Land Warfare Studies Centre

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Refocusing Concepts of Security

The Convergence of Military and Non-military Tasks

by

Ian Wing

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADO	Australian Defence Organisation
ANU	Australian National University
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
AIPIO	Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CF	Canadian Forces
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAA	defeating attacks against Australia
DGI	defence of global interests
DRI	defence of regional interests
EEZ	exclusive economic zone
GDP	gross domestic product
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
IGO	international government organisations
LWSC	Land Warfare Studies Centre
MRC	major regional conflicts
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	National Defense Panel
NGO	non-government organisations
NMO	non-military organisations
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNI	protection of national interests
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RMA	revolution in military affairs
SGI	supporting our global interests
SSE	shaping the strategic environment
UCAV	uninhabited combat aerial vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US	United States
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates two phenomena: first, the conceptual broadening of the term ‘security’ and the implications of this broadening for the contemporary meaning of ‘national security’; and, second, the implications of this process for the armed forces of advanced countries, whose tasks have also broadened from their Cold War focus on warfighting. The changing theoretical meaning of security has contributed to the broadening of these tasks. This broadening is, in turn, reflected in the phenomenon of the convergence of military and non-military tasks.

An understanding of the changing theory of security is of prime importance to the practitioners of security. This is because theory informs the decision making that directs their activities and is, in turn, influenced by the effects of these activities. The paper includes the changing theoretical approaches to security and national security; the changing international security environment; the new security agenda; and contemporary international and Australian policy responses. The paper then discusses the implications of the broadened security agenda under the rubric of ‘refocused national security’. As part of this discussion, the paper provides a framework for understanding the delineation between military and non-military tasks.

Informed by the examination of theory and the broadened security agenda, the paper examines the trend towards convergence and its implications: ‘overstretch’ and ‘overlap’. These implications will affect military sociology and lead to a partial redefinition of the roles of armed forces. This redefinition will have an impact on future force structures and change some requirements for military organisations and military equipment. The paper concludes with a discussion of concepts that would enhance and inform the integration of military and civilian capabilities within the increasingly complex international security environment.

INTRODUCTION

In 1994 the Australian Department of Defence produced a public-relations poster showing an armed Australian soldier leading a small Rwandan child by the hand. The soldier was from the Australian Special Forces, highly trained in counterterrorism, and was serving in a humanitarian peace-operation in Rwanda. The caption on the poster read: 'Ambassador, Teacher, Soldier, Peacekeeper'. These words neatly summarised the increasingly complex role of the Australian military professional: first and foremost a warrior, but one who is able to assume the guise of 'a man for all seasons'.

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is not alone in experiencing this phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War the armed forces of all the advanced countries have faced a period of soul-searching about their role. The once clearly defined separation between so-called military tasks (which were concerned with the management of violence to achieve national ends) and other tasks (which were by implication 'non-military') became increasingly blurred. An important cause of this blurring of the separation of tasks has been that the capability to meet the demands of the tasks and often the responsibility to do so have converged.

This paper investigates two phenomena: first, the conceptual broadening of the term 'security' and the implications of this broadening for the contemporary meaning of 'national security'; and second, the implications of this process for the armed forces of all advanced countries, whose tasks have also broadened from their Cold War focus on warfighting.[1] The changing theoretical meaning of security has contributed to the broadening of the tasks of the armed forces of all advanced countries. This broadening is, in turn, reflected in the phenomenon of the convergence of military and non-military tasks.

The paper is in two parts. The first part examines the changing theoretical approaches to security and national security; the changing

[1] 'Warfighting' is an inelegant but useful term, frequently used in Western military literature and employed as a noun or adjective. It generally pertains to in interstate armed conflict, although it is also applied to intrastate conflict with high levels of organised violence.

international security environment; the new security agenda; and contemporary international and Australian policy responses. The second part of the paper discusses the implications of the broadened security agenda and provides a framework for understanding the delineation between military and non-military tasks. It examines the trend towards convergence and its implications: overstretch and overlap. It concludes with a discussion of concepts that would enhance and inform the integration of military and civilian capabilities within the increasingly complex international security environment.

The Changing Meaning of 'Security'

Security is an ambiguous term that defies a universal definition. This is because it is possible to apply the term to a range of ideas that operate at many levels of analysis, and because judgments of relative levels of security vary from the objective to the subjective. The term 'security' has become, to use W. B. Gallie's words, an 'essentially contested concept' in that there are no assumptions of agreement as to its meaning and that this lack of agreement constitutes a widely recognised ground for philosophical inquiry.[2] Nonetheless, a brief consideration of the definition of security will assist in setting the scene for the examination of its changing meaning. First, it is useful to examine some definitions of security derived from a literal approach.

The Oxford English Dictionary provides this definition:

> security *n.* The condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety. The safeguarding or safeguarding of (the interests of) the state against danger. Freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger.[3]

The Macquarie Dictionary definition is similar:

> security *n.* Freedom from danger, risk . . . freedom from care, apprehension, or doubt . . .[4]

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[2] W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56, 1955-56, p. 167.

[3] *The Oxford English Dictionary,* 2nd edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, vol. XIV, pp. 853-4.

[4] The Macquarie Dictionary: The National Dictionary, The Macquarie Library, Sydney, 1995, p. 1587.

Emma Rothschild traced the origins of the word and provides an important clue to the broad interpretation of its meaning. The original Latin noun *securitas* referred:

> . . . in its primary classical use, to a condition of individuals, of a particularly inner sort. It denoted composure, tranquillity of spirit, freedom from care, the condition that Cicero called the 'object of supreme desire,' or 'the absence of anxiety upon which happy life depends'.[5]

Definitions derived from the academic and policy-making perspectives are more specifically applicable to this paper. Arnold Wolfers' definition points out the importance of perceptions within the meaning of security: '. . . security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked' .[6]

Security has been traditionally understood almost exclusively in terms of the ability of sovereign states to survive and prosper. This concept has a lengthy antecedence that dates from the writings of Thucydides in classical Greece and underwent rigorous examination by philosophers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thomas Hobbes took a pessimistic view of the fundamental self-interest within human nature:

> Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre as is of every man against every man.[7]

Hobbes applied this philosophy to describing his view of man's existence in a hypothetical 'state of nature'. His conclusion was bleak: 'And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short'.[8] Hobbes argued that, to escape from this misery, humankind had formed communities

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5 E. Rothschild, 'What is Security', *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,* vol. 124, no. 3, Summer 1995, p. 61.

6 A. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics,* Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962, p. 150.

7 T. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Part 1, Chap. X111, J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1959, p. 64.

8 *Ibid*., p. 65.

that were intended to provide security. These communities were the forerunners of the nation states that we know today.

At the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia recognised the pre-eminent position of nation states as the actors in international affairs and as masters of their own domestic activities. States were seen to possess sovereign authority over most of their internal affairs, and the notable exception to this authority-the transnational operation of religious organisations-had also undergone circumscription through the divisions of the Christian church.

States were seen as the outcome of the 'social contract' between individual humans to form a 'collective moral person' that became the state and was embodied in a prince. [9] This process was intended to provide security and was both an individual and collective good. The state became essential to the process, contributing to its own privileged status.

The acceptance of the social contract was thus significant, as it supported the concept that the state was the primary `referent' in considerations of security.[10] It was argued that, without the state, the international system could not operate and that chaos would ensue, leading to greater suffering than that caused by the operation of the states themselves. This utilitarian approach reinforced the importance of states and under normal circumstances protected them from outside interference. This is demonstrated by the contemporary paradigm that it is undesirable for states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states.

Unlike the internal affairs of states, which were conducted in accordance with the theoretical social contract, no social contract existed between

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9 J.J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* J. M. Dent and Sons, London, 1966, pp. 11-27; 85-91.

10 'Referent' is a term that has gained currency since its use by Barry Buzan. When used in the context of security it refers to the object of security, in other words, the entity for which security is sought. See B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era,* 2nd edn, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991.

states. State-to-state discourse was conducted as part of other theoretical understandings. These included:

- the anarchical and unregulated system of states, in which states were competitive and selfish (and sought above all to maximise their material national interests through the application of amoral *Realpolitik);*

- the search for security, in which states sought to maximise their opportunities for survival and prosperity, even if such maximisation meant reducing the security of other states (the latter effect became known as the 'security dilemma');[11] and

- the notion that states were rational actors and would therefore avoid activities that threatened their own survival or the survival of the states system. This notion did not preclude states from waging war on each other: states were able to exercise the prerogative to invade and conquer one another according to their perceptions of their interests.

Overall this system, which is now referred to as 'classical realism', was imperfect by modern standards because it offered no moral restraint to interstate discourse and utilised war as a legitimate element of policy. Despite the prevalence of the realist paradigm, the prerogative to wage war according to calculations of self-interest was not universally accepted. It was challenged by the doctrine of the 'just war', which sought to apply moral principles to the decision to wage war and the means of waging war. Lying between the two camps was the Prussian 19th-century soldier Carl von Clausewitz. He argued that ethics should be excluded from political intercourse between states and therefore from decisions to wage war, although he accepted the need for rules within

[11] For a useful description of the security dilemma see A. Collins, `The Security Dilemma', in M. J. Davis (ed.), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World,* Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1996, pp.181-95.

war itself: ' . . . war is merely the continuation of policy by other means'.[12]

The calamitous experience of World War I, whose outbreak was largely caused by states attempting to enhance their security through armed force and military alliances, dramatically challenged this thinking. When he declared war on Germany in 1917, President Wilson argued in his speech to Congress that:

> We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong [sic] done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilised states.[13]

This school of thought became known as 'idealism', a name applied by its less idealistic critics,[14] and it became the dominant theory of international relations between the world wars. The idealists believed that progress could be made in making the world a more peaceful place. They were optimistic that democracy and law could replace authoritarianism and tyranny. The idealist conception of security tempered the use of power with regulations derived from conceptions of morality and legality.[15] Although states were the only recognised actors in this international system, morality and legality were the primary referents.

During the 1930s, Japan, Germany and Italy took a series of actions that were in breach of the aims of the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant

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12 C. von Clausewitz, *On War,* ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, Book One, chap. 1, section 24, p. 87.

13 W. Wilson, 'Special Message to Congress for Declaration of War Against Germany April 2, 1917', in R. Vexler (ed.), *Woodrow Wilson* 1856-1924, Oceana Publications, Inc., New York, 1969, p. 78.

14 For the origin of the term idealism see H. Bull, 'The Growth of a Discipline', in B . Porter (ed.), *The Aberstwyth Papers: International Politics* 1919-1969, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, p. 34.

15 'The Covenant of the League of Nations', G. C. Butler, *A Handbook to the League of Nations,* 2nd edn, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1925.

of the League of Nations.[16] These actions, and the inaction of the other powers, demonstrated that the key element of national security (and insecurity) remained military power. For this reason, the late 1930s saw a period of hurried rearmament and alliance making in the vain hope of avoiding another world war.

The outbreak of World War II was viewed as evidence of the failure of idealism and idealist international constructs, most notably the League of Nations. As a direct result of this failure, idealism was challenged both theoretically and normatively by 'political realism'. At the forefront of this reaction, E. H. Carr rejected the work of the idealists, which he called 'Utopianism', and instead preferred to emphasise power-and specifically military power-as the fundamental element of national security: 'The supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the *ultima ratio* of power in international relations is war'.[17]

While the idealists saw security as an outcome of the prevention of warfare and the removal of the quest for power, the contrary realist viewpoint was that security was best maintained with the maximisation of power. This power enabled nations to maintain deterrence through the readiness to wage war and, when it served the national interest, the waging of war. Realism has become the most widely accepted approach to international relations since World War II.

It should be noted that Germany and Japan were theoretically not subject to the jurisdiction of the League of Nations following their withdrawals from it in 1931. The actions that were in breach of the Covenant were: in 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria; in 1935 Germany raised an air force and reintroduced conscription, and Italy invaded Ethiopia; in 1936 Germany reoccupied the Rhineland; and in 1938 Germany gained control of Austria, in a contrived union, and the Sudetenland, by annexation (gaining the remainder of Czechoslovakia by force in 1939).

17 E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* 1919-1939, St Martin's Press, 2nd edn, New York, 1966, p. 109. For other important works of the realist school see Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War,* trans. R. Warner, Penguin Books, Melbourne, 1972; N. Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses,* The Modern Library, New York, 1950; H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* Alfred A. Knopf, 5th edn (rev.), New York, 1978; J. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951.

According to the realist school, security depends on power. Reduced to its crudest form power refers to coercive force, and particularly military power, which provides the ability to persuade others to take a course of action that they would otherwise not take of their own volition.[18] Unfortunately, power is an imperfect means of achieving security. Power is relative in its character and it can be misunderstood, by those who seek to employ it and by those upon whom it is employed. It is also a complex and elusive force, particularly because it may contain moral and intellectual elements that resist precise definition. It can be viewed as a goal that must be sought through struggle; a means to enable that struggle; or a relationship between political actors. More subtle realist manifestations of power have dealt with this issue by referring to political, social and economic pressure.

From a broad realist perspective, power is synonymous with security when it provides the ability to control one's environment. The fundamental distinction made by realists is that their concept of security and the utility of power for its maintenance refer first and foremost to the state and the operation of the states system, and this must take precedence over all else.

The Changing Meaning of `National Security'

This section describes a range of contemporary theoretical approaches to understanding national security. Walter Lippmann's writings on security provide a useful definition of the application of security to the nation state: 'A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war'[19].
Lippmann uses the term 'security' in the sense of the security of states. Frank Trager and Frank Simonie define national security as:

> that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the

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[18] A. A. Jordan, W. J. Taylor and L. J. Korb, *American National Security: Policy and Process,* 4th edn, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993, p. 9.

[19] W. Lippmann, US *Foreign Policy,* Hamish Hamilton, London, 1943, p. 32.

> protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.[20]

Richard Ullman's definition, proposed well before the end of the Cold War, has a broader and less military focus. It provides some clues on changes in the contemporary meaning of security:

> A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-government entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.[21]

In 1952 Wolfers examined security and demonstrated that it was viewed as a 'burden'. He observed that:

> . . . security after all is nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity, a negative value so to speak. As a consequence, nations will be inclined to minimise these efforts, keeping them at the lowest level which will provide them with what they consider adequate protection.[22]

This concept of security likens it to an insurance policy that one is prudent to arrange but that one hopes is never needed. The broadened and more contemporary view is that security is a positive value that can contribute to the quality of life of those concerned. This view receives attention later in the paper.

Central to the realist concept of security is the national interest, which is the traditional intrinsic goal of national security.[23] According to this paradigm, states put their own interests first, regardless of whether this

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[20] F. N. Trager and F. L. Simonie, 'An Introduction to the Study of National Security', in F. N. Trager and P. S. Kronenberg (eds), *National Security and American Society: Theory, Process, and* Policy, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1973, p. 36.

[21] R. Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security, vol.* 8 (Summer 1983), pp. 129; 133; 135.

[22] A, wolfers, ` "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 67, no. 4, December 1952, p. 488.

[23] For a discussion of this phenomenon see H. Morgenthau, *In Defence of the National Interest,* Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951.

prioritisation occurs at the expense of other states. National security is apparently fundamentally selfish.

The realist approach to national security contains an internal logic that suits the nature of the international system, which is anarchic, competitive and dangerous. Despite this logic, national security is difficult to measure, and it can be an 'ambiguous symbol' that is subject to varying interpretations depending on the perceptions of the viewer.[24] Depending on these perceptions, national security may mean the ability of a state to develop to its full potential or it may simply mean the ability of a state to survive external attacks, no matter what the human cost to its inhabitants.

National security and the national interest have become labels that may be applied to varying political agendas and personal perceptions. Wolfers described the implications of this phenomenon thus:

> When political formulas such as 'national interest' or 'national security' gain popularity they need to be scrutinised with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.[25]

Moral issues further complicate the analysis of national security. Is it better to pursue an amoral policy if it contributes to national security, or should moral issues be given a particular status even at the cost of national security?[26] Amorality may arguably be rationalised as political good sense, unclouded by considerations of sentimentality-but what of

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24 A. Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', reprinted from *Political Science Quarterly, vol. LXII,* no. *4,* December 1952, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics,* The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962, *p. 147.*

25 Wolfers, `National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', p. 147.

26 For a consideration of this question see J. H. Rosenthal, 'Rethinking the Moral Dimensions of Foreign Policy', in C. W. Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge,* St Martin's Press, New York, 1995.

immorality? When can an immoral act be justified by considerations of national security?

For these and other reasons, in the years following the World War II, many international-relations scholars became dissatisfied with these aspects of realism.[27] They examined the philosophical and structural influences on the apparently anarchical operation of the states system and found that it was influenced by forces that could be identified and understood. Kenneth Waltz recognised the importance of human behaviour, forces within the state, and systems and structures operating within and between states.[28] Waltz's theory of 'structural realism', now more widely known as 'neo-realism', emphasised systems and structures, while retaining the state as the primary referent. Waltz's system of states depended on the balance of power theory, in which states were unitary actors relying on 'self-help' to maximise their power, which remained the fundamental element of security.[29]

The great debate between realism and idealism became much more complicated with the proliferation of other explanations for the behaviour of states. These explanations gained acceptance from the 1950s onwards and were based on methodological, scientific, sociological and anthropological approaches to international relations.[30]

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27 Realism has many other theoretical weaknesses. It privileges states (neglecting actors other than states); tends to disregard economics (which is increasingly dominating the relationships between states); regards states as 'rational actors' (which they may not always be); and contains a narrow power-centric concept of security.

28 K. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*: A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

29 *Ibid*., pp. 117-18.

30 See for examples of these approaches M. A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 1967; K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Enquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd edn, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1966; K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1969; J. A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique, Frances Pinter, London, 1983; R. A. Rubinstein and M. L. Foster (eds), *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict: Culture in International Security,* Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1988.

Notwithstanding the intellectual debate between the realists and the idealists, the study of conflict and national security from the end of World War II until the 1970s was dominated by the international-relations sub-discipline of 'strategic studies'. This discipline considered conflict in terms of the use of force and weapons systems, particularly nuclear weapons systems. A huge body of literature dealt primarily with the strategic nuclear stand-off between the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Union, but also with the myriad of other conflict-related issues of the Cold War.[31] The avoidance of nuclear war became the negative and widely accepted goal of strategic studies and national security. The study of peace, regarded in the realist lexicon as merely the period between wars, was generally neglected.

