Introduction
The Retrospect section of the Australian Army Journal: For the Profession of Arms (AAJ) is designed to reproduce interesting articles from the Australian Army’s earlier journals, notably the Commonwealth Military Journal and the Australian Army Journal from the 1940s to the mid 1970s. In this edition of the journal, we are reprinting an edited excerpt from Lieutenant Colonel S. C. Graham’s study on the use of tanks in tropical conditions. The study first appeared in the June 1955 edition of the AAJ and was reprinted by the Armoured Centre in February 1968 during the Vietnam War. The Army is about to undergo a transformation from a light infantry to a light armoured force. It is therefore both timely and relevant to reproduce part of Lieutenant Colonel Graham’s analysis of how Australians employed tanks in combined arms warfare in jungle conditions against the Japanese during World War II. Readers should note, however, that, although Graham examined the entire Allied experience in using armour in the South-West Pacific theatre in his original article, for reasons of space, only an edited version of the Australian experience is reproduced here.
* This article is based on an essay written for the original Australian Army Journal and published in June 1955.
Tanks Against Japan
At first sight, tropical or jungle areas would come under the category of tank-proof country. A closer examination of the conditions prevailing in New Guinea suggests a greater scope for the employment of tanks than may at first have been considered possible.
- Report by Headquarters 1st Australian Corps
The tanks had more than proved their worth during the long advance from Aitape, and most of the critics were converted to the need for armour in this type of warfare. The infantry were loud in their praises, as the Tillies had saved them many casualties. The Engineers did a splendid job in clearing the path of mines. The infantry also gave the tanks the fullest support, and their co-operation was excellent in every way.
- Tank Tracks—Official History of 2/4 Australian Armoured Regiment
In arguing the case for tanks in jungle warfare, I do not suggest that they are the cure-all that will guarantee victory. I do suggest, though, that when considering armour there are certain fundamentals that must be carefully evaluated. Firstly, any army fighting in the jungle against an enemy with unlimited manpower must have some ‘equaliser’ if it hopes to win. Secondly, we are told that the atomic bomb is not the effective weapon in the jungle that it is in open warfare. Nor is air power the ‘equaliser’—as was shown by the conflicts in Korea and Indo-China. Thirdly, the effectiveness of an army is always measured in terms of the firepower that can be delivered at the right time and place against an enemy.
Whether we like it or not, then, we come back to tanks. An armoured regiment on tropical establishment has the gun power of one-and a-half regiments of field artillery, the machine-gun power of six infantry battalions, and the light machinegun power of three infantry companies. An armoured regiment achieves this firepower with 360 men. Yet, say the critics, the effort to move armour through the jungle is prohibitive. In reply to a question on these lines at the Staff College in 1954, Field Marshal Sir William Slim said that tanks could be used in the jungle provided that the necessary effort to use them was made. Such an effort might be considerable, but would usually be repaid.
I believe in tanks. I believe that they are an essential, integral part of any army in any theatre. However, one swallow does not make a summer; I have therefore resurrected the files [from Australia’s World War II campaigns in the South-West Pacific] to write with the simple, unabashed ambition of converting a few more adherents to the faith. Whether the lessons are learnt or not, at least the excuse of ignorance will no longer be valid.
Buna
The Australian–American operation in Buna was aimed at reducing the coastal perimeter area of Gona–Buna–Sanananda and ending the Japanese grip on Papua. Fighting lasted from 20 November 1942 until 3 January 1943 over a front of eight miles. There were 5500 Australian and US casualties, while the Japanese suffered the loss of their 11 000-strong garrison.
At Buna the main advance was through coconut groves and overgrown airstrips, which allowed limited tactical manoeuvre. The tanks used in Buna were Lights (from a squadron of 2/6 Armoured Regiment). The terrain was swampy and thick with undergrowth and the tanks generally used line ahead on a track. In the Cape Endiadere area, water-filled shell holes, stumps and logs caused bellying and bogging among armour. Eight tanks were used at Cape Endiadere on 18 December 1942; during the sixteen-day advance that followed, the armoured squadron saw continuous action. Due to enemy action and the effects of the terrain, only eleven of the squadron’s nineteen tanks were available at any one time, and of these six were knocked out in the fighting.
