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Sustaining Deterrence

Journal Edition

Strengthening the Systems that Underpin Australia’s Northern Base Network

Author: Lieutenant Colonel Julian McMahon

Introduction

Before the bombing of Darwin in 1942, Prime Minister John Curtin warned that ‘the protection of this country is no longer that of a contribution to a world at war, but is a resistance to an enemy threatening to invade our own shores’.[1] His warning was soon borne out when Japanese aircraft conducted two major raids against Darwin, causing extensive damage to military facilities, shipping and civilian infrastructure. The attacks transformed a looming strategic concern into an immediate national crisis, galvanising Curtin’s resolve and reinforcing his call for total national mobilisation. Arguing that the war had reached Australian soil, he demanded unity, urgency and the full commitment of national resources. Curtin advocated a transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing, aligning industry, manpower and society toward the nation’s defence. Central to this vision was the need for a resilient logistics system capable of sustaining the demands of war, underpinned by the recognition that Australia’s security would ultimately rest on its preparedness and determination to confront an expanding regional threat.[2]

Nearly eighty-five years after the bombing of Darwin, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the release of the 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS 2026).[3] He observed that Australia faces an increasingly unstable and contested strategic environment, with intensifying great-power competition reshaping the nation’s security outlook. Ongoing conflict in the Middle East, including tensions involving Iran, had contributed to global energy volatility, affecting domestic fuel prices. Drawing comparisons to the uncertainty of the Second World War era, Albanese highlighted the need for national resilience and preparedness.[4] The NDS 2026 was presented as a response to these challenges, prioritising deterrence, resilience and Australia’s ability to operate in a more dangerous and unpredictable strategic environment.[5] Fundamental to this approach is Australia’s northern base network, which is a critical enabler of force projection and sustained operations. In alignment with earlier strategies, it highlights Northern Australia as the primary geographic platform for operations, enabling dispersal, resilience and proximity to key Indo‑Pacific approaches.[6] Australia’s northern base network, comprising established airfields, bare bases, and austere operating locations, remains critical to sustaining military operations in an era of heightened strategic competition.[7]

Deterrence by denial depends on an adversary believing Australia can generate, sustain and regenerate combat power over time. Sustainment systems underpin operational endurance, resilience and responsiveness. Therefore, weaknesses in sustainment undermine the credibility of deterrence. This article argues that, if the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is to sustain deterrence, the systems underpinning Australia’s northern base network must be strengthened, with fuel resilience the most critical requirement for sustaining operational reach, persistence and combat power to achieve that deterrence effect.

The article first examines the strategic importance of Northern Australia in sustaining deterrence through both the defence of the continent and the projection of military power into the Indo-Pacific. It then analyses the challenges associated with operating in the north and the critical role of sustainment systems in overcoming them, with particular emphasis on fuel as a foundational enabler of operational reach, endurance and resilience. While sustainment depends upon a range of commodities and enabling systems, fuel warrants particular attention because it is consumed continuously across all domains and directly influences the ability to generate and sustain military effects; the sustainment of credible military capabilities is central to deterring adversaries. Finally, the article argues that the vulnerabilities inherent in operating in Northern Australia should be viewed not merely as constraints, but as opportunities to test, evaluate and refine the sustainment concepts, technologies and infrastructure measures required to improve resilience across the integrated force.

The Strategically Valuable North

Australia’s northern base network derives its strategic value from two complementary functions: defending the Australian mainland and enabling military operations throughout the Indo-Pacific. Debate persists regarding the network’s primary purpose. Some analysts argue northern bases should focus on the defence of Australia, acting as a shield against potential threats to the continent. Others contend the network functions as a sword, enabling offensive operations by coalition forces deep into the Indo‑Pacific.[8] NDS 2026 implicitly reconciles these perspectives by treating the ‘shield’ and the ‘sword’ as complementary functions of an integrated force. The government’s priorities are reflected in the approximately $425 billion investment over the decade to deliver an integrated, focused force.[9] While the importance of logistics, including fuel, infrastructure, and sustainment systems is well recognised, workforce capacity and distribution capabilities have not advanced at the same pace. In particular, shortages in deployable logistics units and ground distribution capabilities pose challenges to sustaining dispersed operations at scale.

Northern Australia spans a vast, sparsely populated and operationally complex region, yet one of considerable strategic importance. Australia’s northern base network enables force projection. Positioned across Northern Queensland, the Northern Territory, and Western Australia, these bases provide the geographic reach necessary to project air power into the Indo‑Pacific, generating operational tempo, responsiveness and strategic influence.[10] Their significance both includes and extends beyond continental defence; they underpin Australia’s ability to operate forward, support coalition partners and contribute meaningfully to regional stability. Its northern air bases provide critical support to allied operations and advanced military aircraft. In October 2024, for example, access to and overflight of Northern Australia enabled a long-range US Air Force B-2 Spirit strike mission against hardened Houthi weapons storage facilities in Yemen.[11] This highlighted the region’s role in supporting global power projection. In a future Indo-Pacific contingency, Australia could once again serve as a major staging and sustainment base for allied airpower, much as it did during the Second World War when Australian bases enabled American air operations across the Southwest Pacific.[12]

