Countering Drones and the Challenge of Prioritisation in Australia
Abstract
Small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) are an increasingly significant domestic security challenge. Their low cost, accessibility and rapidly evolving capabilities enable missions ranging from surveillance and disruption to kinetic attack and the movement of contraband. Australia’s ability to counter these threats is constrained not only by technology, but also by the need to decide where to allocate limited counter-UAS resources to provide the greatest reduction in risk to national defence and security.
This article argues that domestic counter-UAS should be understood as three related problems: prioritisation, capability allocation and capability generation. It proposes a layered approach to countering the threat that combines intelligence, passive measures and active defences, and develops a framework for prioritising protection based on consequence, likelihood, vulnerability, expected risk reduction and duration of the requirement. It also examines the governance arrangements needed to allocate capabilities across competing demands and considers the implications for future capability generation. Finally, the article argues that the Australian Army, particularly the 2nd (AS) Division, can contribute deployable expertise and surge capacity as part of a broader national counter-UAS architecture.
Introduction
Few challenges to national security have emerged as rapidly and consequentially as the threat posed by small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), commonly referred to as drones. The dual-use nature of this technology, combined with its low cost, has enabled widespread proliferation among nation states, non-state actors and individuals.[1] UAS can be employed across a range of missions, including surveillance, kinetic and non-kinetic attack, and the movement of contraband. While these systems have played a transformative role on battlefields in Europe and the Middle East over the past decade, they have also increasingly been used domestically to undermine security and disrupt activities across several nations.[2]
Compared with battlefield operations, where hostile UAS are generally encountered within an established military context, the domestic environment presents a broader range of potential targets, missions and actors. Importantly, intent may be considerably more difficult to determine as UAS are employed by hobbyists, photographers, security forces and other users for legitimate purposes. The relatively low barrier to entry means that individuals, non-state groups and nation states can employ UAS for a wide range of purposes. The result is a large and diverse set of potential threats and targets that must be considered in any comprehensive approach to counter-UAS defence. This breadth of vulnerability, combined with Australia’s limited and still-developing counter-UAS capacity suited to domestic use, will require difficult decisions about prioritisation, capability allocation and capability generation.
The release of the Defence Amendment (Counter-UXS Measures) Regulations 2025 has made these questions more immediate.[3] The regulations provide a legal framework for authorised personnel to take measures to counter uncrewed devices threatening protected defence areas or defence assets, including areas or assets declared by the Minister in the interests of defence or national security. However, the legal authority does not determine what assets, areas or activities should receive protection, how limited capabilities should be allocated or how much and what types of capability Australia should maintain for domestic national security purposes, recognising that systems suitable for domestic use may differ substantially from those required for overseas contingencies. As this new framework is implemented, questions of prioritisation, allocation and capability generation require attention.
Much discussion of counter-UAS focuses on the acquisition of technology. This article argues that Australia’s domestic counter-UAS challenge must also be understood as a problem of prioritisation, capability allocation and capability generation. It first briefly examines the characteristics of the domestic threat and the contribution of intelligence, passive measures and active defences as a layered approach to reducing risk. A framework is then proposed for prioritising protection and allocating scarce capabilities, before considering the implications of these requirements for future capability generation. Finally, the article examines the role the Australian Army, and particularly the 2nd (AS) Division, could play as part of a broader national counter-UAS architecture involving Defence, law enforcement, other government agencies and private operators.
Domestic Threat from Uncrewed Aerial Systems
Commercially available small UAS already possess capabilities that make them useful for a wide range of hostile activities. Current systems combine increasingly capable sensors with substantial speed, endurance and operating range, while remaining inexpensive and widely available.[4] These capabilities are also improving rapidly. Analysis of DJI systems produced between 2013 and 2024, for example, found continuing increases in speed, transmission distance and flight duration.[5] Such trends mean that assessments of the threat, and defensive systems to counter that threat, can become outdated quickly.
The range of missions that UAS can perform further complicates domestic defence. Small UAS can conduct surveillance and reconnaissance using the electro-optical cameras with which they are typically equipped, or additional sensors such as infrared or radiofrequency systems. Suspicious UAS activity has been reported around sensitive military and nuclear facilities in the United States, France and the United Kingdom.[6] In 2024, Thomas Matthew Crooks used a commercially available DJI drone to survey the site of a campaign rally before attempting to assassinate Donald Trump.[7] Such incidents illustrate a particular challenge in the domestic environment: the same aircraft and sensors used routinely for recreational, commercial and other legitimate purposes can also collect information to support hostile activity.
