A Theory of Army
Author: Matthew Jeffries
2026 Chief of Army Essay Competition Runner-up
How can we rewire the Army to continually adapt to the changing character of war?
In times of drastic change, it is the learners who inherit the future. The learned usually find themselves equipped to live in a world that no longer exists.
Eric Hoffer[1]
The 2023 Defence Strategic Review found that the Australian Defence Force was ‘not fully fit for purpose’. In November 2024 the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart AO DSC, confirmed this in his own words: ‘I am not assured that our systems are yet enough to win the battle of adaptation in the face of a major war in our region.’[2] In April 2025, he returned to the same theme, quoting the theorist Carl H Builder:
An Army requires a theory of an Army … there must exist something in addition to its soldiers and tanks and guns—a concept, a strategy, a notion of who it is and what it wants to be, of what it is about and what it wants to be about.[3]
This essay accepts both Stuart’s diagnosis that Army’s systems are not yet enough and his solution, ‘a theory of an Army’.
The Australian Army has actively pursued adaptation down the same path since at least 2011. Plan Beersheba restructured the combat brigades.[4] Accelerated warfare reframed the operating environment, and ‘Army in Motion’ refined how Army responded.[5] The Defence Strategic Review reset the strategic guidance,[6] and the National Defence Strategies operationalised it.[7] Each effort was substantial and well resourced. None of these activities has been enough to convince Army’s most senior officer that we are ready to meet the future threat. Army has not failed to adapt because it lacks effort, professionalism or reform activity. It has failed to adapt because most reform has operated inside Army’s inherited model of itself. To continually adapt to the changing character of war, Army must make that model visible, testable and answerable.
This essay argues that reform has missed the layer at which adaptation actually happens. Two decades of structural and cultural reform have rearranged Army based on its understanding of a world that no longer exists. To rewire Army to continually adapt to the changing character of war requires epistemic reform: reform of how Army knows, tests and updates what it believes about itself. Assumptions have to come into the open. They have to be tested against evidence. People who change their minds have to be rewarded for it. Army has to weaponise curiosity. Three institutional rewires do that work, and a fourth move amplifies the learners Army already has. The rewires create permanent institutional surfaces on which the model becomes visible: an external model audit, observation-bound doctrine and a standing model audit. These artefacts are hardwired through amplification of the learners Army already has, the people who can read what the surfaces show. What makes the four moves distinct from previous reform is that they target Army’s understanding of itself, ‘a notion of who it is and what it wants to be, of what it is about and what it wants to be about’.
A Model Army
An organisational model is the institutionally held set of underlying assumptions about the world that the organisation operates in. Edgar Schein places these underlying assumptions at the deepest of three cultural levels, beneath the published values and the visible artefacts that organisations more readily discuss.[8] Argyris and Schön describe the same layer as the institution’s ‘theory in use’: the level at which things are actually done, an internal operating model below the ‘espoused theory’ that strategy documents articulate.[9] Karl Weick calls it the ‘enacted environment’: the world the institution constructs through its own processes and procedures and then proceeds to act within.[10] In this essay, Army’s ‘model’ means its inherited theory-in-use: the assumptions embedded in how it plans, buys, trains, promotes, writes doctrine and measures readiness.
Organisational studies converge on several characteristics common to institutional models. Within Army the underlying assumptions that define the model are rarely articulated. They can be inferred from the operating procedures the institution maintains: what it plans for, how it acquires capability, how it manages careers, how it codifies knowledge, and how it measures itself. Another characteristic of the Army model is that it is inherited. It is not chosen by the people who live inside it. It is the medium through which institutional thought is conducted and activities are executed. Over time, the world in which the model operates changes; the model does not pace this change, except by deliberate effort. The gap between the model and the world widens silently because the model’s output continues to look rational when there is no mechanism to question if the world that the model was developed for still exists.
The key claim of this essay is that underlying assumptions that reinforce the model are not interchangeable with the structural and cultural layers that reform has so far addressed. Restructuring the brigades or rewriting the values statement does not test the underlying assumptions. The institution can complete a five-year cultural reform program, write new doctrine, and stand up new force elements without reforming the model that drives the theory of Army. Without a mechanism to test the model’s alignment to the changing character of war, Army will not close the adaptation gap.
