Introduction
The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) brought Australia’s strategic context into sharp focus. As a rising power, China is challenging the rules-based global order, and great power competition threatens Australia’s national interests. Australia faces the most challenging set of strategic circumstances since the Second World War, making the potential for short-warning large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in the Indo-Pacific a real possibility.[1] The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) sought to action the recommendations of the DSR and to clarify the Army’s role as the integrated force’s experts in land combat—a force that must be prepared to project and sustain land forces into the littoral regions to Australia’s north.[2] Despite increasing dialogue around the likelihood of conflict in the region, and shifting force structure and posture to meet the threat, a significant gap remains in literature and practice concerning prisoner of war, internee and detainee (PWID) activities. While PWID activities have been an enduring aspect of war throughout human history, and recognised as strategically important, there has been a continual under-prioritisation by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for the preparation and conduct of effective PWID activities.[3] To succeed in completing the missions and tasks set out in the DSR and the NDS, the ADF, and specifically the Army, should plan and prepare for PWID activities in a forward-deployed context. Such preparations must consider all phases of operations from the point of capture through to repatriation and how this will be achieved in conjunction with allies and partners.
‘PWID activities’ refers to the process of depriving individuals of their liberty during conflict.[4] These activities play a critical role in combat because they remove enemy troops from the battlefield, thus supporting the maintenance of operational tempo. They enable the collection of information to produce intelligence and ensure the security and humane treatment of PWIDs.[5] Credible PWID activities support post-conflict repatriation and reintegration, and pave the way for a return to normality and long-term stability. Further, PWID activities set the conditions for the investigation and prosecution of enemy combatants suspected of war crimes. Effective PWID activities require significant force preparation, planning, synchronisation and resources to overcome operational friction while ensuring compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC).
Poorly planned and executed PWID activities present several risks, ranging from the tactical to strategic levels. Insufficient LOAC training, confusing rules of engagement and inadequate tactics, techniques and procedures threaten the efficiency of PWID activities at the point of capture—the time that carries the most tactical risk to individuals and the mission due to fog and friction. At the operational level, LOAC breaches can have ramifications for the force protection of Australian forces and partners because adversaries may seek retribution on similarly detained personnel.[6] Adherence to LOAC is a strategic imperative for the enduring legitimacy of military operations.[7] If operational-level considerations such as theatre-level detention facilities, movements and logistics are not accounted for, the ability to clear PWIDs from the battlefield at the tactical level will be compromised. Lastly, a lack of planning and preparation at the strategic level for PWID activities, such as inadequate or non-existent legal frameworks or policies, can have direct and dire impacts from the strategic through to the tactical. Poorly managed PWID activities can threaten an operation’s domestic and international legitimacy through the loss of public trust and confidence in the ADF, and the degradation of strategic cohesion between allies and partners.[8]
This paper explores the ADF’s capacity and potential to contribute to PWID activities in future warfare. It draws upon Australian and United States operational experiences over the past 25 years to elucidate the challenges of implementing effective PWID activities. These lessons are then overlayed with current doctrine and practice to provide the basis for the article’s practical recommendations concerning how the ADF might better prepare to contribute to PWID activities in future warfare.
Strengthening the ADF’s preparedness for PWID activities will not only treat a present risk. It will also reinforce Australia’s strategic legitimacy and operational effectiveness in times of conflict. Thus, the risk is not just one for the ADF but one for the wider Department of Defence and ultimately the Australian Government. While past experiences of PWID activities have tested the ADF’s capacity for planning and challenged the legitimacy of Australia and our partners when processes have been neglected, these experiences nevertheless offer valuable lessons. By considering these lessons in force design, updating and refining doctrine, embedding lessons learned in the training continuum, and practising them in routine training and exercises with international partners, the ADF can improve its capacity to conduct credible and effective PWID activities. As Defence reorients to address the challenges posed by a peer adversary, timely reform is essential.
Australia’s PWID Activities—East Timor and Afghanistan, and the US Experience in Iraq
Australia has a long and little-understood history in PWID activities. Throughout the conflicts that Australia has participated in, the ADF has (for the most part) handed over personnel after capture and initial processing. Such handover has been to detention facilities run by partners, allies or host nations. This practice has its genesis in Australian participation in the Boer War and World War I, where personnel captured by Australian forces were placed into the British Army run prisoner camps. During the Korean War, captured North Korean and Chinese soldiers were housed in United Nations Command camps, most notably at Geoje-do. During the Vietnam War, captured enemy personnel were held in camps run by the South Vietnamese with US advisors. The varying styles of detention for captured enemy combatants during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) will be examined later in this article, but ultimately involved the ADF handover of captured personnel to other forces for longer-term detention. While these experiences have all differed to some degree, the common thread is that primary responsibility for PWID activities has been undertaken by another force. The result is that Australia has little recent practical experience in theatre-level detention operations. The notable exceptions have been the Second World War and, more recently, the Australian experience in East Timor.
