Lessons from Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier
The concept of the profession of arms has existed for centuries. Many ancient Egyptian, Persian, Greek and Roman texts discuss generalship and soldiering.[1] The high medieval period saw extensive military research. Kings, nobles and knights all studied siege craft, fortifications, engineering, artillery and the management of armies.[2] As dominions grew in size and scope, so did scholarly works on military development and investment as a part of state affairs.[3]
The Italian Wars (1494 to 1559) solidified the idea of a ‘professional soldier’ in Western history. Such individuals specialised in the conduct of war and were separate from the nobility of the state. These soldiers were a mixture of mercenaries and growing city-state citizen militaries. However, it would not be until the Thirty Years War (1618 to 1648), and the military reforms introduced by Gustavus Adolphus, that the ‘profession of arms’ would become a key component in developing, managing and employing nation-state militaries.[4] The concept of the profession would be further refined through the educational reforms of Fredrick the Great, as well as others. A similar progression can be traced in Asian, particularly Korean and Japanese, history.[5] Despite such a rich history, it is still difficult to define what the profession is. Additionally, answering how the profession is structured, what is required to enter it and how to achieve professional mastery remains elusive. Medicine, engineering and law can trace their modern structures through their historical developments; however, the profession of arms remains an opaque concept—including, sometimes, to those who profess to be a part of it.
This short essay leverages Morris Janowitz’s seminal work The Professional Soldier to provide some answers to the above. Although Janowitz may be less frequently cited than Samuel Huntington, his work offers a critical perspective on the modern profession of arms.[6] It is interesting that Sir John Hackett, another key figure in understanding the military profession, directly references Janowitz’s deductions when discussing what is required of British military officers.[7] Additionally, recent scholarly work has reinvigorated the need to study Janowitz to better understand the profession of arms in a contemporary context.[8] Within Australia, there appears to be limited exploration of Janowitz’s work, particularly among those in uniform.[9] In the book The Commanders, editor David Horner highlights several key traits of the military professional, including courage and integrity, charisma, robust and creative thinking, political acumen, and logistical and administrative understanding.[10] The Australian Defence College’s study The Chiefs reinforces these points.[11] As this article shows, Horner’s traits align with Janowitz’s earlier work. Yet, unlike Janowitz, these Australian texts do not delve deeply into the questions posed earlier. What these works, from Huntington through to Australian scholarship, indicate is that the profession of arms, like all professions, adapts throughout history and to the context of its time.[12]
To explore Janowitz’s deductions, this essay first places his work within a contemporary setting. Janowitz’s work was originally published in 1960, and updated in 1971. His analysis focuses on the US military transition from national service to a volunteer force at the height of the Cold War. Janowitz wrote his masterpiece partly to help US military leaders guide this transition.[13] His conclusions relate to geostrategic circumstances similar to contemporary times, suggesting his work may still hold meaning for today’s Western militaries. Part of this contemporary discussion is understanding Janowitz’s three officer types: the military technologist, the heroic leader and the military manager. Each ideal type represents a different approach to military professionalism and drive for professional mastery.
With an understanding of Janowitz’s work within today’s context, the essay then discusses what ‘profession’ and ‘professional mastery’ mean. This discussion is reinforced by Janowitz’s deductions concerning the importance of two activities that develop professional mastery: challenging and scaffolded professional military education, and a diverse military career. Next, the essay touches on another important part of the profession of arms: philosophical world views and their influence on military thinking. The above points are the most relevant to the Australian Army’s review into the profession of arms; however, these are not the only lessons Janowitz’s work can provide. Therefore, the essay concludes by explaining why, within the Australian context, officers at the O5 level (lieutenant colonel or equivalent) and above should read The Professional Soldier.
It is necessary to place Janowitz’s meaning in a contemporary setting. His terminology and intended audience may lead modern Australian readers to misinterpret or dismiss his conclusions. Janowitz’s writing, after all, is a product of his time and his disciplinary background: sociology. As such, he uses terms that either do not equate to their contemporary meaning or have been replaced in the military vernacular. Therefore, some key terms in The Professional Soldier require modern reinterpretation. The first is Janowitz’s concept of a ‘constabulary force’ and its relationship to the military.
