Contribute

A Central Pillar of the Army Profession

Journal Edition
Early Access Articles
DOI
10.61451/2103012

The Conceptual Evolution of the Australian Army’s and Australian Defence Force’s Operational and Tactical Planning Processes

In the opening chapter of his seminal 1957 book The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington enduringly defined what makes the military a profession rather than a trade, vocation or job. Huntington defined a profession as uniquely manifesting three aspects: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.[1] In the case of the military, the foremost aspect, he asserted, is:

a central skill [that] is perhaps best summed up in Harold Lasswell’s phrase ‘the management of violence’. The function of a military force is successful armed combat. The duties of the military officer include: (1) the organizing, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its activities in and out of combat.[2]

Though Huntington’s primary focus was on civil-military relations, and most of his arguments in this regard have since been disproven,[3] his definition of what constitutes the military profession has been remarkably enduring. This is likely to be because, in this definition if not in most other aspects of his study, Huntington was largely right. It is no wonder, therefore, that other scholars using this definition have since traced the military profession to ancient times,[4] and that the majority of the ‘classical’ studies of military affairs focus on strategy, tactics or campaign histories.[5] Even Clausewitz, arguably the most masterful military scholar, focused primarily on these areas, the most significant of his many contributions being to explicitly link their purpose to the pursuit of government policy.[6] It is only since the late 20th century that other aspects of military professionalism, such as ethics and related matters including organisational value systems and codes of conduct, have risen to a position of equal prominence.[7]

Despite this recent broadening of scholarly focus, the management of violence not only remains central to the military profession but is its raison d’être. No Australian Army Journal special edition focusing on the Army profession would be complete without addressing it. This paper focuses on one of its significant components: how the Army plans military operations. Specifically, it analyses the recent conceptual evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Decision-Making and Planning Processes doctrine publication, which provides guidance for planning at the operational and tactical levels.[8] The centrality of this doctrine publication to the Army profession, and for that matter to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a whole, should not be understated. In the words of Marcus Mäder:

Doctrine is more than the formal publication of military concepts. It stands for an institutional culture of conceptual thinking on the nature of conflict and the best conduct of warfare. It is the military’s instrument for analysing past experience, guiding current operations and exploring future challenges.[9]

The management of violence is central to the Army profession; planning military activities is central to the effective management of violence; and the Decision-Making and Planning Processes doctrine publication is central to how Army plans military activities. As a profession, it would be remiss of us not to critically reflect upon it.

Such an analysis is also timely. Part of an entirely new doctrine hierarchy that was introduced following recent reforms that rolled single-service and joint doctrine into a single, integrated series, Decision-Making and Planning Processes was published in November 2024. It has superseded two prior publications: Joint Military Appreciation Process, which was an ADF joint doctrine publication; and the Army’s Military Appreciation Process doctrine publication.[10] Yet the new Decision-Making and Planning Processes doctrine publication is not simply an integration of its two predecessors. On the contrary, it arguably contains the most unique planning process that the ADF has ever promulgated. It is therefore even more important that it be thoughtfully examined than would be the case had it merely been a minor update to the publications it replaced. This paper provides context by briefly summarising Decision-Making and Planning Processes. It then conducts a quantitative, followed by a qualitative, analysis of this publication relative to its predecessors. In conclusion, recommendations are made about how the planning processes it contains and their implementation could be further enhanced.

Decision-Making and Planning Processes: An Overview

Decision-Making and Planning Processes contains two separate yet interrelated planning processes. The first is the Immediate Decision-Making Process (IDMP), which is designed to assist a commander to quickly appraise a situation, determine a response and, depending on the context, either issue orders to subordinates or issue guidance to planning staff. IDMP has seven elements: scoping; framing; mission analysis; decide response; develop response into orders or plan; implement orders; and assess. Two additional elements may be added, depending on the context: reassessing the situation if scoping and framing determines that the commander does not possess enough information; and course of action (COA) development and analysis if the commander cannot intuitively determine a suitable response. IDMP is intended to be rapid and intuitive, using pattern matching to enable commanders to determine suitable response options.[11] This requires training in pattern recognition, and chapters are included discussing how to effectively make decisions, and how to effectively train commanders and planning staff.[12]

The second planning process contained in Decision-Making and Planning Processes is the Deliberate Military Appreciation Process (DMAP), which is designed to be undertaken by a planning staff in support of a commander. Completed over a longer timeframe than IDMP, DMAP consists of three core steps, which are summarised below.

  1. Scoping and framing. This step confirms that the commander and planning team understand the nature of the problem to be solved, and establishes a risk management process that adapts a conventional workplace risk management framework to suit operational conditions. A ‘staff estimate’, which contains a snapshot of key information and planning outcomes, is established in this step, but requires continual update and supplementation throughout the rest of the process.[13]
  2. Mission analysis. The most substantial step, this step determines objectives (achieving all objectives enables an ‘end state’, which was determined by the commander during their IDMP) to be reached at the conclusion of the operation; tasks; and decisive actions, which determine discrete activities required to achieve objectives. A mission statement is determined, limitations identified, and decisive actions sequenced in space and time along thematic lines of operation. A centre of gravity analysis identifies adversary vulnerabilities that can be targeted to defeat it, and own vulnerabilities that need to be protected. COA sketches and statements are produced at the end of this step. These contain a broad schematic of how an operation may unfold.[14]
  3. COA development and analysis. During this step at least one COA, sometimes more, is developed in detail. The purpose of each COA is to enable all decisive actions, tasks and objectives to be achieved. The suitability of each COA is then tested through the conduct of a wargame, enabling improvements to be identified and incorporated.[15]

These steps are supported by two complementary activities. The first is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) process. This iterative activity occurs concurrently with DMAP. It analyses the environment, adversary and other major stakeholders, enabling possible adversary actions to be identified and countered.[16] The second is ‘concept of operations development’ or ‘plan development and execution’, which may occur at any point in the process once the commander has decided upon actions to be taken. This activity takes DMAP’s outcomes and finalises them for implementation. Depending on the operation, this may be as simple as writing and issuing orders, or it may involve development of several detailed supporting plans and assessment measures.[17]

Several aspects of IDMP and DMAP deliberately overlap, with the complementary relationship between the two processes being that the commander uses IDMP to identify key inputs to, and requirements from, DMAP. They also use the information gaps and resulting questions identified during IDMP, and their assessment of available planning time, to consider which parts of DMAP need to be completed, and which can be abbreviated or omitted.[18] This occurs because DMAP is comprehensive but very lengthy, and completing all activities may not be possible in all circumstances.

