Key Ingredient or Holdover?
Author: Charles Miller
Mission command is the Australian Army’s reigning command doctrine.[1] In this regard, Australian philosophy and practice are consistent with those of the United States and of NATO.[2] Underpinning the widespread belief in mission command among developed world militaries is a scholarly consensus that, until recently, held that armies which practise mission command or mission command–like philosophies should be more effective on the battlefield. Many scholars have attributed the fighting ability of forces such as the German Wehrmacht in World War II, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Six-Day War and Yom Kippur War, and the United States Marine Corps in the Gulf War at least in part to their practice of mission command.[3] At the same time, however, many military analysts and professionals have argued that in a modern battlespace, especially in a complex environment such as the littoral, mission command should no longer be seen as the only appropriate form of command. In this article, I explore both sides of this debate and apply them to the modern littoral environment. I conclude that the mission command sceptics are broadly correct: while mission command is still appropriate in many circumstances, there are also a large set of occasions in the modern littoral environment in which a more centralised command style would be more fitting. Consequently, the recent shift in the ADF’s philosophical doctrine with respect to command—that command exists on a spectrum from more to less centralised and that the right point on the spectrum depends on context[4]—is well advised. The Army should further ensure that personnel are trained to fight both under mission command and under a more centralised command style (what ADF doctrine terms ‘prescriptive command’[5]) and to switch between the two command styles as appropriate.
Decentralisation implies granting subordinates a high degree of autonomy in deciding on the details of mission implementation—in some readings, it even implies the right to disobey a superior’s orders if these are judged inappropriate in light of the subordinate’s understanding of the situation. Mission command is characterised by many—including by ADF doctrine—as a decentralised command philosophy, though it is important to stress that subordinates under mission command must still act in accordance with their superior’s intent. Mission command is thus not pure decentralisation, but decentralisation only relative to other types of command style. It is nonetheless the element of decentralisation in mission command which some theorists argue makes mission command so potent. Their argument is that the modern battlefield is so fast moving, and the local knowledge of superior officers often so restricted, that decentralised command and control is essential to military effectiveness.[6] This theory, however, depends on these assumptions about the modern battlefield. Believers in decentralisation argue, for example, that in past historical eras (for instance, in the Napoleonic Wars), battlefield observability was greater and hence centralised command and control was more appropriate.[7]
The dominance of mission command, however, has increasingly been questioned. In the modern environment, many security scholars argue that conditions have again changed, such that decentralisation, which was appropriate for the 20th century, may no longer be so to the same extent today. Two factors specifically are held to have changed. First, modern communications allow for much closer observation of the battlespace by superior officers than was possible in, say, the 1940s or 1960s. Thus, the information gap between superior and subordinate—which was a key argument in favour of decentralisation—no longer holds to the same degree. Second, the growing number of capabilities which must be synchronised across different domains—multi-domain operations—makes it increasingly risky for subordinate commanders to ‘do their own thing’. These factors may be especially important in the littoral environment, which has been identified as the Australian Defence Force’s principal area of concern in the future.[8] In the littoral environment, the Army’s combat arms must not only cooperate with each other but also work closely with the RAAF and RAN, with the ADF’s space and cyber capabilities, and most likely with one or more allies. They must do so in a contested environment, most likely with a peer competitor which will contest the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and in which resupply will prove especially challenging. In light of this, then, some authors argue that in a modern littoral environment, mission command should no longer be assumed to be the only or optimal command philosophy.[9]
In this paper, I begin by recapping the arguments in favour of decentralisation. I then contrast these arguments with the growing literature which qualifies the view that decentralisation is optimal for military effectiveness, especially in a 21st-century littoral environment characterised by increasing observability, interdependence among elements of the joint force, and importance of high-level assets whose control cannot be usefully decentralised. I conclude in favour of the position that mission command still has a place as one of the possible command styles the Army might choose to employ, but not as the only one.