Australia’s northern region also serves as a critical platform for projecting ground forces deeper into the Indo-Pacific. The redeployment of Army units to the north outside of their traditional bases in Eastern and South-Eastern Australia has placed key forces closer to potential operating areas, reducing transit times and extending the effective reach of both maritime and air assets. This is an important consideration for a defence policy and strategy based on deterrence by denial, where an adversary’s assessments of our responsiveness, preparedness, resilience and operational tempo become key factors. The acquisition of long-range strike capabilities such as the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) extends the ADF’s capacity to hold key maritime approaches in the Indian Ocean and the Arafura and Coral Seas at risk, contributing directly to deterrence by denial. This is to say little of developing technologies, such as drones or autonomous surveillance, transport and attack aircraft.[13] Although these capabilities are already available, they have yet to be widely integrated into Northern Australia, where they could play a critical role in supporting future operations at scale. Force projection and long-range strike capabilities, however, are only as effective as the sustainment systems that support them. Northern Australia is a cornerstone of Australia’s ability to project power and sustain operations across the Indo-Pacific.

However, strategic value does not automatically translate into strategic utility. The ability to project force from the north depends upon the capacity to sustain personnel, fuel, munitions and equipment across vast distances. Consequently, the central question is not whether Northern Australia is strategically important, but whether the systems supporting operations in the region are sufficiently resilient to sustain deterrence over time.

In his 20 May 2026 address, ‘The Future of the Australian Army Profession’, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart affirmed that the Australian Army is the nation’s expert in combat ‘from, on, and onto the land’.[14] Central to this role is the ability to enable and sustain joint operations. This expertise extends beyond manoeuvre to include the critical logistics functions required to support operations across Australia’s vast and challenging geography. While air and maritime forces generate much of Australia’s deterrent effect, their effectiveness depends on the Army’s ability to establish, sustain and protect the logistics networks that underpin northern operations.

The Army’s role in supporting the logistics network is clear. Concept Lantana, the ADF Land Domain Concept, emphasises the Army’s role in enabling joint force projection through control of key terrain, sustainment networks and persistent land-based capabilities.[15] Northern bases represent critical nodes within this system, requiring sustained logistics capacity to remain operational and resilient. The Army’s ability to establish, sustain and protect these networks enables air and maritime forces to operate effectively across extended distances. In this way, the Army’s warfighting expertise and logistics capabilities are mutually reinforcing, underpinning both land operations and the broader effectiveness of the joint force. Absent substantial improvements to base infrastructure and the supporting air, road, rail and digital networks, northern basing will remain an uneven and weather-dependent proposition. In such circumstances, climatic conditions, rather than operational requirements, will dictate the tempo and feasibility of military operations. This is neither desirable nor acceptable when the nation’s defence and capacity to hold adversaries at distance is at stake.

Defence of Australia’s north requires sustaining operations across a vast and remote region. The archipelagic approaches to the continent encompass hundreds of islands, including the strategically significant offshore territories of Christmas Island and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. These locations offer valuable strategic depth, surveillance opportunities and options for forward positioning. However, their limited infrastructure, harsh environmental conditions and distance from major population centres present significant sustainment and resupply challenges. The demands of this region require robust, flexible and highly distributed sustainment systems.[16]

Northern Australia’s combination of vast distances, sparse infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions places significant strain on transport and sustainment networks. Seasonal extremes of the wet and dry seasons profoundly affect mobility and sustainment. During the wet season, heavy rainfall and flooding frequently render roads impassable, isolating communities and degrading critical supply routes. River crossings and low-lying infrastructure are especially vulnerable. For example, flooding in North Queensland has repeatedly cut the Flinders Highway, isolating inland centres, and has been identified as an issue requiring direct federal and state government investment to alleviate.[17] In Cape York, river crossings such as the Archer River are routinely impassable during the wet season, effectively severing access for weeks. In Western Australia, the bridge at Fitzroy Crossing was severely damaged in 2023, cutting road access across the Kimberley.[18] Conversely, the dry season introduces dust, heat, and road degradation, increasing vehicle wear and reducing endurance. These environmental pressures complicate sustainment planning and place additional strain on already fragile infrastructure. Movement of vital goods and services by road cannot be guaranteed in Northern Australia’s climate and terrain.

Compounding these challenges is Australia’s underdeveloped northern rail network. It remains sparse, primarily north-south in orientation, and lacks the lateral connectivity required to support distributed operations across the continent. This constrains the efficient movement of bulk commodities, particularly fuel, leaving Defence and industry heavily reliant on road transport. Together, these factors create a fragile and constrained logistics network across Northern Australia. The concerns over Australia’s underdeveloped rail system have been long held. As the Australian General Staff observed in 1920:

By reason of the great expanse of Australia, the long distance between vital points and the unavoidable necessity for mobilization of the units of the Field Army at widely separated places, the question of efficient and judiciously located railway communications is of very great importance. The recent war has demonstrated that the power to manoeuvre depends upon inviolate railway facilities.[19]

More than a century later, the fundamental relationship between mobility, logistics and military effectiveness remains unchanged. While modern sustainment networks now incorporate road, rail, air, maritime and digital infrastructure, Australia’s ability to generate and sustain combat power still depends on resilient and redundant lines of communication spanning vast distances.

