A Submission for the Chief of Army Essay Competition and Chauvel Prize 2026
Author: Christopher Wooding
The need to learn from mistakes, to exploit new opportunities, and adapt to complex situations in order to defeat an adversary on the ‘other side of the hill’ are enduring and timeless.
Aimee Fox, Learning to Fight[1]
The Australian Army faces a period of global uncertainty, change and competition. This period is straining the ability of militaries to adapt and remain effective in the face of compounding security challenges.[2] Using James G March’s exploitation-exploration dichotomy, this essay argues that the Australian Army should reframe adaptation to focus on exploration through parallel experimentation and enhancing knowledge management. This essay first introduces adaptation and March’s dichotomy before examining the limits of the Army’s current approach to exploration. This essay then introduces parallel experimentation to improve Army’s approach to exploration, especially for long-term competition and conflict. This discussion is situated within the context of the emerging tactical regimes and the Indo-Pacific. Finally, this essay discusses the role of knowledge sharing in exploration to support institutional adaptation. Hardwiring adaptation in any institution is a challenging endeavour, requiring numerous elements to coalesce. However, doing so is essential to sustaining military effectiveness now and into the future.
Framing Adaptation
Adaptation, like its related term innovation, is about changing to improve performance (or effectiveness) in a particular context.[3] It is contingent on context, which is composed of both environmental changes and the actions of another entity. The aim is not for the best performance in absolute terms but for better performance relative to an adversary. Being contingent on these factors introduces a temporal aspect: adaptation must keep pace with change.[4] This temporal aspect has gained greater prominence in recent years due to increasing calls for accelerated change.
The idea of ‘accelerated change’ is a recurring argument underpinning the importance of military adaptation. It argues that militaries must be increasingly responsive to change to remain relevant in the face of an increasingly dynamic operational environment. Although the term is frequently repeated, including by the Australian Army, Andrew Carr notes there is no consensus on what is meant by ‘accelerated change’.[5] Carr argues that this perception is the result of our inability to interpret the current rate of change through historical frameworks. In other words, current mental models no longer provide sufficient usefulness in interpreting and acting in today’s world. For militaries, this challenge is experienced as increasing adaptation lag—the gap between identifying a problem and implementing an effective solution.[6] As rate of change accelerates, adaptation lag rises as system capacity becomes increasingly unable to cope.[7] When adaptation lag becomes excessive, militaries lose effectiveness—often resulting in defeat.
Reducing adaptation lag, and thus maintaining the ability to adapt, requires understanding adaptation as a process. Aimee Fox, in her excellent study on organisational learning in the British Army during the First World War, succinctly describes this process:
Put simply, individuals learn through intuition and interpretation. Once learning has been interpreted, it can be shared with others and integrated at the group level before it is subsequently institutionalised at the organisational level.[8]
Fox’s description, similar to others in the field of military innovation studies, highlights how knowledge is generated and then moves through the organisation to produce institutional adaptation.[9] In addition to this process, adaptation features two inter-related approaches: exploitation and exploration. Advanced by political scientist James G March, these approaches describe differing loci of learning and change but occur through the same process described above.[10]
Exploitation is ‘the refinement and extension of existing competencies, technologies and paradigms’.[11] The results of exploitation are often ‘positive, proximate, and predictable’, meaning that exploitation is faster and more certain compared to exploration.[12] Exploitation has lower short-term risk. Exploitation raises the reliability of performance; that is, it makes performance more consistent. This being the case, exploitation often promotes uniformity and standardisation. In knowledge management terms, exploitation is a convergent approach.
Exploration is the ‘experimentation of new alternatives’.[13] It raises mean performance; that is, exploration can increase the average and the maximum performance of a system. In contrast to exploitation, the results of exploration are ‘uncertain, distant, and often negative’.[14] This means that exploration carries greater inherent inefficiency and risk. Exploration is thus more costly than exploitation in the short term and more prone to failure. Whereas exploitation benefits from uniformity, exploration benefits from variability—differences in approaches to the same problem.[15] This variability and the search for alternatives make exploration a divergent approach, in contrast to exploitation. Notably, exploration is more than simply the search for new technologies. It is also exploring alternative methods and organisations to maximise the benefits of new technology.[16]
The relationship between exploitation and exploration is non-linear, interdependent and nested. The interaction between exploitation and exploration is a feature of the adaptation process, which frequently moves between investigating alternatives and selecting the best-fitting solutions.[17] Alternatives are explored until a suitable option is selected for exploitation, and then exploration may start again. Exploiting one approach may involve the exploration of sub-elements. A simple example is refining a vehicle by exploring alternative engines. This is useful to acknowledge because adaptation is not a single-level process. It occurs at and across multiple layers. Retired Australian Army major general Mick Ryan describes this in terms of various levels: battlefield/tactical, strategic/institutional, political, international.[18] Knowledge is generated and moves across organisational layers simultaneously. This relationship between exploitation and exploration is fundamentally a knowledge management challenge—discussed later in this essay.
