A Case Study for Home Defence
‘They’re old Diggers all right, but not so old now,’ declared a recruiting officer. ‘They will make excellent garrison battalions.’[1]
Surely men who withstood and the survived the ordeal of the last war can be trained and organised as an additional safeguard. The Volunteer Defence Corps hopes to achieve this object by utilising the eagerness of the returned soldier to serve once more.[2]
Introduction
Collectively known as the Australian Military Forces (AMF), the Australian Army of the Second World War was a heterogeneous force comprising five discrete forces: the tiny Permanent Military Forces (PMF), the vastly more numerous Citizen Military Forces (CMF, commonly referred to by its past name, the militia), the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF), the Australian Garrison Battalions, and the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC).[3] At war’s outbreak, the PMF provided the Army’s staff officers, instructors and some full-time specialists, while the 2nd AIF was a specially raised force for service overseas. The militia formed the backbone of the Army, yet started the conflict as an under-equipped, partially trained, part-time force. From December 1941, as a direct consequence of the emergence of Japan as a national threat, the militia would mobilise and its divisions be activated for full-time service—some abroad, such as the 3rd, 5th and 11th Divisions, but mainly for home defence.
In the context of home defence, the 2nd AIF was raised, under the Defence Act 1903, to deploy and defeat the enemy offshore. The militia divisions, meanwhile, were designed to be mobile field forces able to cover strategically important areas and defeat landings on Australia and its mandated territories (including Papua and New Guinea). The youngest and healthiest (and not in a reserved occupation) enlisted and served in the 2nd AIF and the militia. The fourth and fifth forces under the broad AMF model were the garrison battalions and the VDC. The garrison battalions were for local and static defence. The VDC was conceived as a home guard—essentially a force of last resort—and was envisaged to augment some of the garrison battalions and fixed defence sites. Both were a means to integrate an older and/or medically restricted workforce, while the VDC was the sole means for those in a reserved occupation to contribute to the nation’s defence. Both organisations were an important part of the overall defence plan for Australia, although from 1943 onwards, the VDC’s contribution was markedly less notable.
Combined, both the garrison battalions and the VDC remain generally understudied, and the critical support they provided in freeing up manpower for the militia and 2nd AIF is not well understood. This article remedies this and examines how their structures, organising principles and force employment can provide a valuable case study for a future expanded home defence capability.
‘We are on war service and at our war station’: the Australian Garrison Battalions
The garrison battalions existed in three iterations. The first was as a prewar concept developed in the final months of peace before the outbreak of the war. The second was the activation and deployment of garrison battalions in September 1939 during the ‘business as usual’ phase.[4] This period saw them take over the protection of key locations from the militia, which had seen some of its units activated for short defined periods for vital point protection. In turn, this freed the militia to begin the process of calling up tranches of its soldiers for 10 weeks of training under the reactivated Universal Training Scheme. This state of affairs—where the militia trained for block periods but then returned to civilian occupations—existed until the mobilisation of the militia from December 1941. The third period was that of war service from mobilisation until the end of the war, wherein the garrison battalions conducted close defence of coastal batteries and vital point protection, and guarded prisoner-of-war and internee camps.
In these early years of the garrison battalions’ existence, the Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia (RSSAILA, the antecedent to the present-day Returned & Services League, RSL) acted as a facilitator between the Army and returned soldiers community. As early as April 1939, a committee directed by the Military Board (the governing body for the Army) examined the possibility of creating a reserve of former AIF men. The government agreed to the Military Board’s plans to use men of this ‘Army reserve’ to form eight static garrison battalions, thereby freeing up the active militia to perform its mobile field force role. This Army reserve, which was variously also referred to as the ‘AIF reserve’, would use the networks in the RSSAILA to gauge interest from its members and pass on the contact details of such men to the Army.[5] Therefore, the Army reserve was the organisational entity that acted as a pool for ex-AIF soldiers or former militiamen, although once war was declared, veterans could and did join the reserve ‘off the street’. Those men who were deemed ‘Class A’—that is, of good health and under 45 years of age—were allocated as unit reserves in an active militia unit. Those classified as ‘Class B’ were aged between 45 and 60 years of age and were earmarked as candidates for garrison battalions to be raised for static guard duties. Expectations at this juncture—the war was still months away—were quite low. Reservists would not be issued uniforms, had no expectation to attend parades and, if they did, would not be paid for them. When they were allocated to a garrison battalion reserve, they would be required to attend two muster parades annually. Substantive ranks from prior service in the militia or AIF could be carried over but upon mobilisation, these ranks would be reassessed and new appointments made on merit.[6]
With the outbreak of the war, men in Class B were called out to form the initial eight garrison battalions. Previously, members of this reserve had provided their details to the local military command through the RSSAILA sub-branches, and they now received letters calling them up in batches to attend a nearby drill hall or other commandeered facility for medical assessments. In fact, the RSSAILA sub-branches were asked to undertake preliminary vetting and classify volunteers as ‘known favourably, ‘not known’, ‘known unfavourably’ or ‘known very unfavourably’,[7] representing an extraordinary degree of trust by government in this technically private organisation. To be medically fit for service in the garrison battalions, a Class B man also had to be deemed Fitness Class II; that is, fit for any duty other than field formations or where a certain disability was no bar. A newspaper described the duties expected of the garrison battalion as:
to some extent static and sedentary and call[ing] for a minimum of movement. They are therefore suitable for ex-service men even over the age of 45 years who are medically fit.[8]
Those accepted were then enlisted for full-time service for the war’s duration, and could be deployed anywhere within Australia. Upon enlistment, pay commenced and training began. At this stage, membership of the Class B reserve did not in itself entail a binding legal commitment to enlist. The Army did, however, state that:
applicants for enrolment … give an honourable undertaking to serve if allotted to a garrison battalion and they may be asked in the event of a shortage of volunteers if their services could be made available.[9]
Members of a reserved occupation were ineligible to enlist in garrison battalions.
Key appointments such as the commanding officer, quartermaster, adjutant, regimental sergeant major and orderly room sergeant were appointed first and began bringing together the work of the RSSAILA with the direction of the military authorities.[10] Attention was paid to selecting high-calibre, experienced and decorated leaders to be inaugural commanding officers. For example, among the first 25 officers in the 2nd Garrison Battalion, awards held included one DSO, two DCMs, 14 MCs and three MMs.[11] Normally after a two-week period, the newly appointed CO was ready to begin recruiting for the units. Advertisements were placed in the print media calling for former officers with war experience to volunteer if they were not already registered with the Army reserve. The CO usually personally vetted prospective officers.[12] Newspapers around the nation carried similar stories of ‘olds and bolds’ joking and jostling with each other, enthusiastically lining up to re-join the Army. After initial promising interest from men in the Class B reserve, recruitment for some of the garrison battalions plateaued. In some cases, there was widespread resentment among returned men who had applied for service in the garrison battalions but were rejected on age and medical grounds.[13] The garrison battalion war diaries indicate that between one-third and one-half of prospective volunteers from the Class B reserves were found to be unfit for duty.[14] In response, the government decided to amend the previous requirement for prior service to secure sufficient physically fit men; in December 1939, eligibility was expanded to allow men between 18 and 20 (those not yet old enough to enlist in the 2nd AIF) to join the garrison battalions, as well those who volunteered for the 2nd AIF but did not meet its physical standards.[15]
The first garrison battalions to be raised conducted a 10- to 14-day ‘refresher’ training course of 70 training hours comprising drill, weapon handling and range practices, duties of guards and sentries, and powers of arrest. The training syllabus clearly indicated that garrison battalions had a purely static, protective function.[16] The term ‘refresher’—widely used at the time—was revealing. It indicated that the Army expected that even after a 20-year hiatus, these former soldiers simply needed to brush up on the military basics and update their knowledge on key areas relating to defensive duties. Further courses of instruction were run for those former AIF officers and NCOs who had successfully passed the selection boards for commissions.[17] Local showgrounds were a popular choice for the conduct of this training; the 2nd and 11th Garrison Battalions, raised in Sydney, trained at the Moore Park showgrounds, while the 1st Garrison Battalion did so at the Brisbane exhibition grounds.[18] Nearby rifle ranges were used for conduct of range practices. The training of the garrison battalions was taken seriously, with allocations of permanent force instructors from the Australian Instructional Corps (AIC) and/or regular staff corps officers provided to each battalion in training.[19] Once the authorisation was received to raise them, the garrison battalions coalesced quickly. For example, the 1st Garrison Battalion, which began recruiting on 11 October, went into camp in Brisbane on 18 October, completed its training by 30 October, and had soldiers deployed for the relief of militia forces by 31 October 1939.[20] By January 1940, the first eight garrisons were deployed: one in Queensland, two in New South Wales, two in Victoria, and one each in Tasmania, Western Australia and South Australia, with a total strength of approximately 5,000 officers and soldiers.[21]
As only small arms were required for training and the intended role, sufficient numbers of short magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE).303 rifles and Lewis machine guns were available to equip the units. Similarly, sufficient trucks were available for moving troops between the training locations and, later, guard posts. Making a virtue of the national logistical pressure of equipping the 2nd AIF and militia divisions at the same time, the government announced that the garrison battalions (characterised as the ‘AIF’ garrison battalions) would wear First World War-vintage breeches and puttees rather than the new-issue long trousers and short gaiters. It was explained that:
[to] maintain as far as possible the traditions and distinctive appearance of the original AIF, the garrison battalions would wear the well-known uniforms adopted for the expeditionary forces during the last war.[22]
In addition, the garrison battalions would be allocated a distinctive colour patch of a black shape (square, circle, oval, diamond, rectangle) superimposed with a smaller green shape. Linkages to the original AIF were also maintained by men wearing a miniature version of their old colour patch above the larger black/green garrison battalion colour patch.[23]
Insert AWM 139933 (public domain). Members of the 12th Garrison Battalion form up on parade at their barracks in November 1943. Clearly evident are the older ages of the soldiers, the green diamond on a black oval colour patch and the smaller colour patch signifying the soldiers’ old AIF battalions.
