* The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr Alden Klovdahl, School of Social Science, Australian National University, and Dr Carlo Kopp, School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Monash University in developing the ideas in this paper.
In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mimicry will play in contemporary conflict, particularly in unconventional or asymmetric warfare. This article argues that the Australian Army needs to develop an information warfare concept based on mimicking operations—that is, the imitation of an adversary’s methods in order to facilitate deception. The development of a concept of mimicking operations by the ADF has the potential to elevate the more generic notion of deception into the realm of a precise operational concept for use in a networked force structure.
Mimicking in Information Operations
The phrase ‘mimicking operations’ is commonly used in modelling and scientific simulation and is connected to the idea of shielding friendly forces from detection and deception. For example, the Australian Army’s keystone doctrine,
The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, identifies the concept of ‘shielding’ as a combat function in the application of land power.1 Shielding, the manual points out, ‘is achieved by measures that include avoiding detection, and [ensuring] protection against physical or electronic attack’.2 In short, shielding is viewed as an action that contributes to combat effectiveness. The connection between mimicking in scientific research and the use of deception in the military application of information operations has been described in a paper delivered by two researchers, Carlo Kopp and Bruce Mills, at the 2002 Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference. Kopp and Mills pointed out:
Deception and Mimicry/Corruption is the insertion of intentionally misleading information ... [deception and mimicry] amounts to mimicking a known signal so well, that a receiver cannot distinguish the phony signal from the real signal.3
Kopp and Mills define mimicry as one of ‘four canonical offensive information warfare strategies’.4 The authors go on to develop a methodology that is influenced by biology, ecology and the workings of the natural world. The authors point out that ‘a species evolves the appearance of another to aid its survival’.5 For example, animals or insects that develop a physical similarity to predators are engaged in avoiding danger. Mimicry is also found in the behaviour of more aggressive species. For instance, ‘Portia spiders strum the webs of other spiders to imitate mating behaviours or the actions of distressed prey’.6 In this case, the target is given confusing information and is encouraged to walk into what appears to be a safe situation.
In essence, then, mimicry manipulates information through the simulation of behaviour or of physical appearance. In military terms, the employment of mimicking operational strategies has the potential to create a more sophisticated understanding of the way in which information operations might be applied in combat. In addition, mimicking operations may represent an increasingly cost-effective way of achieving a desired operational effect using superior information to exploit concealment, deception and imitation techniques.
Information-based mimicking operations using principles of non-linearity have the potential to extend military action beyond traditional tactical approaches. For instance, most conventional 20th-century operations have been traditionally planned and executed by commanders using sequential methods of decision making, often in traditional headquarters. In sequential decision-making, staff organisations are hierarchically organised and employ linear models of command and control. Conventional military doctrine tends to neglect intuitive and non-linear thinking because the command-and-control implications of such an approach require decentralisation. Effective mimicking operations demand a networked structure in which component groups are either loosely connected or are almost autonomous, but where all concerned have access to common information.
The American researchers, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, have developed a netwar model for ‘swarming’ attacks in warfare whose features are similar to non-linear organisations. They note that ‘network formations can reinforce the original assault, swelling it; or they can launch swarm attacks upon other targets, presenting the defence with dilemmas about how best to deploy their own available forces’.7 The ‘Netwar’ concept developed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt is concerned with how widely distributed forces may operate collaboratively. A netwar approach requires an ability to work in a relationally based mode and to retain the ability for coordination, without the need for hierarchically based command and control.
For a non-linear network model to succeed, networked groups and individuals must be capable of pooling information and knowledge, and of undertaking swift decision-making. To date, it is those that practice unconventional, rather than conventional, warfare who have been most successful in mimicking an adversary. For instance, the al-Qa’ida movement appears to be a prime example of a non-state group that possesses a networked character based on autonomous cells that infliltrate and mimic their enemy. These cells are distributed globally, but remain connected by information systems that are common to those used by the societies that the movement aims to attack. Islamic religious schools or madrassas and assorted training camps in the Middle East represent the key ideological–military institutions for preparing cadres for decentralised jihad operations in infiltrated societies. In this sense, these schools and camps seem to operate as ‘network hubs’ on which a cellular structure of cadres can operate globally as a virtual army.
Networks of the type envisaged in the RAND netwar concept are predicated on a belief that, ideally, human relations are fluid and non-linear in character. Participants in a network system perform any collaborative function necessary for success and treat each other as peers rather than as superiors or subordinates. The networked, cellular structure of an organisation such as al-Qa’ida confers tactical advantages since there is a reduced need for communication, control or command coordination. Such a decentralised yet connected structure aids in the launch of mimicking operations against target societies. For instance, the al-Qa’ida cells that launched the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States mimicked normal flight passengers. During the operation, the attackers were indistinguishable from their victims and the surprise they achieved was total. Dispersed tactical measures in a decentralised operational plan were coordinated to achieve strategic effect through the power of information networking.
Conclusion
The concept of mimicking operations simulates activity that resembles a bacterial attack on a large and complex organism. Attacking cells mimick the behaviour of their victims, but remain dormant while awaiting an opportunity to launch an attack. In order to counter a connected, non-linear enemy, the ADF needs to investigate the use of the concept of mimicking operations as a counterstrategy in its evolving network-centric warfare doctrine. Such an approach may require a radical new direction in operational art, one that empowers a dynamic networked military organisation based on non-linear units and decentralised military activity. The challenge for the 21st-century ADF will be to reform its organisation and command-and-control methods in order to make such a military approach a reality.
Endnotes
1 Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, Vic., pp. 70–2.
2 Ibid., p. 72.
3 Carlo Kopp and Bruce Mills, ‘Information Warfare And Evolution’, paper delivered at the 3rd Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference, 2002, p. 3.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
5 Ibid., p. 6.
6 Ibid., p. 4.
7 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996, p. 11.