Though both approaches operate simultaneously and interact with each other, they compete for limited resources. This competition for resources shapes adaptation opportunities but changes with time and context. Adaptation, particularly in military contexts, is:
a constant balancing act, an ongoing search for the equilibrium of being able to change just enough, but not too much. … [Where] the best equilibrium today may not be the best equilibrium tomorrow.[19]
In this sense, the balance between exploitation and exploration is dynamic.
A useful paradigm for exploring this dynamic balance is James P Carse’s finite and infinite games. In Carse’s own words, ‘[a] finite game is played for the purpose of winning, an infinite game for the purpose of continuing the play’.[20] For militaries, particular wars might be considered finite games. The aim is to achieve a specific political outcome, and each war has its own character. Infinite games, in contrast, might be the regular competition that exists outside a particular war. The aim is to maintain sufficient effectiveness to enable governments to continue to act. During finite games, militaries may be incentivised to prioritise exploitation over exploration; the reverse might be true of infinite games.
Despite the shifting balance between exploitation and exploration, there are clear costs for focusing on one function to the exclusion of the other. Systems which exploit without exploring are ‘likely to find themselves trapped in sub-optimal stable equilibria’.[21] Those systems which explore absent exploitation will realise the costs of exploration without gaining its benefits. March concludes that in competitive environments, exploration is essential for long-term success, despite the short-term effectiveness of exploitation.[22] Exploration, therefore, is essential to preparing for long wars. Lawrence Freedman notes that ‘the longer a conflict lasts, the more pressure there is for innovations in tactics and technologies that might yield a breakthrough’.[23] While clear benefits exist for exploration, the balance often favours exploitation.
The Tendency for Exploitation
Organisational and individual tendencies drive a preference for exploitation. The faster, more positive and more certain results of exploitation account for part of this favouritism. These traits make exploitation appear a more efficient and less risky use of resources compared to exploration. These traits also make sharing any adaptations across the organisation simpler, as it is easier to assess the suitability of an adaptation in different contexts when feedback loops are faster, clearer and more precise. The positive feedback loop that occurs with increasing competence expands on these reasons. As competence with an approach increases, so does the likelihood of positive reward. This in turn reinforces the use and improvement of that approach, creating a self-reinforcing loop.[24] This loop affects the burden of evidence for change. Barno and Bensahel argue that the burden of evidence rests with reform, not with the status quo.[25] In other words, militaries tend to look for evidence that a new thing works, rather than evidence that an old thing no longer works. Exploitation avoids this challenge because it is an extension of the status quo, rather than challenging the status quo.
Bureaucracies are particularly prone to exploitation bias. Barno and Bensahel note that bureaucracies are designed not to change, instead offering predictability, continuity and clarity by reducing uncertainty.[26] Bureaucracies achieve this through various mechanisms but predominantly do so through uniformity. Such attempts to reduce uncertainty inherently minimise exploration and the ability to adapt to new and different contexts. This is a systemic source of resistance to change in bureaucracies. Barno and Bensahel note the additional factors that affect military resistance to change:
- chance and friction
- strategic interaction with the adversary
- the radical difference between peacetime and wartime
- the existential costs of failure.[27]
These reasons result in what pseudonymous military blogger Secretary of Defence Rock describes as the tendency ‘to cling to inherited ideas, cultural preferences, and bureaucratic routines long after those ideas have become obsolete’.[28] Take, for example, Andrew Carr’s critique of the Army’s use of time, which seeks to exploit rapid action:
[A]s many in Army and across Defence have already experienced, there is only so much extra pace that can be achieved within an organisation or on a battlefield. Each additional increase is more difficult and costly.[29]
The organisational tendency for exploitation is mirrored in individual tendencies and compounded by social dynamics. As Fox writes, ‘Though bound by a shared ethos, the army was still an organisation made up of individuals with their own motivations, ideals, and agency’.[30] Vested interests, internalised norms and motivations, among other factors, all influence adaptation and resistance to change. Studies in psychology and behavioural economics have demonstrated individual preferences for exploitation, such as prospect theory. Developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, prospect theory suggests that people tend to be loss averse.[31] This suggests that people will tend to prefer the reliability of exploitation to the risks of exploration, reinforcing the positive feedback loop identified by March above. The centrality of individuals and social dynamics to the adaptation process means that the presence of the exploitation preference in individuals is a feature of adaptation that must be accounted for, in addition to systemic organisational tendencies.