In Military Misfortunes, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch describe institutional reorganisation as a substitute for thought rather than a result of it.[11] They observed a clear pattern: a diagnosis is made, and a structure is announced, published, briefed and resourced. A new diagnosis arrives, and a new structure is announced. The activity satisfies the demand for response without testing the model inside which the diagnosis was made. The gap between the model’s understanding of the world and the reality of the world grows.
The Russia-Ukraine war clearly demonstrates the gap. Brave1 was established in April 2023 by the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation. In April 2025, Brave1 Market launched with 1,500 suppliers and over 540 grants, billed as ‘the Amazon for the military, giving units the ability to buy exactly what they need, right when they need it’.[12] This emerging defence innovation ecosystem supported the growth of Madyar’s Birds, the 414th Unmanned Strike Aviation Regiment, which achieved brigade status in January 2025.[13] Ukraine established a new military procurement and distribution system and a new military brigade focused on cutting-edge emerging drone technology, fielded by an army at war, under fire, while losing terrain. Ukraine’s government and armed forces were forced to confront a changing world; they were forced to become learners.
The priorities of a military preparing for war and a military at war are different. Their models of the world are different. Australia is moving further toward a centralised delivery model in the form of an integrated Defence Delivery Group from 1 July 2026, with an independent Defence Delivery Agency from 1 July 2027.[14] The trajectory is centralisation away from the units that procurement is meant to support. A Ukrainian unit can access a website to order equipment. An Australian unit must work through the centralised structure. The December 2025 Major Projects Report from the Australian National Audit Office found that Defence’s major equipment acquisition projects have averaged 21 months of schedule slippage.[15] The average project slippage time is the time it took Ukraine to establish, equip and field a cutting-edge drone brigade and an online military marketplace accessible by individual units.
The Bounded Model
More than six decades of theoretical research articulate why the Australian Army has not yet built a durable mechanism to ‘be masters of our most consequential trade’.[16] The value of this theory is not academic ornament; it is that the theory explains why smart people inside serious institutions can make rational decisions that still leave the institution misaligned with reality.
Herbert Simon’s foundational insight is that decision-making is rational only inside a model the decision-maker occupies and largely cannot see. Simon writes that human decision-making is ‘intended and bounded’ and that decision-makers ‘satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize’.[17] The decision-maker cannot capture the full complexity of the model due to limited information, limited cognitive capacity and limited time. Every decision an institution makes is rational within its bounds and its own understanding of its world.
In their 1958 publication Organizations, March and Simon treat the organisation as an information-processing system that acts on a simplified internal representation of its environment.[18] The organisation does not perceive the world. It perceives the briefs, doctrines and reports through which the world has been prescribed to it. Bounded rationality, once organisational, becomes a defining property of the model. Decisions made within the bounds of the model appear rational to the decision-maker because they are aligning to the model’s construct.
In their 1963 publication A Behavioral Theory of the Firm Cyert and March argue that an organisation does not behave; its members behave, and the pattern of those behaviours is what the organisation is.[19] Each member acts within the model that the institution has supplied. The aggregate of those model-bound decisions is the institution’s output. There is no separate institutional intelligence sitting above the decisions and correcting them. If the model drifts, every individual decision drifts with it, and the drift is invisible at the individual level because each decision still looks rational inside the model the institution provided.
In 1995, Karl Weick named the perceptual mechanism by which institutions hold their model in place: sensemaking. Weick describes sensemaking as the process by which institutions construct intelligibility from streams of events.[20] The institution receives events already sorted into the categories the model provides. When events fit the model, the model is confirmed. When events fail to match the model, the institution re-fits the events. As a defensive routine, the institution reclassifies anomalies, softens contradictions, and obfuscates signals that should disturb the model.
