Lessons from the United Kingdom
Author: Vincent Connelly
Abstract
Any transition from competition to conflict would place significant workforce pressures on the British Army to generate forces. In the past, this has been addressed by maintaining a pool of ex-regular personnel, a Regular Reserve, which has suffered decay in recent years. The British Army’s response to the 2025 United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review (SDR) has focused on revitalising its Regular Reserve—akin to the Australian Defence Force’s Service Category 2 (SERCAT 2), commonly referred to as the Standby Reserve—to provide individual reinforcements and supplement home defence.[1] The Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves (SRR) has recommended SERCAT 2 undergo ‘immediate expansion’[2] in a broadly similar fashion to deal with the challenges of current workforce numbers and to provide access to pretrained talent supplemented by civilian skills in a major crisis.
This article looks back over the history of the British Army Regular Reserve and details the factors underpinning the 1980s individual reinforcement plan that would have seen 120,000 Regular Reserve personnel mobilised in 48 hours. A brief synopsis of the Regular Reserve from its genesis through its gradual decline in the aftermath of the Cold War is provided, with an analysis of the barriers that have since prevented the British Army from revitalising the Regular Reserve. A contrast of the UK experience with that of Australia—which has maintained SERCAT 2 over the same period—is provided as a parallel. The UK and Australia face similar challenges in maintaining a reliable pool of ex-regular personnel to be called upon in a crisis. In examining those challenges, this article proposes a common framework to enhance numbers, availability and readiness of the latent reserve workforce.
Introduction
The 2025 UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) highlighted the requirement for the British Armed Forces to accelerate their readiness to fight a state-on-state war[3] as part of the NATO alliance. The UK SDR, bolstered by the evidence from the war in Ukraine, emphasises the key role that reserve forces play in war. The 2026 Australian National Defence Strategy also seeks to strengthen the ADF Reserve to deliver the integrated, focused force required to protect and defend Australia.[4] The lessons from the Ukraine conflict demonstrate that on mobilisation, armies need to scale up their forces to be sustainable for state-on-state war. Armies that rely on volunteer enlistment will need to use reservists to reinforce their peacetime gaps and also replace individual battle casualties. However, armies also need reserve units to mobilise to deliver the additional collective capability to deal with the massive expansion of tasks and rapid wearing-out of units in war.[5] This is a dual pressure of filling peacetime gaps and supporting army expansion of reserve forces that many professional armies have not had to consider for decades.
The British Army’s response to this challenge is to begin to refocus its part-time volunteer reserve, the Army Reserve (formerly the Territorial Army), on providing additional collective capability, while revitalising its pools of ex-regular reserves (the UK’s equivalent of the ‘Standby Reserve’) to provide individual reinforcements and supplement home defence.[6] Many armed forces are now focusing attention on these previously trained workforce pools.[7] Australia’s 2024 SRR, for example, recommends that the current SERCAT 2 category of previously trained ex-regulars, the ‘Standby Reserve’, be immediately expanded.[8] However, the 21st century has seen the workforce pools of ex-regular reservists in the ADF,[9] as well as in the British Army, languish for many years with little engagement and no realistic planning or resourcing for their use.[10] This article reflects on the UK’s recent history of regular reservists and considers why they are thought to be currently ineffective. The UK and Australia face similar challenges in maintaining a reliable pool of ex-regular personnel to be called upon in a crisis; in examining those challenges, this article proposes a common framework to enhance numbers, availability and readiness of the latent reserve workforce.
The Need for Reserve Forces
Most nations (especially democracies) cannot afford to have standing regular armies made up of the numbers of trained and equipped units needed to fight large-scale wars. As threats increase, regular armies that are limited in size by peacetime defence budgets must be ready to expand rapidly to cope with the heavier demands of war. Tasks will increase greatly, formations will suffer attrition, units will need replacement, and areas of operation will grow larger, greatly exacerbating workforce pressures. Therefore, smaller professional armies must be ready to generate more units on mobilisation for war, as well as plug inevitable gaps in establishments and source pools of battle casualty replacements. Reserve forces can provide both the additional units and the individuals to meet the challenges of wartime pressures without the economic demands of a large peacetime regular force, as has been demonstrated in Ukraine.[11]
The British Army for most of the 20th century had a simple and well-understood reserve system. The full-time regular forces provided the British Army standing forces at high readiness in peacetime; the part-time volunteer Army Reserve, at lower readiness, mobilised units and so expanded the army’s collective capability in wartime; and the Regular Reserves provided a workforce pool of ex-regular individual reinforcements and a supplement to home defence. History demonstrated that this system worked well. Today, under the UK Reserve Forces Act 1996, there is still a part-time Volunteer Reserve, organised into units, which trains in peacetime and can be ‘called out’ for war, in crisis, or to supplement the Regular Forces. There is also the Regular Reserve, consisting of previously trained ex-regulars who can legally be called out for service under the same conditions as the Volunteer Reserve. Finally, there are those ‘individuals liable for recall’, who are also ex-regulars but have a different legal status and lower readiness. The UK Government is now referring to the Regular Reserve and ‘individuals liable for recall’ as the Strategic Reserve, and to the Volunteer Reserve as the ‘Active Reserve’, but these terms have no current legal basis and can be confusing. In this article, for simplicity, the Regular Reserve and those liable for recall will be referred to as the British Army’s Regular Reserves.
