Mobilising Space for Army

How Space Supports Army

As recognised in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), space-based services and technologies are key enablers and supporters of all Defence operations. Indeed, the DSR identified the importance of space and cyber as both enabling and operational domains, equally important as the three traditional domains maritime, land and air. Although space and cyber already formed part of a joint force design, one key recommendation from the DSR was to move from a ‘joint’ to an ‘integrated force’[x] and, relatedly, to move Space Command from Air Force to Joint Capabilities,[xi] a change which was prudently implemented in July 2023. 

By taking an integrated rather than joint approach, it becomes even more evident that space and cyber, while different in nature to the three traditional domains, are integral to all modern military operations. It is true that they are separate, strategic domains which need greater investment into developing capabilities, as well as specific technical skill sets and a specialised workforce in order to protect against attacks and interferences. But they have become contested strategic domains unto themselves precisely because of how important they are as supports to operations in the other three domains. The most effective way to compromise an adversary’s ability to see, hear, navigate, operate certain weapons, or even access some command and control systems is to compromise their space systems, through jamming signals, ‘dazzling’ remote sensing instrumentation on an Earth observation satellite, ‘spoofing’ positioning data, attacking a ground station, or undertaking a cyber attack.[xii] The intended results are always terrestrial. 

In many ways it is difficult to distinguish how space-based services and technologies are integral to Army in ways that are different from the other armed services. As Army considers preparing for potential mobilisation across civil sectors for its needs in times of competition, crisis or conflict, however, there must be awareness of the role space-related assets, data and workforce already play and could potentially play in fulfilling Army’s needs. In the case of mobilisation, this requires an appreciation of risks and dependencies, as well as opportunities for engaging private sector capabilities and workforce. This is particularly important given the shift under the 2023 DSR and the 2024 NDS to an ‘integrated, focused force’ instead of a domain-specific force.[xiii] Under the 2024 strategy, the capability priorities include space and cyber capabilities that strengthen ‘the ability to project force and decision advantage’—specifically: 

Space capabilities that enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, provide resilient communications and counter emerging space threats through: 

• continued investment in Australia’s first sovereign-controlled satellite communications system, enhancing ADF communications in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions; 
• the Deep-space Advanced Radar Capability, which is a collaborative project with the UK and US, providing greater situational awareness in space; 
• investment in geospatial intelligence capabilities; and 
• investment in space control capabilities, providing the Government with options to assure Australia’s access to space.[xiv]

These space capabilities, and associated efforts to assure Australia’s access to space, are all about ensuring continued support for Army (and the other two armed services). Indeed, the capability priorities for Army listed in the 2024 NDS all have heavy, built-in dependencies on satellite technologies, including littoral manoeuvre capability, long-range fires, precision strike missiles, combat reconnaissance vehicles, and uncrewed tactical systems.[xv] To understand how these Army capabilities depend on satellites, it may be helpful to identify satellite services as falling into three main categories. The first is ‘position, navigation and timing’, or PNT. These satellite systems require a ‘constellation’ or group of satellites, which, combined, can provide precise and accurate location and timing information. Positioning is the ability to precisely determine one’s location and orientation. Navigation is the ability to determine both one’s current and desired position and apply corrections to course, orientation and speed to attain the desired position—from anywhere in the world, from sub-surface to surface, and from surface to space. Timing is the ability to acquire and maintain accurate and precise time from a standard (such as UTC), anywhere in the world. PNT systems include global navigation satellite systems, of which the Global Positioning System (GPS, owned and operated by the US military) is one example. Others include the Chinese-owned Beidou, the European-owned Galileo, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), the Japanese-owned Quazi-Zenith Satellite System, and the Russian-owned GLONASS. Aside from more obvious navigation uses for combat systems and individuals, some examples of PNT applications are situational awareness; GPS-guided weapons; autonomous or unpiloted vehicles; and precision timing that underpins digital payment systems and the international stock and trade markets. The second main category is communications satellites, including telecommunications and internet. Satellite phones have been used in a civilian context for decades by farmers and those in extremely remote areas, as well as in military operational contexts. Advanced communications are increasingly satellite based, as is internet access, provided by commercial operators such as Optus or Starlink. The third category is ‘Earth observation’ (EO), or satellite remote sensing, which is key to GEOINT and to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) more broadly. EO satellites also provide weather and meteorological information which can be critical for safety and planning during operations on land, at sea and in the air. The key regional EO systems are the European-owned Copernicus, the Indian owned RISAT and EOS systems, the Japanese-owned Himawari, and the US-owned Landsat and Landsat Next programs. There are also several commercially owned EO systems. It is hard to conceive of an Army operation or exercise that does not depend on each of these types of satellite systems in multiple ways. The level of critical dependency, often coupled with low levels of redundancy in the case of a loss of service, is not necessarily reflected in a sufficient level of space literacy across the armed forces.[xvi] This was highlighted by then Chief of Army Lieutenant General Rick Burr at the 2022 Air and Space Power Conference: 