Quantitative Analysis

Comparing Decision-Making and Planning Processes to the two doctrine publications it replaced requires comparing the two current planning processes to four predecessors. This is because one of the two preceding publications, Military Appreciation Process, contained three different processes. In descending order of scale, these were the Staff Military Appreciation Process (SMAP), designed for use by staff in land domain tactical headquarters; the Individual Military Appreciation Process (IMAP), designed for use by individual commanders prior to execution; and the Combat Military Appreciation Process (CMAP), designed for rapid post-execution responses to changing situations. The previous joint doctrine publication contained only one planning process, the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP), which was designed for use by staff in joint operational-level headquarters.

A quantitative comparison of the two new and four previous planning processes is shown in Table 1. This table shows the planning methods featured in each process. For the purposes of this comparison, a ‘method’ is defined as a way of doing something, or an established approach or procedure. Each planning process is itself a ‘methodology’, which is a deliberately structured framework of methods employed to complete a task.[19] Table 1 therefore breaks each planning process (methodology) into its constituent components (methods) for the purposes of analysis, in the same way the planning processes themselves consist of steps and sub-steps to break planning down into manageable tasks. Importantly, the steps and sub-steps of each planning process are not synonymous with their constituent methods. Some sub-steps contain several methods, while others contain just one. This is why Table 1 shows more methods than there are steps or sub-steps in any of the planning processes reviewed. Additionally, in some instances different processes use different methods to achieve the same or similar planning outcomes. Table 1 therefore includes several methods that may seem synonymous within the table but which are different when the doctrine is read in detail.

Table 1. Comparing methods in different planning processes
Ser. Method CMAP IMAP SMAP JMAP IDMP DMAP
1. Allocate resources (e.g., to tasks) 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
2. Assess relative combat power           🗸
3. Battlespace operating systems   🗸 🗸      
4. Branches (on lines of operation)     🗸 🗸   🗸
5. Centre of gravity analysis   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
6. Commander’s critical information requirements   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
7. (Commander’s) decision points     🗸 🗸   🗸
8. Commander’s direction and guidance 🗸 🗸 🗸     🗸
9. Commander’s estimate         🗸  
10. Commander’s intent statement 🗸   🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
11. Consider implications of operational environment         🗸  
12. Consider own capabilities and their availability 🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸  
13. Control measures 🗸 🗸 🗸      
14. COA (map) overlay   🗸 🗸      
15. COA analysis questions   🗸        
16. COA development 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
17. COA method statement     🗸      
18. COA viability test (e.g., FASSD (feasible, acceptable, suitable, sustainable, distinguishable) or FASSADD (feasible, acceptable, suitable, sustainable, adaptable deception, distinguishable)) 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸  
19. Critical factors analysis   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
20. Culminating points       🗸   🗸
21. Deception measures (mandatory incorporation)     🗸     🗸
22. Decision support (map) overlay     🗸     🗸
23. Decisive events   🗸 🗸      
24. Decisive points/actions       🗸 🗸 🗸
25. Determine area of interest   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
26. Determine area of operations   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
27. Determine mission 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
28. Developing supporting plans       🗸   🗸
29. Documenting the plan       🗸   🗸
30. Effects 🗸   🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
31. End states   🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
32. Enemy capability analysis* 🗸 🗸 🗸      
33. Enemy COA analysis* 🗸 🗸 🗸      
34. Enemy doctrinal (map) overlay*   🗸 🗸      
35. Evaluation/assessment     🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
36. Event (map) overlay   🗸 🗸     🗸
37. Event and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance matrix*     🗸      
38. Force ratio comparisons     🗸      
39. Framing       🗸 🗸 🗸
40. Graduated response           🗸
41. High value target list or matrix*   🗸 🗸      
42. Identify assumptions   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
43. Identify critical facts   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
44. Identify limitations/constraints   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
45. Identify named areas of interest   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
46. Identify opportunities   🗸 🗸   🗸  
47. Identify targeted areas of interest     🗸 🗸   🗸
48. Identify tasks 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
49. Integration of functions       🗸   🗸
50. Intelligence/threat assessment     🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
51. Iterative planning (process or cycle)     🗸 🗸   🗸
52. Killboards           🗸
53. Lines of operation     🗸 🗸   🗸
54. Main effort   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
55. Objectives     🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
56. Operational pauses       🗸   🗸
57. Operational reach       🗸   🗸
58. Operational risk 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
59. Other battlespace factors analysis (i.e., PMESII/ASCOPE (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure / areas, structures, capabilities, organisation, people, events))*   🗸 🗸      
60. Outline sketch     🗸     🗸
61. Pattern matching         🗸  
62. Phasing   🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
63. Risk assessment/management (including safety and welfare)       🗸   🗸
64. Sequels (on lines of operation)     🗸 🗸   🗸
65. Sequencing       🗸   🗸
66. Simultaneity in depth       🗸   🗸
67. Situation (map) overlay*   🗸 🗸      
68. Situation description       🗸 🗸 🗸
69. Staff estimate           🗸
70. Structure for staff functions       🗸    
71. Synchronisation (not using matrix) 🗸 🗸   🗸   🗸
72. Synchronisation matrix     🗸 🗸   🗸
73. Tempo planning       🗸   🗸
74. Terrain analysis (e.g., OCOKA/MCOO (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key and decisive terrain, avenues of approach / modified combined obstacle overlay))* 🗸 🗸 🗸      
75. Timeline planning 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸   🗸
76. Visualisation 🗸 🗸 🗸     🗸
77. Wargaming     🗸 🗸   🗸
78. Weather analysis*   🗸 🗸      
79. Writing a concept of operations   🗸   🗸    
80. Writing and issuing orders 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
  Total methods included 18 40 56 49 21 56

Given that Decision-Making and Planning Processes has replaced four previous planning processes with two new ones, one could reasonably expect the two new processes to synthesise the functions of all four of the old ones. The nature of the new processes conforms to this expectation: two old process and one new one (CMAP, IMAP and IDMP) are intended for use by individual commanders, while two old processes and one new one are intended for use by headquarters staffs (SMAP, JMAP and DMAP). Table 1 enables us to see where overlap, synthesis and divergence occur in the case of both of these groupings of processes.