The Utility of the Regular Reserves
One of the most successful periods for Regular Reserve utility for the British Army was the start of World War I. On mobilisation in 1914, 98 per cent of regular reservists reported for duty, with all battalions having enough regular reservists to bring them up to war establishment, and many forming complete reserve second line battalions.[12] The reason for such success was not random. Those leaving the Regular Army had a clear legal reserve liability but received a relatively generous retainer of half pay, and in return were expected to parade for a few days of training a year. Retainers were paid quarterly in arrears on condition of reservists turning up at their regimental depot with their uniform and equipment. A Regular Reserve liability was a well-known feature of army life; the regular reservist turned up for their training at their previous regular battalion or depot in the UK and was looked after by their previous regimental affiliation. This system continued and worked as well for mobilisation of the army in 1939[13] as it did in 1914, since the army continued to educate regular troops and communicate with regular reservists in the interwar period.[14]
The basics of the scheme did not change for most of the 20th century. Over time, defined sections of the Regular Reserve were developed with differing levels of readiness and commitment and with varying levels of retainer paid so that workforce pinch points, especially for specialist trades, could be adequately covered in an emergency. The largest call outs of the Regular Reserve after World War II were for the Korean War in 1950 and the Suez Crisis in 1956. The system had worked well for large-scale crises facing the nation (such as the world wars), but the call out for these smaller ‘wars of choice’ was not, unsurprisingly, popular with regular reservists—disciplinary issues, for example, were noted during the Suez Crisis.[15]
The British Army’s 1980s Individual Reinforcement Plan
Through the Cold War period (1945–1990), the British Army’s planning for war included extensive use of the Regular Reserves.[16] By the 1980s, this planning required regular reservists to be more rapidly available, so an effort was made to reinvigorate the entire system of planning and mobilisation. The individual reinforcement plan (IRP)[17] was developed between 1979 and 1981. This saw the matching of demand and supply for regular reservists, calculated by a simple algorithm, using a single computer against the army’s mobilisation order of battle for war. Each receiving unit’s current strength in peacetime was assessed in comparison with its peacetime gaps and increased war establishment. The algorithm then matched gapped posts with individual regular reservists of the required rank and trade group who were living nearest to the unit or mobilisation centre requiring reinforcement, selecting those who had most recently left the army first, and so on. Once selected, the individual reservist received details by post of their war role and their reporting centre on call out, and this was added to the more general information about their liability for call out. Mobilisation reporting centres and all units had live lists of the named regular reservists they were to receive. The plan was estimated to be able to mobilise more than 100,000 reservists in 48 hours once activated.[18] Forecasting indicated that 50 per cent of regular reservists were expected to report within 24 hours, 40 per cent within 36 hours, and the remaining 10 per cent within 48 hours.[19] The plan included a surplus of reservists nominated to cover a percentage of ‘no-shows’, and even to account for enemy action while reservists were in transit to war locations.
As part of the IRP, regular soldiers leaving service were informed of their liability through briefings using specially produced films[20] and pamphlets, and the keeping of a home retention scale of uniform and equipment. Under the Reserve Forces Act 1980[21] each regular reservist had a 15-day training liability, but only one day of reporting a year was invoked. For this, reservists were required to attend an annual Army Reserve reporting centre exercise (ARRCEX). The aim of the day was to maintain regular contact with the reservist, verify personal details, determine a current state of health and welfare, check documentation and ensure that kit was complete. Reservists received written instructions about the ARRCEX well in advance and were given a choice of local reporting centres to attend. Reporting centres were typically Army Reserve unit or Regular Army unit locations with weekday, weekend or evening attendance options. The reservist was required to take their documentation, uniform and equipment to the centre to be paid for attendance. ARRCEX claimed an 85–90 per cent attendance rate with over 50,000 reservists attending each year during the 1980s.[22] Standardised and detailed instructions for reporting centre administrators were produced and their target was the processing of 30 reservists per hour.[23]
Regular reservists could also volunteer for additional training as part of the IRP. Project STAR (Scheme for Training Army Reservists) was a one-week voluntary refresher course available for regular reservists after they had been out of regular service for three years. Major exercises often involved testing mobilisation and reinforcement plans, so regular reservists were also invited to volunteer to take part. For example, Exercise Lionheart in 1984 saw 3,350 regular reservists rehearse mobilisation and move to Germany to fill war roles. By 1990, it was estimated that there were 180,000 British Army regular reservists potentially available, with about 120,000 of these allocated roles in the IRP. Of the rest, up to 40,000 were estimated as being unavailable due to occupying vital civilian occupations in war such as police, fire or ambulance services, or were living overseas, while a further 20,000 were deemed likely unusable due to medical issues or were untraceable.[24]
Regular reservists in the 1980s were typically allocated a war role identical or very similar to their previous roles in the army. Little account was taken of their civilian skills or experience developed since they had left regular service. In addition to reinforcing regular and volunteer reserve units in the order of battle and providing formation-level battle casualty pools, some regular reservists were also tasked with forming rear area infantry defence companies for the deployed corps in Germany. In the UK, a large number of home defence General Service Units of infantry, engineering and transport would be formed from regular reservists. There were some doubts over the feasibility of this idea since no routine peacetime training was undertaken. However, the largest UK home defence exercise of the Cold War, 1985’s Exercise Brave Defender, saw 2,500 regular reservists join the other 60,000 participants to practise forming General Service Unit infantry companies. These companies were allocated to guarding key points such as government and defence installations and infrastructure, ports, energy installations, food depots, and transport nodes across the UK. Home defence plans envisaged a role for over 40,000 regular reservists to protect the UK homeland’s key points in these formed sub-units, as well as the provision for 15,000 individual reinforcements to backfill the regular and volunteer reserve units allocated to home defence.[25]
For those regular reservists who wished to have a more active part in home defence, the newly formed Home Service Force (HSF) welcomed ex-regulars leaving service who could commit up to 10 days a year training. The HSF provided formed infantry platoons for home defence, whose purpose was specifically to guard key points in their local areas. The HSF also recruited ex-volunteer reservists into their ranks. The result was an older but highly experienced cohort with a focused role that proved on numerous home defence exercises to be a valuable addition to the security of the nation in war. At its peak, the HSF had a strength of about 6,000 personnel. The HSF was disbanded along with all military home defence provisions in 1991 at the perceived end of the Cold War.
