General Joseph Stilwell and the China-Burma-India Theatre
Naval Institute Press, 2024, ISBN 9781682472033, 266 pp, RRP AU$35 (hardcover)
Author: Eric Setzekorn
Reviewed by: David Connery
The history of the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theatre of World War II is not well known in Australia, where the focus usually falls upon Australian and American campaigns in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands or Borneo. On the rare occasions when the focus moves further afield it centres upon Field Marshal William Slim and his drive across Burma. Yet there is much more to the CBI Theatre, as Eric Setzekorn shows in his relatively short book Uncertain Allies. Setzekorn uses his deep knowledge of this theatre to provide a sharp analysis of one of its key leaders, General Joseph ‘Vinegar Joe’ Stilwell, United States Army. The book is an important one because it examines a unique theme, namely why a highly competent, values-based battlefield leader and operationally successful general was ultimately relieved of his command.
Eric Setzekorn had already established himself as a significant author on the topic of the Chinese military across multiple eras, and more generally on United States strategic policy in East Asia. This is his first work on the CBI Theatre, and he has used a number of previously unpublished sources (drawn from the US Army archives at Fort Leavenworth) to create this rich picture of Stilwell’s command, relationships and challenges.
Setzekorn divides his examination of Stilwell’s tenure into three periods. The first period (1942) covers Stilwell’s assumption of command and his related challenges concerning political support and mission clarity. This analysis illuminates the ambiguity of Stilwell’s command relationships and mission, and how he struggled to articulate a clear strategic plan to Washington while dealing with counter-narratives coming from within his own command.
The analysis of the second period of his command (1943) shows Stilwell’s skill in raising and training forces to execute a complex manoeuvre in northern Burma. It also covers how Stilwell lost control of the debate about the use of air power in the theatre and—in competition with the major operations planned in Europe—was unable to argue for more resources. However, this operational success was not replicated when the strategic focus shifted into China. Here, political factors dominated the third and last period of Stilwell’s tenure (1944). This period was shaped by competition within Nationalist Chinese forces, a poorly supported offensive, and conflicting objectives of the Allies.
Through this narrative structure, Setzekorn examines his two key themes and assesses the ultimate reasons why Stilwell was unable to create a unified campaign in the CBI Theatre. The theme of uncertain allies (which gives the book its title) is clearly shown in the way Stilwell needed to reconcile Chinese, British and multiple domestic sources of power and influence at the same time. Stilwell, who Setzekorn describes as ill-disposed to the British, thought Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten’s priority—even though he was the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia—was to protect Britain’s colonial interests in Burma and India. Setzekorn also explains that Stilwell deeply mistrusted the Chinese Nationalist leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, who was popular in the United States but perceived (by Stilwell at least) as being more concerned about his grip on power and the Chinese Communists than about the Japanese.
On top of this, Stilwell failed to establish a positive relationship with President Franklin D Roosevelt or to see the importance of influencing broader audiences. His ‘straight down the road’ approach of dealing through his chain of command meant, for example, he could not (and did not) counter popular and persuasive arguments about the relative merits of independent air power versus more land forces in the CBI Theatre (Chapter 7). Nor was Stilwell prepared to manage the global strategy conferences that could have linked the CBI Theatre more closely to wider strategic efforts (Chapter 3). Further, his lack of attention to ‘political niceties’ delayed his eventual appointment to overall command of US and Chinese forces in the theatre (Chapter 6). Setzekorn attributes the general’s ultimate removal to this lack of political astuteness.
The ambiguity of Stilwell’s role and mission in China was also a significant problem. When deployed to China in early 1942, Stilwell was ordered to coordinate and increase the effectiveness of US military assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Army. Further, he was appointed as ‘Chief of Staff’ to Chiang as the supreme Chinese military commander, an undefined position with authority only as far as the Chinese leader would allow. According to Setzekorn, Stilwell’s inability (or unwillingness) to shape his poorly defined mission and consequent orders was a further factor contributing to this unsatisfactory situation.
Reading Setzekorn’s narrative and his analysis of Stilwell’s generalship brings to mind a newish adage, ‘What got you here won’t get you there’.[1] Stilwell’s directness and integrity, his professional passion and his tactical acumen, as described in this book, are exactly what an army seeks in battalion and brigade commanders. That Stilwell applied his personality and professionalism on a larger scale is a tribute to the training and selection process that took him to Burma. Yet, as Setzekorn demonstrates, Stilwell’s inability to grasp the political dimension of his role as a theatre commander ultimately diminished his position and led to his dismissal.
While this is a significant book and a most useful one, it assumes a lot of knowledge of the reader. There is no real description of Stilwell as a person, which means not every reader will understand why he was called ‘Vinegar Joe’ or appreciate the key forces that shaped his personality. Nor is there a good link between General George Marshall’s assessment of Stilwell as the best person for the role of dealing with China and the relatively fast breakdown in Stilwell’s relationship with Chiang Kai-Shek. An outline of the CBI campaign would also help those without background knowledge of this campaign.
These points are, however, minor. This work is a significant addition to the literature on civil–military relations, coalition operations and the strategic competition for resources. The lessons presented could be well absorbed by any officer given either a senior command role in coalition operations, or national command of any operation.
Endnotes
[1] A phrase popularised by Marshall Goldsmith, What Got You Here Won’t Get You There: How Successful People Become Even More Successful (Profile Books, 2008).