Army

An Australian doctrinal concept for Special Warfare: Lessons and Considerations

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Executive Summary

Recent operational experience, operating 'through, by and with' security partners in Afghanistan and Iraq, has yet to be codified into Australian doctrine. To develop such doctrine, the Australian Army requires a conversation, drawing on analysis of best practice, personal observation and lessons captured from over a decade of recent deployments. The clear conclusion from the Australian (and Western) experience is that special warfare — the conduct of operations with local partners — is difficult, time-consuming and must be tailored to the subtle nuances of the cultural environment. The relevant literature presents a strong argument that specific training, development opportunities, selection criteria and career streaming should be utilised to build a mature Australian special warfare capability. This is contrary to the way in which Australia has deployed forces during recent operations, and therefore requires detailed analysis before it can be considered. This paper launches this conversation by offering 'best practice' recommendations for the conduct of special warfare, and providing an initial reference for those assigned to mentor Iraqi forces or undertake international engagement activities with like-minded security partners.

The author

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Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered appropriate.

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called 'wars of liberation,' to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it — and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved — a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training …

You will need to understand the importance of military power and also the limits of military power, to decide what arms should be used to fight and when they should be used to prevent a fight, to determine what represents our vital interests and what interests are only marginal. Above all, you will have a responsibility to deter war as well as to fight it … Our forces, therefore, must fulfill a broader role as a complement to our diplomacy, as an arm of our diplomacy, as a deterrent to our adversaries, and as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them.

<div align="right">

US President John F. Kennedy
6 June 1962

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Introduction

Written over half a century ago, President Kennedy's words to the 1962 graduating class from West Point belie the concept of the 'strategic corporal' as a product of the globalised media age. Instead, his address highlights the fact that junior military leaders have long operated at the edge of their nation's political will. Clausewitz would agree. Special warfare focuses this effect through the lens of diplomacy, economic unrest, ethnic enmity and poor governance. Its 'special' nature stems from the Western military foundation in conventional bipolar contests, utilising a planning methodology that assesses enemy critical vulnerabilities, the friendly mission requirement and orchestrates defeat mechanisms accordingly. When operating through, by and with like-minded security partners, this paradigm appears insufficient given the simple addition of at least a third key stakeholder. To orchestrate plans in a traditional bipolar manner does not satisfactorily address these complexities.

The term 'special warfare' has been deliberately adopted to alert military professionals to the subtle differences in stakeholder influence, objectives and capabilities that govern the conduct of such operations. 'Special' in this context does not imply 'special forces'; instead, special warfare as a term urges caution and invites a deliberate and sensitive approach to such battlespace complexities appropriate to contemporary defence challenges.

The need to define special warfare

> Following limited success in counter-narcotic operations during the early 1990s, President Bill Clinton launched the Plan Columbia policy which called for SOF [special operations forces] to 'build and train a large and capable Columbian special operations command and a highly proficient special police unit … Since 2001, the production of cocaine in Columbia is down by 72 percent. The guerrilla organisations … have stopped their kidnapping for ransom campaign and, as of 24 November 2012, the peace talks between the FARC and the government of Columbia are off to a good start … This train-the-trainer approach by SOF is now helping to create a stable Central America with nations able to protect their own security without a major investment by US forces.[1]

The value of indirect capacity-building strategies is exemplified by Plan Columbia, yet the Australian Defence Force (ADF) lacks a coherent doctrine for the conduct of such operations. The Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) emulates aspects of Plan Columbia in what is termed 'indigenous capacity building' (ICB).[2] In Iraq, such activities are referred to as 'advise and assist' (AA) operations. In Afghanistan, Australian contributions to NATO's mission were conducted under Security Force Assistance (SFA) or Building Partner Capacity (BPC) missions, but may retrospectively have been be termed advise, assist and accompany (AAA) missions. If nothing else, this litany of three-letter acronyms and synonymous terms demonstrates the Army's need to develop a single, defined concept for operating through, by and with security partners.