At the end of the 1980s, the British Army had a detailed and well-practised plan to use the Regular Reserve in war to reinforce both units and home defence. The IRP was never put into practice, so we can only speculate as to how well it would have worked.[26] For example, there was a baseline public assumption in the 1980s that any conventional war between NATO and the Soviet Union would be of very short duration and would be followed by a large-scale nuclear exchange.[27] There were also concerns raised in the Ministry of Defence that reservists might not be persuaded to part from families who could be under threat of nuclear attack. The archival files detail frustration in the Ministry of Defence with the Home Office—responsible for the UK civil police force—over the Home Office’s refusal to order police officers to arrest regular reservists who failed to respond to an actual call out.[28] Finally, while the IRP infrastructure was funded, the available kit and equipment for regular reservists was more limited. After almost 10 years of the IRP, by 1990 the British Army still only had enough weapons and equipment for 80,000 of the 120,000 regular reservists allocated an IRP role. As others have indicated regarding UK Cold War preparations, the ideas were sound but sometimes fell through due to a lack of funding.[29]
The Regular Reserve After the Cold War
Members of the Regular Reserve, mainly medical reservists, were asked to volunteer for call out for the first Gulf War in 1990. Not surprisingly, many chose not to volunteer for a ‘war of choice’ and the call was not helped by ambiguity over job protection due to volunteering status.[30] The government therefore had to compulsorily call out small numbers under legislation. This was moderately successful but a number of reservists failed to report, prompting the Ministry of Defence to consider prosecution. However, the political appetite was not supportive, so prosecutions were not proceeded with. Paid retainers ceased later in 1991 as the peace dividend was taken, which reduced to a small grant to those who returned an annual reporting letter within the first five years post regular service. With the early 1990s centralisation of all personnel services in the Army Personnel Centre, no sign of a large-scale threat to the UK, and a new Reserve Forces Act in 1996 giving more flexibility to call out volunteer reservists, engagement and communication with the Regular Reserve was downgraded and funding for training, weapons and equipment began to wither away.[31]
Unit war establishment tables continued to reflect the planned use of the Regular Reserve for war until at least 2010, but any annual training requirements had long ceased. This did not prevent the army from compulsorily calling out regular reservists for Operation Telic 1—the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The call out of troops to an accepted-into-service ratio for regular reservists was low, with only approximately one in five accepted into service.[32] Compulsory call out orders were also issued for the part-time volunteer Army Reserve required for Operation Telic 1. They had a much better call out to accepted-into-service ratio of one in 1.25.[33] The Army Reserve therefore became the reserve of first choice for backfilling the British Army’s continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014.[34]
This success meant that the part-time volunteer reserve, the Army Reserve—which had traditionally provided complete units on mobilisation—was now relied upon to provide individual backfill to the Regular Army on operations.[35] Over time, however, the collective capabilities and unit-level training of the Army Reserve drifted lower and lower in terms of Ministry of Defence priorities.[36] By the time of 2021’s ‘Future Soldier’ review, the remaining 70 Army Reserve units were expected to primarily provide individual reservist backfill to Regular Army units and, at a stretch, were liable to provide some sub-unit level collective capability as well at 180 days’ notice to move.[37] This contrasted with the end of the Cold War in 1990 when the Army Reserve could provide 107 major units, many organised in brigades, and 270 sub-units, all ready to expand the army at 72 hours’ notice to move, backed up by 120,000 Regular Reserve individual reinforcements.[38]
By 2025, the British Army—through relying on the part-time Army Reserve for unit backfill and effectively ignoring the Regular Reserve—had lost its ability to rapidly expand its number of units in war. The dual system of the volunteer Army Reserve to provide additional units in war, and the Regular Reserve as a reliable source of individual reinforcements, had gone. This was despite the British Army’s declining regular force structure and the many workforce gaps in regular units (including against several difficult-to-retain trades) introducing a hollowness in key skillsets that endangered the Regular Army’s depth. In fact, the UK’s National Audit Office reported that many of the specialist gaps in the Regular Army could not be filled by the part-time Army Reserve either.[39]
Barriers to Revitalising the Regular Reserve
Since Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, western European nations acknowledge an increased threat of large-scale war returning to Europe. There is now an increased political focus on reserve forces and readiness for war, as there is in Australia.[40] However, the British Army has tried to reinvigorate the Regular Reserve several times since 2003.[41] What are the factors that are making this difficult to achieve?
A Failure to Communicate and Manage Expectations
The termination process for those leaving the Regular Army can be difficult for those transitioning,[42] so reminders about a legally liable enduring commitment may not be welcome. It has been reported from leavers’ surveys that many Regular Army personnel consider that the obligation to be recalled is unfair, despite personally entering into a legally binding time commitment on entering regular service.[43] This may not be surprising in cases where there has been little mention of the reserve liability since the 1990s during their service, and where individuals thought it unlikely they would ever be called out for operations.[44] Leavers’ surveys also indicate there is little, if any, mention of reserve liability when personnel go through the separation process from regular service.[45] Given evidence for the cultural marginalisation of reservists,[46] a lack of education about or contact with the Regular Reserve throughout a regular career, and the workplace culture of silence about Regular Reserve liability on leaving, it is not surprising that many regular leavers claim little knowledge of their ongoing liability.[47] Through this lapse, the British Army has failed to psychologically condition the regular workforce for reserve service.
