Introduction
Defence, including Army, continues to face public scrutiny over the political activities of its personnel. In June 2024, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) sent a joint message to Defence personnel to remind them of their social media obligations.[1] This appeared to be a response to questions raised in Senate estimates hearings earlier that month about personnel who signed an open letter accusing Australia of ‘support’ for alleged acts of genocide in Gaza.[2] It was not the first time in recent years that Defence’s political neutrality had come under public scrutiny.
In response to allegations that Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) cadets claimed they were pressured not to wear their uniforms on Wear It Purple Day in August 2023, shadow defence minister Andrew Hastie, himself a graduate of ADFA, told the media that the leadership at the academy were being ‘overtly political’.[3] In November 2022, The Canberra Times reported that Defence members in uniform were seen attending a politically controversial Jordan Peterson event at the federal Parliament House.[4]
Based on this recent pattern, it is tempting to call for Defence to further restrict members’ (private) engagement in political activities. Indeed, Sir Robert Peel once told the House of Commons that ‘it would be utterly impossible to maintain the discipline of the army, if soldiers were allowed to be political partisans, correspondents of newspapers, or members of political clubs’. He thought that a standing army that would allow this ‘would be in truth … [an ethical curse bidding] farewell to civil liberty’ and that, because of this, ‘the soldier must [have the character to] forfeit that portion of his civic right which would interfere with the discipline of the army’.[5]
But since this speech, laws and policies governing political activities in an Australian Defence context have evolved. This article will not only submit that this evolution is ethical in the contemporary sense but also examine the importance of political activities of Defence members to civil–military relations (CMR) in Australia. Ultimately, this article contests that political activities have provided an opportunity (at times a misunderstood one) for Defence members to develop skills and experience to engage in equal dialogue with unequal authorities. That is, political activities build members’ capability to help the ADF, the Australian Public Service (APS), and members of parliament (MPs) and senators to mutually understand Australia’s national interests in a complex world.
Defence Ethics, and Some Forgotten History of Political Activities in a Defence Context
The word ‘ethics’ is derived from the Greek word ‘ethos’, meaning character.[6] The ADF-P-0 Military Ethics doctrine indicates that ethical action both legitimises Defence business and ensures the support of the Australian people. Therefore, Defence members are ethically expected to apolitically follow the directions of the elected government of the day, as long as these directions are based on applicable Australian and international law.[7] The implication of this is that there are limitations to members’ political activities. What these limitations are has been debated since the federation of Australia.
The Constitutional Convention debates before the turn of the 20th century discussed the issue of whether Defence members should be able to serve in parliament, leading to the wording of the final paragraph of section 44 of the new Australian Constitution.[8] The constitutional ambiguity led to an unresolved debate during World War II about whether MPs could retain their seats while serving as Defence members.
For example, in 1943 the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces, General Sir Thomas Blamey, complained about the potential conflict of duties of MPs serving in Defence.[9] He referred to the ethical dilemma of Captain Clarrie Martin, New South Wales Attorney-General, serving on the staff of the Port Moresby Base Sub Area. Martin was at one point granted leave during this service to deal with urgent ministerial matters; otherwise, his functions as an MP and a government minister would have been unduly restricted.
During World War II, at least 11 MPs and senators served in Defence and still received parliamentary allowances as well as their military pay and allowances. This situation went legally unchallenged. The side questions regarding the eligibility of national service conscripts to run for parliament was addressed by the Defence (Parliamentary Candidates) Act 1969 (Cth), noting that conscription was a politically contentious issue and Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War was becoming increasingly unpopular with the public. But the ‘office of profit under the Crown’ issue debated during the last World War was not revisited until 1996.[10]
Because she was still an Air Force officer at the time of nomination for election, Jackie Kelly, federal MP for Lindsay, was found to have been invalidly elected. Though she transferred to the non-active reserves before the election date, this took place only after candidate nominations closed. She did not challenge the disqualification; after all, Defence members are responsible for serving the government of the day in a neutral, apolitical manner. But what of non-candidate political activities of serving Defence members?