Space provides the higher-ground advantage over land forces. Space power enables land forces to be connected and disposed of simultaneously through access to space-based systems for global positioning, navigating and timing, satellite communications, targeting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mapping and weather forecasting. The generation of space power will require more, though, than just the employment of space systems. It will demand a coherent, joint and integrated culture in the space domain. Increasing the awareness of space power within Army will be a critical part of this cultural development.^[xvii]

The majority of satellite services today are also dual use; that is, a single satellite system may be providing services both to military and civilian end users as clients. Of the nearly 10,000 operational satellites estimated to be in orbit in mid-2024, only 554 are dedicated military satellites, owned by nine countries.^[xviii]

A further complicating factor is that the vast majority of current operational satellite systems are also commercially owned. Until the beginning of this century, only nation states had the technological and economic wherewithal to access space, but as technologies have advanced, satellites have generally become smaller and cheaper to build and launch. Further, commercial entities have overtaken governments in designing, building and operating advanced space capabilities.^[xix] Even access to a launch provider has become cheaper due to the impact of commercial launch companies like SpaceX, RocketLab and United Launch Alliance (all US companies). Their modern launch vehicles and increased frequency of launch availability have collectively reduced the cost of launch per kilogram by almost a factor of 10 in the last 15 years.^[xx] This has seen a rise in the notion of ‘space as a service’ gaining traction, whereby militaries procure space data and space services from commercial providers, without having to procure an actual satellite system.^[xxi] While this is a cost-convenient option, it raises vulnerabilities in the event of military counter-satellite operations, and the dependability of such services if they were to be subjected to deliberate military interdiction.

There is no doubt that exquisite, dedicated satellite systems for government purposes are still being designed and built by civil space agencies and some militaries around the world, but these are in the vast minority of operational satellites today. And many sovereign satellite systems are acquired through government contracts to commercial entities. The dedicated military satellite communication system JP9102, comprising a constellation of three satellites and several ground stations, is a case in point. It was contracted to Lockheed Martin Australia under a $4 billion contract with Defence, and would therefore have qualified as a sovereign-owned constellation of satellites, even though it would have required ongoing contracting with Lockheed Martin personnel for its operation and support^[xxii]. Capability acquisition and contracting with the private sector is ‘business as usual’ for Defence, but aside from JP9102, there are currently no plans to acquire other sovereign space systems. Instead, purchasing ‘space as a service’ appears to be the preferred approach. This may be considered a form of mobilisation even in peacetime, since it requires drawing from the civil commercial sector for Defence needs. The risks and opportunities of this dependence on industry partners and service providers therefore needs to be fully understood, and will be further unpacked in the following sections that deal with mobilising space assets, space data and a space workforce.

The prevalence of ‘space as a service’ is particularly salient in the sense that much existing thinking about mobilisation focuses on industrial and primary sectors, whereas in fact the provision of services is a critical piece of the puzzle for mobilisation. This includes distribution services, communications, transport, utilities, information technology (IT), accommodation and food services, health services, retail, finance and insurance, and construction.^[xxiii] Indeed, the services sector forms the largest and wealthiest part of 21st century societies, with over 80 per cent of Australia’s GDP and 90 per cent of employment in Australia being in service industries rather than manufacturing or goods.^[xxiv] When it comes to the military space capabilities that Army, Air Force and Navy depend upon, these are all essentially services which Australia either purchases at a direct cost to the taxpayer from allies (and their respective private industries), or receives from partner nations in return for use of Australian ground infrastructure and data management. For example, much of the crucial EO information that Australia relies on for its weather, agriculture, mining, policing, intelligence, and response to flooding or bushfires comes from an agreement to access data from the European Commission’s Copernicus Sentinel satellites.^[xxv] In return for this access, CSIRO, Geoscience Australia and the New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australian governments all support the Copernicus Australasia Regional Data Hub, where the data is downlinked, processed and made available for Australasia, South-East Asia, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the Australian Antarctic Territory.^[xxvi]Australia also has a timeshare arrangement on the commercially developed NOVASAR-1 satellite, to collect data and monitor the Australian environment and disasters for 10 per cent of its time in orbit_—as do the United Kingdom, India and the Philippines.^[xxvii] Australia depends on Japanese, US and European satellites for all its weather information, which is a critical service for Defence operations.^[xxviii] And for GEOINT in particular, there are strong intelligence sharing agreements through the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) partnership, involving Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the UK and the US.^[xxix] In this partnership, Australia is a beneficiary and user of EO data, but not a contributor. This heavy reliance on foreign and commercial providers for critical space data puts Australia—and the ADF in particular—at great risk. The continued, reliable provision of these critical services cannot be assumed to remain secure and stable. If any of our partner nations task their satellites for a natural disaster response or an urgent national or regional security need, Australia risks losing access. If any of them were to change their data policies, or commercialise what is currently government owned, Australia would lose existing access or have to pay for it. Even if this situation were to be temporary, the effects could be dangerous to potentially catastrophic.^[xxx] There are also significant data-quality risks when it comes to commercially provided space data. Because there is no national or global oversight of the companies offering EO data, or of the quality or trustworthiness of the data being provided, there are risks of low-quality, unreliable, corrupted or inaccurate data.^[xxxi]