The COVID‑19 pandemic highlighted systemic weaknesses in Australia’s northern base network, offering a useful analogue for how the north might function under wartime strain. During the pandemic, supply chain disruptions, limited infrastructure redundancy, and workforce fragility exposed the region’s dependence on civilian and interagency support.[20] Northern bases lack sufficient organic sustainment capacity, relying heavily on external stakeholders to maintain operational continuity.[21] The lesson is that northern basing cannot rely upon just-in-time logistics or narrow supply chains; resilience requires redundancy, local capacity and pre-positioned resources.

Sustaining Australia’s northern base network is a challenge too large for any single service to solve alone. The scale, distance and complexity of operations across Northern Australia demands a genuinely joint approach that integrates the capabilities of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), Army, and Royal Australian Navy (RAN), alongside international partners who can provide additional logistics capacity and resilience. The United States’ Marine Rotational Force–Darwin (MRF–D) represents a key allied presence that both contributes to and depends upon this shared sustainment system. Its presence provides additional logistics support, engineering, and force protection depth, enhancing resilience and interoperability.

Beyond the military domain, there is significant value in leveraging interagency and civilian organisations already operating in remote environments. Australia Post, the State Emergency Service (SES), Australian Border Force (ABF) and Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS) offer enduring access, distribution networks and crisis response capabilities that could meaningfully complement Defence logistics in a crisis or conflict.[22] Australia Post underpins essential mail distribution and supply movement across dispersed and remote communities, ensuring continuity of communications and goods. The SES contributes surge manpower and disaster response capabilities, critical for base support during crises, while the ABF maintains regulatory control, biosecurity enforcement, and port/airfield access—functions vital in both competition and conflict scenarios. Meanwhile, the RFDS ensures aeromedical evacuation and primary healthcare access across vast distances, compensating for limited medical reach in austere environments. These organisations and their unique capabilities and experience must be integrated into a whole-of-nation approach to defence.[23]

Northern Australian bases continue to face workforce challenges associated with remote locations and limited local populations. The success of fly in fly out (FIFO) workforce models in the resources sector provides one example of how specialist labour can be sustained across dispersed northern locations. Historically, the ADF mitigated distance challenges through dedicated air mobility platforms such as the Government Aircraft Factories (GAF) Nomad and de Havilland Canada DHC-4 Caribou, which provided flexible and responsive troop and light cargo transport between remote bases. However, their replacement, the C‑27J Spartan, has not delivered the expected level of utility. Persistent reliability and maintenance issues have constrained its availability, reducing its operational use and limiting its effectiveness as a routine intra-theatre transport solution. As a result, the ADF has struggled to replicate the agility once provided by its predecessors, creating capability gaps in personnel movement and sustainment. This shortfall reinforces the need for an alternative approach, such as a structured FIFO model supported by reliable airlift or contracted services. Without this, northern basing will continue to face workforce and logistics inefficiencies, undermining operational readiness and resilience in a region of growing strategic importance.

Fuel: The Critical Commodity

While sustainment encompasses personnel, munitions, spare parts, medical support and information systems, fuel occupies a unique position because nearly every component of the integrated force depends upon it. Aircraft cannot fly, ships cannot sail, vehicles cannot manoeuvre and generators cannot power military networks without access to fuel. Consequently, fuel represents the most critical and universally demanded commodity within the northern sustainment system. Unlike munitions, which are consumed primarily during combat, or spare parts, which are required intermittently, fuel is consumed continuously across all domains regardless of operational tempo. Its absence immediately constrains movement, power generation and combat operations. While all sustainment commodities are important, fuel’s universal demand and direct relationship to operational reach make it uniquely significant within northern basing and force projection. For this reason, the effectiveness of Australia’s northern base network is likely to be constrained less by the availability of combat platforms than by the resilience of the fuel systems that support them.

In announcing the outbreak of war with Japan, Prime Minister Curtin warned that ‘the thread of peace has snapped—only the valour of our fighting forces, backed by the very uttermost of which we are capable in factory and workshop, can knit that thread again into security’.[24] Curtin’s observation highlighted the inseparable relationship between combat capability and national industrial capacity. Among the many outputs of that industrial base, fuel was paramount. Aircraft, ships, vehicles and logistics networks could only operate to the extent that adequate petroleum products could be refined, stored and distributed to where they were needed. Recent conflicts have reaffirmed this reality. In Eastern Europe, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have expended enormous resources protecting, attacking and sustaining fuel infrastructure, recognising that operational reach and combat endurance depend upon reliable access to energy. The conflict has demonstrated that even technologically advanced militaries remain constrained by the availability, movement and storage of fuel, making logistics and industrial resilience critical determinants of battlefield success.[25] While the character of warfare continues to change, the enduring relationship between military capability and industrial capacity remains relevant to Australia’s northern approaches. The ADF’s ability to sustain forces across vast distances through resilient fuel infrastructure and supply chains will be as important as the combat systems themselves.

