Social Cohesion and Army's Social Legitimacy

Introduction

Embedded within Army’s document detailing its contribution to the National Defence Strategy (NDS) is a succinct description of one of its five ‘land power’ characteristics: presence. This description articulates that ‘the Australian Army provides a human presence among populations, building trust, and protecting and projecting Australia’s influence. Our positive networks reassure communities, enhancing security and reducing instability’.[1] In the context of domestic tasks and operations, this characteristic presupposes Army’s enduring social legitimacy and the cohesion of society, implying that Army will consistently retain its social legitimacy and that Australia will remain a broadly cohesive society in the foreseeable future. However, an assumption of continued social legitimacy and cohesion is not guaranteed.

Army’s purpose, whether it is deployed overseas or domestically, tacitly requires the support and cooperation of Australia’s population[2]—or, at the very least, an implied positive sentiment towards its activities. During domestic operations, this requirement for support extends to local populations and communities among which Army will conduct operations; without it, mission success will become more complex, difficult to achieve and challenging to maintain in an enduring manner.[3] The sociology of mission success for Army, therefore, requires two interrelated but separate preconditions: a cohesive society that shows general support[4] and a socially legitimate Army that has not had its purpose undermined.[5]

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) does not formally consider social legitimacy as a direct or indirect input to its capabilities in its policy or doctrine,[6] although a recent Chief of Army did briefly reference social license (legitimacy) in the context of Army’s ‘jurisdiction’,[7] a symposium was held to discuss Army in society,[8] and the land power characteristic of ‘presence’ had its singular mention in Army’s NDS companion document. The significance of Army as a participant in society and the reciprocal impact of society on Army are still not well articulated; perhaps they are assumed to be self-evident or beyond the Army’s capacity to influence.[9] Overall, there appears to be an implicit assumption that legitimacy and cohesion are immutable, stable and established constructs that Army cannot influence; therefore, their inclusion as an input to capability is mute. If this assumption is true, it would hint that Army takes for granted its position in society and its level of public support, along with the cohesiveness of the national population, and presumes that these settings are enduring. However, there are risks to Army’s social legitimacy that are not recognised or fully appreciated, and if they are not addressed, there may be consequences for Army’s capability.

This article explores the concepts of social cohesion and social legitimacy as they relate to the Australian Army. First, the concepts of social cohesion and social legitimacy are introduced. These are complex topics in themselves and warrant dedicated discussions; however, for this article, a general overview is sufficient. The subsequent discussion delves into the intersection of Australia’s social cohesion and Army’s social legitimacy to operate and exist within the society it is tasked with protecting. This will highlight Army’s role in contributing to social cohesion and the impact on Army that might arise from diminishing legitimacy, should it occur. The second portion of this article will introduce a brief assessment of the sources of gaps and deviations in Army’s social legitimacy and identify how this may affect the domestic conduct of operations specified in the NDS.[10] A brief case examination of the role of the 2nd (Australian) Division is included, owing to its intimacy with Army’s social legitimacy. Finally, this article will close by suggesting some practical measures by which Army can contribute to social cohesion and concurrently maintain or improve its social legitimacy, such that when or if the ADF is deployed domestically, it will benefit from the support of the local and national populace.

Social Cohesion

In the shadow of conflicts in the Middle East, ongoing Islamophobia, evidence of a rise in antisemitism, and the Bondi Beach terrorism incident, national discussions around social cohesion reached a fever pitch. A Special Envoy for Social Cohesion was appointed in mid-2024,[11] albeit for a brief period of less than a year, and in its place, separate special envoys to combat antisemitism[12] and Islamophobia[13] were appointed. Perhaps because of national events[14] and the profile of these envoys—both of which mention social cohesion numerous times in their plans and recommendations—the current dialogue around social cohesion is constrained largely to religion-oriented or perhaps ethnicity-based dimensions.[15] However, social cohesion encompasses a broader and more intricate scope, as reflected in prevailing Australian definitions.

Adapting the OECD definition,[16] the Australian Human Rights Commission refers to social cohesion in simple form as ‘positive social relationships … the bond or “glue” that binds people’. It further explains that a socially cohesive society ‘is one which works towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust and offers its members the opportunity of upward mobility’.[17] Similarly, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare’s definition explains that cohesion is ‘created from connections based on a shared sense of belonging and attachment, similar values, trust and a sense of “social solidarity”’.[18] Five domains have been adopted to describe and measure social cohesion:

• Belonging: the sense of pride and belonging people have in Australia and in Australian life and culture, and the belonging they feel in their neighbourhoods
• Worth: the degree of emotional and material wellbeing
• Social inclusion and justice: perceptions of economic fairness and trust in government
• Participation: involvement in political activities and participation in social, community and civic groups
• Acceptance and rejection: attitudes toward immigrant diversity, support for minorities and experience of discrimination.[19]

Several of these definitional domains are conceptually useful in describing an interaction between social cohesion and Army’s legitimacy. If society has diminished ownership and pride in the Australian Army (belonging), does not recognise its contribution to national wellbeing (worth), perceives it as unfair or loses trust in the organisation (social inclusion and justice), has a reduced propensity to participate in the Army (participation), or observes that the Army has negative attitudes towards diversity and minorities (acceptance), it risks isolation from the cohesiveness of mainstream society. That is, Army would not contribute positively to the social cohesion of society and may in fact become a source of negative public sentiment or even a sponsor of societal discontent, with consequences for the provision of capability.

Significantly, social cohesion is temporal and can change with time. Its characteristics at a point in time, including societal tensions, conflicts, disagreements and flashpoints, are the prevailing domestic, social and environmental contexts in which the Army will deploy. Domestically, good or bad social cohesion will characterise an area of operations, and deployments are affected positively or negatively in response. Social cohesion not only constrains the government’s political mandate, dictates strategic stamina and frames any societal polarisation but also specifically affects Army’s freedom of manoeuvre in a domestic area of operations.[20] Importantly, social cohesion will remain a dynamic characteristic of the domestic environment into which Army could deploy.

Despite recent commentary on social cohesion in Australia, it is fortunate that recent assessments conclude that ‘the relative stability of … social cohesion speaks to the enduring strength of the social fabric of communities across Australia’,[21] and that in comparison with other (OECD) countries, ‘Australians’ feelings around social connection and social cohesion are generally either similar or better’.[22] It is less fortunate that, perhaps because of the stability, Army does not consider cohesion an external input to capability and may have become complacent about its potential impact.

Social Legitimacy

Sometimes referred to as ‘social license’, the term ‘social legitimacy’ has been around in some form for almost half a century, with aspects of its definition derived from the theory of organisational legitimacy first described in 1975.[23] One of these first definitions stated:

Organisations seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which they are a part.[24]

A succinct and relevant definition is also provided: ‘the acceptance of an institution within a given audience’.[25]

Social legitimacy, in its essence, pertains to an organisation’s ability to conduct its activities without causing societal disruption or undermining social cohesion. It is the permission that society gives for it to exist and function. If an organisation lacks legitimacy within society or fails to possess the requisite societal authorisation to engage in its activities, it may find itself unable to operate effectively, thereby compromising or rendering its fundamental purpose untenable. This principle is universally applicable to all organisations, whether public or private, including educational institutions such as universities, banks, insurance agencies, supermarkets, law enforcement entities, charitable organisations etc. None of these organisations are exempt from the imperatives of social legitimacy.