The Evolution of CMR Study, and the Parallel Evolution of Defence Policies Governing Political Activities
Contemporary American scholar Peter Feaver defines CMR as ‘the control and direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in nation states’.[11] The study of CMR owes its foundations to the work of post-World War II American scholars Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, but there has been only intermittent scholarly research on Australian CMR.[12] This is due in part to the American schools of thought nowhere near fully capturing the Australian experience, which evolved from Australia’s British military heritage and predominantly Westminster-style system of government.
Australia’s Mick Ryan pointed out in 2025 that there were attempts in the early 2020s to revive examination of Australian CMR and that these were attempts to pick up from where 1970s and 1980s scholarly work left off.[13] An example of this was the conclusion of Air Commodore Ray Funnell (later Vice Chief of the Defence Force) that a Huntingtonian approach would lead to an ‘absolutist’ ADF isolating itself professionally from society.[14]
Indeed, Huntington in The Soldier and the State argued that harmonious CMR could be created through ‘objective control’—that is, the clear demarcation between military and civilian spheres.[15] His contemporary Janowitz counter-argued that both would eventually converge to become indistinguishable from one another.[16] Yet Australia has the longstanding practice of formulating defence policy through a formal diarchy between public servants and military officers, supervised by elected parliamentarians, thereby complicating efforts to harmonise CMR. Unsurprisingly, Hew Strachan pointed out that in the real world, politics and the military are not clearly demarcated, especially as modern warfare continues to technologically integrate.[17]
In the early days of the new diarchy, Air Commodore Funnell argued that to remain relevant in strategic policy, Australian military professionals would have to upskill for the bureaucracy, a counter-Huntingtonian point reinforced later by the likes of General Sir Phillip Bennett and Major General Stephen Day.[18] To this seemingly awkward aspect of Australian CMR, the non-candidate political activities of serving Defence members becomes an important complement.
Prior to 1981, Defence took a somewhat Peelian-Huntingtonian approach to political activities. Though Australian Military Regulation 210 did not prohibit full-time members from joining political parties, it did prohibit them from taking an active part in the affairs of any political organisation, ‘either by speaking in public or publishing or distributing literature in furtherance of the purposes of any such organisation or party, or in any other manner’.[19]
Huntington argued:
Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism … The military officer must remain neutral politically … The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics … The military profession exists to serve the state … The superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact.[20]
But with a growing recognition that this approach was unsatisfactory, the regulation was repealed, and put in its place were Defence Instructions (General) Pers 21–1 Political Activities of Defence Personnel.[21]
The new liberalising instructions allowed Defence members to participate in political party activity, provided said participation did not involve using rank or uniform, prejudicing performance of duty, impacting Defence capability, or identifying Defence with any political activity. The timing of this coincided with Australia’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[22] Since Articles 18, 19 and 21 of the ICCPR refer to the freedoms of religion or belief, opinion and expression, and assembly, the liberalisation may have been an attempt to ethically align with the ICCPR.
Perhaps it was also a Clausewitzian recognition that Defence is a branch of broader political activity and so—unsurprisingly—Defence personnel (civilian or uniformed), their elected supervisors and the electors are inexorably ‘tangled up in each other’s business’.[23] Noting that CMR is the foundation for articulating strategy—that is, the relationship between civilian and military leaders is crucial to linking use of military force to a desired policy end of government—the political activity experience and skill set of serving Defence members is a value-add to the Defence bureaucracy. Regardless of what the case was, Air Commodore Jarrod Pendlebury argued that the ADF needs first to provide an environment that feasibly enshrines individual rights, and second to be perceived as legitimate, based on the Janowitzian position that armed forces representing a liberal democracy must feasibly align to the goals of democratic political control.[24]
The current Chief of Army (CA) affirmed in 2025 that Army exists only in the context of Australians.[25] By extension, the wider Defence exists only in the context of Australians, for Defence draws its members and its legitimacy wholly from the society Defence serves. CA pointed out that during the Peloponnesian War, Athenian general and statesman Pericles extolled the virtues of Athenian society, which included democracy, celebrating the citizens who made Athens what it was. In this sense, the political activities of Defence members, if carried out without risking Defence’s apolitical status, enhance CMR.