Sustainment in Northern Australia will ultimately hinge on fuel. The ability to generate, store, distribute and protect liquid fuels will be decisive in both peace and conflict, underpinning the effectiveness of air, maritime and land operations. These functions depend upon resilient logistics networks, secure infrastructure and the capacity to distribute fuel across vast distances and into austere environments. In this context, Army plays a critical role in enabling the integrated force through the establishment, protection and operation of sustainment networks. Investment in fuel infrastructure, distribution systems and resilient supply chains should therefore be regarded not as a supporting activity, but as a prerequisite for credible deterrence, force projection and operational endurance.

As Major General Martin White has observed, liquid fossil fuels remain fundamental to ADF military capability despite ongoing efforts to incorporate alternative energy sources across the force.[26] Like the US military, the ADF remains heavily dependent on liquid fuels, particularly for aviation, maritime and logistics operations. Tanker aircraft illustrate both this dependence and the opportunities it creates. Operating from Northern Australia, they can extend the range of combat aircraft, support a persistent air presence and sustain coalition operations across vast distances. However, recent global instability, has highlighted the vulnerability of fuel supply chains and Australia’s continued dependence on imported refined fuel. More than 80 per cent of Australia’s refined fuels are sourced from overseas, including key regional hubs such as Singapore, South Korea and China.[27] Fuel security is therefore not merely a logistics challenge; it is a strategic imperative underpinning Australia’s northern defence posture.

Australia’s dependence on internationally refined oil is compounded by the steady decline in domestic refining capacity over recent decades, leaving only a small number of refineries in operation. A quarter of a century ago, Australia operated eight domestic oil refineries, while today, only two remain open—one in Brisbane and the other in Geelong.[28] Incidents such as Viva Energy’s Geelong facility fire, which took more than 13 hours to extinguish, illustrate both the fragility of existing infrastructure and the potential for sudden degradation of national supply.[29] At the same time, post-COVID-19 analysis has highlighted the considerable financial and industrial challenges associated with rebuilding large-scale domestic refining capacity, which largely fall beyond Defence’s remit and budget. [30] In these circumstances, Australia must pursue a dual approach: strengthening international partnerships that underpin fuel security, particularly with key regional hubs such as Singapore, while investing in resilient fuel infrastructure across Northern Australia. This includes the development of hardened fuel storage facilities and secure distribution networks capable of supporting both national resilience and military operations. Such infrastructure would not only enhance Australia’s ability to sustain combat power during crises but also provide shared access opportunities for regional partners with limited training areas, strengthening interoperability and collective capacity.

A consistent fuel supply to key nodes across Australia is a well‑established requirement, but the growing demand for expeditionary fuel support is increasingly evident. The RAAF’s decision to adopt agile basing concepts, combined with the Army’s transition to platforms such as the Apache attack helicopter and the continued reliance on Chinook heavy‑lift aircraft, places greater emphasis on dispersed, responsive fuel networks. These capabilities are only effective if supported by forward fuel nodes that enable sustained operations across vast distances.

While options such as hot‑wing refueling remain vital for rapid turnaround, they are resource-intensive and underscore the need for reliable bulk fuel resupply­—particularly from maritime sources. Petroleum Over the Shore (POTS) operations during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2023 demonstrate how sea-based fuel delivery can support expeditionary operations.[31] Army’s continued participation in Exercise Balikatan in the Philippines and Operation Southern Discovery in Antarctica further reinforces its commitment to practicing and validating fuel distribution in austere environments.

The RAAF’s investment in agile air basing emphasises dispersal, resilience, and the ability to operate from a network of main and bare bases.[32] Agile basing ensures these northern locations can support sustained operations even under threat, transforming them into flexible projection nodes rather than static infrastructure. Within this model, fuel emerges as the critical commodity. Air operations drive immense fuel demand, and dispersal dictates the need for multiple sites. As such, fuel logistics becomes the defining constraint on operational output. Addressing this challenge requires prioritising bulk storage, distribution systems and sustainment capacity. In this context, the Australian Army is uniquely positioned to support the integrated force, providing the bulk fuel storage, ground distribution and sustainment capabilities necessary to enable continuous and scalable operations from northern bases.[33]

Emerging solutions include the renewed use of dracone barges—flexible fuel bladders proven in the Falklands War­—and the need for an Inland Pipeline Distribution System (IPDS) to support Northern Australia’s geography.[34] The IPDS serves as a temporary pipeline that allows fuel to be pumped over long distances across land to sustain military operations. Ultimately, operational reach and endurance across Northern Australia will depend on resilient support nodes capable of sustaining dispersed forces at distance. This reinforces a recurring lesson from modern conflict that fuel remains central to military operations, while the supply chains that sustain it remain inherently vulnerable.

Typically, the RAAF is the largest consumer of fuel on a day-to-day basis in expeditionary operations. Air platforms—particularly fast jets, surveillance aircraft, and air mobility fleets—require significant volumes of aviation fuel to generate sustained airpower, making fuel a critical enabler of reach and persistence. Despite this demand, there exists a well-established global fuel and basing infrastructure that supports air operations from fixed land bases, enabling rapid projection of airpower across regions. This reliance on fuel-intensive air operations places a premium on the protection of critical storage and distribution nodes such as airbases, fuel storage sites and logistics hubs. Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) systems must therefore be prioritised to ensure the survivability and continuity of these key enablers.[35] Without adequate protection, fuel infrastructure remains a critical vulnerability that can constrain operational effectiveness. The protection of the northern base network is as important as the strategic capabilities it enables.