Decentralisation and Military Effectiveness: the Argument in Favour
Decentralisation has been seen as the key to success on the battlefield. The Ukrainian army’s effective resistance to the Russian invasion, for instance, surprised many observers who sought explanations. Crucial, for many, was the Ukrainian army’s greater ability to adopt mission command;[10] in making this argument, Joe Junguzza and Kelly Lelito are expressing the consensus in the literature on military effectiveness. Stephen Biddle’s influential ‘modern system’, a type of force employment which he argues is crucial to success in modern war, is crucially dependent on the ability of armies to decentralise command.[11] Similarly, David Barno and Nora Bensahel write that ‘[mission command] is rightly seen among military leaders as the most important precept of US military leadership. Mission command will remain extremely important in future wars’.[12]
Many other security scholars treat decentralisation as an intervening variable between broader social or political variables and military effectiveness. Decentralisation itself is assumed to promote military effectiveness—the question is rather why, in light of this, some armies do not choose to decentralise. For example, Daniel Reiter and Allen C Stam argue that autocratic political systems promote centralised command in order to protect their domestic political power.[13] Caitlin Talmadge promotes more nuanced distinctions between different types of autocratic regimes, arguing that autocracies facing greater external threats will decentralise command (and hence fight more effectively) while autocracies facing greater internal threats, such as coups, will centralise command (and hence fight less effectively).[14] Stephen Rosen argues that ethnically heterogeneous societies will tend to produce more centralised military command styles.[15] In a similar vein, Jason Lyall argues that armies from states characterised by widespread repression of excluded ethnic groups will promote centralisation even though this reduces their fighting effectiveness against external foes.[16] Kenneth Pollack argues that ingrained cultural values—such as entrenched belief in social hierarchy in the Arab world—make it harder for some armies to fight in a decentralised manner.[17] In each of these cases, however, decentralisation equals effectiveness.
It is worth examining in detail why these strands of the literature hold that decentralisation is good for military effectiveness. The primary reason relates to the nature of the modern battlefield.
Stephen Biddle outlines this argument in the greatest detail in Military Power. Biddle notes that the increasing range, accuracy and volume of firepower (resulting from technological innovations such as rifling, breech loading mechanisms and automatic fire) from the early 19th to the early 20th century required radical decreases in troop concentration in order to ensure survivability.[18] These developments led in turn to a radical reduction in the ability of superiors to observe and communicate with their subordinates. In the early 19th century, for instance, armies fought in densely packed formations. This, Biddle argues, allowed for direct observation of most—if not all—of the battlefield by high command echelons.[19] By the end of the First World War, however, troops fought in such a dispersed manner that even junior officers would have found it difficult to observe the actions of most of their subordinates.[20] Dispersion not only reduced the ability of commanders to observe their subordinates; it also reduced their ability to communicate with them, since with the majority of subordinates voice communication would no longer be audible.[21]
These two developments resulting from greater dispersion—reduced observability and reduced communication—made decentralisation more imperative in Biddle’s view. If a superior cannot see what the situation looks like from the perspective of his subordinates, he or he cannot give them effective orders, at least not in a timely manner. This is especially important if the situation on the ground changes rapidly in a manner unanticipated by the commander, necessitating adaptation. Consequently, if those subordinates instead are trained and motivated to make decisions for themselves, decisions will be made more quickly and also more appropriately for the circumstances. Similarly, if communication between superiors and subordinates is harder and slower, timely and appropriate decisions will be more likely under a decentralised command and control system than a centralised one.
