* This article is based on a presentation by Major General Lewis to the Homeland Security Forum on 29 April 2003 at the Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre.
The task of counter-terrorism has sometimes been compared to that of goal keeping in a soccer World Cup final. The keeper may save a hundred shots—relentlessly angled from every direction, height and velocity—aimed at the mouth of the goal, but his professional skill, tenacity and anticipation will pass largely unnoticed by spectators. What the public will remember, probably forever, is the goal that the keeper lets through. The analogy with counter-terrorism is compelling: a stream of terrorist shots aimed at a country and ‘saved’ by its national security agencies are likely to remain undeclared and unreported in what is essentially a silent war. Yet, a single terrorist action that succeeds in penetrating the security goal mouth can create a media blizzard and enter the public consciousness permanently. The reality that months, even years, of clandestine success can be compromised by a single incident that captures public attention is the philosophical dilemma of all professionals engaged in the counter-terrorist business.
This article examines the role of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) new Special Operations Command in Australian security. Both the legal basis for, and the background to, the ADF’s role in counter-terrorism in Australia are analysed. The article goes on to describe the formation of Special Operations Command in 2002 and concludes with several observations on the character of contemporary terrorism.
The Legal Basis of ADF Involvement in Counter-Terrorism
There are two ways in which the ADF contributes to the security of the nation with regard to the threat posed by terrorism. The first way is the ADF’s traditional role as the defender of the state—a role that is enshrined in the Australian Constitution. Under the Constitution, military forces may be deployed on the executive order of the Government in the defence of the nation. A recent example of the ADF’s performance of this warfighting role is the deployment to Afghanistan, where Special Forces conducted protracted combat operations against the al-Qa’ida movement and the Taliban regime during 2002. The second role that the ADF performs in the national counter-terrorism effort is through the support that it provides to Australia’s civil authorities.
The 1903 Defence Act and subsequent 2001 amendment make provision for the ADF to deploy domestically in support of the civil authorities. Australian law is highly prescriptive and clear in this respect. The law provides that the ADF may be called on to assist civil authorities in contingencies where there is no prospect of the use of armed force. These types of contingencies include the provision of flood relief, or the conduct of high-risk searches at a major venue in a sporting event such as the 2000 Olympic Games. Such operations, in which the use of armed force is not a consideration, are referred to as Defence Force Aid to the Civil Community (DFACC). There is, however, a second, more serious category laid down in the constitutional legislation, known as Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority (DFACA). The latter regulation provides that the ADF may be called on to assist in the maintenance of public order when situations arise in which there is a strong possibility that the use of armed force will be required in a manner that is beyond the normal capacity of the civil authorities. When the ADF is employed under conditions of DFACA, the use of force by the military is guided by four overarching principles: necessity, proportionality, primacy of the civil authority, and the retention of military command over troops.
The use of military forces in a situation of civil disorder requires formal authorisation by the Governor-General-in-Council. A request for military forces may be made by State or Territory jurisdictions, or by the Commonwealth acting in defence of its own interests. Whatever the circumstances necessitating military support, there will always be a requirement for extensive consultation between Federal and State authorities and meticulous adherence to the call-out legislation.
The ADF's Role in Australian Counter-Terrorism, 1978-2001
The ADF first became engaged in domestic counter-terrorism following the bombing of the Hilton Hotel in 1978. This event presented Australia with the first indication that it was not immune to the rise of terrorism as a global phenomenon during the 1970s. As a direct consequence of the Hilton bombing, the ADF formed the first specialised counter-terrorist force, the Tactical Assault Group. Established in 1980, the Tactical Assault Group was drawn from, and subsequently embedded in, the Special Air Service Regiment in Perth, Western Australia. The Tactical Assault Group provided the Australian Federal Government with a force of last resort for the resolution of terrorist siege-hostage situations and hijacking incidents. Over the past two decades, funding, hard training and international standards of performance have seen the Tactical Assault Group become one of the finest of its type in the world. It is a quick-response force maintained at extremely high levels of readiness and capable of dealing with a variety of operational contingencies. From 1980 onwards, subsequent public events—notably the 1982 Brisbane Commonwealth Games, the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, and the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Queensland—provided further impetus for refining Australia’s counter-terrorist capability both as a deterrent and as a high-readiness, quick-reaction force. Providing security for the Sydney Olympics, in particular, represented a high point in the development of the ADF’s anti-terrorist capability. To draw a term from classical music, the Olympic experience placed the ADF in a strong position from which to segue to a new post–11 September 2001 security environment—one characterised by the phenomenon of transnational, mass-casualty terrorism.