'Special warfare' as a term has a rich history. In 1962, special warfare was defined by then US Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr, as 'a term used by Army to embrace all military and paramilitary measures and activities related to Unconventional Warfare, Counter-Insurgency and psychological warfare'.[3] This definition grew from US experience in the Philippines in the 1890s, the

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1   Colonel Cory Peterson, 'The Use of Special Operations Forces in Support of American Strategic Security Strategies', Joint Special Operations University, 2014, p. 8.

2   The Australian Army most recently defined the role of ICB as: 'ICB nurtures the establishment of civilian governance which may include local and central government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems.' Future Land Warfare Directorate, LWD-1, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,* Army Headquarters, Canberra, 2014.

3   Alfred H. Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins,* National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1982. In this context, unconventional warfare refers to subversion, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, counter-insurgency to efforts to prevent or eliminate subversive insurgency and psychological warfare to efforts to influence to support US objectives.

actions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II to foment insurrection behind enemy lines, and countering Soviet expansion in Korea, Eastern Europe and Germany. Secretary Stahr offered a more succinct definition when he described the capability as designed 'to fight as guerrillas, as well as against guerrillas'.[4]

US special forces now define 'special warfare' as the:

> … execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in permissive, uncertain or hostile environments.[5]

From an Australian perspective, the term 'special warfare' has similar origins which include clandestine activities with partisan forces in Europe, with tribal Abyssinians in Ethiopia, with the Nationalists in China, and with the Iban in Borneo during World War II, the Montagnard and Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) advisers during the Vietnam War, and the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR). In the Australian context, special warfare is better defined as:

> … a combination of direct and indirect methods of achieving strategic aims through, by or with a foreign military, paramilitary, militia or other recognised organisation.

This difference in terminology is a result of the US history of optimising its special warfare capability, leveraging particularly the scale of the American military which can dedicate areas of responsibility to elements of its forces. A 'deep understanding of cultures and foreign languages' is almost untenable for Australian Army force generation, despite being an admirable end state. However it is also worth recognising that capacity-building operations appear to be the government's current preference, and therefore the 'special training and education' essential to the conduct of such operations will be an implicit requirement for the Army into the future.

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4   Ibid.
5   United States (US) Army Special Operations Forces, 'ARSOF 2022', 2014, at: www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf (accessed 16 July 2016).

Special warfare in context

The conflict in Vietnam was characterised by the assiduous use of the Maoist doctrine of the People's (Guerrilla) War by the Viet Cong, prompting some later commentators to observe that 'the French and American failures to suppress the Revolutionary War in Vietnam have made it evident that the world is entering an era in which such wars will be a dominant feature.'[6] However this era was arguably already under way at the time of the Vietnam War. Insurgency has 'been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949',[7] with almost every South-East Asian nation experiencing insurgency since World War II.[8] In this context, it is imperative that the ADF gain an intimate understanding of insurgency, counter-insurgency and the indirect methods employed within each. This understanding will allow the counter-insurgent to apply the style of practice advocated by Galula (and others), involving the mobilisation of a like-minded partner force:

In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause. The technique of power consists in relying on the favourable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralise or eliminate the hostile minority … The strategic problem of the counterinsurgent may be defined now as follows: To find the favourable minority, to organise it in order to mobilise the population against the insurgent minority.[9]

Planners must use the following lessons from counter-insurgency conflicts to plan the building of partner force capacity:

- The median length of a successful counter-insurgency operation (COIN) is 11 years.[10]

- 'Forces that establish effective COIN practices prevail in 69 months [around five years]'[11] which means that simply establishing effective practices is not enough. They must be sustained for an average of six years to become institutionalised.

