Author: Georgina Edwards
Acknowledgement. This essay is based on a paper selected from student essay submissions to the United Kingdom Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land). This course exists to educate, train and assess British Army and Royal Marine Majors, instilling a manoeuvrist mindset and intellectual edge essential to winning in war. The views expressed in this essay are not official UK policy and do not represent the official UK view.
The operational level of war continues to generate significant debate among military theorists. Often described as the bridge between strategy and tactics, it enables campaign design and sequencing to achieve strategic objectives.[i] Its status as a distinct level is disputed—a question shaping how militaries plan, allocate resources, and integrate actions across domains. Early theorists such as Clausewitz (1832) and Jomini (1838) linked tactics directly to strategy,[ii] but the industrialisation and mass mobilisation of World War I introduced unprecedented depth and complexity,[iii] prompting the emergence of operational art without clearly institutionalising a separate echelon.[iv] World War II reinforced this perceived need through global mechanised warfare and joint operations,[v] though coordination often occurred without formal operational headquarters.[vi] Western doctrine codified the operational level in the 1980s,[vii] a move that critics argue reflects institutional belief rather than a universally accepted truth and often conflates operational art with the operational level.[viii] Contemporary multi-domain operations and networked command models have led NATO to embed operational headquarters and more collaborative planning processes,[ix] highlighting its perceived functional necessity. This analysis concludes that while the operational level has evolved as a functional necessity in complex warfare, its legitimacy remains largely socially constructed and its existence should be understood as contingent rather than universal.
Debate over the operational level of war is often linked to its historical evolution. When battles were sequential and nations fielded a single army, military thought recognised only two levels: strategy, (the conduct of war) and tactics (the execution of battles).[x] Achieving strategic objectives requires aligning ends (outcomes), ways (methods), and means (resources).[xi] The debate centres on whether ‘ways’ necessitate a distinct operational level to translate strategy into coherent tactics, or whether this link occurs without an intermediate construct. Napoleonic-era theorists largely rejected such a necessity.[xii] Clausewitz (1832) emphasised connecting tactics to strategy, viewing war as politics by other means.[xiii] Jomini (1838) offered principles that bridged manoeuvre and campaign planning, proto-operational in nature yet prescriptive and geometric.[xiv] Hamley (1866) refined these theories with lines of operation and communications, improving planning without creating a third level.[xv] Foch (1903) urged coordination of large-scale operations but focused on doctrine and morale rather than institutionalising any operational concepts.[xvi] Few articulated an intermediate level of warfare. Owen (2012) argues that this absence proves that the operational level is a fallacy, an artificial construct that obscures the natural link between strategy and tactics.[xvii]
The emergence of operational concepts is often linked to changes in warfare’s scale and complexity. Moltke (1857–1888) advanced decentralised command and, through railways, telegraphs and staff processes, sought to coordinate multiple armies across space and time;[xviii] these developments are often seen as precursors to modern operational art, though he never coined the term. Early 20th-century industrialisation, mass mobilisation, and technologies such as heavy artillery and aviation introduced significant depth and logistical complexity to World War I, contributing to its character as a global war of attrition.[xix] The German Army’s expansion from 840,000 to 3.8 million highlighted the growing gap between strategy and tactics, creating pressures to coordinate forces across space and time.[xx] This necessity segmented campaigns into ‘operations’, shaping the development of operational art, a concept focused on sequencing actions across multiple fronts to support strategic objectives.[xxi]
Soviet theorists codified operational art during the interwar period to support strategic objectives. Svechin (1926) contrasted positional and manoeuvre warfare and emphasised planning under static conditions, highlighting the need for adaptable operational planning.[xxii] Triandafillov (1929) argued that mechanisation created operations too vast for tactics yet too detailed for strategy, highlighting a conceptual gap that operational art sought to address.[xxiii] Varfolomeev (1933) stressed synchronising technology, logistics and tempo, underscoring the systemic integration required for modern campaigns.[xxiv] Tukhachevsky (1933) advanced campaign design that integrated multiple battles, contributing to operational art’s emergence as an influential concept.[xxv] Isserson (1936) introduced deep battle theory for continuous operations in depth, which informed Soviet doctrine and later manoeuvre warfare.[xxvi] Although Soviet thinkers embedded the concept in doctrine, its legitimacy remains debated. Friedman (2021) characterises operational art as a ‘myth’, suggesting that it emerged to enable planning while preserving Lenin’s political primacy.[xxvii] This critique reframes the issue, suggesting that although modern warfare’s complexity made operational art indispensable, it does not imply a fixed operational level. Soviet theorists saw operational art as fluid, occurring wherever conditions demand rather than within a rigid echelon.[xxviii] Yet the growing scale and technological sophistication of warfare introduced systemic complexities that arguably supported the case for an operational level as a practical solution.