The challenges associated with fuel security are well understood, and addressing them will require a coordinated effort between Defence, government and industry. Encouragingly, significant investments are already underway. The continued development of RAAF Base Tindal reflects a growing recognition of the importance of fuel resilience to Australia’s defence posture, while analysts have repeatedly called for the diversification of fuel supply chains and the hardening of critical transport infrastructure to reduce strategic vulnerability.[36] Similarly, proposals for major jet fuel storage facilities at Tindal, Curtin and Learmonth demonstrate an increasing commitment to strengthening the endurance, dispersal and resilience of the northern base network.[37] Beyond Defence-led initiatives, the Gascoyne Gateway Marine Complex (GGMC), a privately funded and Australian-owned deep-water port, has the potential to further enhance resilience in North-West Australia by providing an additional logistics hub capable of supporting force projection, sustainment, fuel distribution and allied operations.[38] Collectively, these developments represent important steps towards strengthening the logistics foundations upon which Australia’s deterrence and operational effectiveness increasingly depend.

Effective force projection is not the product of any single service, but of an integrated force capable of generating and sustaining combat power across vast distances. While the RAAF delivers much of Australia’s operational reach and is among the largest consumers of fuel in expeditionary operations, its effectiveness depends upon the Army’s ability to establish, protect and sustain forward operating bases, fuel nodes and logistics networks.[39] The Navy, in turn, provides the maritime lifeline that connects industry to the battlespace through strategic sealift, replenishment capabilities and access to critical ports and infrastructure. Together, the services create the sustainment architecture that underpins operational endurance, ensuring airpower and joint force capabilities can be generated, maintained and protected in both contested and austere environments.

The challenge is not simply acquiring additional fuel infrastructure. The ADF must also determine how fuel can be distributed, protected and sustained under realistic operational conditions. Questions surrounding dispersed fuel storage, autonomous resupply, inland pipeline systems, integrated air and missile defence, and coalition sustainment cannot be answered through planning alone. They require persistent experimentation under operationally relevant conditions. Northern Australia therefore offers more than a location from which to project force; it provides an environment in which the integrated force can continuously test, evaluate and refine the sustainment systems upon which deterrence ultimately depends.

From Constraint to Opportunity: Developing a Multinational Test and Evaluation Ecosystem

The preceding analysis has identified a series of unresolved challenges: fuel security, infrastructure resilience, workforce constraints, autonomous resupply, logistics protection, and coalition interoperability. Addressing these challenges requires more than additional investment; it requires a mechanism through which concepts, technologies and partnerships can be continuously tested and refined. Northern Australia is uniquely suited to perform this function. Critically, the purpose of such testing is to improve the resilience of the sustainment systems identified throughout this paper, rather than to establish a separate strategic objective.

Australia’s northern bases should be positioned as a national test and evaluation ecosystem, tightly integrated with international engagement. Success will depend on attracting sustained foreign investment; Australia is unlikely to resource a credible northern test enterprise on its own. Done properly, a foreign investment partnership model can help address the long‑standing challenges of logistics and sustainment in Northern Australia. While the constraints are well understood by experts, many proposed solutions remain unfunded or impractical. A viable path forward is to design infrastructure with clear dual‑use outcomes in both peacetime and contingency operations. In particular, the centralisation of key logistics resupply—enabled by air mobility—demands a coordinated, multi‑departmental approach, underpinned by contributions from allies and partners.

While exercises such as Talisman Sabre and Pitch Black are invaluable for validating concepts and interoperability, their episodic nature limits opportunities for continuous experimentation and refinement.[40] The northern base network must be evolved into a persistent, year‑round test and evaluation ecosystem, enabling continuous refinement of sustainment and dispersal in under multiple types of simulations. This includes leveraging both wet and dry seasons to test system resilience, particularly electromagnetic spectrum capabilities under varied environmental conditions. In the context of competing priorities such as nuclear-powered submarines, prioritising joint logistics investment is critical to sustaining and maturing the network.

The north’s geography and climate are strategic advantages that should be deliberately leveraged for testing, training and evaluation activities. Existing multinational exercises with the United States, Japan, India, and Singapore demonstrate the value of this approach. Similarly, industry support to NASA and the European Space Agency in Australia highlights the type of partnership model required. By aligning defence needs with commercial and international interests, the north can become a sustainable, high‑value ecosystem for test and evaluation.

Technological advances are transforming the character of war and, in doing so, increasing the importance of sustainment. Long-range fires, autonomous systems, electronic warfare, and space-enabled capabilities provide unprecedented operational reach, precision, and persistence. Yet these advantages come with growing demands for fuel, maintenance, specialist personnel, data infrastructure, and resilient supply networks. Consequently, the logistic development of Northern Australia cannot be limited to the construction of bases alone. Equal attention must be given to building a robust ecosystem for testing, evaluation, logistics and sustainment capable of supporting both current and emerging capabilities. Viewed through this lens, Northern Australia is more than a collection of forward operating locations; it is a strategic platform from which future military capability can be developed, sustained and projected across the Indo-Pacific.

