* This article is based on an address to the Australian Defence Organisation’s Network-centric Warfare Conference in May 2003, in the immediate aftermath of the warfighting phase of Coalition operations in Iraq.
The brevity, violence and spectacular speed of the second Iraq War demonstrated that armed conflict in the information age is likely to coexist with older aspects of industrial and even pre-industrial warfare. Kinetic effect—that is, the collective impact of blast, heat and penetration from the force of modern munitions—will remain the ultimate expression of violence in war and is always magnified by the ability of the modern media to capture images of destruction. Kinetic effect on screen was shown in abundance through the television coverage of the recent Iraq War. However, as information-based and network-related warfighting techniques begin to dominate the battlespace, we should expect combat to become speedier and certainly more complex than the 20th-century force-on-force paradigm between opposing armed forces. The interconnected dimension of 21st-century warfare is less obvious to the public eye, but almost certainly represents the future.
During the 2003 war with Iraq, Coalition forces employing what were mostly first-generation network-centric technologies and concepts beat Saddam Hussein’s military. Using Special Forces and advanced aircraft, the Coalition was able to conduct deep raids, exploiting information gained from human intelligence sources. The latter frequently used mobile phones to relay vital information to Coalition forces. As a result, in some cases, the operational targeting cycle was compressed from days to hours and then even to minutes.
During the Iraqi campaign, ships in the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) Maritime Interception Force employed network-centric concepts. While naval ships in modern Western fleets have been able to share basic situational awareness data for many years, what has changed recently is the ability of navies to derive real-time interpretative value from an information-based common operational picture. In 2003, Coalition vessels made extensive use of naval intranet chat rooms from ship to ship in order to facilitate operations. Naval vessels were able to employ a wide range of sources in order to maintain the blockade of Iraq’s ports. The networking of information, combined with the professional expertise of the RAN, proved vital in preventing the Iraqis from releasing deadly mines into the Gulf in the first days of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The linking of sensors with command-and-control techniques allowed the RAN to achieve outstanding results in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, we need to recognise that we are only in the early stages of networked operations. In many respects, our current command-and-control system might be described as ‘Generation One of Network-centric Warfare—the Australian way’. Our first major challenge during the 2003 Iraq War was to obtain sufficient satellite bandwidth to facilitate communications over a dispersed operational area. We needed bandwidth both in and out of the Gulf area of operations in order to be able to transmit quick, accurate, high-density data for twenty-four hours a day. Once we had acquired sufficient bandwidth, we were able to network the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) command-and-control system across the three levels of war: from the strategic level through to the operational to the senior tactical levels. In Operation Bastille (the operation involving the forward deployment of Australian forces) we used a home page as a major tool of information. Then, during actual hostilities, in Operation Falconer, the ADF posted a large variety of information material to the website. This information was vetted, catalogued, updated and archived throughout the course of the war. All persons in the command and staff chain had access to virtually all of the database and they could browse, or refer directly to particular issues.
As Chief of the Defence Force, I spent the first two hours of every day poring over the website, reading the various reports and following up on them by e-mail communication, telephone calls or through face-to-face meetings with colleagues and subordinates. Brigadier Maurie McNarn, stationed in Qatar as Commander of ADF forces in the Middle East, could read intelligence reports from the Defence Intelligence Organisation in Australia seconds after they had been lodged. Simultaneously, the strategic-command element in Canberra was able to analyse Brigadier McNarn’s notes from his meetings with senior Coalition commanders almost immediately after these had taken place.
As a commander, one of my apprehensions about such a networked command-and-control regime was the danger of what I describe as ‘information obesity syndrome’. Australian Special Forces in Iraq could send their commanders extraordinary amounts of data, including images, from within enemy territory. Conversely, ADF Headquarters in Canberra and Qatar could send forces in the field information and intelligence from almost any level of command, ranging from military orders to the local football scores. As a consequence, I became concerned about the possibility of the sheer volume of information leading to ‘paralysis by analysis’, so inhibiting decision making. Anyone with experience of operational command knows that the temptation to acquire more and more information in a quest for perfect knowledge of the enemy is a constant risk for military commanders. The great British military theorist, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, put it succinctly when he wrote of how every general wanted to know what was happening on the ‘other side of the hill’. Yet, ultimately, piercing the veil of operational obscurity is not a science as much as an art. The art of command lies in realising when sufficient information has been received to make a sound decision. Moreover, the art of command requires refinement of a number of professional and personal attributes, including mental discipline, operational experience, a clear sense of professional judgment and a rigorous approach to the use of time. Information is important in war but it must be interpreted, measured and assessed by the human mind, not by technology.
During Operation Falconer, I refrained from bombarding our troops with orders from the strategic level, although I did not hesitate to send appropriate congratulations and encouragement down through the chain of command. The key point to be grasped is that, in military command in the age of networks, the tactical level can critically affect the strategic level. It is quite possible that occasion, means and opportunity will coalesce and allow a tactical element to achieve a strategic outcome—a situation that was improbable in the annals of warfare up until the arrival of the information age at the end of the 20th century. The impact of the tactical on the strategic and the compression of the levels of war are philosophical issues that the world’s advanced militaries are only just beginning to address.