The operational level debate stems from recognising that tactical success does not guarantee strategic success; nor does failure ensure defeat. The 1916 Battle of the Somme illustrates this: despite heavy losses and limited territorial gains, the Allies achieved strategic aims by relieving pressure on Verdun and forcing German attrition.[xxix] Integrating dispersed tactical actions towards strategic objectives illustrates the value of operational art as a planning methodology, yet it does not confirm a distinct operational level; it may simply reflect effective application of operational principles. Isserson (1936) warned against assuming that tactical victories ensure operational or strategic success, urging commanders to conceptualise the whole and cautioning that without operational art, wars become ‘tacticised’ and lack decisive results.[xxx] Critics challenge the assumption that formalising an operational level solves this problem. Kelly and Brennan (2009) suggest that operational art has become a ‘catch-all’ term, sometimes obscuring planning shortcomings through vague terminology.[xxxi] Owen (2012) argues that the concept is an artificial construct that complicates the link between strategy and tactics, contributing to doctrinal ambiguity and allowing planning weaknesses to be concealed by operational language.[xxxii] Strachan (2010) notes that in the absence of clear strategy, operational planning has occasionally acted as a proxy for strategic direction.[xxxiii] At its core, this debate asserts that whether the operational level exists hinges on its perceived function, either as a bridge strengthening the link between strategy and tactics or as a barrier that obscures it.
World War II, a global mechanised conflict marked by rapid manoeuvre and combined arms operations across multiple theatres, highlighted the importance of planning beyond the tactical level.[xxxiv] Joint operations such as Normandy illustrated the value of synchronising land, sea and air forces under unified plans, yet this coordination reflected emerging practice rather than established doctrine.[xxxv] Griffin (2005) argues that the evolution of joint warfare drove operational thinking by shifting from service-centric approaches to joint design, requiring integrated planning that connected ends, ways and means across phased campaigns while introducing depth, sequencing and multi-domain integration.[xxxvi] The complexity of World War II suggests the case for a formal operational level to manage operational demands. Luttwak (1980) notes that Allied practice lacked a clearly defined operational echelon, observing that while operations were coordinated, command structures jumped from theatre-level strategy to tactical execution without a distinct operational headquarters, indicating a perceived gap in military thought.[xxxvii] Supporters of the operational level concept, including Strachan (2010),[xxxviii] Griffin (2015)[xxxix] and Eikmeier (2015),[xl] argue that it offers an important planning layer for complex, multi-domain operations, helping commanders maintain coherence across campaigns, allocate resources effectively, and sequence tactical actions in ways that align with strategic goals. Its value is often highlighted in coalition warfare, where strategic intent and tactical execution are often separated by national boundaries, differing command structures and varying operational cultures.[xli] World War II illustrates a conceptual tension: whether the application of operational thinking in practice constitutes the existence of an operational level or simply reflects adaptive practice, given that there was no formal doctrine or distinct headquarters to make it a concrete, structured entity. As a result, its status as a distinct echelon remains contested.
If we accept the premise that complex joint manoeuvre warfare underpins the operational level’s existence, the Cold War altered its relevance by shifting emphasis from large-scale campaigns to nuclear deterrence, proxy conflicts and technological rivalry, focusing instead on escalation control, credibility and integrated theatre planning.[xlii] The advent of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction made decisive victory highly improbable; exercises such as Proud Prophet in 1983 predicted catastrophic outcomes, supporting a strategy centred on deterrence rather than on decisive campaigns.[xliii] In this environment, operational planning persisted but adapted, prioritising escalation control and credibility over manoeuvre and attrition. This evolution suggests that managing escalation and theatre-level complexity may have demanded more than aggregating tactical actions, hinting at a possible role for an intermediate level of command and planning. However, escalation control and theatre-level coordination were largely strategic functions, managed by national and alliance headquarters rather than by an intermediate echelon.[xliv] Furthermore, nuclear deterrence and proxy conflicts reduced the perceived functional necessity of large-scale manoeuvre campaigns, the very conditions that originally justified operational art, making the concept of an operational level less compelling.
