Civilian Control of the Military and the Revitalization of Democracy
Stanford University Press, 2024, ISBN: 9781503637300, 298pp, RRP $70.00USD (hardcover)
Author: Alice Hunt Friend
Reviewed by: Matthew Jones
In Mightier Than the Sword, Alice Hunt Friend presents a compelling case for revitalising civilian control of the military as both a normative pillar of democracy and a practical imperative for national security. Drawing on her experience within the US Department of Defense and her academic background, Friend advances a clear thesis: in modern democracies, the effectiveness of military force is a function not simply of capability but of how well it is governed by civilians. For readers within the Australian Defence Force (ADF), particularly those concerned with strategic policy and civil–military relations, this is a timely, if at times confronting, work.
Friend’s core argument is that civilian control is not self-executing. It requires deliberate, professional skills from civilians across political, bureaucratic, and policy domains. She argues that three attributes underpin effective civilian control: authoritative status (legal power), institutional power (access and influence within the defence apparatus), and political expertise (the judgement to align military force with national interests and democratic values). When these attributes are absent or underdeveloped (as they increasingly are in polarised, populist democracies), the military risks becoming either unduly autonomous or inappropriately politicised. Friend is particularly attuned to the risk of ‘civilian drift’, where elected officials and senior civil servants defer too readily to the military under the guise of respect for expertise.
These themes map directly onto Australia’s evolving defence landscape. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR)[1] and the 2024 National Defence Strategy[2] mark a clear shift towards a strategy of denial, focusing on preventing coercion against Australia and its near region. Civilian leaders have taken bold steps to reshape the ADF accordingly: restructuring the Army for littoral operations, scaling down programs such as the procurement of infantry fighting vehicles, and accelerating missile and strike capabilities. These reforms reflect Friend’s model of civilian direction of strategy and force design, where the Minister for Defence and the Cabinet identify strategic ends, and the ADF is tasked with generating appropriate ways and means.
Crucially, when reflecting on Australia’s own unique defence diarchy—the shared leadership of the Department of Defence by the Secretary (civilian) and the Chief of the Defence Force (military)[3]—it can be seen that this model embodies Friend’s call for institutionalised civil–military partnership. It ensures that the Minister for Defence receives integrated advice that is both strategically sound and operationally informed, aligning well with Friend’s insistence that civilian control is not merely a legal relationship but a professional practice that is learned, exercised and accountable. Furthermore, in applying Friend’s framework to the Australian Government, the Minister for Defence (who exercises delegated command from the Prime Minister and Cabinet) occupies the critical civilian node, possessing legal authority, policy tools and political accountability. Additionally, the Prime Minister (as Chair of the National Security Committee of Cabinet) sets the overarching strategic direction. Thus, Australia’s system exhibits the layered, networked model of civilian control that Friend champions: from strategy-setting at Cabinet, through ministerial command, to diarchic execution and military compliance.
However, Friend would caution that structures alone are not enough. She argues that civilian expertise and confidence must be cultivated continuously. In Australia, this means investing not just in the professional development of military officers but also in senior public servants, ministerial staff and political decision-makers. Friend’s book suggests that one response is to enhance the ‘civilian ethic’ in defence governance, ensuring that non-uniformed actors are not only legally empowered but also strategically literate and ethically grounded.
The book’s relevance has sharpened further in light of recent global events. With Donald Trump returning to the US presidency, Australian policymakers face renewed uncertainty about the consistency of American strategic commitments. This concern underscores the DSR’s call for greater Australian self-reliance and the importance of investing in sovereign capabilities and deterrence options. Friend’s analysis supports this shift: she highlights how civilian leaders must tailor defence planning to present political realities rather than past assumptions, even when it is uncomfortable to do so. Australia’s continued public rhetoric of alliance assurance must now be balanced with genuine capability investment and contingency planning for scenarios where US support is delayed, conditional or absent.
The 2025 re-election of the federal Labor government also reinforces this civil–military theme. With an emboldened mandate and bipartisan acceptance of the DSR’s threat assessment, the civilian leadership has a political window to enact deeper reform. Friend’s framework would suggest that this is a critical test of civilian control: whether the government can transition from a declaratory strategy to meaningful capability delivery, industrial reform, and regional engagement, while maintaining public trust and alliance credibility.
Friend’s work is particularly resonant for those who straddle both military and civilian professions, such as Army Reserve officers who also serve in demanding civilian roles, offering a dual perspective on the practical tensions and synergies within civil–military boundaries. Her argument that civilian control is both a privilege and a responsibility resonates strongly. In uniform, we are trained to respect lawful authority, maintain apolitical service, and execute orders following government direction. Out of uniform, we work in civilian systems that habitually prize open debate, professional autonomy, and institutional transparency. Friend’s emphasis on the point that both realms must be understood and that civil–military interaction must be grounded in mutual competence and trust rings true in both professional worlds.
There is a clear lesson for the ADF: while military professionalism is necessary, it is not sufficient, by itself, to achieve strategic effectiveness. Achieving this depends on a system in which civilians are not just nominally in charge but demonstrably in control by virtue of expertise, engagement and resolve. The burden lies not just on generals to respect civilian oversight but on ministers, advisers and bureaucrats to earn that oversight through performance and principle.
Mightier Than the Sword is an essential addition to the strategic bookshelf of any Australian military officer, academic, policymaker or Defence public servant. It is not a treatise on military misconduct or constitutional mechanics; it is a timely guide to how democracies should, and must, govern the instruments of war. For Australia, a middle power facing unprecedented regional pressure and alliance ambiguity, the message is both sobering and empowering. To preserve the legitimacy and effectiveness of our armed forces, we must ensure that the pen continues to guide the sword—not by tradition but by deliberate and enduring practice.
Endnotes
[1] Australian Government, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review (Commonwealth of Australia, 2023).
[2] Australian Army, Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2024 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), at: www.army.gov.au/our-work/strategy/australian-army-contribution-national-defence-strategy-2024.
[3] Mark Thomson, ‘Defence and the Diarchy’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1 October 2014, at: www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-and-the-diarchy.