With regard to the processes intended for use by staffs, SMAP and DMAP contain the same number of methods (56); however, only 38 (68 percent) of these are common between them. Although JMAP contains seven fewer methods overall (only including 49), 46 of these (94 per cent of those in JMAP) are also included in DMAP. SMAP and JMAP overlap for 33 methods (respectively 59 and 72 per cent), although it should be noted that 32 of these 33 methods are included in all three processes. Serial 18 is the only method in both SMAP and JMAP that is not in DMAP. This is because it has been moved to IDMP in the new doctrine, meaning that although it is now completed by the commander rather than the staff it is still included in planning. The first of the two JMAP methods that have been removed from DMAP is serial 70, which is now in a different doctrine publication.[20] The other is serial 79; however, the status of this removal is questionable. Although a method for how to write a concept of operations is not included in DMAP, the related term ‘conops’ is used throughout, mostly in sections of text that appear to have been copied verbatim from the previous JMAP doctrine. Indeed, the term is even used in the name of one of DMAP’s two complementary components, despite omission of a corresponding method.[21] Accordingly, this omission may be an editorial oversight rather than the result of deliberate process design (more on this below).

Before drawing any conclusions from these overlaps, a key difference between the old processes (SMAP and JMAP) needs to be considered. This difference is that the number of included methods is higher in SMAP because it was intended to be taken into the field for use by all staff within an Army tactical headquarters as a single point of reference. By contrast, JMAP was designed for use by planning staff in operational-level joint headquarters, where other staff branches could access their own corresponding doctrine. As a result, JMAP was not intended to be a single point of reference. This difference in relative purpose resulted in SMAP including information that JMAP deliberately omitted. In particular, SMAP included methods used to complete the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) process, whereas the joint equivalent, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operation Environment (JIPOE), was contained in a separate doctrine publication. Nine IPB-specific methods are marked in Table 1 with an asterisk (serials 32, 33, 34, 37, 41, 59, 67, 74 and 78). None of these methods appears in either JMAP or DMAP. Once these are removed from the comparison, SMAP includes 47 other methods, of which 33 (70 per cent) are also in JMAP and 37 (79 per cent) are also in DMAP. Three of the nine non-IPB SMAP methods that are not included in DMAP are in IDMP instead (serials 12, 18 and 46), while the other six have been entirely removed from the new processes (serials 3, 13, 14, 17, 23 and 38).

An additional analysis of each method was undertaken to determine if that method is discussed primarily in terms of tactical application, in terms of operational application, or as being applicable at both levels.[22] This analysis was completed for all methods based on their description within all six planning processes. The resultant groupings are shown in Table 2. Regarding the methods that are described both tactically and operationally, this assessment was made in consideration of the description in all processes that included the method. In several cases, description of a method in Army’s processes (CMAP, IMAP and SMAP) was tactical in focus, while description of the same method in JMAP was operational in focus. For example, in CMAP, serial 30 is discussed primarily in tactical terms (local, immediate and direct effects); in JMAP and DMAP it is discussed primarily in operational terms (systemic, variable duration, and either direct or indirect effects); and in SMAP and IDMP it is discussed in a manner applicable to both levels.

Another qualifier regarding Table 2 is that its categorisation applies only to the methods as described in the evaluated doctrine. It does not take into account military theory or historical applications of each method, which may be broader or narrower in focus than the doctrine. For instance, serial 20 is assessed as being described primarily in terms of operational application and serial 21 as being described primarily in terms of tactical application. This is despite the fact that military theory conceives of both methods as being applicable at both levels.[23]

There is a final qualifier regarding the use of percentages in Table 2 and the subsequent quantitative analysis. Percentages are used here to refer to the overall number of methods only. This does not account for the relative prominence afforded to some methods within a particular planning process, their relative centrality within it, or the number of other methods they are explicitly linked to. Although the findings of its quantitative analysis are nevertheless valid, these limitations are offset by further discussion contained below in this paper’s qualitative analysis section.

Table 2. Categorisation of methods by explanation primarily in terms of tactical or operational application
Methods described primarily in terms of tactical application Methods described primarily in terms of operational application Methods described both tactically and operationally

3. Battlespace operating systems

9. Commander’s estimate

13. Control measures

14. COA (map) overlay

15. COA analysis questions

17. COA method statement

21. Deception measures (mandatory incorporation)

22. Decision support (map) overlay

23. Decisive events

32. Enemy capability analysis*

33. Enemy COA analysis*

34. Enemy doctrinal (map) overlay*

36. Event (map) overlay

37. Event and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance matrix*

38. Force ratio comparisons

46. Identify opportunities

52. Killboards

59. Other battlespace factors analysis (i.e., PMESII/ASCOPE)*

60. Outline sketch

61. Pattern matching

67. Situation (map) overlay*

69. Staff estimate

74. Terrain analysis (e.g., OCOKA/MCOO)*

76. Visualisation

4. Branches (to lines of operation)

20. Culminating points

24. Decisive points/actions

28. Developing supporting plans

39. Framing

49. Integration of functions

53. Lines of operation

55. Objectives

56. Operational pauses

57. Operational reach

64. Sequels (on lines of operation)

65. Sequencing

66. Simultaneity in depth

68. Situation description

73. Tempo planning

1. Allocate resources (e.g., to tasks)

2. Assess relative combat power

5. Centre of gravity analysis

6. Commander’s critical information requirements

7. (Commander’s) decision points

8. Commander’s direction and guidance

10. Commander’s intent statement

11. Consider implications of operational environment

12. Consider own capabilities and their availability

16. COA development

18. COA viability test (e.g., FASSD or FASSADD)

19. Critical factors analysis

25. Determine area of interest

26. Determine area of operations

27. Determine mission

29. Documenting the plan

30. Effects

31. End states

35. Evaluation/assessment

40. Graduated response

41. High value target list or matrix*

42. Identify assumptions

43. Identify critical facts

44. Identify limitations/constraints

45. Identify named areas of interest

47. Identify targeted areas of interest

48. Identify tasks

50. Intelligence/threat assessment

51. Iterative planning (process or cycle)

54. Main effort

58. Operational risk

62. Phasing

63. Risk assessment/management (including safety and welfare)

70. Structure for staff functions

71. Synchronisation (not using matrix)

72. Synchronisation matrix

75. Timeline planning

77. Wargaming

78. Weather analysis*

79. Writing a concept of operations

80. Writing and issuing orders
Total number: 24 (30 per cent) Total number: 15 (19 per cent) Total number: 41 (51 per cent)

Regarding the significance of the omission of nine non-IPB SMAP methods from DMAP, it can now be observed that two of the nine fit into the category ‘described both tactically and operationally’ (serials 12 and 18), while the other seven are ‘described primarily in terms of tactical application’ (serials 3, 13, 14, 17, 23, 38 and 46). Both of the methods described at both levels (serials 12 and 18) were kept, but are now included within IDMP rather than DMAP; only one of the exclusively tactical methods was also retained here (serial 46). This finding shows that several of the land domain focused tactical planning methods included in SMAP are now omitted from ADF planning doctrine altogether.