In actions at Buna, the tactics employed involved tanks leading the assault, spaced across the battalion front, with each individual tank being closely followed by a specially detailed protective party of infantry. The bulk of the remaining infantry followed in open order. Depending on visibility, the distance between the tanks and the main body of infantry varied from between 5 and 50 yards. Standard troop organisation was not always used with tanks fighting in pairs, threes and fours.
Although light tanks were unsuitable for the operation, they succeeded due to surprise. A heavier tank was required—one that would be able to take punishment, crash through undergrowth, mount a bigger gun and travel slowly. In addition, a short range, high angle high explosive weapon was required.
Satelberg
After the fall of Lae in September 1943, Australian plans called for converging thrusts by the 7th Division through the Markham and Ramu Valleys and by the 9th Division along the coast to Finschafen. The reduction of the fortress of Satelberg was necessary for the protection of the line of communications and began on 18 November 1943. The tanks used were Matildas from C and A squadrons of the 1st Australian Army Tank Battalion and operated in November and December 1943, with infantry battalions of the 4th Brigade.
These operations were completely successful, largely because of the high standard of the tank crews, the cooperation between the armoured squadrons and the infantry, and the lack of enemy antitank weapons. Satelberg itself was a steep mountain, thickly covered with bamboo and undergrowth, which concealed sticky red mud. A track led up to the cleared top, where the old Lutheran mission was situated. The advance along the coast was through a kunai flat dotted with patches of virgin jungle and coconut plantations and crossed every mile or so by steep-sided creeks.
Infantry, tank troops and engineer sections or platoons were employed. For the early operations, the tanks stayed mostly on tracks, moving in line ahead. The first tank had no accompanying infantry, but was covered by the second tank (15 yards in rear), behind which walked a section with the platoon or company commander and a tank officer. The third tank was 40 yards behind, followed by the remainder of the infantry, except for protective parties, who made their way through the jungle on either side of the tanks. More orthodox tactics were possible during the advance along the coast. Tanks moved two, three and even four up, with infantry 100 yards in rear (though infantry led sometimes because of the obstacles). Engineers rode on the rear tanks, armed with explosives and tools for rapid action on obstacles. Targets were indicated by the use of walkie-talkie radios from the ground.
Bougainville
American marines landed on Bougainville on 1 November 1943 and established a beachhead. This beachead was developed into an advance base at Torokina, and was taken over by 2nd Australian Corps at the end of 1944. Subsequent operations on Bougainville were designed to mop up Japanese troops on the island. Matilda squadrons from 2/4 Australian Armoured Regiment were continuously in action in southern Bougainville until the end of the war. One tank troop also operated at Soraken in the north from July 1945.
Probably because of the lessons learnt from earlier operations, this campaign was the best example of infantry and armoured cooperation in the jungle. The country was almost universally inhospitable, comprising mainly terrain with thick undergrowth. Swamps were common, and deep mud from incessant rain was the normal ground surface. Rivers were met every few miles. The Buin Road, the main axis of advance, was really an overgrown mud track, and was mostly avoided by tanks in order to prevent its complete disintegration.
A standard team consisting of an infantry company, a tank troop and an engineer section was used in operations. Infantry (with engineer mine-clearance parties) normally led any advance and covered the flanks, followed by the tanks and the remainder of the engineer section with its bulldozer. The troop commander on foot, the infantry company commander, engineer section commander and artillery/mortar forward observers stayed together. In order to obtain surprise and avoid antitank measures, great imagination and effort was spent in moving the tanks through ‘impenetrable’ areas, often in long outflanking roles. Invariably, these moves were successful, and the confidence of everybody that the tanks would ‘get there’ was almost unlimited. In addition to normal tasks, tanks were also used for contact patrolling, clearing lines of communications, armoured reconnaissance, the extrication of forces caught in ambush and carriage of stores.
Borneo
The recapture of Borneo was an Australian operation with US naval support. It was the most ambitious, coordinated operation undertaken by Australian forces in the Pacific War. The aim was to take the island with its rich resources as part of the general plan for the reduction of the Japanese occupation of the East Indies and Malaya. Landings by troops from the 9th and 7th divisions occurred at Tarakan, Brunei Bay and Balikpapan between May and July 1945.
