* This article is based on a presentation by Major General Lewis to the United Service Institution of the ACT on 12 November 2003 at the Spender Theatre, Australian Defence College, Weston Creek.
Special operations have now become central to the conduct of joint operations in many advanced Western armed forces. However, this was not always the case, and in the past there was frequent disagreement on the resource requirements between Special Forces and their conventional counterparts. When I joined the Australian Special Forces twenty-six years ago, the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) was composed of about 300 soldiers and our numbers were dwindling. There was also a possibility that the SASR might be struck off the Army’s order of battle in the post-Vietnam era of reduced force levels. In 2003 the situation is very different from that which I encountered in 1977. The Commander of the Special Operations Command controls a force of nearly 2000 personnel consisting of three major regular units, a reserve unit and supporting agencies. Moreover, Special Operations has become an equal component in the joint operations arena, equivalent in status to the Land, Maritime and Air Commands.
This article examines the role of special operations both inside and outside the modern battlespace. While most military forces have as their principal function the conduct of military operations inside the battlespace, those same forces often have utility in areas that are clearly outside the battlespace. For example, No. 36 Squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force, comprising C-130 transport aircraft, concentrates on tactical air transport within the battlespace, and played an important role in the transport and recovery of burnt and maimed Australian citizens following the 2002 Bali bombing. In addition, 8/12 Medium Regiment of the Royal Australian Artillery (RAA) makes a clear contribution to ground and joint fires in the battlespace, but on many occasions the regiment has also been used to assist in fighting bushfires that threaten the civil community. Military forces can therefore possess dual functions and, in this respect, special operations forces have a particular duality. While special operations forces focus on warfighting inside the battlespace, they also remain ready to conduct operations outside the battlespace by providing counter-terrorist support to the civil authorities if, and when, required.
When one examines the role of special operations inside the battlespace, one sometimes hears the critique that conventional forces could have undertaken the missions that Special Forces undertook in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such a proposition is misguided and comprehensively fails to understand the character of operations in both campaigns. While there were some aspects of the campaigns that might have been conducted by conventional forces, these missions were carried out by special operations forces simply because they were the deployed force element from the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The majority of the missions accomplished in both Afghanistan and Iraq, however, required specialist capabilities. The duration of patrols, the distances to be covered, the long-range communication requirements, the calling of precision air strikes, the use of stealth and agility, and the liaison role with Afghan indigenous forces demanded skills that are not generally available in our conventional forces.
Afghanistan was an unusual campaign in that it lent itself to special operations. During the campaign, a strategic alliance was developed between special operations and air power, while the presence of opposition forces to the Taliban offered an opportunity to utilise armed proxies to moderately good effect. In addition, the peculiar terrain of Afghanistan was well suited to small-group operations.
While the campaign in Iraq in 2003 differed considerably from that waged in Afghanistan in 2001–02, the central importance of special operations remained. In desert conditions, Special Forces were able to operate largely unimpeded. The Special Forces harassed the enemy flanks and rear, and operated in conditions distinguished by complex and inhospitable terrain. The linkage between special operations and airpower forged in Afghanistan was reinforced in Iraq. Moreover, the relationship between special operations and conventional force capabilities, particularly the combined arms team, were rediscovered during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
There are three basic operational factors that have contributed to the rise to prominence of Special Forces over the past decade: situational awareness, precision fires and the growing transparency of the battlespace. In considering the role of situational awareness, it is useful to recall that, when Julius Caesar entered Gaul in 59 BC, he could see no farther than the hill in front of him. In addition, Caesar’s cavalry used for scouting had limited range and vision. For all of Caesar’s brilliance in the field, he was, by today’s standards of situational awareness, almost blind. In the early 21st century, information technology provides small groups of once vulnerable soldiers with high-grade situational awareness. We can now see not only over Liddell Hart’s ‘other side of the hill’ but deep into the enemy’s territory. The old adage of ‘five men, alone and unafraid’ is no longer a phrase of bravado; it represents the reality that small groups of properly equipped soldiers can operate in a potentially high-threat battlespace in a way that was not possible before the coming of the information age in the 1990s. While there is no such phenomenon as perfect situational awareness, there is now sufficient knowledge of conditions in a battlespace to permit small groups of highly specialised soldiers to operate with great effectiveness.
In the case of precision fires, it is again useful to reflect on Caesar’s experience in Gaul. In Caesar’s Gallic Wars, Roman legionnaires carried several pileum (spears) and a gladius (short broadsword), and moved massive siege machines and ammunition by horse and human muscle power. In Caesar’s day, a soldier had to carry whatever he used, whether it was spears or ballistae. Today, advanced communications and munition technologies have conferred on soldiers the power to call for indirect fires and have these delivered on time and on target. Accordingly, Special Forces soldiers, although few in number, can now unleash disproportionate effect through precision fires delivered by remotely located forces. The Special Forces soldier is now not only better protected through situational awareness, but is also more lethal because of precision-guided munitions. It is the nexus between situational awareness and precision guidance that has facilitated a parallel strategic alliance between special operations and air power.