The intertwined, dual-use nature of space systems and the dominant role of commercial actors means that the ADF’s intersection with industry is both unavoidable and complex. In relation to preparedness and mobilisation, this means Army has to adopt agile thinking and approaches to how it intersects with the private space sector when it comes to space assets, data and workforce. The 1991 Wrigley Report to the then Hawke Labor government highlighted that ‘[t]he core role of the military profession [was] not to fight the nation’s wars on its own, but work as part of a “national security team”’.^[xxxii] Because of the prevalence of commercial space services, mobilisation requires preparing civil society as much as preparing the armed forces, which in turn necessitates closer relationships between civil and military organisations. This speaks to the nature of modern mobilisation efforts more generally. However, the changes in our geopolitical realities mean that a broader approach may be necessary when considering the kinds of scenarios that may lead to the need for mobilisation than was the case historically.

Endnotes

National security issues that might require a partial or full national mobilisation are now defined much more broadly than in the past. They include resilience to climate disasters such as floods and bushfires, food security, cybersecurity broadly and, as the international community learned recently, the ability to respond to global health pandemics. Mobilisation plans therefore need to include social issues and concerns.^[xxxiii] While this is a whole-of-government responsibility and does not fall solely on the shoulders of the Australian Army, it is a factor that Army must remain cognisant of when preparing for mobilisation. 

This broad definition of national security issues means there may be more and different scenarios that trigger the need to mobilise in favour of Defence needs than there were historically. On top of this, the context of current geopolitics further raises the likelihood of mobilisation. The strategic view of Australia’s defence has shifted slightly with changes of government over the past decade, yet there have remained some constants, which (according to the DSR) are projected to continue into the next decade. Since the 2013 Defence White Paper, the collective security of the Indo-Pacific region has been Australia’s core ‘strategic geographical framework’.^[xxxiv] The shift in ‘strategic weight’ from West to East that was identified in that paper is now increasing, with forecast economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region identified as an opportunity for Australian investment. At the same time, however, the 2023 DSR highlighted increased tensions in the region, and replaced ‘Asia-Pacific’ with ‘Indo-Pacific’. This nomenclature that has become more popular with India’s rising power, and an acknowledgement of the strategic importance of both the Indian and Pacific oceans, and interests held by the US and Europe in this expanded region.^[xxxv] Building on the 2013 White Paper’s foundation, the DSR acknowledged that tensions in the region a decade later are increasingly complex, being ‘economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives’.^[xxxvi] It may be a complicating factor that Australia’s own economic prosperity is interdependent with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region; however, this interdependency may also contribute to greater collaboration, even in times of competition. Importantly, the DSR recognised that the ADF must depart from the longstanding assumption of a 10-year timeframe to prepare for a major conflict, and highlighted the changing character of threats and conflicts as a result of disruptive technologies across all five domains—which include space and cyber.^[xxxvii] Recognition of this competition, a condensed timeline for potential conflict, and the role of space and cyber as key domains within this context, are all built into the 2024 NDS. Australia’s primary area of military interest is defined as the Indo-Pacific, but there is also the important acknowledgement that ‘developments in cyber, space, nuclear and long-range precision strike mean Australia’s security interests are not bound by geography alone’.^[xxxviii]Critically, the shift from a domain-specific force to an integrated force includes integration ‘across five domains—maritime, land, air, space and cyber—with the capabilities that are vital to the ADF’s posture and preparedness’.^[xxxix] The 2024 NDS also highlights six capability effects that an integrated force must be able to deliver in order to be fit for purpose across all domains and enablers. They are the projection of force; holding a potential adversary’s forces at risk; protecting supporting critical infrastructure; sustaining protracted combat operations—especially in circumstances of disruptions to command and control networks, infrastructure, logistics networks and communications systems; maintaining persistent situational awareness; and achieving decision advantage.^[xl] All six of these capability effects have heavy dependencies on space services and data such as PNT, advanced satellite communications, and EO data, even where it is capabilities in the other domains that will directly deliver those effects.

The strategic environment, and the impact of high-technology threats on a condensed and unpredictable timeline for conflict preparedness, is similarly highlighted by a range of academics and strategic thinkers.^[xli] It is clear that preparedness—‘accelerated’ or otherwise—must take into account threats to critical space capabilities. And because much of the space workforce is employed commercially, and many space-based services are purchased from commercial providers, all three of the armed services must be cognisant of their dependencies on space and cyber, and prepare for the potential for mobilising civil space capabilities and space workforces to the benefit of the nation in a time of crisis. The following sections consider the ways Army can approach mobilisation of the private sector with regard to space-related assets, space data and a space workforce.

