s current approach to warfare is based on the philosophical underpinning of ‘multidimensional manoeuvre’ in a range of operational scenarios, especially MOLE.8 The main roles for the Army within this overarching concept are to contribute effective land forces to warfighting operations, carry out Military Operations Other than Conventional Warfare (MOOCW), and to conduct activities to shape Australia’s strategic environment. Recent examples of the latter two categories of operations have been the missions to East Timor and the Solomon Islands. In meeting the demands of manoeuvre operations, the Chief of Army has directed that land forces ‘must be highly mobile, well prepared and able to manoeuvre effectively in a littoral environment’.9
A motorised force is particularly useful in the context of two of the four phases of the current MOLE concept. While there is limited scope for motorised forces in the first two phases of MOLE, shaping the operational environment and entry from the sea and air becomes important during the last two of the four phases, namely decisive action and the transition from combat to stability operations. Once ground forces are lodged in a littoral operation, the use of a motorised force will increase the ability of the commander to move into a decisive-action phase deeper inland. In the fourth, or transition, phase towards stability operations, a motorised force permits a protected wide-area presence. In this context, the Bushmaster IMV is an ideal vehicle in missions to support a handover to a United Nations or inter-agency force.
Motorised Infantry and Combined Arms: The Motorised Battle Group
In Australia’s current threat environment, it is likely that the Army will encounter both traditional and non-traditional threats in operations. Motorised forces in isolation are best employed at the low and medium levels of the spectrum of conflict. However, as part of a combined arms force based on elements of a cavalry regiment, a mechanised infantry battalion or a tank regiment, a motorised infantry battalion can operate at the higher end of the spectrum. The grouping of different combat arms and services into a task-organised motorised battle group based on ‘capability bricks’ of motor infantry, armour, cavalry, mechanised infantry, and/or armed reconnaissance helicopters multiplies the overall effect of combat power.
A combined arms motorised battle group has the potential to field a unique combination of mobility, protection and sustainability. Moreover, the protected tactical mobility of the motorised battle group will enable its elements to disperse quickly and, should conditions permit, allow for the rapid massing of combat effects. The key is to achieve overmatch through the motorised battle group’s possessing manoeuvre sub-units such as mechanised, cavalry or armour elements. For example, if a motorised battle group had deployed to East Timor, it would have consisted primarily of the force elements contained in a standard motorised infantry battalion. Yet in the case of Iraq, a motorised battle group would probably have included a motor infantry battalion headquarters and cavalry, armour and armed helicopter sub-units.
A motorised battle group should be task-organised under a manoeuvre headquarters, while the combat elements should be designed to suit the tactical situation. The ‘capability bricks’ or combat teams based on combined arms should ideally consist of three to five combat sub-units, each possessing an integral joint offensive support team and their own combat service support. In determining the particular composition and arms combinations of combat teams, it is important to realise that a motorised battle group would also require a range of capabilities that enable it to conduct reconnaissance, provide security, deliver stand-off firepower and engage in close combat. In terms of combat support, there should be engineer and signaller elements attached and a close support battery. A motorised battle group must be capable of conducting independent operations for up to seventy-two hours. Accordingly, it will require first-line combat service support, and the capacity to link directly into third- or fourth-line support.
Characteristics of a Motorised Battle Group
A motorised battle group can be employed in a range of operations across the spectrum of conflict. However, it is important for staff planners to acknowledge that motorised forces use the Bushmaster vehicle to offer protected mobility only, which means that the transition from a mounted to a dismounted role will affect tactical momentum.
Mobility and Firepower
A motorised battle group is capable of operating in environments ranging from the desert to the tropics. The Bushmaster is more mobile than a UNIMOG and can operate on firm to hard ground, and rudimentary as well as developed road and track systems. The vehicle is also capable of traversing medium-density vegetation and of fording some watercourses by means of an adjustable tyre-pressure system. In terms of firepower, the Bushmaster is fitted with a pintle-mounted 7.62 mm general-purpose machine-gun for local protection and for limited offensive or defensive use in a dismounted role. However, the limited range and stability of any vehicle with pintle-mounted weapons, as well as the need to operate it in the dismounted role, are likely to restrict the use of such weapons. Nonetheless, if a motorised group is task-organised, then its combined arms fires will make it a formidable force.