As there was no set establishment for the battalions, their strengths and structures varied across the regional commands. For example, the 1st Garrison Battalion had five companies for most of the war, whereas the 15th Garrison Battalion was a two-company unit for all but four months of its existence.[24] At this point in the war, with no apparent direct threat to Australia, most garrison battalions might have one or two companies on full-time duty with the balance of its sub-units remaining part-time. The intention was that with arms, uniforms and training provided, and with pay rates equivalent to those of the 2nd AIF, sufficient personnel would enlist in the garrison battalions ‘with the minimum interference with civilian occupations and with a definite job to go to in the event of extreme national emergency’.[25]
| Unit name | Area of operations | Role | Raised | Disbanded |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Aust Grn Bn | South Queensland | Internal security | September 1939 | December 1946 |
| 2nd Aust Grn Bn | Sydney, Newcastle, Port Kembla | Close defence | October 1939 | February 1945 |
| 3rd Aust Grn Bn | Port Phillip Bay | Close defence / coast defence | September 1939 | February 1942 |
| 4th Aust Grn Bn | Adelaide and surrounds | Close defence / internal security | October 1939 | October 1944 |
| 5th Aust Grn Bn | Fremantle and surrounds | Close defence | October 1940 | November 1944 |
| 6th Aust Grn Bn | Hobart | Close defence / coast defence | October 1939 | End of war |
| 7th Aust Grn Bn | North Sydney Beaches then South Queensland | Close defence (NSW) / internal security (QLD) | November 1940 | October 1943 |
| 8th Aust Grn Bn | Newcastle and surrounds | Close defence | November 1940 | November 1942 |
| 9th Aust Grn Bn | Port Phillip Bay | Close defence / coast defence | November 1940 | December 1943 |
| 10th Aust Grn Bn | Rottnest Island | Close defence / coast defence | November 1939 | June 1946 |
| 11th Aust Grn Bn | Metro Sydney | Internal security | October 1939 | May 1944 |
| 12th Aust Grn Bn | Regional Victoria | Internal security | October 1939 | January 1944—became 12th Garrison Coy in February 1944 |
| 13th Aust Grn Bn | Port Kembla, Brisbane, Cape York | Coast defence | November 1940 | October 1943 |
| 14th Aust Grn Bn | Brisbane, Cape York, Thursday Island | Close defence / coast defence | November 1940 | Became 62nd Infantry Bn in December 1942 |
| 15th Aust Grn Bn | Townsville, Cairns, Rockhampton | Internal security | October 1940 | End of war |
| 16th Aust Grn Bn | Hay Internment Camp | Internment camp | July 1940 | April 1945 |
| 17th Aust Grn Bn | Tatura Internment Camp | Internment camp | July 1940 | July 1944 |
| 18th Aust Grn Bn | Adelaide beaches then Sydney | Close defence / coast defence | November 1940 | November 1942 |
| 19th Aust Grn Bn | Bunbury, Geraldton then NW Western Australia | Close defence / coast defence | August 1940 | November 1944 |
| 20th Aust Grn Bn | Newcastle and surrounds | Close defence | December 1941 | May 1943 |
| 21st Aust Grn Bn | Liverpool Internment Camp | Internment camp | July 1941 | April 1945 |
| 22nd Aust Grn Bn | Cowra POW Camp | Prisoner of war camp | May 1941 | April 1945 |
| 23rd Aust Grn Bn | Murchison and Dhurringile POW Camps | Prisoner of war camp | January 1941 | July 1945 |
| 24th Aust Grn Bn | Myrtleford and Dhurringile POW Camps | Prisoner of war camp | December 1941 | July 1945 |
| 25th Aust Grn Bn | Loveday, Moorook and Woolenook Internment Camps | Internment camps | April 1942 | November 1944 |
| 29th Aust Grn Bn | NW Western Australia | Internal security | March 1942 | November 1944 |
| 30th Aust Grn Bn | Hobart and surrounds | Internal security | March1942 | April 1944 |
| 31st Aust Grn Bn | Central NSW | Internal security | April 1942 | End of war |
| 32nd Aust Grn Bn | Brisbane and surrounds | Internal security | May 1942 | June 1943 |
| 33rd Aust Grn Bn | Loveday Internment Camp | Internment camp | November 1942 | September 1943 |
Note: Table collated from information in Graham McKenzie-Smith, The Unit Guide, Volume 2.
From June 1940, the RSSAILA, determined to make an ongoing and demonstrable contribution to the home defence effort, formed the RSL Volunteer Defence Corps (RSL-VDC).[26] The VDC was organised and operated at the RSSAILA branch level and was a means for returned soldiers to contribute to the defence of their communities, and an opportunity for those in reserved occupations to serve. At this early juncture, the VDC received no support from the Army and undertook only elementary training under RSSAILA initiative. Its stated role was to ‘augment the local defences of the State by providing static defence of localities … and by giving timely information regarding enemy movements to superior military organisations’.[27] In practice, this meant that VDC units located in metropolitan areas were affiliated with a local garrison battalion as a ‘battalion reserve’.[28] The status of this ‘battalion reserve’ was unclear and required official clarification on multiple occasions. For example, an April 1941 article in Brisbane’s The Sunday Mail called for former soldiers to join the 14th (Reserve) Garrison Battalion, despite no such unit existing. In reality, the article called for returned men to join one of the two part-time companies of the 14th Garrison Battalion. To further confuse matters, Northern Command (the Army’s state-based geographic command, in Queensland) clarified that a returned soldier could be a member of a part-time (reserve) company of the garrison battalion and remain a member of the RSL-VDC. This clarification added that:
[enlistment in this] garrison reserve in no way renders a man liable for full time duty except in the event of general mobilisation. Recruits in the reserve cannot be called upon to fill vacancies in the full-time garrison battalions.[29]
This distinction would change from October 1941, when the Army took ownership of the VDC and organised it as standalone force.