Despite this omission, DMAP has a more tactical focus than JMAP. This difference is shown in Table 3, which sorts the methods in each process shown in Table 1 according to the groupings of primary method descriptions shown in Table 2. Unsurprisingly, given their intended application, CMAP and IMAP contained exclusively dual or tactical methods, while JMAP contained exclusively dual or operational methods. SMAP contained a mixture of all three method categorisations, though it included more tactical than operational methods. Both of the new planning processes contain a mixture of all three method categorisations, with the number of primarily tactical or operational methods in IDMP being relatively balanced and DMAP including more operational than tactical methods. The operational methods in DMAP match those in JMAP. Indeed, all 15 methods assessed in Table 2 as being ‘discussed primarily in terms of operational application’ are included in both JMAP and DMAP. Of the seven tactical methods in DMAP, three were in SMAP (serials 21, 22 and 60), one was in CMAP, IMAP and SMAP (serial 76), one was in IMAP and SMAP (serial 36) and two were not in any previous planning processes (serials 52 and 69).

Table 3. Number of methods per planning process, grouped by primary focus of methods
Description of method is primarily … Number of methods in CMAP Number of methods in IMAP Number of methods in SMAP Number of methods in JMAP Number of methods in IDMP Number of methods in DMAP
Tactical 5
(28%)		 14
(35%)		 19
(34%)		 0
(0%)		 3
(14%)		 7
(13%)
Operational 0
(0%)		 0
(0%)		 4
(7%)		 15
(31%)		 4
(19%)		 15
(27%)
Both 13
(72%)		 26
(65%)		 33
(59%)		 34
(69%)		 14
(67%)		 34
(61%)
Categorisation Exclusively dual/tactical Exclusively dual/tactical Primarily dual/tactical with some operational Exclusively dual/ operational Primarily dual with balanced operational/ tactical Primarily dual/ operational with some tactical
Level Tactical Tactical Primarily tactical Operational Dual Primarily operational

This quantitative analysis identifies that JMAP and DMAP much more closely align than SMAP and DMAP. It is therefore likely that JMAP was much more influential on DMAP’s development. Where changes have occurred between JMAP and DMAP, they have tended to incorporate tactical methods into what was previously an exclusively operational planning process. As a result of being optimised for neither tactical nor operational level planning, DMAP represents at once a ‘tactification’ of the ADF’s joint operational art and a removal of tactically focused methods from Army’s planning toolkit. This is most likely due to the integration of all ADF doctrine into a single series that attempts to address all domains. The integration of planning processes that were previously intended to serve different organisational purposes at different levels and in different operational environments has been achieved at the cost of the new processes being suboptimal at both levels.

Turning to the three processes intended for use by individual commanders (CMAP, IMAP and IDMP), quantitative analysis shows foremost that IMAP was (as it claimed to be) a downscaled version of SMAP that could be completed by an individual commander rather than requiring a staff. Of IMAP’s 40 methods, only three were not also included in SMAP (serials 15, 71 and 79). This is because all three had replaced others in SMAP that required more than one person to adequately complete (respectively serials 77, 72, and both 17 and 60). IMAP and SMAP were therefore very similar. The former was very much the individual version of the latter.

Unlike IMAP and SMAP, CMAP and IDMP are unique—both compared to each other and among all of the other planning processes assessed. CMAP was specifically designed for small-scale tactical decision-making. As shown in Table 3, five (28 per cent) of its included methods were primarily tactical in focus, and the other 13 (72 per cent) had a dual tactical/operational focus. This dual focus is due to these methods featuring in multiple planning processes; all are described exclusively in tactical terms within CMAP. Variations of all 18 methods contained in CMAP are also contained in other processes: all 18 were found in either IMAP, SMAP or both; and 11 were also found in JMAP, albeit that JMAP’s description of these methods upscaled them for operational rather than tactical application. In the 10 instances where the same method appears in CMAP and IDMP (serials 1, 10, 12, 16, 18, 27, 30, 48, 58 and 80), discussion of this method within IDMP more closely aligns with that contained in one or more of the other processes that also feature that method. It is therefore likely that CMAP was not extensively considered during the development of IDMP. IDMP is intended for flexible application either tactically or operationally and, as summarised above, for use either independently or to enable a commander to formulate guidance for a planning staff that is using DMAP. IDMP’s predominance of dual-focused methods, accompanied by an approximate balance between methods described primarily tactically and methods described primarily operationally, reflects this dual intention.

Between them, IDMP and DMAP introduce seven new methods that were not in any previous process. Of these, three are dual focus (serials 2, 11 and 40) and four are tactical (serials 9, 52, 61 and 69).[24] This finding adds weight to the above observation that the new processes represent a tactification of the ADF’s operational art. Two of the new tactical methods are in IDMP (serials 9 and 61) and two are in DMAP (serials 52 and 69). Although none of the new tactical methods overlap processes, serial 69 is the staff version of serial 9’s method for individual commanders. Serial 46 is the only legacy primarily tactical method in IDMP. Serials 24, 39, 55 and 68 are the only four legacy primarily operational methods in IDMP. All of these serials are also contained in JMAP and DMAP, but only one (serial 55) is also found in SMAP. Of the 14 dual-focused methods contained in IDMP, one is new (serial 11), one is also found in CMAP, IMAP and SMAP (serial 12), and the others are also in one or more of the three previous Army planning processes and also in JMAP (serials 1, 10, 16, 18, 27, 30, 31, 35, 48, 50, 58 and 80). From this data, it is difficult to determine whether IDMP was influenced more prominently by SMAP, JMAP or both, or whether it was developed relatively independently.

Qualitative Analysis

Whereas the preceding quantitative analysis was based on the number and focus of methods in each planning process, the following qualitative analysis is instead based on content interpretation, examining factors such as the relative prominence of methods, and the coherence of the processes holistically.[25] This mode of comparison between Decision-Making and Planning Processes and the two doctrine publications it replaced leads to four significant observations about the focus of the new publication, and another five about the processes themselves.