A Perception of Reserve Deficiency Rather than Potential Utility
The workplace culture of the regular soldier demands that they maintain professional currency and demonstrate full-time commitment.[48] There is evidence that Regular Reserves are often perceived by serving regulars as deficient, and this risks an emphasis on reservist ‘skill fade’, combined with the organisationally negative image of the unreliable, less committed civilian reservist.[49] Any focus on the perceived risk of reservists not meeting theatre entry standards has the corollary that the reservist is risk-inducing rather than gap-filling or capability-enhancing.[50] This detracts from an honest debate about the utility of individuals who have been previously trained. A number of studies have demonstrated that individuals, of course, do suffer from skill fade once out of the army, but previously well-trained individuals can be brought back to a useful standard more quickly than ab initio recruits.[51] A recent study in Estonia, for example, demonstrated that a high level of basic combat skills was maintained many years later, even in one-year trained conscripts.[52] Furthermore, discussions about Regular Reserves rarely consider how their potential post-discharge civilian skills could be leveraged in new roles. The armed forces can have difficulty recognising the value of knowledge, skills and experience from civil life[53] but, combined with previous military experience, reservist civil and specialist skills can potentially be enormously useful to the army.[54]
Perceived Unwillingness to Consider Returning to the Army
In the UK, there is also a belief held by many serving regulars that most regular reservists will not want anything to do with the army on leaving.[55] Data, however, demonstrates that there is a willingness across many regular reservists to engage more as time away from the army passes.[56] About a quarter of UK regular reservists return their annual reporting letter, and those in touch with the army are those more willing to consider training and other opportunities.[57] An important point is that a strong determinant when stating a preference to train was a local Regular Army or Army Reserve location. Maintaining such army locations among the community may well be a key element in retaining a Regular Reserve capacity. A 2021 study found that more than half of regular reservists would consider positively more engagement from the army, with many preferring modern communications (email or a webpage) over the standard postal letter they receive.[58] Previous surveys also suggest that between one-half and two-thirds of Regular Reserves state that they would respond to a short-notice call out for a large-scale national emergency.[59] They also believe a paid retainer would motivate them more to engage and train.[60]
The Challenges to Overcome for the UK Regular Reserve
The long decades of inadequate investment means that revitalising the Regular Reserve will not be easy. Given reports that many ex-regulars do not think an ongoing liability for call out or recall is fair,[61] many of those with a current legal liability may resent a change to the previous extremely low expectation of being recalled to the colours. The 2025 SDR recognises that the UK is in a very different position today in that the army has increased workforce demands in wartime that it currently cannot meet from the Regular Army and Army Reserve workforce alone. The communication of this need and the justification for such a change in expectations will be a key factor in convincing those in the Regular Reserve to re-engage with their liability.
In summary, aspirations to reinvigorate the British Army Regular Reserve appear to have faltered for three interrelated reasons:[62]
- A workplace culture that does not value the potential contribution that the Regular Reserve could make and may not wish to engage with liability for recall after full-time service
- No specified demand held against the Regular Reserve workforce, despite gaps in critical pinch points and doubts over the British Army’s ability to provide mass for warfighting[63]
- A lack of funding for effective workforce management and reintegration of the Regular Reserve into a Whole Force Approach.
The Regular Reserve represents a large sunk investment for UK Defence in knowledge, skills and experience that can provide a cost-effective return to the nation through its legal liability to call out and recall. Over the last three decades, this sunk investment has been allowed to waste away.
The ADF Standby Reserve, SERCAT 2
The 2024 ADF SRR, similarly to the UK 2025 SDR, committed all parts of the Reserve to be ‘an integrated, focused force as part of National Defence and provide an expansion base for the ADF in times of crisis’.[64] Service Category 2 (SERCAT 2) is the standby reserve of the previously trained workforce that would be a key component of any future contingent reserve required to expand the ADF. This service obligation is mandatory for trained personnel who enlisted after 1 July 2003[65] and who do not transfer to the other reserve SERCAT categories. The SRR makes clear that SERCAT 2 is not in a healthy state. The numbers are low, about 9,400,[66] with little year-on-year growth compared to 125,500 UK regular reservists.[67] The review also references the complexity of activating SERCAT 2 individuals; many instead prefer to remain inactive on SERCAT 3, thus complicating the accounting of the operational and contingent reserve components. Of note, SERCAT 2 personnel were not called out in 2020, which has been the only contemporary government-enacted compulsory call out of the ADF Reserves. The current level of engagement and information held on those in SERCAT 2 was found to be wanting, which would be of greater concern should any mobilisation activities be contemplated. In line with the rest of the ADF reserve components, a clear role and purpose for SERCAT 2 is needed, aligned with an employee value proposition.
