Introduction
Throughout history, military commanders have sought to exploit technologically superior capabilities to achieve tactical advantage on the battlefield. Technology informs strategy and provides tools to deliver tactical advantage, and is widely recognised as a force multiplier on the battlefield.[1] However, technologically superior capabilities alone do not assure military success; rather it is ‘the integration of innovation into effective methods and means that gives a strategic or tactical edge’.[2]
The rate of military innovation and technological change is most pronounced in times of war, with remarkable advancements in military technology made during World War I and World War II. Even outside of major conflicts, and consistent with the theory of accelerating change, the rate of technological development has continued to exponentially increase over the last century.[3] Since the turn of the 21st century, significant research and development has been undertaken by governments across the globe looking to create military advantage.[4] This has led to the emergence of a wide range of advanced technologies with the potential to revolutionise how future military operations are conducted.
This article examines how the emerging technologies will impact the command and control (C2) of land operations. First, it explores the scope of the technologies that are commonly referred to as ‘the emerging technologies’ and assesses whether any of these technologies alone should be considered revolutionary. Second, it evaluates whether the collective technologies have resulted in a revolution in military affairs (RMA) or merely represent the natural evolution of existing military capabilities. Third, the article describes additional criteria that must be considered to realise an RMA. Finally, it highlights the aspects of military operations that will be affected by the emerging technologies, and the resulting impact on the C2 of land operations. The article concludes by stating that, with the exception of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic autonomous systems (RAS), emerging technologies are evolutionary rather than revolutionary; that an RMA has not yet taken place; and that as a result of this, the impact on C2 of land operations will remain marginal until the technologies mature to their full potential and are fully integrated into the military.
Emerging Technologies
Sun Tzu stated: ‘In warfare, there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent will succeed and win.’[5] Tactical evolution is often driven by technological change, the rate of which is rapidly increasing. It is estimated that the rate of change 20 years from now will be four times greater than it is today, and 16 times greater in 40 years.[6] New battlefield technologies will thus become increasingly common, which may in turn lead to the evolution of tactical operations. However, the impact of new technologies will vary greatly. Some technologies will produce short-term tactical advantage that will only persist until effective countermeasures or counter-tactics are developed, whereas others will have a more enduring impact. To quantify the impact, it is first necessary to clarify what the term ‘emerging technological revolutions’ means, and identify if the individual technologies could bring about revolutionary change.
There is no authoritative list of emerging technologies, which are often categorised into groups based on shared characteristics. Common groups include cyber; space-based technologies; directed energy weapons; biotechnology, quantum sensing and computing; hypersonic missiles; and extended reality, which incorporates virtual and augmented reality.[7] In 2000, a study of 29 different types of military-related technologies identified only two that were likely to experience revolutionary change (notionally defined as ‘a type and pace of progress that renders obsolete old weapons, tactics, and operational approaches while making new ones possible’) over the following 20 years: computer hardware and computer software.[8] In 2018, the author subsequently concluded that although his prediction about computers was correct, he should have included robotics such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for which he had predicted a high rate of change rather than revolutionary change.[9] What, then, distinguishes computer technologies and robotics from other emerging technologies, and what has driven their revolutionary development?
AI is defined as ‘the capacity of computers or other machines to exhibit or simulate intelligent behaviour’.[10] One such behaviour that has remained constant is military decision-making, which has always been a responsibility entrusted to humans. However, the development of AI has presented a potential cultural shift in which ‘for the first time since the cognitive revolution began tens of millennia ago, human strategy may be shaped by non-biological intelligence that is neither embodied nor encultured’.[11] The integration of AI decision-making into military operations would represent a fundamental change to warfare. Nonetheless, militaries across the world are investing significantly to integrate AI technology, recognising that not only is it highly likely to change future warfare but it could ‘tip the strategic balance’.[12] It is important to additionally differentiate AI from other emerging technologies in the effect it delivers. Unlike many other emerging technologies, AI in isolation has no kinetic effect on the battlefield. Instead, AI is integrated into existing military capabilities to enhance aspects such as distinction, manoeuvrability, survivability and lethality. In doing so, AI does not contribute a single capability to a military force but has the potential to deliver significant military advantage through enhancements across the force.
