Re-raising the Seventh Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment

The Enhanced Land Force plan involved 7 RAR being re-raised with minimal new establishment that would incrementally grow over an extended period. The complete 5/7 RAR structure was allocated to 5 RAR to preserve that unit for an impending battle group level operational task in Iraq. Chief of Army further directed that 7 RAR was to be raised in Adelaide from the outset as part of a supporting effort to rebalance Army geographical locations. There were significant implications for the pace of growth that could be achieved with these aspects of the plan. The primary constraint of this incremental approach was the lack of junior leaders in sufficient numbers to enable the increasing number of available private soldiers to be assimilated into new sections and platoons at a pace that matched their posting into the battalion. The aim to raise 7 RAR in Adelaide would further impact growth by the lack of any support normally expected from the formation level, particularly combat service support functions due to the limited capacity of the local Reserve formation. An uncritical adherence to the original Enhanced Land Force plan and dislocating 7 RAR from the remainder of 1st Brigade at the most critical period of re-raising were identified as the two most significant risks to achieving Chief of Army intent.

Commander 1st Brigade (then Brigadier Craig Orme) took decisive action to address this situation, overriding opposition at various staff levels committed to the Enhanced Land Force program. Despite the plan directing the retention of all previous 5/7 RAR establishment and capabilities by 5 RAR, the commander directed that B Company, then deployed with the Reconstruction Task Force—One, in Afghanistan, would be reallocated to 7 RAR. He further directed that working and living accommodation be found within the 5 RAR precinct and across the 1st Brigade to facilitate 7 RAR growth in Darwin. These were the most impactful decisions in the re-raising effort and enabled an initial objective of a battalion headquarters, two rifle companies and a nucleus administration company to be achieved within 2007. The impetus generated towards the full potential of the Enhanced Land Force initiative was clearly demonstrated to the Chief of Army. His personal support for the revised re-raising method further built confidence in achieving accelerated growth. 

With the return of B Company from Afghanistan in April 2007, lance corporals were promoted to corporal and sufficient private soldiers were promoted to lance corporal to provide the leadership for both A Company and B Company. Concurrently, junior officers and sergeants were posted in incrementally to match this growth, although some newly promoted corporals were required to conduct platoon sergeant roles. Throughout this time, private soldier reinforcements were routinely arriving following initial employment training at the School of Infantry. By mid 2007, as restrictive climatic conditions reduced with the return of the dry season, 7 RAR absorbed the task of training riflemen within the unit as recruiting achievement had outstripped the School of Infantry capacity. This training was conducted by the specifically formed Downward, MM Platoon,^[i] staffed by instructors from within the battalion, employing the mandated training design. 

An additional training objective completed concurrently within the battalion was crew conversion and sustainment training for the M113AS4 family of vehicles. This commenced with 7 RAR receiving the first delivery of these vehicles outside of training establishments, starting the introduction into service program for tactical units. 

The higher than anticipated tempo of growth also entailed unforeseen challenges in the establishment and availability of mission-essential equipment, which did not keep pace with the increases in personnel establishment. This was largely due to the personnel growth focus of the Enhanced Land Force plan, which did adequately reflect a ‘whole of FIC’^[ii] approach to Army’s expansion at this time. The lack of a more comprehensive plan was a sound pragmatic approach due to the need to exploit the opportunity of Army growth by rapid action. The plan necessarily took a more incremental approach for major systems and support and supplies, with facilities to be found at an existing Defence location in Adelaide. 

This situation also reflected the prioritisation of capabilities to in-theatre and mission-specific training pools for the concurrent operational deployments, further constraining equipment availability across Army. A range of short-term solutions were found, primarily through brigading critical capabilities and reallocation from Reserve formations. Notwithstanding these actions, deficiencies remained, particularly with night-fighting equipment and communication systems. This was most keenly felt with the development of the mechanised capability, where new M113AS4 vehicles were delivered without communication systems that had been reallocated to different platforms for operational deployment. An alternative solution implemented to continue training was the allocation of obsolete AN/PRC-77 radios, which were mounted on the turret exterior to enable vehicle employment, with the additional training for personnel already qualified on in-service systems. Both night-fighting equipment and explosive ammunition types^[iii] were in limited quantities across Army due to operational priorities. This had some impact on unit-conducted individual training, requiring detailed management of brigaded assets and acknowledged training deficiencies for subsequent remediation when resources became available. 