In his study of the nature of the causes of war, John Vasquez was critical of the realist assumption that war is a normal and logical element of the international system and described his findings as follows:

> Unlike realist thought, this analysis makes it clear that peace systems have existed and their characteristics can be delineated. One of the most hopeful lessons of the enquiry is that peace is possible. Peace can be learned. Humanity need not be condemned to living in a world constructed around war.[32]

This type of thinking had led to the development of the discipline of 'peace research', or 'peace studies'. From the 1970s onwards it had become a recognised sub-discipline of the study of international politics.[33] Peace research was the 'yin' to the strategic studies 'yang',

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31 See for examples of this literature H. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign* Policy, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957; B. Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1959; B. Brodie, *War and* Politics, Macmillan, New York, 1973; H Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War,* 2nd edn, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1960; and B. Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations,* International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1987.

32 J. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle,* Cambridge Studies in International Relations, no. 27, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 308.

33 For a description of the development of peace research see A. Mack, *Peace Research in the* 1980s, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1985; A. Mack, *Australia and Peace Research,* Peace Research Centre, Australian National University,

and it remained primarily concerned with issues of conflict resolution. It emphasised the so-called 'feminine' side of the discourse rather than the 'masculine' strategic-studies side (feelings rather than thinking, the sense of community rather than competition, intuition rather than sensation, mediation rather than invention, consequence rather than result).[34] It contributed to the broadening meaning of security and the development of the field of 'security studies'.

Security studies are undertaken within many disciplines. These range from defence and strategic studies; through peacekeeping, law enforcement and sociology; to peace studies and a range of alternative approaches to security including feminism, conflict resolution, disarmament and pacifism.[35] For this reason the field of security studies is broad, diverse and difficult to characterise. The practitioners in the field do not necessarily share a single view on the meaning of security but they share a generally broader concept of security than that of practitioners in the classical realist school.

Abraham Maslow's 'theory of human motivation', which posits a hierarchical structure of human needs and expands on idea of the human search for happiness proposed by David Hume, is highly relevant to the broadening of the security studies discourse.[36] Maslow believed that

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Canberra, Working Paper No. 67, May 1989; D. J. Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies', in K. Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security,* Harper Collins, London, 1991, pp. 56-72; and P. Kerr and A. Mack, *Security Studies in Australia in the* 1990s, Department of International Relations, Working Paper 1994/2, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994. For a critical viewpoint see W. Maley, *Peace Studies: A Conceptual and Practical Critique,* Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1986.

[34] For an explanation of Yin and Yang see R. Kaje, 'Bringing the Feminine into Forecasting: Foreseeing and Learning', H. A. Linstone and W. H. C. Simmonds, *Futures Research: New Directions,* Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1977, pp. 65-76.

[35] For the development of the field of security studies see the introduction to R. Schultz, R. Godson, and G. Quester (eds), *Security Studies for the 21st Century,* Brassey's, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp.1-12.

[36] G. A. Kimble, N. Garmezy and E. Zigler, *Principles of Psychology,* 6th edn, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1984, pp. 292-4. A. H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality,* 2nd edn, Harper & Row, New York, 1970,

basic human needs make up the fundamental levels of the hierarchy and that, when these needs are satisfied, higher needs emerge, ultimately leading to the highest human motivation of selfactualisation. This is the sense that a person is becoming everything that he or she is capable of being.[37] Maslow used the individual as his referent and saw the state as merely a factor in providing for individual security.

Once the needs for food and water have been met, security occurs within the hierarchy of needs as a fundamental requirement. As was shown earlier in this paper, the need for security was one of the most important reasons for early man to form social groups, and it remains fundamental to the operation of society. Security is thus a social construct, and its provision constitutes a social contract between the people and their state. Seen in this broad light, security can be understood on an individual level, and this represents an important conceptual outcome. Using this approach, anything that reduced the security of an individual, or humanity in general, had a place in understanding the nature of security. When applied to the study of international relations, the hierarchy of needs revealed contrasts between states and the relative security of their citizens. Significant proportions of humanity had-and still have-less security than others, for example people living in the developing world, women, and other disadvantaged groups.

The idea that the objective of national security could be the provision of security for individuals rather than the state has had a significant impact on security theory. Notwithstanding this development, changes in conceptual approaches are one thing, but it takes change in the so-called ‘real world’ of international politics to enable the implications of theory to be realised.

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pp. 35-51. D. Hume, Essays, *Moral, Political, and Literary,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963.

[37] The hierarchy is listed below, from the most fundamental needs up to self-actualisation:
- physiological needs,
- safety and *security* needs,
- love and belonging needs,
- the need for self-esteem, and
- the need for self-actualisation.

The Changing International Security Environment

This section describes the effect of changes in the system of sovereign states that have contributed to the changing understanding of security and national security.

The Cold War between the two global superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, began during World War 11 anddominated international security for almost fifty years. The end of the Cold War was signalled by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the reunification of Germany in 1990; and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1991. It is important to recognise that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not caused by the direct use of the military power of other states, and for that reason did not fit easily into the realist understanding of state behaviour. It was an internally driven collapse, which could trace its origins to such factors as the bankruptcy of Soviet political and economic theory; the failure of the Red Army in Afghanistan; the inability of the Soviet economy to keep pace with US armaments spending (an indirect use of military power); and the corrosive effects of liberalism, capitalism and globalisation. The nature of the Soviet collapse was a clue that a paradigm shift was in operation. The international order, the way it operated and the way that it should be understood had undergone great change.

The end of the Cold War marked the closure of a period of relative global peace that had lasted since the end of World War II, described by one commentator as 'the long peace'.[38] This period of relative peace, at least in the sense that few major regional wars occurred, did include interstate and sub-state conflict, but these conflicts were always geographically limited. This period had also been remarkable in that, despite the deployment of thousands of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear powers, no nuclear attacks occurred. The nuclear deterrent capabilities of the nuclear powers restrained them from taking action that would have precipitated large-scale conflict, although the world came to the brink of

[38] J. L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', *International Security, vol. 10,* no.4, Spring 1986, pp. 99-142; J. L. Gaddis, *The Long Peace,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987.

such conflict several times. Security operated at three levels during the Cold War.

The first level of operation involved the necessity that nuclear deterrent capabilities be maintained at credible levels to ensure that they continued to affect the behaviour of other states. This concept saw security in terms of national survival, and the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction placed the need for national survival above that of the planet: a first strike by one nuclear power against another would lead to massive nuclear retaliation, which would destroy both with potentially catastrophic results for the remaining countries of the Earth. The bipolar nature of the international security environment contributed to the stability of this system by providing for mutually assured destruction, in which the survival of third parties was of only marginal importance.[39] The US eventually gained ascendancy in the bipolar stand-off, but multipolar nuclear stand-off may have operated in an even less predictable manner.

The second level of operation of security involved the ideological conflict between the competing political philosophies of communist socialism and capitalist liberalism. In this concept the state was partially transcended by doctrines that could theoretically be applied by their proponents almost universally. The competition between the two political philosophies caused tension and insecurity through mutual distrust, and contributed to interstate and sub-state violence. Ultimately both political philosophies measured their success by the number of countries that made up each camp, and the end of the Cold War has seen the almost complete triumph of the countries of the capitalist liberal camp.

The third level of operation of security was manifested by the smaller interstate and sub-state conflicts that continued to occur, sometimes

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[39] Nuclear-age strategy is epitomised by two works: H. Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1961 and H. Kissinger (ed.), *Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings,* Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1965. For a different interpretation that is critical of the inexact and pessimistic nature of nuclear era realism, see R. N. Lebow, `The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', R. N. Lebow and T. Risse-Kappen (eds), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 23-56.

sponsored by the major powers as part of the context of a global struggle and operating as proxy conflicts, and at other times breaking out for more localised reasons. These conflicts included the Vietnam conflict and other wars of postcolonial liberation and resulted in decades of misery for much of the third world, particularly because the effects of such wars have included famine, disease and forced refugee flows.

All three levels of operation of security concerned the state system and the existence and relationships between states. The Cold War exemplified realism, with states employing brinkmanship and intimidation to maximise their relative advantage over other states. This situation changed with the end of the Cold War, which led to a reordering of the strategic environment.

With the end of the Cold War the US became the pre-eminent and undisputed world power, a phenomenon now referred to as the ‘unipolar moment’.[40] This was the result of US economic and military strength, and the deteriorating economic and military power of Russia. The superiority of the US was exemplified in its leadership of the UN-mandated coalition that ousted Iraqi forces from Kuwait in February 1991. At the time US President George Bush described the operation of the post-Cold War world as ‘the new world order’. He envisaged the reinvigoration of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, which would enable it to fulfil its role as foreseen in the UN Charter. This forecast was to prove overly optimistic.[41]

The US was not, however, completely unchallenged. The economic giants Japan and Germany initially emerged as potential competitors. This development has been retarded, at least in the short term, by the deleterious effects of the Asian financial crisis on Japan and the need for Germany to concentrate on its de facto leadership of the European Union. Yet the importance of states whose international leverage was primarily derived from economic power provided clues about the changing security environment. As a result of the rising importance of

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[40] The term was first used in C. Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, *Foreign* Affairs, vol. 70, no.l, Winter, 1990/91, pp. 23-33.

[41] For a discussion of the disappointing nature of the ‘new world order’ see C. G. Jacobsen, *The New World Order's Defining Crises: The Clash of Promise and Essence,* Dartmouth, Aldershot, Hampshire, 1996.

the economic dimension, 'geo-economics' was arguably the primary arena of international struggle, largely replacing the struggle between states through the use of armed force.[42]

This view was associated with the themes of globalisation, the rise of liberalism and the rise of capitalism. International financial arrangements and multinational economic entities were seen by some to be combining to create an 'international security community'. Yet, despite optimistic predictions about the decline of the use of war as a rational instrument of international policy between the advanced countries, the continued existence of 'have-not' countries (and possibly a 'have-not' major power in the case of China) pose the threat of the continuation of state behaviour based on the use of military power.[43] James Richardson found that:

> If the end of geopolitics does not imply an end to realism, it does challenge its claims to paradigmatic status. Realism does not provide a plausible overarching framework for discerning the potentialities for change in the contemporary global system, and offers only a narrow perspective on the construction of order and disorder. It does not, then, provide the essential clues for understanding the 'high politics' of the emerging system but rather a constant reminder of the continuing realities of 'low politics' . . .[44]

Other commentators pointed to a range of factors that could shape the future international security dynamic and foretell the future of the US. In his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,* Paul Kennedy used historical examples of 'imperial overstretch' to argue that the US faced a period of inevitable relative decline.[45] For this reason the 'unipolar moment' should be considered a temporary one, to be followed by a new phase of multipolarity, perhaps based on a concert of powers as

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42 J. L. Richardson, 'The End of Geopolitics?', in R. Leaver and J. L. Richardson (eds), *The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses,* Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993 (also published as *Charting the Post-Cold War Order,* Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1993), pp. 39-50.

43 Richardson, 'The End of Geopolitics?', p. 42.

44 *Ibid., p. 46.*

45 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988.

hypothesised by Coral Bell.[46] Joseph Nye disagreed with Kennedy's extrapolation from earlier data and argued that the US possessed a range of strengths, both 'hard' (military) and 'soft' (cultural domination), to retain its leadership role.[47] Samuel Huntington concurred, rejecting the so-called 'declinist' theory that increasing US current-account deficits indicated the overall weakening of the US economy. He contended that, although not immortal, the US continues to renew its power and that this renewal of power is the 'central source of American strength'.[48]

Henry Kissinger's work *Diplomacy* broadly agreed with Huntington's conclusion. He carefully described the requirement for the US to steer a course between *Realpolitik* and Wilsonian idealism; to operate within a system of states, some of which will become its peers; and to recognise its limitations despite its status of the world's greatest nation.[49] This recommendation provided clues for other countries that also needed to find an appropriate balance between the realist and idealist approaches to the formulation of foreign and defence policy.

The apparent decline in major wars between states led to another debate. This debate concerned the reasons for the decline in the frequency of interstate warfare and whether it was a permanent condition. Some argued that the use of armed force between the advanced countries had become increasingly obsolete, partly because nuclear weapons (and increasingly even conventional weapons) had made the costs of war unbearable, and partly because of the thesis that 'democracies don't go to war with one another'. John Mueller argued that war was not a fundamental element of the human condition but rather '. . . an

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46 C. Bell, 'Future Hypothesis: A Concert of Great Powers', R. Leaver, and J. L. Richardson (eds), *The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses, pp. 110-20.*

47 J. Nye, *Born to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power,* Basic Books, New York, *1990;* J. Nye, 'Soft Power', M. Charlton and E. Riddell-Dixon (eds), *International Relations: Crosscurrents in the Post-Cold War Era,* Nelson Canada, Scarborough, Ontario, 1993, pp. 58-65.

48 S. Huntington, 'The US-Decline or Renewal', *Foreign* Affairs, vol. 67, no. 2, Winter 1988/98, pp. 76-96.

49 H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy,* Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, pp. 804-13; 832-5.

institution, like duelling or slavery, which has been grafted onto human existence'. War could therefore disappear from the behaviour of the advanced countries, and the widespread appreciation of the destructive effects of modern war made this increasingly likely.[50] Such forecasts do not include the extinction of war within and between the less-advanced countries. These countries may not behave as rational actors, or may simply have little to lose, and so war will continue, but probably never again on a global scale. Martin van Creveld has examined this phenomenon; he has observed the small wars of the post-Cold War world and has described them as being characterised by irregular forces fighting for sub-state causes, and using brutal and inhumane methods.[51] War had become limited in its scope and geographic location but no less ghastly; indeed it had frequently become less restrained when it sought to meet the ends of ethno-nationalistic and religious conflict. Martin van Creveld contends that '. . . the future of war is Chechnya'.[52]

The changes in war underwent empirical analysis. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg analysed patterns of armed conflict between 1989 and 1994 and found that ninetysix armed conflicts had occurred, of which only four were inter-state. They observed a shift from 'wars' to 'intermediate and minor conflicts', and an increasing number of conflicts involving control of territory and the break-up of states.[53] Following this thinking, US strategic planners became aware that the vast military resources of the US did not provide optimum responses to the wide range of security challenges that it now faced. These challenges included:

- *Information warfare:* interference with an adversary's information systems and the protection of one's own systems.

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50 J. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War,* Basic Books, New York, 1988, pp. 9-13. See also J. Mueller, 'The Obsolescence of Major War', M. Charlton and Riddell-Dixon, E. (eds), *International Relations: Crosscurrents in the Post-Cold War Era, pp.* 4-13; and M. Mandelbaum, 'Is Major War Obsolete?', *Survival,* vol. 40, no. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 20-38.

51 M. van Creveld, *The Transformation of War,* The Free Press, Sydney, 1991.

52 M. van Creveld, quoted from notes taken at 'The End of Strategy', lecture delivered at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 22 September 1998.

53 P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg, 'After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94', *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 32, no. 3, 1995, pp. 345-60.

- *Asymmetric threats:* the use of weapons and tactics by relatively weak adversaries to foil or circumvent the military superiority of the advanced Western countries.Asymmetric threats may include the use of information warfare, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and non-violent resistance.
- *The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,* including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The abrupt end of the Cold War also permitted a range of 'new security issues' to be raised in prominence. These were issues that had hitherto been largely neglected by statesmen and had instead been mainly the concern of academics and social activists. The consideration of nuclear-missile capabilities and the bipolar constructs of strategic studies were of decreasing importance. Their place on the strategic planning agenda was increasingly taken by issues such as the military activities of 'rogue states'; ethnonationalist-inspired terrorism; ethnic cleansing; large-scale movements of refugees; the degradation of the environment; and epidemics such as AIDS and the ebola virus.

This is not to claim that nuclear weapons and large conventional military capabilities are obsolete. They have both apparently retained their utility, if only as deterrents to the recidivism of rogue states. This utility was seen during the 1990-91 Gulf War: first, in the US threat of nuclear attack against Iraq if Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were employed against coalition forces; and, second, in the massed armoured offensive during the ground campaign. Despite thisdemonstrated utility, the circumstances of the 1990-91 Gulf War were unusual and unlikely to occur often.[54] Such circumstances relied largely on the disruptive behaviour of Iraq, rather than the emergence of a new international order.

Aside from the extraordinary circumstances of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the termination of the Cold War nuclear and conventional stand-off

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[54] The terrain of the Gulf War battlespace-consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq-was a virtual 'sandtable', ideal for the use of US doctrine and armed forces, and the level of Iraqi resistance was remarkably low. The formation of the coalition was also dependent on circumstances that were fortuitous for the US, placing traditional adversaries such as Israel and many Arab nations in the same camp.

changed the tasks required of the armed forces of the advanced countries. These forces became smaller and reoriented towards dealing with low to mid-level conflict rather than warfare between the superpowers. Between 1990 and 1998 the UK made significant reductions: spending down by 23 per cent; armed forces personnel numbers down by 32 per cent; conventional submarines reduced by 59 per cent; tanks reduced by 45 per cent; aircraft reduced by 30 per cent; destroyers and frigates reduced by 27 per cent; and infantry reduced by 27 per cent.[55] British expenditure on defence fell from 4.7 per cent of GDP to 2.7 per cent.[56] In the same period, the US defence budget had been cut by 38 per cent, the force structure by 33 per cent and defence procurement by 63 per cent. US defence spending,which once constituted 7 per cent of GDP, had fallen to 3.2 per cent, and this is planned to fall further to 2.7 per cent. [57]

Nuclear and conventional forces declined in size, while other types of military organisations, such as special forces, received greater attention. Special forces offered greater versatility for the application of direct force, and great utility in counter-terrorist, recovery, humanitarian and diplomatic missions. Similarly, weapons systems that offered lower casualty levels, such as uninhabited aerial vehicles and precision-targeted cruise missiles, gave the advanced countries the opportunity to wield force with lower levels of risk.

The field of international relations also underwent an intense period of soul-searching in the years that followed the Cold War.[58] Realism and neo-realism were failing to provide all of the answers, and strategic studies had lost its previous importance. At the same time, a plethora of new approaches to security had started to rise in prominence.

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55 Source: 'Future Military Capabilities', *The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays,* The Stationery Office, London, July *1998, p. 6-1.*

56 *The Military Balance,* International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brasseys, London, 1988-89, 1989-90, 1998-99, *1999-2000. Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbooks,* Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago, 1989-99.

