De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023, ISBN 9783110657258, 471 pp, RRP EUR€84.95 (hardcover)
Edited by: Mark Charles Fissel
Reviewed by: Nick Bosio
Many commentators view the concepts of military revolutions and revolutions in military affairs (RMA) as synonymous with technological advantage. A cursory view of these concepts assumes that advanced technology drives military development. Under this simple view, the military that harnesses technology more quickly than its opponent will achieve superiority. Commentators who take this view then assert that technology equates to decisive victory. Fortunately, Mark Fissel’s edited book The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs does not fall into this trap.
Fissel’s book takes a fresh approach to exploring military revolutions and RMA. Most of the text focuses on military revolutions and their interplay with politics, society, culture and the harnessing of national power. The book takes a broader view compared to other works by exploring different regions and periods, emphasising Eastern European, Ottoman/Türkiye and North Asian military revolutions. Much of the text reinforces three themes relevant to any military practitioner wishing to understand the interplay between technology and military power.
The first central theme is that military culture influences technological use. The work compares the gunpowder military revolutions in Western Europe, North-East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire. It explains that nations of the time understood the relevant technologies, their benefits and how others used such advances. Nevertheless, each case showed a very different interpretation and implementation of capability.
Hyeok Kang’s chapter is highly illustrative of this first theme. Kang’s chapter, ‘Difference in an Age of Parity’, discusses musketry development, use and training. Kang highlights how the West was capable of crafting precision muskets for hunting, yet the West’s military culture emphasised military mass in combat. In the gunpowder era, this culture manifested as weight of firepower through mass-produced weaponry. Such weapons were individually less accurate but faster to reload and easier to train. East Asia, with a culture of individual martial excellence, focused instead on precision fire using exquisitely crafted weapons. Kang’s case studies, and others throughout the book, show how different military cultures often use the same technology in different ways. Therefore, understanding military culture helps one interpret how one’s own nation—and others—may apply technology. Already contemporary military cultural differences see different nations emphasising and using emergent technology, such as drones and artificial intelligence, in divergent ways. Understanding military culture may also give insights into future adaptations by allies, partners and possible malign states. The importance of military culture is not the only theme within this text.
The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs outlines the importance of political and social culture and context. While military culture may influence the use of technology, several authors explain how political and social culture influences technology’s acceptance. Of the book’s chapters, Wayne Lee’s chapter, ‘To Stop a Cannonball: Ottoman Fortress Design and Comparing Military Revolutions’, best demonstrates this theme. Lee explains several factors that influenced Ottoman strategic and military thinking. First was the need to manage a large empire. Next, the Ottoman Empire was reliant on centralised control from Istanbul. Such a centralised system created economic inefficiencies but was necessary to manage different political groups within the empire. Finally, the Ottomans had a military culture of swift offensive action.
Lee outlines how the Ottomans understood all the technological developments occurring in Western and Asian nations. Further, the Ottomans recognised the need to fortify their frontier. However, such fortifications rarely leveraged the technological advances seen in Western, and later Asian, nations. The decision not to integrate or upgrade military infrastructure was partly based on the main threat faced by the Ottomans: insurgencies within provinces. Another reason was the difficulty of disseminating design and technological knowledge across the empire. For cultural reasons, there was limited use of the printing press and perspective drawing. These limitations hindered the widespread promotion of knowledge of new technological methods. Instead, Ottomans often held centrally controlled scale models, or replicated designs by hand. Such replication was time and cost intensive. Lee’s analysis clarifies how a nation’s decisions on technology are grounded as much in political, economic and societal culture as in military culture. Therefore, studying a nation’s socio-political culture and economic context helps military officers understand what technology is likely to be accepted, how that acceptance may be enhanced, and how the technology could be used beyond the military sector. As Kang states in his chapter:
The difference … stemmed not from an incommensurable gap (or ‘divergence’) in drill and training … but from a certain ‘interpretation’ of technology that shaped (and was being shaped by) its surrounding context, social and cultural as well as political, economic, and aesthetic.[1]
The final theme that reading The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs makes clear is how technology can also be a weakness. Technology may give a military, and by extension a nation, an edge in war. However, technology can also become a crutch. Nations and militaries must be careful not to become over-reliant on specific capabilities. Such over-reliance leads to second- and third-order adverse effects on logistics, industry, the economy, and potentially society. Although discussed by several authors within the book, this theme is best seen in James O’Neill’s analysis of the military revolution in Ireland during the early and mid-17th century.
O’Neill’s chapter, ‘Firearms and Fieldworks: Military Transformation and the End of the Gaelic Ireland’, discusses two points. The first is that middle and small powers can leverage military revolutions to defeat larger powers tactically. This lesson has relevance to Australia. However, the second point is just as pertinent and is a recurring theme in this book and history: technology can lead to military weakness. O’Neill explains how the Irish readily adapted the pike and shotte technology (capability) and tactics more quickly than early English forces. Irish political leaders and society embraced such capabilities, including limited manufacture. This enabled technology acceptance. However, without considering the second- or third-order effects, the Irish became fixated on gunpowder and its tactics without developing robust logistics and national systems to support its use. When the English finally targeted this weakness, English victory became inevitable, even though the English were not as superior in capability or the military arts. As O’Neill states:
The dramatic and enthusiastic adoption of firearms and firepower dominated [Irish] warfare … However, their rapid change also planted the seeds for Irish defeat … Irish had come to depend almost completely on gunpowder, without which the thousands of Irish guns become just so many expensive clubs.[2]
Over-reliance on select capabilities has been seen throughout history. For example, Israeli over-reliance on tanks and strike craft post the Six-Day War, at the expense of other arms and military arts, contributed to the surprise and early losses in the Yom Kippur War.
This book also includes some unique discussions on military revolutions. The abovementioned chapter on Irish military revolutions is a valuable case study for a small to middle power. Noting the capability risks identified above, the case study explores how small powers can adapt technology, adjust culture and enhance national power to achieve disproportionate outcomes. Vladimir Shirogorov writes about the development of amphibious warfare and technology. His chapter provides a useful foundation for anyone interested in exploring the different ways to think about littoral and amphibious operations. Finally, Fissel provides a chapter that helps scholars and practitioners understand the links between historical case studies and contemporary thinking concerning technology, military revolutions and RMA.
Advocates for RMA often over-emphasise the benefits of technology and minimise the importance of culture and national power. The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs takes a broader view. It captures the themes of how military culture influences the use of technology, how political and societal culture influences the acceptance of technology, and how technology over-reliance can lead to national weakness.
The lessons one can draw from The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs are critical for the profession of arms. Whether it is within military education, capability development, training and doctrine, or in the development of future warfighting concepts, military professionals should remember the importance of culture and context. Often culture and context drive technology acceptance and use. Technology will either be ignored or become a tactical fascination without cultural support. Tactical fascinations often lead to technological weakness and, as seen with the Irish, can result in strategic risk and failure.
Endnotes
[1] Mark Charles Fissel, The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023), p. 58.
[2] Ibid., p. 200.