Janowitz states that contemporary Western militaries that seek to deter another power must be ‘constabulary forces’. In contemporary thinking, such a term may lead readers to the wrong conclusion. Janowitz does not believe the military must become the police. Instead, he outlines that the military must move away from the dichotomy of peacetime and wartime and accept an always available, deployable and active mindset.[14] This ‘constabulary mindset’ is not dissimilar to contemporary military preparedness and operations during this time of great power contestation.
The officer best suited for the always-on force is what Janowitz terms the ‘military manager’. Janowitz’s use of this term is not derogatory. Janowitz defines three broad types of military officers: the technologist (or specialist), the heroic leader and the military manager. Janowitz does not profess that these terms relate to US military officer categories, nor do they equate to contemporary doctrine or thinking. Rather, these terms are ideal types, or concepts that capture the general characteristics of a phenomenon or group.[15] Ideal types can help frame a problem space and compare trends or themes. These three ideal types may help the Australian Army in its review of the profession of arms—how to enhance it and how broad such efforts should be.
The three officer types provide a way of thinking about the spectrum of officers, their importance to the military, and their focus and drive for military professionalism. As Janowitz states:
The military establishment requires a balance between the three roles of heroic leader, military manager, and military technologist, a balance which varies at each level in the hierarchy of authority.[16]
The first ideal type worth exploring is the military technologist: an officer who engages with the military profession while seeking or having professional mastery in another related discipline. Technologists are officers who, through direct recruitment, as a formal career path, or through individual self-selection, are highly specialised within a select military or civilian technical area.[17] Such individuals actively seek professional mastery within their specialist discipline, allowing them to support the military better. Although such officers have potential for high office, they may require ‘modification of their skills and outlook’.[18] In the contemporary Australian Army, a range of officers may fit within this technologist ideal type. The first are specialist service officers (SSOs).[19] The concept may also refer to officers who seek to emphasise their specialist knowledge and move away from the broader general service officer continuum for a range of reasons. Some may belong to a formal career path, such as capability project management. Others may become ‘unicorns’, or individuals with specialist knowledge or background in an area, which makes them difficult to replace. In all cases, technologists are highly specialised individuals, often with a strong technical background, who actively seek professional mastery of their specialist area for the betterment of the military. Using this specialist mastery is part of their career motivation.[20] However, such drive means technologists may be unable to sustain the requirements to attain military professional mastery.[21]
The heroic leader and the military manager seek military professional mastery. Although some of these officers may have technical backgrounds, their career motivations drive them towards generalist skill sets and military professional mastery.[22] Janowitz defines heroic leaders as ‘warrior types’ who are authoritarian and directed, and who uphold the fighting zeal for decisive battle—or the current mission.[23] Honour and tradition are paramount for the heroic leader because honour leads to prestige.[24] Meanwhile, military managers are pragmatic decision-makers and consultative leaders.[25] They seek to balance the needs of the immediate mission with longer-term goals. Their leadership style is one of consultation when time permits, directive action and guidance over prescribed control. What Janowitz describes as a military manager, Australian contemporary doctrine lauds as effective leadership and mission command.
Janowitz’s concepts of the military manager and the constabulary force directly align with today’s views on values, leadership and the expectations of service. The focus of the military manager’s, and by extension the contemporary military officer’s, professionalism is different to the honour- and family-based professional focus of the ‘heroic leader’. Janowitz does not define ‘profession’ or ‘professional mastery’. Nevertheless, his work provides significant insight into the profession of arms for a contemporary ‘military manager’ officer leading a ‘constabulary’ always-on force. Put another way: it remains directly applicable to the always-ready ethos of the Australian Army professional.
The report of the Ryan Review of Army’s education and training system defines a professional as a ‘person who earns their living from a specified activity, which primarily engages that person in creative and intellectually challenging work’.[26] The review expands on this definition by outlining how professions have an entry requirement focused on the rigorous study of first principles, ongoing standards and ethical structures.[27] Janowitz’s work reinforces these points, stressing the intellectual and creative nature of the profession of arms. Through Janowitz’s work, and Ryan’s definition, it is clear that a military professional could be defined as someone in the military who acquires and holds knowledge concerning war. This knowledge is derived from theory, practical application of theory, and experience. Such knowledge allows the individual to exercise creative thinking to solve very real and practical problems. Although military officers require training in military (war-fighting) skills, they primarily engage in the intellectual endeavour of understanding, shaping and applying military theory in practice.