From 1942 onwards, garrison battalions began to accept former 2nd AIF personnel who were no longer categorised as Medical Class I, and ‘universal service personnel’ (USPs)—the title given to men called up under the Universal Training Scheme. This scheme, which had been suspended (but not formally abolished) in 1929, had recommenced in January 1940. USPs undertook 10 weeks of training and then, upon completion, were placed in the militia reserve. In essence, the militia reserve kept these USPs ‘on the books’, notionally linked to a militia unit. Thereafter universal service trainees had an ongoing requirement to complete an annual 12-day refresher camp and 12 days of home training. Every three months thereafter, further tranches of universal service trainees would be called up and commence the 10-week training cycle. In mid-1940, the call-up was extended to all unmarried men and childless widowers aged between 18 and 35. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the government called up Classes 2 and 3—that is, married men and childless widowers aged between 35 and 45, and married men and widowers (with children) aged between 18 and 35.[30] The influx of former 2nd AIF personnel and the USPs meant that over time, the average age of the garrison battalion soldier became much younger than that of the initial cohort that first formed the battalions in late 1939. In May 1942, for example, the 15th and 32nd Garrison Battalions each received 200 USPs who had been called up.[31]
Once activated, trained and deployed, the initial garrison battalions took over the role of ‘security troops’. This role had been previously undertaken by militia troops on short-term, fixed periods to protect key installations and infrastructure. From January 1940 onwards, the militia underwent its designated periods of compulsory training. Then after general mobilisation in December 1941, it commenced its mobile field force role. The garrison battalions, therefore, were among the first Australians deployed operationally in the Second World War—a point not lost on Lieutenant Colonel JJ Scanlon DSO, commanding officer of the 6th Garrison Battalion, raised in Tasmania. In December 1939, he stated to his battalion:
We are on war service, and at our war station. In this important fact, the 6th Garrison Battalion differs from members of the 2nd AIF, who are still training for active service, and are not yet at their war station.[32]
What then was the nature of this ‘war service’? Although they would perform a static role, the battalions themselves were not rooted in one location. As they were part of the Army, they could be, and were, redeployed to different parts of the country. For example, the 19th Garrison Battalion, raised in August 1940 from across southern Western Australia, variously served across the breadth of that state, from Albany in the south through to Geraldton and northwards to Broome.[33] The first garrison battalions were broadly classed as either internal security (guarding vulnerable points) or close defence (close protection of the coastal artillery batteries), although some necessarily did both in the early stages of the war. The list of vulnerable points around the country was extensive; this list grew after December 1941, when invasion fears were at their peak. The 11th Garrison Battalion, headquartered at Victoria Barracks, Paddington, was purely an internal security battalion responsible for 18 vulnerable points around Sydney. These included 11 wireless towers or broadcast stations, five oil storage depots, Mascot aerodrome, the Rose Bay flying boat station and the ammunition and ordnance stores at Leichardt and Moorebank. The 15th Garrison Battalion—which had sub-units in Townsville, Rockhampton, Cairns and Thursday Island—had an almost identical set of vulnerable points: seven wireless stations, four oil depots, one aerodrome, one flying boat station and five ammunition and ordnance stores.[34] Several other garrison battalions guarded similar types of vulnerable points, with some geographic variations including submarine cable landing points and key bridges.[35] Some of the protected areas had guard facilities for the troops (normally platoons so they could maintain a 24-hour guard and rest cycle) but most did not. Often the soldiers slept in tents (later with floorboards), while special arrangements had to be made with contractors to provide ablutions and, in some cases, access to fresh water.[36]
The 2nd Garrison Battalion, raised in Sydney in late 1939, was a close defence unit responsible for guarding the coastal gun batteries located on key headlands from Newcastle southwards to La Perouse. A mixture of permanent force and militia gunners operated these batteries.[37] It also provided guards on the wharves and aboard merchant vessels and troopships berthed at Circular Quay. The 20th Garrison Battalion, raised in November 1940, was tasked to protect the fixed defences around Newcastle. Like other garrison battalions in similar roles, it was responsible for the defence of fixed works, leaving the artillery units therein free to operate the guns. This placed the responsibility for defensive wiring, lighting and minor field works upon the garrison battalion.[38] Its Operation Order Number 2 stated:
Dispositions will be by company and platoon areas. The principle of perimeter defence will be followed where practicable. Mutual support between platoons and sections and defence in depth will be considered in siting sections post and gun positions. Fire plans will be tied in with fire plans of adjacent units.[39]
As these batteries had well-established accommodation and messing facilities, or were located within residential areas, sub-units allocated to these tasks generally enjoyed better conditions than those employed to far-flung vulnerable points.[40]
Regardless of role, all members of a garrison had to remain aware of the limits of their authority in relation to the arrest or shooting of civilians. A Military Board Instruction released in October 1939 stipulated that officers and soldiers could only arrest a civilian if that civilian was caught in the act (or was escaping after completing said act) of committing an offence under the National Security Act 1939. Such offences included sketching or photographing military installations, interfering with telephone/telegraph infrastructure, and trespassing on military land. Officers and soldiers could only fire on a civilian offender attempting to escape after an arrest had been made; if they killed a civilian committing a misdemeanour, then the officer or soldier would be charged with murder. Likewise, if a sentry was attacked by an offender they were attempting to arrest, the sentry could respond with reasonable force—including, if such force was justified, killing the offender. However, the burden of any proof was on the sentry. Accordingly, garrison battalion commanders were instructed to ensure that their men understood and did not exceed their legal authorities.[41] Several war diary entries record that suspicious persons detained were handed over to the civilian police or that the local police station was called if unusual activity was sighted but did not immediately threaten the protected asset or area. However, from February 1942, when invasion fears were at their zenith, such reticence disappeared. Instead, new instructions stated that sentries:
will take any action required to ensure the safety of their posts or to defeat the activities of enemy or suspected enemy agents. If necessary, they will fire upon or otherwise attack any persons threatening the safety of theirs or engaging in hostile actions. The sentry must use his intelligence and sense of responsibility, as to whether he will shoot or not, but he must be careful not to allow any suspected persons to approach so close that he can be rushed and overpowered.[42]
This more liberal and permissive interpretation of the legislation was a product of the heightened security environment of the period. While the legislative wording remained unchanged, the reinterpretation of the rules of engagement transformed the task from ‘monitoring’ with police protection, to one of proper military point protection of national assets.
Initially the garrison battalions used what vacant military buildings (in particular the old militia drill halls) and camps were available for their battalion and company headquarters. However, as the Army mobilised from December 1941, new facilities needed to be acquired. Sometimes buildings were gifted from local organisations (such as a church hall) or businesses, but often premises had to be formally acquired through compulsory possession by the Commonwealth. Executed under the provisions of regulation 54 of the National Security (General) Regulations, payment for use of such facilities was managed by the Directorate of Hirings in each geographic command (and, later, line of communications area). For example, from February 1942 through to the end of the war, elements of the 20th Garrison Battalion occupied the Broughton School in Newcastle, the premises being hired from the local Church of England diocese.[43]
As the war progressed, several garrison battalions were split to form new battalions with new roles. Some garrison battalions took over from militia units and undertook a coast-watching role. Other battalions were raised to guard prisoner-of-war and internment camps. Previously the guarding of the small number of German and Italian internees had been undertaken by a sub-unit of an established garrison battalion. However, after the Australian Government agreed to take over custody of thousands of German internees from Great Britain in mid-1940, dedicated garrison battalions were assigned to guard five internment camps established in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. Here, the garrison battalions supervised work parties, facilitated visits by the Red Cross and representatives of the protecting power (neutral observers under humanitarian law), and searched accommodation for contraband. Not surprisingly given the nature of their task, these garrison battalions were augmented by a legal officer, several medical officers, dental technicians, a field hygiene section, and Lutheran and Catholic padres for the German and Italian internees respectively.[44] Likewise, three prisoner-of-war camps were established, each requiring a dedicated garrison battalion, including the ill-fated 22nd Garrison Battalion, which was present for the infamous August 1944 Cowra breakout.