In the Australian Army context, social legitimacy is the extent to which Army is supported by the Australian population and enjoys positive sentiment to the level that allows it to function in society and recruit from its population. However, there are ever-changing and evolving boundaries that define the expectations of a population, such that the requirements for legitimacy can change. What might have been appropriate norms, behaviours, traditions and cultures for Army in the past may undermine its legitimacy in the future. Significantly, gaps in civil–military demographic characteristics may not be as tolerated as they once might have been, and a simple discrepancy in matters such as representation may be enough to undermine Army’s legitimacy. Nonetheless, Army’s legitimacy is synonymous with its public support at a given moment.

Interaction Between Social Cohesion and Legitimacy

The interaction between social cohesion and social legitimacy is shown in Figure 1.[26] In a harmonised scenario, an organisation will be able to maintain its social legitimacy within a cohesive society (represented as Area A in Figure 1). Its ability to operate, function or provide services will be supported by the population at large, and any changes in society or its expectations will be reflected in or adopted by the organisation. In essence, as long as society remains cohesive and the organisation does nothing to compromise its own legitimacy, harmony and positive sentiment will prevail.

Figure 1: Interaction between social cohesion and social legitimacy

However, society and organisational cultures are not always harmonious, nor do they remain static. Both social cohesion and social legitimacy can deviate or evolve at different times, in different ways or in different directions. Occasionally, this can occur quickly, such as a decisive incident in society or within an organisation (e.g. a scandal); at other times, it can occur gradually over time, such as a deviation in demographic characteristics resulting in a misalignment in values and norms. When deviations in cohesion or legitimacy occur, risks emerge for organisations.

In the absence of societal cohesion, an organisation may find it challenging to attain widespread legitimacy, as it will inevitably be misaligned with at least one sector of society regarding norms, values or purpose (Area B). Consequently, its lack of legitimacy may be forced through society’s lack of cohesion rather than anything the organisation has done itself. A pernicious cycle may result: without social cohesion, organisations may only be able to hire from the sector of society that best reflects the norms and values of the organisation itself, rather than those of the entire population. This practice could exacerbate isolation and further erode legitimacy. Even if an organisation effectively hires from across the broad spectrum of a non-cohesive society, it may simply end up importing aspects of negative social cohesion. This will result in internal organisational conflict and dysfunction, reflecting the lack of wider social cohesion. Regardless, social legitimacy is difficult—although not impossible—to achieve in the absence of social cohesion.

Despite this, it is plausible that an organisation may find a pathway to maintain social legitimacy even when social cohesion is diminishing or has broken down (Area C). Organisational reputation and trust, built over generations, will go some way towards forging legitimacy. However, the ability to perform normal activities may be compromised. Hiring into the organisation will require drawing from a non-cohesive population and somehow reconciling the differences between individuals and groups to form cohesiveness within the organisation, despite externalities. There will be obstacles in effectively operating in a non-cohesive society, and freedom of manoeuvre may be threatened where sentiments towards an organisation differ among societies in different geographic locations. The risks of a challenge to legitimacy will be ever present, and the effort and discipline to maintain legitimacy may be insurmountable in the longer term.

Finally, an existential threat to organisations exists when they have no social legitimacy but social cohesion remains (Area D). This represents an instance where an organisation has lost the trust and confidence of society and can no longer effectively function. Support for the organisation will be diminished, its ability to hire from society will be limited, public sentiment may be hostile, support for public funding will be compromised, and reputational damage may be irreconcilable. In this instance, an organisation will face difficulties in continuing to exist in some environments.[27]

Incidents of corruption, fraud, misconduct, mistreatment and other challenges to values and norms, all of which have occurred within Army over the last decade, can reduce public sentiment and legitimacy. The fact that these types of incidents might not yet have had an enduring or easily measurable impact on Army’s legitimacy is a testament to the organisation’s longstanding positive public sentiment. However, this does not mean that there are no limitations. High separation rates from 2021 to 2024, coupled with reduced recruiting outcomes over the same period, may indicate wavering desires to serve—which may indicate concerns with legitimacy.[28] The resources required to arrest both separations and recruitment underperformance from 2025 onwards were expansive and costly, and may serve to obscure any underlying social legitimacy metrics.[29]

The practical implication derived from Figure 1 is that there may be a non-reciprocal relationship between social cohesion and social legitimacy. An organisation’s enduring social legitimacy is likely only to be achievable when the domestic society (in which the organisation exists and derives its legitimacy) is cohesive. However, social cohesion does not necessarily guarantee an organisation’s social legitimacy. This is partially because organisations themselves influence their own legitimacy, reputation and sentiment.

Army’s Contribution to Social Cohesion

While Australia’s social cohesion is a likely precondition for the Army’s enduring legitimacy, there are several mechanisms by which Army itself contributes to Australia’s social cohesion. Underlying each of them is a sense that Army belongs to the nation or, more specifically, the citizenry, and offers the nation a unifying army of which it can be proud.[30] For Army’s part, if there is social legitimacy epitomised through high public trust and confidence (including positive sentiment), perceptions of non‑partisanship, custody of some of Australia’s norms, complicity with domestic and international law, and adherence to professional ethics and codes of conduct,[31] then Army can be used as an embodiment of or a rallying point for social cohesion, or an exemplar of how society should behave.[32] In practice, Army contributes to cohesion through:

• Inclusivity and diversity, demonstrating that Army serves the spectrum of societal demographics equally and fairly (including among ethnic and religious groups). This helps build a multicultural national identity and bridges social divisions. 
• Adherence to legal processes and transparency, which aids in public knowledge and perception that the Army is not above the normal requirements of law and can be trusted. This improves public confidence in the Army and, when coupled with visible legal and moral restraint, makes the public more supportive of any operational task. 
• Self-regulation, described by the Chief of Army as the ‘ability to establish and uphold professional standards’.[33] This provides a sceptical public with some reassurance that Army will address internal incidents, discipline and misbehaviour to the expectations of society, thereby providing an exemplar of regulation. 
• Contributions to crisis response, which provide a non-wartime service to the population, strengthen community solidarity and provide clear visibility of professionalism and presence, binding Army to the population through shared adversity and response. 
• National symbolism and ceremonies such as involvement in parades, commemorations and observance of national days. These reinforce a sense of continuity between the past and present, connecting citizens to a common narrative of service and sacrifice. This helps bridge social differences and strengthens a collective national identity grounded in shared traditions and respect for public institutions.

While Army possesses a practical ability to contribute to social cohesion, its effectiveness in this regard still requires social legitimacy—a responsibility that lies overwhelmingly with itself. While governments, media, advocacy groups, ex-services organisations and citizenry all contribute to perceptions of Army’s legitimacy, Army remains the primary custodian of its own brand (reputation and legitimacy). In short, if Army is observed and perceived to be a unifying organisation within society that is trusted, representative, apolitical and serving the public good, then it will contribute to positive social cohesion. However, if Army does not maintain social legitimacy, its ability to make a valued contribution to social cohesion is compromised, and it may actually become a focal point for negative sentiment that unifies sectors of the population against it (a scenario unlikely in Australia but not unprecedented globally).

Causes of Diminishing Legitimacy and the Impact on Army

Over time, the Australian Army may have become somewhat complacent about its social legitimacy and ability to operate in society (i.e., its freedom of manoeuvre). In the decades since the end of the Vietnam War, when public sentiment towards the Army was arguably at its lowest,[34] and since the introduction of the all-volunteer force in 1973, the reputation of the Army has recovered, along with its social legitimacy.[35] Relative trust in the ADF has been ranked high in reports and surveys, frequently appearing in the top five most trusted organisations,[36] and widespread enduring criticism is relatively rare despite isolated incidents. However, there have been events that have demonstrated the vulnerability of social legitimacy and provided indicators of what can occur when legitimacy is threatened. While the conditions for some of the examples below were created by a government’s use of Army, others originated from events within Army itself. In other words, social legitimacy—while largely influenced by an organisation itself—can sometimes be made vulnerable to environmental circumstances and political decision-making.