In improving exploration, Army must be careful to avoid impeding adaptation with unnecessary policy, convoluted processes and extraneous work. There are already numerous critiques of militaries placing process over product—that is, mistaking activity for outcomes. In The Rules of the Game, naval historian Andrew Gordon argues the Royal Navy of the First World War was handicapped by inappropriately elevating process over product.[32] Similar critiques have been levied against modern military establishments, one suggesting that:
it isn’t process per se that is the problem, it is our dysfunctional relationship with process that is all wrong. As an organisation, we have erred towards a risk-averse, process-driven culture that treats process as the ends rather than the means. Our obsession with this is prioritising convenience over imagination, and this is actively harming our ability to think and adapt.[33]
These critiques suggest an enduring preference for exploitation over exploration. Australia is by no means immune from this preference. Ryan has argued that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has adopted a slow, zero-risk management approach instead of an approach better suited to rapid adaptation. This critique implicitly reflects a preference for exploitation over exploration. Ryan has repeatedly argued in recent years that the ADF—and by extension the Australian Army—lacks the elements needed for rapid adaptation. He stresses the need to learn directly from operating contexts more rapidly, share lessons across institutions and alliances, and adapt force structures to account for new technologies.[34]
Army’s existing approach is heavily centralised. Authority to accept risk is consolidated in senior positions rather than delegated to the lowest levels. Change is dependent on formal experimentation programs that support top-down adaptation and a single dedicated experimental unit rather than being conducted by regular units to experiment within constraints. Even where bottom-up innovation is encouraged, such innovation is often small scale until given the institutional seal of approval. Further, reliance on centralised mechanisms for capturing and analysing data reduces the effectiveness of bottom-up efforts. Major exercises focus on building competence and confidence in processes, tactics and equipment—which, though important, resemble exploitation rather than exploration.[35] Reliance on centralised mechanisms for sharing knowledge increases adaptation lag between units, as such mechanisms are often slow, beholden to well-meaning process. Army’s existing approach reflects organisational choices in allocating limited resources and choosing centralised and formalised mechanisms over alternatives. However, this approach, while valuable, is insufficient to guarantee Army’s ability to adapt to the continually changing character of war.
Exploration in the Indo-Pacific
Australia’s operational environment plays a significant role in how the Army should hardwire adaptation and exploration. This environment is defined by several considerations, such as strategy, alliances and national industrial base. For this essay, however, the chief considerations are tactics and geography. These are the most prominent factors in driving the physically dispersed operational environment that increasingly defines modern combat.
Reconnaissance-strike tactics (RST) is a new tactical regime emerging from trends such as battlefield transparency and pervasive surveillance; precision mass and concentration of effects; protection and concentration of forces; and vulnerability of enablers and logistics.[36] Based on several descriptions, RST is defined as the fusion of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities with precision fires and electronic warfare capabilities to create opportunities for manoeuvre forces.[37] RST is driving the dispersion of forces for protection, with concentration only occurring once the appropriate conditions are met. RST and the notion of dispersed forces are reflected in anti-access/area denial systems and the ‘stand-in’ concepts to address them. Dr David Kilcullen has suggested that ‘stand-in’ concepts must be distributed and self-sufficient, among other features, to be effective.[38] This means that even within a geographically constrained area, individual force elements will still be separated from one another much of the time. This challenges how militaries capture, analyse and share knowledge—particularly in cyber-degraded environments—and requires new information processing capabilities to fight and learn.[39]
This challenge is exacerbated by the geography of the Indo-Pacific, which encompasses a vast area of the Earth’s surface. Although predominantly ocean, interspersed with occasional islands, the area to Australia’s north is characterised by archipelagos. Archipelagos are interconnected littoral spaces. This extends the dispersion of land forces, despite the shorter distances in archipelagos compared to other parts of the Indo-Pacific.[40] These other parts, and their greater distances, remain relevant to knowledge management due to the need to learn with allies. Operations involving multiple nations are among the most challenging, yet they are essential for competing and fighting in the Indo-Pacific. Differing cultures, doctrine, authorities, strategic considerations and more complicate how allies learn from one another. Figuring out how to learn with other nationalities is not discretionary but presents a challenge exacerbated by the distances of the Indo-Pacific. Though work is already occurring in this regard, simply having the mechanisms to share knowledge across an alliance does not ensure its efficacy.