Recent conflicts, including the Russia–Ukraine war and actions by Iran, its proxies, and North Korea, demonstrate how the character of war has evolved through the widespread use of lethal one-way Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS). First-person-view (FPV) drones, in particular, have proven highly effective, delivering precise and low-cost strikes that have caused significant battlefield casualties. A notable trend has been the deliberate targeting of logistics networks, including resupply assets, fuel points, and critical infrastructure, highlighting the vulnerability of sustainment systems in modern conflict. The increasing range and accessibility of these systems mean that Australia’s northern bases and lines of communication are no longer insulated by distance.[41] This exposes key logistical hubs, which are essential for force projection, to emerging threats from both state and non-state actors. The ADF has recognised this challenge for several years and has accelerated investment in counter-UAS capabilities to address the growing threat.[42]

However, as potential adversaries acquire increasingly capable long-range strike systems, sustaining operations in Northern Australia will require more than simply expanding logistics capacity. It will also demand the protection of critical fuel infrastructure, munitions stockpiles, airfields, and resupply routes.[43] This includes enhancing protection of northern resupply routes and developing resilient logistics systems. Equally important is identifying suitable platforms capable of rapidly transporting large volumes of guided weapons to remote locations, ensuring sustainment and operational effectiveness in contested environments. Recent conflicts highlight the urgency of this challenge.

The widespread employment of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones, such as the Iranian-designed Shahed series, has demonstrated their ability to threaten critical infrastructure and impose disproportionate costs on defenders.[44] These challenges are not new. A decade of efforts to counter Iranian drone systems has demonstrated that traditional air defence solutions alone are unlikely to provide a complete answer, particularly against massed attacks.[45] Contemporary battlefield experience in Ukraine demonstrates that the contest between drones and counter-drone systems is evolving rapidly, with both attackers and defenders continuously adapting.[46] Protecting sustainment infrastructure may ultimately prove just as important as expanding it, as fuel supplies, logistics hubs and distribution networks are likely to become priority targets in any future conflict.

An enduring challenge for the Australian Army is preparing for the threat of long-range fires across the full spectrum of competition—cooperation, competition, crisis, and conflict. Central to this challenge is justifying the investment in remote logistics bases during periods short of war, where the immediacy of threat may not be apparent, but preparedness remains essential. A potential solution lies in reframing the inherent challenges of Northern Australia as strategic advantages. The significance of these developments lies not only in their ability to destroy combat forces, but in their capacity to disrupt sustainment. Fuel farms, pipelines, logistics nodes and transport networks have emerged as priority targets in modern warfare, demonstrating that sustainment infrastructure is increasingly part of the battlefield.

The region’s sparse population and vast distances between major centres create an ideal environment for the testing and evaluation of capabilities such as long-range fires. These conditions enable realistic experimentation at scale, unconstrained by the density and limitations of more populated areas. Importantly, this concept is not unprecedented. Over the past decade, Northern Australia has seen significant growth in dual-use infrastructure, including commercial space launch facilities and Defence capabilities such as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN). Building on this foundation, the development of sustainable, dual-use logistics and testing hubs would provide enduring capability in peacetime while retaining the capacity to surge and support operations during crisis or conflict. Such an approach would enhance military preparedness while generating broader economic and technological benefits for the region. However, any expansion of these activities must be approached with sensitivity, acknowledging Northern Australia’s historical association with atomic testing during the mid-twentieth century.

The RAAF’s Jericho Disruptive Innovation Cell has been actively exploring the ‘Camel Train’ concept—an autonomous aircraft program designed to extend logistics reach across Australia’s vast northern regions.[47] This initiative reflects a broader shift toward leveraging emerging technologies to address the enduring challenges of distance, access, and sustainment in remote environments. By integrating autonomous systems into the logistics network, the RAAF aims to reduce reliance on traditional, resource-intensive supply chains while increasing responsiveness and resilience. This effort aligns with advancements in the United States, where collaboration with industry partners has demonstrated the viability of autonomous and semi-autonomous flight systems.[48] Although still nascent, the Camel Train concept has the potential to fundamentally reshape how Northern Australia is resupplied. Autonomous aircraft could deliver fuel, munitions, and critical supplies to dispersed and austere locations with reduced risk to personnel and greater operational tempo. If successfully developed and integrated, this capability would significantly enhance Australia’s ability to sustain forces and project power across the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

In 1942, John Curtin recognised that military power could not be separated from the national capacity to sustain it. The challenges confronting Australia today are different in form but not in substance. Geography, distance, infrastructure and logistics continue to define the effectiveness of Australia’s defence posture in the north. This paper has contended that Australia’s northern base network derives its strategic value not from its physical infrastructure alone, but from the force projection and sustainment it enables in support of operations across the Indo-Pacific. Northern Australia provides the geographic foundation for deterrence by denial, agile basing, long-range strike and coalition operations across the Indo-Pacific. Yet these capabilities will remain constrained unless supported by resilient logistics systems capable of sustaining combat power across vast distances and under contested conditions.