While pragmatic and sufficient to maintain training tempo, these solutions were not sustainable in the longer term without transferring training and readiness risks elsewhere within Army. Given the known commitments and ability to forecast subsequent deployments, these risks were manageable, albeit with impacts on lower priority organisations that could not be mitigated. In an environment where a greater size of the force was required for operational employment concurrent to significant increases in force structure, this prioritised reallocation of capabilities would have failed to enable both outcomes.

The advantages of raising within 1st Brigade were clearly validated by suitably managing solutions to the lack of resources required for training and readiness, particularly ammunition, fuel and rations. The dislocation between the original Enhanced Land Force schedule and the reality of re-raising at the unit level resulted in a lack of forecasted resources compared to the training need. Some mandatory unit resource types had not been established by Army Headquarters, due to the incremental nature of the plan, with local arrangements developed until these issues were resolved by formal action. In isolation these deficiencies would have been a significant constraint; however, the flexibility to reallocate across 1st Brigade units, employing both formal and informal methods, was crucial to maintaining momentum. 

Despite these challenges, the Chief of Army objective of substantive growth to trigger the government approval to re-raise the second additional infantry battalion (8/9 RAR) was achieved by the end of 2007. In the same timeframe, 7 RAR elements were deployed and preparing for operations with a mechanised platoon grouped to a 2 RAR led battle group deployment in Timor Leste and A Company forming the basis for a Security Detachment Iraq rotation in Baghdad. The remainder of the battalion was warned to form an overwatch battle group rotation in southern Iraq with other 1st Brigade elements. The change of government in 2007 resulted in the withdrawal of this commitment, and priority shifted to Afghanistan. Subsequently 7 RAR was tasked with forming a battle group to undertake the initial Mentor and Reconstruction Task Force mission later in 2008. Concurrent with this effort, C Company was raised, bringing the battalion establishment to a level not planned until 2010 by the original Enhanced Land Force schedule. 

The strong recruiting achievement for Army, and infantry soldiers in particular, at the time should be noted as central to these outcomes. Without the willingness of young Australians to voluntarily serve, particularly in the knowledge they would likely be deployed on operational service, any growth would have been far more modest and elongated. Their motivation is worthy of separate consideration as without voluntary enlistment at the scale of this experience, rapid growth would not have been achievable. 

Within two years of re-raising, 7 RAR had exceeded the planned level of growth by two years, converted to a new platform, deployed platoon and sub-unit elements on operations and was the bulk of a battle group deployed in Afghanistan conducting the most challenging offensive operations for conventional forces since the Vietnam War. None of these outcomes were envisaged at the commencement of re-raising at the unit level. They were, however, the result of a consistent approach to the task, with guiding principles and planning considerations derived from historical example and contemporary factors. 

Endnotes

There is no single reference point that mandated how the re-raising of 7 RAR was to progress. Neither the Army-level plans nor unit directives provide a complete understanding of the approach taken in this effort. There are, however, identified themes that reflect the culture of Army at that time, the operational focus of the period and the approach to the task by battalion leaders. To describe how re-raising was conducted in the 7 RAR experience, five core considerations that were consistently applied will be discussed. They are the centrality of unit identity; the galvanising effect of clear purpose; the criticality of growth from existing organisations; trusting in the quality of people and individual training; and seizing every opportunity to develop the unit.