In recognising these challenges, the review recommended radical change to the current implementation of SERCAT 2 personnel based on the conclusion that ‘reserve demand outweighs Defence’s capacity to pay for, recruit and train such [a] reserve capacity’[68] solely from reservist volunteers from society. It endorsed a ‘qualitative shift in management’[69] to modernise record keeping, regularly engage with the reservists on SERCAT 2 to assure individual available capability, and integrate civilian skills into record keeping. The review also recommended that SERCAT 2 supply be aligned with the workforce positions needed in a crisis. In addition, there was a recommendation to extend the allotted time in SERCAT 2 from five to 10 years (capping out at retirement age) to double numbers over five years. Out of the 14 recommendations made in the strategic review, this recommendation was the only one not initially agreed;[70] it was finally implemented in September 2026.[71] Even with this doubling of numbers, the total workforce available remains very small compared to the UK compulsory liability system where Regular Reserve numbers are three times that of volunteer reserves.
Setting the Conditions for Success
A change in requirements for modern reserve forces, as expressed in the UK 2025 SDR and the ADF SRR, sets out the reality that both armies have shortages in their workforces that previously trained personnel could provide in a crisis. The UK Ministry of Defence has, through the 2025 SDR, committed to reinvigorating the Regular Reserve and improving the ministry’s ability to track, manage, mobilise, train and generate it. Presently, there is increased political will and recognition that the Regular Reserve needs to be brought back into the order of battle. From a weaker starting point in terms of numbers, the ADF has recognised similar issues and required solutions. The conditions for achieving both the UK’s and the ADF’s ambitions are tied to addressing six major challenges.
Modernised Legislation
The UK has the Reserve Force Act 1996, which provides on leaving regular service a compulsory legal liability for call out or recall for regular reservists. This allows a large pool of individuals to be legally brought back into service without going through a complicated rehiring process, and gives individuals the required legal protections. This provides the British Armed Forces with options when planning to use individuals to reinforce the workforce: asking for volunteers from that liability pool to come forward for mobilisation (as they have done since 2003), or compulsorily mobilising individuals at pace and scale.
The UK Ministry of Defence has also put forward legislative change to modernise the Reserve Forces Act 1996, introduced into parliament in early 2026.[72] The 1996 Act is broadly fit for purpose, but some sections are being amended to expand the potential Regular Reserve workforce. Publicly available figures demonstrate that the pool of regular reservists has shrunk since 2020.[73] While almost all officers—Regular or Volunteer Reserve—have a recall liability for life, the proposed measures extend the age limit for recall from age 55 to age 65 for regular other ranks, bringing the UK in line with most other NATO allies. Another measure introduces a compulsory recall liability for the part-time volunteer Army Reserve other ranks, aligning with their Regular Army other-rank counterparts. The proposed measures also include widening the liability of individuals for recall from only ‘if national danger is imminent or great emergency or an actual or apprehended attack on the United Kingdom’ to include ‘Warlike Operations’.[74] This introduces flexibility to recall so that individuals can be in place before an attack, thus strengthening national readiness.
There is clear evidence that opinions in the ADF about the value of reservists bear much similarity to those in the UK,[75] and these negative views may have influenced the decision to conservatively decide on only five years of compulsory liability after full-time service in SERCAT 2.[76] In fact, the only legislative change proposed by the SRR was to extend the current five-year liability for SERCAT 2 to 10 years. Now implemented, this will take five years to increase numbers by a few thousand. To provide similar numbers to the UK will take some time. There is no evidence that a lengthy compulsory reserve liability for the UK has impacted on Regular Forces recruitment at any point in time, but this may be down to lack of awareness and youthful optimism. While there will always be a portion of the UK Regular Reserve unwilling to contribute post-service, the evidence shows that many would be willing to return to service in the defence of the UK, and history has demonstrated that UK veterans beyond their legal liability will also look to volunteer in a crisis.[77] The ADF would likely see the same patriotic surge of veteran volunteers. However, given the small size of SERCAT 2, even with a 10-year liability, the ADF would be handicapped at bringing significant numbers of veteran talent back into the ADF as presumably, under extant regulations, they would need to be rehired individually.
A Clear Demand Signal
Like any reserve force, the Regular Reserve and the SERCAT 2 contingent reserve require a clear demand signal to provide a justification for resources. It has taken the British Army longer than many of its NATO allies to recognise that reserve forces are important for sustaining the army in a long-term conflict.[78] According to 2023’s Defence Strategic Review, Australia also has its own issues with identifying a clear demand for its reserve components. Part of the reason the British Army IRP in the 1980s was a success was the clear and very detailed workforce demand signal. The post–Cold War change in organisational culture that believed the future British Army would only ever take part in small conflicts led to the Regular Reserve literally dropping out of the army’s workforce demand calculus. The 2025 SDR identified a lack of British Army workforce to deal with concurrent home threats while also fulfilling overseas commitments in support of NATO. This can provide the impetus for the British Army to define the Regular Reserve demand required. The ADF requires a similar demand signal for SERCAT 2.
Adequate Funding and Resources for Enhanced Readiness
Legislative changes require military and political leadership and a commitment to cultural change, but cost little while setting the conditions for future success. To ensure future success, a number of additional improvements need to be implemented, as set out below. All these improvements require funding and resources, without which nothing will succeed. To be credible, reservists will need to be provided adequate uniform, equipment and, where required, weapons. Neither the UK nor the ADF has adequately funded or resourced their pools of previously trained workforce for a very long time, and they both need a rapid injection of funds. The good news is that the funds required would be far short of the sunk investment costs inherent in these previously trained individuals and the huge cost of building such knowledge, skills and experience in wartime from ab initio recruits. Both the British Army and the ADF have pressures on their finances that lead to prioritisation of funding decisions. Reserve-focused measures are often overlooked in favour of other decisions that prioritise the force of today rather than the reserve needed for tomorrow. Overcoming the ‘here and now’ funding priorities will take both the political and the military leadership to lead a change in culture. Without funding, there will be no strategic/contingency reserve to speak of in either nation, despite the fact that the funding of the Regular Reserve is a relatively insignificant percentage of total workforce costs.