Northern Australia provides the geographic reach necessary to support deterrence, agile basing, long-range strike and coalition operations. Geography alone does not confer military advantage. The decisive challenge is sustaining combat power across vast distances in a region characterised by limited infrastructure, harsh environmental conditions, workforce constraints and vulnerable supply chains. Logistics, particularly the storage, distribution and protection of fuel, underpins operational reach, endurance and resilience. Realising the full potential of northern basing will therefore require more than investment in physical infrastructure alone. Australia must strengthen joint and interagency logistics networks, improve fuel security and resilience, and embrace emerging technologies such as autonomous resupply. Equally important is the development of Northern Australia as a persistent test and evaluation ecosystem capable of refining sustainment concepts, validating emerging capabilities and supporting operations in an increasingly contested strategic environment.

Among these requirements, priority should be given to fuel storage, distribution and protection systems, as they underpin the operational reach and endurance upon which all other capabilities depend. The ability to manage this critical commodity will determine the operational reach and endurance of the integrated force. Equally important are the transport networks, workforce capacity, industry partnerships and emerging technologies that collectively underpin sustainment. Achieving this will require a genuinely joint and national approach, drawing upon Army, Navy, Air Force, allies, industry, and civilian agencies to create a resilient northern support network.

The enduring lesson is that force projection without sustainment is merely aspiration. As Australia adapts to a more contested strategic environment, investment in northern logistics, fuel resilience, and sustainment capacity will be as important as investment in ships, aircraft, missiles or autonomous systems. Ultimately, the defence of Australia and the projection of Australian power into the Indo-Pacific will depend not on how far the force can reach, but on how long it can endure.

Endnotes

[1] Brendan Nelson, ‘70th Anniversary of the End of the Second World War in the Pacific’, Australian War Memorial, August 15, 2015, https://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/speeches/70th-anniversary-vp-day.

[2] John Curtin, Address to the Nation Following the Bombing of Darwin, 16 February 1942, National Archives of Australia.

[3] Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2026 National Defence Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2026), accessed via ‘2026 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program’, Defence Ministers, 16 April 2026, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2026-04-16/2026-national-defence-strategy-integrated-investment-program.

[4] Anthony Albanese, ‘Australia-New Zealand Leaders’ Meeting 2026’, Prime Minister of Australia, 2026, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-new-zealand-leaders-meeting-2026.

[5] National Defence Strategy 2026.

[6] Australian Government, National Defence Strategy 2024 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2024).

[7] Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review 2023 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023).

[8] Andrew Carr, ‘Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence’, Survival, 65, no. 4 (2023): 79–100.

[9] Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2026 National Defence Strategy and 2026 Integrated Investment Program (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2026), https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2026-national-defence-strategy-2026-integrated-investment-program.

[10] Australian Government, National Defence Strategy 2024 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2024).

[11] Andrew Galloway, ‘Australian airbase used in US strike on Houthi stores in Yemen’, ABC News, 18 October 2024, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-10-18/australian-airbase-used-in-us-strike-on-houthi-stores-yemen/104490578 (accessed 16 June 2026)

[12] See The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan (Military Analysis Division, 1947).

[13] John A. Tirpak, ‘Autonomous Cargo Aircraft Could Transform Logistics’, Air & Space Forces Magazine, March 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com.

[14] Australian Army, ‘Chief of Army Address: The Future of the Australian Army Profession’, 20 May 2026, https://www.army.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches-and-transcripts/2026-05-20/chief-army-address-future-australian-army-profession.

[15] Australian Defence Force, Concept Lantana: Australian Defence Force Land Domain Concept (Canberra: Department of Defence), (accessed 2 June 2026).

[16] Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review 2023 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023).

[17] Kristy McBain and Ann Leahy, ‘Upgrades to fix Flinders Highway flood hot spots’, 3 June 2026, media release, https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/KristyMcBain/Pages/upgrades-to-fix-flinders-highway-flood-hot-spots.aspx (accessed 16 June 2026)

[18] Vanessa Mills, ‘Demolition of Fitzroy Crossing bridge under way after Kimberley floods’, ABC News (Online), 18 May 2023, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-18/fitzroy-bridge-demolition-begins-after-kimberley-floods/102362890 (accessed 16 June 2026).

[19] Australian Military Forces, Report on the Military Defence of Australia by a Conference of Senior Officers of the Australian Military Forces, Volume 2 (Melbourne: Department of Defence, 1920), 8, National Archives of Australia, B273703, https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=273703.

[20] Isobel Bredhauer, ‘Coronavirus Panic-Buying Threatens Food Security in Remote NT Community’, ABC News, 21 March 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-03-21/coronavirus-panic-buying-threatens-food-shortage-in-nt-community/12071414.

[21] Deloitte Access Economics, Regional Risk and Resilience: COVID-19 Impacts on Northern Australia (Canberra: Cooperative Research Centre for Developing Northern Australia, 2021)

[22] Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls, ‘Sustaining Australia’s Northern Bases’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022.

[23] National Defence Strategy 2024.