Small UAS can also conduct kinetic attacks or deliver other harmful payloads. Commercial and hobbyist aircraft require relatively minor modifications to carry explosives.[8] Ukraine’s 2025 Operation Spiderweb demonstrated the potential consequences when small UAS are positioned covertly close to valuable targets: 117 UAS were launched from concealed locations near Russian airfields in attacks that reportedly damaged or destroyed multiple strategic bombers.[9] Criminal organisations have also employed UAS kinetically, including gangs in Rio de Janeiro that used drones to drop grenades on police during a 2025 operation.[10] These examples are particularly relevant to domestic defence because an attacker able to position systems close to a target can greatly reduce the warning time available to defenders.
Other applications broaden the threat further. UAS can transport contraband into restricted areas and across borders, including cross-border drug shipments and prohibited items delivered into prisons.[11] Such activity has already occurred in Australia. Small UAS may also provide platforms for electronic attack by operating close enough to a target to reduce the power required for jamming or other interference.[12] Agricultural spraying technologies demonstrate the technical potential to disperse chemical or biological material, although developing and effectively delivering such payloads presents significant challenges. A 2024 United Nations review identified no successful UAS-enabled chemical or biological attacks.[13] Other applications might include emplacing sensors, acting as communications relays or collecting environmental samples near sensitive facilities.
The significance of this diversity is that there is no single domestic UAS threat against which Australia can optimise its defences. The characteristics that matter to an attacker vary according to the mission: payload capacity may be critical for delivering explosives, sensing capability and standoff distance for surveillance, and proximity to the target for electronic attack. The consequences also vary substantially depending on what is targeted and what the attacker is trying to achieve. UAS conducting surveillance near a defence facility, delivering contraband into a prison or carrying an explosive towards a public event may employ similar underlying airframe and control technologies while presenting very different risks and requiring different responses.
Australia’s geography provides little protection against UAS threats that originate within the country or are positioned covertly near their intended targets. Combined with the large number of potentially vulnerable sites, this creates a defensive problem that cannot be solved by attempting to provide equivalent protection everywhere. The diversity of actors, missions and system characteristics reinforces the need for a layered approach that can reduce risk and allow limited defensive capabilities to be concentrated where they are likely to have the greatest effect.
Legal Framework for Domestic Counter-UAS Operations
Prior to December 2025, legal and policy constraints limited Defence’s ability to engage UAS within Australia. This changed with the making of the Defence Amendment (Counter-UXS Measures) Regulations 2025, which established a legal framework enabling authorised personnel to take measures to counter uncrewed devices threatening protected defence areas or defence assets, including areas or assets declared by the Minister in the interests of defence or national security.[14] The resulting provisions are now contained in Part 11B of the Defence Regulation 2016.[15]
Under this framework, appropriately trained ‘authorised persons’, including Australian Defence Force (ADF) members, certain Australian Public Service employees, contractors and specified law enforcement personnel, may employ a range of counter-UXS measures when they reasonably believe a device poses a safety or security risk. These measures include identification, tracking, interference, diversion, seizure and destruction, provided that they are reasonable and safe, the authorised person has regard to relevant ministerial guidelines or directions, and applicable international air and maritime navigation obligations are observed.[16]
The regulations also clarify the scope of key concepts such as ‘protected defence areas’, which may include defence premises, declared maritime or aviation zones and other locations designated by the Minister where national security interests are at stake. They further provide authority to exploit captured systems for intelligence and investigative purposes, including the collection and sharing of relevant information with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.[17]
The regulations provide authority to act but do not determine how that authority should be implemented across competing requirements. They do not establish which assets, sites or activities should receive priority, where limited counter-UAS capabilities should be deployed, or what capabilities should be generated to meet future requirements. Those questions are particularly important given the number of organisations potentially involved and the limited counter-UAS capacity currently available. The following sections therefore consider how intelligence, passive and active measures can reduce risk, before examining the problems of prioritisation, capability allocation and capability generation.