From 1940, five regionally based garrison brigades were formed to command the battalions; a brigade commanded a mix of both close defence and security battalions.[45] These brigades were short lived, as the subordinate garrison battalions were transferred to new organisations created once the Army mobilised in December 1941. For example, the 14th Garrison Battalion—which guarded coastal defences on the islands off South-East Queensland—was transferred from the 1st Garrison Brigade to Headquarters, Brisbane Covering Force. Similarly, in December 1943, the 11th and 31st Garrison Battalions in New South Wales were transferred from the 2nd Garrison Brigade to Headquarters, New South Wales Line of Communications Area.[46]
| Unit name | Headquarters location | Garrison battalions commanded | Raised | Disbanded |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Aust Grn Bde | Victoria Barracks, Brisbane |
1st Garrison Bn 14th Garrison Bn 15th Garrison Bn 32nd Garrison Bn 7th Garrison Bn * |
November 1940 | December 1943 |
| 2nd Aust Grn Bde | Sydney Showground, Moore Park |
2nd Garrison Bn 11th Garrison Bn 16th Garrison Bn 7th Garrison Bn * 8th Garrison Bn 13th Garrison Bn 20th Garrison Bn 31st Garrison Bn 18th Garrison Bn # |
July 1940 | December 1943 |
| 3rd Aust Grn Bde | Flinders Street, Melbourne |
3rd Garrison Bn 12th Garrison Bn 17th Garrison Bn 9th Garrison Bn |
July 1940 | December 1941 |
| 4th Aust Grn Bde | Warradale, Adelaide |
4th Garrison Bn 18th Garrison Bn # |
October 1939 | July 1942 |
| 5th Aust Grn Bde | Swanbourne, Western Australia |
10th Garrison Bn 5th Garrison Bn 19th Garrison Bn 29th Garrison Bn |
August 1940 | May 1942 |
Notes:
* The 7th Garrison Battalion transferred from 2nd Garrison Brigade to 1st Garrison Brigade in June 1942.
# The 18th Garrison Battalion transferred from 4th Garrison Brigade to 2nd Garrison Brigade in June 1942.
Information drawn from Graham McKenzie-Smith, The Unit Guide, Volume 2.
During the war, 33 garrison battalions were raised, with the maximum strength achieved in late 1942 to early 1943. Based on the three-battalion brigade structure, this equated to more than two divisions worth of troops dedicated solely to internal security, close defence or internee/prisoner-of-war camp duties, albeit without the supporting arms and logistics enablers such formations normally contain. Regardless, these units therefore freed up several militia divisions to be redeployed around Australia in their mobile field force role. Their existence also enabled the defence of critical infrastructure and military assets around Australia, protecting it from possible sabotage or enemy action. From early 1943, with the Japanese threat receding and the need to re-prioritise manpower towards industry, militia and garrison units began to be disbanded. Some soldiers were transferred to other units, while others returned to civil vocations. Some units, like the 10th Garrison Battalion, served on until 1946. When it was eventually disbanded in June of that year, the adjutant, who maintained the war diary reflected:
The disbandment of the 10th Garrison Battalion brought to end service which commenced in September 1939, during which some thousands of all ranks served with the unit, and at all times, gave honourable and efficient service to the Australian Military Forces.[47]
‘Living, fighting and feeding in their own districts’: the Volunteer Defence Corps
While the RSSAILA played a big part in facilitating enlistment of returned soldiers into the garrison battalions, it was also fundamental to the creation of the VDC. Indeed, the VDC owed its existence almost entirely to the persistent lobbying of the government by the RSSAILA. As early as October 1936, this organisation had advocated some sort of ‘home guard’ style force, comprising returned men, that was funded, raised and controlled by the RSSAILA. Even by June 1940—nine months into the war—the Australian Government showed little appetite for such a force, noting that Australia was not yet under immediate threat, with the 2nd AIF serving offshore, the garrison battalions protecting key points, and the militia undergoing periods of continuous training in tranches. Importantly, the government did not wish to support a force analogous to a ‘private army’—especially after the well-documented linkages between some returned soldiers and the right-wing private armies of the 1930s.[48]
By July 1940, after sustained lobbying in the press and in parliament, the government directed the Army to consider how returned men could usefully contribute to home defence. The Military Board considered an expansion to the Army reserve the best way to achieve this, essentially creating a pool of men who, upon mobilisation, could bring the existing militia and garrison battalion units up to strength. So, on 15 July 1940, the Military Board informed the RSSAILA that it could form the ‘RSL-Volunteer Defence Corps’, which was to consist solely of returned men with war service.[49] The government would not provide uniforms, equipment, weapons or training, with the RSSAILA responsible for funding and raising the force. Importantly, there was no defined role for the VDC other than being a source of Class B (aged 45 to 60) personnel for the Army reserve.[50]
Even so, the RSSAILA sub-branches went ahead and raised VDC units. But with no defined role or national standardisation, the results varied widely. The VDC battalions would be numbered sequentially in each state, so, for example, there were six separate battalions named ‘2 VDC Battalion’. Some VDC units drilled, while others tried to use the services of adjacent rifle clubs to conduct some weapon practice. Moreover, the Army decreed that as the RSL-VDC was a voluntary, non-military organisation, it was not to have ranks. However, as units had to be led and managed somehow, a de facto appointment structure developed, signified by a colour-coded armlet. The leader of a battalion-sized VDC unit wore a yellow armlet, while that of a platoon-sized entity wore a white one. Despite equating to officer ranks, these appointments had no standing outside the RSL-VDC. The matter of ranks and VDC leadership plagued the fledgling organisation in other ways. The local RSSAILA sub-branch selected leaders for its supported VDC unit. Some selected leaders had no desire to update their antiquated military knowledge. Others were selected based on their standing in the local RSSAILA sub-branch, regardless of their competence. Further grievances arose among some men who had held commissions in the AIF during the last war and now refused to serve under former officers who had previously held a more junior rank than they had last held.[51] Perhaps expectedly, personal relationships, petty jealousies and ego blighted the organisation’s early existence, with a concomitant impact on effectiveness.