In 1990, Argyris defined defensive routines as the patterns by which organisations protect themselves from the threat of learning something that they would rather not know. His formulation is that defensive routines ‘make the undiscussable undiscussable and make their undiscussability undiscussable’.[21] The model itself becomes one of those undiscussables. Questioning it is read by the institution as disloyalty, naivety or category error. In a 1978 publication with Schön, Argyris gave this its sharpest form: institutions can engage in single-loop learning that adjusts behaviour within the model, but will suppress double-loop learning, which adjusts the model.[22] Defensive routines are why model-level audits do not happen even when model-level failure is obvious.
The five theoretical concepts, when stacked together, form a single mechanism. Institutions adapt to their model of the world rather than to the world itself. The model is supplied by the institution. The model drifts as the world changes. The drift produces no internal signal because the model’s decisions look rational from within. Sensemaking re-fits any anomaly back into the model before it can register as a contradiction. Defensive routines prevent the model itself from being discussed openly and honestly. Its rational response, within its model, is to apply more of the model. The harder it tries, the less the gap closes, because the effort is measured against a world that no longer exists. The mechanism’s combined effect is the suppression of curiosity itself.
This is the theoretical foundation for why decades of structural reform may not have closed the adaptation gap despite serious institutional effort. It is not for lack of effort or professional mastery within the institution. Reform inside the model is single-loop learning. It measures the institution’s behaviour against its own metrics, which are themselves part of the model. New structures, new doctrines and new technology are absorbed into the existing model and rendered legible by it. The gap that the reforms were meant to close is the gap between the model and the world, and that gap is exactly what the institution’s own instruments cannot measure.
Army’s Inherited Model
Army’s model is visible in five places, each a behavioural default: what the institution plans for, how it acquires capabilities, how it manages careers, how it codifies knowledge, and how it measures itself. Together they describe the world the institution implicitly believes it is operating in.
The central organising case for Army planning remains force-on-force land combat, even where strategic guidance has moved on. The strategic directions sequence that runs from Plan Beersheba (2011) through Accelerated Warfare (2018) and Army in Motion (2020) modernises the language but preserves the model. Other tasks (littoral, long-range strike, information manoeuvre, supporting joint effects) are appended to this model rather than displacing it. The consequence is that the reform intended to achieve adaptation is filtered through the legacy model.
Technology is the most obvious gap between the model and the real world. Ukraine’s Brave1, examined above, illustrates the gap at speed. The compressed timeframes are even more stark when compared with the Defence capability life cycle, which routinely spans 10 to 20 years for major land systems. The cycle’s tempo assumes more stability than the current environment provides; it therefore risks producing obsolescence by design rather than by accident. These extended cycles become less tolerable as autonomous systems, machine learning and robotics are moving along steep capability curves. If the trajectory holds even loosely, a 2026 capability decision taken against a 2016 technology baseline is being made against a reference point now multiple orders of magnitude obsolete by the time the system enters service. It was procured for a world that no longer exists.
Why the Model Is Invisible
Diane Vaughan’s The Challenger Launch Decision examines the closest historical analogue to the position the Australian Army now occupies. NASA did not lose Challenger because individuals were negligent. NASA lost Challenger because, over the preceding 30 years, the agency’s model of acceptable solid rocket booster O-ring erosion drifted by small steps.[23] Each compromise was rational and accepted by NASA’s model of the world. No single decision crossed a visible line. The model itself was never re-examined because it was not anybody’s job, and the people best placed to do so had built their careers inside it. The disaster on 28 January 1986 was the moment the model’s misalignment with reality became visible. Vaughan named the pattern: normalisation of deviance. Within Army each individual cell, directorate, branch and group acts to meet their commander’s intent within the rational bounds of their area. It is not currently anybody’s job to question the bounds of the model. The Australian Army risks normalising deviance—not through negligence but through repeated rational decisions made inside an unexamined model.
The Australian Army’s promotion system is one of the central instruments by which the model is preserved. Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews, in The Future of the Army Profession, identified the dynamic with reference to the United States Army: the profession is shaped most powerfully by the gates at which its members are advanced.[24] An officer with 20 years invested in the existing planning process, orders format and reporting chain has a rational interest in the continued relevance of those skills. Within the current career management model there is no incentive to question underlying assumptions. This is the ordinary arithmetic of professional life, not a moral failing. Officers who diverge from the model at the captain or major level do not reach the appointments at which the model’s framing could be revisited. The selection mechanism is doing exactly what it was designed to do. It rewards exemplary performance in the bounded rationality of the current model.