In 2007, the Howard government launched the Northern Territory National Emergency Response to address child sexual abuse in Aboriginal communities. This involved deploying Army personnel to provide varying community services primarily oriented towards medical, dental and logistical support. Despite it being a humanitarian supporting role with no combat elements or authorisation to carry weapons, the deployment was criticised as being disproportionate and undermining of First Nations peoples’ rights and autonomy: ‘[b]y deploying uniformed members of the Australian Defence Forces … the Intervention was designed to send a clear message of disruption and control’.[37] Perceptions linger that the Army ‘rolled into town’.[38] Despite only operating in a support role and deploying at the direction of the government of the day, Army attracted criticism, which likely reduced the localised social legitimacy of the Army in the affected communities.

By contrast, a paper examining the involvement of the Army Reserve in Operation Bushfire Assist noted that ‘[p]olitical and community acceptance of the use of the Reserves for this mission appears strong’.[39] The paper called for more deliberate planning and use of the reserves for disaster relief, including ‘Reserve units specialising in the tasks needed for disaster relief’.[40] However, as Army’s resources are limited, prolonged relief operations have seen some affected communities develop a sense of inequity, particularly if Army has not been present in their area, is slow to respond or lacks the resources to assist. For example, during support for the 2022 New South Wales Flood Recovery efforts, there were reports of Army members receiving abuse from the public reflecting ‘heavy criticism over the time taken for the military to respond to the flood disaster’.[41] This can occur regardless of whether Army has been involved in support decision-making or not, awkwardly placing its legitimacy in the control of other authorities such as state governments. There is ‘a risk for Defence of creating escalating dependencies and expectations in the community and government’.[42] In this example, at least in the minds of a few individuals, Army had lost its legitimacy. Fortunately, this was not a widely held view, but it does indicate how fragile legitimacy can be during times of high tension and community expectation.

Use of the Army during COVID to assist police in preventing interstate movement, and in enforcing lockdown and quarantine regulations, also opened it to criticism.[43] Legal opinion relating to the use of the military during COVID and the 2019 bushfires noted in its conclusion that ‘the federal government should be cautious with its use of [the] military here, due to debate as to whether it is “necessary” in relation to executive power, as opposed to mere convenience’.[44] Fortunately for Army, the provision of support to the authorities during COVID occurred without incidents that would draw enduring criticism. However, in a different, less friendly or less compliant scenario, particularly one that might involve some civil disobedience, support for the Army’s involvement might not have been assured, and there is a risk that Army’s legitimacy may have been negatively affected by association if law enforcement services undertook more direct enforcement activities.

In January 2020, the Orroral Valley bushfire burned through a significant portion of the Namadgi National Park and Tidbinbilla Nature Reserve. Subsequent investigation determined that the fire had been started by an Army helicopter spotlight.[45] Fortunately, in this case, the incident had no enduring reputational impact from the perspective of social legitimacy. However, had public sentiment been lower or social legitimacy for Army’s activities been on the precipice of collapse, this accident could have been enough to result in the withdrawal of public support—especially if human life had been lost. As it was, the Australian Capital Territory Coroner’s report found that ‘[a]ffected persons suffered emotionally and financially’.[46]

An obvious pattern in the examples above is that risks to social legitimacy emerged when the Army was tasked with domestic support roles outside its core mission ‘to prepare land power to enable the integrated force in competition and conflict’.[47] Governments must recognise the ongoing risk that assigning the Army to tasks for which it is not adequately resourced, trained or experienced may undermine its legitimacy and disrupt social cohesion. Expectations for performance in non-warfighting domestic roles may be raised, and the boundaries around what Army should do, what is acceptable and how well it should perform may become blurred or ambiguous. While the longer-term effects on Army are discussed later, there is an inherent trade-off: short-term contributions to Defence Assistance to the Civil Community, Defence Force Assistance to the Civilian Authority or Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief—which should ordinarily improve social legitimacy if performed with professionalism—may increase the risk of reduced social legitimacy if done poorly or if the task itself is not viewed as a legitimate task for an army by the Australian public, potentially affecting Army’s legitimacy and its credibility in future warfighting.

Nevertheless, while Army may be directed to undertake tasks that could affect social legitimacy and amplify fractures in social cohesion, there are also examples where Army’s (and Defence’s) behaviour has risked its own legitimacy. Notable among these over the last 15 years are the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) Skype sex scandal,[48] the findings of the Afghanistan Inquiry (Brereton Report), the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, an inquiry into contamination and a pending inquiry into military sexual violence.

The ADFA Skype sex scandal has been analysed in some depth regarding its impacts on individuals, Defence’s culture, and the ADF overall. Some quarters have accused Defence of using its capital (including social, cultural and symbolic capital) to shield or defend itself from scrutiny or negative public perception. Ultimately, in this example, the scandal was not contained and attracted substantial media attention with a likely impact on the ADF’s social legitimacy, and ‘highlighted how a dispute can not only escalate into the public domain very quickly, but also result in ongoing and serious consequences as a result of a public trial’.[49] The historical incidences of sexual abuse and Defence’s response to them became a public matter that was frequently reported in the media and subject to open reporting. In the absence of surveys on the public’s perception of Army, the extent to which social legitimacy was affected will remain largely speculative. However, it is notable that the scandal and responses progressed at the same time that the ADF was attempting to increase the representation of women and other diverse groups and, at the very least, would have been unhelpful.[50]

In 2020, a report by the Inspector General of the ADF found credible information on the conduct of war crimes committed by the ADF in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016.[51] In closing the Afghanistan Inquiry report, the defence minister reflected that the allegations would always be a ‘matter for national shame’, and noted that the report ‘offered a defining opportunity for Defence and the nation to do right in the face of wrong’.[52] The implications for social legitimacy are self-evident in the potential for a loss of trust and confidence in the ADF. It is fortunate that a majority of the public may simply be unaware of the allegations; however, a University of New South Wales (Canberra) report argued that ‘these events have had a detrimental impact on public trust in the ADF’.[53]

In 2021, the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide was established, with a final report released on 9 September 2024. The commission heard extensive and frequently damning evidence about ‘cultural and systemic issues that affect the mental health and wellbeing of military personnel’,[54] and specifically noted that its findings may ‘also help address the ADF’s recruitment crisis and slow the revolving door of employee turnover’. Some evidence explicitly concerned the ADF’s treatment of its people, highlighting failures in leadership, accountability and support systems, and underscoring the urgent need for enduring cultural reform to rebuild trust, improve retention and safeguard the wellbeing of those who serve.

Commencing in 2026, and in response to a recommendation from the Royal Commission, the Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission will lead an inquiry into military sexual violence.[55] It is expected that some evidence presented at the inquiry will have the potential to harm the reputation of the defence forces and diminish public trust.

Even non-personnel-related inquiries have threatened the broad reputation and trust in the Army among a sceptical population. For example, Defence’s response to per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances contamination on and around Defence sites[56] received strong criticism from some sectors of the public.[57] Similarly, exercises at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area receive regular scrutiny from various environmental advocacy groups, including ‘opposition … on environmental, social, and political grounds’.[58]

The abovementioned events, inquiries and commissions are not exhaustive, but what is observable is that the frequency of inquiries into Defence’s activities has increased over the last decade. Public scrutiny and the demand for transparency have increased, for which the role of the media remains instrumental. Whether this increases or decreases trust in Army will depend on the findings of inquiries, subsequent media reporting and, of course, Army’s response.