A cri de coeur letter written by a Tasmanian VDC member in April 1942, addressed to the Minister for the Army, Mr Francis Forde, captured the poor state of the organisation due to lack of role, lack of equipment, and poor leadership:
I have been a member for over a year and my platoon, which is composed of graziers, trappers, horse keepers, farmers and garage and station hands is quite a representative cross section of opinion within the force. For over a year, these men have stuck to a disheartening job, many men come some distance paying, too, their own petrol and in many cases, they have to use their own meagre ration tickets. They have had no training or personal equipment, and they have had to suffer from the depressing effect of bad leadership and administration.[52]
The bad leadership to which the author referred was the perception (not universally held, but prevalent in some quarters) that all leadership positions were held by RSSAILA office holders, regardless of the competency of those men. It also established the perception that the VDC turned away interested volunteers who were not returned men from the last war. This opinion was maintained to some degree, despite the VDC opening up enlistments to non-returned men from late 1940.[53] The minister duly referred the letter to local military command, which requested a response from the commanding officer of the VDC battalion in question. In response, the CO highlighted all the courses offered for the junior leaders in the VDC, but noted that the main military instructor was located some distance from the training area and was not funded for much of the training needed. The CO continued:
Our authorised strength was 530 men, we have enrolled approximately another 500 men, and organised and trained these extra men to the best of our ability with what weapons we could acquire … Altogether I have 21 centres to direct and train, over an area of 10,000 square miles. This has been done at my own expense. The battalion funds being sufficient for only a small portion of our costs, personally I have not drawn one penny for myself. It is quite impossible for me to visit each centre more than twice a year, and this I have done.[54]
Besides officers and men being out of pocket through attendance at training, the fact that the VDC was a private organisation and not part of the military meant that its members were ineligible for compensation if killed or injured while on VDC duty. Poor (effectively, no) conditions of service, the lack of equipment and weapons, and no defined role continued to militate against both the attractiveness and the viability of the VDC. Still, the RSSAILA aspired for the VDC to be part of the AMF and to be integrated into the order of battle as part of the home defence system.[55]
The deteriorating strategic circumstances from late 1940 provided much needed, if belated, justification for the invigoration of the VDC. From early 1941, the Army gradually softened its stance towards the VDC, realising that if it was to integrate it usefully into home defence plans, the VDC had to be funded by the federal government and therefore needed to be part of the AMF. From February 1941, the government purchased 50,000 uniforms for the VDC. In May, it approved a capitation allowance that funded training travel and other unit administration expenditure. During this time, a conference attended by state and federal RSSAILA officeholders, the Chief of General Staff and the Army Adjutant-General resolved that the Army would take control of the VDC. This decision took effect in May 1941. This had an almost immediate effect on the VDC units, including the provision—albeit in very limited quantities—of.303 SMLE rifles and ammunition.[56] In addition, once the VDC was incorporated into the Army, other aspects of military professionalism infused the part-time force. This included the issue of a bespoke VDC colour patch; the formalisation of command structures that placed VDC units under military formations; unit administration; the cross-posting of personnel from the AIF, the militia or the garrison battalions into the VDC; and the panelling of VDC personnel (especially officers) onto the multitude of training courses held at the various schools established throughout each military district.[57]
The growing threat to the nation from December 1941 and into January 1942 provided further impetus to remedy the poor state of the VDC. Not all VDC units were issued uniforms, and none had been issued greatcoats. ‘The approach of hostilities [to mainland Australia],’ wrote one commander, ‘makes it imperative that VDC units be supplied now with a proportion of weapons, explosives and engineer stores’.[58] This was necessary for the VDC if it was to undertake its two newly allotted roles. Category ‘A’ roles comprised beach defence, coast watchers, permanent guards on vulnerable points, and guarding the reserved demolitions placed by engineers.[59] Such VDC units would be under command of the military formation operating in that area. Category ‘B’ units were those that performed a ‘home guard’ style role, which could include action against paratroopers, guerrilla and anti-sabotage actions, protection of railways, creation of roadblocks, intelligence gathering about enemy movements, and cooperation with other Australian units in the area. These units would come under command of the line of communications headquarters of that region. However, the limitations and capacity of these VDC units were clear:
Their activities will be limited by the absence of organised supply and transport. Their operations will, therefore, be confined to the close vicinity of their home areas. When transport is required, they will have to depend on privately-owned motor vehicles or horses supplied by themselves.[60]
These circumstances had an operational impact. For example, a proposal that VDC units relieve garrison battalions guarding vulnerable points was rejected in many commands. The reasons were manifold: the vital points were often in remote areas with few VDC members nearby; it cost the VDC members time and (their own) money to reach the vital points in question, and the sheer quantity of VDC troops required to sustain the same guard effect over multiple rotational shifts (to work around their protected employment) was not feasible. Some VDC members also voiced the opinion that ‘enlistment in the VDC does not entail duty of this nature until an emergency necessitating the VDC being called up for continuous service’.[61]
In some cases, local councils and other government bodies used the VDC as free labour. One instance at Lilydale in Victoria, prompted Southern Command to write to the Premier’s office reminding them that the VDC was a ‘static body of troops whose role is local defence of their own areas’.[62] As they were ‘not a regular military organisation’ they could not, unless called out, ‘be ordered to undertake any task’. Instead, the commander suggested:
as they are a voluntary body every help should be given to the VDC by local persons and organisations to carry out the tasks which are ordered for an emergency in the defence of the country.[63]
These conditions of service were inadequate and barely compensated for the tasks demanded of the VDC. For example, the VDC was widely used to assist the garrison battalions by undertaking weekend and night shifts, thereby affording opportunities for rest and local leave. Despite the ‘out of hours’ nature of this duty, VDC soldiers were given a subsistence allowance in lieu of being supplied rations. These circumstances remained until mid-1943, when direction from no less than the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General John Northcott, authorised the provision of dinner and breakfast to VDC personnel conducting night shifts on anti-aircraft, coast defence and searchlight batteries.[64] The poor conditions of service were largely viewed as consistent with the VDC ‘living, fighting and feeding in their own districts’ and being ‘a semi-military organisation’ wherein ‘administrative difficulties [were] bound to occur’.[65] It is difficult to reconcile the VDC’s evident lack of administrative capacity despite being an authorised part of the AMF—an organisation that was able to raise, feed and administer the 2nd AIF overseas and the militia at home and in Australian territories.
Insert AWM 052212 (public domain). Members of the Volunteer Defence Corps loading a 6-inch coastal defence gun in Sydney, May 1943.
Insert AWM 062114 (public domain). The badge of the Volunteer Defence Corps as worn on armlets and colour patches.
After the Army mobilised, the government authorised the expansion of the VDC from 50,000 to 80,000 men, and the call-up of 5,000 VDC men for aerodrome protection and coast-watching duties.[66] At this peak, the VDC fielded 111 battalion-sized units. However, the vast majority of VDC personnel remained on part-time duty, undertaking training on weekends and providing what volunteer service they could in units that were close to their home locations. The number of VDC men on full-time duty never exceeded 3,000—approximately three per cent of the paper strength of the VDC at its strongest.[67] In the Queensland Line of Communication Area in September 1942, for example, 15,815 VDC men (all ranks) were on part-time duty, compared to the 979 on full-time duty. About three-quarters of VDC personnel on full-time duty were allocated to vulnerable point or coast defence positions, the remainder being key command and administrative staff.[68] Based on operational needs, some VDC personnel could volunteer for full-time duty for certain periods. This avenue of service was not open to those who were members of reserved occupations. However, if ‘enemy action was imminent and civil life can no longer continue undisturbed’, personnel in reserved occupations could be called up for full-time duty with the understanding that they were to be returned to civil industry as soon as possible.[69] VDC personnel volunteering or called up for full-time duty had to pass the same medical standard as soldiers in the garrison battalions (Medical Class II). Therefore, it remained that the attractiveness of part-time duty in the VDC was that it was the sole means for personnel in reserved occupations to contribute to the defence of the nation. This obvious social good must, however, be considered against the readiness ramifications of allowing reserved occupations to serve. A defence emergency would surely have seen many of the VDC’s members directed to remain at work in the reserved occupations, requiring VDC units to cross-post or amalgamate to create operationally viable units.
The Army’s view on the role of the VDC matured and evolved through 1942. Initially, it was content for it to be a guerrilla-style organisation, with enough training and equipment to harass enemy incursion. However, if the VDC was to undertake an ongoing and formal operational augmentation of the garrison battalions or other units, the Army understood that it had to train and equip it appropriately.[70] This was especially so if VDC troops were to be given loaded weapons for their various duties.[71] The VDC was therefore directed to ‘carry out the maximum training possible … they will not be given an operational role until they have undergone a minimum of two weeks intensive training’.[72] This meant the provision of instructors and full-time cadre staff, standardised syllabi and, perhaps most importantly, enough weapons and ammunition. Certainly SMLE.303 rifles were not abundantly supplied to the VDC; instead.310 cadet rifles and.22 rifles had to fill that gap, with range practices adapted accordingly. Likewise, small quantities of flares, anti-tank mines, grenades and explosives with detonators were provided.[73] The new syllabus of 90 hours (equivalent to two weeks’ training) emphasised weapon handling, fieldcraft (camouflage, fire and movement, infantry minor tactics, map reading and signalling) and planning for the defence (siting of pits, guns and wiring).[74] There was also the recognition that, as the VDC was often employed on the night shift, at least one night training parade per week should be ‘spent in the dark on patrols, direction finding, and guides leading units to specified points’.[75]
In addition to the various guard tasks allocated, the VDC performed a useful intelligence collection role. This was divided into two components. The first aspect was to report on the state of transport infrastructure such as the condition of roads (many of them unsealed) and the capacity of bridges. The need for this information was made clear to Queensland VDC units as ‘topographical information is of great value because movement of formations may have to occur during the wet season in any part of the state’. The second aspect was to gauge the mood of the local population. In addition to watching for evidence of subversive activities, the VDC was to report on the ‘public reaction to recent legislation’ and the ‘public support to [the] war effort and public morale in general’.[76]
From 1943, with the threat of invasion diminishing and therefore the need for a counter-invasion guerrilla force reduced, the Army determined that the best use of the VDC was to man the searchlight, coastal artillery and coastal artillery batteries in all areas south of Townsville. In doing so, the Army considered it a justifiable risk to reassign full-time personnel in these establishments and replace them with part-time VDC personnel. To achieve this, the VDC units were required to generate and coordinate several part-time shifts to replicate the previous full-time effect.[77] It also required VDC units to reconfigure themselves from infantry battalions into small gun and searchlight teams, and upskill its members in these more technical roles. Not all VDC members were willing or able to adjust to these new functions.