While in terms of counter-terrorist preparation and organisation the Olympics left the ADF well prepared to meet the transformed security situation of the new millennium, there could be no complacency in protecting the Australian public against the menace of global terrorism. On 13 September 2001, only two days after the al-Qa’ida attacks on New York and Washington, the ADF had commenced immediate planning to raise a second Tactical Assault Group, based on the East Coast in Sydney. In addition, a newly formed Incident Response Regiment supplemented both assault groups. In technical terms, this special regiment is an Army engineer unit, with special skills in the detection and neutralisation of chemical, biological and radiological devices. In addition, the regiment deals with contamination and specialises in confronting the danger of large-scale explosive devices. Along with a new assault group, the creation of a special engineer regiment to counter the use of weapons of mass destruction effectively doubled the size of the ADF’s counter-terrorist forces.
The Creation of Special Operations Command, December 2002
The Bali bombing of 12 October 2002 reinforced the point that Australia was not immune to the rise of global terrorism. This incident led directly to a decision by the National Security Committee of the Cabinet to create a new Special Operations Command announced by the Prime Minister on 19 December 2002. The Government’s aim was to enhance the ADF’s Special Forces capability still further, and to strengthen effective joint, inter-agency and international counter-terrorist planning and capability. The new command ensured that the ADF could support Federal and State police and counter-terrorist agencies, and provide an effective mechanism for synchronising ADF special operations with the requirements of emerging national coordinating bodies, such as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee. In essence, the establishment of an ADF Special Operations Command dramatically increased Australia’s ability to use unconventional warfare methods to respond to the growing asymmetric threat of terrorism.
The ADF’s Special Operations Command is a joint command staffed by members of the three services. The Command Headquarters is split between Sydney and Canberra. The Sydney Headquarters is based on the already established Army Special Forces Group, while in Canberra a new section of the headquarters has been established and has responsibility for counter-terrorist coordination and future capability development. The new command comprises a number of special operations units, including the Special Air Service Regiment, the 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (Commando), the Incident Response Regiment and a Combat Support squadron. The command will also have a rotary-wing squadron in direct support along with assigned Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force assets. Among the current priorities of the command is the integration of naval and air support into special operations. The command also maintains a matrix of important linkages with a variety of Federal and State agencies, with the peak body being the National Counter-Terrorist Committee. Through this committee and the Protective Security Coordination Centre that supports it, the ADF’s anti-terrorist forces are able to participate in a comprehensive range of exercises across Federal, State and Territory jurisdictions. While much has been written about the concept of Homeland Security involving multiple agencies, it is important to note that Special Operations Command is a military organisation with a direct focus on countering terrorism.
The command-and-control functions of Special Operations Command are unique. The Special Operations Commander is in the unusual position of being responsible to three different headquarters. For warfighting functions, such as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Special Operations Headquarters is responsible to the Commander Australian Theatre, who is the ADF’s lead, joint operational-level commander. In terms of responsibilities for raising, training and sustaining forces, the Commander Special Operations takes direction from the Chief of Army, since it is through Army Headquarters that the Special Force Command’s funding is managed and allocated. Finally, in the execution of counter-terrorist operations, the Special Operations Commander is directly responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force. While such a command-and-control arrangement might be considered unusual in a classical military sense, given the complexities and peculiarities of Special Forces’ organisation and the flexibility required in the conduct of operations, the system works well. For instance, in the short period of its existence, the Command has successfully executed warfighting operations in the Middle East, and has provided support to civil agencies such as the Australian Customs Service and the Australian Federal Police in the boarding and recovery of the North Korean vessel, the MV Pong Su.
The Character of Contemporary Terrorism
Within Special Operations Command, there exists a growing appreciation of the character of 21st-century terrorism. Our assessment is that terrorism is both chameleon-like and viral in its approach and behaviour. It is chameleon-like in that it adapts its characteristics to surrounding circumstances. Modern terrorism assumes different manifestations—from jets used as cruise missiles to truck bombs and suicide attacks—making it difficult to anticipate. Terrorism is also viral in behaviour, in that it changes both its form and direction across time and space, requiring continuous monitoring of its condition. It is the dynamic character of terrorism as an operational phenomenon that requires the ADF in general, and Special Operations Command in particular, to maintain a flexible and agile force structure that is capable of conducting multidimensional missions.