Even the sensitive matter of political impartiality and non-partisanship is occasionally threatened, despite a former Chief of Defence Force’s notable effort to avoid such exposure.[59] Political candidates elected to federal parliament such as veterans Andrew Hastie,[60] Luke Gosling[61] and Mike Kelly,[62] and unsuccessful candidates including Mark Wales, Pat O’Neill and, more recently, Grange Chung, have all deliberately used images or political marketing based around their previous military service during political campaigning. By extension, the risk is that military members are not impartial, undermining the ADF’s apolitical reputation, with a potential risk to its legitimacy among sectors of the population that do not share the same political views.

When aggregated, state or federal government employment of the military that generates public discontent or places the military as the face of an unpopular government decision (including accidents and incidents that diminish public respect and trust) risks reducing the Army’s reputation and legitimacy. Further, perceived or actual mistreatment of its own personnel, and perceptions of political bias or partisanship among serving or ex-serving members, can also contribute to a loss of social legitimacy. Regardless of the cause, any erosion of social legitimacy has important consequences in two key areas: domestic operations and manoeuvre, and recruiting and retention.

Operationally, compromised social legitimacy can result in a loss of freedom of manoeuvre in the domestic area of operations. Army is dependent on local infrastructure for logistics, local private landholders for training areas and training area access, local government councils for some services, small and large businesses for contracting support, and many others. Army does not have the capacity or resources to conduct these functions without compromising its own capability. In extremis, a local population could obstruct freedom of manoeuvre deliberately by restricting access to lines of communication, industrial strike action, ‘go slow’ approaches to support, obstructionist contracting support or any range of behaviours that can make operations more difficult than necessary. If Army had to undertake all vital functions itself to requisition services, demand access or otherwise impose itself, this would risk further alienating the populace.

Social legitimacy is also an established precondition for recruitment. Individuals will be reluctant to join a military that is not seen as legitimate, does not command positive public sentiment, is not viewed as a valued career or does not maintain a sound public reputation. Those who join and find solace in a non-legitimate army may reflect some of its less popular attributes, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating its lack of social legitimacy for another generation. This could also create an undesirable perception of exceptionalism[63] or elitism, further distancing the military from society. Recruiting sufficient numbers to provide capability against a climate of threats to its legitimacy would be challenging.

Less obvious is the impact on serving members who may have joined during a period of heightened legitimacy and now observe diminishing public support. It is difficult to speculate on the impact; however, survey data indicates that over one-quarter of serving Army members consider themselves not to have an organisational ‘fit’ with the Army.[64] Separately, one-quarter of Army members indicated an intention to leave, and one-quarter indicated low or neutral organisational integrity. Fortunately, these figures have remained relatively stable since 2020.[65] Nevertheless, any fluctuations may suggest a shifting internal landscape influenced by external perceptions of the Army’s social legitimacy.

Possible Gaps and Vulnerabilities in Social Legitimacy (Risk Factors)

While the ADF (of which Army is the largest constituent part) currently enjoys relatively high levels of public support,[66] it may be more disconnected from society than perceived, and its social legitimacy may not be as assured as both it and the government would like.[67] There are several existing and emerging data points that may indicate or precipitate an evolutionary decline in Army’s social legitimacy, many of which are characteristic of a gradual distancing of Army from society. Other factors are indicative of a society that is less tolerant of institutions that do not (or no longer) reflect the values and norms of the society in which they exist. For Army, these can be broadly grouped into two interrelated concerns: the extent to which it is familiar and relatable to the population (familiarity), and its physical visibility and proximity (presence) within society.

At the time of the 2021 national census, only one in 20 Australian households had at least one person who had served in the ADF (i.e., at least one person who was either currently serving or had previously served in the ADF).[68] Geographically, this potential source of distance and disconnection—which can result in unfamiliarity with Army—is even more pronounced in specific and important areas of Australia. For example, while there are large Army veteran populations centred around Townsville, Toowoomba and Ipswich,[69] some of Australia’s largest population centres that are likely to have the greatest influence on Army’s national social legitimacy, such as Melbourne and Sydney, have proportionately few.[70] This places an inconsistent weight on military knowledge across the nation, leading to uneven levels of understanding, engagement and trust, and increasing the risk that perceptions of Army are shaped more by distance, misconception or limited exposure than by informed experience.

The location of military bases and units (permanent or reserves) also contributes to this observation of inconsistent military knowledge. For example, Victoria is Australia’s second most populous state with one-quarter of the national population,[71] yet has a presence of less than 11 per cent of Army.[72] There is limited permanent presence in Australia’s largest city, Melbourne. This lack of presence in major urban population centres, while not directly threatening social legitimacy, has the potential to reduce the extent to which Australians are familiar with the Australian Army. While this article does not argue that force disposition should be based on population, it does suggest that it could be a pragmatic consideration in basing arrangements to help avoid a degradation in society’s military knowledge and familiarity.

A lack of familiarity with Army becomes more acute given the recently announced plans to divest real estate, which will further reduce physical presence.[73] Army and the ADF awkwardly flirt with the tensions between the resources necessary to maintain physical heritage (tradition) and the resources required for other purposes. The optimum balance is unclear.[74] Regardless, the need for physical presence and visibility among communities is rarely considered and probably underestimated in the context of maintaining social legitimacy. At least one commentator has lamented that the divestment ‘represents the culmination of decades of quiet dislocation that have slowly pushed the Australian Army from the civic and cultural heart’ of communities.[75]

Fortunately, a recent report on public attitudes towards the ADF found that public sentiment remains good, with 68 per cent of survey respondents reporting a positive attitude.[76] However, the report acknowledged that ‘only 46% of respondents would recommend service in the ADF to a family member’, explaining that ‘public knowledge of the ADF as an institution, and of the activities it conducts, was very limited’. Significantly, the report found ‘clear signs of a positive correlation between knowledge of the ADF and trust in it’, indicating constraints on social legitimacy simply through a lack of familiarity—that is, if knowledge of the ADF is compromised or reduced, trust may decline, leading to an otherwise avoidable reduction in legitimacy.

In an illustration of the dynamic nature of legitimacy, public sentiment towards the military and political views are closely linked. When political affiliations change, it can be expected that sentiment would change with them. While centrist political views associated with Australia’s dominant Labor and Liberal parties are supportive of the military, people with political leanings towards the Greens, Nationals and minor parties were the ‘least positive toward Defence’.[77] This is significant because if social cohesion diminishes in line with partisan political views, the social legitimacy of Army may be collateral. Currently, just over 50 per cent of Greens and Nationals voters are reported to have a positive view of the ADF. Should the representation of Green and Nationals voters increase and support for the ADF does not increase among this group, legitimacy may be reduced.

Finally, Army is demographically dissimilar to the general population, which creates the potential for an expanding social distance that could compromise social legitimacy. Australians under 45 years of age are less willing to defend Australia,[78] and while this reflects a range of generational characteristics including voting intention, it is of concern given that this is also the recruiting demographic. Differences in characteristics such as gender diversity and ethnicity can also contribute to social isolation. Currently, Army does not adequately represent Australia’s demographic composition on a range of metrics.[79] To ensure its future legitimacy, it must actively endeavour to enhance its representation in those areas where it may be expected to reflect the expectations of society, fortify its connections with diverse communities and demonstrate alignment with the values of the society from which it originated.