Operational concepts entered doctrine at different times across militaries, influenced by differing cultures and strategic imperatives.[xlv] Soviet thought emphasised operational art, mass, and deep battle, integrating manoeuvre and attrition at scale, while Western militaries were late adopters; NATO tended towards scientific management and technological superiority rather than fully integrated approaches.[xlvi] The US Army explicitly introduced the operational level in 1982, emphasising campaign design and operational frameworks.[xlvii] Britain’s Design for Military Operations (1989), influenced by NATO’s manoeuvre warfare and joint operations, advanced multi-domain thinking by synchronising deep, close and rear operations to counter Soviet tempo—a focus reinforced by the developed Higher Command and Staff Course (1988).[xlviii] These milestones signalled a move from implicit practice to explicit doctrine, introducing a layer between strategy and tactics. Yet doctrinal presence does not guarantee ontological reality.[xlix] Critics argue that the operational level is socially constructed, reflecting institutional beliefs more than universally accepted principles; Høiback (2015) describes doctrine as ‘institutionalised beliefs about what works in war’.[l] Mattis and West (2019),[li] Fuller (1926)[lii] and Vego (2009)[liii] caution that doctrine can become inflexible, dated or politically influenced, while Jackson (2013) notes that without epistemological foundations, it risks devolving into jargon.[liv] Latawski (2011) stresses definitional clarity,[lv] and Eikmeier (2015) highlights conflation of operational art and operational level, proposing clearer definitions to preserve doctrinal precision.[lvi] Definitional clarity is therefore important: if doctrine cannot specify the operational level’s purpose and function, it risks becoming a theoretical layer with limited practical relevance.
The evolution of headquarters structures illustrates the institutionalisation of an operational level. During the Cold War, NATO established regional commands under Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic to translate strategy into multinational operational plans, suggesting acknowledgement of an intermediate level.[lvii] Britain’s creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters in 1996 similarly consolidated operational planning for overseas operations within a joint framework.[lviii] These examples suggest that the operational level is more than conceptual, as it was being embedded institutionally to support integrated operations across large theatres. Variation in form reflects strategic culture and geography, challenging any notion of a universal model.
Alongside doctrinal and structural changes, a command revolution in collaborative planning influenced the operational level. Friedman (2005) shows that growing data volumes expanded staffs and shifted command from personality-driven leadership to staff-centric processes,[lix] suggesting the operational level as a practical requirement. McChrystal (2015) argues that hierarchical structures are too slow for complex environments and advocates networked approaches built on shared consciousness and empowered execution—principles increasingly incorporated into operational headquarters to improve decision cycles.[lx] King (2019) adds that command is increasingly collective and distributed, and he supports the operational level as a headquarters function.[lxi] Wass de Czege (2009) highlights operational design as an iterative, collaborative process embedded in headquarters practice,[lxii] while planning frameworks in doctrine and education indicate its institutionalisation rather than leaving it theoretical.[lxiii] Yet critics challenge this interpretation: Friedman (2021) claims that operational art is a staff discipline rather than a level,[lxiv] Vego (2009) observes that continuous reframing in operational headquarters leads to ineffective planning,[lxv] and Sjøgren (2023) warns that routinisation may risk diminishing operational art into procedural practice.[lxvi] Thus, while the operational level is institutionalised, reliance on routinised processes may erode creativity and manoeuvre, undermining operational art.