Australia’s experience when leading the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) offers operational lessons for the conduct of PWID activities in future conflicts within our region, particularly where Australia has a leadership role. The INTERFET example serves as the first of three case studies considered in this article. INTERFET was raised in response to the degrading security situation in East Timor after the UN-supported referendum for East Timor’s independence from Indonesia. The initial deployment was broadly considered successful, with one exception—there is little evidence that the ADF had adequately planned or prepared for PWID activities.[9] PWID activities were not considered in detail when formulating the operation’s legal framework, force composition and disposition, and processes and procedures.[10] ADF forces deployed to East Timor on 20 September 1999 and commenced patrolling activities without a detention management framework.[11] On reflection, former Commander of the 3rd Brigade Brigadier Mark Evans recalled that PWID activities were ‘probably something we had not thought through enough’.[12]
Upon commencing operations, the ADF encountered complex human terrain typical of stability operations in urban environments. Tensions ran high as militia activities increased, and reports of missing and murdered civilians and discoveries of mass graves flooded in.[13] In the degraded security environment, ADF forces found it necessary to detain suspected militia members.[14] INTERFET initially transferred detainees to the Indonesian civil authorities; however, this approach soon proved unsatisfactory. Due to the collapse of the civil judicial system, Indonesian police usually released detainees soon after receiving them, as there was no capacity, and minimal desire, to investigate or adjudicate crimes.[15] As no planning for dedicated facilities or adequate processes existed, hastily improvised brigade detention centres were established by the ADF.[16] These measures quickly proved insufficient, with two detainees attempting to escape on 21 September 1999, resulting in ADF troops illegally firing on them.[17] The incident demonstrated a lack of proficiency in PWID activities, a poor understanding of LOAC and an incorrect interpretation of rules of engagement.
In response to the demand for greater control, a series of orders were given to establish facilities, govern PWID activities and adjudicate crimes committed within the area of operations. Commander INTERFET Major General Peter Cosgrove struck ‘Orders for the Force Detention Centres’ on 21 October 1999, a month into the operation.[18] These orders established the Force Detention Centre (FDC) and directed that it would be administered in line with the Fourth Geneva Convention—the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.[19] The order provided that detainees’ families would be notified of their detention and would be allowed to visit, clarified the duties of the officer in charge and visiting officer, and ensured detainees’ access to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) including its medical, legal and chaplaincy services.[20] On 28 October 1999 the Detention Management Unit was raised to review the detention of captured personnel, as there was no existing judiciary.[21] The unit could determine the grounds upon which the accused could be detained but it could not try cases.[22]
As the mission progressed, it became clear that INTERFET needed to be structured to conduct PWID activities on a more extensive scale. The extant force could not address violations of local law, investigate allegations of crimes against humanity or conduct crime scene exploitation.[23] The Military Police (MP) element was stretched between investigatory work and the FDC, though it was deficient in both functions as it had few personnel with forensic expertise, and limited experience conducting PWID activities.[24] The MP had prioritised law enforcement training and were unclear on their role in the intelligence collection process.[25] The lack of adequate PWID activity training permeated the force, with up to 96 per cent of captured personnel not being tactically questioned at the point of capture.[26] Consequently, the ADF missed valuable opportunities to collect information that could inform ongoing operations. The shock of capture was lost by the time detainees were processed into the FDC, and detainees were less likely to provide such information.[27]
The ADF’s subsequent operational commitment to Afghanistan provides an alternative case study in recent Australian PWID activities. It is more complicated than the INTERFET example due to Australia’s legal mandate in the country and its relationships with both host country officials and allies.[28] The US deployed to Afghanistan in October 2001 in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Australia quickly followed suit, deploying troops under the Special Forces Task Group to work alongside the US ‘to seek out and destroy Al Qaeda and ensure that Afghanistan can never again serve as a base from which terrorists can operate’.[29]
Similar to the experience in East Timor, in the early phases of the ADF’s deployment to Afghanistan it became apparent that PWID activities had not been thoroughly considered. Specifically, ADF planners had made two assumptions: the US would consider captured Taliban and al-Qaeda to be prisoners of war under the relevant Geneva Convention, and there was no need for an ADF PWID framework as the US would take responsibility for all captured personnel.[30] These assumptions were proven incorrect. Primarily as a legal convenience, the US considered Taliban and al-Qaeda forces to be unlawful combatants, and accordingly they would not be afforded the protections of prisoner-of-war status provided by the Geneva Conventions.[31] These US policies rendered the ADF legally and practically constrained. Captured personnel could not be transferred to the US as this would breach the Geneva Conventions, and they could not be detained because the ADF did not have the resources to accommodate them. These conditions threatened the ADF’s capacity to achieve its mission. Chief of the Defence Force Admiral Chris Barrie communicated these risks to Minister of Defence, Robert Hill, on 25 February 2002, stating:
There is currently no clear government policy on the handling of personnel who may be captured by the ADF on Operation Slipper... Defence, and in particular, ADF commanders are currently accepting risk flowing from the lack of government policy.[32]
The minister questioned why he ‘didn’t get this brief before the Afghanistan operation. We clearly should have sorted out this issue with the US as leader of the Coalition months ago’.[33]
Following this admonishment, in June 2002 an arrangement was made allowing ADF troops to continue operations. This was achieved by augmenting ADF patrols with one US soldier, meaning that the US continued to act as the ‘detaining power’ of any captured personnel.[34] As the ADF was not the capturing force, no transfer between Australia and the US need occur, negating Australia’s obligations under the Geneva Convention.