Endnotes

Although Australia has no sovereign military space assets orbiting the planet, it does have sovereign space-related assets on the ground. This is where Army comes into its own by being able to incorporate civil and defence capabilities for Defence mobilisation needs. Army houses outstanding expertise in managing ground segment infrastructure (for example, satellite dishes on bases in Australia) for receiving data from communications satellites and EO satellites, and this may present opportunities for joining up with private sector infrastructure if the need presents itself in a crisis scenario. Famously the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap is a joint US and Australian base on Australian soil which contributes to satellite operations for geosynchronous intelligence satellites developed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It is also a ground station for receiving satellite data used for US signals intelligence, geolocation of potential targets, satellite communications interception, nuclear monitoring and missile launch warning.^[xlii] Pine Gap has been described as ‘the CIA’s most important technical intelligence collection station in the world’.^[xliii] US personnel at Pine Gap include staff from the National Reconnaissance Office and detachments from the US Army, Navy and Air Force; and Australian personnel also come from all three of our armed forces. The intelligence gathered through the Pine Gap infrastructure serves Australia’s intelligence needs as well. This means that if the satellites or the link segment were to be targeted or interfered with by an adversary of the US, Australia would risk loss of access to that same data. Given the important role of signals intelligence (SIGINT) personnel within Army’s ranks, Army has a particular interest in this vulnerability, particularly as the intelligence gathered from these US satellites informs Army’s approach to military operations. While the US has cutting-edge counterspace capabilities and can protect its space-based assets to a certain extent, there is no doubt that deliberate interferences are occurring regularly.^[xliv] In the event of a crisis or conflict situation, commercially owned infrastructure may need to be available to provide necessary redundancy. This could occur in response to the potential loss of critical data, or (in an extreme scenario) an attack on the ground station infrastructure at Pine Gap. It is difficult to understand the complexities of this kind of commercial integration from open-source information alone, but taking steps to achieve such commercial integration is necessary to ensure successful mobilisation of non-Defence space assets that would serve Army’s interests and needs. 

Other forms of ground segment assets include mobile ground stations or receivers. The majority of Army equipment has mounted GPS receivers and much of it includes mounted satellite communications receivers. The fully equipped soldier carries personal receivers for these satellite services as well. While the maintenance of redundancy and resilience for these technologies is routine for all Army operations (including training personnel to be able to navigate with physical maps and compasses), it is important to properly consider how civil or commercial infrastructure could support Army’s needs in a crisis scenario. The scenario may be as simple as an Army deployment to assist in a bushfire or flood, or a situation of damage to Army equipment. But if the scenario is more complex (for example, a circumstance of increased competition of conflict), it is critical that commercial infrastructure is sufficiently cyber hardened and protected against other forms of interference such as jamming. Achieving such quality assurance might go over and above existing industry standards, and thus preparing the civil and commercial sectors for mobilisation would include requiring the highest possible standards from them. To a degree, such a requirement falls within scope of the updated Security of Critical Infrastructure (SOCI) Act, which has included the space sector as a new sector since 2022.^[xlv] Among other things, this legislation requires that any space researchers or commercial providers of space‑related services must employ strict cybersecurity standards and background checks on staff, and declare the nationality of staff members and clients, even if they do not have government as a client. It is therefore not a responsibility for Army but is another factor that must be taken into account in terms of future thinking and preparedness plans.

Future ground segment capabilities must also take into account the need for interoperability with allies and their systems. In the past, the lack of interoperability has led to increases in cost and decreases in effectiveness. This was evidenced, for example, when the Australian Army sent equipment to Iraq in 2003 in support of US operations, only to find that the ADF equipment was not interoperable with US equipment and infrastructure, rendering it impractical.^[xlvi] Lessons have obviously been learned and implemented since then; however, this is not always the case for the space ground segment. In the case of PNT, for example, measures must be taken to ensure that ground and mobile infrastructure has redundancy built in by including receivers that are compatible with ‘friendly’ regional global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) such as Galileo, the Quazi-Zenith Satellite System and the IRNSS, rather than simply GPS. Currently many systems which depend on GPS do not have in-built receivers that are compatible with alternative GNSSs. 

Because of its prevalence as the main GNSS across much of the globe, GPS is incredibly vulnerable to both deliberate and inadvertent interruptions or spoofing (sending false signals so that it is difficult to know which positioning signal is correct). In the Russo-Ukraine war, GPS has already been targeted by Russian electronic warfare (EW) activities through spoofing and jamming, impacting not only Ukraine’s defence but also commercial airline operations for a number of companies operating in nearby countries.^[xlvii] Deliberate interference may be difficult to detect. Even if it is easily attributable, it may take some time before users notice they are being sent off course, even in the context of Army manoeuvres and operations.^[xlviii] GPS jammers designed to interfere with ground stations and mobile GPS receivers are very cheap and easy to acquire, and may have inadvertent knock-on effects when employed in a civilian context. This is another reason why Army (and indeed the ADF as a whole) has a vested interest in ensuring the highest possible standards of protection against attacks or inadvertent interferences in private sector infrastructure, as a measure of preparedness and possible mobilisation. 