The pro-decentralisation argument rests on a number of cases from modern military history. The German army’s traditional command system of Auftragstaktik, from which the modern concept of mission command derives, arguably stressed a more decentralised command and control system than that of comparable armies in the First World War and Second World War.[22] Many historians have consequently argued that the tactical achievements of the German army in the world wars—the Germans’ ability to hold off superior numbers and materiel in both wars, the rapid conquests of the Blitzkrieg in the second—are directly related to this decentralised philosophy.[23] Indeed, Biddle and others argue that the ‘modern system’ around which modern war is still based today was created by the Germans in the later stages of World War I. The belief that Germany’s tactical achievements in the world wars were attributable to Auftragstaktik led to the adoption of decentralised command and control by their former enemies, the British and Americans, after World War II. The fact that Germany lost both world wars was not considered to detract from the potency of decentralised command and control, since German defeats were ascribed to defects in areas of warfare besides tactical combat on land (for example, air and naval warfare, industrial production and alliance diplomacy).[24] Instead, decentralised command and control was seen as providing an explanation for why Germany had held out for so long and achieved so much despite their deficiencies in other areas. Similarly, the crushing tactical victories of the IDF against Arab armies, especially in the Six-Day War of 1967 and to a lesser extent in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the Suez Crisis and the Yom Kippur War, were ascribed to the IDF’s adoption of decentralisation.[25] By contrast, the IDF’s decreased effectiveness from the 1970s onwards has been attributed to creeping command centralisation.[26] Decentralised command and control has also been seen as key to the fighting effectiveness of the United States Marine Corps in conflicts such as the Gulf War of 1991.[27]
This view of the positive effects of decentralisation on effectiveness may be convincing on both a theoretical and an empirical level for warfare in the 20th century. It does, however, depend on the interaction between a number of assumptions about the contemporary battlefield. For instance, the argument that greater dispersal implies a greater need for decentralisation rests on the assumption that there will not be countervailing technological advancements which restore observability and communication even in the presence of radical dispersal. Satellites and helmet-mounted cameras, for instance, can allow a commander, should she so choose, to close the gap in information about the battlespace between her and her subordinates. The question of the desirability of centralisation therefore relies in part on the extent to which advances in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) technology can compensate for the increasing troop dispersal imposed by precision fires. This reasoning, along with several other considerations, has led security scholars to temper the view that decentralisation is necessarily always optimal, as I will now explore.
The Case for Greater Centralisation
Modern critics argue that mission command and decentralisation have come to be romanticised[28] and may even be favoured for reasons which are not, strictly speaking, related to military effectiveness, such as the idea that decentralisation is an appropriate command philosophy for the army of a free society.[29] Even if decentralisation is more normatively appropriate for a democracy, this does not mean that mission command is always the approach which will get results on the battlefield. Analysts such as Amos Fox, Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi have argued even further, in the context of the modern US military, that mission command has become something of a dogma. Fox writes:
Army mission command doctrine is, in effect, being applied in a prescriptive manner. The Army dictates the primacy of mission command instead of providing commanders and staffs with options for directing action within their commands.[30]
Hill and Niemi concur:
Mission command is presented as a premise of effective command—‘Given that I am decentralizing control as much as possible (that is, exercising mission command), how should I command?’—when it is in fact just one of many possible answers to the question of control, and not always the right one.[31]
On the empirical level, David Stahel has questioned the degree to which the German army in World War II actually did practise mission command. He argues that in most cases centralisation was more common at the tactical level and that decentralisation at the operational level in fact represented senior officers’ ‘going their own way’ rather than the exercise of disciplined initiative within the constraints of their commanders’ intent, as the modern doctrine of mission command requires.[32] This in turn challenges the idea that Auftragstaktik was the ‘secret sauce’ which made the Wehrmacht so effective in ground combat. There are of course many other empirical cases which appear to support the idea that decentralisation fosters combat effectiveness, but the German case is the original and the most influential. If decentralisation was not the reason for the Wehrmacht’s proficiency, this seriously undermines the case for decentralisation in general.
When might centralisation be superior to decentralisation?