For over twenty years, the Tactical Assault Group has maintained a siege and hostage resolution force, but in 21st-century conditions we have recognised that the new strain of international terrorism will not necessarily confront us with a familiar modus operandi. For example, the potential confluence of transnational terrorism with weapons of mass destruction may create a deadly cocktail and presents us with sobering operational and strategic challenges. Herein lies the nub of our problem: we cannot rest content to simply monitor current strains of terrorism. Rather, we must attempt to anticipate new manifestations of terrorist activity and, to stay ahead of the phenomenon, we must develop sophisticated levels of intelligence to support ADF operations.
Since the beginnings of recorded warfare, when the Hittites fought the Egyptians at Megiddo and Kadesh, and when Babylon and Assyria were great powers, military forces have been aware of the value of intelligence in gaining information superiority in combat. In early 2003, when Australian special forces were operating in Iraq—the ancient land of the Babylonians—we saw, once again, the critical importance of intelligence and information dominance in destroying Saddam Hussein’s military forces. In the ongoing war against terror, the role of intelligence is vital since the conflict is, first and foremost, an intelligence-led struggle.
Special Forces are often the instrument of choice in modern conflicts, particularly in the War on Terrorism, and this development is a peculiarly modern phenomenon. The rise of Special Forces to prominence in contemporary military operations is largely the result of three fundamental changes in armed conflict. These changes are the availability of improved situational awareness, the use of precision fires and the growing transparency of the battlespace.
Despite the pervasiveness of Clausewitz’s friction in war, superior information is critical to success in modern combat. It is the rise of information technology in producing situational awareness across the battlespace that has shaped the way in which war is waged in the early 21st century. In an age of information dominance, smaller, highly flexible and expertly trained Special Forces, which are armed with near-perfect situational awareness, have adequate force protection and can achieve disproportionate success in combat. As a result, such forces are attractive to strategic policy makers.
A second feature that has facilitated an increased use of Special Forces has been the ubiquity of precision strike. General Ronald R. Fogelman, a former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, once predicted that, ‘in the first quarter of the 21st century, you will be able to find, fix or track, and target—in near real time—anything of consequence that moves upon or is located on the face of the Earth’.1 Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have certainly moved us closer to Fogelman’s vision, given the astonishing accuracy achieved by stand-off precision weapons systems. Once again, the military requirements of reconnaissance, intelligence, and targeting for the employment of precision munitions have contributed to the increasing use of Special Forces throughout the modern battlespace.
The third change in the character of modern combat has been the increased role that politics plays. As classical military theorists such as Machiavelli and Clausewitz recognised, warfare is an extension of diplomacy. War may have its own grammar but its logic must be supplied by political objectives. In an age of globalised communications, a mass television audience can watch military operations unfold in their lounge rooms in near real time. The rise of the global electronic media represents a revolution in the sociology of war. No longer is the violence of armed conflict witnessed only by combatants; we are all now witnesses to the waging of war. As a result, governments are highly sensitive to the political impact of televised bloodshed. One has only to recall the effect of the bloody images of Coalition air attack on Iraqi ground forces along the ‘Highway of Death’—from Kuwait City to Basra in the first Gulf War of 1991—to understand that no responsible government wants to wage an unrestricted war that is captured on camera. In recent operations in Iraq, Special Forces provided an effective means of finding and destroying enemy forces, or negotiating the capitulation of such forces without scenes of wholesale slaughter or of death and injury to innocent civilians.
Conclusion
The increasing use of Special Forces in contemporary armed conflict should not be seen as constituting ready-made panacea for all security contingencies. On the contrary, the ADF will always require a balanced range of military capabilities, currently including ships, aircraft, armour and artillery, along with ground forces in combined arms teams that can execute joint warfare. What Australia’s Special Forces have accomplished in recent years is to establish themselves as an important capability in the joint fight and can achieve disproportionate effects in operations in the war against terrorism. It is the growing importance of Australia’s Special Forces in an effects-based approach to strategy that has contributed to the formation of the ADF’s Special Operations Command. Moreover, the new command has been designed to assist the ADF to support Australia’s post-Bali ‘whole of government’ approach to national security.
Finally, we need to appreciate that, in Western systems of democratic government, the use of military force is generally a last resort. In a domestic sense, this last resort approach is particularly applicable when deciding to request military aid to the civil power. In Australia, terrorism is first and foremost a criminal matter that is the responsibility of our law enforcement agencies. Thus, despite the creation of the Special Forces Command—with its increased military capabilities, higher readiness and emphasis on preparedness—it ought never to be forgotten that, in the war against terrorism, the ADF is not the first but the last line of defence.
Endnote
1 Quoted in Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of War, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2000, p. 13.