As the expectations of the VDC evolved, so too did its organisation and composition. The thorny issue of VDC ranks arose again. It was widely recognised that the system of appointments (not ranks) was increasingly unworkable. But there was reluctance in the Army to allow VDC officers, of untested competence, to have command authority over AMF officers. In 1942, after much deliberation, the Military Board approved the granting of commissioned, warrant officer and NCO ranks in the VDC. When this was instituted, it was made clear that a commission in the AIF or the militia took precedence over one in the VDC. Therefore the ranking VDC officer—the Director VDC—became a brigadier. VDC groups (rather than brigades) consisted of several VDC battalions in a state and were commanded by a lieutenant colonel; battalions and companies were commanded by majors and captains respectively. The connection between the VDC and RSSAILA necessarily became more distant as the war progressed. By December 1942, only 20 per cent of the VDC were returned men. This meant that the VDC’s image evolved. It became less an organisation of old veterans, transitioning to an organisation in which men in reserved occupations (or with minor medical conditions), of all ages, could serve. As a result, by February 1944 the average age of a VDC member was 36 years.[78]
As the fighting moved northwards away from Australia, the need for the VDC diminished. Throughout 1944, therefore, the majority of the VDC were placed on a reserve list with no training liability. Demobilisation began well before the war’s end, with the priority to get men back into industry rather than giving them a means to provide military service at home. Ultimately the utility and effectiveness of the VDC was never tested, though it may be assumed that the VDC’s presence freed up an unknown number of younger, fitter and more available men for service in the militia or 2nd AIF. At a farewell dinner for the disbandment of the 18th Battalion VDC in October, its former commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Chenery posited:
The VDC had been accused of being a surplus body, spending money unnecessarily. My reply is that it was the cheapest army Australian ever had, and if this country had been invaded the people of Australia would really have realised the value of the corps.[79]
Assessment—the Fundamental Inputs to Capability
The experience of the garrison battalions and the VDC provides a rich case study in force expansion in support of home defence needs. Certain lessons are obvious, such as harnessing the services of older or medically downgraded personnel for national defence, thereby freeing up younger and fitter soldiers for more arduous roles. Likewise, the nexus between funding, equipment and training to achieve even a modest military capability needs no further comment. That said, history suggests that decision-makers must be reminded that a nation only gets the military capability it is prepared to pay for. History also demonstrates that governments grossly (perhaps wilfully) underestimate the breadth and quantity of military tasks and the concomitant forces required to meet all these tasks.
Instead, this article concludes with an assessment viewed through the prism of eight fundamental inputs to capability (FIC) and how they may be pertinent to any future force expansion requirement facing Army.[80]
Command and management. In time, both the garrison battalions and the VDC were organised along tried and tested military lines with the commensurate command structures in place. This included the provision of suitable staff officers and the training of garrison battalion and VDC officers to ensure they could undertake their command appointments. If doctrine is a command enabler, any future force engaged in home defence must be more like the garrison battalions and less like the VDC. Doctrine must understand the specific nuances of operating within Australia, among the civilian population, and in conjunction with other government departments—most notably law enforcement.[81]
Organisation. Before the war, the Army identified the need for several static guard battalions that could be deployed anywhere in Australia. While there was no fixed establishment for these units, they were remarkably homogenous given that each regional command raised them independently. The standard infantry battalion (albeit varying between two and five companies) was an appropriate organisation for this task. Companies were responsible for areas and could parcel out platoons (and sometimes sections) to protect key assets and infrastructure within those company areas. The organisational nomenclature afforded operability with other AMF units in the area. In time, some companies became the basis on which to build new battalions, adapting to a new role of guarding internees and prisoners of war.
By contrast, the VDC struggled to define a role for itself. Starting its life as a non-Army entity, with wildly fluctuating strengths and structures, the VDC was an organisational orphan for half of its existence. Even after its incorporation into the Army, its role was never clearly articulated or set. Was it to be a guerrilla army? Reinforcement for the garrison battalions? A part-time home guard? Form follows function, and the absence of a clear role for the VDC militated against a sound organisational structure. During the peak period for home defence of 1942–1943, 21 garrison battalions were deployed throughout Australia protecting vulnerable points and key defence installations. Roughly (noting the variation in battalion size discussed above) this equated to approximately 84 companies. The nature and types of ‘vulnerable points’ may differ in the modern context, but the quantity of vital assets and key infrastructure would surely be greater. If 84 companies, specially raised and trained for static defensive duties, was considered sufficient in 1942, researchers and planners must consider what quantity would be required today.
Personnel. Although the VDC came under Army control, it was never really part of it. As such, it found itself outside the conditions of service enshrined in the various Acts and regulations that covered service in the AMF. Matters of pay and allowances, rationing, injury and death benefits were unclear and required constant administrative workarounds to achieve practical and equitable results. From a force generation perspective, the VDC was never a guaranteed workforce. The confusing status of call-out provisions meant lingering uncertainty as to who in the VDC (and for what duration) could be called out. It was never clarified whether, in case of a defence emergency, the priority for the VDC’s members was VDC service or their own reserved occupation.
The early creation of the Army/AIF reserve successfully provided a partially vetted manpower pool from which to create the garrison battalions. The role of the RSSAILA was fundamental; in effect the Army outsourced much of its recruiting and some of its personnel management functions to this non-Army entity. Although the RSSAILA’s other efforts in establishing the VDC were less successful, its contribution as the interface between returned men and the Army was, initially at least, a useful one.
The Army currently employs Service Category (SERCAT) 2 and 3 groupings to manage service liability for former members. This suggests there is no present-day requirement for the RSL or any of the modern ex-service organisations to act as an interlocutor. Likewise, successive modifications to the Defence Act have clarified (and expanded) how part-time forces can be used. Nonetheless, there remain disparities in the conditions of service as they apply to regular and reserve forces, while the recall, vetting and training of SERCAT 2 and 3 personnel has not been tested.
Collective training. The training required for the static duties performed by garrison battalions was minimal. Widely describing it as ‘refresher training’, the Army took the risk that even with a 20-year hiatus, former soldiers could be brought back up to a certain standard quickly. The two-week course was pared back to only the basic skills needed for the role. Even so, the Army made sure that the professional instructors of the AIC were available to conduct the training. As the Army was structured around geographically based regional commands or military districts, this training was conducted at distributed centres in each area. A syllabus was provided, but the training itself was executed in a decentralised manner. It proved to be fit for purpose, just in time, not exquisite, and later sufficient to train off-the-street recruits to a ‘good enough’ standard.
The VDC was hampered by the part-time nature of its service and the limited availability of weapons and ammunition. This made reaching a minimum standard difficult, despite the best efforts of instructors and the dedication of the VDC members themselves. This was further exacerbated later in the war when the VDC had to crew searchlight, coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, which had a higher technical training liability.
If force expansion for home defence is required in the future, the garrison battalions will provide an excellent example of a useful lower-tier force with a substantially reduced training burden—and that training can be conducted in several distributed locations. Even so, the experience of the garrison battalions highlights how a small investment in high-quality trainers paid off in the quality and quantity of the training throughput.