Lieutenant General Stuart’s November 2024 Australian National University address illustrates the mechanism in operation. The Chief of Army organised the Army profession around three pillars (jurisdiction, expertise and self-regulation), named command accountability as the wellspring of self-regulation, and identified that the command relationship between Army and the individual has not thrived these last two decades.[25] The address is rich in the language of accountability. It does not connect the call for accountability to the gates at which the institution actually advances its officers. This is not a critique of the Chief of Army; it is an example of the power of the model. Even when the most senior officer in the Army identifies the right terrain, the prescription that follows operates within the constraints of the model the diagnosis was built to expose.
Professional military education is the final reinforcement. The Australian Command and Staff Course, which is required for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, delivers Joint Professional Military Education at the institutional level around a syllabus that presents the existing planning model as the syllabus to master.[26] Students are assessed on their fluency in the model. The model is not flagged as a model; it is taught as the way the world is. A graduate who has internalised the model is, by the institution’s own standards, more professionally developed than one who has not. The medium of thought becomes invisible in proportion to how thoroughly it is taught.
Three Rewires
Three interventions within the Army’s existing authority would force the institution to perceive its own model. The rewires are themselves structural. They create new artefacts, new cells, new registers and new accountabilities. This essay’s diagnosis is that two decades of structural reform have not produced epistemic change. Why would three more structural interventions succeed where prior ones have failed?
The answer is that prior reforms operated within the institution’s existing model of itself. They rearranged the structures, the doctrines and the artefacts the model already knew how to produce. The three rewires proposed here are structural in form but epistemic in function. Each one creates a permanent institutional surface on which the model itself becomes visible to its inhabitants. None of them requires the institution to abandon the model immediately. Each requires the institution to put the model on the public record, where it can be examined by people who do not share the model’s assumptions and where its outputs can be tracked against the world. The structural form is the means by which the epistemic surface is created and held in place.
The External Model Audit
The first rewire is a permanent panel that sits outside Defence and reports to the Chief of Army. Its members come from places Defence rarely listens to: executives from sectors that turn over faster than Army; academics in organisational behaviour, strategic studies and decision science; allied scholars; and a small number of recently retired Australian officers whose only job is to translate. The panel meets once a year and has one question to answer: what assumptions in Army’s operating model reflect a world that no longer exists? The findings go to the Chief of Army in writing. They run in the Army newspaper. Army publishes a response to every one of them within 90 days.
The composition matters. The objection that recently retired Australian officers are by definition inside the model is correct, which is why the panel’s centre of gravity must sit outside the profession. The objection that NASA also had external advisory panels and they did not prevent the Challenger disaster is also correct, which is why the discipline of the rewire is not the panel’s findings but the public response. NASA’s panels reported privately and produced documents that were filed. The rewire’s discipline is that the institution must respond, on the public record, to every finding. The pain point that forces change is the publication-and-response mechanism, not the panel’s authority.
The mechanism has a working precedent in Australian Defence at the strategic level. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review was led externally by Sir Angus Houston and Professor Stephen Smith, demonstrating that an independent review at the Defence strategic level is institutionally possible.[27] The RAND Arroyo Center has provided the equivalent multi-decade external advisory function for the United States Army.[28] What does not currently exist in Australia is the standing, service-level, public-response version.
The Observation-Bound Doctrine
The second rewire connects the units that observe the gap between the model and the world to the directorates that codify the doctrine. Soldiers and junior officers in operational and exercise rotations operate within a different model (immediate, tactical, embodied), and the cross-model triangulation between their observations and the institution’s codified knowledge is the signal the system needs. The evidence that Australian soldiers and junior officers can produce that signal is in the volume of professional writing already published by The Cove, the Australian Army Journal and the Land Power Forum.[29] The current institutional reflex is to read these outlets and to leave the doctrine cycle untouched.