Independent Operations and Combat Surveillance
A motorised battle group should be capable of undertaking sustained independent operations over a wide area of operations. Once deployed, the group should be able to dominate an area of 200 km by 200 km, and be capable of influencing an area 400 km by 600 km. Indeed, with further development, it is possible that the Bushmaster could act as a ‘mother ship’ to facilitate soldiers ‘plugging in’ to networks in order to download situational awareness information or recharge batteries.
Communications
The Bushmaster can be fitted with tactical voice communications systems (three in the troop variant), and a vehicle condition monitoring system that is capable of limited communications with other vehicles. Individual vehicles of the force can be fitted with a battlefield information management system or Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS). When linked to a network of sensors and the other combat force elements of a motorised battle group, these systems will increase situational awareness. The command variants of the IMV have the capacity to monitor up to five networks; this capacity allows for mobile command posts and effective command and control on the move. This type of capacity suggests that the motorised battle group would be a candidate for adaptation to network-centric warfare as part of the LAND 5000 project.
Vulnerability
Motorised vehicles are vulnerable to attack by armour, anti-armour, artillery, and aircraft missiles. It has been noted that the IMV will be easily detected by radar and thermal imagery. However, wheeled vehicle vulnerability can be diminished by use of the battle group design that is task-organised for a specific mission. It is vital to recognise that a protected mobility vehicle relies on secure routes, speed and agility for its survival rather than on its armour protection. As a consequence, an IMV should not be employed in decisive close combat.
Conclusion
Historically, success in the execution of land operations has always been determined by the ability of a commander to unite the elements of mobility, protection and firepower into a tactical system of combined arms. The ‘Hardening the Army’ initiative enhances combined arms capability to execute warfighting operations in complex environments. Organising motorised forces into a battlegroup will help to optimise the advantages of an all-arms approach to future combat and may assist in outweighing the increased logistic challenges that the Bushmaster presents to the Army.
Two doctrinal publications, LWP-G 3-3-2 Motorised Operations Developing Doctrine and LWP-G 3-3-13 Motorised Battalion Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, will be released in mid-2004 to guide the use of the IMV in the land force. The Bushmaster has a capacity to contribute to many types of infantry operations in the future. The vehicle provides a protected mode of transport to deliver troops quickly to a position of advantage from which to execute dismounted operations. The key challenge may be to persuade conservative ‘foot’ infantryman to accept the philosophy of battle grouping for operating motorised force elements. We need to avoid developing the profile of the British Army of the Victorian Age—a small professional force adept at fighting light infantry brushfire wars but one that, over time, lost sight of its primary role of combined arms warfighting. An overconcentration on brushfire wars with light forces contributed to the slaughter of a generation of British soldiers in World War I. The introduction of the Bushmaster should be viewed as an opportunity to develop a protective shield in the land force in the form of an all-arms motorised battle group. Such a capability will support the Army’s ‘offensive swords’ represented by armour, mechanised infantry, and armed reconnaissance helicopters in the future. In short, motorised innovation can only increase the options available to a genuinely ‘hardened Army’.
Endnotes
1 Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003, March 2003, p. 6.
2 Address by Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, Chief of Army, to members of Project Bushmaster, Bendigo, 29 August 2003. Notes taken by author.
3 J. F. C. Fuller, Armoured Warfare, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1943, p. 64.
4 Department of Defence, The Australian Approach to Warfare, Public Affairs & Corporate Communication, Canberra, June 2002, pp. 23–4.
5 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, Vic., 2002.
6 Address by Lieutenant Colonel Louise Abell to 7th Brigade personnel, 4 June 2003.
7 Australian Army, LWD 3-3-2 Motorised Operations (Developing Doctrine), Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, Vic., 2003, p. 1–1.
8 The Australian Approach to Warfare, p. 20.
9 Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2002, p. 2.