One concept that offers utility for understanding how exploration and knowledge management operate under distributed conditions is parallel experimentation—multiple, simultaneous experiments occurring across different elements that address a common problem in different ways.[41] Each experiment provides feedback on possible solutions and on the problem itself, improving subsequent adaptation efforts. Parallel experimentation is driven by variability across several factors, but notably context and judgement. This variability underpins how different solutions emerge to the same problem. This is provided by constraints, which facilitate coordination through ‘a general system within which individuals and groups [can] develop their own solutions’.[42] Constraints are either top-down, such as senior directives, or enabling, such as doctrine.[43] Constraints mean that variability is applied in a constructive direction without being uniform across the force.
Parallel experimentation, though emergent, was essential to the success of the United States Navy (USN) in the Pacific during the Second World War. Trent Hone, in his study on that topic, describes how the variations throughout the USN made it ‘possible to conduct multiple parallel experiments, each intended to solve the same basic problem’.[44] This allowed the USN to rapidly explore potential options and identify suitable methods. The USN employed parallel experimentation repeatedly throughout the early 20th century, on problems such as fire-control systems and combat information centres.[45] Through the fleet, ‘different ships implemented different approaches, allowing the Navy to compare a variety of potential solutions simultaneously’.[46] Fundamental to the success of parallel experimentation were the mechanisms to learn and disseminate knowledge. Without these mechanisms, such as type commands, knowledge generated from individual experiments could not be exploited by the fleet.[47]
A contemporary example of parallel experimentation is Ukraine’s Brave1 Market, a points-based system that uses market forces and gamification for parallel experimentation and adaptation. Points earned by soldiers for killing enemy combatants are spent to purchase more equipment. The distribution of point earning and spending (combined with other feedback like reviews) indicates the effectiveness of methods. Military commands adjust points to incentivise which problems are explored, acting as constraints. Notably, the Brave1 Defence Cluster—a large group of small to medium defence companies—also engage in parallel experimentation through the same Brave1 Market mechanisms. Successful methods and equipment are more likely to be imitated and shared, while competition between units drives exploration of new methods to earn more points.[48] The Brave1 Market delegates authority to explore to the front line and provides a mechanism to share the results of experiments with others, both military and industry, for exploitation.
Parallel experimentation offers a new paradigm for adaptation, one that emphasises delegating and connecting exploration. Delegation enables adaptation at the lowest echelon suitable. Connection permits a community of exploration that learns collaboratively. Rather than simply applying more resources, parallel experimentation is about shifting how current resources are spent, delegating who can spend them and sharing the results. This offers the Army a more resilient and responsive approach to adaptation, particularly in distributed environments.
Philosophically, parallel experimentation also reduces the pressure to find the next big thing. Instead, parallel experimentation is about solving the problems facing individuals in their local contexts and giving the organisation the opportunity to learn from those solutions. This paradigm shift aligns with existing scholarship on the impact of leadership and organisational culture on adaptation—which emphasises leaders who ‘embrace a more decentralised mode of command style, exhibit personal openness, and cultivate a climate of evidence-based inquiry’ and cultures which permit ‘the freedom to experiment, to offer new ideas and opinions, and to cross traditional institutional boundaries’.[49]
Parallel experimentation will likely be the dominant form of exploration in the distributed contexts resulting from RST and the Indo-Pacific’s geography. Learning how to apply parallel experimentation can support Army’s long-term exploration and effectiveness across competition and conflict. Despite its benefits, parallel experimentation presents the most challenging form of knowledge management. There remains a need to capture, analyse and share knowledge across disparate contexts to ensure military forces can continue to explore and adapt, especially when disconnected from more centralised capabilities. Success requires robust and distributed knowledge management capabilities. Without these, adaptation will remain localised and its benefits minimised, though not its costs.
Understanding Knowledge Management in Adaptation
Knowledge management is the capacity to capture, analyse and share lessons and ideas. This nests within the broader topic of organisational learning and adaptation. Knowledge management is an institutional process, involving the flow of ideas from their points of origin to their points of utility across various networks of individuals and groups. Fox identifies four networks involved in organisational learning—see Table 1. These networks play a crucial role in capturing, analysing and sharing information across organisations, and in institutionalising that knowledge, with both formal and informal mechanisms. In other words, knowledge management connects parallel experimentation into a unified exploration effort.