Identity. The re-raising of 7 RAR was strongly influenced and guided by the raising and subsequent operational service of the original 7 RAR. There was a ready source of information and inspiration from the enthusiastic contribution of the 7 RAR Association, composed of Vietnam veterans, and the published battalion history^[iv] recording the period from raising in 1965 to linking in 1973. The galvanising effect of identity was therefore provided at the outset of re-raising and would prove to be central to subsequent efforts. Regular opportunities were taken to educate on the battalion history, with signature examples forming the basis for unit competitions, teams, awards, social events and other team-building efforts. This was a key factor employed in assimilating the many new members joining the battalion during re-raising. There was a deliberate reflection of the common themes of achievement over austerity and rapid growth for operational tasks between the original 7 RAR and the re-raised version that served as example and inspiration. A later example was the forming of the sub-unit conducting the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team role within the 7 RAR battle group deployment to Afghanistan. The officers and soldiers of this unique organisation drew heavily upon the history, achievements and expectations of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam, directly influencing their strong identity and exemplary conduct during subsequent operations.

Purpose. The 10 years from 2005 to 2014 involved a high tempo of operational deployments with highly positive effects for both recruiting and retention. For those serving within infantry battalions in particular, a regular routine of deployment followed by reconstitution and mission-specific training for the next deployment became the norm. Consequently, the purpose of service and training in particular had tangible meaning for all ranks. Unlike in periods of low operational tempo, there was a direct expectation that the training being conducted would be employed and tested in an operational environment in the near term. 

This sense of immediacy of operational employment, when combined with identity, had a strong galvanising effect in the 7 RAR experience during re-raising. From the outset it was made clear that the purpose of re-raising 7 RAR was for operational employment in the same way 7 RAR was first formed in 1965 for service in Vietnam and, by extension, the genesis of the 7th Battalions of the 1st and 2nd Australian Imperial Force during both world wars respectively. This sense of raison d’être for being a member of 7 RAR was actively promoted to develop collective attitudes and qualities focused on operational employment. By late 2008, the 7 RAR battle group then deployed to Afghanistan would draw heavily on the attitudes and resilience developed by this collective sense of purpose in the conduct of offensive operations. 

Growth from existing organisations. The decision by Commander 1st Brigade to allocate an existing sub-unit to 7 RAR was central to the success and tempo of the re-raising effort, providing an immediate source of leaders essential to the formation of sections and platoons. The raising of the original 7 RAR was rapidly achieved due to a similar model. On the return of 3 RAR from active service during Confrontation in 1965, single private soldiers and junior leaders were posted to form the nucleus of 7 RAR, subsequently reinforced by National Servicemen to build the battalion. The allocation of B Company 5/7 RAR on de-linking had the same effect for the new 7 RAR in providing experienced soldiers to accelerate unit growth objectives.

This principle of growth from existing organisations includes the advantages found from close support of the parent formation or command. The retention of 7 RAR in Darwin provided the opportunity to be supported by all elements of 1st Brigade, thereby mitigating the lack of organic support capabilities that would otherwise have constrained rapid growth. This was particularly important for the development of the mechanised capability within 7 RAR, enabling the brigading of courses with 5 RAR and vehicle maintenance by second-line assets within 1st Brigade. The original plan of re-raising in Adelaide would have negated these opportunities and delayed the development of the mechanised infantry skill set and culture that were to prove critical to success in the subsequent deployments. 

The challenges in growing from an existing organisation that is designed and resourced for a specified capability should also be acknowledged. The pressures on accommodation, life support, training facilities and many other implications of rapidly expanding dependencies should not be underestimated. Notwithstanding this risk, the 7 RAR experience demonstrates that the ability to brigade assets and maximise the shared use of high-demand and low-density capabilities is a critical enabler of raising new tactical units. 

Trust.  The early promotion of selected personnel to enable a readily available supply of junior leaders was central to the re-raising of 7 RAR. This decision was not purely mathematical but was a pragmatic, risk-aware approach based on an expectation of mutual trust. At the time there was some institutional resistance to this action due to the perceived risk of junior leaders not possessing sufficient time-based professional experience to adequately undertake these roles. The approach taken by 7 RAR was to trust in the quality of people and their individual training to do the job; promote trust in their leaders that they would be supported; and provide ongoing training and mentorship to develop junior leaders. The net effect was to create an environment where those stepping up to leadership roles felt valued and were supported and trusted, thereby mitigating any actual or perceived lack of experience and building individual confidence to lead. 