History has taught us that even the most impressive of new weapons rarely determine the outcome of a battle on their own. Integration and adaptation of existing technologies, enhanced with new innovations, are key to increasing military effectiveness and recognising military objectives.[13] RAS technologies rely on integrated AI. Like AI, they have the potential to profoundly influence future military operations by delivering tactical actions determined through non-human decision-making. RAS is a collective term for military capabilities that include unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomous ground vehicles, autonomous weapons systems and loitering munitions. RAS are composed of a number of sub-components that allow the platform to collect and process information, then determine and execute an appropriate response. RAS exemplify the importance of integrating technologies to enable functionality and maximise a capability’s potential. Without integrated AI, autonomous technologies would only be capable of completing rudimentary tactical actions that rely on human input, but with integrated AI their potential is vast: ‘Bringing AI into the realm of warfare through the use of AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems (AWS) could revolutionise defence technology.’[14] AI-integrated systems could facilitate an era of warfare in which autonomous decision-making will enable military forces to plan and execute operations far more quickly than those which rely exclusively on human decision-making, while delivering increased precision and lethality on the battlefield.[15]
Revolution in Military Affairs or Weapons Systems Evolution
To assess the impact emerging technologies will have on the C2 of land operations, a determination must be made as to whether the collective technologies could lead to an RMA, or whether they are merely an evolution of extant capabilities. An RMA is defined as a military transformation delivered through organisational, doctrinal and technical change, resulting in military operations characterised by revolutionary tactics.[16] Historical examples of RMAs include the Gunpowder Revolution in the late medieval ages (firearms and artillery), the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries (mechanisation and mass production), World War I and World War II (tanks and aircraft), the Cold War (satellites and nuclear missiles) and most recently the Information Revolution of the 21st century (computing, network-centric warfare and precision targeting). Each of the historically recognised RMAs was characterised by a significant technological advancement providing a substantial military advantage. However, there is a divergence of opinion as to whether the current emerging technologies have triggered a new RMA.
Western nations have publicly acknowledged the benefits the emerging technologies can offer to military operations, and have actively engaged to integrate them to enhance existing capabilities. US Congress was informed in 2018 that ‘the nexus of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to change the nature of warfare’,[17] with estimated defence spending on these technologies rising from USD$1.8 billion in 2018 to over USD$3 billion in 2023.[18] Similarly, other Western nations’ militaries and NATO partners are investing heavily in research and experimentation activities utilising AI and RAS technologies, including the UK.[19] However, these nations have acknowledged that advanced technologies alone do not have the capacity to decisively win battles and that ‘military history over the last eighty years offers many cases in which forces with inferior technology have won conflicts’.[20] For example, for a limited period during World War II, the US Air Force employed a tactic of daylight bombing using unescorted heavy bombers, with disastrous consequences for itself.[21] Technologically the aircraft were far superior to those of the German Luftwaffe, but the doctrinal failure to integrate them with other technology—namely long-range escort fighters—initially denied the sought-after operational advantage. The potential of the current emerging technologies is widely acknowledged by Western nations, but it is rarely articulated that a new RMA has taken place.
Conversely, Russia and China hold the belief that the emerging technologies have already led to a form of RMA. In 2019, Chinese leaders concerned about a technological gap with the US urged the People’s Liberation Army to leverage AI and related technologies ‘to enable and enhance a range of military capabilities’ through the development of AI-enabled C2 and weapons systems.[22] In recent years, China and Russia have partnered to develop these emerging technologies and incorporate them into modernised and increasingly interoperable militaries.[23] Russia has used these in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and claims that the use of AI-enhanced drones and missiles has led to a radical change in military strategies, indicative of an RMA.[24] However, the claim appears to be an overstatement based on a misunderstanding of the definition of an RMA. It is also perhaps more reflective of Russian rhetoric, which is intended to enhance the credibility of its military equipment, thereby seeking to attract future trading partners and allies to assist with its ongoing war against Ukraine.