During this time, ADF operations occurred throughout Afghanistan and were not centred in a single province. After three rotations, the Special Forces Task Group was withdrawn from Afghanistan in December 2002. Just three years later, in 2005, and amid a deteriorating security situation, Australia once again committed significant forces to Afghanistan. From 2006, Australia commenced stability operations in Uruzgan Province as a junior partner to the provincial security and detention lead, the Netherlands. As part of this arrangement, individuals were transferred by Australian troops to the Dutch-operated Initial Screening Area (ISA) at Kamp Holland in Tarin Kot. In 2010, Australia accepted increased responsibility for PWID activities. The ADF assumed command of the ISA from withdrawing Dutch forces and negotiated renewed arrangements for the transfer of criminal detainees to the fledgling Afghan authorities for prosecution, and detainees of high intelligence value to the US-run Parwan Detention Facility at Bagram Airbase.[35]
The conduct of Australia’s PWID activities in Afghanistan as the lead for the ISA in Tarin Kot was fundamentally influenced by the US experience in Iraq—specifically, the atrocities that occurred at Abu Ghraib Prison in 2003. The exposure of human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison made headlines worldwide, including in Australia, by placing PWID activities into the forefront of strategic and political conversations. This saw PWID activities gain a high level of attention from Australian defence and political leaders, with focus on governance, procedures and legitimacy. The US experience at Abu Ghraib has had a significant and lasting impact on how Western nations plan, prepare for, and conduct PWID activities. It has served as an exemplar, and oft-cited case study, of the importance of effective detention operations for maintaining legitimacy in the pursuit of strategic goals.[36]
The official investigation (AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205 MI Bde)) into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, as well as the subsequent review (Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations) sought to identify systemic and situational causes of the abuse and make recommendations to prevent reoccurrence.[37] The review identified a range of deficiencies in the legal framework, lack of operational planning, inadequate command oversight and outdated doctrine that contributed to the human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison.[38]
The investigation and review identified that legal complexities were a fundamental contributor affecting how detainees were treated. The US classified the GWOT as neither an international nor non-international armed conflict.[39] As previously noted, this resulted in al-Qaeda and Taliban personnel being considered unlawful combatants and thus not afforded the protections of LOAC. Despite this, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers maintained that detainees would be given a standard of care consistent with the Geneva Conventions.[40] The review found that ambiguity at the strategic level confused operations at the tactical level across multiple theatres. The guard force and interrogators were left without clarifying guidance and were uncertain about what interrogation techniques were approved for use in Iraq and how they should conduct PWID activities.[41] The scant guidance given to guards at Abu Ghraib Prison amounted to the sentiment that ‘after 9/11, the gloves come off’.[42]
Significant oversights in operational planning severely hindered the US ability to manage the escalating demands of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Combined Joint Task Force 7, which led the operation from May 2003 to June 2004, was not sufficiently staffed to meet the scale and complexity of its mission.[43] The operational staffing document was approved six months after the initial deployment, leaving the contingent understaffed by approximately 900 personnel.[44] Additionally, mid-2003 saw an escalation in combat operations in Iraq; however, the requirement for more MP personnel relative to the projected number of detainees was not considered.[45] At the height of hostilities in October 2003, the Abu Ghraib Prison guard force consisted of 90 personnel from 320 Military Police Battalion (320 MP Bn) who were responsible for guarding approximately 7,000 detainees—a ratio of approximately 1:75.[46] The capacity issues impacted the mission’s intelligence collection goals, with some detainees held for up to 90 days before their first interrogation.[47] One of the key findings of the review was that planning figures for expected detainees are almost always underestimated.[48] Workload pressures resulted in the forces conducting PWID activities having the lowest reported morale of all deployed troops in the Middle East theatre. This was attributed to a perceived lack of support from their hierarchy and a belief that their senior leaders did not care.[49]
The investigation and review found that commanders from platoon to brigade level failed to exercise adequate command, contributing to systemic abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison. Commanders were found to have failed to prepare soldiers to conduct large-scale, protracted detention operations and to have failed to provide suitable oversight to ensure processes were compliant with LOAC.[50] Although 320 MP Bn had one year to prepare for deployment, key force preparation activities were cancelled due to competing priorities and troop availability. There was no theatre- or mission-specific training, or training on how to manage non-compliant detainees.[51] The unpractised and unclear command structures between 320 MP Bn and 205 MI Bde contributed to the lack of command oversight.[52] The commanders of 205 MI Bde and 320 MP Bn at Abu Ghraib Prison were found to have failed to adequately train and control their soldiers or establish a culture of accountability.[53] This negligence fostered a sense of approval for abusive behaviour and generated a dysfunctional command climate.[54] Lessons learned from earlier experiences in the Middle East theatre highlighted the need for more effective integration of MP and intelligence capabilities, and more cogency within the command structure. However, these recommendations were not actioned.[55] Suspected contraventions of LOAC were highlighted during an October 2003 visit by the ICRC; however, recommendations to rectify shortfalls were not implemented.[56]
Force structure and doctrinal approaches to PWID activities were also found to be inappropriate for the Iraq theatre.[57] US detention procedures in 2003 remained based on World War II and Cold War scenarios, where captured personnel were usually enemy soldiers, and the battlefield geometry was generally linear.[58] The MP force elements were designed to generate tempo in combat operations by quickly removing detainees from the battlefield and moving them to rear holding facilities.[59] This force structure and doctrine had yet to be adapted or updated to account for GWOT detainee classifications.[60] Further, it did not account for the nature of the contemporary operating environment, which had no clear forward or rear areas. The inappropriate force structures and doctrinal processes resulted in increased detainee holding times and an associated loss of operational tempo. Specifically, combat unit holding times of 12 to 24 hours increased to 72 hours, and corps-level detainee collection points extended from three days to 30 to 45 days. Such protracted processing negated the intelligence value that could be gleaned from detainees. Further, it was found that one-third of reported abuse occurred at the point of capture.[61]
As the prospect of LSCO in the Indo-Pacific continues to heighten, the ADF must be prepared to conduct PWID activities of a scale and duration not experienced since World War II. Thus, taking on recent lessons from a major ally with analogous doctrinal underpinnings is not only prudent but essential to ensure that known risks are treated and the ADF is as prepared as possible.