Every unit returning from a major training event, exercise or operational rotation would be required to produce a structured learning artefact in a fixed format: what was expected, what was found, what changed our minds, and what the institution does not yet know. The artefact is produced by the unit in the arena, not by a directorate observing from within its own bounded rationality. Each artefact is formally tagged to specific doctrine publications. Each tag carries one of three values: this observation challenges the publication’s claim, this observation supports the publication’s claim, or this observation has no view on the publication. Tags aggregate in a doctrine-challenge register held by the ADF Doctrine Directorate.
When a piece of doctrine receives three independent challenge tags from three separate units, its review date is automatically advanced and the doctrine must be reviewed within 90 days. The review must address each challenge tag by accepting the challenge and updating the doctrine, or by contesting the challenge and explaining, on the public record, why the observation does not generalise. The threshold is small enough to act on early signals and large enough to filter idiosyncratic observations. The trigger for change moves from the codifier to the observer.
The objection is correct: soldier observations are model-bound too. The mechanism still works because they are also the fastest signal Army receives, and because triangulating between what soldiers see in contact and what doctrine codifies is the cheapest way to surface a gap. The pattern has working precedents. The United States Army runs the Center for Army Lessons Learned. NATO runs the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre. The Internet Engineering Task Force retires superseded standards through its request-for-comments obsoletion process. Each one couples observation to codification on a fixed cadence.[30]
The Standing Model Audit
The third rewire is the continuous companion to the first. The external model audit interrogates the institution’s assumptions periodically and from outside; the standing model audit interrogates them continuously and from within. Together the two constitute Army’s model audit capability. The panel surfaces what the institution has stopped seeing because it has stopped looking; the standing model audit surfaces what the institution is failing to see while it watches.
The mechanism is an Army digital vault, located in the Chief of Army’s office and sized as a thin technical team. The cell ingests three classes of feeds onto a single inspectable surface:
- existing G1 to G8 reporting feeds
- external allied capability gazettes, technology benchmarks, Australian National Audit Office findings, coalition lessons learned, and open-source intelligence on the operating environment Army is preparing for
- registered forecasts—every formal Army strategic document, capability plan, force-structure decision, threat assessment, and operational concept registers its load-bearing forecasts, with a stated condition for failure.
Machine-learning software runs in the background, testing every registered forecast against the data Army holds and the signals the world is throwing off. When a forecast begins to fail, the cell flags the gap and traces every decision that rests on it. The Chief of Army sees the live picture at any moment: (1) where Army is now, (2) where the world is heading, (3) what the institution has been telling itself about that world, and (4) the gap between the (2) and (3). Calibration is no longer something the officer in post brings or fails to bring. It belongs to the institution. The cell carries the track record from one rotation to the next, and incoming officers inherit it as the starting position.
Philip Tetlock’s Good Judgment Project[31] and the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity’s Aggregative Contingent Estimation program proved the same point. Score forecasters on calibration over time, and accuracy improves, both for the forecaster and for the institution that holds the scores. The standing model audit borrows the method. The line that appears on the promotion-board summary is ‘the officer updated when the variance signal arrived’. That is what the system is now rewarding: responsiveness to evidence.
A cell with only internal feeds is a high-fidelity mirror; a cell with internal reporting, external feeds and accountability forecasts is a continuous audit. The minimum viable version is a structured forecast register, live data feeds, and a quarterly variance review. The full instrumentation is a five- to 10-year body of work. The pattern is already being used in allied militaries: Palantir’s Maven Smart System is becoming a US Department of Defense program of record in 2026,[32] and the US Army’s March 2026 contract with Anduril for Lattice commits US$20 billion to the same pattern at operational altitude,[33] with Australia as the second-largest adopter under AUKUS Pillar II.[34] The standing model audit applies the pattern one floor up at the institutional altitude.