A reserve can only provide deterrence and utility if it is seen to be equipped, practised and exercised. A clear demand signal also needs well-practised mobilisation procedures where individual regular reservist supply can be assessed against establishment gaps and demand. Annual reporting and routine mobilisation exercises will be needed to test the system. The UK plans to test its reserve mobilisation processes as part of the NATO Exercise Steadfast Defender in 2027.[79] There is no public record of the ADF exercising SERCAT 2 mobilisation processes, but there has reportedly been a small-scale test of the process for mandatory call out of Reserves each year, since 2019, called Operation Civil Assist. Sometimes it is a tabletop activity, while at other times it requires small numbers of reservists to attend and go through the process of transition from SERCAT 2, 3 and 5 to Service Option C (SERVOP C).[80] For both armies, a larger-scale process much like that of the 1980s’ IRP with its series of annual reporting ARRCEX events and the Project STAR refresher training periods—with opportunities to attend larger exercises if the reservist so wishes—would appear to be the ideal model to follow.
Commanders lead people, drive innovation and cultural change, and provide accountability for military capability. A relatively cheap, small-scale command and staff team could drive a program of engagement and persistent communication, deliver workforce management and force sensing when required, and work with units and commands to provide a flexible and dynamic set of mobilisation plans for a range of commitments from small to large scale. Ideally, this should be reservist based, as reservists understand other reservists best of all—as the recent success of the reserve-led formations in the UK (19 Brigade) and Australian armies (2nd Australian Division) demonstrate.
Effective Workforce Management, Accurate Data and Information Management Systems
The British Army has been criticised in the UK media for lacking the ability to track the home addresses of those in the Regular Reserve.[81] The current method of keeping track, through an annual postal letter,[82] is no longer fit for purpose, and is far below the expectations for a highly connected, technologically capable population. The home address is usually based on the one lodged at the point of discharge and thus is likely to be out of date; additionally, fewer people now use the postal system generally, so a postal-based system potentially undermines the credibility of using the Regular Reserve in an emergency. It is also slower than electronic means. A memorandum of understanding is now in place for the Ministry of Defence to facilitate access to national tax data for the sole purpose of seeking home addresses[83] and this has substantially improved access to contact address details.[84] The ADF process of engaging and tracking SERCAT 2 reserves is reportedly little better.[85] However, it will be an overall investment in the information management systems, resources and processes to accurately record, collate and easily access the military and civilian skills that could unlock the wider talent in the UK Regular Reserve and SERCAT 2 cadres.[86] Such a system would also vastly improve utility and speed up mobilisation. Legal permissions to access email and other electronic communications will be key to future developments.
Expectation Management and Education as a Regular
Early in-service education and a consistent narrative throughout regular full-time service of post-service liability are required; these cannot form part of resettlement and transition only. A through-life communications plan is needed; videos and social media posts are ideal for this purpose and could form part of annual refresher training. This would make Regular Reserve or SERCAT 2 part of the accepted lexicon and part of considerations of British Army and ADF service—akin to the ADF’s ‘One Defence’ approach to acknowledging and including all forms of service. Use of the terms ‘discharge’ and ‘service leaver’ must be caveated, and it should be made clearer that most individuals will have a post-service liability. The cultural change required to deliver and maintain this education is likely to be considerable in order to culturally reframe the value of the Regular/Standby Reserve and SERCAT 2 to national preparedness.[87] Consideration must also be given to the impact on families of a return to service in a crisis, and education provided for the service leaver and their family on the conditions for call out—including the welfare support that would be available.
A Regular Reserve Identity, an ‘Offer’ and a Local Location
Prior to the British Army Personnel Centre opening in 1996, its Regular Reserve in the UK was administered by devolved cap badge and arms and services headquarters, with similar for the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Historically, a locally devolved organisation to foster long-term contact and engagement worked best for the UK regular reservist, either with a cap badge/regimental focus or with a local geographic unit. While this would still make sense for central administration processing, it would be productive for regular reservists / SERCAT 2 to develop links with actual units on the Order of Battle that they may well deploy with in the future. This option could achieve the ADF SRR recommendation to match contingent reserve supply with detailed demand.[88] However, as with the UK, the rationalisation of defence sites is making it increasingly harder for reservists to serve near where they live, introducing long travel times as a barrier to service.
A paid retainer was a key offer used to reward UK regular reservists for staying in touch and attending annual checks, and was a process that worked well. This was set at £150 in the 1980s, equating to approximately £400 today. Other communication, incentives and processes that encourage face-to-face or virtual engagement with the army, fostered by a transition process that discourages permanent separation, would promote a continued sense of belonging. Accessible online briefing opportunities and the opportunity to maintain skill levels at weekends or evenings—or even on larger-scale exercises with units—could be offered to those willing to volunteer, similar to UK efforts in the 1980s. This has the advantage of highlighting a post-service liability to those currently serving full time within each unit involved. The positioning of a liability for recall or call out also needs consideration in terms of a wider national narrative on increased defence preparations to justify the reliance on the call back of regular/standby reserves as a prudent defence measure.