More senior-level commanders may not have as good a view of the local-level situation confronting their subordinates, but they most likely have a superior view of the overall operational picture and where each tactical fight fits in. Mission command attempts to reconcile this fact with decentralisation via the concept of the commander’s intent, which must be communicated clearly to subordinates. At the same time, however, senior-level commanders are also likely to be in somewhat safer circumstances than their subordinates, further from the front line. This gives them the ability to make decisions without having to be concerned (at least to the same degree) with their own immediate physical survival. Senior- level commanders are generally supported by staffs and a suite of decision support tools unavailable to their subordinates. Senior-level commanders can also collate and transmit information from one lower-level unit to another—lower-level tactical innovations and adaptations, for instance. Recognising these advantages, many security scholars argue that under some circumstances, centralised command and control is likely to be preferable to decentralisation.
Ryan Grauer, for instance, argues that centralised command styles are more appropriate in armies facing a relatively slowly changing tactical environment.[33] Theo Farrell argues that the decision on whether centralise can be seen in light of the ‘explore/exploit’ trade-off—decentralisation is advisable where armies need to explore new solutions and ways of doing things, while centralisation is preferable where the need is to exploit existing solutions.[34] Michael Huntzeker argues that an adaptive army is one which combines elements of both centralisation and decentralisation—some decentralisation to allow units to experiment with new innovations, some centralisation to spread good innovations across the army.[35] Huntzeker also notes that many armies have, historically, switched between centralisation and decentralisation as needed, even over the course of the same day (the example he gives is of fire control in World War I).[36]
Organisational theorists have also produced a number of arguments—not confined to the military context—as to why one would opt for a more or less decentralised decision architecture. The social scientists Chanuwas Aswamenakul, Paul Smaldino and Tyler Marghetis, for example, argue that organisations face a fundamental trade-off between decision quality and decision speed.[37] Ideally, of course, an organisation should make good decisions quickly, but there is an inherent trade-off between speed and quality. Better decisions arise from extensive exploration of many possible options and rigorous evaluation of alternatives, but this takes time. Some organisations operate in a context where decisions must be made quickly, even if this implies sacrificing a certain degree of decision quality. Organisations on the other side of the spectrum, by contrast, are better advised to take their time to make quality decisions. The more an organisation is in an environment requiring quick decisions, Smaldino argues, the more that organisation’s decision architecture should be centralised. The more an organisation is in an environment requiring high-quality decisions, even at the cost of delay, the more decentralised should its decision architecture be.
Similarly, organisational economists Wouter Dessein and Tano Santos argue that organisations face a trade-off between coordination and adaptation. The more decentralised an organisation, the better its constituent units can adapt to unforeseen circumstances. But decentralised organisations come with a cost—they make it harder for an organisation’s constituent units to coordinate with one another. In the extreme case, if every constituent unit has the right to do what it wants, each one may end up acting at cross-purposes with the others. Consequently, Dessein and Santos argue that an organisation’s degree of centralisation/decentralisation depends on its relative need for adaptation versus coordination—the more an organisation needs to be adaptive, the more decentralised it will be; the more an organisation needs to coordinate, the more centralised it will be.[38] Again, ideally, an organisation would be both adaptive and well coordinated, but in practice it is difficult to increase an organisation’s ability to do one without reducing its ability to do the other.
The implications of this discussion for military command styles are clear: the more the contemporary battlespace requires coordination between disparate units and rapid decision-making at higher echelons, the more centralised decision-making should be. In the following section, I will apply these considerations to warfare in a modern littoral environment.
Command Style in the Modern Littoral
A modern conventional battlespace in any environment is more complex and interdependent than its 20th-century equivalent and hence requires greater coordination. In addition to coordinating infantry, armour, artillery and aircraft as their forebears did, modern commanders must reckon with unmanned and autonomous systems both in the air and on land; satellite and aerial reconnaissance; cyberspace; and the crucial battle for the EMS. It is for this reason that military professionals speak not only of combined arms warfare or joint operations but also of multi-domain operations. All of these developments imply an even greater need for coordination in the modern battlespace relative to the 20th-century environment described by Biddle and others.
