2025 CA Essay Competition
Runner Up
“Our peace strategy must formulate our war strategy, by which I mean that there cannot be two forms of strategy, one for peace and one for war, without wastage – moral, physical and material when war breaks out. The first duty of the grand strategist is, therefore, to appreciate the commercial and financial position of his country; to discover what its resources and liabilities are. Secondly, he must understand the moral characteristics of his countrymen, their history, peculiarities, social customs and systems of government, for all these quantities and qualities form the pillars of the military arch which it is his duty to construct.”[1]
JFC Fuller, The Reformation of War
Army, as a profession, needs to set the conditions through which to enable rapid mobilisation for conflict. Currently the Australian Army appears to be precluded from vigorously pursuing mobilisation preparation, due to a lack of clear mandate within the current strategy. The National Defence Strategy 2024 (NDS 24) sets the primary strategic objective of deterrence and does not mention mobilisation. This presents the Army with a dilemma of justifying mobilisation preparation in the event of a failure to achieve the primary strategic objective. If this dilemma is not addressed, and Army’s approach to mobilisation preparation is not reconciled with NDS 24, there is a risk of undermining mobilisation preparations through lack of understanding and under-resourcing. This essay seeks to address this dilemma by analysing how Army can pursue mobilisation preparation when viewed as a function of the profession. In doing so, it presents recommendations as to how Army as a profession, can derive a mandate for mobilisation preparation congruent with NDS 24.
This essay presents two key arguments through which to justify its recommendations. Firstly, if the Army is a profession, then Australian society dictates the need for mobilisation preparation as a requirement for the profession. This is a social constructivist approach best viewed through James Burk’s model of the military profession. Secondly, mobilisation can and should be integrated into our approach to deterrence by considering mobilisation as an interpretive structure through which deterrent effects are communicated. To make these arguments, this paper will begin by defining mobilisation and examining the development of the concept of the military as a profession. It will then explore the Army Profession through Burk’s pillars of jurisdiction, expertise and legitimacy. It will contend that mobilisation preparation can be legitimated in the eyes of society by describing it as within the jurisdiction of Army. The confluence between mobilisation and deterrence will then be explored through the pillar of expertise. Finally, it presents civil-military relations as the key component for assuring the legitimacy of mobilisation as a function of the Army Profession. Whilst providing recommendations throughout, this essay concludes that if mobilisation is viewed as a function of the profession, the impediments of NDS 24 can be overcome, thereby enabling Army to fully pursue mobilisation preparation.
Mobilisation
Mobilisation, as it relates to military usage, is primarily about the preparation of the nation and its resources for war. The previously publicly released Australian Defence Force (‘ADF’) mobilisation doctrine provides a solid foundational definition, with mobilisation defined as “the process that generates military capabilities and marshals national resources to defend the nation and its interests”.[2] United States (‘US’) Army doctrine provides a more specific Army-focussed definition, stating:
“Army mobilization is the process of bringing the Army to a state of readiness for war, contingency, or national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Component (RC), as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.”[3]
These doctrinal definitions are broadly consistent with academic definitions.[4] For the purposes of this essay, a combination of the ADF and US Army definitions will be utilised. Mobilisation should be read as the marshalling of resources and capabilities at either the national or army level (inclusive of the activation of reserves and force expansion), in preparation for war.
The definition of mobilisation proposed in this essay is by no means conclusive. It is acknowledged the term may be used to describe the preparation of any number of organisations in the event of “war, crisis, or disaster”, [5] and that there are ongoing discussions about the levels and phases of mobilisation in the context of defence vs. national mobilisation.[6] It is also worth noting that mobilisation is often used in “tandem” with force expansion.[7] Most recently, the Australian Army Journal featured an article titled “Defining Land Force Mobilisation” which details the nuances of the definition and variety of usages in far more detail than will be attempted here.[8] For the purposes of discussing the Army Profession, the proposed definition is sufficiently detailed to explore recommendations for mobilisation preparation.
The Military Profession and James Burk’s model
The conceptualisation of the military as a profession is a relatively recent development. Two early seminal texts in this area were Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and State (1957) and Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier (1960).[9] Huntington sought to establish the officer corps as distinct from “warriors of previous ages”[10] and to elevate the status of military officers to the level of other professionals such as lawyers and doctors.[11] Huntington observed “the distinguishing characteristics of a profession as [a] special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility and corporateness”.[12] By defining the Military Profession though these pillars, Huntington established an early model for analysis. However Huntington largely sought to separate the Military Profession from politics, which has led many to be critical of this aspect of his writing.[13] Janowitz, whilst acknowledging Huntington’s model, emphasised group identity and a “system of internal administration” which involved a body of ethics and standard of performance.[14] Further distinguishing Janowitz’s model from Huntington’s was his belief that the officer corps required an understanding of politics.[15] These early writings form the intellectual foundations for the military as a profession, providing a useful framework for analysing how militaries and their societies have responded to changing geopolitical circumstances.