57 W.S. Cohen, 'Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Special: The Secretary's Message', p. 8. G. Schmitt, 'The Case for Spending on Defense', *Washington Times, 7* January 1998, p. 15.

58 See for example J. L. Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', *International Security, vol. 17,* no. 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 5-58.

The end of the Cold War was thus a turning point in the development of international relations. The previous concerns for the maintenance of the bipolar balance of power and the management of nuclear weapons assumed less importance, and other broader security issues received more attention. Most importantly, the concept of security has developed in many ways that are outside the control of states.

Ken Booth describes the pressures to update the concept of security as coming from two sources:

> First, the problems with the traditionally narrow military focus of security have become increasingly apparent. It is only necessary here to mention the greater awareness of the pressures of the security dilemma, the growing appreciation of security independence, the widespread recognition that the arms race has produced higher levels of destructive power but not a commensurate growth of security, and the realisation of the heavy burden on economics of extravagant defence spending. The second set of pressures come from the strengthening claim of other issue areas for inclusion on the security agenda. The daily threat to the lives and well-being of most people and most nations is different from that suggested by the traditional military perspective.[59]

While the theoretical landscape of international relations has been changing, the practical nature of international relations is subject to forces that do not fit neatly in previous theories. The state is under challenge from supranational and sub-national forces. Janusz Simonides and Vladimir Volodin have identified four 'mega-trends' that are acting on the contemporary world: democratisation, nationalism, regionalisation and globalisation.[60] Democratisation is the transition from totalitarian and authoritarian regimes to democratic 'civil society'; this process is occurring throughout the world with increasing expressions of popular will and greater governmental transparency. These forces may actually assist the state to survive, but other associated forces make the outlook for states less sanguine. Nationalism, and particularly ethno-nationalism,

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[59] K. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies, vol.* 17, 1991, p. 318.

[60] J. Symonides and V. Volodin, 'Concept and New Dimensions of Security: Introductory Remarks', *Non-Military Aspects of Military Security: Peace and Conflict Issues,* UNESCO Publishing, Paris, 1995, pp. 12-14.

has emerged as a potentially destabilising influence on states that contain non-homogenous populations. Regionalisation involves states cooperating to achieve sharedbenefits that range from military security to economic free trade blocs, and it forms a subtext to the larger phenomenon of globalisation. Of the four mega-trends, globalisation is the most influential and the other trends are often its direct or indirect by-products.

Globalisation-which includes international interdependence, global markets, global communications and global institutions-became the subject of great interest during the 1980s.[61] Jan Aart Scholte notes that this phenomenon involved the emergence and spread of a supra-territorial dimension of social relations.[62] The corrosive effect of globalisation on the state has reduced the privileged position of state territorial sovereignty. A possible outcome of globalisation is the weakening of the state as an institution of international relations, and even perhaps the end of the sovereign state altogether.

David Armstrong has analysed the challenges globalisation presents to the state and finds that they fall into six broad categories.

- Many issues, '. . . notably the environment, health, crime, drugs and migration can no longer be contained within national boundaries'.[63] This phenomenon erodes the state's claim to exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and its ability to deal with the problems unilaterally.

- Non-state actors operating on a global scale-for example transnational corporations, financial

61 For a comprehensive examination of globalisation see D. Held, A.McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture,* Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999.

62 J. A. Sholte, 'Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization', in E. Kofman and G. Youngs (eds), *Globalization: Theory and Practice,* Pinter, London, 1996, p. 46.

63 D. Armstrong, 'Globalisation and the Social State', *Review of International Studies,* vol. 24, no. 4, 1998, pp. 462-3.

- Non-state actors operating on a global scale-for example transnational corporations, financial organisations and media empires- are making decisions that affect the world's affairs. The state is losing control

- of aspects of the grand strategic level of its operations, while its citizens are opting to live and work within structures that are 'semi-detached' from states.[64]

- Global markets now control the value of national currencies, and states are often unable to resist the need for the deregulation of national economies. The ability of states to assert 'economic sovereignty' has been further eroded by this process.[65]

- States, including authoritarian regimes, are finding it almost impossible to control communications and the information that is accessible by their citizens.

- National cultures are under threat from 'an all-devouring global culture that is variously labelled as one of modernity, capitalism or westernisation'.[66] States are losing their role as guardians of national cultures and simultaneously, within states, sub-national groupings are asserting their own sub-national cultures.

The state's claim to sovereignty over virtually all human activities within its territory is weakened by extra-state forces and power. Globalisation 'is one of a number of factors that have made old-fashioned wars of conquest pointless' [67]—pointless because states have lost much of their ability to wage war unilaterally, and the new world order' does not permit the forcible annexation of territory.

Despite these challenges, Armstrong's analysis of the nature of globalisation finds that states remain robust:

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64 *Ibid*., p.463.
65 *Ibid*., p.463-4.
66 *Ibid*., p. 464.
67 *Ibid*., p. 465.

> . . . the state should be seen in its international context as a social as well as a self-seeking entity, with its membership of international society helping to confirm and preserve its identity as a state, while also shaping and changing it.[68]

The 'social state', argues Armstrong, retains legal authority under international law, including the ability to balance the management of powers with multinational organisations such as the UN and the European Union.

The effects of globalisation have led to the theoretical meaning of security taking other diverse directions that may contribute to the decline of the state.[69] This process may lead to the replacement of the state by less formal international actors such as 'civilisations'; its undermining by sub-state actors; or its being superseded by a universalising world order. Huntington has predicted that security will retain states as the primary referent, but '. . . the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations'.[70] Huntington's thesis is that conflict and threats to security occur because friction is generated at the meeting points between cultural groupings, which he refers to as 'civilisations'. 'Fault lines' of various degrees of potential for conflict exist between them.[71] The thesis deals primarily with the causes of conflict, but Huntington describes the resultant 'fault line wars' as 'violent and ugly'.[72] Globalisation, which has eroded the influence of states and increased the connectivities of the peoples within them, has unleashed the nationalist aspirations of the peoples who live on the fault lines in places such as the former Yugoslavia.

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68 *Ibid*., p. 462.

69 For a historical examination of the retreat of the state see M. van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

70 S. P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs, vol. 72,* no. 3, Summer, 1993, p. *22.*

71 According to Huntington, the world's cultural groupings are Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese. S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, pp. 26-7, pp. 45-8.

72 *Ibid*., pp. 252-4.

Another contemporary examination of the role of states in armed conflict reaches similar conclusions. Martin van Creveld argues that contemporary warfare is no longer waged between rational national states using armed forces operating according to the Clausewitzian model. Instead, it is perpetrated by sub-national groupings fighting for ethnic and religious causes.[73] Martin van Creveld is critical of the defence policies of the advanced countries; he describes these policies as a search for security through increasingly higher technology weapons systems. He contends that security depends on power wielded at the lowest levels of conflict, with hand guns and bombs. He argues that:

> . . . the state's attempt to monopolise violence in its own hands is faltering. Brought face to face with the threat of terrorism, the largest and mightiest empires that the world has ever known have suddenly begun falling into each other's arms. Should present trends continue, then the kind of war that is based on the division between government, army, and people seems to be on the way out. The rise of low intensity conflict may, unless it can be quickly contained, end up destroying the state.[74]

This concept of state security and war is different from Huntington's, in that it is particularly concerned with sub-state forces, but these forces may indeed operate as part of a larger struggle between civilisations. Martin van Creveld's approach places great emphasis on power, although applied at lower levels than is usually considered in the field of strategic studies; however, van Creveld points out that the power-based realist states system is failing, and pessimistically contradicts idealistic hopes for a better world.[75]

Another very different and more optimistic thesis sees the effect of globalisation as the universalising of Western liberal values. Fukuyama describes the triumph of the West in his article 'The End of History?'[76]

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73 M. van Creveld, *The Transformation of War,* The Free Press, Sydney, 1991.

74 *Ibid*., p. 192.

75 M. van Creveld, 'The Fate of the State', *Parameters,* Spring, 1996, pp. 4-18.

76 F. Fukuyama, *Have We Reached the End of History?,* RAND, Santa Monica, CA, February 1989; F. Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The*

He points to the ending of the Cold War period of ideological competition, which he calls 'history', and the development of a new period characterised by globalised cooperative systems and ideas. Fukuyama is not a naive prophet of a peaceful new world order, as some critics have argued (particularly those that disliked the 'triumphalist' tone of his writings).[77] He is, instead, a forecaster of the dominance of Western thought and ideas, although he notes that completely unbridled capitalist competition could spell its demise.[78] The range of this dominance includes the spread of democracy and the widespread reconceptualisation[79] of security, which is increasingly influencing the development of international relations.

Fred Halliday's work on the pressures for change is particularly pertinent to this paper. He has identified old and new agendas in the discipline of international relations. [80] He argues that the old agenda was concerned with military power and was reflected in the military stand-off between the US and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. The new agenda, visible since the end of the Cold War, includes the degradation of the environment; weapons proliferation; international migration; international cooperation and human rights; illicit drugs; HIV/AIDS; and international terrorism. Halliday notes that the new agenda, although more appropriate for the contemporary era than its predecessor, retains much of the old-particularly nationalist conflict; war; inequality in the distribution of wealth; and the privileged role played by states.[81]

National Interest, no. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18; F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* Penguin Books, London, 1992.

77 For a stark contrast to Fukuyama's optimistic forecast see the pessimistic prognosis of Robert Kaplan: R. D. Kaplan, 'Was Democracy Just a Moment?', *The Atlantic Monthly,* December 1997, pp. 55-80.

78 Fukuyama followed his *End of History* with a consideration of the need for community within and between competitive capitalist societies in his book *Trust: The Social Values and the Creation of Prosperity,* Hamish Hamilton, London, 1995.

79 The term 'reconceptualisation' refers to the process of thinking about the meaning of security using perspectives and analytical frameworks that differ from traditional ones. The process generally results in the concept of security being broadened and deepened.

80 F. Halliday, 'International Relations: Is There A New Agenda?', pp. 57-72.

81 *Ibid*., pp. 58-62.

The New Security Agenda

This section describes the broadened security agenda that has resulted from changing theoretical approaches to understanding security and the changing international security environment.
Many scholars engaged in the study of security contend that traditional approaches to its understanding are no longer sufficient. Barry Buzan is critical of the narrow definition of power of the realist school and proposes that the development of the concept of security in its own right would bridge the gap between the realist and idealist schools. This would then provide a more comprehensive perspective of the security problem and '. . . habilitate the concept of security'. [82]

Buzan argues that security is an 'underdeveloped concept' for five reasons. First, there is the complexity and difficulty of the analysis required. Second, there is the overlap between the concept of security and that of power during acute confrontation. Third, idealists have rejected the concept of collective security because they felt that security had been too closely associated with the power model, and that collective security had been discredited in the 1930s. Fourth, there is the preoccupation of strategic studies with empirical data and national policy, rather than more conceptual approaches. Finally, the 'symbolic ambiguity' of the concept is useful to the practitioners of national policy.[83]

Buzan's analysis eschews the normal structure of strategicstudies analysis and, instead, poses two questions: 'What is the referent object for security? What are the necessary conditions for security?'.[84] On the first question, Buzan recommends that security policies should work on four levels: individual (which includes communities within the state), state, region and international system. He argues that:

> [his analysis] requires that simplistic notions of security as deriving either from the power of the state, or from the creation of trust and order in the system, be replaced by more complex associations of how

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[82] Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 3.

[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-11.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

> state behaviour and system structure interact. It also requires policies that are as sensitive to the vulnerabilities of other actors, and their legitimate assessments of threat (including threats from the policy maker's own state), as they are to the vulnerabilities of, and threats to, the state generating them.[85]

On the second question-the conditions that are necessary for security-Buzan analyses the types of threats to security, which he describes as falling into five broad sectors: military, political, societal, economic and ecological.[86] He argues for a multi-layered approach to security and for 'mature anarchy', preferring to retain the realist paradigm, although with a greatly broadened appreciation of the nature of security.[87] While aware of the constraint imposed by the use of the state as the primary referent, Buzan has decided to retain it, and he describes his philosophy as realist.[88]

Buzan's work has achieved wide attention, but it is far from gaining complete acceptance. The fundamentally realist underpinnings of the Buzan analysis reduce its acceptability to less-realist thinkers. Joseph Camilleri is critical of Buzan's sectoral approach, which he has described as 'traditional security studies with a twist'.[89] On the other hand, Buzan's broadening of the concept of security has attracted criticism on the grounds that security is no longer an 'underdeveloped concept', but instead has become overdeveloped in its scope and is running the risk of losing its meaning.

Buzan has since developed his work on the sectoral analysis of security examining the arguments of those that would broaden the concept of security, the 'wideners', and those that wish to retain the state-centred

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85 *Ibid*., p. 377.

86 *Ibid*., pp. 116-34.

87 *Ibid*., pp. 176-7; 264

88 B. Buzan, 'The Timeless Wisdom of Realism', in S. Smith, K. Booth and M. Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 63

89 Notes taken at seminar by Joseph Camilleri, 'The Security Dilemma in an Age of Globalisation', Department of International Relations 50th Anniversary Lectures, Australian National University, Canberra, 3 June 1999.

conceptualisation, the 'traditionalists'.[90] The traditionalist approach prefers the concept of security to concern 'existential threats' to national survival but modern governments, and their armed forces, are actually confronting a much broader range of threats:

> For many of the advanced democracies, defence of the state is becoming only one, and perhaps not even the main de facto, function of the armed forces. Their militaries may be increasingly trained and called upon to support routine world order activities, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention, that cannot be viewed as concerning existential threats to their states or even as emergency action in the sense of suspending normal rules.[91]

Buzan is not alone in seeking to reconceptualise security. Another analytical approach has been taken by Booth, who argues that the concept of security inherent in strategic studies is too narrow, inbred, state-bound, overly technical, ethnocentric and culturally relativist. [92] Booth also applies this criticism to Buzan's security agenda for three reasons. First, he believes that states are '. . . unreliable as primary referents because whereas some are in the business of security (internal and external) some are not'. The second reason is that states are the means of security rather than the end. Third, states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.[93]

In contrast to Buzan, Booth places primary emphasis on the individual and argues that security is not simply a political or military issue. He proposes a revised approach to security based on 'emancipation', in which individuals are freed from '. . . those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose

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[90] B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1998.

[91] *Ibid*., pp. 21-2.

[92] K. Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism,* Croom Helm, London, *1979, pp. 13-18; 132-3.* For contemporary approaches to strategic studies, their resilience as a useful field of study and their partial evolution into security studies see C. A. Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy,* Macmillan, London, 1999.

[93] Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism, p. 320.*

to do'. This process would make individuals the ultimate security referent because security and emancipation would become virtually synonymous.[94] Security, argues Booth, is increasingly becoming conceived as a 'holistic' phenomenon and that doctrinal realism is a 'shop-worn ideology': 'Realism did its job during the Cold War, but it is now anachronistic in the general thrust of its ideas if not in its particulars'.[95]

Martin Shaw is also critical of Buzan's work. He recommends a more radical approach derived from sociology, in which the security agenda would be deepened as well as broadened. Shaw argues for the inclusion of 'society' as a referent of security. This inclusion would redress the overemphasis on the state and, if the individual is made a separate referent, on the individual as well. Individuals make up 'social groups' and Shaw argues that these groups are the most appropriate level at which to understand the concept and effect of security.[96]

This sociological approach to security is also taken by Anthony Giddens, who discusses security using sociological concepts such as 'modernity'.[97] Modernity has reduced the level of risk experienced by the individual, with developments in technology and medicine, but has also exposed the individual to the threat of nuclear war and catastrophic environmental disasters.[98] Giddens argues that modernism has led to 'life politics', in which every individual is constantly calculating levels

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94 *Ibid*, pp. 319-21. For a critical analysis of the use of the individual as the referent for security see M. Alagappa, 'Rethinking Security: A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate', M. Alagappa (ed.), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1998, pp. 30-2.

95 K. Booth, 'War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for a Stable Peace', in K. Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security,* Harper Collins, London, 1991, pp. 341-4.

96 M, Shaw, 'There is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies', *Review of International Studies* (1993), vol. 19, no. 2, p. 168.

97 A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity,* Polity Press, Stanford, California, 1990; A. Giddens, *Modernity and SelfIdentity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1991.

98 Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, pp. 114-26.

of risk, and these calculations influence human affairs at the individual, societal and global levels.[99]

From this review of thinking about security, it can be seen that international social and political forces are homogenising the philosophical traditions of international-relations theory. This homogeneity is exposing the similarities between theories and reducing the dissimilarities between them, although this process is far from complete. An outcome that is reducing the problems posed by the inherent weaknesses of realism and idealism is the convergence of the two traditions. Convergent thinking draws on the strengths of both traditions by applying moral and ethical decision-making, which is not state-centric, to international policy-making and discourse.

Realist thinkers such as Buzan and John Herz have recognised the dangers of following the cynical and selfish precepts of classical realism without due regard for issues of global survival.[100] The inclusion of idealist concepts of security in realism renders it more acceptable to the policy requirements of the late 20th century and also serves to leaven the more utopian ideas of idealism with the science of the possible. Idealist thinkers are also part of the process of convergence. Booth, a 'lapsed realist' who has been for many years a prominent idealist, argues for 'utopian realism'. This would '. . . reconcile power, order and justice'.[101] In 1991, Booth described the realist work of Buzan as, 'the most comprehensive theoretical analysis of the concept [of security] to date'.[102] The two schools have achieved a recognition of each other's strengths-which is far from the acerbic language of the great debate.

The convergence of elements of realism and idealism are apparent in many of the range of contemporary concepts of security. A brief review of the contemporary security agenda follows.

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99 *Ibid*., pp. 214-31.

100 J. Herz, 'Political Realism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly,* vol. 25, no. 2, June 1981, pp. 182-97.

101 K. Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist', in K. Krause and M. Williams (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases,* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997, p. 112. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', p. 325.

102 Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', p. 317.

Traditional National Security

In its traditional form, national security refers to the ability of a sovereign state to defend itself from armed attack. Realism asserts that the fundamental duty of a state is to protect itself and its citizens from the catastrophic effects of military invasion. All contemporary states assert a fundamental right to effect this principle. Despite its universal acceptance among states, this concept is increasingly being found wanting. While armed attack has been outlawed by the UN Charter and has become a rare course for contemporary states, other options including 'economic warfare', 'information warfare' and terrorism remain viable.
The refocusing of national security, which owes much to the broadened security agenda, is examined later in this paper.