A Layered Approach to Risk Reduction
Australia’s response to the domestic UAS threat should be layered rather than centred on active counter-UAS systems alone. Intelligence, passive measures and active defences reduce risk in different ways, are suited to different circumstances and place different demands on resources. Intelligence may allow threats to be disrupted before a UAS is launched or enable capabilities to be deployed based on warning. Passive measures may reduce vulnerability without requiring continuous deployment of specialised counter-UAS systems that can be expensive to acquire, operate and continuously modernise. Active defences typically provide more direct protection but are comparatively scarce and may be significantly constrained by their operating environment and potential effects on surrounding systems and populations. Taken as a whole, these layers can reduce overall risk while allowing the most limited resources to be concentrated on the highest-priority requirements.
Intelligence
Actionable intelligence plays a critical role in informing, and in some cases pre-empting, the need for other layers of counter-UAS operations. In the best case, intelligence disrupts attacks during the planning phase, well before a UAS is launched or a payload is integrated. Achieving this requires gathering information across multiple domains, including understanding how nation states, terrorists or extremists might employ UAS, monitoring supply chains and smuggling activities, identifying suspicious behaviours and assessing which targets may be most attractive to hostile actors. Such intelligence can enable the prevention of attacks before they occur.
A second intelligence need focuses on the technical characteristics of UAS and the tactics used to employ them. Intelligence mission data derived from observation, capture and analysis of systems can improve detection, classification and electronic countermeasures.[18] Rapid proliferation of technologies and tactics makes intelligence sharing with allies and partners, as well as across government, particularly important, both to maintain awareness of emerging threats and to improve defensive systems and operational concepts.
Intelligence will not neutralise all UAS threats. Indicators may be missed, false positives may occur and legal or policy constraints may limit domestic collection. Nevertheless, high-quality intelligence can reduce demand on defensive systems by disrupting threats before they materialise and by identifying when and where risk has increased sufficiently to justify the deployment of counter-UAS capabilities. For threats that are not identified through intelligence activities or that emerge without warning, passive and active measures will remain necessary.
Passive Defences
Passive defences in the counter-UAS mission include measures that reduce the likelihood that assets or activities will be detected or targeted, and mitigate the effects of attack. While sensitive sites and infrastructure have traditionally been designed to control access by individuals, the threat posed by UAS requires new approaches. Passive measures may be less expensive than the sustained deployment of active systems and, in some cases, can be implemented more quickly than new active defence systems can be procured and fielded. By reducing vulnerability to surveillance, disruption and attack, passive defences can also reduce the number of situations in which scarce active counter-UAS capabilities are required.
Passive measures may include design features that shield or disguise areas vulnerable to observation or attack. Guidance from the United Kingdom’s National Protective Security Authority and the US Joint Interagency Task Force 401 emphasises measures such as hardening, obscuration and management of the area surrounding a site.[19] At existing sites, these might include physical barriers or netting to protect critical assets from kinetic attack, blinds or obscuring films to limit observation, and traditional security measures such as cameras and lighting to help detect suspicious activity or identify UAS operators near the site perimeter.
Passive measures also include procedural actions that reduce vulnerability. These may involve varying routines to avoid predictable patterns, dispersing valuable assets where feasible, limiting the outdoor exposure of sensitive equipment and reducing the visibility of critical activities from the air. Such measures can deny hostile actors useful intelligence and complicate the planning and execution of attacks.
Reporting and response procedures are also important. Sites without dedicated UAS detection systems may still have personnel capable of observing suspicious aerial activity if clear reporting channels exist. A suspicious drone reported by a resident near a shipyard in Virginia, for example, contributed to the identification and conviction of a Chinese national for unlawfully photographing sensitive US Navy facilities.[20] Once a potential threat is identified, organisations should have rehearsed procedures for warning personnel, protecting assets, preserving evidence and escalating the incident to police, Defence or other relevant authorities.
These lessons should inform Australian approaches to protecting defence sites, defence assets and other critical infrastructure. Passive defences should form a baseline layer of protection across important locations because many can be implemented broadly, sustained over time and adapted as threats evolve. They will not eliminate the threat, but they can reduce vulnerability and allow active counter-UAS capabilities to be concentrated on risks that cannot be adequately mitigated through other means.