The Regular Reserve and SERCAT 2 are also important segments of the veteran community, and more engagement with them would allow UK Defence and the ADF to positively message this part of their veteran community. With annual engagement, any members of the Regular Reserve / SERCAT 2 struggling with transition from full-time service may be identified and signposted to help more rapidly. A termination process from full-time service that mandates post-service reserve liability and encourages a continued sense of belonging would potentially benefit both the regular reservist and, by default, the veteran community. Given the high level of political interest in the welfare of veterans in both countries, this could be very positive. This would need to be reinforced with reassurances that welfare provision would be available for the Regular Reserve / SERCAT 2 and their families in a crisis.
Conclusion
In summary, a transition from competition to conflict would place significant workforce pressures on the British and Australian armies to generate forces. In the past, this has been addressed by maintaining a ‘Regular Reserve’, which has suffered decay in recent years. Previously trained personnel represent a large sunk investment in individual training and experience that neither the British Armed Forces nor the ADF has chosen to draw upon for many years. The ‘solution’ proposed (equally applicable in the UK and Australia) is to better engage, resource and manage the latent workforce of former regular service personnel, which presents an opportunity for rapid force multiplication in a time of crisis at minimal cost (as a percentage of total workforce expenditure) and with minimal effort. To transition the Regular Reserve / SERCAT 2 from latent to a more active and usable regular reserve means first challenging internal culture to lead change.
The scale of this cultural challenge should not be underestimated. However, the history of the British Army Regular Reserve demonstrates that all of this has been successfully achieved in the past and represents a cost-effective way to achieve a return on the latent talent, knowledge, skills and experience of previously trained personnel. There is no reason that it cannot be achieved again with the right culture, modest investment, and leadership. A key challenge for the ADF is the cultural change needed to modernise legislation to more rapidly increase the numbers in SERCAT 2; the UK is undergoing this same change. Both nations need to go further to unlock the demand signal, provide adequate funding and resources for enhanced readiness, invest in effective workforce management and systems, ensure expectation management and through-life education in regular service, and work to achieve a Regular Reserve identity, with a clear ‘offer’, alongside a local location for the Regular Reserve / SERCAT 2 population to attend. Doing so will provide the greatest opportunity to draw on the widest pool of latent talent for service in national/homeland defence.
Endnotes
[1] Rupert Kitching, ‘SDR: So What for the Army?’, British Army Review 194 (2025): 6–11, at: https://chacr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/BAR-194_compressed.pdf.
[2] Department of Defence, Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), p. 6, at: www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/strategic-review-of-the-adf-….
[3] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025—Making Britain Safer: Secure at Home, Strong Abroad (Ministry of Defence, 2025), p. 31, at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-ma….
[4] Department of Defence, 2026 National Defence Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2006), p. 45, at: www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2026-national-defence-strat….
[5] Vincent Connelly, ‘Delivering “Mass” for the British Army: Defence Reviews and Second Echelon Choices’, RUSI (website), 7 March 2025, at: www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/delivering-ma….
[6] Kitching, ‘SDR’, p. 11.
[7] Stephen Trynosky, Paper TigIRR: The Army’s Diminished Strategic Personnel Reserve in an Era of Great Power Competition (US Army War College, 2023), at: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/html/trecms/AD1215164/index.html.
[8] Department of Defence, Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves, p. 6.
[9] Ibid., p. 61.
[10] Ibid., p. 61.
[11] Connelly, ‘Delivering “Mass” for the British Army’.
[12] David Langley, ‘British Line Infantry Reserves for the Great War Part 1’, Stand To!
100 (2014): 24.
[13] ‘The Effectiveness of Reservists: A Historical Perspective. A Study for the Directorate of Battle Doctrine’, 13 February 1985, DEFE 70/1343, p. 24.
[14] Ibid., p. 23.
[15] Vincent Connelly, A History of the Army Reserve (Ministry of Defence, 2018), p. 22.
[16] CJ McInnes, ‘BAOR in the 1980s: Changes in Doctrine and Organization’, Defense Analysis 4, no. 4 (1988): 377–394, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/07430178808405366.
[17] ‘Reinforcements: Individual Reinforcement Plan’, 23 February 1982–11 June 1984, DEFE 70/1175, at: https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16896288.
[18] Vincent Connelly, ‘The British Army Reserves: Responding to Challenges, Past, Present and Future’, webinar, Reserve Officers Union for Armed Forces of Denmark, 6 February 2025.
[19] Ibid.
[20] ‘DRA 1416 Film: Reinforcement of the British Army for War’ (video), Imperial War Museum, 1979.
[21] ‘Reserve Forces Act 1980’, The National Archives of the UK (TNA) (website), at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/9/contents.
[22] Connelly, ‘The British Army Reserves’.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Kenton White, ‘Mearsheimer’s Folly: NATO’s Cold War Capability and Credibility’, Military Strategy Magazine 6, no. 4 (2017), at: www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/mearsheimers-folly-natos-cold-….
[27] Ibid.
[28] ‘Reinforcements: Individual Reinforcement Plan’.
[29] Connelly, ‘The British Army Reserves’.
[30] ‘Operation Granby (Gulf War): Manning and Battle Casualty Replacements’, 1 October–11 December 1990, DEFE 70/1976, at: https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16976592.
[31] National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Reserve Forces (National Audit Office, 2006), p. 20, at: www.nao.org.uk/reports/ministry-of-defence-reserve-forces.
[32] Connelly, A History of the Army Reserve, p. 29.
[33] Ibid., p. 29.
[34] National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Reserve Forces, p. 20.
[35] Ian Beckett, ‘The Territorial Army: More than a Manpower Reserve?’, RUSI (website), 24 June 2009, at: www.rusi.org/publication/territorial-army-more-manpower-reserve.