Recent military operations in Ukraine and Israel have demonstrated the application of advanced technologies and weapons on the battlefield, achieving high levels of success, but their application has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In the Ukraine war, AI has been integrated into C2 systems to enhance logistical and operational planning, and further integrated into autonomous drones to improve battlefield situational analysis. Meanwhile, in Israel, AI technology has been incorporated into missile defence systems, such as the Iron Dome.[25] Although they have undoubtedly changed how military operations are conducted, the basic technologies that enable them have existed for some time; AI is a technological progression of advanced computing, and aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities have existed since the 19th century, when in the US Civil War ‘the Army used aerial technology, such as balloons, kites and pigeons, to gather intelligence and to survey the battlefield giving ground commanders the ability to make informed decisions’.[26] Scholars argue that as the wider transformations necessary to fully integrate these technologies have not yet occurred, and existing military capabilities have not been rendered obsolete, an RMA has not yet taken place.[27]
Fundamental Requirements for Realising an RMA
Although technological advancement is widely accepted as the key driver of military innovation, it is acknowledged that a series of complex transformative changes are required for an RMA to occur. There is a difference of opinion as to what these may entail, with some arguing ‘a military’s ability to assimilate and adopt new operational concepts and doctrine’[28] is vital, whereas others emphasise the need for ‘the assembly of a complex mix of tactical, organisational, doctrinal and technological innovations in order to implement a new conceptual approach to warfare or to a specialized sub-branch of warfare’.[29] Furthermore, the integration of AI and RAS technologies has emphasised legal and ethical considerations that must also be addressed.
‘Organizational adaptation connotes changes to the structure of the fighting force to exploit new systems and patterns of operations’.[30] The changes required to fully exploit the range of emerging AI-enabled technologies are diverse and incorporate both physical and cultural measures. Physical measures include structural changes to units, and order of battle changes to formations. Cultural change would necessitate a revised mindset where innovation and experimentation with the latest technologies becomes routine business.[31] Due to the rapid rate of technological change, the adaptation of agile principles and processes would be key in enabling transformation at the pace of relevance. This should be underpinned by flexible and responsive training and education, and agile procurement. To fully capitalise on the advantages the emerging technologies can bring, military operating concepts and doctrine would also need to be amended accordingly.
Legal and ethical changes are challenging because they extend beyond state boundaries, requiring international cooperation. When considering this issue from a military perspective it can become even more challenging and contentious. For example, when contemplating the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), legal and ethical concerns are raised regarding ‘accountability, decision-making, and whether granting machines the power to automatically engage and eliminate a target demeans human life’.[32] Many critics of AI-based weapons state that policy should prohibit the killing of any human without the direct authorisation of another human (referred commonly as the ‘human-in-the-loop’).[33] Conversely, there are some who argue that AI reasoning would be able to consider clearly defined legal, societal, moral and ethical considerations to reach unbiased conclusions, and that AI technologies only operate within their permitted programming.[34] Some go further still to claim that as AI-based technologies do not suffer from fatigue and stress, unlike their human counterparts, they could make more ethical decisions.[35] Although International Humanitarian Law (IHL) provides the legal framework for military use of AI, there are concerns that it does not adequately cover the complexities of AI use in warfare, particularly regarding the use of LAWS. Further work must be conducted by the international community to address this challenge.