Active Defences
Active defences are most useful where intelligence and passive measures cannot reduce risk sufficiently, particularly for high-consequence or symbolically important sites or during periods of elevated threat. Actionable intelligence may also drive the temporary deployment of active systems to particular locations.
Active counter-UAS operations typically involve three phases: sense, decide and effect.[21] Detecting small UAS can be difficult, particularly in cluttered environments such as urban areas. Sensor options include radar, radiofrequency, electro-optical, infrared and acoustic systems, often used in combination. Each has limitations, and factors such as buildings, vegetation, weather and a congested electromagnetic environment can affect performance. Detection opportunities may also extend beyond the aircraft itself, as control links or the presence of nearby operators can provide additional indicators of UAS activity.[22]
The decide function links detection to an appropriate response. This is particularly important in domestic environments, where potential threats must often be distinguished from legitimate UAS activity and where the consequences of an incorrect engagement decision may be significant. Counter-UAS command and control systems therefore need to integrate sensor information, support rapid threat identification and enable the selection and tasking of appropriate effectors.[23]
Effectors may use kinetic, electronic or directed-energy techniques to disrupt, disable or destroy a UAS. The objective is not necessarily to destroy the aircraft, but to prevent it from completing its mission while minimising collateral effects. In domestic settings, this creates difficult trade-offs. Kinetic systems and interceptors can pose risks from missed shots or falling debris, while electronic systems may interfere with nearby communications or navigation services and can be less effective against autonomous platforms or systems using uncharacterised control links and protocols. Directed-energy systems offer additional options, but also face environmental, safety or performance constraints.[24]
These limitations mean that no single active counter-UAS system is suitable for all locations or threats. Systems intended for domestic use should be assessed in operationally representative environments that account for buildings, vegetation, civilian air traffic, radiofrequency congestion, weather and surrounding populations. A capability that performs effectively on an open military range, for example, may have substantially degraded performance near airports, ports, or in urban areas.[25]
Active defences should therefore not be treated as universal solutions that can simply be distributed across vulnerable locations. Their effectiveness depends on the threat, operating environment and legal and operational constraints, while their acquisition and operation consume limited personnel and financial resources. Active capabilities should consequently be concentrated where the consequences of a successful attack are greatest, other layers cannot adequately reduce risk and the available system is likely to provide meaningful protection.
Prioritising Counter-UAS Protection
The combination of limited counter-UAS capability, constrained budgets and the broad range of potential sites that hostile actors might target means that it will be neither possible nor sensible to defend all locations equally. Resources in the form of funding, systems and personnel will therefore need to be prioritised according to where they can provide the greatest reduction in risk for the nation. Such decisions should consider a range of factors, including the consequences of successful hostile UAS employment, the likelihood of a threat being directed against a particular site or activity, the vulnerability of the target, the extent to which intelligence, passive measures or active defences can reduce that vulnerability, the resources required to achieve that reduction in risk and the associated opportunity costs, and the duration for which protection may be required.
Existing investment and deployment decisions necessarily involve some prioritisation of counter-UAS requirements within Defence and across government. This article does not attempt to describe or assess existing processes, many aspects of which may not be publicly available. Instead, the following discussion develops a framework from first principles for how prioritisation could be structured, identifying the factors that should inform decisions about where limited counter-UAS resources can provide the greatest reduction in risk.
Understanding the consequences of successful hostile UAS employment will require imagination, given the range of missions such systems can undertake, as well as detailed analysis and modelling of the potential effects of kinetic attack, intelligence collection, electronic or cyber operations and other missions. There is no single measure that allows fundamentally different consequences to national security to be compared. For example, the casualties resulting from an explosive attack cannot simply be equated with the collection of sensitive defence information that might reduce the future combat effectiveness of the ADF and its allies. Assessments should therefore consider consequences not only in terms of lives and financial loss but also in terms of their immediate and longer-term effects on military capability, essential services and national security.
Estimating the likelihood of hostile UAS employment against any site or activity will also prove quite challenging. Actionable intelligence will prove most valuable in these assessments, along with the value and symbolic importance of the target, the accessibility of the site to operators of shorter-range UAS and the feasibility of conducting the mission. Observable counter-UAS measures at a site may also provide some deterrent effect by reducing an attacker’s perceived likelihood of success. Likelihood assessments will need to be updated regularly as new intelligence is gathered, UAS capabilities and payloads improve, and the operating environment changes.