Army is not only a user of space services provided by others but also has strengths in ground-based space domain awareness (SDA). There is open-source evidence that space systems are consistently targeted as an effective means of compromising an adversary’s ability to navigate, communicate, and deploy forces and weapons.^[xlix] The ability to accurately track what is happening in the space domain is therefore an essential capability. Australia’s geography is particularly suited to ‘look up’, because there is largely unimpeded access to over one-third of the orbital paths covering the globe. Open skies and large areas of sparsely populated land mean there is little physical or signal interference with SDA infrastructure. SDA includes monitoring space traffic (space situational awareness, or SSA) as well as monitoring counterspace activities. Space traffic is a concern because of the sheer scale of objects orbiting Earth. As of mid-2024 there were approximately 10,000 operational satellites in orbit, but this number increases considerably every month due to the rate at which launches take place globally. In the first 50 years of human space activity, there were only some 2,000 launches. By 2023, however, the world had recorded approximately 6,500 launches, with around 200 launches per year carrying multiple satellites and payloads for multiple clients, whether commercial or government.^[l] Additionally there are an estimated 160 million pieces of debris, including large defunct satellites, small objects that break off in the course of routine launches, and small to very small objects (down to 1 millimetre) which are the result of collisions or breakups. Notably, over 100 million of these smallest objects are impossible to accurately track.^[li] In low earth orbit (LEO), where the highest concentration of space traffic is, these objects are moving at 7 kilometres per second, so even an object of 1 centimetre in size can cause lethal damage to a satellite if it collides. SDA data is something all militaries need, and something Australia can contribute to partnerships with nations on which it largely depends on for space services. The ability of the ADF, and in particular of skilled Army personnel, to deliver SSA data to partners is a strength that can be capitalised on, and has been highlighted both in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update^[lii] and in Space Command’s 2022 Space Strategy,^[liii] although the status of the previously announced JP9360 (SDA) is now unclear. But even with increased Defence investment in this capability, there is already (and will continue to be) partial dependence on commercial providers of SSA data. In Australia, LeoLabs is the key commercial player. This is a company that has existing ties with US Space Command and a growing relationship with the ADF.^[liv] Mobilisation may mean further integrating LeoLabs infrastructure into ADF infrastructure.

Aside from SSA data, SDA includes the ability to understand the development of space-based counterspace technologies and is critical to both deterring attacks on space systems and responding if necessary. To maximise this capability requires monitoring the launches of new space objects by potential adversaries, especially if such objects enter an orbit uncomfortably close to space assets owned by partner nations, or if they undertake unusual manoeuvres within an orbit, such as has been demonstrated by China and Russia.^[lv] In December 2023, it was announced that AUKUS partners had entered into a new trilateral agreement to develop the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) to monitor potentially hostile activity as far out as geosynchronous orbit.^[lvi] Being able to monitor activity and attribute irresponsible actions will contribute to deterrence against threats to space assets. This is something to which Army can contribute a skilled workforce, including for managing the ground infrastructure. In terms of how to mobilise such a workforce, the challenges of retaining space-related skills in a competitive labour market will be addressed below.

Another important, though much smaller, part of the ground segment is launch. Although Australia does not currently have any sovereign launch capacity, there are three ‘spaceports’, or commercial space launch sites, under development in Australia. Two of them (Equatorial Launch Australia in Arnhem Land, Northern Territory, and Southern Launch in Whalers Way, South Australia) provide a launch site but no launch vehicles; in other words, they operate similarly to an airport, and provide a site from which clients can launch their own vehicles. In 2022, NASA launched several small sub-orbital sounding rockets from the Equatorial Launch Australia site,^[lvii] and the commercial launch company HyImpulse launched from Southern Launch’s test site in 2024.^[lviii]

Should the ADF develop a sovereign launch vehicle in the future, use of a commercial launch site could be a service procured as and when needed. Alternatively, procuring a launch from a commercial launch operator may prove to be a more efficient choice than acquiring a launch vehicle, especially as the extent to which the ADF will need to launch regularly from its own soil is unclear. Indeed, such procurement could be considered to be an ongoing form of Stage One or Stage Two mobilisation under the doctrine (that is, ‘Selective Defence Mobilisation’ and ‘Partial Defence Mobilisation’), especially if in-built agreements can be reached to provide assurance that, in times of crisis or conflict, Defence’s launch requirements will be prioritised over commercial or foreign clients’ needs. A third spaceport, being developed by Gilmore Space in Queensland, aims to provide a launch site for the company’s own-designed rockets as well as for launch vehicles owned by paying clients.^[lix]