Professional mastery, meanwhile, relates to thinking and learning. Where the definition of a profession refers to applying theory in practical ways, professional mastery is concerned with advancing that knowledge. There has been a substantial amount of ink spilled about professional mastery in general and in military terms. A generalised definition of professional mastery might be offered as: the self-discipline to challenge one’s knowledge and world views, actively learn and grow, and continue to improve one’s knowledge of the profession for the betterment of others.[28]
Developed from various historical and contemporary sources, this definition highlights that professional mastery is not about expertise. Professional mastery is not what you think and know; rather, it is how you think, learn, and interpret the world.[29] In other words, good mastery is about self-disciplined, active learning and understanding how to acquire the knowledge needed to achieve any task within the profession. Janowitz reinforces this point when he discusses military education, development and career progression.
Janowitz’s analysis of successful senior officers highlights that ‘successful leadership [and professional judgement] requires the ability to shift from one role to another with ease … [such skills lead to a] strong propensity to excel and to innovate’.[30] How these abilities are generated is twofold, with the first step being education. Professional mastery is attained through an early foundation in a ‘military science’, or military specialisation. Then, such specialist knowledge is challenged and expanded through scaffolded learning in war studies, humanities, and the social sciences through challenging study.[31] Such study should grow the thirst for ongoing learning and development necessary for professional mastery.[32] This thirst for learning can be achieved through multiple methods. Individuals may actively seek out such educational experiences. Leaders, particularly subunit and unit commanders, may inspire it in subordinates. Often, these experiences are achieved for a select few through a staff college.[33] Although some individuals will develop professional mastery, the military, like other professions, uses a formal method, the staff college, to explicitly recognise professional mastery, thereby supporting longitudinal career management.[34] No matter the path—individual-initiated, leader-inspired or staff college—the first step towards professional mastery is a challenging professional educational experience. Such experiences should be scaffolded courses that leverage academic, experiential and longitudinal learning to develop professional mastery of military art.[35]
The next step in mastery is career diversity. Janowitz found that senior officers who could adapt quickly and advance military thinking often demonstrated unusual and non-standard careers.[36] Janowitz’s work identified that alternative postings, such as secondments, as educators at academic institutions, on out-of-specialisation tours and in international roles, helped build the self-discipline necessary to challenge one’s thinking, accept alternative world views, and incorporate these into future military theory and action.[37] There remains a need for broad career management, or what Janowitz calls ‘standardised careers’.[38] However, Janowitz found that having early career and mid-career diversity, interlaced with ‘normal’ postings, often enhanced, rather than detracting from, military professionalism, leadership, acumen and strategic thought.[39] In this way, education and career diversity suggests that professional mastery is the development of a habit of mind that accepts different world views and paradigms.[40] The above deduction may help guide some of Army’s review into the current state and enhancement of the profession of arms.
Adapting and adjusting world views is another vital element of military professional mastery. Janowitz identifies two philosophical distinctions: ‘absolutists’ and ‘pragmatists’. Absolutists believe that all conflict should be decisive in tactical and total war terms.[41] They also have clear views on when the military instrument should be used: the military is for war, and wars should be decisive (and quick).[42] For the absolutist, ‘There is no substitute for “total victory”’, even if the effort to achieve total victory is beyond the political rationale for the crisis or conflict.[43] The alternative ‘pragmatist’ believes: ‘[The] political objectives of warfare are gained by adapting the use or the threat of violence to the objectives to be achieved. To use too much or too little is self-defeating.’[44]
Essentially, pragmatists believe the military instrument can be used within economic and ideological struggles, not just kinetic war. In other words, the military is for more than war and can be used to persuade, coerce, build and destroy.[45] Janowitz traces the ebb and flow of these philosophies in United States military thinking. Both world wars were absolutist in character and intent.[46] His analysis of General MacArthur’s absolutist position in the Korean War highlights the (strategic and operational) limitations of such thinking, particularly during a period of great power competition. The Korean War was more than a conflict on the Korean peninsula. The war was also part of a wider US–USSR struggle across Asia and Europe. Janowitz compares MacArthur’s total victory focus to Ridgway’s pragmatic approach of limited military objectives to support wider competition.[47] The absolutist mindset led the former to hold a narrow and deterministic view of the Korean War, while the latter’s pragmatist world view adapted military action ‘in the name of political objectives, [and] was concerned with strengthening the system of mutual alliance’.[48] Janowitz’s assessment of these two philosophies provides important lessons for contemporary militaries.