Lessons for the Future
A review of PWID activities in East Timor and the Middle East reveals several recurring themes relevant to the ADF’s preparation for future conflict. These include the strategic importance of legitimacy throughout all phases of operations, the importance of applying a legal framework and adherence to LOAC, and the necessity for forces to adequately plan and prepare to conduct PWID activities.
A core purpose of conducting credible and effective PWID activities is to maintain the mission’s legitimacy. US doctrine notes:
Legitimacy maintains legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Legitimacy is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of actions from the perspectives of interested audiences.[62]
This concept is reflected in ADF doctrine, which agrees that the maintenance of legitimacy is critical to the success of military operations.[63] In conflict and post-conflict phases, legitimacy can be viewed through two distinctive frames. The first considers legitimacy as a subjective and relational matter. This perspective considers legitimacy as it might be perceived by a target audience, influenced by their individual and societal standards. In modern conflict, a target audience may assess the legitimacy of their government in pursuing conflict based on their understanding of the threat and the actions of their national and adversary forces. In the context of PWID activities, the public will form a perception around the ‘morality and rightness of actions’ based on how their forces and the adversary treat captured personnel.[64] The second frame considers legitimacy as an objective matter that can be assessed with reference to the operational mission’s demonstrated consistency with predetermined or universally accepted standards.[65] In modern conflict, legitimacy may be assessed based on a force’s adherence to international laws and regulations, both when entering conflict (jus ad bellum) and in its actions in conflict (jus in bello).[66] The point of reference against which such standards are judged will likely include LOAC and other relevant protocols such as the Geneva Conventions. While both frames are valid and valuable lenses through which to view legitimacy, it is important to note they can sometimes be in tension with one another. To maintain legitimacy, forces should strive to satisfy both frames through practising transparency and operating in accordance with international laws and regulations.
A key theme throughout all three case studies is the correlation between how detainees are legally classified and how they are treated. In the GWOT, the US classification of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters as ‘unlawful combatants’ rather than ‘prisoners of war’ resulted in friction from strategic to tactical levels and degraded the legitimacy of both the US and Australia.[67] This contrived classification stripped away the protections afforded to prisoners of war by the Geneva Conventions and resulted in ambiguity concerning the acceptable treatment of detainees.[68] In Iraq, this classification led to the application of tactics, techniques and procedures from other US facilities, including Guantanamo Bay.[69] Combined with several other factors, the result was that captors’ behaviour towards (and treatment of) detainees degraded to the point of abuse. Photographs depicting gross mistreatment at Abu Ghraib Prison caused a significant loss of subjective legitimacy for US operations in Iraq.[70] The actions of a relatively small number of US troops at the tactical level had resounding strategic impacts across the coalition. In Afghanistan, differences in detainee classification between the US and Australia highlighted deficiencies in the ADF’s strategic understanding of the task and its operational planning. Rather than reconsidering Australia’s commitment to the operation or reinforcing the Australian contingent with additional personnel and resources, Australia sought to temper its obligations under the Geneva Conventions through negotiated arrangements with the US.
Conversely, in East Timor, Australia’s clear direction on the treatment of captured personnel served to maintain the legitimacy of INTERFET in the eyes of the Australian public and the broader international community. The ADF conceded that LOAC did not legally apply to INTERFET due to the absence of international armed conflict between Australia and Indonesia, and the militia failing to meet the criteria of an organised military force. Despite this, the ADF determined to adhere to LOAC as ‘best practice’. This direction was distributed throughout the force and reinforced by Commander INTERFET’s visits around the theatre, including to the FDC.[71] The benefits of this decision were evident, as there were no reported breaches of LOAC within the FDC.[72] Australia’s emphasis on adhering to the principles of LOAC maintained and reinforced the force’s objective legitimacy.
Insufficient operational planning and preparation hampered all three operations, with the common factors comprising planning culture, arrangement of operations, command priorities, and how forces prepare for PWID activities through training and exercises. Operation Desert Storm (1990–1991) saw the US capture approximately 70,000 prisoners of war over four days.[73] This experience influenced the calculation of detainee planning figures for Operation Iraqi Freedom, with the original order of battle providing ample MP for the task.[74] Poor coordination at the operational level, however, led to significant delays in projecting personnel into the theatre, resulting in an insufficient guard force to detainee ratio. A further lack of foresight and synchronisation of planning resulted in mandated conditions of service-related rotations out of the theatre, leaving Abu Ghraib Prison critically short-staffed. Noting the degree of US influence in the development of ADF doctrine, drawing on the lessons learned by the US and addressing doctrinal shortfalls is particularly prescient when considering the prospect of LSCO in Australia’s near region. As the Pacific Campaign of World War II demonstrated, high numbers of detainees are likely, which will be made more complex by the expanse of the maritime theatre.