Matilda tanks were employed from 2/9 Armoured Regiment at Tarakan, Brunei and Labuan. Flamethrowers, tank dozers, tank bridge layers and rocket tanks were used by the 2/1 Reconnaissance Squadron and two squadrons from the 1st Armoured Regiment supported the 7th Division at Balikpapan. However, the campaign was not notable from an armoured point of view. This was because, except for Tarakan, Japanese opposition was weak and much reduced from preliminary bombardment. Because of the limited area of operations on Tarakan, tanks operated from a central harbour area and stayed mainly on the roads being used as a reserve.
Wewak
The Australian 6th Division took over the Wewak–Aitape sector of western New Guinea from the Americans in November 1944 in order to deal with the 22 000 remaining troops of the Japanese 18th Army. Fighting occurred mainly in the coastal belt in the first few months until enemy forces retreated inland. The 17th Brigade then carried out pursuit inland, while the 19th Brigade advanced along the coast. By the end of the war, the Japanese had been driven from the Prince Alexander Range, and 14 500 troops surrendered.
Matilda tanks of C Squadron, 2/4 Armoured Regiment were employed in Borneo and, from the first operation on 6 January 1945, were in action until the end of the war. The biggest single effort of the fighting was the attack on Wewak itself on 10 May 1945 in which engineers, infantry and tanks operated as combined teams. In the Wewak attack, tanks were called forward to deal with enemy positions holding up the infantry assault.
Tanks in the Jungle: A Summary of Lessons Learnt
With the military emphasis once again on South-East Asia, it will be interesting to see how many of the lessons from World War II will be rediscovered in training and operations. One can only hope that they will be few, although the saying that ‘the only thing we learn from military history is that we don’t learn from military history’ cannot entirely be discarded as cynicism. In any case, junior officers should remember that, although the lessons may appear rather obvious, they were learnt at a heavy cost and should not be ignored.
Armoured Mobility
The ideal tank for jungle warfare should have maximum weight (consistent with transportation) to permit the carriage of heavy armour. Such a tank would be able to take punishment, give a good ‘jungle-bashing’ performance and it should have at a minimum a 75 mm, short-barrelled gun and low track pressure. For ease of movement, the fitting of grousers and track extenders on tanks are also desirable. Mobility depends largely on an ability to judge expertly the capacity of the tank to negotiate ground. Accumulated foliage must be cleared at every opportunity otherwise its drag will hinder (if not stop) the tank, or the foliage will damage the tank’s suspension and tracks.
If a heavy preparatory bombardment is used in operations, then an impact on tank mobility from craters and fallen trees must be expected. For the best tank movement, prior ground reconnaissance must be carried out and may necessitate special patrols. Tank officers should keep themselves informed of infantry patrol schedules so that they can either go along themselves, or have specific armoured questions included in the patrol briefing. Where possible, routes should be marked, avoiding signal cables and, where time is short, infantry guides should be used. While on the move, tank guns must remain positioned between eleven and one o’clock on the clock face in order to avoid damage. If good foresight is used in choosing the right lines of advance for armour, then the trail blazed by tanks can often be used by jeeps without further engineering reconnaissance being required.
Engineer support depends mainly on the number of lines of advance available rather than the number of tanks being deployed. Sappers must be specially trained with tanks, particularly in clearing mines and improvising methods of crossing natural obstacles. Bulldozers and tractors are essential, preferably with light armoured protection provided for the drivers. In armoured training, seemingly impossible tasks should be attempted, so that tank crews will know exactly what their equipment can or cannot do in the jungle. Almost no ground is impassable to tanks if imagination and determination are used. The mental attitude of commanders may be a greater obstacle than the jungle itself.
The rate of an armoured advance is normally decided by the speed of the infantry. Tanks bogged in mud or broken down in the jungle must not be allowed to hold up the advance (their superior speed will enable them to catch up), but a protective party must be left with them. Tanks must also operate ‘closed down’ in action in order to protect their crews from sniper fire, explosive bursts, grenades and bombs.
Fire and Movement
The use of armour should always be aimed at getting tanks where the enemy does not think they can go or to a position where his preparations are likely to be the least. Within reason, the more tanks are used in an action, the greater will be the exploitation of surprise and shock action. Target indication will always be a problem. The troop leader on the ground, directing fire by radio, is probably the best method that can be used. Canister is most effective for clearing jungle and for engaging personnel or ill-defined targets.