During operations in Iraq, the various controlling, monitoring and supporting headquarters in diverse locations around the region were able to monitor the location and movement of our people by dint of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology—the main agent of what has been called the precision revolution. The use of GPS was a huge advantage to commanders and their staff from both an intelligence and fire support stance. GPS technology proliferated in the Coalition ground forces since it is cheap, simple and works effectively (provided its users acknowledge some environmental limitations). GPS is a capability that must be extended quickly in modern militaries in order to prevent the danger of fratricide of friendly forces. We need to develop a common operational picture of our dispositions that assists in minimising any loss of life on our own side.
There is, of course, a tendency to view network-centric warfare as an esoteric theory of war reflecting glib military ‘new-speak’ and to see it as the preserve of postmodern military theory. Yet all that network-centric warfare seeks to achieve is the timeless quest of all militaries since the time of Alexander and Caesar—that of shared omniscience. Ultimately, network-centric warfare will stand or fall on its ability to move from the realm of theory to the realm of operational reality. A networked approach to war must envisage a transition from a philosophy of connectivity to an operational expression of ‘shared omniscience’. There are some technologies available—notably unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—that can assist in this transition. UAVs, in particular, represent a powerful tool for networked militaries. These vehicles broadcast information, are potentially ubiquitous and are on the Australian Defence Organisation’s (ADO) ‘A list’ for acquisition under the 2000 Defence Capability Plan.
Within the ADF, we may require different kinds of UAVs in the future. Unmanned vehicles might range from large to supplementary, or serve to replace manned aircraft and smaller, long-endurance aircraft in the littoral sea–land environment. These unmanned platforms are not exotic, or ‘high end’, experimental technology. In the early 21st century, the UAV is a mature component of any modern, flexible warfighting force. We need to examine whether we can accelerate the delivery of the UAV Project outlined in the 2000 Defence Capability Plan.
Within the ADO, we require more commercial off-the-shelf technologies in order to reduce our research and development time. It is important for the ADF to reduce its experimentation and field trial time in order that we can provide ourselves with an initial but usable UAV capability. UAV technology makes it possible for not only commanders, but also front-line troops in the field, to understand what is happening on Liddell Hart’s ‘other side of the hill’. For the benefit of Australia’s warfighters, the ADO needs to examine both local and overseas tactical UAVs, and their available sensor mix and payload capacity.
On balance, the new information age in warfare holds great opportunities for a small force such as the ADF—provided we are prepared to harness our strengths and minimise our weaknesses. The ADF needs to bring a network-centric warfare approach to the forefront of our thinking about future armed conflict simply because networking of weapons and systems promises to make us more effective at warfighting. However, a networked approach depends on how successful we are in developing technology, cherishing our people, and forging partnerships with industry. Only a balanced approach to these three areas will provide us with a lasting warfighting advantage.
Innovation: Preapring for Future Roles
There has been some important work completed in the field of innovation in recent years. In particular, there has been some promising concept analysis to develop the ADF as a flexible, adaptable and effective force that can win the nation’s future conflicts in independent, joint inter-agency and coalition operations. The methodology that we have adopted involves developing, and then experimenting with, a range of concepts that are based on future missions, adversaries and environments.
In 2002, we examined in the Australian Approach to Warfare the way in which we fight, and we set out a vision for the ADF in Force 2020 and the publication Future Warfighting Concept. The latter publication puts our primary task of warfighting in its political, technological and strategic context, and identifies a future concept, called Multidimensional Manoeuvre, as an aspiration for the way in which the ADF would like to fight in the future.
In terms of innovation, a network-centric approach to war must deliver more effective warfighting capability. Achieving this goal requires preparing the ADF to meet strategic uncertainty, particularly in the form of asymmetric threats. The latter threat makes flexibility and adaptability essential characteristics of the future ADF, both in planning and in budgetary consideration. We will need to consider how best to allocate the funds within the Defence Capability Plan, tailoring capability to strategy and synchronising ways, ends and means. A networked military means more than delivering a new radar, computer or weapons; it means developing areas such as air defence and offensive fire support as authentic networked systems. We need to investigate how much we will spend to create a networked system. There are some compelling questions that we will have to be prepared to confront. For example, do we invest in cooperative engagement capability? And again, would we gain a significant advantage if Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft could provide target designation to the RAN’s proposed new air-warfare destroyers? What capabilities do we select to modernise in order to create an effectively networked force? Is it necessary to equip the entire ADF to a single common set of standards? In short, if we are to succeed in transforming our military into a networked force rather than a force that uses multiple platforms, there will have to be significant changes to our acquisition philosophy and military culture.