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6   Brigadier (retd) Samuel Griffith, *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare,* Anchor Press, New York, 1978, p. v.
7   Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan, 'Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies', RAND, at: www.rand.org, 2013, p. xvii.
8   Ibid., p. xxi. These conflicts include: Malaya (1948–1955), Indonesian Darul Islam (1958–1962), Indonesian East Timor (1975–2000), Indonesian Aceh (1976–2005), Papua New Guinea (1988–1998), Philippines Huk Rebellion (1946–1956), Philippines MNLF (1971–1996), Vietnam (1960–1975), Cambodia (1967–1975), Kampuchea (1978–1992), Laos (1959–1975) and the ongoing insurgencies in Myanmar, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines.
9   David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,* Praeger Security International, London, 2006, p. 53.
10 Paul et al., 'Paths to Victory', p. xxxi.
11 Ibid., p. xxxiii.

To sway a neutral majority takes time; likewise, it takes significant investment to sustain gains in the face of adversary counters. RAND analysis identified three key parameters in designing a COIN campaign plan, noting that these concepts were implemented in each and every COIN success, while no losing COIN force implemented all three:

- tangible support reduction ('tangible support' refers to the ability of the insurgents to maintain required levels of recruits, weapons and materiel, funding, intelligence, and sanctuary)

- commitment and motivation (this refers to the extent to which the government and COIN forces demonstrated that they were actually committed to defeating the insurgency)

- flexibility and adaptability (this captures the ability of COIN forces to adjust to changes in insurgent strategy or tactics)[12]

Special warfare will most likely need to consider both security forces (population-centric) and disruption forces (enemy-centric). It must also consider a long-term (6 to 11+ years) horizon while providing short-term tangible effects and it must be dynamic in application, adapting to evolving enemy strategies. 'Although opponents of one view or the other might wish to believe otherwise, population-centric and enemy-centric logics do not follow an "either/or" dynamic; they can be pursued in tandem, with the COIN force seeking to deny the insurgents the support of the population while simultaneously seeking to reduce the insurgents through decisive action.'[13]

In the major conventional conflicts of our recent military history — World War II, Vietnam and Iraq — aspects of the special warfare mission can be readily identified operating in parallel over these long time-frames employing 'strategic optionality' to adapt to the changing campaign.[14] In World War II, the OSS assisted the Yugoslav, Polish and Norwegian partisans, as well as other partisan groups, in their fight against Nazi Germany, tying down forces that might otherwise have been used in conventional battles. Likewise, the Australian independent commando companies in Timor tied down over a

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12   Ibid., pp. xxii–xxiv.
13   Ibid., p. 5.
14   The term 'strategic optionality' is discussed by Jan Glieman in 'Unconventional Warfare and Strategic Optionality', ASPI Strategist, 1 October 2014, at: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/unconventional-warfare-and-strategic-optionality/ (accessed 12 January 2016). Glieman writes: 'Strategic optionality is best described as the deliberate employment of multiple, parallel efforts to shape the environment and the behaviour of actors within it. Additionally, it comes with the intent of selectively switching support as a campaign unfolds, abandoning ineffective or counterproductive efforts in order to increase support for effective ones.'

division of Japanese troops that might otherwise have been employed in Papua New Guinea. Today, the Australian Army trains Iraqi forces to counter the influence of the Islamic State.

Thus a focused review of the Australian Army's capacity to wage special warfare is timely, acknowledging that other nations, like Australia, will seek to influence local forces towards their strategic objectives. A recent US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) paper described this challenge of competing pressures for local partners, noting that:

> Russia currently employs special operations forces, intelligence agents, political provocateurs, and media representatives, as well as transnational criminal elements in eastern and southern Ukraine … the brazen audacity of UW within Russian Hybrid Warfare has produced urgent concern among America's NATO and non-NATO partners that Russia may apply similar approaches to other regional countries in the region with dissenting Russophile populations, such as the Baltic States, Moldova and Georgia.[15]