This framework was further developed by Burk through his model of the Military Profession. Burk’s study, whilst synthesising Huntington and Janowitz’s works, provides a description of the formulation of norms and the interplay between society and the military over time. As Burk states:
To call an occupation a “profession” is usually to make a positive normative judgment about the work being done, and, since we think that professional work is a social good, whatever we call professional work also reveals something about what we believe is required for the well-being of society.[16]
The corollary of this point is, as the strategic circumstances adapt over time, so too do the normative judgments from society about what the military is required to do for the well-being of society. Burk quotes Samuel Haber to make this point, defining professional activities as “social artifacts fashioned by public events and usage”.[17] Therefore to understand and define a profession is to recognise the societal norms at a particular time, to which the profession is expected to conform.
In Burk’s model there are three factors through which to examine the Military Profession; these are jurisdiction, expertise and legitimacy. Jurisdiction is defined by “the boundaries of the domain within which expert knowledge is applied”.[18] Thus jurisdiction is prone to expansion and contraction in line with the societal requirements, the changing character of war and strategic circumstance. Expertise is broadly defined as specialised abstract knowledge and skills. Burk argues that the military’s professional identity at the end of the 20th century was founded on its claim to expert knowledge in the management of violence, but acknowledged that this expertise could be expanded.[19] Finally, legitimacy refers to the trust that society places in a profession regarding the application of this expertise within the bounds of its jurisdiction.[20] By exploring the Army Profession through the pillars of jurisdiction, expertise and legitimacy, the profession can be prepared for rapid and effective mobilisation.
Jurisdiction and normative structures
The first step in preparing the Army Profession for mobilisation is to affirm its jurisdiction in this area. While Burk employs the term ‘jurisdiction’ when considering the Army Profession, it may be equally valid to consider this in terms of norms. Burk makes an explicit connection to norms when he states that the labelling of an occupation as a ‘profession’ makes a “positive normative judgment about the work being done” and reveals what is believed to be required for societal good.[21] Norms “describe collective expectations for proper behaviour of actors with a given identity” and this describes both “regulative and constitutive elements”.[22] Importantly, by considering Burk’s concept of ‘jurisdiction’ through a normative lens, this allows for recognition of the evolving nature of norms in society. Burk stresses this point by describing the adaptation of the Military Profession’s role over the last century; from the management of violence in the early 20th century, to the management of defence during the Cold War, and finally the management of peace once the Cold War ended.[23] Given these adaptations over time, and in line with Carl von Clausewitz’s warning about “arbitrary relationships”,[24] the Army can ill afford to assume what normative expectations Australian society carries with regard to mobilisation and the Army.
To affirm the Army Profession’s jurisdiction, Australian society should be consulted regarding its understanding and beliefs about the Army and mobilisation. Recent history demonstrates the Australian public’s understanding of the ADF cannot be assumed. In 2015, in the lead up to the release of the 2016 Defence White Paper, a major community consultation was conducted regarding public attitudes and understanding of Defence. The consultation produced a report entitled Guarding Against Uncertainty: Australian Attitudes to Defence.[25] The report revealed a significant disconnect between the Australian people and the ADF. It stated “the panel heard repeated concerns that much of the Australian community did not have a good understanding of their present-day defence force.”[26] While this report is now a decade old, it remains unclear if this attitude still prevails. Consequently, the Army shouldn’t wait for an existential crisis to confirm what Australian society expects with regards to mobilisation.
The war in Ukraine is demonstrative of the risk that misalignment of norms poses to mobilisation. For Russia, mobilisation has required conscription, which has brought to the fore norms about the use of Russian conscripts in war. The Russian people expected that conscripts would only be used on Russian territory.[27] When evidence arose of conscripts being used on the Ukrainian frontline, it was not immediately acknowledged by the Kremlin, resulting in campaigns from Russian NGOs to acknowledge the true use of these conscripts.[28] Issues with the mobilisation more generally have generated protests from Russian wives and mothers.[29] While this has not been assessed to be particularly damaging to Russian mobilisation (and may have even been co-opted),[30] in a democracy the impact may be considerably different. These examples demonstrate that transgressions of the normative framework, whether deliberate or unintentional, may have implications that hinder mobilisation. It is therefore important for the Army to baseline existing norms.
Importantly, it is insufficient to simply understand these norms; professions must play an active role regarding their jurisdiction. Given that society’s prescriptions for social good change over time, the profession is therefore required in a consultative manner to “define and defend the domain within which they work.”[31] In the context of mobilisation, the Army needs to consider Australian society’s understanding for the requirement of mass in high end conflict. The war in Ukraine has generated a broad consensus amongst commentators that mass is still of critical importance within modern war.[32] Technological asymmetry or sophistication is yet to compensate for a deficit in numbers, with mass required to counter the adversary’s mass.[33] Furthermore, , AI enabled or autonomous weapon systems are unlikely to ever completely remove the requirement for a large number of humans somewhere in the combined arms system. Jack Watling makes this point regarding the depth of support required for automated systems.[34] The ongoing requirement for mass in high-end conflict presents a powerful argument for the Army to ensure mobilisation remains in the remit of the profession, an argument that nonetheless needs to be made explicitly to the Australian public.