Potential Impact on C2 for Land Operations
Current NATO operational philosophy for the conduct of land operations is the manoeuvrist approach, used in conjunction with the NATO command philosophy of mission command.[36] Military operations are planned collaboratively and conducted as multi-domain operations based on combined arms manoeuvre, integration with allied forces, and network-centric capabilities. The decision-making framework employed by NATO is the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide and act), developed by US Air Force Colonel John Boyd during the mid-20th century, which until recently has relied exclusively on human-centric decision-making.[37] However, with the evolution of data-centric warfare made possible through the rapid expansion of data collection platforms, AI technologies are required to rapidly process vast amounts of data, beyond the processing ability of humans alone, to achieve timely data-driven decision-making. For now, the observe/orient/act elements of the OODA loop will be enhanced through human-machine teaming, leaving the decision-making to humans. However, with the inevitable further development and integration of semi-autonomous and fully autonomous capabilities into militaries, a fundamental change will occur from the current model, in which decision-making is almost exclusively done by humans, to one where human involvement transcends from being in the loop to on the loop, and ultimately out of the loop.[38]
The integration of these emerging technologies offers significant military advantage that could transform C2 in the future. Enhanced situational awareness developed through advanced sensing capabilities and all-source data processing and fusion will produce a richer, more accurate and timely intelligence picture.[39] AI-supported planning cycles will be quicker, allowing operational decision-making and tactical actions to take place more quickly than those of an adversary.[40] Improved target acquisition and automated effector matching will lead to faster and more efficient kill chains.[41] Resilient C2 networks secured by leveraging AI technology will support improved multi-domain integration through the production and sharing of a joint common operating picture.[42] And improved logistical resupply will be enabled through ‘robotic and autonomous systems [that] will conduct precision supply operations that extend operational reach and prolong endurance’.[43] While the integration of the emerging technologies could provide a significant military advantage, it will also present significant threats that must be carefully mitigated.
In addition to the ethical and legal issues previously discussed, the integration of such emerging technologies presents a number of additional challenges and threats. AI-enabled systems are constrained by the data used to create the AI algorithm, and are therefore initially subject to inbuilt AI bias introduced by humans in the selection of the training data.[44] Once operational, the systems are susceptible to data poisoning, particularly when open-source reporting and intelligence gathering has been used to complement military datasets. AI-enabled C2 systems themselves are susceptible to offensive cyber activities, and British analysts predict that ‘the manipulation of artificial intelligence for malicious or unethical purposes will become increasingly widespread, resulting in an urgent need to address and counter artificial intelligence biases’.[45] Although RAS capabilities do not suffer from battlefield fatigue and have the ability to operate in extreme environments hazardous for humans, they are vulnerable to direct cyber attacks. This can render the platforms useless or manipulate them into potential threats to friendly forces, and investment must be made to ensure they remain resistant to hostile interference.[46] Finally, the integration of emerging technologies and the resulting reduced planning timelines may ‘overcentralise C2 functions at the political or strategic level’,[47] which may ‘be detrimental to the conduct of military operations at the operational and tactical levels’.[48]
Conclusion
The emerging technological revolutions, particularly AI and RAS, have the potential to significantly impact the C2 of land operations. These technologies offer substantial enhancements in situational awareness and decision-making at the strategic level, as well as target engagement, logistical resupply and support to multi-domain integration at the operational and tactical levels. Increased operational tempo derived through the integration of the technologies would additionally provide military advantage over adversaries who do not possess similar capabilities. However, the technologies have so far primarily enhanced existing capabilities rather than fundamentally changing warfare and rendering existing capabilities and tactics obsolete. The application of these technologies in the recent conflicts in Ukraine and Israel has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and an RMA has not yet been realised.
An RMA is dependent on more than just technological innovation. To realise the full impact of the emerging technologies in land operations, a series of transformational changes must take place including technological advancement, organisation adaptation, and amendments to military operating concepts and doctrine. Additionally, changes to military culture are required in which truly agile processes are adopted to create an environment in which innovation, experimentation and agile procurement can thrive. The integration of AI and RAS also raises important legal and ethical challenges, particularly in the development and use of LAWS. International collaboration will be required to define an agreed framework for the use of these technologies on the battlefield, and amendments may be required to IHL to cover the complexities of using AI-integrated weapon systems in warfare.