Major Cate Carter emphasised the importance of the Australian soldier as citizen, as the soldier’s domain is predominantly outside of Australia, an operational domain that is subject to political debate led by the Australian community who ultimately produced the citizen who became the soldier.[26] Among other elements of unease related to this duality, the citizen soldier lives under both military and civil law, and Carter questioned: How can Army inculcate humanity in the institution that is Defence? How well can the soldier’s character develop in the barracks without ‘rocking the boat’? Whatever the case, she observed: ‘Even those who have never worn a military uniform are now war veterans ... television has made combatants of them all.’[27]
If the soldier must ultimately be prepared to sacrifice his or her life without it being clear to himself or herself what the sacrifice is for, then is he or she a mercenary rather than a citizen soldier? Later, Carter described the reinvented citizen soldier who expressed public messages of frustration and despair, such as when Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021. This is unsurprising, as there are now identifiable Defence members on online platforms acting as ethicists, agents for social change, humanitarian and gender activists, and leaders in creative thinking.[28] These members are living in the community and knowing why they warfight, which hopefully translates into performance on the job.[29]
Carter concluded that the citizen soldier tradition that has evolved in Australia for the past century allows for a closer relationship between Defence and the Australian public. She pointed out that recent opinion polls show that public support for Defence continues to rise, while support for Defence spending continues to fall, indicating that the reinvented citizen Defence member may be the Australian holding the public trust.[30] If this is true, it appears that the horse has legitimately bolted on Defence policy.
Later Evolution of Defence Policies Governing Political Activities, Why It Matters, and 2010s Case Studies: Major Bernard Gaynor, Captain Mona Shindy (Retired) and the 2016 Federal Elections
In 1989, the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel clarified that the policy liberalisation extended to Defence members writing letters to newspapers—but of course not as Defence members—to preserve Defence’s impartiality.[31] The restrictions the minister outlined do not appear to have significantly changed in policy since, except for one explicit restriction:
[M]embers are not allowed to take a leading part in the affairs of a political organization … [finding] themselves in the position of being spokesperson for their party and possibly having to espouse and support policies which are at variance with those of the Government of the day.[32]
This political leadership restriction was largely lifted by Defence Instructions (General) Personnel 21–1 (DI(G) Pers 21–1) in 2007, where it was changed to:
Defence members on continuous full-time duty must not take a leading or publicly prominent part in the affairs of a political organisation or party where such would identify any part of Defence with a political activity and/or impair their ability to adequately fulfil their obligations to Defence.[33]
As for participation in local government elections while serving, which is not legislatively restricted like participation in state/territory and federal elections, DI(G) Pers 21–1 specifies the approval delegation to the Service Chief level, whereas the Military Personnel Policy Manual prescribes the delegation to a delegate without specifying who.[34]
Colonel Philip Hoglin observed that religion is particularly curious in the context of the changing demographics of both the ADF and the general Australian population, specifically because religion and belief systems in the West often sit at the intersection of other attributes that may pigeonhole an individual as conservative or progressive, or leaning left or right in political ideology.[35] Defence could be stereotyped as politically conservative, as both Huntington and Janowitz have implied, but ADF data, as provided by Hoglin, has surprisingly indicated that as of 2022, 63 per cent of the ADF membership have no religious affiliation, which will likely increase towards 75 per cent in the future.[36]
On this basis, Hoglin extrapolated that future Defence recruits may be more concerned with political causes considered progressive today, such as climate action, gender diversity and multiculturalism.[37] Whether true or untrue, this is precisely why it was important for Defence policies governing political activities to realign as described above. Despite efforts by Defence to ensure such an evolution (perhaps to enable CMR improvement), the 2010s saw Defence policies governing political activities publicly put to the test, including in the cases of Major Bernard Gaynor, Captain Mona Shindy and the 2016 federal elections.