The struggle to generate and retain mass has caused the Ukrainian Armed Forces and its Government to reconsider several of their laws and norms around mobilisation. In an October 2024 interview with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, he revealed that only 12% of new recruits are volunteers.[35] Approximately 16% of the population which are eligible to serve have not renewed their contact and personal details with draft officers. [36] One of the ways to address these issues regarding manpower has been to reconsider the criminalisation of Absent Without Leave (AWOL) cases. AWOL numbers have been described as “endemic”.[37] This is reflected in figures from the Ukraine prosecutor general’s office showing a sharp increase of deserters from 2022 to 2024; in 2024, those figures reached a high of 19,922 battlefield desertions and 41,950 AWOL cases registered.[38] In response, laws have changed to allow first time offenders to return to service, provided the offender did not flee from the battlefield. Units and brigades which have opened their ranks to returning AWOL absconders have enjoyed high levels of recruitment from this source.[39] Anecdotally, absconders that return to different units do so due to the good reputation of the gaining unit, in the hopes of better treatment and service.[40] In particular, prestigious and elite units within Ukraine that conduct their own advertising and recruiting have had fewer manpower shortages.[41] This demonstrates how reviewing existing norms and laws can assist in mobilising the requisite mass for high end conflict, and how a profession can positively impact their jurisdiction.
Recommendations regarding the Army Profession’s jurisdiction
The lessons of the Ukrainian War provide two immediate recommendations for the Australian Army to affirm and mould its jurisdiction, as a profession, with regards to mobilisation. Firstly, the Army should commission a public consultation. In a manner similar to the 2015 Guarding Against Uncertainty report, this consultation should be aimed at understanding the public’s perception of the Army, their current grasp of the strategic situation, and their expectations around high-end conflict, particularly as it relates to mobilisation. As a specific example, existing norms on the use of reserves has likely changed following 2nd Australian Division’s tasking with a domestic security role.[42] Confirmation of the impact that this task has on the collective expectations of Australian society will aid Army, as a profession, to prepare for mobilisation.
Secondly, the findings of this consultation should then be used to inform the Army’s engagement with society, as a profession, regarding its mobilisation jurisdiction. There are a number of topics which the Army might expect to address including the persistence of mass in modern war, the inability of AI/Autonomous systems to ameliorate this requirement for mass, recruitment policies and concepts for localised recruiting. This engagement should take several forms, from articles and publications to proposals for legislative change. Documents such as the Australian Army Contribution to the NDS 2024 (‘Army Contribution’) provide important waypoints in this regard by providing publicly available reference material to inform such discussions. By pursuing these two recommendations, the Army will affirm its jurisdiction, as a profession, thereby creating space to expand its mobilisation expertise.
Expertise and integrating mobilisation into deterrence
The second step in preparing the Army, as a profession, for rapid mobilisation is to examine its expertise on mobilisation. For Burk, expertise rests on the Army’s “claim to expert knowledge in the management of violence”.[43] Importantly, Burk argues that the nature of this knowledge is not static and has evolved over time. Until World War II, the foundation of this claim lay in an “emphasis on the science (not the art) of war” [emphasis original].[44] The development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and the concomitant creation of national security and strategic studies resulted in an expansion in scope of the profession’s expertise.[45] This argument is compelling when read alongside Burk’s views regarding the adaptation of the Military Professions’ jurisdiction, i.e. from the management of violence in the early 20th century, to the management of defence during the Cold War, and finally the management of peace once the Cold War ended.[46] Ultimately, there is a requirement for different expertise with this evolving role. While Burk doesn’t explicitly make this connection, he argues that the conceptualisation of the expert knowledge necessarily adapts with the role. For the Army seeking to prepare for mobilisation, this becomes a question of what knowledge is required and how is it conceptualised.
NDS 24’s expression of strategy and strategic objectives presents a difficult challenge for the Army in conceptualising mobilisation expertise. This difficulty is most readily observed in NDS 24’s circuitous expression of deterrence. That is, that the strategy of denial seeks to deter by deterring through denial. Deterrence is almost exclusively expressed within the context of purchasing capabilities or by working within an alliance to deliver a denial effect. Consideration of the communicative aspect of deterrence is limited to a single line about “signalling” to a potential adversary that Defence has capabilities and friends which would frustrate any plans of aggression.[47] The result is conceptually unclear, with no discussion of mobilisation.