Janowitz argues that the pragmatist world view should hold sway for the contemporary military officer.[49] His analysis, supported by others, demonstrates that these two philosophical views influence thinking about, planning, and preparing for competition and conflict.[50] The absolutist view seeks to limit military use outside of conflict. In contrast, the pragmatist view is willing to employ the military in a variety of roles in and out of conflict. Janowitz’s analysis indicates that the pragmatist’s willingness to consider and adapt military power to various activities, in and out of war, provides greater flexibility to the nation. Such a world view also enables officers to adapt to a ‘constabulary’, or always-on, force—much like the contemporary Australian Army.[51] Nevertheless, he acknowledges that true professional mastery comes from the ability to understand both paradigms, recognise which is appropriate at a given time, rapidly adapt one’s thinking, and assist others to adjust if required. Linking professional mastery to understanding and adapting world views is not the only lesson to draw from The Professional Soldier, but it may be the most powerful.
Although there are numerous lessons in this classic work, it is not for the entire military profession. Much of Janowitz’s analysis explores how officers are developed into flag and general officers, and what makes them successful in generalised terms. The book is not about leadership, though that is discussed. Instead, The Professional Soldier straddles culture, military philosophical thinking, career development, education, recruiting and political acumen. In effect, the book is a distillation of all aspects of the military professional. Yet, to really engage with the work, a high degree of knowledge and experience with military service is required. This is because many of the work’s deductions and conclusions relate to developing strategic insight, senior-level military–civil social acumen, and political understanding. However, the point at which officers require these skills differs in every nation. Within the Australian system, this is normally lieutenant colonel and above.[52]
With a critical and experienced eye, an Australian officer can gain much wisdom from The Professional Soldier. One example is ‘fraternal authority’, or the concept of ‘equality of unequals’, as a way of thinking about the leadership of both peers and subordinates.[53] Janowitz also shatters the often-held shibboleth, or in-group self-belief, that military officers are apolitical. Instead, he highlights that senior military officers are part of politics but are not partisan.[54] Although anyone can engage with this work, the pre-command lieutenant colonel may get the most out of it, both to learn for a higher rank and to guide subordinate officer mentoring.
Janowitz’s deductions on career development, education and how to think about military power are just as relevant to contemporary officers in the Australian Army as they were for US officers of the 1960s and 1970s. His work clarifies the discussion on what the profession of arms is and what is meant by professional mastery. It is this second point that is critical to the contemporary military officer. As highlighted earlier, professional mastery is not what you think and know but how you think, learn, and interpret the world. Good professional mastery is developed through challenging and scaffolded military education, career development that includes diverse postings, and a willingness to recognise, accept and use different world views. It is this final point that Janowitz and others believe is critical for officers during periods of great power competition and war.
Endnotes
[1] Several texts outline the extensive history of military writing and thought. For a focus on ancient developments, some illustrative texts include: Thomas R Phillips (ed.), Roots of Strategy, Vol. 1 (Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 1985); Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), with emphasis on Part II; Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Hal Brands (ed.), The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023).
[2] In addition to some of the texts listed in endnote 1, see Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Mark C Fissel (ed.), The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs, De Gruyter Studies in Military History (Berlin: De Gruyter Olbenbourg, 2023).
[3] Although this is recorded in several places, particularly in the texts listed above, the best examples remain Machiavelli’s Art of War and The Discourses.