The first focus-related observation was previously deduced using quantitative analysis: the new doctrine represents a tactification of the ADF’s joint operational art. Qualitative analysis adds an additional dimension by enabling assessment of the relative prominence of different methods. For instance, relative to JMAP, DMAP de-emphasises the production and refinement of one of the key domain-agnostic, operationally-focused methods: specifically, the lines of operation diagram. Instead, it emphasises the importance of producing an outline sketch. Although DMAP includes a paragraph about how an outline sketch may be used at the operational level, the rest of the five-page explanation of this method is primarily tactical, and the two examples given are exclusive to the land domain.[26] Another example of this shift in focus is in DMAP’s section on how to develop COAs at different levels. Considerations for developing operational-level COAs are summarised in a single page, while considerations for developing tactical COAs are given 3.5 pages.[27] Although operationally focused methods are included throughout DMAP, as these examples illustrate, they have often been de-emphasised relative to tactically-focused methods.

Second, the new doctrine is commander-centric rather than staff-centric, which is a key point of departure from both SMAP and JMAP. This change in focus manifests in the inclusion of greatly expanded ‘commander’s direction and guidance’ between each DMAP step. How a commander ought to develop and deliver this guidance is contained in a new chapter bearing this title. In summary, this new chapter explains that the commander needs to understand the situation, visualise options, describe responses, then direct action.[28] IDMP is the means by which the commander does this.

Although CMAP and IMAP were designed for use by individual tactical commanders, these processes were nowhere near as versatile as IDMP, which has filled a hitherto significant gap at the operational level while maintaining tactical-level coverage. In the words of the new doctrine’s author, Major General Michael Krause:

if you remember in the [previous version of the] MAP, it’s got one little paragraph in there that says, ‘the commander can abbreviate this process’ … and it never tells you how. This new [doctrine] does.[29]

General Krause also explained that discussion of the commander’s enhanced role was included following feedback on an earlier draft from Lieutenant General Greg Bilton, who was then Commander Joint Operations Command. Having worked in proximity to both generals, this author knows firsthand how engaged they both are as commanders. However, as a staff officer, this author has also worked in proximity to a range of commanders who were relatively disengaged. As a result, one is left wondering if, in closing a gap in the old doctrine, the current doctrine has opened a new gap, that being provision of guidance for staff officers about what to do if they work for a disengaged commander. In theory, this ought not to happen. Commanders ought to be as engaged as the doctrine specifies. Alas, reality may sometimes differ, and guidance on how to address this would have been a valuable addition.

Closely related to the increased role of the commander is the third substantial difference between the new doctrine and its predecessors. This is the greater emphasis placed on speed and intuition relative to analysis in decision-making. This is particularly the case in IDMP, which uses pattern matching as its key intuitive decision-making tool.[30] This method has not been included in any previous ADF planning doctrine; nor is it included in key allied planning doctrine publications.[31] It is therefore one of the most unique and innovative aspects of the new doctrine. In a doctrinal rarity, the section of IDMP that explains pattern matching includes two citations of source material. One citation is an academic journal article in the field of cognitive psychology. It argues that the outcomes of naturalistic decision-making research indicate ways to enhance intuitive decision-making, and proposes how these findings may be applied within cognitive psychology’s other sub-fields. Of direct relevance to military decision-making is its finding that multiple variants of ‘tactical decision games’ (what the Australian Army calls ‘quick decision exercises’) enhance tacit knowledge, which in turn aids intuitive decision-making.[32] The other citation is a military journal article that proposes the use of pattern matching to enhance tactical adaptation, arguing that a training approach that mixes deliberate practice, metacognition and emotional intelligence would help to build such recognition.[33] Both IDMP and the chapter on training commanders and staff to plan incorporate these papers’ findings.[34]

Given the substantial difference between pattern matching and methods previously included in ADF planning doctrine, it is noteworthy that its inclusion does not appear to have been preceded by any kind of trial application within the ADF. This is, to an extent, offset by testing that has occurred in other fields and in allied militaries.[35] However, this is not the same as testing it in ADF-specific conditions. Training commanders to effectively use this type of decision-making method requires an approach that incorporates multiple exposures to different scenarios, to enable them to build a mental library of experiences that can be combined to allow rapid recognition of different pattern types in chaotic, emerging situations. This is different to how the ADF has previously trained commanders to plan, and successfully implementing it will require a significant adjustment to how the ADF trains its personnel. The ADF’s training approach will need to move from fewer iterations involving detailed analytical decision-making, to many more iterations focusing on snap decision-making. As a result, it is likely that a post-publication adjustment period will now need to occur to align ADF training to its new doctrinal methods. Care needs to be taken not only to ensure that feedback is then incorporated into the next planning doctrine review but also to ensure that if the method is a good one but poorly implemented, the methodological baby is not thrown out with the pedagogical bathwater.[36]

A further difficulty may arise from the application of this method at the operational level. As the papers cited in the doctrine indicate, prior application of pattern-matching methods has occurred at the tactical level, where it enables commanders to make faster decisions than those strictly applying analytical methods. Pattern matching is therefore a tactically focused method. At the tactical level, it has been observed that ‘units simply do not train collectively often enough to give leaders the necessary repetitions to develop adaptive expertise’.[37] Although this deficiency can be overcome by ‘critical event training’, all available examples of critical event training are also tactical in nature; none are at the operational level. Even in a single domain, it takes a tactical commander multiple repetitions to optimise performance. While operational-level commanders could potentially use their judgement to adapt the method to their specific requirements, neither Decision-Making and Planning Processes nor prior examples of the method’s application that were detailed in the other cited sources offer explicit guidance on how to successfully achieve this.

Furthermore, at the operational level, no single commander is an expert across all domains. As Colin Powell famously put it, ‘joint warfare is team warfare’.[38] This is because to succeed, it has to be. Operational planning therefore lends itself to a collaborative and analytical approach, even by a commander. This reality was observed in a major study of British commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq, which found (though not uncritically) evidence of a collaborative command approach emerging due to the complex nature of multi-domain, whole-of-government counterinsurgency operations in those conflicts.[39] Indeed, one of the key evolutions in military planning that resulted from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan stemmed from recognition that commanders and staff are susceptible to misunderstanding the nature of unfamiliar problems and misdirecting planning efforts if they do not first consciously analyse the nature of the environment and the problem they should be trying to solve. From the late 2000s, design methods were included in operational planning processes alongside operational art, in an effort to address this issue.[40] This observation is not to suggest that pattern matching should be removed from the doctrine. On the contrary, it provides a method to address what was previously a doctrinal gap. However, in future iterations of IDMP, pattern matching could be supplemented at the operational level by inclusion of a suitable design method for commanders to confirm that their intuitive response has led to a correct assessment of the environment and the problem needing to be solved. The ‘framing’ and ‘reassess the situation’ elements of IDMP currently allude to this type of consideration but do not include an explicit method to enable it.