NDS 24’s lack of conceptual clarity around deterrence has historical precedence, with the same issues evident during the Cold War. In the Cold War this “new strategy of deterrence” conflicted with many of the traditional military ideas and goals given that the “object of military force now is not to win a war but to prevent it”.[48] At the heart of this confusion was a widening of the term “strategy”.[49] Hew Strachan’s seminal article “The Lost Meaning of Strategy” provides an authoritative account of this confusion.[50] Central to Strachan’s argument is that strategy is often conflated with policy.[51] During the Cold War this conflation occurred between strategy and foreign policy.[52] The result was that conventional military forces, intent on mobilisation for total war, were replaced by “force(s) in being” designed to achieve deterrence.[53] Today, in a similar fashion Australia has adopted a strategy of denial,[54] whereby the primary strategic objective is deterrence,[55] to be achieved by an “enhanced force-in-being.”[56] It is worth noting that Paul Dibb in his 1986 review of the ADF, recommended a “Strategy of Denial” but conceded this strategy was more akin to a policy.[57] This concession eerily reflects Strachan’s critique on the conflation of strategy and policy decades later. With no discussion of mobilisation, a lack of conceptual clarity surrounding deterrence, and possible conflation between strategy and policy, NDS 24 provides little substance in which to ground an argument for mobilisation.
To provide a modicum of theoretical structure, it should be inferred that NDS 24 is pursuing deterrence by denial. This inference is supported by the Defence Strategic Review (‘DSR’) which mentions “deterrence through denial” twice and by juxtaposition with its alternative, deterrence by punishment.[58] Early thinkers during the Cold War were chiefly concerned with the development of nuclear weapons and thus deterrence by punishment.[59] However deterrence by denial, which came to the fore primarily at the end of the Cold War, focussed on the use of conventional forces to achieve deterrence.[60] Snyder provides an apt summary of the two forms and their corresponding logic:
Denial capabilities—typically, conventional ground sea, and tactical air forces––deter chiefly by their effect on the ….. aggressor’s calculus, [and] estimate of the probability of gaining his objective. Punishment capabilities – typically, strategic nuclear power for either massive or limited retaliation – act primarily on the ….. aggressor’s estimate of possible costs, and may have little effect on his chances for territorial gain.[61]
More recently, Wilner and Wegner expressed this more simply as “punishment deters through fear of pain, denial deters through fear of failure.”[62] Through this apposition, deterrence by denial emerges as the most obviously aligned form of deterrence to NDS 24, and provides a simple coherent formulation of deterrence for integration with mobilisation.
Mobilisation integrates with deterrence by denial by acting as an interpretive structure. Emile Simpson in War from the Ground Up describes how these “interpretive structure(s)” operate in conflict to provide meaning.[63] Simpson argues that “strategy must in reality configure the abstract template of war to provide an interpretive structure that has purchase on its audiences.”[64] An understanding of the adversary and their decision-making calculus is critical. As Schelling states:
But what configuration of value systems for the two participants – of the “payoffs,” in the language of game theory – makes a deterrent threat credible? How do we measure the mixture of conflict and common interest required to generate a “deterrence” situation? What communication is required, and what means of authenticating the evidence communicated? What kind of “rationality” is required of the party to be deterred –a knowledge of his own value system, an ability to perceive alternatives and to calculate with probabilities, an ability to demonstrate (or an inability to conceal) his own rationality?” [65]
As Schelling elicits, there is a complex and evolving interplay between the deterrer and deterred. Mobilisation contributes to this by simultaneously providing communicative actions and evidence. Thus, the patterns of mobilisation in pursuit of deterrence becomes dialectic.[66] Antulio Echevarria describes this process as a “fragile” ongoing exchange, which requires “constant attention” to ensure the ongoing cultivation of deterrence in the mind of the target.[67] It is the combination of force structure and preparedness conceived in the context of an adversary’s plan that makes it credible.[68] The intent to deter is therefore credibly communicated by the various actions of mobilisation by a state.
Mobilisation for the purposes of deterrence, however, must be used cautiously. Reflecting on Word War I, Schelling argues that mobilisation for deterrence would have appeared no different to mobilisation for war.[69] Schelling’s point is that to the target of deterrent strategy, the difference between defensive or offensive mobilisation is likely to be difficult to discern.[70] However, Schelling concedes that World War I mobilisation was reliant on mechanical factors which are not necessarily relevant to modern mobilisation. Further to this, if the mobilisation is pursued in such a way as to reduce the impact or success of surprise attacks, this could communicate a deterrent effect.[71] Indeed, as Jack Watling in his recent book The Arms of the Future has stated, “a credible defence can be emplaced without suggesting an intent to attack”.[72] The advent of clear, detailed satellite imagery has enabled the interrogation of logistic chains to determine whether a combatant is actually preparing for combat operations.[73] Watling argues that unambiguous force structure can be used to signal intent.[74] Thus mobilisation can be conducted in support of deterrence by denial without being misconstrued, although this requires careful consideration of communicated signals and their impact on the intended target.