Iran is mounting its own strategic challenge by competing for control of populations in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria, using proxies to attain strategic ends. Such actions (and their counters) blur the lines between intelligence agencies and military forces, and the distinctions between 'war' and 'peace' — a situation met by US SOCOM's adoption of the 'grey zone' terminology.[16] There may be potential for such operations to serve as a preemptive 'inoculation' by improving the capacity of a nation to resist unconventional or insurgent threats (termed 'foreign internal defense' by the US). Such operations are an attractive strategic objective for Western militaries seeking to avoid the costly interventionist actions of the past decade. Special warfare is therefore inherently long term, political in nature, and its effects difficult to assess.

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15   US Army SOCOM white paper, 'Counter-Unconventional Warfare', 26 September 2014.
16   Described by Dr Michael Mazaar in *Mastering the Grey Zone: Understand a Changing Era of Conflict,* Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2 December 2015, at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil (accessed 12 January 2016).

The spectrum of special warfare

The primary challenge associated with special warfare is the litany of terminology that exists which serves to confuse rather than illuminate. While some of the terminology used in this paper may be unfamiliar to the Australian reader, it can be useful to accurately describe the concept itself and its employment. Perhaps unhelpfully, graphics such as Figure 1 below demonstrate aspects of this definition, but also immediately highlight inconsistencies, namely the over-simplification of COIN as distinct from special warfare.


Figure 1: A graphical representation of the US definition of special warfare.[17]

17   'Dan Madden, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson, Abby Doll, 'Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in US Coercive Options', November 2014, RAND, at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR828.html (accessed 16 July 2016).

Key US definitions in the field of special warfare include:

- Unconventional warfare — defined as 'operations conducted by, with and through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.' It has also been defined as: 'activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.'[18]

- Foreign internal defence — this term is used by the US, United Kingdom (UK) and France. It is defined by the US doctrine publication JP 3-22 as: 'participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organisation to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.'[19] It is primarily concerned with strengthening an existing government.

- Security Force Assistance (SFA) — this term is used by the US and has been adopted by NATO. US Army doctrine defines SFA as 'the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.'[20] This term is useful in that 'legitimate authority' infers the host nation government and also the Australian and/or US governments, which of course represent the primary influence. This definition clarifies the mutual alignment of interests that exists in the use of indirect actions to achieve Australian national objectives through a foreign government's armed forces.

- Guerrilla warfare — guerrilla warfare in a classical special forces sense was defined by FM 31-21 as: 'military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.'[21] Hence, in the US sense, it is a tactic, not a strategy. This point is emphasised by Major General William Donovan, OSS commander during World War II: 'What distinguishes guerrilla warfare is the consistent strategy, of the refusal to fight a pitched battle, the refusal of any combat which can be avoided, sticking to the order to attack the isolated soldier, the small group, the convoy.'[22]

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18   JP 3-05, *Special Operations,* US SOCOM, Tampa, 2011.
19   JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense,* US Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 2010.
20   FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance,* US Department of the Army, 2009, p. v.
21   FM31-21: *Special Forces Operations,* US Department of the Army, 1965, p. 9.
22   Major General William J. Donovan (retd), Lecture on Partisan Warfare, Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 January 1951, p. 11.

Table 1 explains these US doctrinal concepts through descriptions of the way in which these terms differ.

Description	Prime Mover	US Role	Footprint	Low Signature
Unconventional Warfare	Insurgent	Advisory	Small	Yes
Foreign Internal Defense	HN Government	Advisory with the exception of 'Armed FID'	Small to Very large	Possibly
Counterinsurgency	US Government	Support to HN Government countering an insurgency	Large to very large	No
Stability Operations	HN Government	Stabilise an unstable HN Government	Small to very large	No
Counter-terrorism	US Government or HN Government	Disrupt clandestine networks that employ terror as a tactic.	Small	Yes

Table 1: Operations and activities of irregular warfare
(source: US Army SOCOM white paper, 'Counter-Unconventional Warfare', 26 September 2014).