There are some who advocate for the development of ‘tactically responsive’ rapid launch as a solution for scenarios where a satellite has been targeted or a service has been lost due to an unintentional event such as collision with space debris. Tactically responsive space (TacRS) was demonstrated in the US in 2023 with VICTUS NOX, when the US Space Force issued an order for launch. In this instance, the commercial companies they had engaged (Firefly Aerospace and Millennium Space Systems—the latter is a Boeing company) were reported to have launched within 27 hours.^[lx] However, it is important to understand that the full timeline involved was actually closer to a year. To begin the process, contracts needed to be awarded, a satellite pulled from an active production line to have specifications added, and regulatory approvals sought and granted (including RF spectrum allocation, launch and operation permits, and certification for launch vehicle). After all of these processes, the companies entered a ‘Hot-Standby Phase’, ready to receive an order to activate at any moment. When that call was received, it took 57 hours to pull the satellite from the factory to a launch site, conduct final testing, fuel the launch vehicle, and be ready to await an order to launch. When Space Force finally gave the order to launch, the launch vehicle was ready within 24 hours, and the approved window for launch was three hours later. This final phase of activation represented a record-breaking window of time to complete a process that had previously taken weeks. In combination, however, the whole process took far longer than the vaunted 27-hour activation rate that inspired excited headlines. 

While VICTUS NOX demonstrates the existence of an extremely impressive capacity to launch a replacement satellite capability in the event that one were to be permanently lost, it must be seen within the context of a highly mature relationship between US Space Force and specific commercial space companies. These relationships are built on prior trusted associations between US Air Force Space Command and its partner companies (particularly among the leadership, many of whom previously worked for NASA or the US military). These companies had achieved many years of proven success with their respective satellite operations and launch capabilities. Further, the TacRS example involved the launch of a relatively small, replicable satellite into LEO, where systems are often made up of large constellations of small satellites. 

Given that the satellite manufacturing industry in Australia is still in its nascent stages and necessarily limited in size, and that there is (as yet) no local launch capability, the timeline for Australia to achieve TacRS is extremely long. Indeed, there is no indication that government has an appetite to prioritise this capability and, aside from JP9102, there are no current plans to develop sovereign military space systems. If priorities shift, or if, for example, Australia were to revisit the plan for a sovereign EO system (which would serve national security needs as well as civil sector needs) there is no guarantee that Australia’s system could be replaced at anything like the rate already demonstrated by the US. The trouble is that a sovereign EO capability tends to involve exquisite, dedicated satellites (rather than off the shelf) and would likely operate at higher orbits than LEO. These characteristics make a government EO system intrinsically more difficult to replace quickly, even if access to rapid launch were possible. 

There are options available to Australia to achieve a military space capability that do not involve the development of sovereign launch vehicles. Rather than building dedicated military satellites that are LEO constellations, and then seeking to develop an Australian TacRS capability, it would be more cost-effective, faster and more feasible for Australia’s boutique-sized Army to acquire certain space services from trusted partner countries or companies which operate in LEO, and which carry the economic burden of maintaining or replacing their system, and ensuring it has other features to support redundancy. Indeed, this is one way in which the private sector can be integrated into an Army mobilisation plan, by determining which companies can fulfil Army’s needs, by prompting the cultivation of relationships that are independent of any specific acquisition contract, and by advocating for cybersecurity standards and protections against interference that will meet Army’s and the ADF’s requirements. Among these measures, relationship building with the commercial space sector may be one of the most important aspects of preparedness.

Endnotes

Space capabilities provide data, so it is necessary to consider the extent to which Australia’s space data is, or needs to be, sovereign produced and managed, in both the civilian and military sectors. With no current sovereign Australian satellite systems, and the overwhelming commercialisation of space data and services globally, the ADF—and therefore Army—continues to depend on foreign and commercially provided space data. This situation creates enormous risks. For Army, there needs to be sufficient understanding of the existing risks of (1) loss of access; (2) loss of service due to deliberate interference with a foreign sovereign or commercial provider’s space capabilities; and (3) poor-quality service or data from a commercial provider. Mobilisation will require increased reliance on the commercial sector to mitigate these risks, including the capacity to achieve a rapid reaction time, whether in response to domestic civilian contingencies or (even more critically) in wartime. This is where Army’s intersection with the space industry comes into focus, particularly its implications for national mobilisation efforts. 

The character of war continues to change as space capabilities become more and more integrated with military operations and therefore become vulnerable to interference or attack. At the same time, the highly commercialised nature of the space sector globally and locally in Australia means that Army has no choice but to interact with, contract and use the services of commercial space providers. This is the crux of the ‘space as a service’ concept. As well, if any of Australia’s partner nations were to change their domestic policies and commercialise what was previously a sovereign-owned space asset or service, Australia would be forced to contract with those commercial providers. Relying on commercial providers creates vulnerabilities in terms of the accuracy and quality of the space data being relied upon for Army operations, and the risk of unattributed or undetected interference with the data. For example, there is a known instance of a commercial satellite image being manipulated to remove clouds before being supplied to an Australian government agency, thereby compromising the integrity of the data.^[lxi] Sufficient geospatial data expertise within Army’s internal workforce is necessary in order to mitigate this risk with respect to EO data, and similarly to understand and mitigate data risks when it comes to PNT and satellite-based communications.

