The Strategists
Written by: Hugh Smith (ed.),
Australian Defence Studies Centre, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 2001,
ISBN: 9780731704538, 145 pp.
Reviewed by: Martin Sheehan, Strategic and International Policy Division, Department of Defence
In 1989 Francis Fukuyama, then Deputy Director of the US State Department’s policy planning staff, published a curious essay, ‘The End of History?’ in the journal The National Interest. Fukuyama’s argument was that, with the collapse of monolithic communism in the form of the Soviet Union, the last ideological threat to the dominance of liberal capitalist ideas had disappeared. With the triumph of Western capitalism, Fukuyama predicted that the threat of international conflict between advanced Western societies would also diminish considerably.
Fukuyama’s liberal triumphalism was influential in Western political and strategic thought during the 1990s, but suffered somewhat in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks on New York. There were other voices countering Fukuyama’s thesis: in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington argued that future conflicts would be between civilisations—such as the Islamic, the Western and the Sino-Confucianist—rather than between nation-states. Huntington argued that the major areas of regional conflict would be along what he called the ‘fault lines’ between civilisations (for example, in areas such as Palestine).
Such a thesis did little, however, to dampen Western liberal optimism in the 1990s. Written during the euphoria following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the End of History thesis failed to recognise the potential for other forms of political strife and armed conflict in the world. With the threat of widespread terrorist attacks and disruption of the liberal capitalist West by Islamist and other militants, it is valuable to study a book dealing with the great strategic thinkers of world history.
The Strategists, edited by Hugh Smith, Associate Professor, School of Politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy, examines some of the influential strategic and military theorists—from Sun Zi in 6th century BC China, to the nuclear strategists of the Cold War period. The book also discusses the future of warfare, how and why wars will be fought in the next twenty to fifty years, and closes with a perceptive essay on the future of strategy by military historian Martin van Creveld.
Divided into three, the first part of the book deals with arguably the best-known classical military theorists, Sun Zi and Carl von Clausewitz. The second part looks at modern strategists, with essays focusing on Alfred Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett; J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart; Giulio Douhet; and Mao Zedong. Part three looks at contemporary strategic thinking, and speculates on the future role of strategy.
Hugh Smith’s splendid opening essay sets the tone with his elegant description of the good military strategist:
In short, the good strategist displays a historical depth, an intellectual breadth and an openness to new ideas—qualities which in turn stimulate the thinking of those engaged in the practical business of killing enemies and leading states. (p. 11)
These qualities are particularly relevant in a world of increasing military, political and economic complexity—a world in which threats are multiplying faster than anyone could have predicted even ten years ago.
James Cotton’s excellent piece, ‘Sun Zi: Diplomacy and War’, reveals the reasons that the ancient Chinese thinker is increasingly considered the important strategic theorist of the 21st century. Born at a time in which the state and the traditional order seemed threatened by rapid social and cultural change, Sun Zi faced the formidable task of formulating a comprehensive philosophy of war in a time of turmoil.
Sun Zi emphasises the achievement of victory over an enemy without fighting, through the use of cunning and deception. His perspective is particularly relevant in today’s world, where modern weapons of mass destruction make full-scale war between advanced states an exercise in futility. Sun Zi’s advocacy of obtaining intelligence on the enemy and the use of spies, so that enemies’ plans and/or networks can be attacked rather than his cities and/or civilians, is also of importance for the contemporary military commander. In the context of the decline of the Clausewitzian world of warfare, in which the sovereign nation-state stood supreme, strategic theorists are looking to thinkers such as Sun Zi for a new understanding of war and international relations.
Hugh Smith’s chapter, ‘Clausewitz: Apostle of Modern War’, analyses Clausewitz’s relevance in strategic thinking today. His now-famous dictum from On War, that ‘War is the continuation of policy by other means’, is discussed in the light of modern developments such as globalisation, the decline of warfare between advanced states and the possible decline of the nation-state. More importantly, Smith argues that what has changed in today’s world is the nature of warfare itself, which is less about large-scale conflict in the open field and more about low-intensity conflict and guerilla operations.
Perhaps the most fascinating and thought-provoking essay in the book is Martin van Creveld’s chapter, ‘The End of Strategy?’. Declaring the Clausewitzian concept of state-based warfare to be essentially bankrupt—thanks to the domination of nuclear weapons since 1945—van Creveld argues that instead we are faced with new types of warfare for the nuclear age. The author states that since 1945 one modern Western army after another has been defeated by guerillas of various political stripes—insurgents that have refused to fight by the Clausewitzian rule book. From American defeat in Vietnam, to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, as well as the many brutal bush wars fought against European colonial powers in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the nature of warfare has changed dramatically.
In his 1991 book The Transformation of War, van Creveld argued the radical thesis that irregular movements will replace what we have understood as conventional warfare. As warfare becomes more and more the clash of small, highly trained, professional warrior elites, Western armies will be forced to downsize and restructure along similar lines. Territorial interests and high-tech weaponry may still figure in these future wars, but will not have the same importance they once had.
Faced with such a thoroughgoing transformation of the political, social, economic and military world, what is the contemporary strategist to do? In this postmodern world, how can the strategist assimilate such rapid social and cultural changes so that an integrated theory of the nature of warfare can be produced? These are the questions posed at the end of The Strategists, and the answers are by no means certain.
In the future it would seem that the role of the strategic thinker, and indeed the role of the warrior and the diplomat, will be to formulate a new understanding of war and international relations, to meet the circumstances of a post-nation-state era. Even if the nation-state does survive into the 21st century (after all, the death of the nation-state has been predicted for over a century now), it will be a less powerful, more circumscribed entity in comparison with the large bureaucratic states of the modern era. If the ordered and technological societies of the West are not to sink into barbarism and decline, our rulers have to begin to rethink the role of armed conflict in relations between states and cultures.
Martin van Creveld believes that, in order to reconstitute strategic thinking for the new millennium, we must begin with a reconsideration of the reasons behind why we fight in the first place:
If you open Clausewitz, [the question of what is a just war] is simply not there ... For him, justice had nothing to do with strategy. And that, I believe, is where he was mistaken—the reason being that nobody is so foolish as to lay down his life for a cause that is not just. Hence, in any attempt to rethink strategy, we must start by asking ourselves not how to get the other side to submit to our will but what constitutes a good policy and a just war. (p. 127)
The Strategists is highly recommended as an introduction to the history of strategic thought, and as a fascinating account of the state of contemporary strategic thinking. It should be compulsory reading for all our politicians, diplomats and defence planners, as well as our military leaders.