[36] Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces: External Scrutiny Team Annual Statutory Report 2025 (CRFCA, 2025), at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69380a8de447374889cd8f5a….
[37] Connelly, ‘Delivering “Mass” for the British Army’.
[38] Connelly, ‘The British Army Reserves’.
[39] National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Ensuring Sufficient Skilled Military Personnel (National Audit Office, 2018), at: www.nao.org.uk/report/ensuring-sufficient-skilled-military-personnel.
[40] House of Commons Defence Committee, Ready for War?: First Report of Session 2023–24 (UK Government, 2024), at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmdfence/26/summa….
[41] Vincent Connelly, ‘Bringing the Regular Reserve Back Into the Whole Force’, British Army Review 181 (2021): 82–89, at: www.army.mod.uk/media/14374/bar_181-autumn-2021.pdf.
[42] David I Walker, ‘Anticipating Army Exit: Identity Constructions of Final Year UK Career Soldiers’, Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 2 (2013): 284–304.
[43] Connelly, ‘Bringing the Regular Reserve Back Into the Whole Force’.
[44] National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Reserve Forces.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Vincent Connelly, ‘Understanding and Explaining the Marginalization of Part-Time British Army Reservists’, Armed Forces & Society 47, no. 4 (2020), at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20948591.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ministry of Defence, ‘Supplementary Written Evidence Submitted by the Ministry of Defence’, Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the Army inquiry (Commons Select Committee: Defence Committee, 2016), Q3, at: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidenc….
[52] Marten Vares, ‘Measuring Skill Decay in Reserve Soldiers’, presentation, NATO Science and Technology Organisation Meeting Proceedings—Reserve Forces: Challenges and Relevance to NATO and National Security, 2025, at: https://publications.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedi….
[53] Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[54] Directorate of Land Warfare, Operation Herrick Campaign Study (Ministry of Defence, 2016), at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7f4833e5274a2e8ab4b3ab….
[55] The individual references reinforcing these arguments in the following sections have not all been reproduced here but are located in my 2021 paper: Connelly, ‘Bringing the Regular Reserve Back Into the Whole Force’. Readers interested in the wide variety of data, reports and sources that underpinned those arguments should consult that paper, with all sources used provided with grateful permission of the British Army and Ministry of Defence.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, ‘Warfighting at Scale: Regenerating and Reconstituting Mass’, Ares & Athena 6 (2016).
[64] Department of Defence, Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves, p. 55.
[65] Australian National Audit Office, Performance Audit Assistance Provided to Personnel Leaving the ADF, General Audit Report No. 9 (ANAO, 2005), p. 22.
[66] Ibid., p. 35; Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2024–25 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2025), p. 127.
[67] Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces: External Scrutiny Team Annual Statutory Report 2026 (CRFCA, 2026), p. 32.
[68] Department of Defence, Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves.
[69] Ibid., p. 61.
[70] Ibid., p. 74.
[71] ‘Bolstering the ADF’s Contingent Workforce’, Department of Defence (website), 21 September 2026, at: www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2026-09-21/bolstering-adfs-continge… (accessed 30 September 2026); Tom Lowrey, ‘ADF Doubles Post-Service Commitment for New Recruits to 10 Years’, ABC News, 22 September 2026, at: www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-22/adf-doubles-post-service-committment-to-… (accessed 30 September 2026).
[72] Ministry of Defence, ‘Armed Forces Bill 2026’, UK Government, updated 13 July 2026, at: www.gov.uk/government/collections/armed-forces-bill-2026.
[73] Ministry of Defence, ‘Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics: 1 January 2026’, UK Government, updated 23 September 2026, at: www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics….
[74] Ministry of Defence, ‘Armed Forces Bill 2026’.
[75] Jodie Lording, ‘Paid Volunteers: Experiencing Reserve Service and Resignation’, Australian Army Journal 12, no. 1 (2015): 90–110.
[76] Mark Armstrong, ‘Historical Legacy to National Asset: The Australian Army Reserve in the 21st Century’, PhD thesis, Deakin University, 2024.
[77] Connelly, ‘Bringing the Regular Reserve Back Into the Whole Force’.
[78] Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces: External Scrutiny Team Annual Statutory Report 2025.
[79] Ministry of Defence, ‘Letter from Louise Sandher-Jones MP, Minister For Veterans And People, to Lord Peach’, 11 December 2025, at: https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2025-0849/External_….
[80] Anonymous reviewer comment to an earlier draft of this paper.
[81] Daniel Boffey, ‘MoD Has Lost Track of Veterans on Recall List, Says Defence Adviser’, The Guardian, 19 April 2026, at: www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/apr/19/mod-has-lost-track-of-veterans….
[82] Ministry of Defence, ‘Service Leavers’ Guide’, UK Government, updated 18 September 2024, at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/service-leavers-pack/service-leavers….
[83] ‘Reserve Forces Act 1996’, The National Archives (TNS) (website), Part XII Miscellaneous Section 125A, at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/14/section/125A.
[84] Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations, The United Kingdom Reserve Forces: External Scrutiny Team Annual Statutory Report 2026.
[85] Department of Defence, Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves.
[86] Richard Anon, ‘The Strategic Reserve: What it Is, and Why It Could Be You’, Wavell Room, 27 November 2024, at: https://wavellroom.com/2024/11/27/the-strategic-reserve-what-it-is-and-….
[87] Connelly, ‘Bringing the Regular Reserve Back Into the Whole Force’.
[88] Department of Defence, Strategic Review of the Australian Defence Force Reserves.