To The Editors,
I have just commenced reading the new Australian Army Journal. I note that the Introduction states that the AAJ is to be ‘a professional Journal in which officers can record their ideas, views and experiences’. The Introduction goes on to state that ‘the AAJ welcomes articles, review essays and letters from all serving officers’. Are these phrases meant to suggest that the Army’s enlisted soldiers will never have anything to offer the revived journal?
Warrant Officer M. Levine
Regimental Sergeant Major
9 Brigade
The Editors' Reply
The AAJ welcomes contributions from all members of the Army. All contributions to the AAJ are assessed for publication solely on merit and not on rank—a policy outlined by the Chief of Army in his Message in the inaugural edition. The Chief stated, ‘I want to appeal to all members of the ‘Army family’—serving members, reservists, retired members, civilian writers and all academics with an interest in military affairs—to throw their weight behind the new journal’. Furthermore, one of the most powerful and well-received articles in the June edition of the AAJ was former Army corporal Paul Jordan’s article on the 1995 Kibeho massacre in Rwanda.
To The Editors,
In the inaugural edition of the excellent Australian Army Journal, I noted with interest the 1957 article written by Field Marshal Slim on leadership. The article describes Slim, a British soldier, as a Field Marshal in the Australian Army. Is this status claimed because as, Governor-General of Australia, Slim was also Commander-in-Chief or is it simply an error on the part of the AAJ?
Lieutenant Craig McGuire
Royal Australian Navy
The Editors' Reply
Slim was a Field Marshal in the British Army. The only Field Marshal in the Australian Army has been Sir Thomas Blamey, who was appointed in 1950. The AAJ believes that to try to claim Slim as a Field Marshal in the Australian Army on the basis of his tenure as Governor-General of Australia and role as Commanderin-Chief is an inaccurate representation of his constitutional status. The Editors regret the error.
To The Editors,
Alan Ryan’s excellent review of Carol Off’s book, The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle: A Story of Generals and Justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, highlights the merits of undertaking a closer examination of the Canadian military experience, and its ethical and operational lessons for Australia. The tragedy of Major General Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda and the difficulties faced by Major General Lewis Mackenzie in Sarajevo in Bosnia have much to teach about the complexities of modern soldiering.
Australian ‘warfighting’ professionals have an unfortunate predisposition to be dismissive of the Canadian military because of its ‘peacekeeping’ focus, and due to operational shortcomings revealed in both Rwanda and Somalia. Yet, to dismiss recent Canadian experiences as irrelevant overlooks the fact that later peacekeeping missions have reflected many lessons learnt from both Rwanda and Bosnia. For example, in Kosovo in 1999, Canadian forces clearly recognised the value of the combined arms team and the need for force protection and deployed several Leopard tanks as part of KFOR.
Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland
Australian Army, Visiting Defence Fellow
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada
To The Editors,
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Krause’s article on the use of tanks in combined arms warfare reinforces the arguments first made in Major-General R. N. L. Hopkins’ excellent, albeit now dated book, Australian Armour. Krause’s article is valuable because it brings Hopkins’ argument up to date in a short and cogent manner for today’s soldier. Reading Krause’s article suggests that Australian tactical doctrine does not sufficiently emphasise lessons learnt from own combat experience. Whenever we have successfully used our tanks—in Amiens in World War I, in New Guinea in World War II and in Vietnam in the 1960s—they have always been a significant combat-multiplier and have reduced casualties. Australia has never employed tanks in the traditional ‘Fulda Gap’ or ‘Kursk’ manner of massed armour. Yet, on IOC TEWTs and throughout my military career, I have always been told by instructors: ‘Don’t penny-packet your tanks’.
We need to redefine an ‘Australian way’ of armoured warfare. The fact is that we do penny-packet our tanks—and with good reason. For our operational purposes, ‘penny-packeting’ is the way to keep armour not only relevant for the Asia-Pacific ‘arc of instability’, but uppermost in ADF force-planners’ minds. If we stress concentrated armour, no-one will seriously contemplate deploying tanks anywhere. While we do not expect to use our armoured forces in Korea or the Gulf, we need to stress the utility of tanks as individual platforms, or in small groups in support of other troops in operations in our region. By doing this, we will not only help to validate the case for the retention of medium armour within the Australian Army, but we may eventually see Leopards employed on future operations.
Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland
Australian Army, Visiting Defence Fellow
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada
To The Editors,
General Sir Francis Hassett, AC, KBE, DSO, LVO, has asked me to write his biography. The Army History Unit has assured publication. I ask that any reader of this journal who has any anecdotes that can assist me to ‘fill out and colour’ the character and experiences of the General to contact me by phone, fax, e-mail or snail-mail at the RAR Foundation, P.O. Box 3112, Canberra ACT 2601; tel./fax (02) 6265 9842; e-mail<essexc@optusnet.com.au>.
All will realise that I face an enormous but wonderful challenge to do justice to the extraordinary military career and life of the General but I look forward to the spiritual rewards from the task, and to your help.
Brigadier John Essex Clark (Retd)