The inherent vulnerability of a target should also influence prioritisation, along with the extent to which different measures can reduce that vulnerability. Highly vulnerable sites may be more attractive to hostile actors, but vulnerability alone should not determine priority. Where intelligence, passive measures or active defences can substantially reduce risk, investment may produce a greater benefit than at sites where available measures are unlikely to be effective. For active defences, assessing likely effectiveness may require consideration of terrain, typical air traffic, the electromagnetic environment and the potential for collateral damage. Similar assessments would also be useful when determining the potential effectiveness of additional intelligence resources or passive defensive measures.
The resources required to achieve a particular reduction in risk should also influence prioritisation. A measure that provides only modest additional protection at significant financial or personnel cost may be a lower priority than one that produces greater risk reduction with the same resources. For scarce deployable capabilities, the opportunity cost must also be considered: assigning a system or personnel to one requirement may make them unavailable to protect another.
A final factor that should shape investment decisions is the expected duration of the protection requirement. Enduring requirements, such as those associated with critical Defence locations, may justify fundamentally different investments from temporary requirements associated with major sporting events or other short-duration activities. Enduring requirements may support fixed or permanently installed improvements in passive and active defences, potentially reducing long-term operating costs. Temporary requirements may instead be better served by deployable teams and mobile active defences that can be redeployed once the need has ended. Temporary passive measures, such as netting, or surged intelligence support may also be appropriate.
Effective decision-making for allocating and deploying resources requires structured decision-support packages. These packages should include current threat intelligence, assessments of the potential consequences of hostile UAS activity and site vulnerability, the expected coverage and effectiveness of potential active and passive measures, the anticipated duration of the protection requirement, and the personnel and financial costs of mitigation options. A framework incorporating likelihood, consequence, vulnerability, expected risk reduction, resource requirements, opportunity cost, and duration would support consistent prioritisation. Standardising such packages across Defence, police and other organisations involved in domestic counter-UAS operations would improve the allocation of scarce resources, particularly during crises or periods of heightened threat. It would also help ensure that decisions are transparent, evidence based and capable of withstanding subsequent scrutiny.
Capability Allocation and Governance
Establishing priorities is only the first step in managing scarce counter-UAS resources. Effective capability allocation will also require coordination across government and clearly defined roles, responsibilities and decision authorities. Even highly capable counter-UAS systems may provide little value if responsibilities are unclear, approvals are slow or available capabilities cannot be reallocated rapidly in response to changing requirements.
The goal of an effective capability allocation system should be to translate established priorities into decisions about assigning available capabilities to reduce risk in the current threat environment. Some capabilities may be permanently assigned to sites or assets that continue to be high priorities for counter-UAS protection. Others, particularly mobile active defences and deployable personnel, may need to be allocated temporarily to meet requirements that persist for only days or weeks. Rapid reallocation may also be required as intelligence and the threat environment evolve.
Defence, intelligence organisations and police forces may all identify requirements for counter-UAS capabilities based on the threats and assets relevant to their responsibilities. Effective allocation therefore requires clear processes for consolidating requirements, comparing competing demands and determining which organisation will provide the required capability. Responsibilities will also need to be defined for authorising deployments, exercising operational control over deployed systems and reallocating capabilities as priorities change. The precise institutional arrangements for making these decisions are beyond the scope of this article, but responsibilities and decision authorities should be established and tested before a crisis occurs.
This challenge is further complicated by the fact that many assets requiring protection, particularly critical infrastructure, are owned or operated by private entities. Effective counter-UAS protection may therefore require coordination between government and industry, including clear guidance on their respective responsibilities for protective measures, access to sites and the integration of government capabilities with measures already provided by site operators.
A cautionary example of poor coordination occurred in the airspace above Fort Hancock, Texas. There, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) halted air traffic after a drone operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection was engaged by a high-energy laser operated by the US military. The military believed it was targeting a drone used by a Mexican cartel, while the FAA was unaware of the system’s deployment and its potential impact on civilian aviation. The incident prompted debate about how the Pentagon should coordinate with other agencies prior to deploying laser-based counter-UAS systems.[26] Australia would benefit from establishing and exercising such coordination mechanisms before a crisis, particularly for counter-UAS measures that may affect civilian aviation, communications, navigation services or critical infrastructure.