In jungle engagements, closing with the enemy should be avoided. Fight the enemy with tank fire and allow the infantry to ‘mop him up’. However, a suitable signal, such as a long burst of machine-gun fire, is needed in order to show the troops when fire has ceased. On such a signal, the infantry must move in quickly if the benefits of supporting fire are not to be lost. When attacking pillboxes and bunkers, the tank’s main armament should be employed against the slits, if necessary with armour-piercing shells followed by high-explosive rounds or smoke. Flanks should be sprayed with machine-gun fire since the enemy may well try to weather the storm by moving outside the bunker and then try to get back in before the infantry advance begins. The supporting fire plan for an attack must, therefore, cover both tank and infantry requirements. With the added effectiveness of short-range weapons, such a unified fire plan is more necessary than ever before.
Infantry - Armour Cooperation
Infantry must accept the responsibility for dealing with close-quarter antitank weapons and with fire from snipers. These requirements will normally mean that infantry should precede tanks and protect their flanks, but in any case, some infantry must be within sight of the armour at all times. In fact, infantry must be prepared to operate without tanks, but tanks should never operate without infantry. Time must be allowed in planning an attack for armoured personnel to reconnoitre terrain and service their vehicles. Early inclusion of armoured commanders in all planning likely to involve tanks is therefore vital.
Distances are governed by visibility, and infantry who keep unnecessarily close to armour risk becoming casualties from mines, shell splinters, and fire aimed at the tanks. Tanks do save infantry casualties, but infantry must not become ‘tank-minded’ to such a degree that they expect, as a right, armoured support for any action. The morale effect of tanks on the enemy is enormous, but this effect will naturally decrease if an armoured force is used improperly or is deployed in an unsuitable role that highlights the force’s limitations. In defence, tank weapons should be given a definite arc of fire but they must still be well protected by the infantry. Armour firing in defence should also be well camouflaged, and allowance made for their muzzle blast.
Communications
Sound and alternative means of communication between tanks and infantry must be available. The telephone and wireless are normal, but visual signals and personal contact will also be required. Infantry must be able to recognise tanks from their markings. A thorough understanding of each other’s capacity and limitations is required of infantry and armour. Regimental and squadron commanders should always be with the divisional, battalion or brigade headquarters being supported. Tank troop leaders must be able to control their personnel from positions on the ground, since the troops will often have to move on foot with the infantry commanders. A ‘mopping-up’ drill on a position is also necessary if friendly casualties are to be avoided.
Administration
Where supply is difficult, it may be necessary to have replenishment areas with ammunition and spare crews close behind the scene of action. Ammunition expenditure must be carefully controlled by fire discipline. The infantry should not request that targets be engaged by tanks if they can be better dealt with by aircraft or artillery.
An armoured reconnaissance vehicle for each squadron is necessary in the forward area, but a heavy tractor can also do a great deal of work to keep tanks moving out of small-arms range. As normal maintenance is very difficult in the jungle, it is imperative that tanks go into action in the best condition, and that a crew and troop rotation system is in operation. Pulling tanks out of action should be abnormal. Having fought laboriously forward, it is obviously unsound to go back with the added risk of ambush on the way. For maintenance and replenishment purposes, however, it may be desirable to move armoured vehicles to a reserve company area. As engine front idlers are the most commonly damaged parts of tanks, a good supply of spares is necessary.
Because recovery over any distance is a problem in the jungle, armour should be repaired on the spot by Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (RAEME) flying squads whenever possible. RAEME equipment must therefore be designed with immediate repair in view (the use of the helicopter may be an answer in the future).
Conclusion
The Malayan campaign has not been covered in this article because tanks were not used in the defence of Singapore. Malaya was the only campaign that Australia and the Allies lost, and it is interesting to speculate as to what might have occurred if we had possessed tanks on the Malayan peninsula in 1942 and used them boldly. What, for instance, would have happened if the Japanese tanks that smashed the 11th Indian Division and started the Allied collapse had met British and Australian armour? Would that have happened had we used tanks in the more open areas to cover our withdrawal and give us much needed time? What would have happened to the Japanese landing parties on Singapore Island if they had been hit by a couple of hundred tanks? The answer to these questions is partly given by Brigadier C. H. Kappe in his Fall of Singapore. Kappe says, ‘what was needed [in Malaya] was a squadron or two of tanks to track the tired and disintegrated Jap[anese] units as they emerged into the more open country north-west of the Tengah aerodrome, but we didn’t have the tanks’.