Major systems. There were no major systems, as understood in the modern FIC construct, that were part of the garrison battalions and the VDC. In many ways, that was the very attraction of these two types of auxiliary formations: they offered value for money compared to AIF or militia divisions. Although not major systems of the VDC, searchlight, anti-aircraft and coastal defence batteries were nonetheless crewed by its member in the latter stages of the war. These were the anti-access/area denial (A2AD) systems of their day. What A2AD systems might be required in the future? Who will crew them? Does technology afford an ‘ease of use’ dividend that would allow older or medically downgraded personnel to contribute to the A2AD home defence system?
Supplies. Necessarily, the garrison battalions and the VDC were a lower priority than the AIF and the militia. Generally, garrison battalions had sufficient quantities of key classes of supply to undertake its missions. The issuing of older uniforms and weapons was not only an appropriate use of war stocks but also had no detrimental impact on garrison battalions’ effectiveness. The VDC, by comparison, struggled to maintain even a rudimentary level of effectiveness, with training ammunition in particular being in short supply. If a capability is expected and needed, then it must be funded and supplied appropriately. While risks can be taken and corners can, in extremis, be cut, a ‘minimum viable capability’ still incurs a cost. The garrison battalions achieved a minimum viable capability but the VDC probably did not. This can be reduced to a simple explanation: one was funded and supplied sufficiently, while the other was not.
Support. Noting the historical context of the period studied, it is difficult to make any real assessment of the ‘support’ provided to these two organisations. However, as one was part of the Army and the other was only partially so, it is not surprising that the VDC was often orphaned from the wider home defence support system.
However, if a more expansive view of support is taken, some different and interesting insights emerge. What of ‘society as support’? Both the garrison battalions and the VDC in particular relied on the support of the RSSAILA. Likewise, both organisations (especially the VDC) lived in the Australian community and, with the 2nd AIF overseas and the militia deployed into various covering positions, garrison battalions and the VDC were the face of the Army in the community. In return, by being based at home, both organisations were supported (to varying degrees) by the military districts and line of communications headquarters. This allowed the Army to take more risk in using older and medically restricted personnel; both organisations were closer to the military and civilian medical systems in urban and regional Australia.
Perhaps the most important ‘support system’ in a home defence context is the integration with civilian police forces. In the Second World War, both organisations understood this; any future home defence organisation must understand it also.
Facilities and training areas. The garrison battalions used a combination of extant military training areas, vacated militia drill halls, sports and show grounds; and, where none of these existed, hired privately owned buildings for their headquarters and accommodation. Tents were seen as only a temporary fix. There was a far larger extant military footprint of drill halls—many built for earlier universal service schemes—than exist in modern Australia. Home defence is likely to require extensive hiring of real estate and facilities to provide the necessary raise, train, sustain and headquarters footprints, made more complex and expensive by a reduction in the Defence estate.
One benefit of the VDC was that it had a minimal facilities requirement. When on duty, it largely used extant facilities (although some did in fact need to be hired in the first instance), and when off duty, VDC members went home to their own accommodation.[82] Any future home defence plan should consider an option of a ‘serve at the base, sleep at home’ model for some types of part-time service.
Conclusion
Though based on the Second World War experience, analysis of the role that Australian garrison battalions and the VDC played in national defence remains relevant today and for the future. Both organisations provided economical capabilities due to the use of older and medically downgraded personnel and older equipment. In doing so, both freed up younger and fitter personnel for more demanding tasks. However, any expanded home defence capability, no matter how innovative in its use of personnel, will not be cheap. The garrison battalions and the VDC still required training, equipment, rationing, accommodation and personnel support. Conditions of service and concepts of employment will likewise need to be determined if such force expansion is undertaken again—especially if it is to be generated to the scale it was between 1939 and 1945.
Endnotes
[1] ‘Diggers Answer the Call’, The Newcastle Sun, 2 October 1939, p 7.
[2] ‘RSL Volunteer Defence Corps’, The Gloucester Advocate, 17 September 1940, p. 3.
[3] The PMF comprised the small cadre of Duntroon-trained staff corps officers, the professional NCO instructors of the Australian Instructional Corps (AIC), and the permanent gunners and engineers who operated the coastal batteries.
[4] The term refers to Prime Minister Robert Menzies’s radio broadcast informing the Australian population that the country was at war with Germany. During the broadcast, he asserted that ‘our staying power, and particularly the staying power of the mother country, will be best assisted by keeping our production going; by continuing our avocations and our business as fully as we can; by maintaining employment and with our strength’. See James Morrison, ‘The Australian Militia at War, 1939–1945’, PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 2022, p. 22.
[5] The shortened acronym ‘RSL’ was also used widely at the time.
[6] ‘Emergency Reserve Particulars, The Port Stevens Pilot, 12 May 1939.
[7] AWM 52, 8/7/5/1, ‘1st Garrison Battalion, September–December 1939’, war diary entry for 24 September 1939.
[8] ‘Forming Garrison Battalions’, The Advocate, 29 September 1939.
[9] ‘Garrison Battalion’, The West Australian, 28 September 1939.
[10] AWM 52, 8/7/15/1, ‘11th Garrison Battalion, October–December 1939’, war diary entry for 6 October 1939.
[11] AWM 52, 8/7/6/2, ‘2nd Garrison Battalion, January–June 1940’, ‘Nominal Roll—17 June 1940’.
[12] Ibid.
[13] ‘Selection of Men for Garrison Battalion. Returned Soldiers “Sorely Disappointed”’, The Advocate, 5 February 1940. The doctors conducting the assessment were either Australian Army Medical Corps members, doctors on the Reserve of Officers or civilian GPs hired by the Army. The list of medical conditions tested was extensive, with eyesight, hearing and skeletal deformities paid particular attention to. See Allan S Walker, Australia in the War of 1939–1945 Series 5 (Medical): Volume II, Middle East and Far East (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953), pp. 34–36 and p. 422.
[14] AWM 52, 8/7/10/1, ‘6th Garrison Battalion, September–December 1939’, war diary entry for 23 October 1939 and 11 November 1939; AWM 52; 8/7/16/1, ‘12th Garrison Battalion, October 1939–February 1940’, war diary entry for 22 January 1940.
[15] ‘Men Required for Garrison Battalion’, The Advocate, 1 December 1939.
[16] AWM 52, 8/7/10/1, ‘6th Garrison Battalion, September–December 1939’, ‘Routine Orders’, November 1939.
[17] Likewise, after the garrison battalions were established, members attended ongoing promotion and other specialist courses as required.
[18] ‘Garrison Battalions’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 October 1939.
[19] The AIC was a specialist corps of NCO instructors analogous to present-day Australian Regular Army training warrant officers in an Army Reserve battalion. Staff corps officers were Royal Military College Duntroon graduates who served in key roles in the militia such as adjutant and brigade major. AWM 52, 8/7/6/1, ‘2nd Garrison Battalion, October–December 1939’, war diary entry for 16 October 1939.
[20] ‘Refresher Course for Diggers’, Brisbane Telegraph, 18 October 1939.
[21] Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of Its Organisation (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 137; and Graham R McKenzie-Smith, The Unit Guide: The Australian Army, 1939–1945, Volume 2 (Newport: Big Sky Publishing, 2018), pp. 2389–2409. McKenzie-Smith’s six-volume collection is the definitive work on the organisation of the Army in the Second World War. It chronicles every unit raised and demonstrates the sheer size and breadth of the Army, giving due recognition to the largely unknown units that stayed home in Australia to support either home defence or forces deployed abroad.
[22] ‘Refresher Course for Diggers’, Brisbane Telegraph, 18 October 1939.
[23] ‘Gaiters Out Puttees. Uniform Change in Army’, The Townsville Daily Bulletin, 18 October 1939.
[24] McKenzie-Smith, The Unit Guide, Volume 2, pp. 2389–2409.
[25] ‘Home Defence. Returned Soldiers for the 13th Reserve Garrison Battalion’, The Queanbeyan Age, 14 March 1941.
[26] Note that contemporary sources such as newspapers referred to the organisation as the ‘RSL VDC’ In time, the organisation was simply referred to as the ‘VDC’.
[27] Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 186.