The allocation of responsibilities should also reflect the nature and sophistication of the threat. Routine criminal misuse of UAS, such as contraband delivery, harassment or other relatively unsophisticated activity, would generally be best addressed by police, site security and other civilian authorities using capabilities appropriate to normal security requirements. More sophisticated threats, particularly those involving advanced UAS, state-sponsored intelligence collection or kinetic attacks against significant targets, could require capabilities, intelligence and operational expertise more commonly resident within Defence. Terrorist threats may involve both sets of organisations, with police and intelligence agencies retaining their established responsibilities while Defence provides specialised capabilities as required. A national counter-UAS architecture would enable capabilities to be drawn from different organisations according to the character and severity of the threat rather than seeking to replicate the full spectrum of capability in every agency.
In this context, effective governance requires more than identifying which organisation has formal responsibility for a particular capability. It requires established processes for sharing information, making allocation decisions, resolving competing demands and rapidly reallocating resources as circumstances change. These arrangements should be tested through regular exercises involving relevant government organisations and private-sector operators of assets that may be threatened by UAS. Patterns of persistent unmet demand identified through this process should also inform decisions about what additional counter-UAS capability Australia needs to generate.
Implications for Capability Generation
Prioritisation and allocation address how Australia should employ the counter-UAS capabilities currently available, but they do not answer the separate question of what capabilities should be developed and maintained over time. This article does not attempt to determine the number, mix or readiness of counter-UAS capabilities that Australia should maintain; doing so would require a detailed force-sizing study incorporating threat assessments, anticipated demand, existing and planned capabilities, workforce constraints, costs and competing Defence priorities. Instead, this section identifies implications that the preceding analysis has for future capability generation.
It is important to recognise that capabilities generated for domestic counter-UAS operations may differ substantially from those designed primarily for battlefield or expeditionary use. Domestic systems may need to operate in congested airspace and electromagnetic environments, distinguish hostile UAS from legitimate activity and minimise effects on surrounding populations, communications and infrastructure.[27] These constraints could limit the suitability of some systems that perform effectively in combat environments or on open military ranges. Capability-generation decisions should therefore consider domestic operating requirements explicitly rather than assuming systems acquired for overseas contingencies will be suitable for use within Australia.
The pattern and duration of expected demand should also shape investments in counter-UAS capability. Requirements at enduring high-priority locations may justify permanently installed active defences or long-term improvements to passive defences. By contrast, temporary requirements associated with major events, exercises or periods of elevated threat may be better served by mobile systems and deployable teams that can be reassigned as priorities change. A national capability model will likely require a combination of fixed capacity and surge capability rather than relying predominantly on either approach.
Surge requirements also have implications for readiness and workforce design. Deployable counter-UAS capability must be available quickly to respond to changes in threat. However, maintaining large numbers of personnel and systems at high readiness may be costly and inefficient when demand is intermittent. This creates a need to balance standing capacity with scalable personnel, including reserve or contractor support, and equipment that can be moved between locations as needed.
Counter-UAS capability generation must also account for the rapid evolution of UAS technologies and tactics.[28] Systems, intelligence mission data, operating procedures and training require regular updates as threats evolve. Investment decisions should consider not only procurement costs but also the resources required to sustain, modernise and adapt capabilities over time.
Army’s Role in Domestic Counter-UAS Operations
The requirement for deployable surge capacity identified above provides a potential role for the Australian Army in domestic counter-UAS operations. Army should focus on those requirements where its capabilities provide a comparative advantage, while ensuring that domestic counter-UAS taskings do not detract from its broader operational responsibilities. It is neither practical nor desirable for Army to provide routine protection across numerous domestic sites. Its strengths lie in its ability to generate and deploy task-organised forces, surge personnel during crises and apply expertise in force protection, planning, command and control, and sustainment. Army’s comparative advantage is likely to be greatest at the higher end of the threat spectrum, where sophisticated systems, nationally significant targets or rapidly escalating threats require specialised capabilities and deployable force-protection expertise.