While these emerging technologies have the potential to have a significant impact on the C2 of land operations, their influence will remain marginal until the technologies mature and are fully integrated into the wider military. In the near term, these technologies will not replace human decision-making but instead augment C2 through human-machine teaming allowing commanders to make more informed decisions, with greater speed. In the long term, emerging technologies may trigger an RMA, fundamentally transforming the future of warfare.
Acknowledgement
This article is based on a paper selected from student essay submissions to the United Kingdom Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land). This course exists to educate, train and assess British Army and Royal Marine Majors, instilling a manoeuvrist mindset and intellectual edge essential to winning in war. The views expressed in this article are not official UK policy and do not represent the official UK view.
Endnotes
[1] Murat Caliskan and Michel Liegeois, ‘Technology and War Strategy’, Beyond the Horizon (website), 13 June 2017, at: https://behorizon.org/technology-and-war-strategy.
[2] Thomas Greenwood and Patrick Savage, ‘Technology and the Nature of War’, Marine Corps Association (website), 15 January 2024, at: https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/technology-and-the-nature-of-war.
[3] Dorothy Neufeld, ‘Long Waves: The History of Innovation Cycles’, Visual Capitalist (website), 30 June 2021, at: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-history-of-innovation-cycles.
[4] UK Government, UK Innovation Strategy: Leading the Future by Creating It (2021), at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-innovation-strategy-leading-the-future-by-creating-it.
[5] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).
[6] Michael Simmons, ‘How Fast Will the World Change in Ten Years?’, Reimagining the Future (website), 1 March 2021, at: https://frankdiana.net/tag/michael-simmons.
[7] ‘Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on Warfare’, Modern Diplomacy, 11 June 2024, at: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/06/11/emerging-technologies-and-their-impact-on-warfare.
[8] Michael O’Hanlon, Forecasting Change in Military Technology, 2020–2040 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2018), p. 2.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘Artificial Intelligence’, at: https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/249075 (accessed 20 November 2024).
[11] Kenneth Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence: A Revolution in Strategic Affairs?’, Survival 60, no. 5 (2018): 30, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1518374.
[12] Heiko Borchert, Torben Schütz and Joseph Verbovszky, The Very Long Game: 25 Case Studies on the Global State of Defense AI (Cham: Springer, 2024).
[13] David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[14] AI in Weapon Systems Committee, Proceed with Caution: Artificial Intelligence in Weapon Systems (UK Parliament, 2023), at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5804/ldselect/ldaiwe/16/1602.htm.
[15] Payne, ‘Artificial Intelligence’, p. 9.
[16] Zhivan Alach, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Slowing Military Change (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008), p. 50.
[17] Andrew Feickert, Jennifer Elsea, Lawrence Kapp and Laurie Harris, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2018), at: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45392.
[18] Mitch Ambrose, ‘Senate AI Blueprint Proposes “Emergency” R&D Surge’, AIP (website), 15 May 2024, at: https://ww2.aip.org/fyi/senate-ai-blueprint-proposes-emergency-r-d-surge.
[19] British Army, British Army Approach to Robotics and Autonomous Systems: Generating Human-Machine Teams (Ministry of Defence, 2024), at: https://www.army.mod.uk/media/15790/20220126_army-approach-to-ras_final.pdf.
[20] Williamson Murray, Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs, Pentagon OASD(PA)/DPC (1997).
[21] Stephen P Rosen, ‘New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation’, International Security 13, no. 1 (1988): 167.
[22] Elsa B Kania, ‘Chinese Military Innovation in the AI Revolution’, RUSI Journal 164, no. 5–6 (2019): 26–34, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1693803.