Despite inherent risks, the dual-use nature of space services and space data has the potential to create promising opportunities to engage the private sector in support of mobilisation efforts. The availability of private sector space technologies mitigates the necessity for Army to procure end-to-end technologies to gain the same services. The fact is that the private sector will continue to carry the weight of Australia’s small space industry, which means that a whole-of-nation approach to fulfilling Army’s space data needs is unavoidable. Similar to space-related assets, it is possible that Australia is already in a first (selective) or second (partial) stage of mobilisation with respect to some space data needs. It is therefore necessary to build trusted relationships and protocols with commercial space entities, including stringent cybersecurity requirements, now in a time of peace, in order to be prepared for mobilisation in the face of crisis or conflict. In making such preparations, it is important to realise that one of the biggest challenges facing Australia is how to protect its armed forces from the loss of critical services and data caused by attacks on the allied and commercial space systems upon which our nation depends. Because Australia is so highly dependant on others for its space data and services, it can be difficult to identify how it can best contribute to protecting those systems and services. This challenge is made even more complex in regard to protecting commercially provided space data. Nevertheless, it is arguable that—if there is indeed a selective or partial mobilisation of space data currently underway, there may already be a corresponding responsibility of commercial providers to protect that data against nefarious interference. As highlighted above, assured access to space is recognised in the 2024 NDS as a critical component of an integrated force, given the importance of space-based services to all other domains. This policy position aligns with the publicly available eManual on Space Power, which gives the following definition of space control:

Space control involves offensive and defensive operations to ensure freedom of action in space by defeating efforts to interfere with or attack Australian or allied space systems and, when directed, deny space services to a competitor.^[lxii]

One area where Australia could effectively exercise space control is through EW, which is one of the most effective forms of counterspace interference. Indeed, EW can contribute to deterring other kinds of attacks on space systems, as it includes use of the electromagnetic spectrum for observing, jamming and manipulating an adversary. Equally, counter-EW missions can protect against an adversary’s access to the electromagnetic spectrum, and can also protect personnel and equipment from the potential impacts of an EW attack by an adversary. EW can also be employed to respond to attacks in any other domain. In this regard, EW can be seen as a sovereign data capability. In 2021, under the Morrison government, Defence Project 9358 was announced ‘to explore options for the acquisition of a ground-based Space Electronic Warfare capability’^[lxiii] and thus expand EW’s effectiveness more completely into the space domain. While there is limited information in the public domain as to where this program stands today, it is potentially a move towards a sovereign counterspace capability. There may be a role for this capability, and for existing Army EW skill sets, in protecting commercially provided space data, as a correlative responsibility when commercially generated data is mobilised for Defence needs.

Endnotes

If mobilisation ‘consciously shifts the boundary between the military and civilian sectors in favour of the former’,^[lxiv] this is especially true when it comes to a space-capable workforce. It is already clear that the ADF competes with the private sector for technically skilled individuals, particularly when salaries can be higher in the private sector.^[lxv] This is a challenge even in terms of increasing the number of reservists. This is particularly the case because the private sector is likely to service any Defence shortfall through a contracted solution. Therefore, it may become increasingly difficult to convince individuals to enter military service as reservists rather than to simply provide their professional expertise through a contractual relationship with Defence. However, in reality the private space and cyber sectors are likely to be unavoidably drawn in if there is a crisis or conflict in the region. As highlighted above, the extent to which the ADF already engages with the private sector with regard to cyber and space technologies in particular, and the fact that this trend will accelerate in years to come, makes this inevitable. Indeed, the 2024 NDS makes clear that the translation of disruptive and new technologies into ADF capability will require close partnership with Australian industry.^[lxvi] Such partnerships will be underwritten by the standards imposed by the SOCI Act, discussed above.^[lxvii]

As noted above, the relationships that Army forges with commercial entities are critically important to the generation of space capability in support of the national interest. This goes two ways: in terms of the generation of doctrine and protocols for integrating private sector employees into Army operations and space capability needs, and in terms of Army becoming more adaptive and agile in supporting private sector decision-making and the generation of risk profiles. Currently, under political shifts and major federal budget cuts to direct investment in space research and development,^[lxviii] many in the private space sector have their eyes on Defence as the only real government client and the greatest source of space funding in the country. However, the commercial space sector must also understand the implications of working closely with Defence, and wherever Army is engaging with contractors or space service providers, there is work to be done to create a mindset in those partners that mobilisation is possible in the next decade, and what it is likely to entail.