Within Army, the 2nd (AS) Division is particularly well placed to develop this contribution. Its responsibilities for domestic security and response operations, together with its reserve force structure, provide an institutional basis for maintaining expertise and preparing task-organised counter-UAS force packages for domestic requirements.[29] These packages could supply or augment protection at prioritised sites during periods of elevated threat, provide planning and technical support, and integrate Army capabilities with police, other Defence elements and commercial providers. Regular training with these organisations would be needed to ensure that such force packages can be integrated rapidly.
Army’s contribution should be both scalable and complementary to civilian and other government capabilities rather than becoming a mechanism for permanent nationwide coverage. Determining the precise level of personnel, equipment and readiness that Army should maintain for this role requires the broader force-sizing analysis identified earlier and is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, maintaining institutional knowledge of evolving UAS technologies, tactics and countermeasures, together with the ability to generate deployable capability when required, would provide an important contribution to any national counter-UAS architecture.
Conclusions
The domestic UAS threat presents Australia with a problem that cannot be solved purely through the acquisition of technology. The number and diversity of potential targets, rapid evolution of UAS capabilities and limited availability of counter-UAS resources mean that equivalent protection cannot be provided everywhere. Effective defence will require a layered approach that combines intelligence, passive measures and active defences, with each investment and capability deployed where it can provide the greatest reduction in risk.
This article has argued that three related but distinct problems require attention. Prioritisation determines which sites, assets and activities warrant protection based on factors including consequence, likelihood, vulnerability, expected risk reduction and duration of the requirement. Capability allocation translates those priorities into decisions about where available systems, personnel and other resources should be employed, supported by clear governance arrangements across government and with private-sector operators. Capability generation concerns the question of what capacity Australia should develop and maintain over time. Domestic requirements may differ substantially from expeditionary ones, and a national approach will require a combination of enduring site protection and deployable surge capability.
These distinctions matter because scarcity will persist even as Australia expands its counter-UAS capacity. Structured decision-support processes will help ensure that limited resources are concentrated where they are most likely to reduce national security risk, while also identifying persistent shortfalls that inform future investment. Just as importantly, responsibilities, authorities and coordination mechanisms must be established and exercised before a crisis rather than improvised once a threat emerges.
The Australian Army can contribute to this broader architecture, but its domestic counter-UAS taskings should not grow to the point at which they displace resources needed for its broader mission. In particular, the 2nd (AS) Division can provide institutional expertise and task-organised surge capacity able to reinforce civilian and other government capabilities during periods of elevated threat. Ultimately, Australia’s ability to counter hostile UAS will depend not on any single technology, but on whether it can build a coherent system for deciding what must be protected, where scarce capability should be employed and what additional capability must be generated as the threat evolves.
Endnotes
[1] Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, ‘On the Horizon: The Ukraine War and the Evolving Threat of Drone Terrorism’, CTC Sentinel 18, no. 3 (2025): 1–24; Dan Gettinger, The Drone Databook Update: March 2020 (The Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, 2020).
[2] Steve Feldstein and Dara Massicot, ‘What We Know About Drone Use in the Iran War’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), at: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/03/iran-drones-shahed-us-le…; Oleksandra Molloy, Drones in Modern Warfare: Lessons from the War in Ukraine, Occasional Paper No. 29 (Australian Army Research Centre, 2024).
[3] The amendment defines a UXS device as an autonomous or remotely operated uncrewed device capable of moving on the ground, on water, underwater or in the air.
[4] Bradley Wilson et al., Small Unmanned Aerial System Adversary Capabilities (RAND Corporation, 2020); DJI, ‘DJI Mavic 4 Pro—Specs’, DJI (website), at: www.dji.com/au/mavic-4-pro/specs.
[5] Jake Dulligan et al., ‘The Rising Threat of Non-State Actor Commercial Drone Use: Emerging Capabilities and Threats’, CTC Sentinel 18, no. 3 (2025): 39–44.
[6] Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, ‘Mysterious Drones Swarmed Langley AFB for Weeks’, The War Zone (website), at: www.twz.com/air/mysterious-drones-swarmed-langley-afb-for-weeks; Rudy Ruitenberg, ‘Drones Fly Over French Strategic Nuclear Submarine Base, Media Report’, Defense News, 6 December 2025; Josh Layton, ‘Up to Six Drones Spotted over UK Nuclear Plant in Possible “Malicious” Event’, Metro, 31 October 2022.