The ADF deployed to East Timor and commenced operations without detailed planning for all tasks within the mission profile.[75] Limited consideration was given to the complexities of conducting PWID activities, and it was assumed that detainees taken on by ADF troops would be transferred to Indonesian civil authorities.[76] Insufficient emphasis on understanding the operating environment resulted in friction that could have otherwise been avoided or at least minimised.
Stability operations are generally conducted when the host nation cannot provide a secure environment because organic law enforcement is ineffective, resulting in loss of the rule of law and increased likelihood of criminality.[77] Given this scenario, it is reasonable to conclude that local law enforcement agencies will generally have a limited capacity to conduct patrolling activities or to accommodate and administer detainees. In the case of East Timor, the degraded security situation resulted in a significant law enforcement challenge for the UN and Australia to manage. While the ADF may not have anticipated high numbers of captured personnel in a traditional sense, they did find it necessary to detain volumes of militia and criminal detainees and accommodate some security internees. Secondly, the prospect of transferring suspected militia members to the Indonesians was ill-considered given the context of the conflict and the collapsed civil judicial system.
While planning Australia’s initial contribution to Afghanistan, the ADF neglected to consider PWID activities as a task they would conduct or be responsible for. ADF planning failed to take on the lessons from East Timor in that it assumed there would be limited, if any, captured personnel arising from ADF mission profiles and that, if there were, they would be transferred to another force.[78] Negotiated arrangements resulted in consternation at the strategic level and legal manoeuvring to remain compliant with LOAC. The maintenance of Australia’s subjective legitimacy was a constant concern, evidenced by correspondence from the Australian theatre commander to the Chief of the Defence Force highlighting a media report that incorrectly attributed the capture of enemy forces to ADF troops.[79]
In both East Timor and the Middle East, Australian strategic, operational and tactical level decision-makers misunderstood and misinterpreted LOAC. In East Timor, once the absence of a detention framework was identified as a problem, it was addressed from the operational level with increased resources and renewed command oversight. The results were clear—objective and subjective legitimacy for the operation was retained, and no LOAC breaches in the FDC were reported.[80] For US forces in Iraq, their lack of understanding and misinterpretation of LOAC had disastrous consequences. Commanders were found culpable for failing to prepare their troops and provide adequate command oversight. Further, commanders were unaware of the importance of engaging with the ICRC to maintain objective legitimacy. Commanders were reluctant to allow ICRC representatives to access their facilities and unwilling to implement recommendations to improve compliance.[81] The events at Abu Ghraib Prison resulted in a loss of both objective and subjective legitimacy, with public support for the war in the US dropping below 50 per cent for the first time since the war began.[82]
The Reasons for Change
Experience demonstrates that a failure to adequately plan for detainees on operations results in suboptimal solutions. This situation was exemplified by Australia’s planning to hand over detainees to an ill-functioning civil power in East Timor, and abrogating its proper responsibilities to avoid being a ‘detaining power’ in Afghanistan. At their worst, these conditions could lead to the kinds of atrocities that unfolded at Abu Ghraib Prison. Australia and the ADF will continue to carry significant strategic and operational risk until they adequately prepare for PWID activities, including aspects relevant to command, planning, training, doctrine and capability.
While the nature of war remains constant, its character is evolving at an accelerated pace. This evolution is becoming ever more consequential for the ADF when it operates in the Indo-Pacific due to two major factors: the increasing economic prosperity and urbanisation of the population, and the rapid advancement and proliferation of technology. Together, these factors result in an increasingly ‘transparent’ battlefield. The existence of more people with access to more advanced technologies (such as sensors and cameras) increases the volume of information available to adversaries and to the public. Within this environment, the ADF must be prepared to conduct effective PWID activities under public and legal scrutiny.
Understanding that legitimacy is judged through objective and subjective lenses, the ADF’s strategic leaders need to reinforce the importance of international law and LOAC on operations. This strategic approach to PWID activities should be embedded in internal messaging to the ADF, and in external messaging to the Australian population, allies and partners. In practice, this would mean the inclusion of LOAC and PWID activity training when planning operations, activities and investments in the region, when participating in large-scale PWID exercises, and when promoting these initiatives through official and social media channels. Doing so would further underscore Australia’s strategic legitimacy by demonstrating this nation’s commitment to international law and LOAC, promoting behaviours within the ADF and participating forces that are consistent with that commitment, and reinforcing the ADF’s reputation as a trusted partner in the region.
The ADF’s understanding and application of LOAC at the tactical level requires some further refinement. ADF LOAC training consists of access to available doctrine, an online course and instruction. This instruction consists of legal officers delivering theoretical training, and MP delivering tactical training in capturing and processing detainees at the point of capture. However, access to this training at unit level is subject to individual command priorities. Experience on recent operations has brought a renewed focus to the importance of understanding LOAC. Theoretical LOAC training now extends past the unit level and consists of a graduated continuum beginning with basic principles during ab initio training, and introducing the increased responsibilities of commanders through career promotion courses.[83] Further improvement could be gained. Critically, LOAC should be discussed during advanced planning courses and tested on collective training exercises. To improve awareness and consistency in training, LOAC considerations should be embedded in routine training, much as the Army’s Combat Behaviours are already.[84] This could be further enhanced by developing a program that improves retention of LOAC considerations, similar to the US Army’s Soldier Rules.[85]
The ADF draws many of its planning frameworks and force structures from the US, and PWID activities are no exception. ADF and US MP serve similar functions—law enforcement, security, mobility and manoeuvre support, as well as PWID activities. Both ADF and US MP are intended to provide close support to combat forces and general support within the theatre of operations. The most significant difference is in scale. Due to their size, the ADF MP have limited capacity to provide both close and general support concurrently. Understanding that there is limited scope to grow the ADF’s MP capability, even more emphasis must be placed on all-corps training for dealing with personnel at the point of capture. Future conflict in Australia’s near region has the potential to generate high volumes of detainees requiring processing and removal from the battlefield—a process likely to be prolonged by the logistical challenges of operating in littoral environments. These delays risk the loss of key information collected at the point of capture and diminish the ability of commanders to act on time-critical information. This risk could be treated by increasing the number of personnel qualified in tactical questioning, to ensure timely and effective information collection.