Another consideration is the nationality of space companies and of their staff. As noted above, the AU$4 billion contract to develop sovereign satellite communication program JP9102 went to a US prime. Generally speaking, many companies with existing Defence contracts fall under foreign parent companies, with one estimate that only 10 per cent of ADF contracts are with Australian-owned companies.^[lxix] While choices may sometimes be limited, there are economic as well as security benefits to Army working closely with companies that are truly, or at least mostly, Australian. Indeed, this may be a factor of vital importance in the case of mobilisation. A foreign company can pull out of Australia if it determines the risks in a crisis or conflict scenario are too great, leaving a potential hole in both civilian and military capabilities. The competition for talent between Defence, large consulting companies and dedicated space companies may be softened if there were clear space career pathways within Army (and across the ADF). Without a space trade, highly skilled individuals will be moved across Army into different posts and positions that may not be related to their skill—and passion—in space technologies and the space domain. This situation creates a risk to the ADF and puts Australia behind our counterparts. Space Command must ensure future recruitment, training and sustainment of space specialists is possible. Indeed, creating a space stream for ADF personnel that is applicable across all three armed services is one of the stated priorities of Major General Greg Novak, the Army officer who is currently Commander of Space Command.^[lxx] While there may be a perception of a risk of losing skilled Army personnel to Space Command, an alternative view is that Army benefits from a newly integrated ADF. Space Command can provide space-literate input into operations in the other domains, and ensure use of space systems for those operations is coordinated with Australia’s international partners, upon whom the country depends for much of its space technologies. Similarly, as this author submitted to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, when it comes to a skilled space and cyber workforce:

Space and ICT/cyber security should be more closely integrated. The greatest threats to any space system are cyber threats, and Defence personnel with the necessary training and skillsets to work in cyber operations are a great asset to space operations … The two capability areas need not compete with each other, rather they complement each other.^[lxxi] 

Endnotes

In many ways, consideration of how to leverage space-based capabilities for Army in a scenario requiring mobilisation is no different from consideration of how those capabilities support the other two armed services. It may seem that many of the considerations discussed here are therefore generic to the ADF as a whole. However, in the context of the shift towards an integrated rather than a joint force (as underscored in the DSR and 2024 NDS), this article has highlighted that space, much like cyber, must be integrated into Army’s thinking and planning at all levels. It has also shown that preparing for mobilisation must take into account the vulnerabilities of Army’s dependencies on others for many of its space capability needs, as well as the opportunities provided by the highly skilled workforce within Army. 

Defence’s preparedness and mobilisation doctrine states that ‘[m]obilisation is the process of transition between preparedness and the conduct of a specific operation’.^[lxxii] Preparedness includes not only exploring the capacity to scale existing capabilities and infrastructure within Defence but also the ways in which the private sector, researchers and wider Australian society can be leveraged for national defence needs. Preparedness is therefore key to mobilisation, but at the same time:

it is unrealistic to expect the entire force to remain in a high state of preparedness in perpetuity … Critically, preparedness is bounded so that Army can meet short notice contingency requirements, within budget and resource allocation (ready now), while also maintaining its capacity to pursue necessary modernisation projects and initiatives to meet the requirements of the objective force (future ready).^[lxxiii]

In this context, Army must be consistently prepared for either war or peace, and it must integrate space-related assets, space data and space workforce into that preparedness. The dual-use nature of most space data and services, combined with the overwhelming commercialisation of space, may mean it is easier to mobilise in the face of crisis or conflict. Indeed, the extent to which there is already such great dependency on commercial partners may mean that Australia is already in a selective or partial phase of mobilisation. The task for Army, as part of an integrated force, is to be cognisant of the risks associated with this trend, including the risk of poor-quality data, and competition for a skilled space workforce. In order to prepare Army and the private sector equally for the possibility of (further) mobilisation, strong, trusted relationships must continue to be forged with the research sector and commercial space sector, and high cybersecurity and infrastructure security standards must continue to be required of non-government actors, even outside the context of Defence contracts and acquisitions. None of this is a responsibility only for Army. But one way Army culture can shift more seamlessly to an integrated force structure is by implementing these approaches in the context of existing interactions with the private sector when it comes to space infrastructure and space workforce.

This goes in part to a larger discussion on which capabilities and infrastructure need to be sovereign, which can be relied upon from partner nations in return for other services or workforce, and which can be acquired from the private sector. When it comes to space services and space technologies, these decisions need to be fully informed and go beyond the limited ‘lines of effort’ described in the Defence Space Strategy and the eManual on Space Power. Both of those documents have an overwhelmingly space-centric lens, rather than a broader perspective on the criticality of space as a support domain. In this sense, Army strategists can contribute to the development of Space Command thinking, now that it falls under Joint Capabilities Group.

National defence and mobilisation are always a response to external events, and are shaped by those events, making it very difficult to plan in advance.^[lxxiv] Given the possibility that Australia may need to mobilise in response to increased tensions and a potential conflict in the region, Australia’s regional trade dependencies mean there will be enormous impacts on Australian supply chains as well as increased scrutiny as to the national provenance of technologies, and cybersecurity requirements. The nature of high-tech threats in the space and cyber domains means that timelines for preparations and planning are inevitably condensed. As such, ‘space’ must be brought down to the ground, and Army is well suited to contributing to this shift in understanding across the entire ADF.

Endnotes