The fourth significant change in focus is that the new doctrine is forward focused, whereas the doctrine it replaced was present focused. Most doctrine has a present focus. It captures and disseminates what is currently considered institutional best practice. On occasion, however, doctrine can be forward focused, providing guidance for short-term institutional change to a different way of doing business. Doctrine of the latter type is rare, but, if implemented well, it can spur significant organisational change. Successful examples include the ‘AirLand Battle’ doctrine that set the US Army up for success in the 1990–91 Gulf War, and the Australian Army’s ‘Military Operations in the Littoral Environment’ doctrine that set it up for success during Operation Warden in East Timor.[41]

Decision-Making and Planning Processes is forward focused because it intends to bring about a change in how ADF personnel plan and make decisions. Where it differs from the examples just mentioned is that they were a part of broader institutional change that was already occurring. As such, they provided solutions to already identified problems. In contrast, Decision-Making and Planning Processes has initiated the need for such change. This situation presents a risk to its successful implementation, and indicates that a unified approach is required across training establishments to mitigate said risk. Perhaps in anticipation of this need, the doctrine includes a chapter discussing training of both commanders and staff; however, this is only five pages and is limited to highlighting requirements.[42] Development of this unified approach could take the form of a miniature version of the Ryan Review, with a narrower focus limited to planning and decision-making.[43]

In addition to these four significant observations about the focus of the new doctrine, several other observations can be made about the processes themselves. The most significant of these is bland and editorial in nature. This observation is that the new processes, DMAP in particular, contain several minor inconsistences and internal contrasts that probably result from insufficient editorial review prior to publication.

Examples are numerous. For instance, there is ongoing use of old terminology in some places. JMAP’s ‘decisive points’ have been renamed ‘decisive actions’ in DMAP, but the term ‘decisive points’ remains in some places.[44] Use of the term ‘conops’ remains in Chapter 9 in reference to a JMAP output that has been removed from DMAP.[45] It is implied in IDMP that establishing the desired end state now occurs in this process, but DMAP has not been changed to reflect this, with occasional references to establishing the end state within DMAP remaining unchanged from those in JMAP.[46] A different editorial issue is that numbered sub-steps are included in the scoping and framing and in the mission analysis DMAP steps, but not in the COA development and analysis step. They are also missing from a few places in the other steps. This indicates that where content was included relatively unchanged from the previous JMAP the sub-step numbering has been retained, but this was not standardised in places where new content was added. Diagrams and tables also present inconsistencies. On page 96, a table containing consequence descriptions omits minor and moderate risks, even though these are discussed throughout the corresponding text.[47] On page 70, a figure shows friendly actors in red and adversaries in blue.[48] Finally from an editorial perspective, annex numbers cited in text differ from those of the annexes themselves, some paragraph headings are not bolded, and occasionally section headings are not standardised.

The cumulative effect of these editorial issues is unfortunately greater than the sum of its parts, making DMAP unnecessarily difficult to understand. Fortunately, their editorial nature also makes these issues easy to fix. Such amendments are common within doctrine. The previous JMAP doctrine is illustrative. For similar reasons, its 2015 edition was amended twice within 18 months of publication.[49] Even if no other aspect of its content is changed, publication by year’s end of an amended version of Decision-Making and Planning Processes that addresses its editorial problems would be highly beneficial.

Other observations about the planning processes are more conceptual in nature. One regards how much of DMAP occurs in mission analysis relative to the other steps. Looking at previous editions of JMAP, there is evidence of considerable ‘mission analysis creep’ over time. In its first (2009) edition, JMAP contained a rough content balance between the three steps mission analysis, COA development and (the then-separate step) COA analysis.[50] In its second (2015) edition, centre of gravity analysis, establishing objectives and decisive points, and developing lines of operation were moved from COA development to the previous step, mission analysis. The stated rationale was that ‘the completion of operational design within the first two steps of a five-step planning process addresses the need to develop a broad plan quickly’.[51] As a result, in the 2015 edition of JMAP, over 40 per cent of the planning sub-steps occurred in mission analysis.[52] In DMAP, production of an outline sketch has also been added as an additional mission analysis output, because ‘by being the basis of the [mission analysis] brief to the commander the output [of the brief] is a clear direction that significantly accelerates [COA development and analysis]’.[53] In the case of both the 2015 edition of JMAP and the newly published DMAP, the push to complete products quickly has led to a shuffling of proverbial deckchairs that probably does not actually change how long the entire process takes. Where DMAP is an improvement over its predecessor is that it acknowledges this and proposes an actual shortcut: ‘In many cases, a good sketch and statement can be immediately developed into orders, saving a great deal of time’.[54] In essence, it is now up to the commander to decide whether COA development and analysis is required at all, based on their assessment of situational requirements and associated risks.

The inclusion of two new chapters in Decision-Making and Planning Processes usefully addresses some topics that were omitted from the previous doctrine publications. Chapter 8 discusses how to effectively adapt a plan during implementation, elaborating methods that support this.[55] Chapter 9, titled ‘Plan development and implementation’, discusses aspects of a plan that could be included in annexes, branch plans, sequels, etc., such as sustainment and logistics requirements. Some of the methods included in this chapter, such as event overlays, derive from SMAP; however, much of its discussion is new material, and inclusion of this new material is likely to benefit specialist staff who are required to support the planning effort. Further, a lot of it captures lessons identified during ADF operations over the last few decades. Examples of this include discussions concerning planning considerations for force rotations; movement planning; and reception, staging, onward movement and integration of personnel.[56] Overall, inclusion of these chapters is likely to enhance planning outcomes.

A third process-related observation is that more actions are explicitly stated as being continuous throughout the planning process, rather than occurring in a single step. Although SMAP and JMAP were both explicitly non-linear—with planners encouraged to revisit, remove or change the sequence of steps to suit situational needs—they contained very little that was designed to be continually updated. DMAP, on the other hand, specifies that commander and staff estimates, risk assessments, and critical facts and assumptions all need to be constantly revised and updated. This is in addition to DMAP having enhanced the non-linearity of the process itself by expanding the explanation of how and when commanders should give directions to subordinates to abbreviate or skip steps.[57] The outcome of this change is greater flexibility in process application, and increased potential for rapid decision-making. The accompanying risk is that staff may get distracted from analysis by the need to update multiple outputs concurrently. The commander or chief of staff will need to ensure this risk is managed, and training in the use of the process needs to emphasise the requirement for ongoing analysis, rather than merely ensuring staff update briefing products.