Recommendations regarding the Army Profession’s Expertise in Mobilisation
It is recommended the Army develops a model for the integration of mobilisation into a deterrence framework. As a currently understudied area, this will require a multi-disciplinary approach including history, legal, security and strategic studies. This will provide a more solid theoretical backbone to the Australian expression of deterrence, culminating in the creation of options with which Australia can seek to manipulate escalation dynamics. Key to this will be the development of stages or phases within the mobilisation framework which directly supports the credibility of Australian deterrence. In practical terms, the result of this study should trigger new doctrine and planning, with a particular focus on publicly accessible material. This material can then be used to support the argument that mobilisation expertise forms part of the Australian Army Profession, with the Army employing this expertise to directly contribute to the primary strategic objective of deterrence.
Legitimacy
Establishing legitimacy is the final step in preparing the Army Profession for mobilisation. Burk’s exposition on legitimacy in his oft cited chapter in The Future of the Army Profession is incomplete. This is because Burk, somewhat unhelpfully, explains this factor in the negative, focussing on the challenges to legitimacy to define it. Specifically, he highlights the deleterious effects of modern scepticism and “uncertainty about ‘objective truth’” as obstacles to the Military Profession’s legitimacy.[75] Burk’s esoteric epistemological inquiries almost entirely obfuscate his definition. Arguably, his article “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations”, written in the same year, provides a more thorough account of Burk’s thoughts on legitimacy as it relates to the Military Profession.[76] In this article, Burk provides a detailed description of the scope of civil-military relations, stating:
The empirical domain of civil-military relations is large. It includes direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people and institutions have with the military, legislative haggling over the funding, regulation and use of the military, and complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and implement national security policy.[77]
Importantly, Burk uses the article to call for “a new normative theory of civil–military relations for mature democracies”.[78] This focus on civil-military relations echoes his discussion on dialogue, the “public’s trust” and the development of “sustainable partnerships” within his model of the Military Profession.[79] By synthesising Burk’s work, it becomes evident that Burk perceives civil-military relations as a key component for assuring the legitimacy of the Military Profession.
A central tension within civil-military relations lies in the oscillation between the mobilised and de-mobilised state. This is most readily evident in an exploration of the “citizen-soldier ideal”.[80] The issue, as Burk sees it, is the “gap” between the citizen and the soldier, which has widened as citizens have become less likely to be required to defend their democratic state.[81] Mass standing armies have been reduced in favour of small professional armies reliant on mobilisation to produce mass as required.[82] For Burk this necessarily requires questioning of how to encourage citizens to “participate in public life and to take responsibility for the defense and well-being of their society”.[83] On the other hand, Janowitz makes an equally valid point about the “civilianizing” effect that mobilisation can have.[84] In relation to the mobilisation of a “military force for deterrence”, Janowitz states:
The line between the military and the larger society weakened because of military dependence on civilian industry and science, and because of the impact of the mobilization of large numbers of civilians for wartime service. “Total war” made both soldier and civilian objects of attack and served to attenuate the distinction between the military and civilian sectors of society.[85]
The corollary is that the gap (and the state of civil military relations) alters pre and post mobilisation. Two important conclusions should be drawn from this. Firstly, the gap between citizens and soldiers must be considered in all messaging relating to mobilisation and where possible, reduced. Secondly, the establishment of any Army ethic, culture or institution must be prepared for a degree of civilianisation upon mobilisation. Thus, for Army to cultivate legitimacy as a profession concerned with mobilisation, planning and communications will need to demonstrate sensitivity to the changing nature of civil military relations in a pre and post mobilised state.
Civil-military relations are also relevant to the consideration and formulation of strategy. For Huntington, the increased participation of civilian entities in the formulation of strategy was a key concern.[86] Importantly, he highlighted that a wealth of strategic writing done in the 1960s was conducted by academics, whilst military officers were left to “lag behind” in the development of strategic thought on deterrence.[87] The result was a gap in the writing of military policy in the US. This led to allegations at the Pentagon that the “civilian ‘whiz kids’” were “unduly contemptuous of the military officers for their backwardness and ignorance.”[88] In practice there needs to be a balance between the civilian and military entities, given the iterative and dialogic nature of strategy. Strachan’s views on strategy as they relate to civil-military relations are relevant here. He states:
In the ideal model of civil-military relations, the democratic head of state sets out his or her policy, and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. The reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy—is a compromise between the ends of policy and military means available to implement it.[89]
To be effective in this process, there is a requirement to cultivate “strategic mindedness” in members of the profession and in turn contribute to the dialogue.[90] Simply put, the Army Profession will not be perceived as legitimate if it cedes the intellectual space on deterrence and mobilisation to others.
Recommendations regarding the Army Profession’s Legitimacy in Mobilisation
To cultivate legitimacy in the civil-military relations space, there are four immediate recommendations. Firstly, reduce the citizen-soldier gap. This recommendation is already recognised in part through the call for a larger reserve force.[91] Efforts to increase the Reserve Force however should consider not just the “capability” that these reserves bring, but also their impact on national defence consciousness within communities. Reserve members have a unique position of participating in daily civilian life with an increased awareness of Defence’s equities, which can a have important role in connecting the Army with local communities. Secondly, the Army’s messaging regarding mobilisation requires increased awareness of the citizen-soldier gap. As Burk argues, the decreased requirement to defend the democratic state impacts the citizen’s views more broadly, indicating that deontological arguments may not be as impactful.[92] Thirdly, decisions about institutional Army need to consider Janowitz’s “civilianising” effect, post mobilisation. This means future decisions particularly around culture and ethic should consider the more diverse citizen-soldier, rather than just the full-time professional soldier of today’s standing army. This point is about ensuring Army’s culture and ethic is accessible to everyday Australians who in the event of high-intensity conflict, may be called upon to serve. This leads to the fourth recommendation in relation to legitimacy; to reinvigorate the study and discussion of these topics in such a way as to impact the civil-military spaces and strategy. In part, the legitimacy of the Army Profession’s purchase on mobilisation will be judged by its ability to contribute intelligently to the dialogue. The overarching effect of these recommendations related to legitimacy is to ensure the validity of the Army’s jurisdiction and expertise, as a profession, in the eyes of the various stakeholders concerned with civil-military relations.
Conclusion
If Army is ill-prepared to mobilise for high intensity conflict, it will be insufficient to respond that mobilisation wasn’t part of the National Defence Strategy. Whilst the Army has a role to perform within NDS 24, there are certain duties owed to the Australian people that run deeper than the current strategic focus. By taking a social constructivist approach through Burk’s model of the military profession, the pillars of jurisdiction, expertise and legitimacy provide a strong framework through which Army can set the conditions for rapid and effective mobilisation. Mobilisation preparation becomes justified as a legitimate expectation of society, while emphasising the importance of the connection between Army and the society it serves. Importantly, viewing mobilisation as a function of the Army Profession elevates it beyond the confines of the current strategy and provides a theoretical framework through which actionable recommendations can be made and implemented.
Endnotes
[1] JFC Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1923), 218.
[2] ADDP 00.2: Preparedness And Mobilisation (Provisional), (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2004). Quoted in Peter Layton, "National mobilisation during war: past insights, future possibilities," (Canberra: Australian National University, 2020), National Security College Occaisional Paper, 4. https://nsc.anu.edu.au/content-centre/research/national-mobilisation-during-war-past-insights-future-possibilities.
[3] Army Regulation 500-5 Army Mobilization (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army (United States) 2015).
[4] Peter Layton agrees with the definition of ADDP 00.2 but with qualifications about its “shortcomings” specifically about the focus on military capabilities. See Layton, "National mobilisation during war: past insights, future possibilities," p. 4. Yenin et. al. provides perhaps one of the most comprehensive definitions in that “Mobilisation is thus the process of simultaneous structuring of society and acquisition of access to the benefits available in society, regardless who owned them before the mobilisation. In the case of military mobilisation, the state is the key structure that deals with the redistribution of resources needed for war. Such resources could include human resources, which could both be used as fulfilment for the military and be the workforce in the war economy to provide goods and services for the military efforts of the state.” Maksym Yenin et al., "Improvement of Human Capital Development: A Factor in Increasing the Mobilisation Potential of Ukraine," Periodica Polytechnica Social and Management Sciences 32, no. 1 (2024): 80, https://doi.org/10.3311/PPso.20547.
[5] Mick Ryan states “Mobilisation involves the deliberate, planned use of a society’s resources to achieve national objectives in time of war, crisis, or disaster.” Mick Ryan, "Mobilising for the moment," Engelsberg Ideas, 03 October, 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/military-mobilisation/.
[6] In Australian discussions there are considered to be four levels: 1. Select, 2. Partial, 3. Defence (whole) 4. National Mobilisation. ADDP 00.2: Preparedness And Mobilisation (Provisional), 3-2. Layton, "National mobilisation during war: past insights, future possibilities," 5. See also Zach Lambert and David Caligari, "On Mobilisation," Online (speech transcript), Australian Army Journal 20, no. 3 (2024). It is also worth noting that Peter Layton explicitly states that all mobilisation should be considered national mobilisation. Layton, National mobilisation during war, p.5.
[7] Hannah Woodford-Smith, "Defining Land Force Mobilisation," Online, Australian Army Journal 20, no. 1 (2024). See also Layton, "National mobilisation during war: past insights, future possibilities."
[8] Woodford-Smith, "Defining Land Force Mobilisation." See also Layton, "National mobilisation during war: past insights, future possibilities."
[9] James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (New York, United States: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing, 2002), 39. See also Suzanne C. Nielsen and Hughe Liebert, "The Continuing Relevance of Morris Jaowitz's The Professional Soldier for the Education of Officers," Armed Forces & Society 47, no. 4 (2021): 733, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20960480.
[10] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (United States: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1957).
[11] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 7-8.
[12] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 8.
[13] Nielsen and Liebert, "The Continuing Relevance of Morris Jaowitz's The Professional Soldier for the Education of Officers," 738.
[14] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, First Free Press Paperback ed. (United States: The Free Press, 1964), 5-7.