Added to situational awareness and the precision revolution is the transparency of the battlespace. When Caesar fought against the Gauls, he often prosecuted the war with great brutality, severing the hands of prisoners from Uxellodunum, and then releasing the victims to serve as a warning to those that continued to resist subjugation. Today, such brutality would be captured by ever-present television cameras and would not be tolerated by any responsible, democratic government. In the West, the threshold for ‘acceptable destruction’ is low, and under such conditions, Special Forces who specialise in the application of discriminate force have great attraction for political leaders. Inside the battlespace, then, it is this troika of situational awareness, precision fires and battlespace transparency that has propelled special operations into playing a central role in joint operations.
What of special operations outside the immediate confines of the battlespace? In this context, the rise to prominence of Special Forces has been accelerated by the blurring of war and peace. In a classical Westphalian sense, wars between nations are usually declared, fought according to rules, and are ended by negotiation and treaty—as was the case when Britain and Argentina fought over the Falklands in 1982. Increasingly, however, the application of military force occurs without such formality, in a shadow world that is neither war nor peace. For countries that face complex missions across a spectrum of conflict with a high risk of violence and considerable political risk, the employment of high-performance military forces has become essential.
Terrorism, of course, is the classic threat that occurs outside the formal battlespace but, because of its lethality, occasionally demands a military response. The complexity of the threat of terrorism was a prime determinant in the creation of an ADF Special Operations Command in 2002 as part of a national ‘whole of government’ approach. One of the important components of Special Operations Command is the second Tactical Assault Group on the east coast. Some commentators have questioned the wisdom of raising such a force, suggesting that, with tactical assault groups on both the east and west coasts of Australia, we are unnecessarily duplicating a limited capability. Several critics have also suggested that the concept of tactical assault groups trespasses on the domestic police role in counter-terrorism. Yet such a view ignores the reality that tactical assault groups based on the east and west coasts—TAG-E and TAG-W—while being largely mirror images of each other, have differing geographic responsibilities. For instance, TAG-E is primarily responsible for providing a domestic counter-terrorist response to deal with onshore incidents in areas of high population concentration on the Australian eastern seaboard. On the other hand, TAG-W—while retaining responsibility for quick response to a domestic onshore terrorist incident in Western Australia—concentrates on the recovery of offshore gas and oil platforms, and operations involving ships underway. Most importantly, however, the Perth-based TAG-W represents Australia’s overseas counter-terrorist response-and-recovery force.
Moreover, with regard to the domestic role of Special Forces in counter-terrorism, it needs to be appreciated that, in the Australian Commonwealth, police resources differ greatly in the various States and Territories. Larger States such as New South Wales and Victoria can afford to create police forces with dedicated special operations groups. However, smaller States with much more limited police forces often lack the full range of capabilities needed to confront a serious terrorist incident. As a result, there is clearly a need for a uniform level of national counter-terrorist capability that is available to support all Australian citizens, irrespective of their location. It is the ADF that provides that national capability support through the possession of tactical assault groups. In addition, the Commonwealth reserves the right to act in its own interest should the Federal Government make a determination that, in a terrorist situation, a military capability is essential to support the civil authorities.
It is the national counter-terrorist requirement that has led to Special Operations Command’s being composed of three major full-time units: the Special Air Service Regiment; 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (Commando); and the Incident Response Regiment. The part-time 1st Commando Regiment also contributes to special operations. As Special Operations Command evolves, the Army is developing a Combat Service Support Company and is basing a squadron of helicopters at Holsworthy in order to provide a rotary-wing capability that is ‘in direct support and at priority call’ to the command. Some of our major challenges include the issues of personnel, inter-agency coordination, and investment in new technology and techniques.
In terms of personnel, it must be appreciated that Special Operations Command has nearly doubled in size over the past twelve months. In this respect, we confront the dilemma that there is only a finite pool of individuals with the qualities and attributes required to become special operations soldiers. Accordingly, we have attempted to reach out directly into the community for recruits through the agency of the new Special Forces Direct Recruiting Scheme (SFDRS). Another major challenge lies in ensuring national coordination in a ‘whole of government’ approach to counterterrorism policy. While there has been significant progress in Federal and State coordination, there is always room for improvement, and much of Special Operations Command’s staff effort is devoted to fostering a web of inter-agency linkages.
Finally, there is the challenge of maintaining sufficient investment in emerging technologies and new capabilities. Here the equation is a simple one: in order to remain ‘special’, all special forces require resources. For example, the US Special Operations Command currently possesses an annual operating budget of some US$1.8 billion (less personnel costs). Because the US Special Operations Command has emerged as the lead element in the American response to global terrorism, the command has received a further appropriation in excess of US$7 billion to fund a variety of capability enhancements over the next five years. In Australia we cannot match such expenditure, but the point to note is that, if a country seeks to maintain an effective special operations capability, it must commit appropriate resources. Over the past few years, Australia’s Special Forces have been well resourced and, as a result, we have developed world-class capabilities for unconventional warfare. Our challenge in the future will be to ensure that we continue to invest in new and emerging technologies and capabilities that increase our military effectiveness.
It is worth noting that the Special Operations Command currently costs the Australian taxpayer a little over two cents in every dollar allocated to the Defence vote. The return is impressive when one considers the Special Forces’ contribution to operations in East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Solomon Islands; the management of incidents at sea involving the vessels MV Tomi, MV Tampa, MV Pong Su; and security for the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Heads of Government. In recent years, the Australian Government and the community that it represents have received good value for the treasure that they have committed to ensuring that Australia maintains a world-class Special Forces capability. It is the firm intention of the Special Operations Command to ensure that this tradition of outcomematching-investment continues well into the 21st century.