Australia has generally adopted US and NATO terminology. However, a uniquely Australian term, 'indigenous capacity building' (ICB), was defined in *Adaptive Campaigning* as: 'actions to nurture the establishment of capacity within civil communities while simultaneously working to establish longer term governance and socio-economic capacity which meets the needs of the people.'[23] The Afghan theatre introduced Australia to the layering of support and its associated political risk, termed 'unilateral [coalition force-led], partnered and independent' (Afghan-led) operations. In Iraq, a similar layering of support emerged, termed 'advise, assist and accompany'. A graphical depiction of this variable level of Western commitment is illustrated in Figure 2 below. This figure also seeks to elaborate on the concepts of SFA, ICB and BPC, particularly in the Afghan context.

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23   Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning – *Army, Adaptive Campaigning: Army's Future Land Operating Concept,* Army Headquarters, Canberra, 2009, p. xii.

'Hourglass' Model for Special Warfare

Accompany implicit at all levels (the first A) wherever feasible. HN capacity informs deliberate decision RE: CF support.
Shared risk = shared understanding = improved ability to support Indigenous Capacity and Capability Building efforts.

Unilateral Operations (A):
- Context: Applied to a nascent HN force, or foreign augmentees to an FE.
- CF-led, planned and executed, potentially exploiting HN forces for linguist, guide and exploitation support.
- Prelim Phase for FORGEN capability: "Train the Trainer" and Talent Spotting for future Leaders.

Partnered Operations (AA or AAA):
- Context: Applied to an immature HN force that may lack specialist capabilities, leadership or experience.
- Generally CF-led, planned but jointly executed. Indigenous forces are utilised for population engagement, exploitation and HUMINT functions. Long-term HN capacity and capability building is the Main Effort.
  FE describes success through transition to independent HN operations.
- FORGEN capability now established. NASCENT OPGEN capability.

Independent Operations (AAA transitioning to Advise + Assist then Advise):
- Context: Applied to maturing HN force that may lack confidence or reslience.
- Generally Indigenous-led, planned and executed. CF provides a safety net, that may prevent tactical failure should the conditions present. CF support maintains situational awareness in the battlespace, and may look like limited or specialist forces.
- FORGEN capability now established. NASCENT OPGEN capability.

100% CF unilateral — CF Led

100% HN Independent — HN Led

Explaining the "Hourglass" model:
- "It takes time" – a key lesson from our operational experience.
- Minor Indig or Minor CF is desirable aspect. Without CF, access and influence is lost. Without Indig, population engagement and credibility is compromised.
- Understanding end-state capability objectives forward-casts critical path requirements (develop future leaders, train-the-trainer, build the facilities, implement FORGEN, refine the system, achieve Gross Training Requirement).

Figure 2: The hourglass model for special warfare

In the Australian context, several terms require definition:

- **Proxy warfare** — operating through others to achieve one's aims, where the target's (or targets') legitimacy is unclear or undetermined. Attribution is protected (clandestine) or may be a temporary expedient (i.e. a militia that is unlikely to be incorporated into a state's security apparatus, but intended for demobilisation in due course). This may also include factional liaison engagements.

- **Unconventional warfare** — operating with non-state actors to undermine a legitimate state. Legitimacy is distinguished by stability and/or a long tenure in control (i.e. operating inside hostile sovereign territory). The context for conducting operations in contravention of Westphalian norms will generally be that of a failed or failing state environment, potentially anchored to a 'responsibility to protect' strategic narrative. Thus, unconventional warfare may be a phase within a campaign plan or a line of operations executed within a joint special operations area.

- **Guerrilla warfare** — operating with non-state actors to prevent a state's armed forces operating illegitimately. Illegitimacy is distinguished by instability, jus ad bellum or shorter tenure in control of territory (i.e. an invading force within Australian sovereign territory). Thus, guerilla warfare may be a line of operations within a campaign, and is likely to be conducted beyond the friendly forward line of own troops.