By the same token, the need for rapid decisions is implied by the tight coupling between these systems and the resultant short windows of opportunity for concerted action. A window of opportunity might, for instance, be created by a cyber exploit which temporarily disables hostile satellite reconnaissance or integrated air missile defence systems. This window of opportunity would then require rapid, concerted action by the joint force—perhaps long-range artillery and air power working in concert with armour, infantry and drones, depending on the context.
Alternatively, many operations in the modern battlespace require carefully staged, sequential action. A subordinate commander acting out of turn would create a significant risk to his forces. In his description of modern warfare in Ukraine, for instance, Jack Watling describes a battlefield in which successful offensive operations require carefully choreographed movements from a number of units acting in sequence. A sector must be surveyed first— primarily by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—then isolated by UAVs and artillery, then degraded and fixed by a combination of capabilities including unmanned ground vehicles and more conventional artillery. Only after all of these missions have been achieved successfully can the attacker close in and destroy the enemy with a combination of tanks and armoured personnel carrier mounted infantry.[39] A subordinate commander who acted out of turn and attempted to complete the final stage before the survey, isolate, degrade and fix stages had been completed would simply see his forces wiped out by enemy firepower. Yet the capabilities necessary to achieve all of these stages in turn must be coordinated at a relatively high level.
If the modern battlespace is one which requires a greater degree of centralisation than before, this is even more true in the case of the littoral environment. Littoral warfare in the form of amphibious operations has always been recognised as necessitating careful coordination. Landings must be carefully scheduled to ensure optimal timing, assault waves must be carefully scheduled to allow for the most rapid build-up of combat power on the beachhead, fire support must be coordinated between army, navy and air force, and so on.[40] The littoral has always been recognised as an environment in which the three services must operate jointly, which requires extensive coordination and hence a tighter degree of central control.
In the modern littoral, the army’s long-range precision strike capabilities are used in part to deny the use of the sea to hostile foreign powers.[41] In this task, long-range precision strike units should expect to be protected by shorter-range fires, infantry, drones and other ground units against hostile ground attack. Integrated air missile defence systems protect the core long-range strike units from hostile air and missile attacks. Friendly air assets carry out reconnaissance, protect the army’s long-range strike units and pose a threat to hostile ground and sea units alike. Friendly naval assets present an additional threat vector to hostile naval assets, resupply or protect the sea lines of communication of friendly ground units, and can—through long-range strikes of their own—pose a threat to hostile ground forces too. Sitting alongside these capabilities, EMS units protect the electromagnetic spectrum to allow for friendly communications and targeting and to deny it to the enemy. Space assets assist friendly communications and reconnaissance; however, space assets are rare and expensive national-level capabilities—control over them cannot usefully be devolved to lower-level tactical commanders. Cyber units ensure the integrity of friendly communications and attempt to attack those of the enemy. Since cyber units protect friendly and attack hostile systems, their operations are generally harder to localise and subject to lower-level control. This is before one considers the complexity of cooperation with host country and allied units. In short, the situation is one of high complexity, requiring coordination and synchronisation among units from multiple domains to an even greater degree than might be necessary in other land power contexts.
The demands of synchronicity are pushing command and control in the littoral in the same direction. Analysis of the littoral environment suggests that the army may need to exploit fleeting windows of opportunity. Suppose, for instance, that friendly reconnaissance identifies a high-value naval target in range of land-based long-range precision fires. Hostile reconnaissance is temporarily disabled by a cyber exploit. In this situation, a variety of units will need to work in concert—quickly (while the opportunity remains) and in a manner which leaves less room for lower-level autonomy.
Similarly, in the littoral, the strategic and political consequences of command decisions are likely to be greater than in a purely land power context. Whereas in a land power context far from the sea (consider the Donbas, for instance), a command decision might lead to the destruction of an enemy tank or supply depot, in the littoral, a command decision could lead to the destruction of a billion-dollar destroyer, frigate or amphibious assault ship.