PWID activities are inevitable in all operations and should be included in combined arms and joint exercises. Unfortunately, field exercises are typically constrained by role-players and timelines, preventing thorough testing of PWID processes. This leads to unrealistically low numbers of captured personnel, causing exercises to proceed with unlikely speed and unsustainable tempo in the advance. Rearward logistic chains remain unburdened, role-players arrive at detention facilities without the required documentation and, after cursory in-processing, are swiftly re-roled and returned to the exercise area for further serials. As a result, personnel and processes at all levels go untested. There is also little focus on the practicalities of PWID activities in tabletop or simulation-focused exercises. The cumulative effect is that PWID activities remain under-prioritised in force structure reviews, and the responsibility for operational planning is relegated to the logistic elements of brigade and divisional headquarters rather than being a close consideration of the manoeuvre plan. To remedy this, PWID activities should be an integral planning consideration, and included in doctrine such as Intelligence in Operations,[86] Decision Making and Planning Processes,[87] and the Staff Officers’ Guide.[88] Further, PWID activities should be exercised from the point of capture through to repatriation. These serials should be appropriately resourced, with enough time allocated to ensure training outcomes are met. International partners should be included as often as possible to reinforce the importance of LOAC and rehearse detainee transfer. The ICRC should be regularly invited to participate and provide feedback on the ADF’s processes to demonstrate transparency and ensure best practice. Properly executed, these activities should be routinely assessed and certified as part of the ADF’s preparedness for conflict. Appropriate emphasis on training for PWID activities and guidance on its execution should be included in ADF-I-5 Exercise Planning and Conduct.
The ADF currently experiences the same doctrinal frictions that US forces faced during Operation Iraq Freedom. The ADF’s doctrinal PWID planning considerations do not account for the complexities of contemporary operations; they assume linear land-based battlefield geometry, simple human terrain, and uncontested rear areas. ADF PWID doctrine should be updated to account for the intricacies of operating in a littoral environment, with consideration to how the integrated force will work together to ensure credible PWID management in all phases of operations.
The ADF’s operational experience suggests that Australia’s responsibility for detention operations will fall into one of two categories: where Australian forces capture personnel and accommodate them in an Australian detention facility, or where Australian forces capture personnel and transfer them to an alternative facility. Noting these limited possibilities, ADF PWID doctrine should be updated to include standing detention frameworks for each of these scenarios. Current ADF doctrine does not include a standardised detention framework, stating that ‘frameworks are tailored to the operation’ and ‘how they [detainees] are treated, who is responsible for monitoring their treatment, and their release, transfer, or handover—will be founded on strategic and operational-level direction’. It goes on to state that ‘while such a framework is not predefined, it will have operational, legal and policy aspects that are similar in each operation’.[89] This situation could be immediately improved by drafting two frameworks that are realistic enough to support training and operational certification, and appropriate in the absence of further guidance on operations.
Conclusion
The ADF’s capacity for PWID activities is a critical yet often overlooked aspect of Defence preparedness. The ADF’s experiences in East Timor and Afghanistan, alongside the US experience in Iraq, demonstrate that PWID activities are a complex task with serious implications. Poorly executed PWID activities can pose significant risks to the force and the mission, ranging from increased risk to personnel at the point of capture, to operational friction, tension between partner forces, and loss of strategic legitimacy. The three case studies presented in this article highlight that credible PWID activities are essential for maintaining strategic legitimacy and operational effectiveness.
The DSR and NDS focused Australia’s attention on the potential for LSCO in the Indo-Pacific region. In this context, comprehensive planning and preparation for the two detention scenarios that will govern PWID activities is crucial—where Australian forces capture personnel and accommodate them in an Australian-led detention facility, or where Australian forces capture personnel and transfer them to a partner-led detention facility. To do either of these tasks without significant risk to strategic legitimacy and operational effectiveness requires the ADF to renew its focus on PWID activities. Revisions should be rigorous and consist of clear legal frameworks, robust planning tools, renewed training priorities, and refreshed doctrine.
Learning from past experiences is vital for improving the ADF’s likelihood of success in future operations. The urgency of implementing these lessons cannot be overstated, given the current strategic environment outlined in the DSR and the lack of strategic warning time. Strengthening the ADF's capacity for PWID activities will mitigate existing risks, enhance its operational effectiveness and support the maintenance of strategic legitimacy. By addressing these concerns now, the ADF can ensure it is prepared for the complex operational challenges of the future in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region.
Endnotes
Due to the sensitivity of this topic and the recency of operations where Australia has played a part, several primary sources remain classified and therefore cannot be discussed in a public forum. This article therefore only draws upon unclassified or ‘OFFICIAL’ documents.
[1] Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023), p. 5.
[2] Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), p. 38.