The final process-related observation is also the most significant. IDMP and DMAP are the most uniquely Australian planning processes in ADF history. Until now, both Australian Army and ADF joint planning processes have remained conceptually close to their allied equivalents. Hitherto, the biggest conceptual change in Australian planning doctrine was the promulgation of the MAP in the late 1990s.[58] This development shifted Australian Army and ADF joint planning processes away from the British planning doctrine they had previously mirrored, and moved them conceptually towards mirroring US planning doctrine instead. But, despite this change, Australian planning doctrine nevertheless remained similar to an allied equivalent. DMAP and, particularly, IDMP break this trend. Despite their author’s assertion that ‘JP 5 is the US joint planning doctrine. It was by my side when I wrote this … the other one I had was the NATO planning doctrine’,[59] Decision-Making and Planning Processes is substantially different to both of these allied planning processes. This difference becomes quickly apparent when all three doctrine publications are evaluated together.[60] The key factors in this divergence are the changed focus areas and amended process aspects described above. None of these aspects of Decision-Making and Planning Processes are reflective of allied joint doctrine.

This unique aspect of the new doctrine is particularly important for the Australian Army profession. On one hand, it represents a significant milestone in the ADF’s conceptual and doctrinal development as an independent, mature force. It also has implications for Australian sovereignty, representing an increased willingness to think independently about the nature of war and the requirements of the core aspect of the Army profession, the management of violence. On the other hand, the lack of institutional debate surrounding this development indicates that the broader implications of the new doctrine may not yet have been fully grasped across the ADF. Despite assertions that personnel familiar with IDMP and DMAP will be able to integrate into coalition headquarters as effectively as personnel trained in the processes they replaced, the available evidence (albeit anecdotal) indicates the existence of latent risk. Australian personnel in embedded roles have tended to bring an approach to planning that is analytical rather than merely being ‘PowerPoint deep’. With IDMP and DMAP emphasising rapid intuitive decision-making and encouraging truncation or outright skipping of process steps—even during initial training in their use—it is possible that the ADF’s analytical edge in coalition headquarters may become blunted. This is not to say that the ADF should return to the previous status quo. Rather, it highlights another risk that will need to be mitigated when developing and delivering training in the use of the new planning processes.

Conclusion

By analysing Decision-Making and Planning Processes comparatively to the doctrine publications it replaced, this paper has identified several ways in which the ADF’s new tactical and operational planning processes have conceptually evolved. In several cases, these evolutions constitute genuine innovations, to the extent that IDMP and DMAP are the most novel planning processes ever included in Australian Army or ADF joint planning doctrine. The new approach to planning is not, however, without risk, and several areas of the new doctrine may require revision following a period of trial and testing. Foremost, an amendment is required to fix several minor editorial issues that together make the new doctrine difficult to read. This amendment should be prioritised for release by the end of this calendar year.

Beyond editorial issues, this paper’s analysis of the focus, content and implementation of IDMP and DMAP enables several recommendations to be made. The first concerns the balance between tactical and operational needs. The task of integrating two previous planning doctrine publications, one with a land domain tactical focus and the other with a multi-domain operational focus, was never going to be easy. Decision-Making and Planning Processes has understandably opted for a middle ground, and seems to have achieved this to the greatest degree possible. But in doing so it is not optimised for planning at either level. The result is the simultaneous tactification of the ADF’s operational art and the removal of several tactical planning methods from doctrine. This issue is of sufficient significance that consideration should be given to whether integrated operational and tactical planning processes are actually appropriate or whether—in future—the ADF should (once again) produce separate operational and tactical planning processes. Some chapters in the current doctrine that explain DMAP steps include annexes addressing land and maritime domain specific tactical considerations.[61] If an integrated doctrinal approach is to be retained, these annexes indicate a possible way forward. Specifically, for each DMAP step, a chapter could describe methods generically, with five separate annexes to each chapter detailing how to apply each step tactically within each domain (land, maritime, air, space and cyber), and a sixth detailing how to apply it operationally across all domains. Implementing this proposal would necessitate inclusion of several additional annexes.

Beyond the content of the doctrine, consideration must be given to how personnel can be successfully trained to apply the new planning processes. Key content changes from previous doctrine include that the new doctrine is commander-centric rather than staff-centric; it increases the importance of speed and intuition relative to analysis in decision-making; it contains an expanded number of outputs that are ongoing concurrently to all planning steps; and it more easily enables the commander to flexibly abridge or skip large parts of the process if they determine that the situation warrants this. All of these aspects will require a very different training approach to that used to teach the previous planning doctrine. A unified approach to training personnel across service and joint training establishments is likely to enhance overall outcomes. In the short term, there is an urgent need to establish a bridging course for personnel appointed as commanders who have completed their training using the previous doctrine. Priority needs to be given to establishing such a course and providing it with adequate resourcing.

Pattern matching is arguably the most significant new method contained in Decision-Making and Planning Processes. It constitutes a fundamental change in how ADF doctrine conceptualises decision-making. Importantly, it is key to enabling IDMP to fill what was previously a doctrinal gap, as it provides guidance to commanders about how to direct and guide planning staffs. While there is evidence of the utility of pattern matching at the tactical level, these findings have not yet been replicated at the operational level. Indeed, there is limited evidence to suggest that at the operational level, pattern matching may result in ADF commanders and staff seeing familiar problems when they are in fact confronting novelty, and they may attempt to solve the wrong operational problems as a result.[62] Further research is therefore urgently required to establish whether this decision-making model is appropriate at the operational level. The findings of this research should be incorporated into the next edition of the doctrine.

Finally, this paper’s most significant observation is that the two new planning processes, IDMP and DMAP, are the most uniquely Australian planning processes in ADF history. Their domestic pedigree is a significant milestone for the Army profession, and indeed for the ADF as a whole, as they constitute a major step forward in the ADF’s evolution as an independent, mature military force. Returning to the roots of the Army profession—as defined by Huntington and those who followed him—planning military activities is at the very core of the profession. Accordingly, this paper’s analysis, and the resulting recommendations, have been made in the spirit of aiding the application of the ADF’s new planning doctrine, as well as enhancing its future iterations. It is sincerely hoped that further analysis will follow from other quarters.

Endnotes

[1] Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 8.

[2] Ibid., p. 11.

[3] Edward M Coffman, ‘The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State’, The Journal of Military History 55, no. 1 (1995): 69–82.