| Liberal | Informal, unstructured learning between individuals. Primarily occurs through incidental interactions or through pre-existing relationships. Produces ‘relatively rapid learning at a lower level’ (than the institution). |
| Horizontal | Informal learning between groups. Reflects collaborative learning as opposed to individual learning—e.g., 6RAR sharing doctrine with 8/9RAR. Often anonymous as it reflects group rather than individual identities. Strengthened by similarities between groups. |
| Vertical | Formal, structured learning often directed from the top down. Focused on solving specific problems. |
| External | Learning from sources outside the organisation. Three primary sources: adversaries, allies and civilian experts. |
The individuals that compose the networks exist in multiple networks simultaneously. Fox finds that the degree to which learning is diffused across the organisation is a function of the size and extent of networks involved.[51] The more interconnected the networks are, the more opportunities for ideas to move between nodes and be diffused across the organisation. Fox notes:
[T]ime spent circulating amongst new people and in different locations, whether that was a new branch or expeditionary force, enhanced individual networks and made links that were of enduring utility to the process of learning.[52]
Strong networks enable faster knowledge flow and feedback loops to explore and identify the best-fitting solution. Interconnected networks further improve the flow and feedback of knowledge because information can flow through multiple avenues simultaneously to reach a wider audience. This allows multiple experiments to profit from the results of any single experiment, creating a community of exploration. In large organisations featuring tens of thousands of people, such as the Army, the ability for information to shortcut across it enhances the Army’s capacity to explore, connect and exploit various options.
Increasing opportunities for idea flow is useful to exploration because it allows others to collaborate on an idea, rather than simply receive knowledge. Computer scientist Alex Pentland writes that ‘the most consistently creative and insightful people … spend an enormous amount of time seeking out new people and different ideas’.[53] Fox similarly describes how individuals ‘learn from colleagues via discussion and debate’.[54] Fox terms this aspect ‘smartening friction’, which improves ideas by exposing them to competition and challenges which must be overcome to be accepted.[55] Smartening friction is thus a type of feedback, gleaned from interacting with other ideas and perspectives. Lessons from other individuals, groups and theatres can influence adaptation in other people, groups and theatres. Knowledge is transferred across the networks to be used by others, either in original form or further modified to suit local conditions.
Without the involvement of other parties, such as industry or other government departments, in collaboration, exploration may not be possible due to lack of resources to experiment with new equipment, ideas or organisations. External networks are particularly important as they serve various purposes in adaptation. While adversaries are the most obvious source of feedback, allies and civilian experts provide additional sources of variation that can inform exploration. Further, civilian experts, in the form of industry and business, can often be crucial to exploration through the production of equipment or prototypes. Ukraine’s Brave1 Market is a clear example of the interconnectedness of networks and the role of civilian expertise in adaptation.
Not all solutions arise with a clear problem or use in mind. These solutions must move across networks to find the appropriate problems. Many problems can only be resolved by the combination of multiple ideas. Knowledge sharing enables the accumulation of ideas that can solve a problem when combined. Paul Kennedy, in Engineers of Victory, notes there was never a single ‘wonder weapon’ that arrived perfectly formed. Instead, the solutions resulted from several complementary developments coming together after many setbacks. Each of the case studies Kennedy presents, from anti-submarine warfare in the Battle of the Atlantic through long-range escort for strategic bombers to amphibious warfare, reinforces this convergence of ideas and technologies.[56] These ideas were brought together by sharing knowledge across networks and, through constraints, selecting which problems to solve and thus providing common direction to exploration.
Aside from spreading and improving ideas, knowledge management is fundamental to the institutionalisation of adaptations. Knowledge must move from individuals, where learning first occurs, through groups to the organisation so that knowledge can be embedded within the formal strictures of the organisation. Institutionalisation is crucial to the sustainment of adaptation and learning. Without institutionalisation, knowledge is easily forgotten and must then be continually re-learnt, often at a cost. In terms of exploitation and exploration, institutionalisation is the transition of knowledge from being explored to being exploited.
Organisations must have learning mechanisms that can collect and interpret knowledge and feedback. Without formal mechanisms, often incumbent in the vertical network, adaptations remain localised, thus limiting the benefits for exploration.[57] The presence of formal learning mechanisms is crucial to institutionalising knowledge and fully learning the lessons of combat. However, these learning mechanisms are imperfect—they will be unable to capture all lessons of war. This is particularly true for the disaggregated nature of liberal and horizontal networks in knowledge sharing. Fox summarises this challenge:
The real problem though was the knowledge that fell between the cracks, occurring outside the army's institutional processes. The army tried to harness the knowledge found within these individual exchanges through conferences and discussions after training schools: it recognised that such knowledge was important. However, the ad hoc occurrence of these exchanges was far more difficult to capture and codify.[58]
Fox’s summary highlights the difficulties of disaggregated knowledge and of tacit knowledge. Though mechanisms, such as those identified by Fox, can mitigate knowledge loss across wide networks, there will still be gaps in what is captured. This is particularly the case for tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge presents a major challenge to knowledge management, which will be discussed later.