[3] John F Hussey, ‘Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration’, Joint Force Quarterly 97 (2020): 73, at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2106519/detention-operations-as-a-strategic-consideration.
[4] Some past doctrine refers to internment and detention operations (IDOPs). For the purposes of this paper, the terms ‘PWID activities’ and ‘IDOPs’ are interchangeable.
[5] Department of Defence, ADF-I-3 Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees (Defence Publishing Service, 2023), p. 6.
[6] Ibid., p. 87; Aaron Pegram, ‘The Reciprocity Principle: Respecting and Abrogating Wartime Agreements’, in Surviving the Great War: Australian Prisoners of War on the Western Front 1916–18, Australian Army History Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp, 40–65, at: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108643559.003.
[7] Geoffrey S Corn, ‘Military Command, Responsibility, and Legitimacy: An Enduring Equation’, American Bar Association website), 6 January 2023, accessed 25 March 2025, at: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_national_security/publications/aba-standing-committee-on-law-and-national-security-60-th-anniversary-an-anthology/military-command-responsibility-and-legitimacy-an-enduring-equation/.
[8] Department of Defence, ADF-I-3 Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees, p. 27; Paul Brereton, ‘The International Law of Armed Conflict: The Australian Application’, speech, The Mayo Lecture for 2021, 8 October 2021, at: http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/JCULawRw/2021/2.html#fn1.
[9] Michael J Kelly, TLH McCormack, P Muggleton and BM Oswald, ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, International Review of the Red Cross 83, no. 841 (2001): 103, at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1560775500106200.
[10] Mark Evans, ‘A Tactical Commander’s Perspective’, in East Timor Intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2015), p. 103.
[11] Bruce Oswald, ‘The Law on Military Occupation: Answering the Challenges of Detention During Contemporary Peace Operations?’, Melbourne Journal of International Law 8 (2007): 1, at: https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1683134/Oswald.pdf.
[12] Evans, ‘A Tactical Commander’s Perspective’, p. 103.
[13] James DeShaw Rae, Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in East Timor (Boulder: FirstForumPress, 2009), p. 225, accessed 25 March 2025, at: https://ezproxy.deakin.edu.au/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xww&AN=1288766&site=eds-live&scope=site.
[14] Kelly et al., ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, p. 130.
[15] Ibid., p. 131.
[16] Craig Stockings, Born of Fire and Ash: Australian Operations in Response to the East Timor Crisis 1999–2000 (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2022), p, 469, accessed 25 March 2025, at: http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/deakin/detail.action?docID=30256379.
[17] Ibid., p. 469.
[18] Kelly et al., ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, p. 136. Major General Cosgrove served as Commander INTERFET (COMINTERFET) throughout the operation.
[19] Bruce M Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 (2000): 5, at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1389135900000696.
[20] Kelly et al., ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, p. 136.
[21] Ibid., p. 131; Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, p. 5.
[22] Stockings, Born of Fire and Ash, p. 760.
[23] James Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and Its Aftermath in Southeast Asia, Politics in Asia Series (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 131.
[24] Kelly et al., ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, p. 128.
[25] Stockings, Born of Fire and Ash, p. 470.
[26] Ibid., p. 469.
[27] Ibid., p. 470.
[28] As previously identified, a lack of unclassified sources limits the ability of this author to examine the latter part of Australian PWID activities in Afghanistan, and therefore this case study principally examines the initial Australian commitment in 2001–02.
[29] John Howard, ‘Prime Minister Address to the Australian Defence Organisation’, speech, Australian Defence Association, Melbourne, 25 October 2001, at: https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-12374#.
[30] Peter Cosgrove, ‘CDF Minute to Minister of Defence—Operation Slipper—Treatment of Captured Taliban and Al Qaeda Personnel’, Department of Defence, 3 October 2001, 1063/02, at: https://piac.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Document-200.pdf.
[31] George Bush, ‘Presidential Memorandum—Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees’, The White House, 7 February 2002, at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/URLs_Cited/OT2005/05-184/05-184_2.pdf.
[32] Chris Barrie, ‘CDF Minute to Minister of Defence—Operation Slipper—Treatment of Captured Taliban and Al Quaeda Personnel’, 25 February 2002, p. 2, 112/02, at: https://jec.org.au/resources/document-74-2/.
[33] Ibid., p. 4.
[34] Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Australia’s Detention, Custody and Transfer Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 2011), p. 9, at: https://piac.asn.au/projects/international-projects/story-1-australias-detention-custody-and-transfer-policy-in-afghanistan-and-iraq/; Peter Cosgrove, ‘CDF Minute to Minister of Defence—Operation Slipper—Treatment of Captured Taliban and Al Qaeda Personnel’, Department of Defence, 30 August 2002, 843/02, at: https://piac.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Document-201-1.pdf.
[35] Paul Cronan, ‘Australian Detention Operations in Afghanistan: Practices and Challenges’, in Gregory Rose and Bruce Oswald, Detention of Non-State Actors Engaged in Hostilities: The Future Law (Leiden, Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), p. 138, at: https://brill.com/edcollbook/title/32745?language=en.
[36] James R Schlesinger, Harold Brown, Tillie K Fowler and Charles A Homer, Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2004), p. 40, at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA428743; Paul T Bartone, ‘Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in Military Operations’, Defense Horizons 64 (2008), at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1006440/lessons-of-abu-ghraib-understanding-and-preventing-prisoner-abuse-in-military-o/.
[37] Schlesinger et al., Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations.