Overall, there is clear potential for gaps in Army’s legitimacy to emerge due to reduced familiarity, relatability, visibility and proximity to the (statistically) average Australian. The demographic and physical gap between Army and society seems destined to increase, or not to close enough to prevent it from becoming a legitimacy concern. Differences in norms, behaviour and expectations may also emerge. While the risks have not yet been realised (or tested), there remains time and opportunity to correct any decline, or even to increase legitimacy through deliberate consideration of Army’s social legitimacy during strategic planning. With its unique position at the junction of Army and society, the Australian Army Reserve may provide an invaluable mechanism to contribute to Army’s social legitimacy, while also being acutely affected by its decline.

Social Legitimacy and the 2nd (Australian) Division

National defence is not yet well understood in the ADF. However, by leveraging the US definition of ‘actions taken by the military to safeguard the nation against external threats’,[80] the term can be interpreted to refer to sovereign territorial operations in the defence of Australia.[81] For Army, this role has been assigned to the 2nd (Australian) Division (2 (AS) Div),[82] a reserve formation with units located throughout Australia, including in areas not populated by permanent force elements.[83] This distribution of the Division’s units and sub-units enhances its familiarity, visibility and proximity to the general public and, with part-time officers and soldiers residing and working within the community, it potentially becomes more relatable to the community.[84] Nonetheless, it is also more susceptible to a decrease in social cohesion or legitimacy at both national and local levels compared to the permanent force.

The extant Army strategy does not delve into detail regarding territorial defence. However, it does apply a broad regional meaning to ‘presence’, explaining that the ‘Australian Army provides a human presence among populations, building trust and protecting and projecting Australia’s influence. Our positive networks reassure communities, enhancing security and reducing instability’. Clearly, the 2 (AS) Div operates in this space and context such that territorial defence and Army’s community presence are closely interwoven.

Reserve members who are part of a community will feel the loss of legitimacy intimately. Their integration into routine non-Army activities—such as regular employment, education and social networks—will be torn by conflicting allegiances and self-rationalisation of their belonging to an organisation that does not hold social legitimacy. Ultimately, this incongruence could result in the resignation of members, resistance to call-out legislation among those who remain, or their complicity in the reduction of legitimacy.

Significantly, the numerous 2 (AS) Div barracks and facilities are integrated more closely into the infrastructure of towns and cities than those of the permanent forces, which tend to be on larger and more secure bases that are serviced by national contracts. Support for such reserve facilities is often bespoke and relies on relationships with small businesses, sub-contractors and the goodwill of the local community. A breakdown in social cohesion or Army’s legitimacy at the national or local level will compromise local logistics support, regional public sentiment and overall freedom of manoeuvre in a nuanced and detrimental way that would be difficult to overcome at a strategic level. In a worst-case scenario, this could constrain the 2 (AS) Div’s ability to deploy and conduct operations in areas of the Australian mainland, especially where it requires the material support of the local population.

The extent to which the 2 (AS) Div can influence its own legitimacy is limited, as its association with the broader Army and ADF cannot be easily distinguished by the public. However, the Division can be a crucial asset in Army’s overall ability to shape its social legitimacy because of its geographic spread and involvement at the local community level. Accordingly, the effectiveness of sovereign territorial defence will depend not only on capability and readiness but on the Division’s ability to sustain trust, credibility and acceptance within the communities from which it is drawn and in which it operates.

Maintaining and Improving Army’s Legitimacy

In 2024, the Chief of Army pondered whether Army had ‘collectively lost the art of building social license’.[85] His context was oriented towards Army’s jurisdiction and the citizenry’s willingness to enlist, but it also acknowledged the difficulties of recruiting and community engagement when social legitimacy is reduced. The avenues through which legitimacy can be increased are limited only by creativity but must have, at their core, the purpose of increasing the extent to which Army is familiar, relatable, visible and proximate within society.

In the first instance, recruiting informs the demographic areas in which Army will differ from the rest of society. Where Army can recruit from a cohesive society across the spectrum of talent (i.e. diversity), its prima facie opportunity to reflect the norms and values is enhanced, and the likelihood of social legitimacy increases.[86] In contrast, as I observed in another publication:

If the military does not draw its members in a representative manner, then the norms, behaviours and demographics will not be congruent with those of society and the ADF will jeopardise its legitimacy as one of the nation’s institutions.[87]

Beyond recruiting and its own internal mechanisms to maintain legitimacy, such as self-regulation and political impartiality, the Army can turn to external engagement to increase legitimacy in more tangible ways. The comparatively simple suggestions below provide the potential for a positive impact on society by employing influencers, media, politicians and community authorities as catalysts for greater legitimacy. Modest investments in social legitimacy will yield returns when there are future threats to legitimacy.

One recommendation is for a mobile demonstration squadron/company to travel widely and expose the wider community to Army’s capabilities. While Army does not have the luxury of an Air Force fly-by or a Navy port visit to inspire and inform the local populace and facilitate visibility and familiarity, it does have vehicles, artillery, helicopters and other hardware. At present, these are confined to a few locations and for the most part, the ‘sexy stuff’ is rarely seen outside Queensland. There is no tradition of routine public display beyond the capacity of reserve units and occasional agricultural shows, career expos and rare barracks open days. Consideration might therefore be given to a mobile standing demonstration squadron comprising equipment intended to be modified for display and interaction.

The Army has one of the smallest band corps among Western militaries relative to its size or population.[88] The preference for warfighting capability has progressively undermined the value of military bands for community engagement and visibility, reducing their capacity to contribute to the promotion of Army’s public image.[89] A local performance from an Army band is not just a display of military musicianship, tradition, uniform and discipline but an opportunity to engage the public in the familiar forum of music, whether the performance is military focused or not. The popularity of the Brisbane Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo[90] demonstrates the potential, but equally, performances can be localised and opportunistic. The permanent force components of the Australian Army Band Corps could be increased to provide this enhanced function.

Community sporting events, such as Run Army, provide an opportunity to ensure Army is familiar, relatable, visible and proximate. These events provide opportunities for engagement, public participation, brand (Army) awareness, charity support and positive media coverage. Where appropriate, they can also be used for commemoration and remembrance purposes.[91] In 2026, Run Army attracted 10,000 entrants across four run distances (2.4 kilometres, 5 kilometres, 10 kilometres and a challenge event) in Brisbane, and a further 3,700 entrants in Townsville.[92] However, such numbers are far below the event’s potential and indicate that it is not fully capitalising on the nation’s larger population centres.[93] Army might consider a dramatic expansion of Run Army beyond Brisbane and Townsville to other cities and plan longer events to take advantage of a growth in participation by Australians in social and competitive running events like Run Army.[94]

Art, theatre and popular culture are means to engage the public, establish the public’s familiarity with Army, humanise its members and offer creative and intellectual outlets for Army personnel. Instead of operating on the organisational fringe of Army,[95] displays, exhibitions, tours and performances could be integrated into routine public relations activities and events.[96] The military arts should be normalised as part of the fabric of community engagement and potentially emerge as a subset of the national arts scene.

Political impartiality must be maintained as the cornerstone of social legitimacy strategies. Army must continue to avoid actions that may create perceptions of partisanship or involvement in political decision-making. While it would be a challenge for the service to enforce, the use of Army barracks and equipment for political announcements should be avoided where possible, and efforts should be made to avoid partisan exposure. Association with the Army may aid a politician’s messaging or personal political prospects. There is no reciprocal benefit except a risk that Army may be perceived as a politicised force with preferences in favour of one side of the political spectrum, which would isolate those with differing political views.[97]

Opportunities to enhance the visibility of Army personnel in and through public exhibitions and via Army installations should be encouraged. The longstanding restriction on wearing uniforms in public merits reconsideration, along with careful consideration of any divestment in public-facing facilities and barracks. Wearing uniforms, when appropriate, allows for the immediate public recognition of Army personnel as integral members of society and should be normalised. Similarly, public access to bases through events like open days, parades and exhibitions offers the community opportunities to engage with the Army in their local area, allowing these bases to maintain regional significance and an important place in local communities. From a social legitimacy perspective, the planned divestment of facilities may require particularly careful deliberation and include mechanisms to ensure that public-facing facilities are still available to support social legitimacy initiatives.