The central question remains whether the operational level represents a genuine tier between strategy and tactics or an artificial doctrinal construct. This essay has explored both perspectives. Critics maintain that it is a doctrinal invention: historically, war was conceived through strategy (ends) and tactics (means), with no intermediate level. From this standpoint, operational art is a planning methodology rather than a distinct echelon, and its formalisation risks conceptual confusion, masks strategic failure and substitutes planning for strategy. Conversely, proponents argue that the evolving character of war—evident in World War I, World War II and the Cold War— rendered an intermediate level increasingly significant. Industrialisation, mass mobilisation and multi-domain operations widened the gap between strategy and tactics, creating pressures for coordination across time and space. NATO institutionalised operational headquarters and processes to manage campaigns, supporting claims that the operational level offers coherence, resource allocation, and sequencing of tactical actions. This analysis concludes that while the operational level has developed as a functional response to the complexity of modern, multi-domain operations, its legitimacy remains socially constructed and contingent rather than universal. Conceptual ambiguity and doctrinal rigidity risk diminishing operational art into procedural practice, underscoring the need for definitional clarity. Future research should examine how emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, may transform operational planning by reducing staff burden and accelerating decision cycles. Discovering whether these developments lessen the requirement for human-centric coordination will be critical to determining whether the operational level remains necessary or becomes obsolete. Ultimately, the question of whether the operational level endures as a practical tier or proves to be a contingent doctrinal construct will shape the future architecture of command systems and the effectiveness of joint operations in an era defined by complexity and technological disruption.
Endnotes
[i] Christopher Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare, 2nd edition (Abingdon: Routledge, 2022), pp. 81–113, at: www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003096252/understanding-land-warfare-christopher-tuck.
[ii] Wilson C Blythe, ‘A History of Operational Art’, Military Review 98, no. 6 (2018): 37–49, at: www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art.
[iii] Robert T Foley, ‘What’s in a Name?: The Development of Strategies of Attrition on the Western Front, 1914–1918’, The Historian 68, no. 4 (2006): 722–746, at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6563.2006.00165.x.
[iv] Jacob Kipp, ‘The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991’, in John Olsen and Martin Van Creveld (eds), The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 64–95.
[v] Williamson Murray, ‘Combined and Joint War During World War II: The Anglo-American Story’, in 2014 International Forum on War History: Proceedings (Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014), pp. 85–95, at: www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2014/07.pdf.
[vi] Edward N Luttwak, ‘The Operational Level of War’, International Security 5, no. 3 (1980): 61–79, at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2538420.
[vii] Hew Strachan, ‘Operational Art and Britain, 1909–2009’, in John Olsen and Martin Van Creveld (eds), The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 96–136.
[viii] Harald Høiback, ‘The Anatomy of Doctrine and Ways to Keep It Fit’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 (2015): 185–197, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115037.
[ix] Gregory Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO’s Command Structure, 1951–2009 (Mons: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2009), at: https://shape.nato.int/resources/21/evolution%20of%20nato%20cmd%20structure%201951-2009.pdf.
[x] Bruno Colson and Alexander Mikaberidze (eds), The Cambridge History of the Napoleonic Wars: Volume 2, Fighting the Napoleonic Wars (Cambridge University Press, 2023).
[xi] Ministry of Defence, UK Defence Doctrine: Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, 6th edition (2022), at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-defence-doctrine-jdp-0-01.
[xii] Blythe, ‘A History of Operational Art’.
[xiii] Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton University Press, 1832).
[xiv] Ami-Jacques Rapin, ‘Rethinking Lines of Operations: Jomini’s Contribution to the Conceptualization of Strategy in the Early Nineteenth Century’, War in History 30, no. 1 (2022): 21–37, at: https://doi.org/10.1177/09683445221107901.
[xv] Adam Dighton, ‘Jomini Versus Clausewitz: Hamley’s Operations of War and Military Thought in the British Army, 1866–1933’, War in History 27, no. 2 (2020): 179–201, at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344518784775.
[xvi] Marshall Foch, The Principles of War, trans. Hilaire Belloc (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), at: https://archive.org/details/principlesofwar00foch/page/n7/mode/2up.
[xvii] William F Owen, ‘The Operational Level of War Does Not Exist’, The Journal of Military Operations 1, no. 1 (2012): 17–20, at: www.tjomo.com/article/the-operational-level-of-war-does-not-exist.
[xviii] Albert Palazzo, From Moltke to Bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in the Contemporary Military Environment (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 2008), at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/sp315_from_moltke_to_bin_laden-albert_palazzo.pdf.
[xix] Foley, ‘What’s in a Name?’.
[xx] Kipp, ‘The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art’.
[xxi] Blythe, ‘A History of Operational Art’.
[xxii] Kipp, ‘The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art’.
[xxiii] VK Triandafillov, The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies, ed. Jacob W Kipp, 1st edition (London: Routledge, 1994).
[xxiv] Kipp, ‘The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art’.