Logistics are another complicating factor. Given the geography of the Indo-Pacific littoral, supplies would have to cross large distances contested by the enemy. Depending on the positioning of friendly forces, host resupply may be limited in certain important respects. Pre-positioning supplies may help in some respects but can only be effective for so long. Consequently, the need to coordinate complex resupply operations across long and possibly contested distances implies an additional level of complexity, which is likely to also imply greater centralisation. A commander unsure of the timing or extent of resupply cannot allow a subordinate to use too much existing stock.
At the same time, however, mission command would not be entirely out of place in a littoral environment. Advances in C4ISR technology have unquestionably increased the timeliness, granularity and fidelity of information. This would of course imply that the information asymmetry between subordinates and superiors has been reduced, and with it—seemingly, at least—the need for decentralisation. However, this overlooks the extent to which enemy action is likely to complicate the picture. Communications could be cut off, hacked or spoofed. At the least, the need for signature reduction implies that communications technology cannot be used to the fullest extent technologically possible against a peer competitor. In light of this, the information asymmetry between subordinates and superiors is likely to persist, even if in reduced form. Moreover, even if C4ISR technology were to be used to its fullest extent, there would remain inherent cognitive limits on the amount of information any one individual can take in. Consequently, for reasons of commander attention if nothing else, a fundamental degree of information asymmetry between superiors and subordinates will persist.
There are also likely to remain a number of tactical situations in a littoral environment in which decentralised command is likely to be optimal. For instance, one possible counter to the use of long-range precision fires against shipping is ground assault against the long-range precision fire units. This in turn could result in ‘old-fashioned’ ground combat between hostile ground assault forces and friendly forces protecting the long-range precision fire units. Given the geography of the Indo-Pacific, this would imply infantry jungle fighting. In such a scenario, independent small-unit decision-making would be key. This is especially so given the known negative effects of tree cover and foliage on the ability of reconnaissance assets to operate effectively.[42]
Conclusion
In this paper I have examined the debate about command centralisation and decentralisation, with special relevance to the littoral environment. I outlined the one-time consensus view in many circles that decentralisation as exemplified by mission command is always the best way to exercise command in modern land warfare. I then examined the growing challenge to this consensus in academic and policy circles and explained why, and in what circumstances, a more centralised command style might be preferable—namely, where coordination among various arms is very important, rapid decision-making at higher echelons is required and modern communications technology reduces the gap in situational awareness between superior and subordinate. Applying this to the modern littoral environment, I argued that precisely these circumstances are likely to occur frequently in the future. Tight coordination among capabilities across multiple domains, many of which cannot by nature be subjected to decentralised control, will necessitate greater command centralisation, as will the necessity of coordinating with allies and host nations and of operating in an environment in which resupply cannot be taken for granted. The requirement for rapid action at higher domains will likewise push in the direction of greater centralisation, while modern C4ISR technology will reduce the gap in situational awareness between seniors and subordinates which had previously been taken to necessitate greater decentralisation. At the same time, however, mission command may remain important in many circumstances. C4ISR technology is not perfect and can be spoofed, jammed, hacked or destroyed. The demands of signature reduction will also ensure that asymmetries in situational awareness will not disappear entirely. Ground jungle combat in the specific context of the Indo-Pacific littoral, with low observability, will also necessitate decentralisation at some times and in some places.
This means that mission command will still be important—there are likely to be many circumstances in a modern littoral environment in which decentralisation will be necessary— but that it will no longer be the only command style. Training for a littoral environment should focus on both centralised and decentralised command and control, and on the ability to switch between the two as circumstances change.
Endnotes
[1] Australian Defence Force, ADF Philosophical Doctrine 0 Series: ADF-P-0 Command (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), p. 27, at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-01/ADF-P-0%20Command.pdf.