Finally, the size of the Australian Army Public Relations Service (AAPRS) should be increased, with a greater mandate to influence social legitimacy. Because of its size, the capacity of Army’s public relations is limited and mostly reactive. Its role to ‘provide public affairs support for regional community relations activities’[98] is currently constrained and could be expanded to achieve a national outcome with a broader influence. The ADF recruiting website describes the AAPRS’s responsibility to ‘implement and monitor communication strategies that affect how the Army is perceived in the broader community’[99], and its role is intimately relevant to the maintenance of social legitimacy. The corps could be profitably invigorated to achieve this.

In 2024 the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, established a strategic priority of ‘telling our story’, which was a tenet he reaffirmed in 2026. This priority aims to connect members with Army’s past, give meaning to current service and inspire the next generation of soldiers.[100] This is a useful first step towards Army establishing a narrative to help maintain legitimacy. However, as with all priorities, it requires resources to implement. Without wide-reaching communication mediums, an audience to hear and listen to the ‘stories’, and positive responses from among the citizenry, the Chief’s strategic priority will become analogous to voices in a vacuum. While the ‘telling our story’ priority could improve the familiarity and relatability of the Army, it requires active effort and planning to maintain, particularly if implementing some of the suggestions provided above.

Conclusion

There is a significant possibility that the Australian Army is complacent about its social legitimacy and takes its position in society for granted. The reality is that Army is vulnerable to the impact of external and internal events and incidents, including decisions made by governments, which can affect its public reputation and standing. There also appears to be an implicit assumption that social cohesion in Australia will remain stable or, if it becomes unstable, that Army will somehow be immune to the negative effects of its disintegration. However, a presumption of sustained legitimacy and stable cohesion cannot be indefinitely relied on. A decline in Army’s social legitimacy, whether accompanied by a collapse in social cohesion or not, is entirely plausible.

The implications of reduced legitimacy for Army are significant. In the first instance, the loss of material support from the population would manifest in constraints on Army’s freedom of manoeuvre domestically within Australia and on support for overseas deployments. Second, negative public sentiment directly affects recruitment and retention, posing an existential risk to personnel capability. While the Australian Army currently enjoys broad public support, maintaining its legitimacy should not be ignored, and deliberate approaches to improve and sustain positive sentiment are necessary. Given their integration among communities, the members of 2 (AS) Div experience even more acute effects of reduced social legitimacy and social cohesion. Fortunately, there are numerous mechanisms through which Army can enhance its familiarity, relatability, visibility and proximity to the public. The primary challenge lies in recognising that an investment in legitimacy is crucial for Army’s enduring capability, as it will be too late to solicit the support of the general public when the nation faces an existential and territorial threat.

Endnotes

[1] Australian Army, Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2026 (Australian Army, 2026), p. 20, at: www.army.gov.au/our-work/strategy/australian-army-contribution-national….

[2] Brendan Nelson, The Role of Government and Parliament in the Decision to Go to War, Papers on Parliament no. 63 (Parliament of Australia, 2015), at: www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Publications_and_resources/Paper….

[3] Phillip Hoglin, ‘Who Do We Think We Are? Demographic Changes in the Australian Defence Force and Implications for Social Legitimacy’, in Brad West and Cate Carter (eds), The New Australian Military Sociology: Antipodean Perspectives, vol. 2 (Berghahn Books, 2024).

[4] Examples include Dermot Nolan, ‘Social Cohesion, Collective Defence, and the Latent Power of Democracy’, The Defence Horizon Journal (website), at: https://tdhj.org/blog/post/social-cohesion-collective-defence; and Stefan Meister and Rostoks Toms, National Cohesion, DGAP Policy Brief no. 23 (German Council on Foreign Relations, 2025), at: https://doi.org/10.60823/DGAP-25-42996-en.

[5] Literature is largely focused on legitimacy in the overseas area of operations or on legitimacy of the mission and objectives. Examples include Yagil Levy, ‘Theorizing the Domestic Legitimacy of Using Force’, Journal of International Politics 58 (2021): 1–17 (2021) at: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00210-2; and Benjamin Krick, Jonathan Petkun and Mara Revkin, ‘Civilian Harm and Military Legitimacy: Evidence from the Battle of Mosul’, International Organization 79, no. 2 (2025): 332–357, at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818325000098.

[6] Department of Defence, The One Defence Capability System (ODCS) Manual (Department of Defence, 2025). Chapter 6 of this publication lists 10 fundamental inputs to capability, and while it lists the external input of ‘industry’ as one of those, it includes no other external inputs.

[7] Simon Stuart, ‘The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession’, speech, Australian National University National Security College, 25 November 2024, transcript at: www.army.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches-and-transcripts/2024-11-25/cha….

[8] The Cove—Australian Army, ‘Chief of Army Symposium 2025: Army in Society, Panel Session: The Future of Societal-Military Relations’ (video), YouTube, 6 October 2025, at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQIE-NKxEDg. Lieutenant General Simon Stuart makes comments at 31:24 and 33:50 regarding the need for Army to ‘explain itself’.

[9] David Hood similarly argues that society should be recognised as a fundamental input to capability. David Hood, ‘Society as a Fundamental Input to Defence Capability’, Contemporary Issues in Air and Space Power 2, no. 1 (2024).

[10] The NDS describes one of the ADF’s five tasks as ‘defence of our nation and its interests against military attack. This includes defending Australia’s sovereign territory’.  Australian Government, 2026 National Defence Strategy (Canberra, 2026), p. 31, para. 3.21, at: www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2026-national-defence-strat….

[11] Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Press Conference—Canberra’, media release, 29 July 2024, at: www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-13.

[12] Special Envoy’s Plan to Combat Antisemitism (Canberra: Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, 2025), at: https://www.aseca.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-aseca-plan.pdf.

[13]  ‘About the Special Envoy’, Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia (website), at: https://www.oseci.gov.au/about.

[14] Such as the Bondi terrorist attack for which a Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion was established on 9 January 2026: Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion (website), at: https://asc.royalcommission.gov.au.

[15] For example, see Government of Australia, Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion Interim Report (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2026), at: https://asc.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/royal-commission-antise…. This interim report makes a recommendation addressing protection of Jewish holy days and events but no other recommendation concerning social cohesion. Media reporting of the Royal Commission reflects this narrow lens of social cohesion.

[16] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World (OECD, 2011), p. 19, at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/perspectives-on-global-development….

[17] Australian Human Rights Commission, Building Social Cohesion in Our Communities (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015), at: https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/WEB….

[18] Australian Institute for Health and Welfare, ‘Social Cohesion and Social Connection’, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (website), at: www.aihw.gov.au/reports/australias-welfare/social-cohesion-and-social-c….

[19] James O’Donnell, Alice Falkiner and Katarzyna Szachna, Mapping Social Cohesion 2025: Social Cohesion Through Troubled Times (Scanlon Foundation Research Institute, 2025), p. 4, at: https://scanloninstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/SI0001_MappingSocial….

[20] In this context, ‘manoeuvre’ has the meaning described in Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power (Department of Defence, 2014).