[23] Casey E Babb, ‘A Match Made in Heaven: China-Russia Tech Co-operation and Canada’s National Security’, Canadian Global Affairs Institute (website), March 2024, at: https://www.cgai.ca/a_match_made_in_heaven_china_russia_tech_co_operation_and_canadas_national_security.
[24] Max Bergmann, Maria Snegovaya, Tina Dolbaia and Nicholas Fenton, ‘Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea’, CSIS (website), 22 May 2024, at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/collaboration-price-russian-military-technical-cooperation-china-iran-and-north-korea.
[25] Ann M Callahan, ‘An Assessment on Israel's “Iron Dome” Defense System’, Universidad de Navarra (website), at: https://www.unav.edu/en/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/an-assessment-on-israel-s-iron-dome-defense-system (accessed 15 November 2024).
[26] Jacob Kohrs, ‘HADES Modernizes Aerial Military Intelligence’, U.S. Army (website), 30 March 2023, at: https://www.army.mil/article/265353/hades_modernizes_aerial_military_intelligence.
[27] Alach, The Revolution in Military Affairs, p. 51.
[28] James Johnson, ‘Artificial Intelligence & Future Warfare: Implications for International Security’, Defense and Security Analysis 35, no. 2 (2019): 156, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800.
[29] MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 18.
[30] Owen Daniels, ‘The AI “Revolution in Military Affairs”: What Would It Really Look Like?’, Lawfare, 21 December 2022, at: https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/ai-revolution-military-affairs-what-would-it-really-look.
[31] Richard Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us about Transforming the U.S. Military? (Rand/Gazelle, 2000).
[32] Stephanie Mae Pedron and Jose de Arimateia da Cruz, ‘The Future of Wars: Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)’, International Journal of Security Studies 2, no. 1 (2020).
[33] Clay Wilson, Artificial Intelligence and Warfare (21st Century Prometheus, 2020), p. 125.
[34] Virginia Dignum, ‘Ethics in Artificial Intelligence: Introduction to the Special Issue’, Ethics and Information Technology 20 (2018), at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9450-z.
[35] Thibault de Swarte, Omar Boufous and Paul Escalle, ‘Artificial Intelligence, Ethics and Human Values: The Cases of Military Drones and Companion Robots’, Artificial Life and Robotics 24, no. 3 (2019): 291–296, at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10015-019-00525-1.
[36] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication 3.2: Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Edition B, Version 1 (NATO Standardization Office, 2022).
[37] Rosario M Simonetti and Paolo Tripodi, ‘Automation and the Future of Command and Control: The End of Auftragstaktik?’, Journal of Advanced Military Studies 11, no. 1 (2020): 129.
[38] Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018).
[39] Feickert et al., U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI).
[40] Simonetti and Tripodi, ‘Automation and the Future of Command and Control’, p. 129.
[41] Doug Graham, ‘Army Developing Faster, Improved Data “Kill Chain” for Lethal and Non-lethal Fires’, U.S. Army (website), 9 January 2023, at: https://www.army.mil/article/263145/army_developing_faster_improved_data_kill_chain_for_lethal_and_non_lethal_fires.
[42] US Army Capabilities Integration Center—Future Warfare Division, Operationalizing Robotic and Autonomous Systems in Support of Multi-Domain Operations: White Paper (2018), at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-RoboticAutonomousMultiDomainOps.pdf.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Simonetti and Tripodi, ‘Automation and the Future of Command and Control’, p. 143.
[45] UK Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends: Out to 2055 (2024), p. 391.
[46] Marta Bistron and Zbigniew Piotrowski, ‘Artificial Intelligence Applications in Military Systems and Their Influence on Sense of Security of Citizens’, Electronics 10, no. 7 (2021): 871, at: https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10070871.
[47] Simonetti and Tripodi, ‘Automation and the Future of Command and Control’, p. 128.
[48] Ibid.