[xxv] BJC McKercher and Michael A Hennessy (eds), The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War (Westport: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1996).
[xxvi] Blythe, ‘A History of Operational Art’.
[xxvii] BA Friedman, On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021).
[xxviii] Blythe, ‘A History of Operational Art’.
[xxix] Robert T Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[xxx] Bruce Menning, Brigade Commander Georgii Samoilovich Isserson: The Evolution of Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2013), at: www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/OperationalArt.pdf.
[xxxi] Justin Kelly and Michael Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Carlisle PA: US Army War College Press, 2009), at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1619&context=monographs.
[xxxii] Owen, ‘The Operational Level of War Does Not Exist’.
[xxxiii] Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War’, Survival 52, no. 5 (2010): 157–182, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2010.522104.
[xxxiv] Murray, ‘Combined and Joint War During World War II’.
[xxxv] Bryon Greenwald, ‘Why Normandy Still Matters: Seventy-Five Years On, Operation Overlord Inspires, Instructs, and Invites Us to Be Better Joint Warfighters’, Joint Force Quarterly 95 (2019): 58–69, at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Joint-Force-Quarterly/Joint-Force-Quarterly-95.
[xxxvi] Stuart Griffin, Joint Operations: A Short History (Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2005).
[xxxvii] Luttwak, ‘The Operational Level of War’.
[xxxviii] Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi?’.
[xxxix] Stuart Griffin, ‘Operational Art and the Operational Level: The Case for the Defence’, Defence-In-Depth, 16 September 2015, at: https://defenceindepth.co/2015/09/16/operational-art-and-the-operational-level-the-case-for-the-defence.
[xl] Dale Eikmeier, ‘Operational Art and the Operational Level of War, Are They Synonymous? Well It Depends’, Small Wars Journal, 9 September 2015, at: https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/operational-art-and-the-operational-level-of-war-are-they-synonymous-well-it-depends.
[xli] Ministry of Defence, Allied Joint Publication-3: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (2017), at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/allied-joint-doctrine-for-the-conduct-of-operations-ajp-3b.
[xlii] David Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank C Cass, 1991).
[xliii] Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 4th edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2019).
[xliv] Michael Mazarr et al., Understanding Escalation: A Framework for Evaluating the Escalatory Risks of Policy Actions (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2025), at: www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2215-1.html.
[xlv] Palazzo, From Moltke to Bin Laden.
[xlvi] Griffin, Joint Operations.
[xlvii] Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).
[xlviii] Strachan, ‘Operational Art and Britain’.
[xlix] Aaron Jackson, The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare (Fort Leavenworth KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2013).
[l] Høiback, ‘The Anatomy of Doctrine and Ways to Keep It Fit’.
[li] Jim Mattis and Bing West, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead (New York: Random House, 2019).
[lii] JFC Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1926).
[liii] Milan Vego, ‘A Case Against Systemic Operational Design’, Joint Force Quarterly 53 (2009): 69–75, at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/JFQ-53.pdf.
[liv] Jackson, The Roots of Military Doctrine.
[lv] Paul Latawski, The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine, Sandhurst Occasional Paper (Camberley: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2011).
[lvi] Eikmeier, ‘Operational Art and the Operational Level of War’.
[lvii] Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO’s Command Structure.
[lviii] Ministry of Defence, ‘PJHQ – History’, The National Archives (website), at: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20121108235947/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/DoctrineOperationsandDiplomacy/PJHQ/PjhqHistory.htm.
[lix] Friedman, On Operations.
[lx] Stanley A McChrystal, Team of Teams: The Power of Small Groups in a Fragmented World (London: Portfolio, 2015).
[lxi] Anthony King, Command: The Twenty-First-Century General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
[lxii] Huba Wass de Czege, ‘Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions’, Military Review (January–February 2009): 2–12.
[lxiii] Kelly and Brennan, Alien.
[lxiv] Friedman, On Operations.
[lxv] Vego, ‘A Case Against Systemic Operational Design’.
[lxvi] Søren Sjøgren, ‘The Last Refuge of the Unimaginative? Doctrine and Its Role in the Military Profession’, PhD thesis, Royal Danish Defence College Institute for Military Operations, 2023, at: www.fak.dk/globalassets/fak/dokumenter/2023/-the-last-refuge-of-the-unimaginative-phd-thesis-.pdf.