[21] O’Donnell et al., Mapping Social Cohesion 2025, p. 3.

[22] Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘Social Cohesion and Social Connection’.

[23] John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer, ‘Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior’, The Pacific Sociological Review 18, no. 1 (1975): 122.

[24] Ibid., p. 122.

[25] Lisa M. Dellmuth and Jonas Tallberg, ‘The Social Legitimacy of International Organisations: Interest Representation, Institutional Performance, and Confidence Extrapolation in the United Nations’, Review of International Studies 41, no. 3 (2014): 451–-475 (2014): 454.

[26] Markus Loewe et al., Social Contract and Social Cohesion: Synergies and Tensions between Two Related Concepts, Policy Brief 2/2024 (Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability, 2024), at: www.idos-research.de/en/policy-brief/article/social-contract-and-social….

[27] The most prominent contemporary example of this is the function of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the United States. For example, see Brandon del Pozo and Barry Friedman, ‘ICE Is Failing the Legitimacy Test’, The Atlantic, 26 January 2026, at: www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/01/policing-open-carry-minnesota-pretti/…; Matt Loffman, ‘Poll: Nearly Two-Thirds of Americans Say ICE Has Gone Too Far in Immigration Crackdown’, PBS News, 5 February 2026, at: www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/poll-nearly-two-thirds-of-americans-say-i….

[28] Commonwealth of Australia, Defence Annual Report 2024–25 (Department of Defence, 2025), at: www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-10/Defence-Annual-Report-20….

[29] Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Chapter 4: Resourcing’, Defence Workforce Plan (Department of Defence, 2024), at: www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/defence-workforce-plan.

[30] For example, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, ‘The Australian Defence Veterans’ Covenant Oath’, Department of Veterans’ Affairs (website), at: www.dva.gov.au/recognition-and-commemoration/australian-defence-veteran….

[31] Australian Army, ‘Contract’, Australian Army (website), at: www.army.gov.au/about-us/who-we-are/our-values (accessed 22 March 2026).

[32] The opposite can also be true. If the Army did not maintain legitimacy, it might become a source of disruption for social cohesion.

[33]Stuart, ‘The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession’.

[34] Alan Ryan, ‘The Australian Army and the Vietnam War in Retrospect’, in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1962–1972 (Army History Unit Department of Defence, 2002), pp. 279–301.

[35] Danielle Chubb and Ian McAllister, Australian Public Opinion, Defence and Foreign Policy: Attitudes and Trends Since 1945 (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

[36] For example: IPSOS, IPSOS Global Trustworthiness Index 2024 (IPSOS, 2024), at: www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-11/Ipsos-Trust in Professions.pdf.

[37] Diana Perche, ‘Ten Years On, It’s Time We Learned the Lessons from the Failed Northern Territory Intervention’, The Conversation, 26 June 2017, at: https://theconversation.com/ten-years-on-its-time-we-learned-the-lesson….

[38] Stan Grant, ‘A Decade on from the NT Intervention, the “Torment of Powerlessness” Lives On’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 21 June 2017, at: www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-21/stan-grant-a-decade-on-from-the-nt-inter….

[39] Mark Armstrong, Every Possible Capability: Some Implications of the Army Reserve Call Out for Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–2020 (Australian Army Research Centre, 2020), p. 25.

[40] Ibid., p. 30.

[41] Andrew Greene and Siobhan Heanue, ‘ADF Members Subjected to Verbal Abuse from Residents During NSW Flood Recovery Efforts’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 18 March 2022; Warren Barnsley, ‘Northern NSW Local Heckles ADF Troops as Anger, Exhaustion Intensifies over Flood Response’, 7News, 8 March 2022, at: https://7news.com.au/news/nsw/northern-nsw-local-heckles-adf-troops-as-anger-exhaustion-intensifies-over-flood-response-c-5974271; Ursula Malone, ‘Defence Force Defends Response to Communities in NSW Devastated by Floods’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 7 March 2022, at: www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-08/defence-forces-defend-response-to-flood-….

[42] Armstrong, Every Possible Capability, p. 30.

[43] Binoy Kampmark, ‘The ADF and the Militarised Response to COVID-19’, The Mandarin, 23 August 2021, at: www.themandarin.com.au/166626-the-adf-and-the-militarised-response-to-c….

[44] Anthony Gray, ‘The Australian Government’s Use of the Military in an Emergency and the Constitution’, UNSW Law Journal 44, no. 1 (2021): 357–393, at: www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/pdfs/law/unsw-law-journal/2020-2029/2021/Is….

[45] Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Inquiry into the Orroral Valley Fire, [2025] ACTCD 4 (Canberra: Coroner’s Court of the Australian Capital Territory, 2005), at: https://www.courts.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/2864921/Inqui….

[46] Ibid., p. 2.

[47] Australian Army, ‘Our Mission’, Australian Army (website), at: www.army.gov.au/about-us/who-we-are/our-mission (accessed 10 April 2026).

[48] Princess Habiba, ‘The Australian Defence Force Academy Skype Sex Scandal: Understanding the Implications of Containment’, Armed Forces & Society 43, no. 2 (2017): 300–321, at: www.jstor.org/stable/48609170.

[49] Ibid., pp. 316–317.

[50] For example: Andrew Greene, ‘More than a Third of Female Australian Defence Force Academy Recruits Report Sexual Misconduct’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 6 June 2024, at: www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-06/third-of-army-recruits-report-sexual-mis…; Ellen Ransley, ‘Shocking Figures Reveal Grim Reality for Defence Force Recruits, and Raise Questions of Transparency’, The Nightly, 22 August 2004, at: https://thenightly.com.au/politics/shocking-figures-reveal-grim-reality….

[51] Department of Defence, Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), at: www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/afghanistan-inquiry.

[52] Richard Marles, ‘Statement on the Closure of the Afghanistan Inquiry Report’, media release, 12 September 2024, at: www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2024-09-12/statement-closure-afg….

[53]  Richard Dunley et al., Public Attitudes Towards the Australian Defence Force (University of New South Wales, 2025), at: www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/pdfs/unsw-canberra/hass/Public Attitudes Towards the ADF Report -V3.pdf.

[54] Australian Government, Final Report, Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), at: https://defenceveteransuicide.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final….

[55] ‘DVSC to Lead Inquiry into Military Sexual Violence’, Defence and Veterans’ Service Commission (website), at: www.dvsc.gov.au/news/dvsc-lead-inquiry-military-sexual-violence.

[56] ‘Defence Approach’, Department of Defence (website), at: www.defence.gov.au/about/locations-property/pfas/defence-approach.

[57] Joshua Aylward, ‘Defence's Toxic Legacy’, Precedent (Australian Lawyers Alliance) (website), at: www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/journals/PrecedentAULA/2018/30.ht….

[58] For example, ‘Talisman Saber 2019: Defend the Environment from Defence’, Friends of the Earth Australia (website), at: www.foe.org.au/talisman_saber_2019.

[59] Andrew Greene, ‘Defence Chiefs Desert Christopher Pyne in Awkward Press Conference’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 28 March 2019, at: www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-28/defence-chiefs-desert-christopher-pyne-i….

[60] David Weber, ‘Election 2016: Canning MP Andrew Hastie Rebuffs Defence Calls over SAS Uniform Photos’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 26 May 2016, at: www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-26/canning-mp-andrew-hastie-rejects-adf-cal….

[61] ‘NT MP Using Picture of Himself in Uniform’, SBS News, 7 May 2019, at: www.sbs.com.au/news/article/nt-mp-using-picture-of-himself-in-uniform/3….