[4] Winthrop Hackett, The Profession of Arms: The 1962 Lees Knowles Lectures given at Trinity College, Cambridge (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007).

[5] Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[6] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[7] Richard M Swin and Albert C Pierce, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2017), pp. 15–26; Mick Ryan, ‘Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part I: The Enduring Nature’, War on the Rocks, 8 February 2017, at: https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/mastering-the-profession-of-arms-part-i-the-enduring-nature/.

[8] Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force—Integration—5—Decision-Making and Planning Processes, 1st edition (Canberra: Directorate of Communications, Change and Corporate Graphics & Doctrine Directorate, 2024), p. iv.

[9] Markus Mäder, In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence: The Evolution of British Military-Strategic Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era, 1989–2002, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy No. 13 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004), p. 22.

[10] Department of Defence (2024), p. iv. The prior publications were Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process, 2nd edition, Amendment List 3 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2019); Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4—The Military Appreciation Process (Canberra: Australian Army, 2015).

[11] Department of Defence (2024), chapter 3.

[12] Ibid., chapters 2 and 10.

[13] Ibid., chapter 5.

[14] Ibid., chapter 6.

[15] Ibid., chapter 7.

[16] Ibid., p. 11.

[17] Ibid., pp. 203–214.

[18] Ibid., pp. 36–37.

[19] Jonathon W Moses and Torbjørn L Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2007), pp. 3–8.

[20] Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force—Integration—0—Headquarters and Staff Functions, 1st edition (Canberra: Directorate of Information, Graphics and eResources & Lessons and Doctrine Directorate, 2022), pp. 50–68.

[21] Department of Defence (2024), p. 10.

[22] This paper uses the doctrinal definitions of these levels, which has remained consistent between two of the three doctrine publications reviewed. The ‘tactical level’ is ‘the level at which actions are planned and executed to accomplish operational objectives’. The ‘operational level’ is ‘the level at which campaigns and operations are planned and conducted to accomplish strategic objectives’. Department of Defence (2024), pp. 256–258; Department of Defence (2019), pp. viii–x. Though these terms are not defined in the third doctrine publication reviewed, Army’s Military Appreciation Process, it nevertheless uses them in a manner consistent with the definitions given in the other publications.

[23] Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Newport RI: US Naval War College, 2007), pp. VII.73–VII.119.

[24] This assessment is exclusively based on the description of each method within the doctrine, wherein serials 9, 52, 61 and 69 are described exclusively in highly localised temporal and spatial terms, indicating their tactical applicability. In theory, each of these four methods could be adapted for operational-level application; however, how this adaptation may occur is not discussed in the doctrine. Successful adaptation would therefore rely on extra-doctrinal training or experience, a factor that is deliberately excluded from this paper’s analysis.

[25] Florian Kohlbacher, ‘The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research’, Forum: Qualitative Social Research 7, no. 1 (2006): 10–22.

[26] Department of Defence (2024), pp. 130–135.

[27] Ibid., pp. 157–161.

[28] Ibid., chapter 4.

[29] Michael Krause, ‘CoveTalk: 5 Brigade: Decision Making and Planning Process’ (video), The Cove, 4 March 2025, at: https://cove.army.gov.au/article/covetalk-5-brigade-decision-making-and-planning-process-video.

[30] Department of Defence (2024), p. 26.

[31] US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0—Joint Planning (Washington DC: US Department of Defence, 2020); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication-5—Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, Edition A Version 2 (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2019).

[32] Gary Klein, ‘A Naturalistic Decision Making Perspective on Studying Intuitive Decision Making’, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 4, no. 3 (2015): 164–168.

[33] Trent J Lythgoe, ‘Coup d’œil and Cognition: How to Build Adaptive Tactical Experts’, Military Review, March-April 2023: 95–107.

[34] Department of Defence (2024), chapters 3 and 10.

[35] K Anders Ericsson, ‘Deliberate Practice and Acquisition of Expert Performance: A General Overview’, Academic Emergency Medicine 15, no. 11 (2008): 988–994; James W Lussier and Scott B Shadrick, Adaptive Thinking Training for Tactical Leaders (Fort Knox KY: US Army Research Institute, 2004).

[36] Aaron P Jackson, ‘The Nature of Military Doctrine: A Decade of Study in 1500 Words’, The Strategy Bridge, 15 November 2017, at: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/15/the-nature-of-military-doctrine-a-decade-of-study-in-1500-words.

[37] Lythgoe, ‘Coup d’œil and Cognition’, pp. 104–105.

[38] Colin Powell, Message from the Chairman: Joint Warfare Is Team Warfare (US Joint Chief of Staff memorandum dated 11 November 1991), at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1325139/to-the-editor/.

[39] Anthony King, Command: The Twenty-First Century General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 8–26.

[40] Ben Zweibelson, Understanding the Military Design Movement: War, Change and Innovation (London: Routledge, 2023), pp. 160–203.

[41] Jackson, ‘The Nature of Military Doctrine’.

[42] Department of Defence (2024), chapter 10.

[43] The Ryan Review examined the Australian Army’s education, training and doctrine systems, their history, evolution, strengths and weaknesses, and made several recommendations to reform them. Importantly, it examined these systems and their interrelationships holistically rather than in isolation. Mick Ryan, The Ryan Review: A Study of Army’s Education, Training and Doctrine Needs for the Future (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016).

[44] Department of Defence (2024), pp. 69, 191, 250, 255, 257.

[45] Ibid., chapter 9.

[46] Ibid., pp. 6, 28, 38–39, 57–58, 67–69.

[47] Ibid., annex 5F.

[48] Ibid., p. 70.

[49] Department of Defence (2019), p. vi.

[50] Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process, 1st edition (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009).

[51] Aaron P Jackson, ‘Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art’, Security Challenges 13, vol. 1 (2017): 70.

[52] Department of Defence (2019).

[53] Department of Defence (2024), p. 131.

[54] Ibid., p. 131.

[55] Ibid., chap 8.

[56] Ibid., chapter 9.

[57] Ibid., pp. 76–77, 87–94, 102–104.

[58] Australian Army, Training Information Bulletin 74—The Military Appreciation Process (Interim Publication) (Sydney: Headquarters Training Command, 1996); Department of Defence, Joint Military Appreciation Process (Interim Publication) (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1998).

[59] Krause, ‘CoveTalk: 5 Brigade: Decision Making and Planning Process’.

[60] The relevant allied publications are US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations.

[61] Department of Defence (2024), annexes 4A, 4B, 4C, 5C and 5D

[62] King, Command; Zweibelson, Understanding the Military Design Movement.