In particular, we will have to be careful about the methods that we employ to harmonise sophisticated technology with our human resources in networked systems. In this respect, Air 7000, the future maritime surveillance and response project, shows promise, as does our work on a joint-command support system. The ADF’s adoption of a standardised J series message system; the introduction of key links, such as AEW&C aircraft into our network; and our recent move into space through the Optus Satellite system are all important developments in the long march towards establishing a networked culture within the Australian military.
People: The Critical Ingredient of Network-Centric Warfare
A network-centric approach to warfare involves passing information between different parts of the ADF in a rapid and seamless way. Achieving an efficient degree of connectivity offers the Australian military a future in which our personnel can detect, identify and engage targets, using a broad range of sensors and weapons. More importantly, however, relevant, accurate and protected information will allow ADF personnel to collaborate and to achieve a level of synchronisation superior to that of any adversary.
The Australian approach to networkcentric warfare has two dimensions that are closely related and mutually reinforcing. First, there is the human dimension, based on mission command and professional mastery. While neither of these ideas is new in the ADF lexicon, they assume greater importance in a network-centric approach to warfare. In a networked approach to the military art, ADF personnel will receive clear information regarding the commander’s intent and may be required to make decisions that have broad repercussions beyond the level of their ‘pay grade’. Mission command is essentially about professional trust between commanders and subordinates, and network-centric warfare has the effect of bringing the quality of this interaction into a sharp and unrelenting focus.
The second dimension is the dynamics of the network itself. The network represents the technical side of connectivity and serves to link our major military systems, permitting new ways of drawing vital information together. Operating in this new environment, however, demands more than better connectivity and information management techniques. In the ADF of the future, we will also have to make hard decisions about our education, training, doctrine and organisational structure. Education and training, for instance, is the touchstone of effective capability. In the future, joint education and training institutions will be major partners in ADF efforts in order to develop a comprehensive, integrated approach to warfighting. In recent years, we have made major advances in progressing joint education through new institutions such as the Australian Defence College and the Defence Force School of Signals.
In the future, we will almost certainly use these education and training establishments for much more than ‘chalk and talk’. For example, it is assessed within the ADF that technical input from the School of Signals will assist in the development of some thirty-five computer and information systems projects planned over the next decade. Moreover, future students at the Australian Defence College can expect to be involved in experimentation, thus helping to create a coherent, learning culture with the ADF.
Change, then, will be a permanent feature in the future, and although change may threaten some individual ‘rice bowls’, it is necessary to ensure that we adapt ourselves to constant transformation. If we fail to do so, we will almost certainly pay an unnecessarily high price in blood on the battlefield in times of crisis and war.
Partnerships
In the future, industry will be a key partner of the ADF. Industry has driven, and continues to drive, the information and communications revolution. Just as the militaries of the first half of the 20th century reflected the industrial techniques of mass production developed by Henry Ford and others, so in the information age will militaries reflect the impact of Bill Gates’s communications revolution on armed conflict. The Department of Defence has established a Capability Development Advisory Forum with several subcommittees—including a Defence Information and Electronic Systems Association and an Armed Forces Communications and Electronic Association—to liaise with industry and commerce, and to keep the ADO abreast of new ideas and trends in the private sector.
A network-centric approach to warfare will need to be encouraged within the ADO, particularly by such areas as those of the Chief Information Officer, the single Services, the Defence Materiel Organisation, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, and Defence Personnel and Corporate Services. Cooperation with our overseas partners and allies is also important. While we cannot make the entire force interoperable with everyone, we will need to tackle this issue by identifying with whom we need to be interoperable—sometimes by service or function—and then working out the way to achieve the required effect.
Conclusion
In the lead-up to the Iraq War, we witnessed a refrain from a Grecian Chorus who predicted that the Coalition forces were too few to succeed and that the whole military endeavour would become a battle of attrition, culminating in a Mesopotamian Stalingrad in Baghdad. What the critics did not understand was that it was the Coalition’s war-winning lead in network-centric operations that led to the rapid decapitation of the Iraqi regime.
A network-centric approach to warfare will help the ADF of the future to ensure that it possesses a strategic advantage over any possible rival. In order to accomplish such an advantage, we will continuously modernise our forces in a way that both achieves and maintains a warfighting advantage. As we build a networked force and use it to enhance our combat power, we will need to balance resources between command and control, sensors, and engagement systems in order to ensure maximum operational efficiency. It is vital, however, that as we implement network-centric warfare we realise that we are not dealing with merely an array of technology, but rather a unified, holistic system that serves the needs of the human being in warfare.
The Iraq War reaffirmed the toughness, resourcefulness, excellent training and self-confidence of Australian military professionals. The ADF has participated in what historians will probably describe as an ‘early network-centric war’. What we learnt in Iraq was the potential of applying a network-centric approach to warfare in 21st-century conditions. In the deserts of the Gulf, we saw information shared, refined and exploited in order to enable good men and women to achieve swift operational success. Our task in the ADF for the rest of the first decade of this new millennium is to race towards the future and create a networked approach to armed conflict. We must move firmly from theory to practice in order to empower our military personnel to succeed in complex operations on the unknown and unexpected battlefields of the information age.