[4] Gat, A History of Military Thought, pp. 9, 34, 64; Jan Angstrom and JJ Widen, Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War (New York NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 94.
[5] An example of this is the development of military training and firearms uses in Japan and Korea. For further analysis, see Fissel, The Military Revolution.
[6] Gregory D Foster, ‘The Profession of Arms: What Scholars, Practitioners, and Others of Note Have Had to Say’, Joint Force Quarterly 115 (2024): 72–75.
[7] John Winthrop Hackett, The Profession of Arms: Officer’s Call (Washington DC: Center of Military History (United States Army), 1962), pp. 36–38.
[8] For illustrative purposes, see Donald S Travis, ‘Decoding Morris Janowitz: Limited War and Pragmatic Doctrine’, Armed Forces & Society 46, no. 1 (2020); Suzanne C Nielsen and Hugh Liebert, ‘The Continuing Relevance of Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier for the Education of Officers’, Armed Forces & Society 47, no. 4 (2021); Suzanne C Nielsen and Hugh Liebert, ‘The Utility of Janowitz's Political Awareness in Officer Education’, Armed Forces & Society 49, no. 1 (2023).
[9] For example, a simple search of the Australian Army Research Centre’s database highlights 16 articles directly employing Huntington’s theories, and many more citing his works. Meanwhile, there are only five that consider Janowitz.
[10] David Horner, ‘Introduction’, in David Horner (ed.), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1984), pp. 6–8.
[11] Nicholas Jans, Stephen Mugford, Jamie Cullens and Judy Frazer-Jans, The Chiefs: A Study of Strategic Leadership (Canberra: Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics (Australian Defence College), 2013), pp. 91–113.
[12] Janowitz discusses the transition of the military profession over time in his introduction. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, 2nd edition (New York NY: Free Press, 2007 [1971]), pp. 5–7.
[13] Ibid. This is implied through Janowitz’s prologue of the 2nd reprinted edition.
[14] Ibid., pp. 419–420.
[15] Matthew Lange, Comparative-Historical Methods (London: Sage Publications, 2013), p. 39.
[16] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 21.
[17] Ibid., pp. 21–22.
[18] This quote is from Janowitz. However, he is reflecting research into the thinking traits of technologists and specialists over polymaths and generalists. Scholars have identified that being a technical specialist often leads to functionalist, structured and deterministic thinking. Although this is not true for all technical specialists, research indicates that a majority hold these thinking traits. Such traits, known as problem-solving thinking, may not be well suited to higher command in the military context. For a summary of research, see Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 22; Nicholas J Bosio, An Analysis of the Relationship between Contemporary Western Military Theory, Systems Thinking, and their Key Schools-of-Thought, PhD thesis (Australian National University, 2022), pp. 107–110, at: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/260048.
[19] Above the current SSO focus on doctors and lawyers, Army has directly employed engineers and specialist technicians as SSOs. Throughout the 2000s, Army directly recruited as SSOs electrical and mechanical engineers into the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. Direct-entry pilots were also SSOs. Australian and other allied nations’ history of mobilisation sees the use of direct-entry specialist officers to enable the military to achieve engineering and scientific outcomes in times of crisis and war.
[20] Janowitz explores career motivations in Chapter 6 of his work. The work focuses on the concept of the ‘military calling’. Though the reasons vary, the technologist’s calling is to employ their skills in the military context. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 104–108.
[21] The Ryan Review highlights that technical mastery was important, but could not be the focus for military professional mastery. Given the time, resources, and necessary commitment to attain military professional mastery, attempting to maintain professional mastery in two disciplines can be difficult. Mick B Ryan, The Ryan Review: A Study of Army’s Education, Training and Doctrine Needs for the Future (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016), pp. 89–91.
[22] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 107–116.
[23] Nolan’s seminal work The Allure of Battle details this trait throughout much of Western and modern Eastern history. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 35–36; Cathal J Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
[24] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 35–36, 215–232.
[25] Ibid., pp. 35–36.
[26] This definition broadly aligns with Janowitz’s definition, though Janowitz focuses more on ‘rendered service’. Quote from Ryan. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 5; Ryan, The Ryan Review, p. 50.