In addition to collating results of exploration, organisational learning mechanisms must support analysing those results. This informs the selection of ideas for exploitation across the organisation—though it should not unnecessarily constrain localised adaptations. Learning mechanisms which analyse the results of exploration provide feedback based on aggregated data to inform problem framing, constraints and subsequent experimentation. Such learning mechanisms can resolve differences in subjective experiences based on different contexts to improve how localised solutions transfer across the institution.[59]
A significant challenge in analytical mechanisms is the selection of appropriate metrics and separating the various factors involved in military effectiveness. As Fox and others have noted, there is a multiplicity of factors that complicate assessing military performance and the impact of organisational learning on that performance.[60] This challenge also highlights the sensitivity of military outcomes to such contextual factors as well as the enduring role of chance, fog and friction.[61] Despite these challenges, learning mechanisms must provide means to assess performance rather than simply capturing data without subsequent action.[62] One mechanism for this is the use of constraints. Constraints provide measures of performance and effectiveness by setting direction, as previously discussed. This allows captured knowledge to be analysed and facilitates adaptation.
Institutionalisation is not just the preservation of knowledge in formal and informal strictures. It is also the transfer of institutional knowledge to members of the organisation. This occurs through both formal and informal (or ambient) mechanisms to inculcate members into the group. This is, in part, what allows ideas to be exploited by the organisation. Organisations should, where possible, transfer critical knowledge through formal and deliberate mechanisms rather than ambient transfers. Relying too much on ambient transfer risks learning the wrong lessons and doctrine, as Gordon notes.[63] However, not all knowledge can be transferred explicitly. Significant portions of knowledge are transferred ambiently through, for example, socialisation processes, on-the-job training and mentoring.[64] These mechanisms are also how tacit knowledge is transferred. While militaries should not be reliant on informal dissemination mechanisms, militaries must equally recognise their ubiquity and usefulness in sharing knowledge. Formal learning mechanisms must therefore be complemented by a variety of informal mechanisms, often occurring through liberal and horizontal networks, so individuals and groups can ‘interpret and make sense of their experiences and share new operational knowledge through social interaction’.[65] Getting this knowledge transfer right matters because adaptation is contingent—the options of the system are constrained by previous choices. Learning the wrong lessons can limit future choices and reduce the adaptability of the system.
Dissemination mechanisms change because of the dynamic balance between exploitation and exploration. Hone argues that exploration was initially dominant in the USN because it possessed a small officer corps and featured a slow socialisation process prior to the Second World War.[66] The rapid influx of officers and sailors due to mobilisation demanded a rapid socialisation process, which shifted the USN’s focus to exploitation and reduced variability. The mobilisation of the British Army during the First World War demonstrated a similar pattern.[67] In both cases, variability was reduced to limit risk and loss and quickly integrate civilians into the military. March affirms this aspect, noting that slow socialisation processes, combined with moderate turnover, ‘sustained variability of individual beliefs, thereby improving organisational and average individual knowledge in the long run’.[68]
The potency of modern computing and communication systems can support the distributed exploration and knowledge management necessary for large-scale combat operations. However, this must be tempered by discipline to avoid overwhelming knowledge management systems. Writing about command and control, Gordon argues that increasingly capable communications systems result in their increased use. In Gordon’s words, ‘the volume of traffic expands to meet capacity’.[69] The risk here, as it applies to adaptation, is that knowledge management systems will become overloaded—a triumph of noise over signal. An excess of knowledge to analyse and share may not only overload the systems responsible for managing that knowledge but may also overload the recipients of that knowledge, who may be unable to absorb new knowledge. These are the exact conditions which increase adaptation lag and diminish the ability to cope with accelerated change. Such a risk is also an example of process over product, where knowledge is transferred without consideration of the recipients’ capacity to absorb that knowledge. Another way to view this challenge is in terms of resources.