Collective Security

In its pure form, collective security refers to the action of all states to renounce the use of violence among themselves and guarantee the survival of any state against aggression. This philosophy underlies the Charter of the UN.[103] The charter stresses that the UN consists of sovereign states and that membership of the UN does not impair the inherent rights of individual or collective self-defence. The underlying philosophy of the charter is realist, although it is tempered by the controlling structural and legislative forces of international organisation and international law. Self-help by the use of aggression is forbidden by the charter. Defensive self-help remains legal, and necessary, because the member countries of the UN may choose not to abide by collective security requirements of the UN Charter.

Collective security is an imperfect method of regulating international conflict because states fail to honour commitments to collective security. This failure has several causes. First, the chauvinistic motivations of *Realpolitik* and the realist notion of self-help require countries to look to their own interests above those of any others. Second, collective security reinforces the status quo irrespective of its merits; it may also worsen military instability by turning minor disputes into major ones.

[103] B. Simma (ed.), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. xix-xxxviii.

Third, there is often disagreement between third parties about which side in a war is the aggressor. Is the aggressor the nation that acts first or the nation that provoked the action? Aggressors have generally been portrayed as morally repugnant states such as Nazi Germany or North Korea; but what should the international community make of the British invasion of Egypt in 1956 or the US invasion of Panama in 1989? Fourth, collective security by definition undermines preparations to balance the power of troublesome states. Minor acts of aggression may be overlooked because the world community is not in complete agreement, but a regional alliance is more likely to have shared interests and be more likely to act. Fifth, the responsibility to counter every aggressor can weaken a threatened coalition of allies seeking security in the ambiguous period of hostilities during the start of a war. Sixth, participation in collective security implies centralisation of control and the loss of national independence.

Regional Security

Collective security on a smaller geographic scale constitutes regional security. Groupings of countries in a region possessing shared national security interests work in concert to achieve a higher perceived level of freedom from military threats than they could as independent actors. The classic example of regional security is NATO, which provides collective defence to North American and European countries. Future manifestations are possible within the European Union and ASEAN.

Common Security

The Palme Commission's report on disarmament, entitled *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival,* proposed the concept of common security in 1982. The commission reported with dissatisfaction on nuclear deterrence and the escalating arms spiral, and proposed a non-adversarial reconceptualisation of security. [104] Common security is not a pacifist doctrine, in that it does not require the renunciation of

[104] *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival: The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues,* under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1982, pp. 138-9. For a detailed description of common security see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Policies for Common Security,* Taylor & Francis, London, 1985.

military power and war, but it does conceptualise military power as only one element of security. The commission noted that:

> As a result, reciprocity, defensiveness, transparency, crisis stability, arms restraint and confidence building are emphasised, while at the same time offensive capabilities, surprise attack potential and escalation and retaliation strategies are eliminated as far as possible.[105]

During the late 1980s Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev provided impetus to the common security movement with the use of the term 'new thinking' in Soviet security policy.[106] Since the Cold War, common security has risen in prominence and acceptability within official policy circles.

Non-offensive Defence

If implemented, non-offensive defence might facilitate common security, but it remains a problematic concept for national decision-makers and even strategic theorists because it requires military capabilities to be realigned and made transparent. Such measures do not come easily to those accustomed to realism. Traditionally, armed forces have two related capabilities: offensive operations aimed at harming other states and defensive operations aimed at reducing the harm caused-by other states. Non-offensive defence places stress on the latter capability, with the goal of reducing tensions and the threat posed by one state to another. Thus the security of all states should improve, if that security is judged in terms of the absence of the preparations for waging aggressive war.[107]

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105 K. Booth, 'War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace', in K. Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security,* Harper Collins, London, 1991, p. 344.

106 M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for a New Era,* Collins, London, 1987. For an analysis of Gorbachev's role see P. Dibb, 'Is Soviet Military Strategy Changing?', *The Changing Strategic Landscape: Part 1,* Adelphi Paper *235,* Spring 1989, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1989, pp. 40-1.

107 For an introduction to non-offensive defence see B. Moller, G. Daniker, S.Limone, and I. Stivachtis, *Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East,* United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Brief, no.3/1998, Geneva, 1998; and M. ter Borg and W. A. Smit, 'Conventional Stability and Non-Provocative Defence', in M. ter Borg and W. A. Smit (eds),

Comprehensive Security

During the early 1980s the term 'comprehensive security' was adopted by Japanese thinkers to describe a broadened approach to national security. In 1987, the Brundtland Commission presented its report to the UN General Assembly entitled *Our Common Future.*[108] The report considered the degradation of the global environment; its causes; and its implications for the security of individuals, countries and the planet. The report also considered the role of the international economy, population growth, sustainable energy, industrial development, peace and disarmament: this approach was termed comprehensive security. Jim Rolfe describes comprehensive security as recognising:

- the multi-dimensional nature of threats to both national and regional security;
- the importance of a multi-dimensional response to those threats (with particular emphasis on non- military approaches); and
- the need for a wide range of informal processes to achieve security objectives.[109]

These informal processes include second-track approaches to international cooperation on broadened security issues such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Formed in 1992, CSCAP promotes regional confidence-building through dialogue, consultation and cooperation.[110] The success of such second-track mechanisms has led to their use within other types of security.

Non-Provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Reduction and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies, Free University Press, Amsterdam, 1989.

[108] Our Common Future: World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford University Press, London, 1987.

[109] J. Rolfe, 'Preface', in J. Rolfe (ed.), *Unresolved Futures: Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific,* Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, New Zealand, 1995, p. vii.

[110] CSCAP activities occur primarily in its five working groups:
- Maritime Cooperation,
- Transnational Crime,
- Confidence and Security-building Measures,
- Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, and
- North Pacific.

Cooperative Security

Since the early 1970s cooperative security has emerged in several forms. The concept of cooperation to improve security in Europe informed the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1973. The conference considered arms control, confidence-building measures, economic cooperation and human rights with some success, although it operated in the shadow of the Cold War for most of its existence. In 1995 the CSCE became the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which continues the work of the CSCE but places greater emphasis on the human dimension of cooperation.[111] In 1990, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark launched the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue initiative at the UN General Assembly. The fundamental philosophy of the initiative was termed cooperative security, which was intended to replace adversarial Cold War balance of power relationships with multilateral consultative frameworks. [112] Cooperative security has developed along regional lines, with a focus on security among the countries of the region, but its aims are frequently global in scope.

An Agenda for Peace, written by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, outlined a program to strengthen preventive diplomacy, peace making, peacekeeping and postconflict peace-building.[113] He envisaged the strengthening of the UN to expand its

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For the structure of the 1993 Charter and the revised 1995 Charter see http://www.cscap.org.

[111] For the origins and development of the CSCE see C. J. Nolan, *The Evolution of Cooperative Security: Canada and the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1973-1994,* Working Paper No.10, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, April 1995; and M. R. Lucas (ed.), *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation,* Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany, 1993.

[112] D. B. Dewitt, *Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in Asia-Pacific,* Canadian Consortium on Asia-Pacific Security, Paper No.3, March 1994, pp. 12-13.

[113] B. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,* report of the Secretary-General

capabilities and realise the potentialities of the charter. The state retained its role as the primary referent but the intrusion of other influences was recognised:

> The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are [sic] crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.[114]

The following year, Gareth Evans, then the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, followed a similar agenda in *Cooperating for Peace.* [115] He sought to combine the concepts of collective and common security within a legalistic and bureaucratic framework.

> Cooperative security . . . embraces the ideas both of common security (that countries' best protective option is to seek to achieve security with others, not against them) and collective security . . . More than that, cooperative security describes an approach which, among other things, is multi-dimensional, gradualist, about reassurance rather than deterrence, and which stresses the value of creating habits of dialogue between potential antagonists.[116]

Evans recognised the importance of 'linguistic labels' and for this reason preferred the term 'cooperative', rather than 'common' or 'comprehensive', for his reconceptualisation of security. He argued that it '. . . encourages an open and constructive mindset, one less likely to be inhibited by traditional state-centred security thinking'.[117] Cooperative security is primarily concerned with the institutionalisation of dialogue between states, with the aim of enhancing security as a comprehensive concept.

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pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, United Nations, New York, 1992.

114 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

115 G. Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993.

116 *Ibid.* , p. 183

117 G. Evans, 'Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict'. *Foreign Affairs,* no. 96, Fall 1996, p. 7.

The concepts of security within common security, comprehensive security and cooperative security are very similar. The differences lie in the degree upon which the concept relates directly to the use of military power. Common security is the most concerned with this issue and, despite its recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of security, it views security primarily in military terms. Comprehensive security is similar in its requirement for transparency, but it places greater stress on the multi-dimensional nature of security. Cooperative security, which is more pragmatic and gradual in its approach, and does not rule out collective security and the balance of power, is the most acceptable concept to those involved in the formulation of traditional national-security policy. Viewed from another perspective, common security is primarily concerned with the means of providing security rather than the ends, which receive greater attention in comprehensive and cooperative security. The lessambitious goals of common security have led to its application to regional security issues, while comprehensive and cooperative security are more global in their scope.

Environmental Security

Both conflict caused by environmental issues and threats to the wellbeing of the global environment constitute environmental security, which is becoming increasingly recognised as a fundamental element of the concept of security. Lorraine Elliott has described the two camps that make up the current concept of environmental security. The first, which she calls the 'environment-and-security analysis', notes the threats posed to the nation state by environmental degradation. This includes conflict caused by resource scarcity and the resource degradation caused by the direct effect of warfare. The second, which she calls the 'securing-the-environment literature', has as its goal the maintenance of the planetary ecosystem for the good of the world and all humanity.[118] Within the first camp, Thomas Homer-Dixon has examined six types of environmental change that are potential sources of violent conflict:

- depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies,

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[118] L. Elliott, 'Environmental Conflict: Reviewing the Arguments', *Journal of Environment and Development, vol.* 5, no. 2, June 1996, pp. 149-50. Examples of both strands of thought are provided in G. Prins (ed.), *Threats Without Enemies: Facing Environmental Insecurity,* Earthscan Publications Ltd, London, 1993.

- depletion of fisheries,
- degradation and loss of good agricultural land,
- degradation and removal of forests,
- greenhouse-induced climate change, and
- stratospheric ozone depletion.[119]

The second camp has much in common with the concepts of societal security and human security, which are described below. The global biosphere is a 'commons', which should be shared by all for the good of all and future generations. Jessica Mathews has presented a compelling summary of environmental security problems such as population growth ('it took 130 years for world population to grow from one billion to two billion; it will take just a decade to climb from today's five billion to six billion'); depletion of non-renewable resources; deforestation; loss of genetic diversity; inefficient patterns of land ownership; and depletion of the ozone layer leading to greenhouse global warming.[120]

The evidence is compelling, but environmental security is a contested conceptualisation, both in the level of agreement about the threats and the policy responses that are necessary to meet them. Debate continues as to the importance, and even the scientific validity, of concepts such as 'global warming'.[121] At the theoretical level, Daniel Deudney argues against linking environmental degradation and national security, pointing out that the focus of national security is interstate violence, which has little to do with environmental problems.[122]

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119 Derived from T. Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict', *International Security,* vol. 19, no. 1, Summer 1994, p. 6.

120 J. T. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 68, no. 2, 1989, pp. 162-77.

121 P. Michaels, 'Chimera of global warming', *Washington Times,* 13 April 1999, p. 28.

122 D. Deudney, 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security', *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* vol. 19, no. 3, 1990, pp. 461-76.

Societal Security

Buzan describes societal security in terms of identity: '.... . . societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom'.[123]

The development of nation states tended to reflect ethnic, religious and linguistic groupings, although in many cases this was influenced by the dictates of geography and the need for natural resources. Ethnonationalism and the pressure to redraw national borders have demonstrated the tensions that exist in countries that are not homogenous. Many of the conflicts of modern times had their origins in tensions between ethnic, religious and linguistic groupings. [124] At its most dramatic, this phenomenon can be observed in the 'ethnic cleansing' of Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians by Serbia, and the ferocious civil wars between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.

Less dramatic examples of societal insecurity can be seen even in relatively peaceful states when discriminatory policies are applied to ethnic minorities. While the state-centric tradition viewed the state as the primary agent in the provision of security, in many cases the greatest threat to the security of individual citizens is the apparatus of their own state. This is particularly true in developing countries and those subject to

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123 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 19.

124 For a range of viewpoints on the implications of ethnonationalism see M. E. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993.

authoritarian regimes, but the acceptance of poverty even within the developed democracies indicates that the structural effects on levels of security are almost universal.

The spread of democracy and the concomitant improvement in standards of human rights is one positive development in this area. The concept of 'civil society', which has risen to prominence since its use in the 1970s by the Solidarity opposition to the Polish one-party state and is now an important perspective on the appropriate development of the state, is part of the contemporary discourse. Civil society had its theoretical origins in Rousseau's work on the social contract, and it empowers all citizens with moral and political influence and restrains the illegitimate use of authority.[125] Thus, the development of civil society within authoritarian states is a positive result of the democratising effect of globalisation. It can directly improve the wellbeing of citizens and, according to the societal security approach, it can enhance their security.

Economic Security

Economic capabilities have always been recognised as an element of national power, but economic security is generally a neglected concept in strategic studies.[126] Two notable exceptions were the Marxist-Leninist analysis of conflict and the north-south resource issue. In 1975,

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[125] See J. Keane (ed.), Civil *Society and the State: New European Perspectives,* Verso, London, 1988; J. L. Cohen, Civil *Society and Political Theory,* The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992; A. B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society,* The Free Press, New York, 1992; J. A. Camilleri and J. Falk, *The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World,* Edward Elgar, Aldershot, UK, 1992; K. Tester, Civil Society, Routledge, London, 1992; and J.A. Hall (ed.), Civil *Society: Theory, History, Comparison,* Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1995. Forthe influence of civil society on authoritarian states see A. R. Norton (ed.), Civil *Society in the Middle East, E.* J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1994; J. Schwedler (ed.), *Toward Civil Society in the Middle East? A Primer,* Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1995; and I. H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity,* Macmillan, London, 1997.

[126] For an explanation of the importance of national economic prosperity to national military power, and the international interdependence of these national phenomena, see E. B Kapstein, *The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective,* McGraw-Hill, New York, 1992.

Lawrence Krause and Joseph Nye defined security and its relationship with the economy in the following manner:

> If we define *security* as the absence of acute threats to the minimal acceptable of the basic values that a people consider essential to its survival, then the economic dimension is important both as a potential instrument of threat to basic values and as one of the basic values itself.[127]

Richard Higgott argued that the 'search for national economic well-being' should be added to the traditional definition of national security, which involves the protection of territorial sovereignty. He stated that this improvement could be achieved without discarding the realist philosophy of international relations.[128] A significant difference between the traditional definition and an economically broadened definition is that economic security is less 'zero-sum' in its operation than security that is conceptualised in terms of pure military power. International economic systems can theoretically operate to the benefit of all countries, although imbalances in benefits are almost inevitable.

The effects of globalisation have rendered the state an imperfect referent for economic security. Politicians, statesmen and generals are increasingly answerable to economists, bankers and corporate moguls, who frequently operate in multinational or transnational corporations. Beverly Crawford describes the effect of this phenomenon as the 'economic security dilemma'. In this dilemma the prevalence of military threats is reduced by the decreasing importance of states, but military vulnerability increases because the global commercial market controls military technology.[129] This dilemma causes the state to lose an aspect of its previously privileged position, although some theorists see the most

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127 L. B. Krause and J. S. Nye, 'Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International Economic Organisations', F. C. Bergsten and L. B. Krause (eds), *World Politics and International Economics,* The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 330.

128 R. A. Higgott, *The Evolving World Economy: Some Alternative Security Questions for Australia,* Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1989, p. 16.

129 B. Crawford, 'Hawks, Doves but no Owls', R. D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 150-6.

advanced countries as the principal competitors in a new form of state-manipulated warfare. Edward Luttwak has described geo-economics as '. . . becoming the dominant phenomenon in the central arena of world affairs'.[130]

Globalisation and interdependence have increased and internationalised the harm caused by economic problems in any one state. The effects of the 1998 Asian financial crisis were felt across the continent, as the crisis caused great harm to many Asian economies and riots in several cities. International measures to improve the equitable and predictable operation of worldwide economic forces are positive steps to redress such economic security problems.

Non-gendered Security

Theorists using feminist perspectives have investigated security, providing further challenges to traditional thinking. J. Anne Tickner contends that:

> . . . international politics is a man's world. It is a world inhabited by diplomats, soldiers and international civil servants most of whom are men. Apart from the occasional head of state, there is little evidence to suggest that women have played much of a role in shaping foreign policy in any country in the twentieth century.[131]

Tickner's work describes the 'masculinist underpinnings' of the field of international relations and seeks to draw attention to gender hierarchies that '. . . privilege men's knowledge'. Tickner asserts that '. . . it is doubtful whether we can achieve a more peaceful and just world . . . while these gender hierarchies remain in place'.[132] In this school of thought, realism is described as a justification of violence by men, patriarchy and militarism. For this reason, Tickner calls for the inclusion

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130 E. N. Luttwak, 'The Coming Global War for Economic Power', *The International Economy,* September/October 1993, p. 20.

131 J. A. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, p. 1. Powerful female leaders such as Indira Ghandi, Golda Meir and Margaret Thatcher are seen as exceptions rather than the rule.

132 *Ibid*., pp. xi-xii.

of feminist perspectives to inform international relations and security studies properly, and to create ‘nongendered’ security.[133]

Tickner argues that the use of the state as the primary referent has reduced perceptions of the importance of women both as individual human beings and their potentially lower utility as warriors:

> Genuine security for all individuals requires a less militarised model of citizenship that valorises different types of activities and allows women and men to participate equally in building the type of state institutions that are responsive to the security needs of their own people as well as to those on the outside.[134]

The feminist agenda often claims that increasing the proportion of women in government will reduce international conflict because of their propensity for building human relationships. Fukuyama accepts this view, and even van Creveld has considered it as a means of making armed conflict irrelevant. Yet both point to the need for aggressive violent actions, which will generally be best performed by men, if governments seek recourse to armed conflict. [135] Even peacefully oriented states may need to employ force when faced with international aggression.

The feminist perspective further broadens the concept of security, which had previously concentrated more on the masculine ‘high politics’ of grand strategy, diplomacy and military power.

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133 See R. Grant and K. Newland (eds), *Gender and International Relations,* Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1991; V. S. Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)visions of International Relations Theory,* Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1992; and J. Steams, *Gender and International Relations: An Introduction,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.

134 J. A. Tickner, ‘Re-visioning Security’, in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today,* Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 1995, p. 194.

135 F. Fukuyama, Women and the Evolution of World Politics’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 5, September/October 1998, pp. 24-40. M. van Creveld, *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Interpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz,* The Free Press, New York, 1991, p. 222.

Global Security

The report of the Commission on Global Governance proposed a broadened concept of security.[136] This proposal was a response to the effects of globalisation; military, economic and social trends; and the need for the application of ethics and 'neighbourhood values'. The concept, referred to as global security, sought to expand security beyond the needs of the state: 'Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the planet'.[137] The report then proposed six principles of security, which it intended for use as norms for the formulation of security policies. The fundamental principle was: 'All people, no less than all states, have a right to secure existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those rights'.[138]

The principles retain the state as the primary referent but emphasise other referents such as 'all people' and 'the integrity of the planet's life support systems' with the overall goal of reducing the use of military force.[139] Global security is cooperative security by a new label, but it received strong support from former German Chancellor Willie Brandt and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Such support demonstrated that the broadening of the meaning of security was gaining acceptance at the national-leadership level.

Human Security

Gareth Evans used the term 'human security' to describe his recommended approach for the UN response to major internal human tragedies. The approach emphasised human rights and the consideration of the individual. Evans argued that the UN Charter could be interpreted to '. . . refer as much to threats to citizens as to threats to borders'.[140] Ramesh Thakur continues the argument for a shift from realist concerns

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[136] *Our Global Neighbourhood,* Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.

[137] *Ibid*., p. 78.

[138] *Ibid*., pp. 84-5

[139] *Ibid*.

[140] G. Evans, 'Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict', pp. 9-10.

with 'national security' to ideas of 'human security' derived from peace research. He observes:

> . . . human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of lifedemographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on-is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life-economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, and so on-is an enhancement of human security.[141]

Thakur argues that the referent for security is humanity and specifically its wellbeing. He notes the realist argument that broadening the concept of security weakens its clarity and focus, but asserts that to do anything else is 'environmentally, societally and globally negligent' and would 'present a falsified image of the policy process'. This multi-dimensional concept allows security to be understood in terms of 'core values' that communities cherish and are willing to make important sacrifices to protect.[142]

Human security is a comparatively recent concept, and it has generated considerable interest among scholars.[143] It is the most inclusive concept of security so far, and this is both its strength and its weakness. Human security acknowledges all of the influences on the wellbeing of the human condition at all levels, making it the most comprehensive and multi-dimensional concept available. In so doing, it presents a vision of security that is regarded with suspicion by hard-headed realists such as

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141 R. Thakur, 'From National to Human Security', in S. Harris and A. Mack (eds), Asia-Pacific *Security: The Economics-Politics* Nexus, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997, pp. 53-4.

142 *Ibid*., pp. 77-80.

143 For example the Human Security Workshop jointly sponsored by the International Relations and Asian Political Research Unit, University of Queensland, the Ilman Institute of International Relations, Korea University, and the Australian Defence Studies Centre, University College, University of New South Wales in Canberra, 31 August - 1 September 1998.

statesmen and bureaucrats because it provides only broad guidance for policy formulation.

The level of influence over policy makers of the theoretical reconceptualisation of security is uncertain. Did the authors of the reconceptualisation during the Cold War provide a new agenda to policy makers or did they simply anticipate an inevitable process? The answer to this question probably lies somewhere between the two, but there is no doubt that the theoretical reconceptualisation had three important effects.

First, it sensitised policy makers and military practitioners to the existence of security agendas that were not derived from realism. Second, it provided a vocabulary with which new security agendas could be described and understood. Third, it challenged the conceptual status quo, causing some policy makers to seek new solutions to contemporary security problems and to apply existing capabilities to problems outside the traditional security agenda.

Theorists developing contemporary concepts of security view former definitions of national security as increasingly dysfunctional. The definitions of the former process of conceptualising security were concerned with the negative goal of deterring or defeating threats, but if human beings are to attain the highest levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, then the concept of security must involve more than the mere absence of threats. It will involve the literal meaning of security: 'freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension'.

This level of human confidence would require that the mainstream concept of security, as understood by security practitioners, be broadened and deepened. Such a course of action would enable the term security to embrace the concept of common security rather than be limited to purely the traditional idea of national security.

The first signs of the broadening and deepening of the concept of security among security practitioners can be detected in the defence policies of the advanced countries, but further developments in this field are likely to occur unevenly, and in some states not at all. Some states are aware that they must realise their potential to provide security, in all senses, if they are to be retained as the pre-eminent referent for security.

Other viable referents, notably the individual and the global commons, already exist. In addition to the traditional military and political dimensions, security must include the dimensions of societal, economic and environmental security.

Security remains a contested concept, and the evidence provided in this paper demonstrates that the contemporary concept of security is complicated and diverse. Despite its contested nature, the dominance of globalisation indicates that the broadening and deepening of the security agenda is likely to continue.

Contemporary International Policy Responses

The defence and national security policies of several advanced countries reflect the broadening security agenda. This section provides a brief survey of the effect of such broadening on several advanced Western democracies including Australia.

United Kingdom

The British concept of security has undergone a significant change since the Cold War. Current UK defence policy is contained in *The Strategic Defence Review,* which was released by the UK Government in July 1998.[144] The review was the result of a detailed examination of UK defence requirements from 'first principles'. It noted that direct threats to traditional national security may still occur in the post-Cold War world, but it placed importance on new security problems, including the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; terrorism and drug-related crime; environmental damage; and vulnerability to technological attack. [145]

It described the roles of the British armed forces as:

- reinforcing long-term security by helping to build and maintain international trust through defence diplomacy;

- engaging in peace support and humanitarian missions;

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144 The Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for a Modern World, Ministry of Defence, UK, July 1998.

145 *Ibid*., p. 3.

- being the best in combat;
- contributing forces to NATO; and
- engaging in nuclear deterrence (while noting that the number of operationally available warheads will be reduced by one-third, to fewer than 200).

The broadened meaning of security is evident in the review, which was informed by a widespread process of public consultation designed to recognise the entire range of opinion about national security:

> The process would be open and inclusive, not conducted in secret behind closed doors . . . This foreign policy-led, open
>
> and inclusive process clearly distinguishes the Strategic Defence Review from previous reviews.[146]

The review places heavy emphasis on security problems and roles that are derived from the broadened meaning of national security. The policy framework that informed the review pointed out that:

> . . . our planning needs to address new challenges: weapons proliferation, ethnic tensions, population pressures, environmental degradation, drugs, terrorism, crime and the failure of state structures.[147]

The review determined that the armed forces should be able to undertake eight missions:

- peacetime security,
- security of the overseas territories,
- defence diplomacy,
- support to wider British interests,

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146 'The Strategic Defence Review Process', *The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays*, pp. 1-1; 1-8.

147 *Ibid.*, pp. 2-2 - 2-4.

- peace support and humanitarian operations,
- regional conflict outside the NATO area,
- regional conflict inside the NATO area, and
- defence of NATO.[148]

The UK armed forces are currently configured to perform twenty-eight military tasks, of which twenty-one are broadly non-warfighting and seven are purely associated with warfighting. The force structuring process of the UK armed forces places equal emphasis on all of these tasks and special emphasis on out-of-area expeditionary missions. The UK has a long history of international military involvements, but the current policy differs importantly in its orientation towards human security. It emphasises such issues as participating in peace and humanitarian operations, and responding to a broader range of security threats, alongside traditional national security concerns of maintaining a balance of power and protecting trade routes. This orientation provides evidence that the UK has significantly expanded its understanding of its national security.

New Zealand

During the latter stages of the Cold War, New Zealand's concept of security followed the layered-defence logic of Australia's 1987 White Paper and the principles of collective security.

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148 The review considered these missions; their subordinate military tasks; the required scales of effort; the necessary levels of readiness; the duration and endurance required; the possibility of concurrent operations; and the influence of emerging trends on force development. Overall the UK concluded that it should be able to conduct two concurrent medium-scale operations (brigade-size) or one full-scale operation (all forces meeting significant aggression). Strategic lift, logistic support and medical support were identified as the key shortfalls as they were vital to successful force-projection operations. Source: 'Future Military Capabilities', *The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays*, pp. 6-2–6-3.

New Zealand has since adopted a different stance on the provision of its national security from Australia. In its 1997 Defence White Paper, New Zealand set out eleven broad security requirements. The highest priority was placed on redressing critical deficiencies in the Army's capability to undertake demanding peace-support operations and the ability of the Air Force to undertake maritime surveillance tasks in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the Southern Ocean. [149] The New Zealand Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), Lieutenant-General Tony Birks, subsequently stated that '. . . peacekeeping is a primary role of the Defence Force'. [150] On New Zealand's security requirements, the white paper states that:

> . . . any challenges to New Zealand's national security are likely to be limited and localised. There will, however, be continuing demands on the NZDF in the areas of counterterrorism, surveillance and protection of the EEZ and Southern Ocean, support for the Antarctic programme, civil defence emergencies, and search and rescue.[151]

Much to the chagrin of its more realist allies, New Zealand contends that its national security is more dependent on human security than the traditional realist approach. It is likely that limited assets of the New Zealand Defence Force will be increasingly configured for tasks associated with the broadened security agenda. [152] The most recent expression of New Zealand's defence policy, released in June 2000, requires that the NZDF be structured 'for combat and peacekeeping'. [153] This policy and New Zealand's nuclear-free stance indicate that New Zealand has significantly reconceptualised its security.

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149 *The Shape of New Zealand's Defence: A White Paper,* Ministry of Defence, Wellington, November 1997, p. 8.

150 Under cross-examination by Dr Wayne Mapp at a select committee inquiry on 11 December 1997, reported in C. Crowley, 'A Missed Opportunity', *New Zealand International Review, vol. XXIII,* no. 2, March/April 1998, p. 13.

151 The Shape of New Zealand's Defence: A White Paper, p. 23.

152 New Zealand currently spends only 1.1 per cent of its GDP on defence.

153 The Government's Defence Policy Framework, n.p., Wellington New Zealand, June 2000, pp. 6-7.

Canada

During the Cold War, Canada's defence policy alternated between emphasis on collective defence within NATO and collective security, especially participation in peace operations.[154]

Current policy is derived from the 1994 White Paper, which described the roles of the Canadian Forces (CF) as providing combat-capable forces, protecting Canada, enabling Canada US defence cooperation, and contributing to international security. The detailed tasks of the CF include many manifestations of the broadened security agenda. These include support to law and order; fisheries protection; drug interdiction; environmental protection; humanitarian and disaster relief; search and rescue; counter-terrorism; aid to the civil power; support to multilateral security; a range of peacekeeping and confidence-building measures; emergency evacuation; expanding civil-military relations; and support to arms control.[155]

Since the 1994 white paper, the Canadian Government has moved further in this direction. The Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy reasons that:

> The traditional military alliances, the *Realpolitik* issues, are now human security issues. A land mine blowing a kid's leg off. A drug czar moving heroin into Vancouver from Burma.[156]

Canada, like New Zealand, is committing its limited defence assets to a broadened national security agenda. [157]

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[154] J. B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967. P. C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era, Oxford University Press, London, 1972. G. S. Vano, Canada: The Strategic and Military Pawn, Praeger, New York, 1988. H. P. Langille, Changing the Guard: Canada's Defence in a World of Transition, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1990.

[155] *White Paper 1994,* National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, 1994.

[156] Quoted in H. Sneider, 'Canada's Global Clout Grows as its Army Shrinks', *Washington Post, 3* December 1997, p. 1.

[157] Canada currently spends only 1.7 per cent of its GDP on defence.

United States

From the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War, the US saw the essence of security as the need to deter, or win, a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The Cold War was fundamentally a conflict between the two superpowers, with the rest of the world either lining up within the two alliance frameworks, or seeking to avoid involvement. [158]

Current US strategy is provided by the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR). The strategy has determined that the US must retain sufficient forces to provide the capability to fight and win two major theatre wars or major regional conflicts (MRC) simultaneously. Despite the declining likelihood of a global war, it argued that theatre wars such as the 1990-91 Gulf War or the outbreak of fighting on the Korean Peninsula may still occur, with the worst-case scenario being for two to occur at the same time. The strategy linked the political, diplomatic and military aspects of foreign policy, but left no doubt that the bottom-line was the use of military force. [159]

Asymmetric threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, information warfare and missile attacks were highlighted as dangers and would receive increased attention from the US Armed Forces. The QDR concept of security is realist, pessimistic and primarily concerned with the application of armed force. This application is intended to utilise the revolution in military affairs by enhancing the technological advantage of US forces. The smaller US armed forces that have emerged from the post-Cold War draw-down are being modernised in accordance with Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010). This modernisation is intended to improve capabilities using information-age technology and the concept of 'information superiority'.The National Defense Panel (NDP)-an

[158] For US security and defence policy in the Cold War see H. J. Morgenthau, 'Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States', M. Kerkowitz and P. G. Bock (eds), *American National Security: A Reader in Theory and Politics,* The Free Press, New York, 1965; and R. Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991,* Roudedge, London, 1995.

[159] W. S. Cohen 'Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Special: The Secretary's Message', *Joint Force Quarterly,* Summer 1997, pp. 8-14.

independent, congressionally mandated board-was subsequently created to review the QDR. In December 1997, the NDP issued its report, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century.*[160] The formidable panel of nine senior congressional appointees, including four retired general officers at the four-star level, institutionalised the debate on the reconceptualisation of US security, reporting that:

> We are convinced that the challenges of the twenty-first century will be quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of the Cold War and require fundamental change to our national security institutions, military strategy, and defense posture by 2020. To meet these challenges, we believe the United States must undertake a broad transformation of its military and national security structures, operational concepts and equipment, and the Defense Department's key business processes.[161]

The NDP analysis concluded that asymmetric threats were more likely than MRC, and described the two-MRC doctrine as 'a force-sizing function' that had tended to 'become a means of justifying current forces'. [162] The report considered a range of threats including famine, disease, transnational crime, arms proliferation, illegal drugs, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 'Homeland defence'-which concerned the protection of the US mainland, and its people and assets, from attacks ranging from terrorism, information warfare and weapons of mass destruction-received high priority.[163] The activities of the US armed forces are global, diverse and frequent, and may be launched as part of complicated foreign and domestic policy objectives. The US possesses global military capabilities and is increasingly utilising them to meet policy objectives that reflect the broadened security agenda. For example, the support to law enforcement in the US 'war on drugs' involves more personnel than that of the entire Canadian Forces. Some examples of the tasking of the US armed forces to address the broadened security agenda are the:

- war on drugs (1986-present);

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160 *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,* report of the National Defense Panel, Arlington, VA, December 1997

161 *Ibid*., frontispiece letter to the Secretary.

162 *Ibid.,* Executive Summary, p. ii;. 23.

163 *Ibid*., pp. 6-17, pp. 25-28.

- military intervention to remove the indicted drug smuggler General Manuel Noriega from power in Panama (1989);

- collective security operation to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (1991);

- associated operations to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, to launch punitive strikes and to enforce sanctions on Iraq (1991-present);

- humanitarian operation in Somalia (1992-94);

- enforcement of a no-fly zone, launch of punitive strikes and the conducting of international peacekeeping in Bosnia (1994-present);

- enforcement of an embargo against Haiti (1993); prevention of illegal entry to the US by refugees from Cuba and Haiti (1994);

- military intervention in Haiti to remove the government of General Raoul Cedras (1994); and

- punitive strikes against Osama Bin Laden's terrorist training camps in Somalia and Sudan (1998).

The publication of the *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* in 1998 provided a significant indication of reconceptualisation. The strategy involves a nine-element strategy, of which one element was '. . . increased attention to terrorism, environmental degradation, emerging infectious diseases, drug trafficking and other transnational challenges as critical elements of "comprehensive security"'.[164]

Overall, US policy and activities are informed by realism, and national security is underwritten by military power. Despite this orientation, the

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[164] *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998,* Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., November 1998, p. 1.

US national-security agenda has substantially broadened since the Cold War.

Australia

The Australian concept of security has generally been realist in outlook. As a result of its history, the disparity between its large size and small population, and its location far from its Western allies, Australia has historically feared external threats to its national security. Australian policy responses to perceived security threats have relied on participation in alliances with larger and more-powerful countries.

In 1989 Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided the first official enunciation of Australia's acceptance of the broadened security agenda:

> . . . the policy responses or instruments that are available to protect Australia's security are *multi-dimensional.* They go well beyond strictly military capabilities, essential though these are. They also embrace traditional diplomacy, politicomilitary capabilities (in the border zone between defence and diplomacy), economic and trade relations, and development assistance. And they extend to immigration, education and training, cultural relations, information activities, and a number of other less obvious areas of government activity.[165]

In 1990 defence policy provided an illuminating insight into the difficulties faced by those considering the force structure of the ADF.

> It is difficult to reconcile the allocation of resources between the immediate demands of national self-defence on the one hand, and activities undertaken for broader national purposes on the other. We have in the past made comfortable judgements that the force-in-being developed for our national defence would provide suitable options for

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[165] *Australia's Regional Security,* Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, December 1989, p. 2.

> meeting other tasks. But the regional uncertainties noted above suggest that this assumption may be less justified in the future.[166]

Australia's current defence policy is contained in the White Paper of 1997. A foreign affairs and trade white paper was released coincidently and its overview describes Australia's policy in the following terms:

> It is about the hard-headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy: the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian people.[167]

The white paper takes a declaratorily realist position, although a thorough reading reveals a more complex outlook in several ways. First, the white paper notes the changing nature of national sovereignty, and identifies globalism and the economic rise of East Asia as the two most profound influences on Australian policy during the next fifteen years. It repeats the assertion of the 1994 Defence White Paper that Australia's security is linked to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region.[168]

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166 Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Department of Defence, Canberra, September 1992, p. 21.

167 In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra, August 1987, p. iii.

168 *Ibid., p.* v, p. 1, pp. 18-31.

Second, while stressing the continued importance of the nation-state, the white paper notes the increasing importance of non-military threats:

> Nor should Australia's security interests be seen exclusively in terms of potential military threats or regional conflicts. Over the next fifteen years it is likely that even more attention will be paid to so-called non-military threats such as pandemics, illegal immigration, refugee flows, environmental degradation, narcotics and transnational crime . . . They reinforce the importance of taking a *broad view of security* which goes beyond military and defence issues.[169]

The broad concept of security adopted in the Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper was coordinated with the Defence White Paper. The preface to the latter asserts that the Government was taking a '. . . comprehensive and coordinated approach . . . to the management of Australia's security interests'.[170] The white paper maintained the assessment that armed attack against Australia was unlikely in the short term but it took a pessimistic tone, arguing that regional uncertainty could cause unanticipated consequences.

The white paper acknowledged that the range of threats that confronted the security of Australia required a more sophisticated defence policy response than previous policy prescriptions. For this reason the ADF was directed to prepare for three tasks that could require combat, enlarging the scope of the former straightforward defence of Australia. These are:

- Defeating Attacks against Australia's territory (DAA) (which remained the 'core force structure priority');
- Defending our Regional Interests (DRI); and
- Supporting our Global Interests (SGI).[171]

Non-military threats to security were considered in the examination of the strategic environment. These included the threat to South Pacific sovereignty posed by organised crime, natural disasters, environmental damage and transnational crime.[172] As a result, ADF 'peacetime tasks' received attention in the white paper. These included:

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169 *Ibid*., pp. 3*; 20-1.*

170 *Australia's Strategic Policy,* Department of Defence, Canberra, December *1997*, p. iii.

171 *ıbid*., p. 29.

172 *Ibid*., p. 13; 26.

- within DAA: the requirement for the surveillance of the Antarctic territories and the Australian EEZ;
- within DRI: military talks, visits, exchanges, training and exercises;
- within SGI: continued support for UN collective security, humanitarian operations and peacekeeping operations; and
- under 'helping Australia's civil community': support to civil emergency services (although the likelihood of such support was qualified on the grounds that it 'diverts Defence from its core business, distorts funding priorities and reduces defence capability').[173]

Two specific exceptions were made to the overall reluctance for the provision of Defence support to the civil community. These were specialist support to counter-terrorist operations (due to the special demands of close-quarter battle), and surveillance and response forces for customs, immigration, fisheries and other civil authorities off Australia's coasts (due to the capabilities of RAN vessels and RAAF aircraft).[174]

The decision to concentrate on the 'core business' of warfighting informed the selection of the four defence force structure priorities, which were all concerned with the military defence of Australia. They were:

1. the knowledge edge (intelligence, command and surveillance);

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173 *Ibid*., pp. 34-5.
174 *Ibid*., pp. 30-5.

2. defeating threats in our maritime approaches (air superiority and defeating ships);

3. strike (F 111 aircraft, special forces and stand-off weapons); and

4. land forces (surveillance, response and defeat of hostile land forces).[175]

In his address to the Royal United Services Institute in February 1999 the CDF, Admiral Chris Barrie, reviewed Australia's changing strategic circumstances and stated that:

> This range of pressure highlights the important point that there is a need to focus on a broader range of issues which could have consequences for us in Defence. And I think some of these issues have meaning beyond the traditional state-on-state war, which has been the usual basis for planning defence forces. *And it is my assertion that we must be prepared to move on, from this narrow definition of security.*[176]

In addition to this bold statement on Australia's future security orientation, this remarkable speech-perhaps the most important ever made by a CDF-contained many elements of the reconceptualisation of security. These elements included globalisation, international and domestic crime, the promotion of common security interests, the need for a whole of government approach, and the range of new missions that the ADF is now required to perform. [177] The CDF asserted that Australia '. . . needed to broaden our definition of security' and that '. . . there is an emerging maturity here in Australia'.

He stated that this maturity was to be reflected in the doctrine of '. . . structuring for war and adapting for peace'.[178]

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[175] *Ibid*. , pp. 55-66.

[176] C. Barrie, *Change and Australia's Defence Capability for the New Century,* Speech given by Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie, at the Royal United Services Institute (text provided by Office of the CDF), Canberra, 10 February 1999, p. 3. Emphasis added.

[177] *Ibid*., pp. 3; 6-7; 12.

[178] *Ibid*., pp. 5; 7; 10.

> The important issue for us here is now to look to the future-to ensure the Defence Force is shaped appropriately to be able to support a potentially broader range of government objectives.[179]

A dichotomy was observable between the innovative CDF and the more traditional defence bureaucracy. In a presentation at the Australian National University in April 1999, Hugh White, Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence, accepted the 'wider concept of security' but maintained a pessimistic world view.[180] He sought to differentiate 'strategy' from security, privileging it because of the 'uniquely serious' nature of the use of armed force, the importance of national security and the moral complexity of planning to take human lives.

The reconceptualisation issue remained at the forefront of discussion about Australia's defence. In the 1999 Defence Review, published in *The Australian,* the CDF pointed out that:

> Security can no longer be seen as a one-dimensional-threat-defence-equation. Security must be seen as a whole-of-nation concept . . . [and] an integral part of our Australian community.[181]

The CDF described future ADF roles, which include military options for diplomacy, peace operations, economic development, natural disasters, counter-terrorism, national intelligence, border control and law enforcement.[182] Some tension exists between official Australian defence policy and the actual activities of the ADF. While the rhetoric insists that combatant operations are the focus of Australia's defence, actual ADF warfighting operations are very rare. These tensions are partly responsible for the frequent reviews of Australian defence that

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179 *Ibid*., p. 9.

180 Notes taken at lecture by Hugh White 'Hopes for the Future, Lessons from the Past-Thought and Action in Strategic Policy', Department of International Relations 50th Anniversary Lecture, Australian National University, Canberra, 22 April 1999.

181 C. Barrie, 'ADF not isolated from need for change', *The* Australian, 18 June 1999; *Defence Review*, p. S6.

182 *Ibid.*

take place every two to three years. Perhaps such constant navel-gazing is evidence of the transition process that is accompanying the reconceptualisation of security. The rhetoric of defence policy is often designed to meet such internal political objectives, and its insistence on the concentration on the core business of warfighting is caused by three concerns:

- Military planners are concerned that the expansion of ADF operations outside its traditional parameters will encourage expectations of further expansion and the erosion of critical capabilities.

- Defence bureaucrats are concerned that, if the Australian Defence Organisation expands its policy to include tasks that are not essential to the military defence of Australia, it will face inevitable demands for budgetary reductions.

- Third, the world view of the authors of Australian defence policy was shaped during the Cold War and is usually realist.

The *Defence Annual Report* 1998-1999 cautiously revealed an expanded Australian defence strategy. The strategy consists of an 'overarching strategy' and five elements of the Framework of Military Strategies. These strategies, which had formerly been classified secret, include the three elements of the 1997 strategy and two new elements that cover nonmilitary security and military diplomacy. The five strategies of the framework are:

- DAA;
- DRI;
- Defence of Global Interests (DGI), formerly SGI;
- Protection of National Interests (PNI); and
- Shaping the Strategic Environment (SSE).[183]

The creation of the five strategies is enabling Australian defence policy to encompass the broadened tasks of the ADF and reflect changes in the theoretical meaning of security. Australia's security concerns over the next generation relate more to issues of global and regional stability than the threat of armed attacks against Australia.

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183 *Defence Annual Report* 1998-1999, AusInfo, Canberra, 19 October 1999, p. 183.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their potential for use by sovereign states and sub-national groups is of particular concern. Even if Australia were not the target of WMD, it would be likely to experience something of their effects, and to be called upon to assist in the inevitable reconstruction process. Instability in the 'inner arc' of archipelagic countries to the north of Australia is a great concern, and this has the potential to involve Australia in complex operations aimed at humanitarian relief or restoring peace and law and order. While direct armed threats against Australia are not likely (although they cannot be ruled out), other types of threat are possible. Challenges to national sovereignty and law and order are possible through asymmetric warfare, particularly through the use of terrorism and information warfare.

Summary of International Policy Responses

This examination of the security and defence policies of selected countries has demonstrated that to varying degrees these policies are being affected by the changing meaning of national security.

Of the four countries, Canada has most completely reconceptualised its security and, benefiting from the protection of the US, its forces have undergone radical changes since the Cold War. New Zealand, isolated from virtually all traditional concerns, has a long experience of the reconceptualisation of security that began before the end of the Cold War. It is now wrestling with the issue of allocating all of its limited defence resources to non-warfighting tasks.

The UK is less isolated, but it has also reduced the size of its armed forces and experienced a significant reconceptualisation, with the majority of its focus now directed at non-warfighting tasks. The US, possessing by far the most capable armed forces in the world, is able to maintain vastly powerful warfighting capabilities alongside the capabilities that it requires in order to meet the broadened range of security challenges. Yet even the US is stretched to meet all of the global and multi-dimensional commitments of the broadened security agenda.

Australia's strategic circumstances, and its historical sense of insecurity, have largely prevented it from following a similar defence policy to New Zealand and Canada. Australia has retained a declaratory defence policy

that is informed by realism but is nonetheless cognisant of the broadened security agenda. It is highly likely that the forthcoming Australian white paper on defence will continue to take this approach.

It is important to note that all five countries have retained the ability to defend the nation against armed attack as the fundamental role of their armed forces. War is too dangerous to ignore, and it has been recognised throughout human history as the greatest challenge to national security. The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, writing in the 6th century BC, opened his work with the words: 'Warfare is the greatest affair of the state, the basis of life and death, the road to survival or extinction'.[184]

Likewise, Carl von Clausewitz's classic analysis of war recognised the fundamental importance of war to the practice of international relations. He argued that war should be fought to achieve the rational political objectives of states, and these must remain in the forefront of national decision-makers. Clausewitz's dictum that war should be '. . . merely the continuation of policy by other means' did not imply that war should be considered as simply being akin to diplomacy.[185] He believed that the destructiveness and risks of waging war made it a special case. If the decision is made to wage war, then it must be waged wholeheartedly and with few restraints.

Clausewitz described war as 'more than a chameleon' because it is a dynamic manifestation of the capabilities of humankind.[186] The way of war changes to suit the times and to fulfil the needs of the prevailing concept of security. The key element of the concept of war that has changed during the course of the 20th century is the growing abhorrence of virtually all forms of war. Since the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 the waging of aggressive unilateral war has been viewed as illegal. The UN Charter has institutionalised this renunciation of war, and all signatories have agreed to oppose it. The theological ideal of a 'just war', which underpins international law, is now applied to all types of armed conflict to ensure that they satisfy popular opinion and, increasingly importantly, the inquisitive and cynical media.

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184 Sun Tzu, *The Complete Art of War,* trans. R. D. Sawyer, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1996, chap. 1, p. 40.

185 C. von Clausewitz, *On War,* Book One, chap. 1, section 24, p. 87.

186 *Ibid*., Book One, chap. 1, section 28, p. 89.

Aside from the revulsion against the amorality of war and the suffering that it causes, a growing scepticism exists as towhether waging war is a rational and useful national strategy. War is so destructive that it is becoming increasingly difficult to offer rational reasons for waging it, unless it is required for self-defence or to rescue or give succour to desperate humanity. As a result, war is both fundamentally important for national security and disastrous to the conduct of international relations.

Refocused National Security

The traditional understanding of national security dealt with the safety of a nation-state from armed attack. This paradigm has shifted, with the advanced countries paying increasing attention to a range of issues that have refocused national security. This refocusing follows two themes.

The first theme is that the range of potential threats to national security has evolved from the traditional military threat, although that threat remains relevant, to include:

Challenges to Border Management. National borders are increasingly subject to a range of challenges inspired by criminal or commercial motives. Among these are illegal trafficking in people, principally to enable illegal immigration (commonly referred to as 'people smuggling'); trafficking in illicit goods (particularly drugs but also firearms and wildlife); and the illegal exploitation of natural resources (most notably 'pirate fishing').

Non-military Challenges to National Sovereignty. Apart from the well-understood 'paramilitary' threat posed by international terrorism, globalisation has increased the threat posed by non-military challenges. These can include economic, political and cultural pressure, and can vary in strength from mere policy irritants to direct threats to national economies and governments. *New Types of Challenges.* Advances in technology have provided the means for new types of challenges such as information warfare (or 'cyber warfare') and other insidious threats such as biological attacks (which may originate from other states or from non-state actors). These types of threats do not necessarily fall into the

military or non-military threat spectrum. This ambiguity may increase their attractiveness as asymmetric weapons.

The second theme that has refocused national security is that the privileged position of the state within the security discourse has been eroded. States were never a perfect referent for security, and their imperfections are becoming more apparent and widely accepted. Other referents-including individuals, society, the region, humanity and the global commons-are all capable of influencing government policy to varying degrees.

The refocusing of national security has three implications for the armed forces of the advanced countries. First, they are increasingly being called upon to address contingencies for which they are not configured, equipped or trained, and which official policy regards as of lesser importance than their core business of warfighting. At the high end of the spectrum of these contingencies, armed forces are often deployed to complex peace operations-a mission that has become at least a de facto role of the armed forces of the advanced countries. At the low end of the contingency spectrum, armed forces are used to support public sporting events and augment government services during industrial disputes or breakdowns.

Second, armed forces are increasingly being required to operate within fields of endeavour that have traditionally been the province of other government agencies. Good examples of this phenomenon are the use of armed forces to support law enforcement and border control agencies; provide search and rescue services; and contribute to domestic civic-action projects. Third, these armed forces increasingly find themselves in situations that have traditionally been the province of 'non-military organisations' (NMOs).

The term NMOs is applied to a very broad range of organisations that are not part of the armed forces and whose activities are not oriented towards warfare. NMOs include:

International Government Organisations (IGOs). These organisations are created by governments to address international concerns and include the

UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross. IGOs are increasingly developing capabilities that enable them to undertake operations in remote and hazardous situations. An example of this trend is the creation of the UN Security and Safety Service, which provides armed guards to some UN officials and payrolls. Other UN agencies provide specialised peace-support functions. Such agencies include the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Program, the World Health Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the United Nations Development Program.

Non-government Organisations (NGOs). The last two decades have witnessed a dramatic rise in the importance of NGOs. They now constitute a diverse and interconnected group, of which the four largest are World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children and Care International. Other well-known examples are Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Amnesty International and Greenpeace. These organisations were created by issue-motivated groups working in such fields as health, famine relief, social improvement and the protection of the environment. MSF, for example, was founded by a group of French doctors in 1971 and now provides emergency medical assistance in more than eighty countries.[187] Amnesty was instigated by a British legal activist in 1961 and now has over one million members in 160 countries.[188] Four antinuclear activists in Vancouver founded Greenpeace in 1971. It has since grown to become a multinational environmentalist organisation, with 2.4 million supporters and a small fleet of ocean-going ships.[189]

NGOs fall into three groups: '`. . . those which finance projects intended to promote (sustainable) development or environmental activities; those which engage in relief work; and those which are advocacy organisations'.[190] Some NGOs concentrate on one of the three roles, while others are active in more than one. The importance of NGOs is

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187 www.msf.org (accessed 25 February 2000).

188 www.web.a.nmesty.org (accessed 28 February 2000).

189 M. Brown and J. May, The Greenpeace Story, Dorling Kindersley, London, 1989, pp. 7-9; www.greenpeace.org.au and www.greenpeace.org (accessed 28 February 2000).

190 S. Cleary, The Role of NGOs Under Authoritarian Political Systems, Macmillan Press, London, 1997, p. 4.

demonstrated by their description by the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as 'full participants in international life'.[191]

Commercial Organisations. Transnational commercial corporations account for many of the world's largest economic entities. The once all-powerful state now faces a range of potential competitors possessing enormous politco-economic power and capabilities that can rival those of conventional armed forces. These capabilities may even include military force in the guise of private military companies such as Executive Outcomes.[192] Such companies may be contracted to IGOs or armed forces in order to provide services including training and logistics.

This duplication of capabilities is a symptom of the process of convergence that is taking place between military tasks and non-military tasks. A good example of this phenomenon is the use of defence assets during medical emergencies, humanitarian relief and natural-disaster relief. This process will be discussed later in the paper, but first it is useful to consider the nature of two types of tasks.

Military and Non-military Tasks

The contemporary understanding of which tasks are properly military has long historical and cultural origins. Armed forces have almost always been essential to the survival of nationstates, and the history of humankind places great emphasis on military success and failure. The fundamental task of armed forces has generally been to defend sovereign territory and interests, or attack the territory and interests of other

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191 B. Boutros-Ghali, 'Foreword', in T. G. Weiss and L. Gordenker (eds), *NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1996, p. 7.

192 Executive Outcomes is able to field Boeing 727 transport aircraft, MIG-23 fighter aircraft, Mi-8 and Mi-17 armed helicopters, Mi-24 attack helicopters, BTR-50 armoured personnel carriers and up to 2000 troops. Sources: D. Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention,* Adelphi Paper 316, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1998, pp. 53-4. H. Howe, 'South Africa's 9-1-1 Force', *Armed Forces Journal International,* November 1996, pp. 38-9.

sovereign states.[193] Notwithstanding the importance of this fundamental task, armed forces have performed a wide range of other tasks, although the range of tasks has expanded and contracted to suit the times.

The history of Australia includes many examples of the uses of armed forces in tasks that would today be viewed as nonmilitary. Such tasks included the:

- establishment of prisons and the guarding of convicts;
- exploration and mapping of remote areas;
- enforcement of domestic law and order, including the provision of protection against attacks by natives and bushrangers;
- surveying and supervision of the construction of roads and public buildings;
- suppression of violent insurrections during political and industrial unrest; and
- maintenance of domestic counterintelligence concerned with espionage, subversion and sabotage.

The armed forces performed these roles in the Australian colonies because they were capable of doing so and because they provided an expedient method for colonial governments to achieve the required ends. Overall, the armed forces of the advanced countries were not engaged in fighting wars of national survival during the long peace that followed the British victory at Waterloo in 1815 and lasted until the beginning of World War I, ninety-nine years later.[194] It is not surprising that, during such prolonged periods of peace, armed forces are required to apply their abilities to performing nonwarfighting tasks.

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193 This does not include armed forces that served interests other than those of particular sovereign states: examples being armed forces raised by sub-national groups and mercenary forces.

194 The infrequent outbreaks of interstate warfare such as the Crimean War, Franco-Prussian War and Russo-Japanese War had more limited objectives. Internal and colonial wars were more frequent and, although often bloody, they generally involved localised conflict, which was eventually quelled by military forces acting for the imperial or central government. Prominent examples of these wars were the Indian Mutiny, the American Civil War and the Boer War.

Other government agencies were created during this period as many governmental functions became increasingly professionalised. Often starting with a group of seconded or retired military personnel, other government organisations took responsibility for such tasks as running gaols, exploration, the enforcement of law and order, exploration, surveying and counterintelligence. The raising of the Australian colonial police forces was the most obvious manifestation of this process, and when the British Army withdrew from the Australian colonies in 1870, responsibility for law and order was entirely in the hands of 'police troopers'. The corollary to this development was that the military forces were perceived as having an increasingly limited role in the operation of domestic society in advanced countries.

During the 20th century the role of the armed forces of the advanced countries underwent a further narrowing of focus to preparing for war, waging war and deterring war. This was due primarily to the paramount importance of the two world wars and the Cold War to national survival. This paradigm shift in the understanding of the role of armed forces was a product of its times, and the end of the Cold War has enabled changes within the role of armed forces.

The development of the roles of armed forces has led to the current perception that, with the exception of times of crisis such as widespread civil unrest and major natural disasters, the military is now expected to concentrate its efforts on training and preparing for war. Those tasks that fall outside the parameters of warfighting are arguably 'non-military'. This argument is problematic for three reasons. First, no clear consensus exists as to how narrowly or broadly the parameters should be set. Examples are the questions of to what extent armed forces should participate in domestic law enforcement and whether it is appropriate for military resources to be used to overcome the disruption caused by strikes.

Second, during earlier historical eras armed forces have performed a range of tasks that are now viewed as nonmilitary. The conceptual quarantining of armed forces into the core business of warfighting would have seemed strange to the armed forces of our great-grandparents' time.

Huntington made this point very strongly in his keynote address to a symposium at the US National Defense University in 1992.[195]

Third, several trends in the expanded uses of armed forces and the expanding capabilities of other types of organisations, which are part of the changing context of the meaning of security, are continuing to alter the parameters. This paper uses the term ‘convergence’ to describe this process.

The Implications of Convergence

The process of convergence is both dynamic and ambiguous but at least some distinct trends are discernible. These trends enable an analysis of the implications of convergence. This section describes those implications, which fall into two broad themes. The paper uses the terms ‘overstretch’ and ‘overlap’ to describe these themes.

Overstretch

The term ‘overstretch’ describes the tendency of ‘can do’ organisations, such as armed forces, to accept more and more roles. The actual acceptance of the growing number of roles is usually incremental, and may even be too subtle to be noticed unless a long-term historical viewpoint is taken. The acceptance may also be unenthusiastic and incomplete, but it has become a discernible tendency in advanced armed forces, particularly since the Cold War.

The Australian Defence Organisation has been steadily accumulating roles since the end of the Vietnam War. This process has accelerated since the end of the Cold War. Bruce Scott, Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, noted this point, stating that:

> . . . as a consequence, the defence force must be capable of fulfilling a broader range of roles than it has before . . . But now it must be prepared to undertake these tasks more often than it ever has before.[196]

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[195] S. Huntington, ‘Keynote: Non-Traditional Roles for the US Military’, in J. R. Graham (ed.), *Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era,* Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Lesley, J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 15-28.

The accumulation of additional roles has not been accompanied by any reduction in existing roles and has occurred during a period of military downsizing, which has resulted in the current phenomenon of overstretch. This phenomenon is not unique to Australia; in fact it occurs in even the most powerful military force in the world. In their analysis of the US military commitment to Asia, Robert Scales and Larry Wortzel found that:

> . . . the military presence in Asia must be capable of doing traditional military things, like fighting and winning manoeuvre wars. But all of the military forces in the region, whether US or allied, must also be robust enough to carry out other missions, including noncombatant evacuation operations; humanitarian and disaster relief missions; de-mining; peacekeeping or peace enforcement; resolving serious, destabilising urban unrest; addressing conflicts over resources; and addressing problems that are partially law enforcement matters, such as smuggling and free trade.[197]

An interesting aspect of the current overstretch is that of public interest in defence. In March 1999 the CDF Admiral Barrie issued a press release on the 2000 Defence White Paper. He intended this press release to increase the amount of debate on defence issues in the media and the community.[198] Ironically, from August 1999 to November 2000**,** defence issues featured as lead items in the media every day (principally because of the ADF operations in East Timor and the problems with the Collins Class submarines). Alan Dupont has pointed out that the Australian public is becoming increasingly interested in the roles and capabilities of the Australian Defence Organisation.[199] The situation in East Timor

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[196] B. Scott, Speech to the Royal United Services Institute (Queensland) Incorporated by the Hon Bruce Scott, MP, Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, Brisbane, 29 May 1999, p. 3.

[197] R. H. Scales and L. M. Wortzel, *The Future Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and the Geostrategy of American Commitment,* Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 17.

[198] G. Barker, 'ADF seeks public debate on defence', *Financial Review, 31* March 1999, p. 6.

[199] A. Dupont, 'Defence needs a major rethink of strategic priorities', *The Sydney Morning Herald, 10* August 1999, p. 13.

has greatly increased that interest. As a result, for the first time since the end of the Vietnam conflict, defence may constitute an election issue at the next federal election.

Samuel Huntington's seminal work *The Soldier and the State* analysed the development of civil-military relations in the US.[200] He observed that military society is shaped by a combination of functional imperatives relating to external threats and societal imperatives derived from the nature of society, and found that the professional military officer corps was a useful barometer of this change. A tension exists between the conservative and authoritarian officer corps and the liberal values of the US. The resolution of this tension depends largely on the work performed by the armed forces.

The Professional Soldier, the classic analysis by Morris Janowitz, profession and reached the conclusion that it was heavily influenced by changes in society.[201] Janowitz described the military as '. . . a social organisation which maintains levels of autonomy while refracting broader social trends'.[202] Hugh Smith has pointed out that the civilian state exerts greater influence over the armed forces during prolonged periods of peace.[203] Australia has experienced its longest ever period of 'peace' since the withdrawal of Australian forces from Vietnam in 1972. Smith's analysis of the development of Australian defence described three periods based on Moskos' thesis. The periods are 'war readiness', dated from the late 1940s; 'war deterrence' from the early 1970s; and 'the warless society' from the late 1980s.[204] According to this analysis, Australia became a warless society when its strategic outlook included

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200 S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1964.

201 M. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Professional Portrait,* The Free Press, United States, 1960. M. Janowitz, in collaboration with R. Little, Sociology *and the Military Establishment,* 3rd edn, Sage Publications, London, 1974.

202 M. Janowitz, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organisation', *Armed Forces and Society,* November 1977, p. 41.

203 H. Smith, 'The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force', *Armed Forces and Society,* Summer 1995, p. 531.

204 Smith, 'The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force', p. 533, citing C. Moskos, 'Armed Forces in a Warless Society', *Forum International* (Munich), vol. 13, 1992.

no particular military threats to security and the ADF became heavily involved in constabulary roles.

This phenomenon has resulted in many changes for the military: shifts from authoritarian leadership to persuasive management; a narrowing in the skill differential between military and civilian professionals; a broadening of the social base of military leadership; the changing requirements of military careers, particularly at the elite level; and the emergence of democratisation and innovation in military attitudes. These evolutionary processes had led to a situation in which a large proportion of military leadership had transitioned from 'heroic leaders' to 'military managers'.

In addition to these broadly internal sociological effects on the military profession, Janowitz predicted a significant role change. He foresaw the further evolution from 'military forces' to 'constabulary forces', with a blurring of the distinction between peace and war and the increasing importance of individual military personnel as 'political agents'.[205] He defined the concept as:

> The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective military posture. The constabulary outlook is grounded in, and extends, pragmatic doctrine. [206]

This process required a closer relationship between the armed forces and society and, as Huntington had concluded, this leads to tensions that require resolution. These tensions result from the increasing need for military 'managers' rather than military 'leaders'; the decline in the importance ascribed to traditional values such as 'duty, honour, country'; and the rising importance of 'military intellectuals'. An example of the effect of these tensions is resistance among institutionalists within the military to the adoption of roles that are increasingly akin to police duties, which are seen as having lesser

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205 M. Janowitz, 'Organising Multiple Goals: War Making and Arms Control', in M. Janowitz (ed.), *The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organisation,* Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1964, p. 30.

206 Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, p.* 418.

importance and prestige, and which do not possess the connotations of national security writ large.

Charles Moskos examined the changes within the armed forces and found that there was a shift from institutional values to occupational values.[207] An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, including concepts such as respect for authority, self-sacrifice and a paternalistic remuneration system. An occupation, on the other hand, is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, including remuneration based on demand for specific skills, which operates in a similar manner to a civilian workplace.

The processes of change are difficult to measure empirically. One aspect of these processes that can be measured is the increasing intrusion of liberal values in military personnel practices. These practices include encouraging more ethnic diversity in the armed forces; accepting manifestations of the institution-occupation phenomenon; including female and homosexual personnel in many armed forces; and providing for selective conscientious objection.[208] The increasing employment of women in combat roles, as opposed to their formerly restricted employment in less-dangerous support roles, is a key indicator of this process.[209]

In looking at the phenomenon of overstretch, it is reasonable to ask: What does society expect from its armed forces? It is probable that a

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207 C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organisation', *Armed Forces and Society,* November 1977, pp. 41-50. For an international analysis of the Institution versus Occupation thesis, which includes a chapter by Nicolas Jans on Australia see C. Moskos and F. Wood (eds), *The Military: More Than Just a Job?,* Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, D.C., 1988.

208 See Smith, 'The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force' and I. Wing, 'Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force', *Australian Defence Force Journal,* no. 137, July-August 1999, pp. 31-40.

209 For an international example see M. Binkin, Who Will *Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military,* The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1993. A recent Australian example is S. Chapman, 'Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of Women in the Australian Defence Force', *Australian Defence Force Journal,* November/December 1999, pp. 25-33.

broad consensus exists on the need for armed forces to defend the nation against armed aggression, but these circumstances are rare. The reconceptualisation of security is reflected in societal concerns about the nature of threats. In an ironic but perceptive article on the future of serious journalism, Geoffrey Hodgson argues that:

> People worry more than ever about disease, global warming and so on. For 75 years, people in the Western world were afraid of war. Now they are afraid of other things. They are afraid of cancer, strokes, AIDS, incompetent surgeons, genetically modified food.[210]

The study of military sociology has shown that armed forces, which reflect the values of their society, have found themselves, willingly or unwillingly, drawn into roles that are related to society's values rather than military doctrine. Charles Moskos and James Burk describe the new manifestation of armed forces as 'the postmodern military'. This involves the increasing use of smaller post Cold War armed forces in new types of operations, particularly in those concerned with 'military humanitarianism'. According to this analysis, armed forces would become smaller and more professional, and they would be supported by reserve forces with important civil-military missions. Moskos and Burk's analysis pointed to the requirement for a new type of military officer, the soldier-statesman/soldier-scholar, who would replace Janowitz's stereotypes of the combat leader and military manager.[211]

James Rosenau ascribes this phenomenon to 'turbulence' within the international system. His analysis points to the simultaneous trends of the declining relevance of warfighting and the increasing demands for other

[210] G. Hodgson, 'Bring the foreign correspondents back home', *Australian Financial Review, 30* July 1999, Review, p. *3.*

[211] C. Moskos and J. Burk, 'The Postmodern Military', in J. Burk (ed.), *The Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent World,* 2nd edn, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1998, pp. 168-75.

types of missions.[212] It is reasonable to deduce that armed forces now have less relevance to national security but face greater demands to satisfy the needs of other concepts of security.

Military sociology has undergone subtle changes that have occurred simultaneously with, and as part of, the reconceptualisation of security. Military organisations, on the other hand, face explicit demands for change, and these may require force restructuring. In an analysis of Australian defence policy written in 1978, Robert O'Neill argued for the development of national security based on policy objectives rather than broad extant capabilities:

> Too often we do things back to front. Because we have a Defence Force which can perform certain functions, we tend to construct a whole national security policy around those functions.[213]

O'Neill judged that armed forces existed primarily to deter and wield the use of force relating to armed conflict. This view has traditionally predominated in Australia as it reflects the realist concept of security. The reconceptualisation of security has challenged the basic assumptions of this approach, leading to arguments for organisational change. In a lengthy analysis of Australian strategy, Michael O' Connor found in 1997 that:

> national military forces will become more like constabulary forces, albeit at the high end of technology and power. But like any constabulary, their operations will be increasingly constrained by law (or acceptable practice). Their targets will be less predictable and may include nation states, sub-national political organisations or mere criminals.[214]

O' Connor has an important message for Australian defence planners:

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212 J. Rosenau, 'Armed Force and Armed Forces in a Turbulent World', in J. Burk (ed.), *The Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent World,* 2nd edn, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1988, pp. 64-5.

213 R. O'Neill, 'Australia's Defence Forces', *Is Australia Defensible?,* Australian Defence Association (Victoria), North Melbourne, 1978, cited in D. Ball, `The Machinery for Making Australian national Security Policy in the 1980s', R. O'Neill and D. M. Homer (eds), *Australian Defence Policy for the 1980s,* University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Qld, 1982, p. 144.

214 M. O'Connor, 'The Implications of a Regional Security Strategy', in I. McLachlan, M. O'Connor, S. Woodman, and D. Woolner, *Australia's Strategic Dilemmas: Options for the Future,* Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p. 88.

> The fundamental test of 'peacetime' defence policy will be the ability of the defence machine to provide government with a wide range of options for the use or threat of military force in circumstances short of war. The insistence in Australian literature on 'the defence of Australia in the narrow sense' belongs to a vanished past and is simply irrelevant in the modern world.[215]

If O'Connor's analysis is accurate, advanced armed forces such as the ADF must expect to face further overstretch as more policy options are sought by government and more tasks are assigned to armed forces.

Overlap

The term `overlap' describes the phenomenon in which the work of armed forces is increasingly overlapping with the work of other organisations. The pressures that operate to cause this phenomenon originate from both sides. On the military side, the phenomenon occurs because armed forces have been directed to accept a broadened range of tasks. They possess capabilities that are useful in tasks other than warfighting and are an expedient solution to a range of domestic and international problems. Many of these capabilities, originally intended for warfighting, can be readily retasked during periods of relative peace.

On the non-military side, this phenomenon occurs because organisations are developing capabilities that were once the preserve of governments. In every field except warfightingand this is of course a vitally important exception-other organisations possess the means to undertake major operations. Such means include planning and operational staffs, intelligence, communications, logistics, aircraft, ships and personnel. The exception of warfighting is important because it is the one area in which armed forces reserve the right to operate under the sanction of the right of the state to wield coercive force. Yet, even within this paradigm, armed groups such as private military companies, terrorist organisations and transnational criminal organisations can possess capabilities that rival those of many national militaries.

Often the domestic tasks undertaken by military organisations and those undertaken by non-military organisations overlap. This overlap is

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215 *Ibid.*

apparent during military support to the civil community, search and rescue, emergency medical support, disaster relief, and law enforcement. The international tasks of armed forces also abound with examples of the overlapping of tasks. Overlap often generates friction between disparate types of organisations.

An authoritative guide to peace support operations describes the current situation of overlap during complex peace operations:

> Stereotyped mutual images flourish when peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies work together in the same operational area. Peacekeepers look with dismay at the loose-knit and apparently 'shambolic' civilian structures that are intended to provide humanitarian assistance, while the civilians view the peacekeepers as inflexible and culturally insensitive. The relationship is fragile. The humanitarian community does not wish to be seen as the instrument of the peacekeepers, the peacekeepers often bring with them a significant capacity to become engaged in humanitarian assistance and resent the fact that this capability is rejected by humanitarian agencies. Yet, the peacekeepers and humanitarians find themselves in complex emergencies relying upon each other to accomplish their respective objectives, each side increasingly seeking the support of the other.[216]

During complex peace operations-which may include missions such as armed combat, law enforcement, emergency relief, humanitarian assistance, electoral support and nation building-military and non-military organisations can develop a symbiotic relationship. For example, an armed force that aims to restore stability often requires support from humanitarian relief agencies, and these agencies need military protection to perform their mission.[217]

The convergence between military and non-military tasks is both a threat and an opportunity to successful operations. The threat is posed by the potential for the overlapping of effort, which can cause inefficiency and frustration. The opportunity is provided by the higher likelihood that the two types of organisation will appreciate each other's work and better coordinate their efforts. Military organisations generally possess

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[216] R. Kent, 'Introduction to Civil Elements in Peace Support Operations', in J. Mackinlay (ed.), A *Guide to Peace Support Operations,* The Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, Providence, RI, 1996, pp. 36-7.

[217] *Ibid.*

superior security, communications and logistics; nonmilitary organisations can draw on these to maximise their missions. Non-military organisations, on the other hand, generally offer better local knowledge and are more altruistic than warfighters. They may also provide longer-term commitment to solving problems, while armed forces prefer quantifiable and achievable 'end-states'.

The armed forces of the advanced countries are increasingly being required to prepare for 'three block war' in which they must simultaneously employ their humanitarian, diplomatic and combat skills in a crowded and confusing environment. In the midst of this environment, NGOs have been described as '. . . the footsoldiers in the war against hunger and disease in complex humanitarian emergencies'.[218] This description reflects both the importance of NGOs and the frequency with which they deploy to situations of armed conflict alongside armed forces.

Concepts for the Integration of Military and Civilian Capabilities

The integration of military and civilian capabilities provides challenges and opportunities. The advanced countries are generally comfortable with limited utilisation of military capabilities in domestic affairs, but this utilisation is usually seen as an exception to the general rule of the separation of armed forces from the political process and normal social processes.

Drawing on the preceding analysis of the changing meaning of security and the changing security environment, two concepts are proposed for the effective integration of military and civilian capabilities.

Whole-of-nation Security

This paper has described the process by which the concept of national security has been broadened from the traditional notion of the ability of a

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[218] A. Natsios, US *Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies,* Washington Papers 170, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1997, p. 56.

state to resist armed attack to the ability of the state to maximise the human security of its inhabitants. This trend has been partially realised through the gradual broadening of the tasks of armed forces, but it is yet to be fully realised in Australia. Such a realisation would require the complete adoption of whole-of-nation governmental processes.

