Assessing the Strategy of Regional Great Power Competition
Marine Corps University Press, 2023,440 pp
ISBN: 9798985340402
DOI: 10.56686/9798985340402
Author: Martin Skold
Reviewed by: Ping-Han Chua
It is an oft-repeated statement that we live in an era of great power competition, between the West (led by the US) and revanchist/revisionist states (led by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)). This statement features prominently in the National Defence Strategy[1] and it guides Australian strategic policy, defence planning, force posture and readiness. This great power competition has become entrenched and is multidimensional. Unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War, which was primarily a military power, the PRC represents a full-spectrum competitor that is willing to blend and use all tools at its disposal on its campaign of ‘national rejuvenation’.[2]
But what is disturbingly unclear is how this competition might end: perhaps uneasy coexistence and an agreement to carve the world up into spheres of influence, perhaps the capitulation of one side and ascendance of the other or, worse still, a catastrophic war. Indeed, the avoidance of war—which is the aim of our ‘strategy of denial’[3]—is in and of itself an incomplete goal. A competition for competing’s sake is still inherently risky, costly and open-ended.
The Race with No Finish Line seems to answer the need to examine the nature of great power competition—how and why states compete, the dynamics at play, and how competition affects those states internally, each other, and other states. In the corpus of writing on the spectrum of conflict, there is much more commentary and speculation on a potential PRC–US war. Indeed, the title of the book (a call-back to the Cold War) promises to redress the imbalance.
This book sets forth a framework for assessing a state’s competitive strategy and its prospects for prevailing in a competition for regional hegemony. The framework is easily comprehensible and mercifully free of quantitative formulae. Based on the book’s date of publication, title, and cover photograph of the US 7th Fleet at sea—and the author’s background as a US policy practitioner—any reader could reasonably assume the book will assess the US–PRC competition.
Instead, what follows is an overly detailed historical case study of the so-called Dreadnought race between Imperial Germany and the British Empire in the late 19th to early 20th centuries, when the former challenged the latter’s dominance in capital ships in the North Sea. The author devotes no fewer than 254 of the book’s 374 pages to the Dreadnought race: its origins (Chapter Four), the competition itself (Chapter Five), and strategic perspectives on the race (Chapter Six). The example is anachronistic and not mentioned on the book’s cover, which felt like a literary bait-and-switch. The unfortunate result that readers, who may need a specific interest in naval history to wade through this case study, are left wishing the book had instead covered other historical examples or the current PRC–US competition.
To be fair, parts of the book are not without their usefulness to the field of statecraft. The first two chapters offer a lucid discussion on the different types of strategy states might employ to compete against other actors. These chapters are a good primer for any budding strategist. Skold outlines the nature of competition, whereby an aspirant seeks to surpass or supplant the incumbent in a zero-sum game. Applying this paradigm, a competitive strategy is one in which a decision to compete is made, finite resources are marshalled and directed, and choices are made (both deliberate and situational) on how, when and where to compete. Chapter One also makes a useful observation that in state competition, business strategy (rather than military strategy) is more relevant. States, like businesses, angle for competitive advantage by allocating resources and making better decisions than their competitor(s).
The third chapter then sets out the framework (summarised on pages 107–108) for assessing a state’s competitive performance. The framework is strictly bounded: there must be a challenger (‘beta’) who has decided to compete, and a reigning hegemon (‘alpha’) who has decided to hold its position. Both states must compete for regional hegemony over a definable area; war could, but need not be, the end point of the competition. The success of a state will depend on how well its leader(s) formulate and execute a plan, and how well they articulate strategic intent. A state’s ascendency will also turn on whether its leader(s) can make consistent decisions (especially on how to use their competitive advantage and core competencies) in pursuit of three broad goals: security, financial prosperity, and the welfare of its polity. Usefully, the author accounts for intangible goals such as national prestige and the ambitions of dominant leaders (Kaiser Wilhelm II, in this example).
Skold’s framework does have utility and relevance, since it can be overlaid on the circumstances of current US–PRC competition. However, readers will need to have an extensive knowledge and nuanced understanding of both the US’s and PRC’s internal politics, systems of government, industrial bases and other sources of national power, and their 20th century histories, to apply the framework and produce cogent insights. It is therefore disappointing that this book falls short in that regard.
Despite the Dreadnought race having a clear winner (Great Britain), this competition was quickly surpassed by the Great War that set Europe on an irreversible path to losing its global power. Similarly, the US and PRC risk getting locked into an ever-escalating and ever-widening pattern of competition with no clear end point. A race with no finish line may tragically bring about the very war that both sides want to avoid.
The most useful chapters of this book have appeal for strategic policy and decision makers, military planners, net assessment and intelligence analysts, or mid-career officers wanting to improve their understanding of strategic competition. The example of the Dreadnought race serves as an implicit warning for our leaders to define objectives, calculate the costs and make prudent decisions.
Endnotes
[1] Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), p. 6.
[2] Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (The State Council—The People’s Republic of China, last updated 20 November 2019), at: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html.
[3] National Defence Strategy, p. 21.