[24] Department of Veterans’ Affairs, ‘Shifting Tides: Australia and the Pacific in the Second World War’, Anzac Portal, https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/resources/shifting-tides-australia-and-pacific-second-world-war. (accessed 27 July 2026)

[25] Elmas Hasanovikj, ‘Lessons for the West from Ukraine on Operations and Supply Chains’, International Journal of Social Science Research and Review, 9:8 (2026), 249-257.

[26] See Martin White, Piqued Oil Interest: Overstating the Priority for United Stated Military Fuel Sustainability in Australia (Australian Army Research Centre, 2021); Khalil Gholami, Ali Azizivahed, Li Li & Dylan Lu, Energy Independence and Microgrid Deployment: Examining the Implications for Defence Operations and Supply Chain Resilience (Australian Army Research Centre, 2026).

[27] Powering Australia, ‘Securing Australia’s Fuel Future’, https://poweringaustralia.com.au/securing-australias-fuel-future/. (accessed 27 July 2026)

[28] David Crowe, ‘Why Australia can’t just drill its way out of a global crisis?’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April 2026, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/beyond-the-petrol-pump-can-home-grown-steps-solve-the-nation-s-fuel-crisis-20260406-p5zll0.html.

[29] Brianna Morris-Grant and Alex Lim, ‘What we know about the ‘unprecedented’ Geelong refinery fire’, ABC News, 17 April 2026, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-17/geelong-refinery-fire-visual-explainer/106571216.

[30] Australian Government, Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, Fuel Security Regulation Impact Statement: Securing Australia’s Domestic Fuel Stocks and Refining Capability (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, May 2021).

[31] Dori Salcido, ‘U.S. Forces Validate Ship-to-Shore Logistics Capability at Talisman Sabre 23’, U.S. Department of Defense News, 20 July 2023, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3468121/us-forces-validate-ship-to-shore-logistics-capability-at-talisman-sabre-23/.

[32] Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review 2023 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023).

[33] Alan Dupont, ‘Transformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 1 (2003): 55–76.

[34] Kenneth L. Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2014).

[35] Daniel Mueller, ‘Authority Is Not Enough: Implementing Australia’s Domestic Counter-UAS Mission’, Land Power Forum, Australian Army Research Centre, 16 April 2026.

[36] Raelene Lockhorst, ‘House of Cards: Northern Australia’s Liquid Fuel Resilience’, The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), 3 March 2025, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/house-of-cards-northern-australias-liquid-fuel-resilience/.

[37] Tom Lowrey, ‘US Military Investigates Converting Remote Australian Airstrips to Major Fuel Depots’, ABC News, 19 August 2026, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-19/could-united-states-use-bare-northern-based-for-defence-assets/107017430.

[38] Gascoyne Gateway Ltd., ‘Project’, Gascoyne Gateway Marine Complex, https://gascoynegateway.com.au/project/. (accessed 27 July 2026).

[39] Robert Powell, ‘Protecting Deployed RAAF Facilities: A Role for the 2nd (Australian) Division’, The Cove, Australian Army, 25 February 2026, https://cove.army.gov.au/article/protecting-deployed-raaf-facilities-role-2nd-australian-division.

[40] Sophie Maxwell, ‘Keeping Pitch Black Moving’, Defence, 28 July 2026, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2026-07-28/keeping-pitch-black-moving.

[41] Marthe van der Wolf and Reuters, ‘How Ukraine’s Deepest Attack in Russia, on Arctic Gas, Signals New Reach’, Al Jazeera, 10 September 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/10/how-ukraines-deepest-attack-in-russia-on-arctic-gas-signals-new-reach.

[42] Land Forces, ‘Project Land 156 Fast-Tracks Advanced Counter-Drone Systems for the ADF’, Land Forces International Land Defence Exposition, January 2026, https://landforces.com.au/news-media/latest-news/news-updates/project-land-156-fast-tracks-advanced-counter-drone-systems-for-the-adf/.

[43] Paul Iddon, ‘Iran War Sparks Surge in Demand for Cost-Effective Anti-Drone Rockets’, Forbes, 3 May 2026, https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2026/05/03/iran-war-created-surge-in-demand-for-cost-effective-anti-drone-rockets/.

[44] Peter Layton, ‘Australia, Too, Is in the Shadow of the Shahed’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 26 March 2026. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-too-is-in-the-shadow-of-the-shahed/.

[45] Robert Tollast, ‘A Decade-Long Struggle to Thwart Iran’s Drones Carries Warnings for the UK’, RUSI Commentary, Royal United Services Institute, 25 March 2026, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/decade-long-struggle-thwart-irans-drones-carries-warnings-uk.

[46] Josh Rogin, ‘Ukraine's way of fighting war can't match what's coming’, Washington Post, 9 September 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/09/09/how-russia-is-erasing-ukraines-battlefield-advantage/.

[47] Department of Defence, ‘Autonomous Aircraft Boost Logistics Reach’, Defence, 4 May 2026, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2026-05-04/autonomous-aircraft-boost-logistics-reach.

[48] Nina Borgeson, ‘Project Convergence-Capstone 6: FCC’s Role in Army Experimentation’, U.S. Army, 24 July 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/294098/project_convergence_capstone_6_fccs_role_in_army_experimentation.