The creation of a national security council that would be responsible for the management of Australian national security in a broad sense, and that would transcend the sectoral approaches to security of defence, diplomacy, trade, economics, border control and law enforcement, would be an important step in this direction. The creation of such a council would bring the elements of Australia's security bureaucracy into a unified organisation that was able to deal with issues of national security at a level higher than that achieved within individual departments. The council would be aimed at overcoming the tendencies of the departments to conceptualise security in terms relevant to their perceptions of their 'core business': Defence as military power; Foreign Affairs and Trade as diplomacy; Attorney-General's as the rule of law; Justice and Customs as border control, and so on.

The idea is not new. Ross Babbage suggested the formation of a high-level policy development and coordination staff, the National Security Council, in 1989, this proposal was supported by the Wrigley Report.[219]

Gary Brown suggested an independent Australian National Security Staff, perhaps as an 'outrider' to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, in 1994.[220] The creation of the National Security Committee of Cabinet and the Secretaries Committee on National Security, following the election of the Coalition Government in 1996, does not fulfil this requirement. These are essentially interdepartmental rather than supradepartmental in nature, and the wrangling between the departments continues.

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[219] R. Babbage, *A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the* 1990s, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, *1990, pp. 206-7. The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia's Defence,* Report to the Minister for Defence by Alan K. Wrigley, AGPS, Canberra, June 1990, pp. 465-8.

[220] G. Brown, *Australia's Security: Issues for the New Century,* Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, pp. 159-69.

These changes will encounter resistance from the governmental bureaucracy and the military establishment. Conservative in its ethos, the military establishment has a hierarchical structure that tends to reinforce accepted practices rather than encourage new ones. Defence bureaucracies, like most large organisations, tend to concentrate on a succession of imminent, short-term crises. This style of management is well suited to dealing with the onslaught of missions with which the ADF has recently been faced, but it is less apt for deep and long-range strategic thinking. It can result in the urgent crowding out the important. In a thought-provoking piece on military conservatism entitled 'The Ghosts of Omdurman', Daniel Bolger pointed out that '. . . armies tend to persist in things they appreciate, and to dismiss unpleasant interim experiences as aberrations'.[221] John Keegan's examination of the war reached the same findings, noting that traditionalist military elites cling to outdated military skills. The Samurai and Mamelukes are Keegan's best-known historical examples.[222] The gallant fighter pilot, skilled in the art of 'dogfighting', may provide another example of an obsolescent, elite skill in the approaching era of smart missiles and uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).[223]

Sustainable Partnerships

The relationship between military and civilian organisations must be based on the concept of 'sustainable partnerships'.[224] This concept requires all parties to understand each other's motivations and aims, in

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[221] D. P. Bolger, 'The Ghosts of Omdurman', *Parameters,* Autumn 1991, p. 32. See also Carl Builder's analysis of the continuity of US military thinking from the American Civil War and particularly since World War II in C. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis,* RAND, Baltimore, MD, 1989.

[222] J. Keegan, *A History of Warfare,* Hutchinson, London, 1993, p. 225.

[223] For recent items on UAV see D. Hambling, 'Sting in the tail of these cyber wasps', *The Canberra Times,* 25 November 1999, p. 10 and B. Park, 'Defence looks to pilotless plane', *The Age,* 30 November 1999, p. 1.

[224] This term is used in *The United Nations and Civil Society: The Role* of NGOs, Proceedings of the 30th United Nations Issues Conference 1999, The Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa, 1999, p. 2.

order to appreciate areas of complementarity and areas of potential disagreement. The health of the relationship depends on the frank and complete exchange of information, as secrecy tends to breed distrust. When information must be protected for reasons of operational security, it is best that the non-military representatives receive an explanation of this reasoning.

Even if the principles of successful convergence are observed, the convergence of military and non-military tasks is not entirely unproblematic. Strategic planners and their armed forces are often uncomfortable with the increasing demands posed by the range of new tasks that have accompanied the broadened meaning of security. Traditional military thinkers often prefer the Clausewitzian logic of warfare, and the ambiguity of success and failure in new security tasks is troubling to statesmen and generals.

Another possible approach would be to create purpose-designed elements of the ADF; these elements would be oriented specifically towards armed conflict or other types of operations. The approach may be attractive to those who wish to quarantine the broadened range of military roles from the 'core business' of warfighting. Closer examination reveals that this approach is not feasible for six reasons:

- The ethos of the ADF would risk compromise by a division into two elements: one tough and aggressive and the other tactful and cautious. One solution to this possible compromise would be to orient the part-time force towards non-warfighting options, but this would serve to reinforce the notion that the part-time force is less important than the full-time force. It would also reinforce the existing impression that non-warfighting missions are considered to be unimportant to the ADO.

- Key equipment such as C-130 aircraft, Blackhawk helicopters and transport vessels are required for all types of missions, and have been in short supply during periods of high demand.[225]

- Principal units such as intelligence, special forces, communications and engineers face similar demands.

[225] The inability of ALG to meet the demands placed on the C-130 fleet is noted in the *Defence Annual Report* 1998-1999, AusInfo, Canberra, 19 October 1999, pp. 214-5.

- The creation of elements optimised for non-warfighting missions would reduce the available forces if armed conflict occurred. Those elements optimised for non-warfighting options may not possess the training or capabilities to engage in armed conflict. As armed conflict is ultimately the most crucial mission of the armed forces, and may be essential for national survival, such a course would not be acceptable. The ADF is too small to allow segmentation into specific functions, particularly when a range of defence options might be required simultaneously. The optimised elements may be subject to repeated deployment, particularly in the case of successive peace or humanitarian operations.

- Overall, the ADF is too small to allow segmentation into specific functions, especially when a range of defence options could be required simultaneously.

Non-military organisations are also worried by some respects of the convergence process. Law enforcement agencies are sometimes suspicious of the intrusion into their area of expertise by military organisations, which dwarf their policing capabilities. NGOs risk the loss of their neutrality if they cooperate too closely with armed forces. The objectives and cultural predispositions of military and non-military personnel often differ, particularly in the case of NGO volunteers whose humanitarian motivations are generally different from those of professional military personnel.

Ultimately, and notwithstanding the importance of the convergence process, armed forces are unique in their ability to undertake the military task of warfighting. This task remains the primary focus of the armed forces of most advanced countries, and the resilience of the state, and the durability of realism, indicate that warfighting will continue to be the main focus.

The Convergent Future

The key to success in the complex multi-mission environment of the future is versatility and adaptability. Capabilities that are restricted in their usefulness to a narrow range of circumstances are less flexible and cost-effective than those that offer a wider range of options.

Convergence will continue to affect the ADF, which will continue to provide deterrence and defence, while contributing to the expanding range of missions that flow from thebroadened meaning of security. Defence policy and operations will increasingly deal with immigration control, counterterrorism, responding to WMD, environmental

protection missions, constabulary operations, disaster relief operations and peace operations.

Some likely force-structuring outcomes can be deduced from the demands of convergence. The navy will require craft that can conduct surveillance and enforcement missions. It will also provide strategic sea-lift to other ADF assets to missions overseas, including amphibious operations.

The Army will require infantry and supporting combat arms, complemented by special forces, in balanced and mobile groupings. It will need to be able to deploy quickly, both in Australia and overseas, and to exert coercive power in a restrained manner. Specialist intelligence, civil affairs, military police and psychological operations personnel will support army combat units. The shrinking size of the Army has required its personnel to have a broader range of skills to enable it to undertake a wider range of tasks.[226] Heavy combat equipment such as main battle tanks and conventional artillery will decline in utility, but innovative approaches may maintain their capabilities in lighter forms. As an example, variants of the LAV-25 reconnaissance vehicle, currently used by the Australian Army, are the ACV-105 (which mounts a 105mm gun) and the 120 AMS (which mounts a 120mm mortar).[227] Armoured transport and reconnaissance vehicles such as the M-113 and LAV-25 proved their relevance to peace operations in Somalia and East Timor, and the need for them will not diminish.The Air Force will require aircraft that can support naval and land-based operations. It will be likely to develop a stand-off warfare capability, possibly using UCAVs. Any future military operations in space will also fall into the realm of the air force.

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226 See B. Houston, *Developing Army Doctrine in the Post-Cold War* Era, Working Paper No. 302, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996, p. 25. For a US analysis see S. J. Freedburg, 'Over There', *National Journal*, 17 April 1999, pp. 1026-30.

227 'Australia interested in fire-support vehicles', *Janes Defence Weekly,* 8 September 1999, p. 45.

Overall, the ADF will need to restructure its balance between forces intended for high levels of warfare and those intended for lower levels of conflict, including peace operations, with the latter gaining increased prominence. Since the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Army has received less emphasis than its sister services in the defence of Australia role. Retired Chief of Army John Grey described his role as 'a mangy dog under the table picking up crumbs from the navy and air force'.[228] The Army will now rise to a renewed level of importance and receive increased funding. This process had started before the operations in East Timor. The Army's key doctrine *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* described an offshore role for the Army.[229] The Prime Minister John Howard characterised the new doctrine as 'inelegantly put' but did not repudiate it and announced that the Army would face no further budget cuts.[230] The process of reinvigorating the Army continued with the announcement of the Timor Levy and the accompanying decision to increase the funding of the ADF, principally the Army.

will differ, not merely in location and military situation, but in fundamental orientation, for example, military diplomacy followed by peace operations followed by support to law enforcement. Only very versatile and adaptable force elements will be suitable for this range of challenges.

These changes will not remove the requirement for a strong and capable ADF, armed with appropriate types of high-technology weapons, because military strength can be crucial to successful operations at all points on the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately, successful foreign policy must be supported by a 'big stick' (a coercive capability), and Australia will continue to require a potent deterrent capability.

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228 Quoted in D. Snow, 'Army fatigue', *The Sydney Morning Herald,* 2 October 1999, p. 42; T. Wright, 'Army on a shoestring', *The Age,* 2 October 1999, pp. 1; 12.

229 *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,* Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training Centre, Departmental Publishing Service, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1998.

230 R. Garran, 'Army has foreign shores in its sights', *The Australian,* 4 March 1999, p. 2; R. Garran, 'Defence to get the cash, says PM', *The Australian,* 5 March 1999, p. 2.

The acceptance of the reconceptualisation of security, and the broadened range of missions for armed forces, may become crucial to the survival of armed forces themselves. Some would argue that their survival is unimportant and that their disappearance would contribute to world peace. The historical lessons provided by the propensity of humankind to engage in conflict, and the demonstrated requirement for communities to seek to defend themselves, makes this pacifist logic unpersuasive. Such logic is also unlikely to be accepted by the peoples of the advanced nations, who continue to require their armed forces to provide for national security as well as for new concepts of security.

If the broadened meaning of security is resisted and wars do not occur regularly enough to justify the maintenance of standing armed forces, as is predicted by some theorists on the stabilising effects of globalisation, then armed forces will fade in their importance. A junior US Army officer ironically illustrated this type of thinking, asserting in 1998 that 'We are the first generation in a long time that hasn't really needed the Army'.[231]

Such words are surprising, particularly as they were spoken by a serving officer, but they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the contemporary role of armed forces. The Cold War paradigm of massed armies preparing to wage war in the shadow of intercontinental nuclear strikes has shifted forever. Instead, armed forces now prepare for, and conduct, a range of roles. This range stretches from deterrence and coercion, used reluctantly but still available to governments as a last resort, through protecting national security against new types of threats, to enhancing the security of individuals, society and the global commons. The expanded range of post-Cold War missions has increased the utility and importance of the armies, navies and air forces of the advanced countries.

The driving forces that have led to the broadening of security and challenged the prevailing realist paradigm will continue to affect the world. Globalisation will further alter the operation of the states system,

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[231] D. Snyder, 'Fort Hood Units Modify Training Role: Brute force no longer troops' main mission', Dallas *Morning News*, 6 July 1998, p. 9.

although states themselves appear resilient, at least in the short term. The post-Cold War era may witness the avoidance of major wars, but it cannot avoid armed conflicts. Thus, the trends that informed the development of this paper will continue as the current generation of ADF personnel is replaced by new recruits whose concept of the Cold War will be as distant in time as ours was of World War II.

Australian defence is engaged in a trajectory that reflects the reconceptualisation of security, and this is leading to the diversification of ADF missions. Australia is not alone in this process, and it can learn much from the experiences of similar nations. Much has changed since the end of the Cold War, not least security and defence. In 1989, foreseeing the scale of the changes to the strategic environment, Luttwak argued for 'profound change within the armed forces'.[232] He later noted that 'the Cold War lasted so long that nobody remembers any prewar normality to which the military should revert'.[233]

In 1990, Theodore Sorensen wrote about the present 'conceptual vacuum' that informed foreign policy since the removal of the 'touchstones' of the threat posed by Soviet communism and the Cold War. He carefully argued against the redefinition of the national interest according to a 'mishmash of political considerations' derived from the broadened security agenda, and argued instead for the promotion of democracy and stable economic development.[234] He recommended the reorientation of US foreign policy towards low-level conflicts, and countering the threats of illicit drugs and damage to the environment. Following a similar logic, Ralph Peters has argued that enemies are now more likely to be criminals than warriors. These emergent enemies will not respect the rules of war and will pay no heed to issues of national sovereignty. Indeed they may turn these issues against nation-states,

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232 E. Luttwak, 'Do We Need a New Grand Strategy?', *The National Interest,* Spring 1989, p. 11.

233 E. Luttwak, 'A Post-Heroic Military Policy', *Foreign Affairs,* July/August 1996, p. 35.

234 T. C. Sorensen, 'Rethinking National Security', *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1990, pp. 1-18.

which find it more difficult to coordinate international responses than unilateral ones.[235]

The study of the future indicates that security will continue to change in meaning and that armed forces are likely to continue to alter as a result. In his analysis of the future roles of the US Armed Forces, Steven Metz described the orthodox position within the US defence establishment: that the security environment of 2020 will be similar to that of 1997. The official expectation is that the conduct of war will be made more efficient by the RMA but that war will remain '. . . essentially political, episodic, violent, state-centric and distinct from peace'.[236] This comfortable complacency is disturbing for those that are willing to consider alternative futures. In the process of this consideration, Metz's analysis revealed four 'feasible alternatives'

- a trisected security system in which nations fall into three categories, depending on their level of advancement and characterised by three varying levels of ability to wage warfare. In this system, first-tier nations would utilise technology to seek to reduce their own casualties; second-tier nations would rely on a Clauswitzian approach to warfare; and third-tier nations would feature armed gangs, militias and terrorists;[237]
- a world divided between transnational ideologies, beliefs or 'civilisations', drawing on Huntington's work;[238]
- a system of states that is complicated by the internal collapse of states, ruthless sub-national violence and the limited utility of the RMA, as predicted by Martin van Creveld, Ralph Peters and Charles Dunlap;[239]

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235 R. Peters, *Fighting for the Future,* Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1999, pp. 22-3.

236 S. Metz, 'Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures', *Parameters,* Autumn 1997, p. 16.

237 This approach is similar to Alvin Toffler's 'three waves' of the development of human society.

238 See Huntington, *op. cit.*

239 See for example van Creveld, *op. cit.; R.* Peters, 'The Culture of Future Conflict', *Parameters,* Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; and C. Dunlap, '21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths', *Parameters,* Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37.

and a new system of commercialised armed conflict characterised by formal mercenary organisations employed by nations and corporations.[240]

The consideration of these differing scenarios, and Metz's conclusion that the future is likely to feature elements of each, indicates that traditional state-versus-state armed conflict is viewed with increasing scepticism, even within US official military thinking. The expectation is for postmodern armed forces to perform a broader and more complicated range of missions.

While deterrence and coercion will remain important requirements for the 21 st-century ADF, it will be confronted by a more extensive range of missions with complicated underlying causes. The types of operations that the ADF may conceivably undertake during the next decade include:

- the continuation of the established range of noncombatant missions derived from the changing meaning of security;
- operations to restore law and order, deliver humanitarian aid or evacuate foreign nationals in weak South Pacific states;
- peace operations responding to secessionist movements in South-East Asia and South Pacific states;
- counter-terrorist operations to respond to asymmetric attacks by state, sub-state or non-state actors; defence against information warfare;

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240 For the contemporary development of this phenomenon see D. Isenberg, *Soldiers of Fortune Ltd: A Profile of Today's Private Sector Mercenary Firms,* Center for Defense Information Monograph, November 1997, http://www.cdi.org (accessed 22 June 1998); D. Shearer, *Private Armies and Military Intervention,* International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 316, London, 1998; and T. K. Adams, 'The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict', *Parameters,* Summer 1999, pp. 103-16.

- participation in multinational enforcement operations against rogue states; and
- humanitarian operations in collapsed states.

The increasingly complex range of threats that spring in part from the changing meaning of security will create a more demanding world for national governments and armed forces. However, scholars have detected reasons for optimism. Barry Blechman's analysis of contemporary international relations sees economic interdependence between nations; technology diffusion from the advanced to developing countries; the increasingly global audience for all things, good and bad, that has been created by the communications revolution; and the universalising and sharing of values as leading to a cooperative version of international security. Collective security, led by a strengthened UN, remains relevant to Blechman's incipient 'new world order', to control rogue states that are unwilling to join in the cooperative spirit.[241]

The closing words of John Keegan's A *History of* Warfare provide a powerful message:

> Politics must continue; war cannot. That is not to say that the role of the warrior is over. The world community needs, more than it has ever done, skilful and disciplined warriors who are ready to put themselves at the service of its authority. Such warriors must be properly seen as the protectors of civilisation, not its enemies.[242]

Australia, like other advanced countries, is well placed to make a positive contribution to a cooperative and peaceful world. Robert Johansen has proposed the need for a 'principled foreign policy' [243] designed to follow humanitarian values, and Australia has demonstrated through its leadership role in East Timor that it is moving in that direction. Australia has accepted the reconceptualisation of security and is modifying its previously exclusively realist stance. It faces the challenges of refocusing its national security and managing

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241 B. Blechman, 'International Peace and Security in the TwentyFirst Century', in K. Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 289-307.

242 J. Keegan, A *History of Warfare,* Hutchinson, London, 1993, pp. 391-2.

243 R. C. Johansen, 'A Policy Framework for World Security', in M. T. Klare and D. C. Thomas (eds), *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End,* St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, pp. 401-24.

the phenomenon of the convergence of military and non-military tasks. The outlook in these areas is promising. Principles such as political legitimacy and humanitarianism, tempered by the norms of using force as a last resort and respect for sovereignty, offer the optimum means of providing security and the best guidance for the creation of successful Australian foreign and defence policy.

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