[2] See Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011).
[3] See for instance Shamir, Transforming Command; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Trevor Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (New York: Hero Books, 1985).
[4] Australian Defence Force, Command, p. 22.
[5] Ibid., p. 27.
[6] Biddle, Military Power, p. 28.
[7] Ibid., p. 29.
[8] Australian Government, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023); John Nash, ‘Land Power in the Littoral: An Australian Perspective’, Journal of Advanced Military Studies 15, no. 2 (2023): 1–13, at: https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20241502003.
[9] Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi, ‘The Trouble with Mission Command: Flexive Command and the Future of Command and Control’, Joint Force Quarterly 86 (2017): 94–100, at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/article/1223929/the-trouble-with-mission-command-flexive-command-and-the-future-of-command-and; Amos Fox, ‘Cutting Our Feet to Fit the Shoes: An Analysis of Mission Command in the US Army’, Military Review (January–February 2017): 49–57, at: www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2017/ART-009.
[10] Joe Junguzza and Kelly Lelito, ‘What National Culture Teaches Us About Mission Command’, Small Wars Journal, 4 March 2024, at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-national-culture-teaches-us-about-mission-command.
[11] Biddle, Military Power, p. 49.
[12] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 266.
[13] Daniel Reiter and Allen C Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[14] Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).
[15] Stephen P Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
[16] Jason Lyall, Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).
[17] Kenneth Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
[18] Biddle, Military Power, p. 30.
[19] Trevor Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1980), p. 312.
[20] Biddle, Military Power, p. 38.
[21] Martin Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War (New York NY: Greenwood Press, 1992).
[22] Shamir, Transforming Command, p. 29.
[23] Ibid., p. 51.
[24] Ibid., p. 52.
[25] Ibid., pp. 89–91.
[26] Ibid., pp. 92–93.
[27] Ian T Brown, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the US Marines, and Maneuver Warfare (Quantico VA: US Marine Corps Press, 2018), p. 125.
[28] Nick Bosio, ‘Command for the Mission: Understanding Mission Command’, Australian Army Research Centre: Land Power Forum, 26 March 2018.
[29] David Stahel, ‘Auftragstaktik (Mission Command): The Prussian-German Origins and Application of Mission Command’, Australian Army Journal 21, no. 3 (2025): 16–27, at: https://doi.org/10.61451/21030.
[30] Fox, ‘Cutting Our Feet to Fit the Shoes’, p. 51.
[31] Hill and Niemi, ‘The Trouble with Mission Command’, p. 94.
[32] Stahel, ‘Auftragstaktik (Mission Command)’, pp. 24–26.
[33] Ryan Grauer, Commanding Military Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 34.
[34] Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 567–594, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2010.489712.
[35] Michael A Hunzeker, Dying to Learn: Wartime Lessons from the Western Front (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), pp. 25–26.
[36] Ibid., p. 60.
[37]Chanuwas Aswamenakul, Paul E Smaldino and Tyler Marghetis, ‘Speed-Quality Tradeoffs Shape the Structure of Decision-Making Collectives’, SocArXiv, 25 April 2025, at: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/bxew4_v1.
[38] Wouter Dessein and Tano Santos, ‘Adaptive Organizations’, Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 (2006): 956–995, at: https://doi.org/10.1086/508031.
[39] Jack Watling, Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine, RUSI Insights Papers (The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2025), pp. 8–10, at: https://static.rusi.org/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine-oct-25.pdf.
[40] See Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics from Gallipoli to Iraq (London: Amber Books, 2014).
[41] Australian Government, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, p. 54.
[42] See for instance the discussion of the effects of tree cover on drones in Kateryna Stepanenko, ‘Russian Drone Innovations Are Likely Achieving Effects of Battlefield Air Interdiction in Ukraine’, Institute for the Study of War (website), 7 August 2025, at: https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine.