Russian Artillery — 1941-1945

THE scarcity of information concerning organization and work of the Russian Artillery during the recent War is to be regretted since much that occurred during this conflict must prove of high interest to all soldiers. The following attempt to reconstruct certain artillery aspects of that war out of scanty scraps of published information is offered for what it may be worth.

For the previous two centuries the Artillery Service had been the pride of the Russian Army. Its complete failure in the war of 1914-17 had come as a shock to Russian soldiers. It could, however, be mainly attributed to the faulty system of supplying both material and ammunition to the troops not only during but long before that war; it could not discredit the human material.

After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 no effectual steps appear to have been taken to restore the Russian Artillery to its pristine pre-eminence until, in 1937, as a result of the political crisis that convulsed the Red Army, General Nikolai Voronov was appointed head of the Artillery Service. This forceful character, then 38 years of age, forthwith set about re-educating the Russian gunners in the traditions of which they had once been justly proud. His belief in the cannon as the main element of strength of the Red Army was profound; his energy was unbounded. By 1939 Marshal Voroshilov, then Commissar for Defence, could report to the Supreme Soviet that the firepower of the Russian Artillery had been trebled.

This statement was not far from the truth, though its further implications appear to have escaped all military critics at the time. This circumstance arose from the fact that the Germans in their frenzied haste to re-arm and to create a “New Model” army had neglected their artillery arm. The doctrine had been evolved that artillery had lost much of its significance, so German military authorities devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the development of their “flying cannon.” i.e., the dive-bombers, to work with large, fast-moving, tank formations, while they pinned their faith to the trench-mortar as the supporting Weapon of infantry.

But Voronov, whilst increasing the actual number of cannon to be manned by his gunners had also made every effort to improve their mobility; and this fact was incorrectly appraised abroad— at least by German critics. The probability that such was the misreading of facts gains greatly from the known course of the German offensives during 1939, 1940 and 1941, when no serious attempt seems ever to have been made by them to reduce any strong place on work of defence by means of artillery fire. Their theory of war depended so greatly on the superior rapidity of movement of their armies, that they assumed that there would be no time for siege operations.

This policy was certainly applicable to conditions prevalent in Western Europe —particularly in view of the limits of the Maginot Line—as well as to Poland in the dry season. But when applied to a projected invasion of Russia, any strategy based on such a theory must encounter at least two formidable obstacles—first, distances; secondly, paucity and poor quality of communications. In addition, climate demanded the attainment of success before the arrival of winter. Finally, the Germans were surprised by the staunchness of the Russian troops. Consequently it may be asked whether the Wehrmacht of 1941, however splendidly armed and equipped it might be for rapid shock movement, was intrinsically a perfect and complete instrument of war? The idea formerly expressed that tanks might suffer from the limitations experienced by the “heavy” cavalry of the 18th century, would seem to gain credence as the outcome of this war. Anyhow the Wehrmacht in 1941 was certainly lacking in artillery power.

It is not yet perfectly clear what actually look place during those early months of the war, but it is at least possible, and more than probable, that the Germans suddenly, and long before the close of the year, became aware that their army, designed and equipped for rapid offensive progress and relying upon massive attacks by tanks and divebombers, was deficient in artillery.

Hence the frantic starch throughout occupied European arsenals during the winter of 1941-42 for every type of cannon and howitzer that could be despatched to the East where the excellent and numerous German trench-mortars were being held at arm’s length by the superior Russian cannon. The Russians, on their side, lacked trench-mortars. Consequently Voronov created a special supply branch for the production of these weapons and their ammunition. Nevertheless as fast as the Germans began to bring up batteries equipped with Finnish, Belgian, Hungarian, Dutch, French, Czech and Rumanian weapons, so the Russians became more and more hardly pressed to produce reinforcing units of medium and heavy guns to counter this new artillery. The result ‘was that there set in a species of competition or race between the two belligerents in the matter of producing artillery material.

The Russians in the end outstripped their rivals; but during the winter of 1941-42—in fact until the first Russian counter-offensive conducted around Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43 — superiority in artillery power hung in the balance. It was during this year that the provision of war material to Russia by the Allies might be regarded as having proved of the greatest assistance to the Red Army. Even “a little” might at that time have signified “very much.”

Again, whatever the effect of Russian fire in the field may have been, it depended throughout the war very largely on a lavish supply of ammunition, which in turn depended on the vast numbers of the transport which the Russians managed to place in the hands of the artillery supply services. The arrival of lorries from the U.S.A. in 1942-43 may therefore have proved a distinct factor in the attainment of the later great Russian successes. The traversing of the vast spaces over which the war raged caused this question of ammunition supply to become the true crux of the whole Russian artillery problem. It was in this respect that Voronov’s direction was so important. He never for one moment lost sight of the need for a lavish supply of ammunition, whilst never sacrificing the mobility either of guns or of artillery transport. Such were the twin foundations on which he evolved his fire tactics. Accordingly, ever stressing the value of massed fire, he planned and was able to produce with some speed and dexterity those great artillery concentrations which became perhaps a truly noteworthy feature of most Russian operations.

The first occasion on which Voronov could bring any concentration of fire against the Germans was before Moscow at the end of 1941. But his resources were still so limited that these attempts could not achieve anything very considerable; they could only be regarded as puny efforts compared with what was to come in 1943 onwards. Nevertheless, during 1942, by withdrawing one artillery regiment from every infantry division of the Red Army, Voronov managed to create a considerable mobile artillery reserve.

On November 19, 1942, the first great Soviet counter-offensive was launched to the north and south of Stalingrad; 5,000 pieces composing Voronov’s reserve were sent into action almost at one stroke; on one single day they tired about 700,000 rounds.

The next ten weeks of fighting proved the value of Voronov’s theory, tactics and organization in a planned offensive. It still remained to be seen how his conclusions would conform to defensive action. When in July 1943 the Germans launched their final offensive effort against the huge Russian salient at Kursk, they attacked simultaneously from north and south with every tank and gun they could muster. The fighting and the casualties were, proportionately, perhaps the heaviest known in the war. In the end the Russian gunners defeated the German assaults—completely in the north of the salient, while they could admit of only a partial lack of success to the south, where they had to withdraw some thirty miles. Voronov’s triumph was complete.

From that moment the Russian artillery swept all before it. Powerfully assisted by the new Russian Air Force, re-created by Stalin by the side of the squadrons existing in 1941, it went on from success to success. The new Russian aeroplanes came into action to assist the batteries just as fast as production began to falter in Germany. It became clear that German casualties in men and material could never recover from the terrific losses of 1941-43. So the tilting of the balance continued rapidly. The most powerful German defences were soon smashed at one blow; so during 1943-44 the greater German “hedgehogs,” i.e., field-fortresses, fell one by one, Right down to the end the Russian guns continued to crush a German resistance that was weakening all the time.

Organization and Tactics

Very little indeed can be gleaned from published sources concerning Russian artillery organization. Interesting sidelights are, however, thrown thereon in Stalin’s Orders of the Day which, for a short time towards the end of 19+3, gave the official designation of the artillery units which bad distinguished themselves in action. Some of the names and numbers disclosed are:—

• Artillery Divisions—3rd, 11th. 13th, 16th, 17th.
• Mortar Division—3rd.
• Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division—
• 8th.
• Anti-Tank Artillery Brigades—8th, 9th, 24th.
• Cannon Artillery Brigade—33rd.
• Mortar Brigade—12th.
• Artillery Regiments—69th, 1157th.
• Mortar Regiments—16th, 91st, 97th, 263rd, 292nd, 328th, 491st, 492nd, 493rd, 497th, 525th.
• Howitzer Artillery Regiments—11th, 678th, 805th, 827th, 839th.
• Anti-Tank Artillery Regiments—4th, 115th, 163rd, 166th, 222nd, 312th, 316th 317th, 493rd, 868th, 1000th, 1075th, 1642nd, 1644th, 1667th, 1669th.
• Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments— 41st, 1543rd, 1694th, 1829th, 1831st, 1893rd.
• Independent Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion—84th.
• Independent Mortar Battalion—No number.

This fragmentary list may not seem of very great value; yet it substantiates several deductions to which various Orders of the Day and Press reports lend much colour. As a general rule it would appear that the ever-increasing Artillery Regiments were raised and armed as required according to tactical needs. As all such units and formations were numbered consecutively on a general list, large or small blocks of like units were being inserted in sequence on the lists without much reference to the nature of their neighbouring units. The list also tends to show that towards the latter part of the war the Russians concentrated on the constitution of new anti-tank and self-propelled units; this is all probably fact and more than guesswork.

Deductions to be drawn from such sources concerning organization, if not tactics, are the following:—

1. There exists no doubt that the Russians organized and employed in the field whole artillery divisions and even corps. These were used as independent formations for tactical purposes and were handled in the field in a manner approximating infantry divisions. This Assumption is strengthened by the continued mention of artillery commanders of the highest ranks in Stalin’s Orders of the Day even when the practice of naming the actual formations and units was not customary.
    
2. In all Press reports the repeated reference to Russian artillery firing over open sights as though this were a very usual proceeding seems to point to a regular practice of thrusting forward the guns to point blank range.
    
3. The mention of artillery units and sub-units playing a leading role in street fighting during the capture of fortified towns would show a very bold handling of the guns, and their close connection with infantry.

In order to ensure surprise the handling of the Russian guns might be considered to be bold in the extreme. To quote one instance: in December 1943, during Vatutin’s attempts made with the 1st Ukranian Group to regain the great Zhitomir main road to the west of Kiev, his batteries first began to conduct a normal creeping barrage. But time was urgent so the guns were suddenly pushed forward to point blank range when they rapidly smothered the enemy’s positions. As might be expected it was owing to this audacity, so frequently possible on account of the Russian superiority in numbers and material, if not also owing to the decline in the German fire-power, that these forceful artillery tactics conduced to a great extension in the use of the self-propelled gun. The speed, the head-on armour and the readiness for action which were developed in this type of weapon was found effective, and this circumstance led to a rapid increase in the numbers of S.P. units — as may be deduced from their numerical appearances in Stalin’s Orders of the Day. In fact the S.P. gun seems finally to have entered largely into the organization not only of the normal artillery division but also of the tank formation. The heavier types of S.P. weapons might be moved by rail to within 60 miles of their fighting destination which they might then reach in about three more hours. The guns fired, as a rule, over open sights and engaged visible targets.

When acting with tank formations the role of the S.P. artillery reserve was considered highly important since these weapons were intended to relieve the tanks of all tasks leading to a “direct” engagement. The object was to enable the tanks to recover their facility for manoeuvre or to carry out Hank attacks. For such purposes the S.P. units would cither go forward at speed to engage the enemy in front of the forward tanks, or they could hang back so as to prepare an ambush—all according to the nature of the terrain. For purposes of surprise to he obtained from ambush positions the Russian claim that this class of gun is unrivalled.

Again there is no reason for doubt that the Russian artillery, in common with the other arms, was organized into two distinct seasonal armies for summer and winter work respectively. The former was equipped as would be the case in any normal Western European army; but the latter was clothed in white; guns, tanks and transport were painted white; tracks on vehicles were made especially broad; ground clearance was increased; wheeled vehicles were supplied with skis in front—six wheelers would be fitted with some sort of tracks for the driving wheels and so forth. Most characteristic was the provision of air-screw propelled sleighs for cross-country work over snow. In between the two seasons “intermediate” formations could be introduced to cope with the mud and floods of spring or of autumn. Such formations consisted largely of horsed Cossack divisions, still accompanied with horsed artillery.

Material

Super long-range and extreme high velocity weapons were not favoured by Soviet artillery designers. Neither did the Germans ever attempt to repeat their performance with the “Big Bertha” of 1918: its effects had come to be regarded as microscopic as to be useless. The largest German ordnance named in Press reports were the monster 24-inch (?) howitzers constructed for the bombardment of Leningrad city, and these constituted an outstanding exception. The Russians did not attempt to emulate this enormous piece. The maximum ranges at which the Russian artillery fired varied from 10 to 15 miles. Conversely the Russian designers did their utmost to obtain accuracy and fire-effect by adopting lower muzzle velocities and increasing the size and power of the bursting charge. The results of such a policy became clear when the Russians set about smashing the strongest German defences round Leningrad and Vitebsk. At the same time, owing to Voronov’s influence, the mobility of all ordnance to be used in the field remained of paramount importance.

General Conclusions

In drawing any deductions, which may be applicable to artillery, from this German-Soviet war, it would be wise to bear in mind some of the general conditions which affected this stupendous struggle. Miscalculations as to the influence of such factors affected the German logistics of the war to such an extent that they may be said to be at the root of the German failure.

First, the scale of the area and the distance over which the operations ranged and the transports worked.

Second, the diversity of climate prevalent in Western Russia which profoundly affected strategy and equipment. The intense cold of winter followed by a period of flood and mud that in its turn gave way to the dust and glare of a flaming summer: the latter then again sinking across another stage of waterlogged terrain into the bitter cold of winter. Further, to the north, on the Baltic shores the winter was far more severe and prolonged than in the south; and even in the south considerable variations in snow and ice conditions prevailed from the Volga to the Danube.

Third, the enormous man-power reserve possessed by the Soviet Union. The Union’s peoples—seven only out of twenty-seven Soviet Republics can be said to be of really Russian stock— offered some 180,000,000 inhabitants to draw upon for troops as against some 80,000,000 of Germanic race. But owing to the higher birth-rate prevalent in Russia the annual contingents between 18 and 36 years of age from which first-line troops could be drawn might have almost doubled the actual number of men to be levied, that is the Red Army might nearly reckon on almost a fourfold superiority in man-power reserves.

Fourth, the immense and distant dispersion of Russian sources of raw materials and war factories which placed a great proportion of Russia’s war industries out of reach of aerial, let alone ground attack. This Russian superiority over the Germans began to increase rapidly from early 1943 onwards: and this result was achieved without any special effort being made on the part of the Russian Air Forces, at a time when air defence was constituting an increasingly serious drain on the German air-war potential.

With such advantages in hand, nor to mention the steady influx of Allied war material, already mentioned, and the all-important results achieved by the Allied Air Force, the Red Army could afford, from the time of the Stalingrad operations onwards at least, to indulge in far more venturesome tactics than the Germans, who soon began to feel the disadvantages of a withdrawal from their exposed positions deep in hostile territory.

Accordingly the Red Army’s policy of employing artillery in large independent formations and of handling the guns almost as though they were wholly mobile tactical units and formations becomes comprehensible, even if allowances be made for any obligatory recourse to the simplest methods of fire and of communications. Moreover with two differently equipped types of units— for summer and winter use—there always existed the possibility of finding a valuable reserve in case of accident. Again the large superiority of man-power enjoyed by the Red Army would permit of an advance in three distinct echelons from the latter part of 1943 until near the end.

Such a military policy might not work altogether as cleanly as outlined above, or as nicely as elaborated on paper; but it becomes exceedingly probable that it was applied as best might he, if the rate and extent of the various Soviet forward rushes made during the last eighteen months of the war be studied. Is it not possible that it was some failure in such a mode of advance that led to the dead stop before Warsaw, after the furious advance carried out through White Russia, in July 1944—if indeed it did not there meet with outright failure. At any rate the gain in confidence obtained from these advantages was of immense value, and so the Russian armies were able to rely on the heaviest and speediest artillery preparation to be followed by the advance of numerous mixed columns of tanks, infantry and artillery and aircraft.

Here we find, in fact, a tendency towards a tactical fusion amongst the various arms and assuming a more intimate nature than had been, normally and in practice, envisaged before 1939. The fact that such Russian mixed forces do not appear to have ever exceeded— possibly—one division in strength, need occasion no surprise since the command and control of any such force might constitute a ticklish matter.

The reduction of the German field-fortresses, “hedgehogs,” was surely a demonstration that sheer artillery power, followed by the bold movements of the guns to keep in step with an infantry advance can be made highly lucrative. But such movement will be rendered possible only by the possession of great artillery superiority, this being of high mobility, and by a lavish expenditure of ammunition. So we return once more to the basic problems of the supply of ammunition and of fuel. In Russia it is said that the transport army employed behind the front numbered 250,000, and that it included women. These figures would imply one transport worker for every 10 to 25 front-line combatants: the total of the lorries absorbed in the bark areas must have been very high, particularly if the use of sleighs for winter work be also taken into account. It might well be that the success of the Russian guns depended on the work achieved by their transport.

* Condensed from an article in the Journal of the Royal Artillery.