Mr Gaynor was an intelligence officer in the Army Reserve when he was issued a termination notice in 2013. Prior to the notice, he was a member of Katter’s Australia Party and had nominated to be endorsed as a Senate candidate, but naturally that was not the concern of the notice.[38] The termination decision appears to relate to certain comments Mr Gaynor made on his personal website, in press releases, on Twitter (now known as X) and on Facebook. Examples include:
- website posts titled ‘Domestic betrayal a waste of soldiers’ sacrifices’, ‘Defence’s gender-bending preoccupation comes at the cost of a real equity issue: fair indexation’ and ‘Malcolm can’t be a Cate’
- press releases titled ‘Defence shows hypocrisy with gay officer’, ‘Australian Defence Force disciplines Reserve Intelligence Officer for discussing Islam’ and ‘Government and Defence blinded on Islam’.[39]
Mr Gaynor directly identified Defence with his political activities and showed that he was unable to serve the government of the day in a neutral, apolitical manner. Initially, Buchanan J in the Federal Court held that the decision was unlawful because it impermissibly infringed the constitutionally implied freedom of political communication. It should be noted at this point that the implied freedom is not an implied right—the implied freedom is a restriction on the legislative and executive powers of government.[40]
The year 2016 was a particularly busy one for Defence’s senior leaders in the political activities space. The start of that year saw the media continuing to report on the @navyislamic Twitter account run by Captain Shindy. She was appointed Chief of Navy’s Strategic Advisor on Islamic Affairs in 2013.[41] The controversy appears to have started in September the year prior with tweets perceived to be critical of former Prime Minister Tony Abbott. In October 2015 Captain Shindy responded to the launch of the Australian Liberty Alliance, a party that Mr Gaynor eventually associated with, by criticising it as an ‘extreme, ill-informed fringe group’.[42]
Such incidents led to complaints to Defence, including one criticising her for retweeting a post by controversial Islamic cleric Mufti Ismail Menk, who had described LGBTQ people as ‘worse than animals’.[43] The Twitter account was eventually closed. Defence’s final public comment on the matter was that in administering the account, ‘CAPT Shindy was inundated with [certain] comments and endeavoured to ensure a balance between [these and] policy … the Chief of Navy counselled CAPT Shindy on these issues’.[44] The @navyislamic account was problematic for the same reasons Mr Gaynor’s website posts and press releases were problematic from a Defence perspective.
While appealing the Gaynor decision before the full bench of the Federal Court, Defence grappled—during an election year—with reports about its personnel straying from policies governing political activities. Then Government backbencher (formerly Captain) Andrew Hastie was eventually terminated from the standby reserve after he refused to remove photos of himself in uniform from campaign material;[45] that is, he participated in a political activity where he identified Defence with said activity. In the same election, the Labor candidate for Brisbane, (formerly Major) Pat O’Neill, was also brought to Defence’s attention for similar policy breaches.
Also noteworthy was that another candidate for Brisbane, (formerly Captain) Bridget Clinch of the Veterans Party, employed election imagery of herself in civilian clothing, with service medals.[46] Defence confirmed that this was not an issue because those medals are issued to currently serving and separated veterans and are not part of uniform.