Amplifying the Learners
The three rewires create surfaces on which the model becomes visible. Surfaces are inert without people who can read them and act on what they see. Across Army those people already exist, scattered through every rank. They hold small platforms and deep institutional knowledge, whose questioning of the model has gone without institutional backing. The fourth move is to identify them and give them voice. Project Ruthless calls openly for ‘red tape targeteers’ willing to challenge entrenched systems;[35] the Deputy Adjutant General leads engagement directly with frontline soldiers and non-commissioned officers. Army Innovation Day has awarded 51 contracts to industry pitches optimising the soldier and the force.[36] The Cove and the Australian Army Journal already give voices outside the model a way back in. The amplification move wires them together with permanent budget lines, position descriptions that outlast their current holders, and a single institutional commitment that keeps the rewires in place. The move is thinner than the rewires by design. The institution can specify a surface. It cannot specify a learner.
Objections
The strongest objections deserve direct answers.
The first defence is that the rewires are structural reforms in their own right. The external panel forces Army to write its underlying assumptions down and answer for them. Observation-bound doctrine puts a number on the gap between what doctrine codifies and what the field reports. The standing model audit keeps the institution’s model under inspection against the world, continuously.
The second objection is that we have tried this before. We have—the First Principles Review in 2015, Pathway to Change in 2012 and again in 2017, the Defence Strategic Review in 2023, and the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide report in 2024. None of them aimed at changing how the institution holds its own picture of the world. They were structural and cultural reforms run by senior sponsors—exactly the kind this argument has been criticising. What none of them touched is whether Army’s model is open to interrogation in the first place. No Australian reform program has tried it.
The third objection is the most serious. As Vaughan describes, NASA learned to see what it had stopped perceiving only after the Challenger disaster. The rewires proposed here might also be absorbed by an institution whose instinct, faced with an audit, is to shelve it; faced with a doctrine challenge register is to dispute the tags; and faced with a standing model audit is to register only forecasts that cannot be falsified. The reply is that the rewires reduce the probability of that outcome rather than eliminate it. A public response is harder to ignore than a private one. A doctrine review is hard to defer when three independent units have surfaced the same gap. A track record of calibrated forecasts outweighs a single contested judgement. The rewires do not guarantee adaptation. They make the failure to adapt visible early enough to act on, and they leave each successive Chief of Army a surface on which to stake the case for action.
Each rewire needs a permanent home outside the Chief of Army’s office. The United States Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned has survived a long line of Army Chiefs of Staff because it sits inside the Training and Doctrine Command and is codified in regulation (Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-33). The model audit needs the same kind of regulatory anchor. The doctrine challenge register has to live inside a directorate with its own command authority. The standing model audit requires a permanent technical and analytical home, with position descriptions and budget lines that survive the people who currently hold them. Without permanent homes, the rewires depend on each successive Chief of Army to defend them. That is the failure mode the diagnosis predicts.
Conclusion
The Australian Army has spent more than a decade treating an epistemic problem as a structural one. Continuing the same pattern will produce the same result. The question the 2026 Chauvel Essay asks is how to rewire the Army to continually adapt. The answer this essay has offered is not a further restructuring of the bricks the institution is built from but the installation of permanent institutional surfaces: a firm foundation on which the model itself becomes visible, examinable and answerable.
The Australian Army has prided itself in being a professional and learned organisation. Over the last few decades, it has found itself exquisitely prepared and structured, and culturally reformed for a world that no longer exists. Epistemic reform invites external voices to question our assumptions; it links the doctrine to our soldiers and uses machine learning to connect the pieces of our organisation that we cannot connect ourselves. Taken together, these moves constitute the theory of Army Lieutenant General Stuart has called for. Under the current system it is not anybody’s job to fix the model. Through epistemic reform and weaponised curiosity it can become everyone’s job to exemplify, amplify and empower an Army of learners.
Endnotes
[1] Eric Hoffer, Reflections on the Human Condition (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 22.
[2] Simon Stuart, ‘The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession’, speech, ANU National Security College, 25 November 2024, transcript at: www.army.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches-and-transcripts/2024-11-25/cha….
[3] Simon Stuart, ‘Strengthening the Australian Army Profession’, speech, Lowy Institute, 3 April, 2025, transcript at: www.army.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches-and-transcripts/2025-04-03/str….