[27] Janowitz reinforces these traits. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 5–6; Ryan, The Ryan Review, p. 50.
[28] This is a composite definition, derived after reviewing multiple sources including Peter M Senge, The Fifth Discipline (London: Random House Business Books, 1990), pp. 17–18; Greg de Somer and David Schmidtchen, Professional Mastery: The Human Dimension of Warfighting Capability for the Army-After-Next (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 1999), p. 3; Sanu Kainikara, Professional Mastery and Air Power Education (Canberra: Air Power Development Centre, 2011), p. 4.
[29] Gat makes a similar observation when considering military theorists over time: Gat, A History of Military Thought, p. 256.
[30] Janowitz often combines leadership and professional acumen in his work. Quote from Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 167.
[31] Ibid., pp. 139–140.
[32] Ibid., pp. 428–430; Bosio, Relationship between Military Theory and Systems Thinking, pp. 102–103 (importance of staff colleges).
[33] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 428–430; Bosio, Relationship between Military Theory and Systems Thinking, pp. 102–103 (importance of staff colleges).
[34] This is similar to other professions, where formal recognition of professional mastery also supports longer-term (self-generated) career development. Engineers Australia has a specific method for selecting and maintaining Chartered Professional Engineers (CPEng). This process includes demonstration of experience and skills, select courses, and specific interview requirements. In the legal profession, KC or SC signifies professional mastery. Only a few may attain this qualification, and it requires specific study, research that adds to barrister’s understanding and advocacy, and assessment by a select committee. Other professions have similar processes to formally select and recognise professional mastery. See previous endnote for information concerning the importance of staff college to military career development and management.
[35] Williamson Murray, War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3.4–3.5, 3.13; Nicholas J Bosio, On Strategic Art: A Guide to Strategic Thinking and The Australian Strategy Formulation Framework (Canberra: Australian War College, 2024), pp. 99–101.
[36] This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8, ‘The Elite Nucleus’. See: Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 150–172 (Chapter 8).
[37] Ibid., pp. 144, 67–71, 426.
[38] Ibid., pp. 145–148, 425–427.
[39] Ibid., pp. 167–171, 425–427.
[40] This is known as a pluralist habit of mind: having or using thinking dispositions that accept pluralism, are willing to consider alternative views, and can accept and integrate a wide range of paradigms/schools of thought and world views. See Bosio, Relationship between Military Theory and Systems Thinking, pp. 58–60, 301.
[41] This discussion on absolutists aligns with military theory’s war-as-science school of thought. This school of thought often has functionalist, structured and deterministic thinking tendencies. See Bosio, Relationship between Military Theory and Systems Thinking, pp. 40–42, 50–51, 222–223; Bosio, On Strategic Art, pp. 20–24.
[42] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. x, 264–275.
[43] This is a similar view to that seen in Nolan, The Allure of Battle, and is best represented by the ‘Weinberger Doctrine’ of 1984, and reinforced by the ‘Powell Doctrine’ during the First Gulf War. Ibid., p. 164.
[44] Ibid., p. 264.
[45] Ibid., pp. 264–275.
[46] Ibid., pp. 267–271.
[47] Ibid., pp. 310–311.
[48] Ibid., pp. 310.
[49] Ibid., pp. 418–422.
[50] For a summary of other references, including Williamson Murray, Colin Gray and similar luminaries, see Bosio, Relationship between Military Theory and Systems Thinking, pp. 270–276; Bosio, On Strategic Art, pp. 12–25.
[51] This point is made in multiple open-source Defence documents, press statements, and news articles. Army, and the wider ADF, is an always-ready, always-on force.
[52] This is an extrapolation of the discussion in On Strategic Art. From the discussion on O6/O7 officers, it can be seen that in the Australian system, social and consultative acumen beyond one’s service becomes paramount at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and onwards. This includes the development and early refinement of political acumen. See Bosio, On Strategic Art, pp. 8–9, 99–101.
[53] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 423.
[54] Janowitz’s Part VII focuses on the way military officers, particularly senior officers, are part of the state’s political discourse. On the matter of non-partisanship for serving officers, versus retired surrogates, see Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 388–392.