[28] Obviously this arrangement was predicated on the presence of a proximate garrison battalion and thus was an opportunity largely afforded to VDC units in metropolitan areas.
[29] ‘Call to Old Diggers to Join Reserve’, The Sunday Mail, 27 April 1941.
[30] Dayton McCarthy, ‘The First Half Measures: The Australian Militia and the Fitful Path to Mobilisation, 1939–1941’, Australian Army Journal 20, no. 3 (2024): 172–174.
[31] AWM 52, 8/7/1/1, ‘1st Garrison Brigade, October 1940–December 1942’, war diary entry for 1 May 1942.
[32] AWM 52, 8/7/10/1, ‘6th Garrison Battalion, September–December 1939’, ‘Special Order No 1’, 20 December 1939.
[33] Graham R McKenzie-Smith, Australia’s Forgotten Army: Volume 2 The Ebb and Flow of the Australian Army in Western Australia—1941 to 1945 (Chapman: Grimwade Publications 1994).
[34] AWM 52, 8/7/19/1, ‘15th Garrison Battalion, September–December 1940’, ‘15th Garrison Battalion’, 1 December 1940.
[35] AWM 52, 8/7/5/1, ‘1st Garrison Battalion, May–December 1942’, war diary entry for 5 July 1942.
[36] AWM 52, 8/7/15/1, ‘11th Garrison Battalion, October–December 1939’, ‘Report on VPs’, 9 November 1939.
[37] Coastal, heavy artillery was a distinct subset of the prewar permanent artillery.
[38] AWM 52, 8/7/24/1, ‘20th Garrison Battalion, December 1941–July 1942’, ‘Command—Close Protection Units’, 11 February 1942.
[39] AWM 8/7/24/1, ‘20th Garrison Battalion, December 1941–July 1942’, ‘Operation Order No 2’, 22 March 1942.
[40] AWM 52, ‘2nd Garrison Battalion, January–June 1940’, multiple war diary entries.
[41] AWM 52, 1/7/34, ‘Western Command, August–November 1939, Part 1’, ‘Arrests of and Shooting by Sentries at Civilians’, 27 October 1939.
[42] AWM 52, 8/7/22/1, ‘18th Garrison Battalion, January–February 1942’, ‘Routine Orders Part I—Power to Fire on Suspected Persons’, 12 February 1942.
[43] National Archives of Australia (NAA), SP16/4, 1057, ‘Hire of Broughton School’, ‘Requisition of Property, EC (AH) 1057’, 20 February 1942.
[44] AWM 52, 8/7/29/1, ‘25th Garrison Battalion, April–June 1942’, ‘Field Return of Other Ranks’, 4 April 1942; ‘Field Return of Officers’, 5 April 1942; and multiple entries in the war diary detailing daily occurrences. If a Lutheran padre was not on the establishment, often a local pastor visited the camps to administer to the internees.
[45] Previously the garrison battalions had reported to the military district / regional command in which they were located.
[46] McKenzie-Smith, The Unit Guide, Volume 2, pp. 2, 126–122, 129.
[47] AWM 52, 8/7/14/11, ‘10th Garrison Battalion, January–June 1946’, war diary entry for 20 June 1946.
[48] Graham Philpot, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps, 1940–1945’, Master of Arts thesis, University of New South Wales, 2016, p. 24. Philpot’s thesis provides excellent context for this lobbying, including the RSL’s political influence at the time and its involvement (tacit or otherwise) with the various ‘private armies’ of the interwar period. Together, these illustrate some of the reasons why the government was reluctant to countenance another type of ‘private army’ run by the RSL.
[49] As noted previously, the organisation was referred to as the ‘RSL-VDC’ using the shorter version of the organisation’s acronym.
[50] Philpot, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, pp. 39–41, 8–51.
[51] Ibid., pp. 53–55.
[52] NAA, P617, 534/1/16, ‘Report by Commanding Officer, Number 2 Battalion re: Volunteer Defence Corps’, ‘Letter by Mr J.C May, 9 February 1942’.
[53] Philpot, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, pp. 56–57.
[54] NAA, P617, 534/1/16, ‘Report by Commanding Officer, Number 2 Battalion re: Volunteer Defence Corps’, ‘Letter by Col A.C Blacklow, CO No 2 Bn VDC’, 10 March 1942.
[55] Philpot, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, pp. 68–74.
[56] AWM 52, 36/1/7/1, ‘Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Tasmania, June 1940 – December 1943’, war diary entry for 27 May 1941.
[57] Philpot, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, pp. 83–90; and NAA, B6390, ‘Routine Orders Part 2, Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Queensland, Order (Officers Only)’, 1 November 1943.
[58] NAA, SP 1048/7, S9/5/48, ‘Duties to be performed by Volunteer Defence Corps’, Minute, 7 February 1942.
[59] Ibid.
[60] NAA, SP 1048/7, S9/5/73, ‘Minute: Volunteer Defence Corps’, 16 April 1942.
[61] NAA, MP 508/1, 286/701/1019, ‘Guarding of Vulnerable Points by the Volunteer Defence Corps, Minute from WA L of C Area to Allied Land Force Headquarters’, 10 September 1942.
[62] NAA, P617, 534/1/13, ‘Volunteer Defence Corps Posts’, ‘Home Guard—Lilydale Municipality’, 27 December 1941.
[63] Ibid.
[64] NAA, P617, 534/1/78, ‘Employment of VDC Personnel in Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defence’, Minute 264/14/178, 23 June 1943.
[65] NAA, P617, 534/1/14, ‘VDC Launceston, Complaint re: organisation’, ‘Minute from Commandant’, 6 MD, 27 January 1942.
[66] NAA A2676, 1882, ‘War Cabinet Minute No 1882—Volunteer Defence Corps’, 10 February 1942; NAA A2671, 343/1941, ‘War Cabinet Agendum, No 343/1941, Partial Mobilisation of AMF’, 11 December 1941.
[67] Philpot, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, p. 93.
[68] NAA, MP 508/1, 286/701/1039, ‘Volunteer Defence Corps Quarterly Strength Returns 30 June and 30 September Australia Wide’, ‘Weekly Strength Return, Volunteer Defence Corps FTD and PTD Week Ending 25.9.42’.
[69] NAA, SP 1048/7, S9/5/73, ‘Minute: Volunteer Defence Corps’, 16 April 1942.
[70] NAA, 1979/574, Folder 1, ‘6th Battalion VDC’, ‘Training’, 16 December 1942.
[71] AWM 52, 36/1/7, ‘Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps Tasmania’, war diary entry for 15 December 1941.
[72] NAA, SP 1048/7, S10/1/650, ‘Use of Volunteer Defence Corps in demolition and defence duties’, ‘Employment of VDC of FTD’, 6 June 1942.
[73] NAA 1979/574, Folder 1, ‘6th Battalion VDC’, various untitled ammunition receipts and range instructions, circa mid-1942.
[74] NAA, 1979/574, Folder 1, ‘6th Battalion VDC’, ‘Training’, 16 December 1942.
[75] NAA, 1979/574, Folder 1, ‘6th Battalion VDC’, ‘No 6 Batt VDC Training Programme, 1942–1943’, n.d.
[76] AWM, 52, 361/5/1, ‘Corps Headquarters Volunteer Defence Corps, Queensland 1943—March 1943’, ‘Pro Forma for VDC (Q) Intelligence Report’, no date.
[77] Philpot, ‘The Volunteer Defence Corps’, pp. 114–118.
[78] Ibid., pp. 90–102.
[79] ‘Final VDC Parade Was a Gigantic Affair’, The Gundagai Independent, 8 October 1945.
[80] The author notes the existence of 10 FIC but has not considered ‘industry’ and ‘data’ due to the lack of applicability to this subject matter.
[81] For more on this consideration, see Dayton McCarthy, ‘Anything but Simple and Clear Cut: The Utility of Mission Command Within Domestic Security and Response Operations', Australian Army Journal 21, no. 3 (2025).
[82] This was greatly facilitated by the fact that the VDC did the night and weekend shifts and so were not occupying facilities while the parent units were present.