The situation in general prompted CDF to urgently write to all members, strongly reminding them to be politically neutral. He emphasised:
[T]here is no limit on [Defence members] holding personal political opinions and expressing them as private citizens. However, to preserve the ADF’s political neutrality, it is essential that members of the ADF do not associate or identify the ADF with the expression of their private opinions.[47]
From a mid-2020s perspective, the limit does not include extremist opinions that are of concern to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.[48]
The violent extremism issue and other security-related issues aside (these issues deserve their own article), the reminder elaborated: ‘Associating the ADF with private views may give the impression to other members of the public that the ADF endorses or agrees with particular points of view.’[49] Naturally, the list of prohibited activities includes taking part in political activities on Defence establishments, and publishing imagery of Defence members in uniform on political websites and social media when referring to political activities. It was a fair and reasonable reminder from CDF—one would be tempted to think that, as a result, there would be no further incidents relating to political activities.
As the dust settled in 2017, the Full Federal Court unanimously overturned Buchanan J’s Gaynor decision.[50] The Full Court held that the relevant Defence Personnel Regulations did not impermissibly infringe the implied freedom of political communication. The High Court refused Mr Gaynor’s application for special leave to appeal, on the grounds that he had no reasonable prospects of success and that his case was not an appropriate vehicle to explore the implied freedom.
Lessons Learnt Since the 2010s and Their Relation to CMR
Upon termination of service, Mr Hastie explained that because he was ‘no longer under the authority of the military’, the use of photos of himself in uniform in Liberal Party election material was not problematic.[51] He further argued that those photos were ‘tasteful … in good judgment’ and that ‘the feedback [he received] from constituents has been positive so it remains in place’.[52] His further argument here is understandable to a certain extent.
The pervading assumption that a Defence member is inherently and reflexively apolitical may discourage strategic thought about Defence’s role in politics in general.[53] So in a sense, to remain non-partisan, the Defence member must be politically aware—engaging in lawful political activities can assist with this. Nevertheless, the Hastie photos created a perception during the election campaign that he was still possibly under the authority of Defence. What if a political scandal had arisen during his campaign which had directly adversely impacted Defence’s reputation? The Jaimie Abbott case demonstrates this point.
Wing Commander Abbott is a reservist public affairs officer[54] who ran as the Liberal Party candidate for the New South Wales state seat of Port Stephens in 2019. During her campaign, she was implicated in a damaging Facebook trolling scandal.[55] Fortunately, because she did not associate Defence with her political activities, Defence was not linked to said scandal. But what are the broader lessons learnt in relation to the non-candidate political activities of serving Defence members and APS employees in Defence? There still appears to be genuine uncertainty among Defence personnel about how much, or even if, they can ethically engage in political activities.
As indicated in this essay, Australia has a long and potentially forgotten history of political activities in a Defence context, a history that is both scattered over the decades and not well understood holistically. The unease around these activities coincides with intermittent Australian CMR research since the 1970s, the fact that most MPs and senators are generalists rather than specialists, and the fact that during 1901–2021 there were 56 Defence ministers, of whom only 12 served longer than three years and 19 served less than a year.[56]
Compounding the issue of the civil–military gap, it appears that Defence leaders’ occasional reminders, usually in reaction to an incident, about the organisation’s political neutrality may have unintentionally left some personnel with the impression that political activities not associated with Defence are completely banned. So how can Defence leaders ethically balance this matter?
Other than a need to reinvigorate Australian CMR research, there is an opportunity to build upon the APS Commission’s guidance to APS employees on ‘Engagement in the Voice Referendum in a Personal Capacity’.[57] The guidance was written in such a way that it could have easily been renamed ‘Employee (APS or Not) Engagement in Political Activities (Including the Voice Referendum) in a Personal Capacity’. It listed types of risks to political neutrality for management, including employee seniority, and connection of political views to employment. The articulation of these risk factors in the guidance appears to be based on lessons learnt from the 2010s.
In inviting a conversation about employee political activities, the guidance recommended that employer response to employee political activities should be proportionate to the combined risk the activities pose to reputation. It makes sense that one of the risk factors is seniority, because the public is more likely to believe more senior employees’ personal comments to be based on perceived ‘inside’ knowledge. Further, the opinions of authority figures of an organisation, especially in the public sector, may be given more weight by the public.