To achieve this outcome, the development of junior leaders was actively and personally led by the Regimental Sergeant Major (then Warrant Officer Class 1), David Allen. His approach was to demonstrate that junior leaders had greater expectations placed on them than the private soldiers who until recently had been their peers. Dave Allen developed and conducted separate follow-on training designed to augment the formal promotion courses, building individual confidence and providing experiences in leading effectively. He also took a detailed interest in individual strengths, weaknesses and potential to advise on where junior leaders were best suited to serve within the battalion and how to mentor and monitor their ongoing development. 

Again the historical antecedents of 7 RAR were an important reference point in the well-recorded knowledge that good people with sound training will achieve the demands of junior leadership. As demonstrated across all units that served during the Vietnam War, the success of National Servicemen and recently trained regular soldiers and officers alike did not rely on time in rank or extensive experience. Selecting suitable people and relying on quality individual training were the critical requirements for successful junior leaders at that time and during the re-raising of 7 RAR. This can be expected to remain constant into the future if the integrity of Army’s individual training is sustained. 

Seize opportunity. While the purpose of re-raising 7 RAR was directly linked to Army’s capacity to sustain operational requirements at the time, the battalion needed to develop collective confidence and begin to build a contemporary history of their own achievements. This was viewed as essential preparation for subsequent operational tasks to build on the seminal factors of identity and purpose. Consequently every opportunity was taken to demonstrate that 7 RAR was an operational capability at the outset despite limitations and constraints in personnel and mission-essential capabilities. Early in the first year the battalion fielded a team in the annual Duke of Gloucester Cup competition. With a section composed mostly of recently joined soldiers, the expectation of a high placing was low, but the statement was critical. Despite the subsequent last place, the evident pride the team had in representing their battalion was widely acknowledged and contrasted well with the absence of one longstanding battalion not fielding a team for an unclear rationale. Other examples included sending selected individuals on external courses, where their strong achievements added to the collective reputation. The aggregate effect of these and other initiatives developed the identity and mindset of a battalion preparing for imminent operational tasks, not just a unit in a building mode.

Opportunity was also taken in achieving unit growth and capability. A key constraint in the early stage of re-raising was living-in accommodation at Robertson Barracks. Planned growth to the unit establishment was based on known capacity. The identification of a satellite facility, with access supported by senior leaders, provided an early solution to trigger establishment growth not planned for another two years. 

Both examples serve to illustrate that raising tactical units requires a judicious balance between strategic-level considerations and local conditions that can best be achieved by devolving authorities and maintaining a consistent focus at all levels on the urgency of purpose for the outcome. Neither the Army nor those serving in new units should be unduly constrained by the lack of ideal conditions to progress substantive growth to meet operational requirements within the earliest timeframe. 

Endnotes

^[iv] Michael O’Brien, Conscripts and Regulars (Allen and Unwin, 1995).

The re-raising of 7 RAR provides just one example of how Army has responded to the need to rapidly expand to meet the demands of operational requirements. The factors and conditions of the time, particularly a clear operational focus and high availability of personnel, are important context for these outcomes. The re-raising effort was based on an evolving framework of directions and opportunities to form a cohesive and capable battalion in the mould of the original 7 RAR. The strength of shared purpose, pride in identity, accelerated growth from existing organisations, establishment of trust and a bias for seizing opportunity were central to this outcome.

The 7 RAR re-raising experience demonstrates that despite numerous shortfalls, pragmatic and risk-aware approaches taken by empowered unit leaders, supported by their senior leadership, will deliver success. Ultimately the only capability element that cannot be mitigated will be personnel: in the quantity required, in their commitment and motivation to serve and in the quality of their individual training.