[7] Michael Kosnar and Ken Dilanian, ‘Trump Shooter Flew Drone Over Venue Hours before Attempted Assassination, Source Says’, NBC News, 20 July 2024.
[8] James Rogers, ‘Written Evidence DTD0014—UK Parliament Domestic Threat of Drones Inquiry’, 15 August 2019, at: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/103872/html.
[9] James Marson, Jane Lytvynenko and Serhii Bosak, ‘Inside Ukraine’s Daring “Operation Spiderweb” Attack on Russia’, Wall Street Journal, 10 December 2025.
[10] Cody Weddle and Iona Cleave, ‘Gangs Bomb Police with Drones in Retaliation for Rio de Janeiro Raid’, The Telegraph, 28 October 2025.
[11] Hannah Haight, ‘High Crimes in Low Airspace: The Rise of Drones in Cross-Border Drug Trafficking’, Journal of Air Law and Commerce 90, no. 3 (2025): 327–372; Jasper Lindell, ‘Drone Drop-Offs to Canberra’s Jail Would Be Banned Under Liberal Bill’, The Canberra Times, 24 November 2021.
[12] Charlie Shoup et al., Autonomous Airborne Electronic Warfare System (University of Utah, 2017).
[13] Ben Belton and Leo Baldiga, ‘Agricultural Drones Are Taking Off Globally, Saving Farmers Time and Money’, The Conversation, 29 October 2025; United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, Global Counter-Terrorism Program on Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems (AROS Program), Global Report on the Acquisition, Weaponization and Deployment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems by Non-State Armed Groups for Terrorism-Related Purposes (New York: United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2024).
[14] Defence Amendment (Counter‑UXS Measures) Regulations 2025.
[15] Defence Regulation 2016, Part 11B.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Carl Rhodes, Small Aircraft, Sizeable Threats: Preparing Army to Counter Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems, Occasional Paper No. 24 (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre, 2024).
[19] National Protective Security Authority, ‘Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS)’, National Protective Security Authority (website), at: www.npsa.gov.uk/specialised-guidance/uncrewed-aerial-systems/counter-un…; Joint Interagency Task Force 401, Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure: Reframing Critical Infrastructure Security for the Drone Threat (Joint Interagency Task Force 401, 2026).
[20] Jordan Pearson, ‘Drone Photographer Pleads Guilty to Espionage Act Charges’, The Verge, 13 July 2024.
[21] Rhodes, Small Aircraft, Sizeable Threats; Shaan Shaikh, Tom Karako and Michelle McLoughlin, Countering Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems: Air Defense by and for the Joint Force (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023).
[22] Georgia Lykou, Dimitrios Moustakas and Dimitris Gritzalis, ‘Defending Airports from UAS: A Survey on Cyber-Attacks and Counter-Drone Sensing Technologies’, Sensors 20, no. 12 (2020): 3537; Rhodes, Small Aircraft, Sizeable Threats.
[23] Rhodes, Small Aircraft, Sizeable Threats; Shaikh, Karako and McLoughlin, Countering Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems.
[24] Rhodes, Small Aircraft, Sizeable Threats; Aaron Angell, ‘The High-Energy Laser: Tomorrow’s Weapon to Improve Force Protection’, Joint Forces Quarterly 64 (2012): 115–121; Lykou, Moustakas and Gritzalis, ‘Defending Airports from UAS’.
[25] Geert De Cubber et al., ‘Standardized Evaluation of Counter-Drone Systems: Methods, Technologies, and Performance Metrics’, Drones 9, no. 5 (2025): 354.
[26] Karoun Demirjian et al., ‘A Laser, a Shutdown of Airspace and Signs of Government Agencies at Odds’, The New York Times, 26 February 2026.
[27] Lykou, Moustakas and Gritzalis, ‘Defending Airports from UAS’; Rhodes, Small Aircraft, Sizeable Threats.
[28] Molloy, Drones in Modern Warfare; Rhodes, Small Aircraft, Sizeable Threats.
[29] Australian Army, The Australian Army Contribution to the National Defence Strategy 2024 (Australian Army, 2024).