[38] Ibid.; JB Caci, ‘POW and Detainee Operations: Lessons Unlearned’, Journal of Special Operations Medicine 15, no. 2 (2015): 139–143.
[39] International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘War on Terror’, How Does Law Protect in War?, n.d., at: https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/war-terror#.
[40] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 7.
[41] Ibid., p. 10.
[42] Originally used by senior White House officials in the days following 9/11 and subsequently used in emails from US HQ, Baghdad, to guards at Abu Ghraib Prison describing how they should approach their duties. J Cofer Black, ‘Testimony Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States’, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 13 April 2004, accessed 25 March 2025, at: https://irp.fas.org/congress/2002_hr/092602black.html; Elizabeth Grimm, How the Gloves Came Off : Lawyers, Policy Makers, and Norms in the Debate on Torture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), p. 148, accessed 25 March 2025, at: http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/deakin/detail.action?docID=4787575.
[43] Hussey, ‘Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration’, p. 75.
[44] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 16.
[45] Ibid., p. 47.
[46] Ibid., p. 29.
[47] Ibid., p. 29.
[48] Ibid., p. 48.
[49] Ibid., p. 53.
[50] Anthony Jones and George Fay, ‘AR 15-6 Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib’, Department of Defense, 25 August 2004, p. 37, accessed 25 March 2025, at: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a429125.pdf.
[51] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 55; Jones and Fay, ‘AR 15-6 Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib’, p. 37.
[52] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 45; Hussey, ‘Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration’, p. 75.
[53] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 44. The JIDC was a sub-unit of 205 MI Bde that was responsible for conducting interrogation at Abu Ghraib Prison.
[54] Schlesinger et al., p. 44.
[55] Ibid., p. 30.
[56] Jones and Fay, ‘AR 15-6 Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib’.
[57] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 48.
[58] Ibid., p. 28.
[59] Ibid., p. 59.
[60] Classifications are based on personnel status and reason for detention. The ADF presently recognises five categories: prisoners of war, internees, detainees, retained personnel, and imprisoned criminals. ‘Detainee’ has been used throughout this article as a collective reference for these classifications.
[61] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 59.
[62] US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Planning (2020), accessed 25 March 2025, at: https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/DOCNET/JP-5-0-Joint-Planning/.
[63] Department of Defence, ADF-C Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine (Defence Publishing Service, 2021), p. 62.
[64] Sarah BK von Billerbeck and Birte Julia Gippert, ‘Legitimacy in Conflict: Concepts, Practices, Challenges’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11, no. 3 (2017): 273–285, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017.1357701.
[65] Ibid.
[66] ‘What Are Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?’, International Committee of the Red Cross (website), at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0%EF%BB%BF# (accessed 22 August 2023).
[67] James Gow, ‘Strategy and the Multidimensional Trinity’, in War and War Crimes: The Military, Legitimacy and Success in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2013), at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199327027.003.0002; Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force: Afghanistan Inquiry Report, Inquiry into Questions of Unlawful Conduct Concerning the Special Operations Task Group in Afghanistan (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020), at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/afghanistan-inquiry/resources.
[68] Jones and Fay, ‘AR 15-6 Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib’, p. 27.
[69] Ibid., p. 22.
[70] Gow, ‘Strategy and the Multidimensional Trinity’.
[71] Kelly et al., ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, p. 114.
[72] Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, p. 1.
[73] Jon Bilbo, Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Operations During Operation Desert Storm (US Army War College, 1992), p. ii, at: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA251209.pdf.
[74] Schlesinger et al., ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’, p. 57.
[75] Evans, ‘A Tactical Commander’s Perspective’, p. 74.
[76] Kelly et al., ‘Legal Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in the International Force for East Timor’, p. 131.
[77] Department of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 1-11—The Military Contribution to Stabilisation (Defence Publishing Service, 2012).
[78] Barrie, ‘CDF Minute to Minister of Defence—Operation Slipper—Treatment of Captured Taliban and Al Quaeda Personnel’.
[79] Ken Gillespie, ‘Brief for CDF—OP FALCONER—ADF Handling of Prisoners of War and Detainees—Media Statements’, Department of Defence, 12 May 2003.
[80] Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, p. 1.
[81] Jones and Fay, ‘AR 15-6 Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib’, pp. 66, 119.
[82] ‘Iraq Prison Scandal Hits Home, but Most Reject Troop Pullout’, Pew Research Center (website), 12 May 2004, at: https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2004/05/12/iraq-prison-scandal-hits-home-but-most-reject-troop-pullout/.
[83] ‘Rules of Engagement FAQ’, Department of Defence (website), at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/afghanistan-inquiry/frequently-asked-questions/rules-engagement-faq.
[84] Department of Defence, Commander Forces Command Directive 11/21—Combat Behaviours (Forces Command, Victoria Barracks, 2021).
[85] Department of the Army, US Army Regulation 350–1 Army Training and Leader Development (Department of Defense, 2017), accessed 25 March 2025, at: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18487_R350_1_Admin_FINAL.pdf#page=193.
[86] Department of Defence, ADF-I-2 Intelligence (Defence Publishing Service, 2023).
[87] Department of Defence, ADF-I-5 Decision Making and Planning Processes (Defence Publishing Service, 2024).
[88] Department of Defence, LP 0.1.0 Staff Officers’ Guide (Defence Publishing Service, 2017).
[89] Department of Defence, ADF-I-3 Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees, pp. 65–66.