One can imagine that between the political activities of a junior Army officer and those of CA, the weight would be skewed heavily towards CA. The suggestion here is not that senior Defence leaders should not engage in political activities out of uniform at all; rather, it is that the risk factors in their doing so will loom larger, including connection of political views to employment. Even so, Ryan has noted that political leaders in recent times have constrained the ability of senior Defence leaders to speak freely in public, thereby socially delegitimising Defence.[58]
A Defence member engaging in political activities relating to Defence political issues—such as, in Mr Gaynor’s words, that ‘Defence’s gender-bending preoccupation comes at the cost of a real equity issue: fair indexation’[59]—is likely to cause greater concern than, for example, activities relating to immigration issues. While Mr Gaynor’s rank prior to termination would not have put him in the category of ‘senior Defence leader’, by expressing political views connected to Defence and its alleged ‘gender-bending preoccupation’, he nevertheless unethically created a perception that he had privileged access to knowledge and influence in Defence.
The relevant current Defence policies appear to have ethically developed over time, in line with the ICCPR, and assurance of this comes down to an ongoing, proactive and good-faith conversation between Defence leaders and their people on the fair and reasonable application of political activities policy. Such assurance would pave the way for Defence members with political activities experience to help fill the civil–military gap. The gap is historically not a new problem.
Conclusion
US President Abraham Lincoln had to:
educate his generals about the purposes of the war and to remind them of its fundamental political characteristics. He had not merely to create a strategic approach to the war, but to insist that the generals adhere to it. His subordinates did not always agree with him or with one another, and indeed, he often found himself having to arbitrate disputes among general officers at odds with each other over matters weighty or trivial.[60]
Political activities have provided a sometimes misunderstood opportunity for Defence members to develop skills and experience in engaging in equal dialogue with unequal authorities, and such an opportunity should not be unreasonably restricted moving forward.
Building capability to enable ADF members, APS employees and MPs/senators to mutually understand each other should enhance Australia’s national interests in a complex world. MPs and senators with a stake in Defence strive for sound political decision-making, and this depends on a taxing back-and-forth dialogue with the ADF and the Defence APS. Equal dialogue means mutual listening and productive cross-examination.[61] This dialogue contributes to strategic policy that is preferably holistic and politically contextual. Defence members with political activities experience are well positioned to help lubricate such dialogue.
This essay has explored historically ongoing public questions about the political activities of Defence personnel. Specifically, it discussed the history of this from a Defence leadership and ethics perspective. The examination of the matter included recent case studies and the lessons learnt from them, establishing that the relevant current Defence policies appear to be an ethical evolution in the management of members’ political activities. On this basis, further restricting Defence member involvement in political activities would be unethical and would miss an opportunity to take advantage of said members’ political capability to potentially enhance a whole-of-government approach to strategy.
Endnotes
[1] E Campbell, ‘Top Public Servants Told to Mind Views on Gaza’, The Canberra Times, 8 July 2024, at: https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/8686601/public-servants-urged-to-remain-impartial-amid-gaza-criticisms.
[2] M Melzer, ‘Defence May Take “Actions” Against Staff Who Signed Open Letter Accusing Australia of “Support” for Genocide in Gaza’, Sky News, 5 June 2024, at: https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/defence-may-take-actions-against-staff-who-signed-open-letter-accusing-australia-of-support-for-genocide-in-gaza/news-story/df9310c96d5f36d124a248c1f03e349c.
[3] A Greene, ‘ADF Academy Cadets Claim They Were Pressured to Remove Uniforms for Wear It Purple Day’, ABC News, 27 August 2023, at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-27/adf-academy-cadets-claim-they-were-pressured-to-remove-uniforms/102780562.
[4] SB Canales, ‘Jordan Peterson Invited to Parliament House in Speech to Coalition MPs Scott Morrison, Andrew Hastie’, The Canberra Times, 24 November 2022, at: https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7995023/lefty-meltdown-coalition-mp-dismisses-critics-after-controversial-speaker-invited-to-parliament.