Leaders play a significant role in managing and authorising the use of resources to investigate new ideas. New ideas flow from the various points across an organisation to the points of authority that can approve and resource change. The resources involved, however, are more than simply money or material—they are also time and workload. Without sufficient capacity in terms of time and workload, individuals and organisations will be unable to interpret their environment or changes within it.[70] Leaders must be able to effectively manage capacity to ensure Army’s people can ‘connect the dots across functions, imagine alternative futures, and make sense of their work’ instead of allowing ‘a culture of urgency and perpetual motion’ to crowd out exploration.[71]
Conclusion
The importance of exploration is captured by Sir Michael Howard’s famous remark:
I am willing to dogmatically declare that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.[72]
The capacity to ‘get it right’ depends on the organisation’s capacity for exploration. Without the mechanisms to investigate alternative approaches, there is little way to escape the tyranny of exploitation. Militaries which can effectively utilise exploration are more likely to encounter winning ideas and alternatives than those which exclude exploration in favour of a bias for exploitation.
Exploration allows organisations to anticipate changes in war—drawing on Douhet’s famous remark that ‘victory smiles on those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur’.[73] The remarks of Douhet and Howard may, on the surface, appear mutually exclusive—one claims anticipation over adaptation, the other the reverse. These remarks, however, are complementary. One must continue to explore alternatives and anticipate changes despite the probability of getting it wrong, because exploration is what enables one to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.
Parallel experimentation offers the Australian Army an approach to capitalise more on the creativity of its people, across all levels of the organisation, by creating a community of exploration. Parallel experimentation uses variability through delegation and connection to drive exploration. This, in turn, is a function of Army’s knowledge management. Though perfection is unattainable, enhancing knowledge management can improve the returns of exploration in competition and conflict without the major resources needed to directly increase exploration.
Though exploration comes with costs and risk, the long-term effectiveness of the Army depends on the quality of its exploration efforts. Delegating the authority to explore and connecting the explorers, Army can mitigate the risks of exploitation and centralised exploration. Hardwiring adaptation means being able to both exploit and explore—parallel experimentation offers a useful paradigm to improve how Army explores and adapts to constant change.
Endnotes
[1] Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918, Cambridge Military Histories (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[2] '2026 National Defence Strategy and 2026 Integrated Investment Program', Department of Defence (website), at: www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2026-national-defence-strat….
[3] There is a noted lack of consensus within military innovation studies over definitions for adaptation and innovation. For this essay, adaptation is used as the umbrella term for adaptation, innovation and other similar terms to avoid the quagmire of differing definitions. David W Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (Oxford University Press, 2020); Frank Hoffman, Mars Adapting: Military Change During War (Naval Institute Press, 2021).
[4] Barno and Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire, pp. 9–10.
[5] Australian Army, The Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2024 (Australian Army, 2024); Andrew Carr, 'Owning Time', Australian Army Journal 20, no. 1 (2024).
[6] Oleksandra Molloy, 'Drone Warfare in Ukraine: From Myths to Operational Reality – Part 1', Australian Army Research Centre (website), at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/drone-warfa….
[7] The capacity to adapt is not solely held in military organisations. As will be highlighted later in the essay, external organisations, such as industry or civilian expertise, also factor into adaptation lag. Therefore, reducing adaptation lag involves the removal of several barriers between agencies both internal and external to militaries.
[8] Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 52.
[9] Frank Hoffman’s 4-I Model and Trent Hone’s description of innovation describe similar processes of adaptation. Frank Hoffman, Mars Adapting, pp. 6–8, 38–43; Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945 (Naval Institute Press, 2018), p. 138.
[10] Hoffman offers a similar model based on a continuum moving from adjust to adapt to innovate. This continuum is not used here due to earlier choices on terminology around adaptation and innovation. Hoffman, Mars Adapting, pp. 6–8.
[11] James March, 'Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning', Organization Science 2, no. 1 (1991): 71–87.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Hone, Learning War (Naval Institute Press, 2018), p. 138.
[16] Ibid.; Friedman, 'Reconnaissance-Strike Tactics, Defeat Mechanisms, and the Future of Amphibious Warfare'.
[17] Hoffman, Mars Adapting, pp. 38–43; Hone, Learning War, p. 138.
[18] Mick Ryan (16 April 2025) 'The New Adaptation War', Futura Doctrina; Mick Ryan (15 April 2025) 'Placing Adaptation at the Heart of Defence Strategy', Futura Doctrina.
[19] Barno and Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire, p. 17.
[20] James P Carse, Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility (Free Press, 2012), p. 1.
[21] March, 'Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning'.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Lawrence Freedman (27 April 2025) 'The Age of Forever Wars', Comment Is Freed.
[24] March, 'Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning'.
[25] Barno and Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire, pp. 16–17.
[26] Ibid., pp. 10–12.
[27] Barno and Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire, pp. 12–17.