[15] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 426. See also Nielsen and Liebert, "The Continuing Relevance of Morris Jaowitz's The Professional Soldier for the Education of Officers."
[16] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 39.
[17] Samuel Haber, The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750-1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), X. quoted in Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 40.
[18] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 49.
[19] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 49.
[20] Burks’ section entitled “Legitimacy” (pp. 51-52) does not explicitly offer this definition; instead in incidental conversation at p. 54 Burk refers to gaining the “public’s trust on which professional legitimacy depends” in Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession."
[21] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 39.
For confirmation of this normative approach see also Suzanne C. Nielsen and Hugh Liebert, "Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations and the Enduring Value of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal," Armed Forces & Society 51, no. 2 (2025): 525, https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=a6ded70e-cf90-3a7c-9241-b9cc40f263df.
[22] Peter Katzenstein quoted in Jan Angstrom, "The changing norms of civil and military relations theory," Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 226, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778014.
[23] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 50.
Janowitz provides an interesting term for the militaries’ role in the Cold War as a “Constabulary”. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 418.
[24] “A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 31.
[25] Peter Jennings et al., "Guarding Against Uncertainty: Australian Attitudes to Defence," (Department of Defence, Australian Government, 2015). https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20151020041130/http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/Links.asp.
[26] Jennings et al., "Guarding Against Uncertainty: Australian Attitudes to Defence," p. 5.
[27] Jennifer Mathers, "Ukraine war: families of unhappy Russian conscripts could undermine Kremlin's war effort," The Conversation 05 March, 2022, https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-families-of-unhappy-russian-conscripts-could-undermine-kremlins-war-effort-178362.
[28] Mathers, "Ukraine war: families of unhappy Russian conscripts could undermine Kremlin's war effort"; Emily Ferris, "Russian Soldiers' Mothers: Independent Activists or State Agents? ," RUSI Newsbrief, RUSI, 31 March 2023, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/russian-soldiers-mothers-independent-activists-or-state-agents.
[29] Steve Cannane, "The Women taking on Vladmir Putin, one flower at a time," (ABC News, 07 March 2024), Online. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-07/wives-and-mothers-of-mobilised-soldiers-challenge-vladimir-putin/103520022. See also Mathers, "Ukraine war: families of unhappy Russian conscripts could undermine Kremlin's war effort".
[30] Ferris, "Russian Soldiers' Mothers: Independent Activists or State Agents? ".
[31] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 40.
[32] Julian Brazier, "Mass, mobilisation and reserve forces," (London, England: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies London, England, September 2022), RUSI Occaisional Paper, V. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/mass-mobilisation-and-reserve-forces. Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future : Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century, New Perspectives on Defence and Security, (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024), 225. Andrew Michta, "Mass still matters: What the US military should learn from Ukraine," New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council, 03 October, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/mass-still-matters-what-the-us-military-should-learn-from-ukraine/. Vincent Connelly, "Delivering 'Mass' for the British Army: Defence Reviews and Second Echelon Choices," Commentary, RUSI, 07 March 2025, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/delivering-mass-british-army-defence-reviews-and-second-echelon-choices.
[33] Michta, "Mass still matters: What the US military should learn from Ukraine".
[34] Watling, The Arms of the Future : Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century, 224-25.
[35] Gil Barndollar, "The Deep Strike Dodge: Firepower and Manpower in Ukraine's War," Commentary, War on the Rocks, 26 February, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/the-deep-strike-dodge-firepower-and-manpower-in-ukraines-war/.
[36] Maria Varenikova, "The Concert Was Great, Until the Ukrainian Draft Officers Showed Up," (The New York Times 22 October 2024), Online. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=8d9b079b-f5d7-3284-a60f-e86e2a7dce30.
[37] Barndollar, "The Deep Strike Dodge: Firepower and Manpower in Ukraine's War".
See also Max Hunder, "Ukraine gives absconding soldiers second chance as forces dwindle," World, Reuters, 04 December, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/depleted-by-war-ukraine-gives-absconding-soldiers-second-chance-2024-12-04/.
[38] Hunder, "Ukraine gives absconding soldiers second chance as forces dwindle".
[39] Hunder, "Ukraine gives absconding soldiers second chance as forces dwindle".
[40] Hunder, "Ukraine gives absconding soldiers second chance as forces dwindle".
[41] Yurri Clavilier and Michael Gjerstad, "Combat losses and manpower challenges underscore the importance of 'mass' in Ukraine," Military Balance Blog, The International Institutue for Strategic Studies, 10 February, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/.
[42] Defence, "Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves," (Australian Government, 2024), 18. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/strategic-review-of-the-adf-reserves.
As the review states: “Most recently, the tasking of the 2nd (Australian) Division in a domestic security role has taken them away from a purely force expansion role to be a more operationally focused organisation.”
[43] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 49.
[44] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 49.
[45] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 49.
[46] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 50.
See also Janowitz’s discussion of the ‘constabulary’, Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 418.