[5] R Peel, The Speeches of the Late Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, Bart., Delivered in the House of Commons: With a General Explanatory Index and a Brief Chronological Summary of the Various Subjects on Which the Speeches Were Delivered: Volume II (George Routledge and Co, 1853), p. 574.
[6] ‘Ethics’, Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute (website), at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ethics.
[7] Australian Defence Force, ADF Philosophical Doctrine 0 Series: ADF-P-0 Military Ethics (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2021), pp. 3–4.
[8] A Twomey, Office of Profit Under the Crown (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2018), at: https://apo.org.au/Node/176161.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Australian Defence College Weston Creek, Civil-Military Relations in Australia: Past, Present and Future, Profession of Arms Seminar Series—Proceedings (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2021), at: https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/research-publication/2023/civil-military_relations_in_australia_past_present_and_future.pdf.
[12] B Wadham and W de Lint, ‘Australia: Expanding and Applying the Field of Civil-Military Relations’, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford University Press, 2020), at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1885.
[13] M Ryan, ‘A Distinctly Australian Approach to Civil-Military Relations’, The Interpreter, 28 April 2025, at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/distinctly-australian-approach-civil-military-relations.
[14] Ibid.
[15] SP Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Belknap Press, 1957).
[16] E Cohen, ‘Civil-Military Relations in a Disrupted World’, Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies 1, no. 1 (2019): 11–21.
[17] Ryan, ‘A Distinctly Australian Approach to Civil-Military Relations’.
[18] M Evans, ‘The Civil-Military Relations Bureaucratic Machinery in Australia’, in FC Matei, C Halladay and TC Bruneau (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations (Routledge, 2021), at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003084228-28.
[19] Australian Senate, Debates, 1979, S34:72, at: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=HANSARD80;id=hansard80%2Fhansards80%2F1979-08-21%2F0120;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansards80%2F1979-08-21%2F0119%22.
[20] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 16, 71, 73, 76.
[21] Defence Act—Regulation—Statutory Rules 1981 No. 257, Together with Explanatory Statement, at: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;page=0;query=%22australian%20military%20regulations%22%20257;rec=1;resCount=Default.
[22] Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into the Status of the Human Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Interim Report: Legal Foundations of Religious Freedom in Australia (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2017), Chapter 2 ‘International Human Rights Law’, at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Freedomofreligion/Interim_Report/section?id=committees%2Freportjnt%2F024110%2F25199.
[23] Cohen, ‘Civil-Military Relations in a Disrupted World’, p. 13.
[24] J Pendlebury, ‘Whose Military Is It Anyway? Transforming the Australian Defence Force into Australia’s Defence Force’, The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces: International Perspectives on Immigrant Participation in the Military (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2022), pp. 56–77.
[25] S Stuart, ‘A Brief History of National Conversations’, speech, Chief of Army Symposium, 26 August 2025, transcript at: https://www.army.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches-and-transcripts/2025-08-26/chief-army-symposium-keynote-speech-brief-history-national-conversations.
[26] C Carter, ‘Citizen Soldier’, Australian Army Journal 7, no. 1 (2010): 109–120.
[27] Ibid., p. 117.
[28] C Carter, ‘The New Citizen Soldier’, The Interpreter, 25 August 2021, at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-citizen-soldier.
[29] Carter, ‘Citizen Soldier’, p. 118.
[30] Carter, ‘The New Citizen Soldier’.
[31] Australian House of Representatives, Debates, 1989, HR166:1909, at: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=(Dataset:weblastweek,hansardr,noticer,webthisweek,dailyp,votes,journals,orderofbusiness,hansards,notices,websds)%20ParliamentNumber:%2235%22%20Responder_Phrase:%22mr%20simmons%22%20Government_Phrase:%22yes%22;rec=4.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Australian Defence Force, Defence Instructions (General) Pers 21–1 Political Activities of Defence Personnel (Department of Defence, 2007), at: https://bernardgaynor.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/DIG-Pers-21-1-Political-activities-of-Defence-personnel-2.pdf.