[28] Secretary of Defense Rock (22 January 2026), 'So You Want to Know Military', History Does You.
[29] Carr, 'Owning Time'.
[30] Fox, Learning to Fight, pp. 71–72.
[31] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), pp. 278–288.
[32] Gordon, The Rules of the Game, pp. 151, 576.
[33] Ben Johnson, 'Are We All Process Monkeys Now?', Wavell Room (website), at: https://wavellroom.com/2023/03/17/process-monkeys.
[34] Mick Ryan, 'Australia’s New National Defence Strategy Must Embrace Adaptation as Warfare Evolves', The Interpreter, 11 February 2026, at: www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-new-national-defence-….
[35] Mick Ryan, 'Home on the Range: The Australian Army Prepares for the Future', The Interpreter, 23 September 2025, at: www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/home-range-australian-army-prepar….
[36] TX Hammes, 'The Changing Character of Warfare: Defense Dominates the Battlespace', Advanced Technology for Strategists course, Australian War College, 2025; Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (Bloomsbury Academic, 2023).
[37] BA Friedman, 'Reconnaissance-Strike Tactics, Defeat Mechanisms, and the Future of Amphibious Warfare', Journal of Advanced Military Studies 15, no. 2 (2024): 54–78; TX Hammes, 'The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again', Joint Forces Quarterly 103, no. 3 (2021): 10–17; Hammes, 'The Changing Character of Warfare'; Frederick W Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Mason Clark, Karolina Hird, Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey and George Barros, Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War (Institute for the Study of War, 2024); Watling, The Arms of the Future; Jack Watling, Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine, RUSI Insight Papers (Royal United Services Institute, 2025).
[38] David Kilcullen, 'Stand-in Manoeuvre in a Contested Littoral Environment', Australian Army Journal 19, no. 2 (2023): 238–262.
[39] Friedman, 'Reconnaissance-Strike Tactics, Defeat Mechanisms, and the Future of Amphibious Warfare'.
[40] Peter Dean, 'The (Re)Rise of the Archipelagic Army: Geography, History, and the Ongoing Utility of Land Power in Australia’s Littoral Arc—A Primer', Australian Army Journal 19, no. 2 (2023): 1–24.
[41] Hone, Learning War, p. 139.
[42] Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 77.
[43] Hone, Learning War, p. 15.
[44] Ibid., p. 141.
[45] Ibid., p. 141.
[46] Ibid., p. 141.
[47] Ibid., p. 136.
[48] Henry Campbell, 'Now That’s Innovation: Ukrainian Army Units Compete for Weapons; Start-Ups Compete for Their Business', The Strategist, 27 May 2025, at: www.aspistrategist.org.au/now-thats-innovation-ukrainian-army-units-com….
[49] Hoffman, Mars Adapting, p. 46; Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (Random House, 2013).
[50] Fox, Learning to Fight, pp. 53–72.
[51] Ibid., pp. 72–73.
[52] Ibid., p. 94.
[53] Alex Pentland, Social Physics: How Social Networks Can Make Us Smarter (Penguin Books, 2015), p. 26.
[54] Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 94.
[55] Ibid., p. 94.
[56] Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (Random House, 2013).
[57] Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 72; Hoffman, Mars Adapting, pp. 257–259.
[58] Fox, Learning to Fight, pp. 100–101.
[59] Molloy, 'Drone Warfare in Ukraine: From Myths to Operational Reality – Part 1'; Hoffman, Mars Adapting.
[60] Fox, Learning to Fight; Hoffman, Mars Adapting.
[61] John Severini and Stephen Biddle, 'The Importance of the Battle of Savo Island', War on the Rocks, at: https://warontherocks.com/the-importance-of-the-battle-of-savo-island.
[62] Hoffman, Mars Adapting, pp. 257–259.
[63] Gordon, The Rules of the Game, p. 580.
[64] Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 95.
[65] Ibid., p. 101.
[66] Ibid., p. 128.
[67] Ibid., pp. 204–239.
[68] March, 'Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning'.
[69] Gordon, The Rules of the Game, p. 582.
[70] Carr, 'Owning Time'.
[71] Benjamin Day and Roderick Parkes, 'NATO’s Dutch Disease: Can a Wartime Mindset Survive an Injection of Resources?', Foreign Policy Research Institute (website), at: www.fpri.org/article/2025/08/natos-dutch-disease-can-a-wartime-mindset-….
[72] Michael Howard and AJ Wilson, 'Military Science in an Age of Peace', The RUSI Journal 119, no. 1 (1974): 3–11.
[73] Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Air University Press, 2019), p. 27.