[4] Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), p. 85.
[5] Rick Burr, Accelerated Warfare: Futures Statement for an Army in Motion (Department of Defence, 2020), at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/other/accelerated-warfare; Rick Burr, Army in Motion: Commander’s Statement for Australia’s Army (Department of Defence, 2020), at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/other/accelerated-warfare.
[6] Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2023).
[7] Department of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024); Department of Defence, 2026 National Defence Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2026).
[8] Edgar H Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th edition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010).
[9] Chris Argyris and Donald A Schön, Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974).
[10] Karl E Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd edition (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
[11] Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Free Press, 1990).
[12] ‘About Brave1’, Brave1 (website), at: https://brave1.gov.ua/en; ‘Ukraine Officially Launches Brave1 Market—the First Online Defense Technology Marketplace for the Ukrainian Army’, Digital State UA (website), 28 April 2025, at: https://digitalstate.gov.ua/news/tech/brave1-market-ukrayina-zapuskaye-….
[13] ‘Madyar’s Birds Regiment Expanded to Brigade’, Militarnyi, 10 December 2024, at: https://militarnyi.com/en/news/madyars-birds-regiment-expanded-to-briga….
[14] ‘Reforming Defence Capability Development and Delivery’, media release, Defence Ministers (website), 1 December 2025, at: www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2025-12-01/reforming-defence….
[15] Australian National Audit Office, 2024–25 Major Projects Report, Auditor-General Report No. 16 of 2025–26 (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2025).
[16] Stuart, ‘The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession’.
[17] Herbert A Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, 4th edition (New York: Free Press, 1997).
[18] James G March and Herbert A Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958).
[19] Richard M Cyert and James G March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
[20] Karl E Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 1995).
[21] Chris Argyris, Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1990).
[22] Chris Argyris and Donald A Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
[23] Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), at: https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo3625477.html.
[24] Don M Snider and Lloyd J Matthews (eds), The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
[25] Stuart, ‘The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession’.
[26] ‘Australian Command and Staff Course’, Defence (website), at: www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/education-training/courses/austra… (accessed 30 April 2026).
[27] Department of Defence, National Defence.
[28] ‘About Arroyo’, RAND (website), at: www.rand.org/ard/about.html (accessed 30 April 2026).
[29] The Cove and the Land Power Forum are managed by the Australian Army; the Australian Army Journal is published by the Australian Army Research Centre.
[30] Department of the Army, Pamphlet 11-33: Guide to the Army Lessons Learned Program (Washington: Department of the Army, 2022); NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, The NATO Lessons Learned Handbook, 3rd edition (NATO: 2016); ‘Informal Guide to IETF Process Documents’, Internet Engineering Task Force (website), at: www.ietf.org/process/informal (accessed 30 April 2026).
[31] Philip E Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: Crown, 2015); Dirk B Warnaar et al., ‘The Aggregative Contingent Estimation System: Selecting, Rewarding, and Training Experts in a Wisdom of Crowds Approach to Forecasting’, AAAI Spring Symposium: Wisdom of the Crowd, 2012.
[32] Brandi Vincent, ‘DOD Components Face “Aggressive” Timeline for Maven Smart System Transition’, DefenseScoop, 15 April 2026, at: https://defensescoop.com/2026/04/15/palantir-maven-smart-system-pentago….
[33] ‘U.S. Army Awards $20B Anduril to Deploy Lattice AI Open Architecture for Battlefield Integration’, Army Recognition, 23 March 2026, at: www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/u-s-army-awards-20b-anduril…; ‘Lattice for Mission Autonomy’, Anduril (website), at: hwww.anduril.com/lattice/mission-autonomy (accessed May 2026).
[34] ‘Anduril’s Lattice Platform: Architecture, Accountability, and the Future of Autonomous Warfare in American Defense Strategy’, Foreign Affairs Forum, 21 April 2026, at: www.faf.ae/home/2026/4/21/andurils-lattice-platform-architecture-accountability-and-the-future-of-autonomous-warfare-in-american-defense-strategy.
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