[34] Australian Defence Force, Military Personnel Policy Manual (Department of Defence, 2018), at: https://pdf4pro.com/cdn/unclassified-department-of-defence-2b665a.pdf.
[35] P Hoglin, ‘Who Do We Think We Are? Demographic Changes in the Australian Defence Force and Implications for Social Legitimacy’, The New Australian Military Sociology: Antipodean Perspectives (Berghahn Books, 2024): pp. 29–59.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., p. 50.
[38] J Forrester, L Finlay and A Zimmermann, ‘Finding the Streams’ True Sources: The Implied Freedom of Political Communication and Executive Power’, University of Western Australia Law Review 43, no. 2 (2018): 188–254.
[39] Ibid., p. 211-212.
[40] Ibid., p. 191.
[41] M Safi, ‘Defence Chief Queried Muslim Officer’s Tweets Before @navyislamic Account Deleted’, The Guardian, 1 April 2016, at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/apr/01/defence-chief-queried-muslim-officers-tweets-before-navyislamic-account-deleted.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] A O’Connor, ‘Andrew Hastie, Canning MP, Dumped by Army over Use of Uniform in Campaign Material’, ABC News, 9 June 2016, at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-09/canning-mp-andrew-hastie-dumped-by-army-over-uniform-stoush/7495190.
[46] C Atfield, ‘Federal Election 2016: Second Candidate Told to Remove Military Uniform Images’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 May 2016, at: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/federal-election-2016-second-candidate-told-to-remove-military-uniform-images-20160524-gp2w3x.html.
[47] H Dennett, ‘Service Bosses React to Employees’ Rule-Breaking Election Campaigning’, The Mandarin, 26 May 2016, at: https://www.themandarin.com.au/65600-service-bosses-react-to-employees-election-campaigning.
[48] A Bogle, ‘Defence Probed 16 Alleged Links Between Personnel and Extremism in Two Years’, The Guardian, 30 June 2024, at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/article/2024/jun/30/australia-defence-force-adf-extremism-links-operation-lumen-ntwnfb.
[49] Dennett, ‘Service Bosses React to Employees' Rule-Breaking Election Campaigning’.
[50] Forrester et al., ‘Finding the Streams’ True Sources’, p. 210.
[51] O’Connor, ‘Andrew Hastie, Canning MP’.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Australian Defence College, Civil-Military Relations in Australia, p. 31.
[54] ‘Episode 40: Helping You Become a Highly Confident Public Speaker with Jaimie Abbott’, The Hayley Osborne Show, 10 October 2022, at: https://hayleyosborne.com/episode-40-helping-you-become-a-highly-confident-public-speaker-with-jaimie-abbott.
[55] B Millington, ‘Port Stephens Liberal Candidate Jaimie Abbott Linked to Trolling from Fake Facebook Accounts’, ABC News, 9 March 2019, at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-09/jaimie-abbott-linked-to-fake-facebook-trolling-nsw-election/10886268.
[56] Australian Defence College, Civil-Military Relations in Australia.
[57] Australian Public Service Commission, Engagement in the Voice Referendum in a Personal Capacity: Guidance for APS Employees and Agencies (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023) at: https://www.apsc.gov.au/resources/circulars-guidance-and-advice/engagement-voice-referendum-personal-capacity-guidance-aps-employees-and-agencies.
[58] Ryan, ‘A Distinctly Australian Approach to Civil-Military Relations’.
[59] Forrester et al., ‘Finding the Streams’ True Sources’, p. 211.
[60] E Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (Free Press, 2002), p. 58.
[61] W Rapp, ‘Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making’, Parameters 45, no. 3 (2015): 13–26.