[47] Defence, "National Defence Strategy," (Australian Government 2024), 22. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program.
[48] Samuel P. Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession," Daedalus 92, no. 4 (Fall 1963): 801.
[49] Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 49, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248102.
[50] Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy."
[51] Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," 40.
[52] Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," 43.
[53] Morris Janowitz, "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy in International Relations," World Politics 26, no. 4 (1974).
[54] Defence, "National Defence Strategy," 21.
[55] Defence, "National Defence Strategy," 22, para. 3.6.
[56] Defence, "National Defence Strategy," 28, para. 4.5.
[57] Paul Dibb states this explicitly twice in the report. Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, The Paliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (03 June 1986), 5 & 50, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/publications/tabledpapers/HPP032016004265/upload_pdf/HPP032016004265.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22Defensive%20deterrence%20through%20denial%22.
[58] Defence, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review," (Australian Government, 2023), paras. 3.10 & 4.6. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.
[59] Bec Shrimpton, "Deterrence, escalation and strategic stability: Rebuilding Australia's muscle memory," (Australia: ASPI, May 2024), Special Report, 11. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deterrence-escalation-and-strategic-stability-rebuilding-australias-muscle-memory.
For example see Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Deterrent of Defense: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position (New York, US: Praeger, 1960). Bernard Brodie, The Anatomy of Deterrence (Santa Monica, California, US: RAND Corporation, 1958), Report (online). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2218.html. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press, 1960). Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961). André Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, trans. R.H. Barry (London: Faber & Faber, 1965).
[60] Samuel Zilincik and Tim Sweijs, "Beyond deterrence: Reconceptualizing denial strategies and rethinking their emotional effects," Contemporary Security Policy 44, no. 2 (March 2023): 249, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970.
Only relatively recently has there been renewed focus on deterrence by denial, although John Mearsheimer’s Conventional Deterrence first published in 1983 standing out as early exception. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, (Ithaca, New York, US: Cornell University Press, 1983).
[61] Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 14-15.
[62] Alex Wilner and Andreas Wegner, "Introduction: Detterence by Denial," in Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice, ed. Alex Wilner and Andreas Wegner (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2020), 7.
[63] Emile Simpson, War from the ground up (Melbourne: Scribe, 2013), 23.
[64] Simpson, War from the ground up, 53.
[65] Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 13.
[66] André Beufre describes the dialectic of deterrence in several ways in both Deterrence and Strategy and Strategy for Tomorrow. For the purposes of this discussion I am referring to Beufre’s description of the “dialectic of the expectation of victory” in Deterrence and Strategy. Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, 50-53.
[67] Antulio J. Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (2016), 37, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/425/.
[68] Wirtz states “Capability (the material capacity to make good on a threat should deterrence fail) plus credibility (the belief in the mind of the opponent that the party making a threat will actually be able and willing to execute the threat)”. However, I would argue this entire extract speaks to credibility as formulated above.
James Wirtz, "Deterrence as Strategy," in Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice, ed. Alex Wilner and Andreas Wegner (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2020), 126.
[69] Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 2020), 268-9.
Schelling’s Chapter 6: The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm focuses heavily on the World War 1 and the difficulty in clear communication of the intentions of mobilisation.
[70] Schelling, Arms and Influence, 225.
[71] Schelling, Arms and Influence, 226-27.
[72] Watling, The Arms of the Future : Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century, 154.
[73] Watling, The Arms of the Future : Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century, 154.
[74] Watling, The Arms of the Future : Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century, 154.
[75] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 51-52.
[76] James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 1 (2002), https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=abeeab18-ce3e-3ac0-bae7-5f08a20e0833.
[77] Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 7.
[78] Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 7.
Nielsen and Liebert, "Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations and the Enduring Value of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal," 524.
[79] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," 54.
[80] Nielsen and Liebert, "Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations and the Enduring Value of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal," 524.
[81] Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 18-19. Burk states:
“there has been a gradual erosion of the idea that citizens have an unlimited obligation to bear arms in the defense of their countries……In general, citizens are now free to decide for themselves whether this is an obligation that they should perform. The roles of citizen and soldier are no longer intertwined—a gap has opened between them. We might say that the charisma of the citizen soldier was routinized and diminished as the choice to perform military service became much like a choice to fill any job.'”
[82] Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 18-19. Burk’s point here is about the overall reduction in the number of citizen-soldiers, not mobilisation.
See also Nielsen and Liebert, "Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations and the Enduring Value of the Citizen-Soldier Ideal," 529.
[83] Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 18.
[84] Janowitz, "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy in International Relations," 500.
[85] Janowitz, "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy in International Relations," 500.
[86] Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession," 798.
[87] Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession," 798.
[88] Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession," 798.
[89] Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," 52.
[90] William Rapp, "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making," Parameters 45, no. 3 (2015): 14, https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2739.
[91] Defence, "Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves," 11.
[92] Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," 18-19. Burk states: “there has been a gradual erosion of the idea that citizens have an unlimited obligation to bear arms in the defense of their countries”.