[62] ‘Labor Candidate Mike Kelly Quits Army After Request Not to Use Uniform in Election Advertising’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 10 June 2016, at: www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-11/mike-kelly-resigns-from-army-after-unifo….

[63] Such as that noted in Department of Defence, Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force Afghanistan Inquiry Report, p. 329, and identified by Cate Carter and Brad West, ‘Introduction: Antipodean Insights into Civil–Military Relations’, in Brad West and Cate Carter (eds), The New Australian Military Sociology: Antipodean Perspectives, 1st edition, vol. 2 (Berghahn Books, 2024), p. 11.

[64] Department of Defence, April 2024 Workplace Experience – Whole of Defence (Department of Defence, 2024), at: www.aph.gov.au/-/media/Estimates/fadt/supp2425/Defence/7_Department_of_….

[65] Ibid., p. 2.

[66] Richard Dunley, Nicole Townsend, Margaret Hutchison, Tristan Moss, Ashleigh Brown and Rhys Crawley, Public Attitudes Towards the Australian Defence Force: 2026 (War Studies Research Group, UNSW Canberra, 2026), p. 3, at: www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/pdfs/unsw-canberra/hass/2026-07-5253529-Pub….

[67] For example, in examining the health of Australian civil–military relations at the time, Chalmers argued that the military had become politicised and that there are circumstances where the military can ‘fail to realize ideal civil-military relationship standards’. David Chalmers, Heroes and Fools: Improving Australian Civil–Military Relations (Defense Technical Information Center, 2003), at: https://doi.org/10.21236/ada415396. Since then, there have been examples additional to that of the main subject of the paper (Children Overboard), such as the Skype scandal.

[68] Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australian Defence Force Service’, Australian Bureau of Statistics (website), at: www.abs.gov.au/articles/australian-defence-force-service#population.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Service with the Australian Defence Force: Census’, Australian Bureau of Statistics (website), at: www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/people-and-communities/service-austral….

[71] Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘National, State and Territory Population’, Australian Bureau of Statistics (website), at: www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/national-state-and-territor….

[72] Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2024–25, Table 5.3, p. 188. Reported for the permanent force.

[73] Department of Defence, Delivering the Future Estate: Defence Estate Audit Report (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2025), at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-estate-audit.

[74] Ibid., p. 2. The executive summary states that the estate divestment will enable Defence to ‘reinvest in the people and capability that Defence needs in line with the strategic priorities of the National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program’.

[75] Ian Langford, ‘Army “Reform” is a Shameful Retreat, a Moral Failure’, The Australian, 5 February 2026, at: www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/army-reform-is-ashameful-retreat-a-…. The article refers specifically to Sydney’s Victoria Barracks; however, the comment is equally applicable elsewhere.

[76] Dunley et al., Public Attitudes Towards the Australian Defence Force: 2026, p. 3.

[77] Ibid., p. 8.

[78] Ryan Neelam, ‘Lowy Institute Poll 2025’, Lowy Institute (website), at: https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2025/defence-and-security/#willin….

[79] Such as gender representation, ethnicity, birth country, religion, marital status and others. See Hoglin, ‘Who Do We Think We Are?’, pp. 47–61.

[80] ‘Exploring the Legal Definition of Homeland Defense and Its Importance’, US Legal (website), at: https://legal-resources.uslegalforms.com/h/homeland-defense (accessed 15 April 2026).

[81] In his thesis, Mark Armstrong mentions the role of homeland defence for the Army Reserve several times; however, the term is generally still undefined in Australia. Mark Armstrong, Historical Legacy to National Asset: The Australian Army Reserve in the 21st Century (Deakin University, 2024).

[82] Formal tasking of 2 (AS) Div to undertake homeland security is not clearly evident in most ADF-level strategic documents; however, it is specified in Australian Army, Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2026, p. 17.

[83] Department of Defence, Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves (Canberra, 2024), p. 21, states that ‘The 2nd (Australian) Division also acts as the lead agent for generating security and response options in support of long-term homeland defence’. While the term ‘homeland’ or ‘homeland defence’ is not specified in the 2026 National Defence Strategy, it is mentioned five times in the Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2026, albeit without definition. 

[84] Although the Army Reserve diverges from society in many key demographic characteristics.

[85] Stuart, ‘The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession’.

[86] However, in seeking legitimacy a distinction needs to be made between recruiting initiatives, which are activities deliberately intended to increase enlistment, and branding/engagement, which are activities intended to maintain public familiarity and maintain the visibility of Army. In the latter, there is no imperative for a recruiting outcome, although it may be a useful by-product in some circumstances.

[87] Hoglin, ‘Who Do We Think We Are?’, p. 43.

[88] For example, the Canadian Armed Forces has six full-time (and 53 part-time) bands and specifically includes civilian engagements in its activities: ‘Canadian Forces Music Branch’, Government of Canada (website), at: www.canada.ca/en/services/defence/caf/showcasing/music/music-branch.html. The UK’s Royal Corps of Army Music comprises over 750 members across 12 regular army bands and is the ‘public face of the British Army’: ‘The Royal Corps of Army Music’, UK Army (website), at: www.army.mod.uk/learn-and-explore/about-the-army/corps-regiments-and-un…. Even the New Zealand Army has over 30 full-time musicians, a higher ratio-to-strength than the Australian Army’s 160 full-time musicians.

[89] Parliament of Australia, ‘Private Members’ Business – Army Reserve Bands’, House of Representatives, 18 June 2021 (Gai Brodtmann), at: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamb….

[90] ‘Crowds of More Than 110,000 Attend Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo at Suncorp Stadium’, Australian Leisure Management Magazine, 20 February 2026, at: www.ausleisure.com.au/news/crowds-of-more-than-110000-attend-royal-edin….

[91] For example, Army Run Canada Remembrance Row displays images of veterans during the final kilometres of the run. The Brisbane 2026 Run Army incorporated ‘Legacy Hill’, which included interactive displays from emergency services and community partners.

[92] Results available via Run Army website, ’Run Army’, Run Army (website), at: https://runarmy.org.au/ or ‘Run Army’, Sports Event Services (website), at: https://results.sportseventservices.com.au/series.aspx?CId=16287&RId=65….

[93] By comparison, Canada’s Army Run, held in a city (Ottawa) barely a third the size of the Brisbane area, attracts 15,000 participants to Ottawa. The USMC Marathon typically sells out at 40,000 entrants for the full event, and a half marathon held earlier each year attracts 7,500 alone.

[94] See, for example, Zachary Gates, ‘Once Seen as “Daggy”, Running is Now Exploding in Popularity. Why?’, Nine News, 3 June 2026, at: www.nine.com.au/sport/athletics/australian-social-run-clubs-events-sydn….

[95] Cate Carter and Richard Barrett, ‘Culture, Creativity and the Australian Military Identity’, unpublished submission (2026).

[96] Significantly, this should be distinct and separate from the use of the arts for veteran therapy and wellbeing, and while there may be an overlap, the intent should be for the arts to foster community engagement.

[97] Although, as suggested by Dana Pham, there should remain scope for non-candidate political activities. Dana Pham, ‘Examining the Importance of Political Activities of Defence Members to Civil–Military Relations’, Australian Army Journal 22, no. 1 (2026).

[98] ‘Australian Army Public Relations Service’, Australian Army (website), at: www.army.gov.au/about-us/army-corps/australian-army-public-relations-se….

[99]’Public Relations Officer’, ADF Careers (website), at: www.adfcareers.gov.au/jobs/army/public-relations-officer.

[100] Australian Army, Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2026, p. 3.