- **Security force assistance (SFA)** — operating with state-sponsored actors to enhance their ability to enforce the rule of law.[24] SFA therefore operates in a pre-conflict or post-conflict environment through routine international engagement activities as well as in a conflict environment.

- **Psychological warfare** — operating across all the categories listed above, psychological warfare can be considered a unifying strand of special warfare. This term recognises that the operating environment is one of contesting wills, subversion, politics and influence, and seeks to distinguish this contest from other relatively benign forms of psychological operations. Thus, under this definition, psychological warfare would also be a component of psychological operations.

Variable commitment may exist, and capturing this level of commitment can be a useful addition to earlier terminology, as depicted in Table 2. In this context, 'assist' refers to the provision of materiel support, 'advise' to the provision of advice, guidance and training, and 'accompany' to the provision of tactical support, inclusive of fire support, medical evacuation support and intelligence sharing. It is important to note that such a matrix operates with blurred boundaries, offering descriptions, not absolutes.

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24   The term 'partner force assistance' could apply; however the use of a state-controlled partner force is explicit in SFA and this distinguishes it from unconventional warfare or proxy warfare.

	Proxy Warfare	Unconventional Warfare	Guerrilla Warfare	Security Force Assistance
Advise or Assist	US weapons support to the Contras in 1980s.	USSF training of Tibetan separatists following the Chinese annexation of Tibet, 1950s.	USSF support to Mujahideen during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 1979–89.	Embedded Officer Eg. DCP program.
Advise and Assist	USSF conduct of the Village Stability Operations program with Anti-Taliban Militias.	USSR training of ZAPTO separatists during the Rhodesian Insurgency.	OSS operations with partisans in occupied Europe during WWII.	CTU, Afghanistan (transition phase) Trg Team Iraq
Advise, Assist and Accompany	AATTV training of Montagnard tribesmen, RFs and PFs to fight the VC during the Vietnam War, 1970s.	Quds Force operations with Shi'a militia in Iraq, circa 2006.	USSF during invasion of Afghanistan, 2001.	ISAF Operations in Afghanistan (early phases 2007–2011)

Table 2: A spectrum of historic examples of special warfare. Coloring is indicative of published knowledge/experience in that part of the spectrum, with historic examples provided, segregating level of risk, training and complexity.

A comparison of this terminology with the framework in Figure 2 is graphically presented in Figure 3. The utility of this diagram lies in demonstrating that SFA is a component of a COIN strategy rather than a complete COIN strategy of itself. Likewise, guerrilla warfare may be a component of major combat operations, but is unlikely to be a complete strategy. Furthermore, the graphic does not delineate special warfare campaigns, again demonstrating the 'fuzzy' boundaries between types of operations.


Figure 3: Graphical presentation of Australian doctrinal terms.

Vietnam partnering — learning large lessons

We weren't the first — French capacity-building efforts

Australian and US efforts to build capacity with the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) were framed by the actions of the French during the Indo-China wars of the 1950s. The Viet Minh had evolved a basic understanding of guerilla warfare through resistance to the Japanese, ironically with US OSS assistance. The Viet Minh and, in particular, Ho Chi Minh's feeling of betrayal at the hands of the US may have served to harden the resolve of the North Vietnamese leadership to wage protracted campaigns against the French and the US.

The French adopted an 'enemy-centric' approach to counter-insurgency against the Viet Minh, which incorporated French advisers working with a large contingent of minority groups operating in offensive roles. By May 1949 there were up to 1868 Montagnard Guards in central and south Annam, approximately 1000 Frontier Guards in East Tonkin (Nung minority), 840 Frontier Guards in West Tonkin (Thais) and 1810 South Region Guards in South Annam (mostly Moi).[25] Such forces generally operated as commando units whose mission was to 'infiltrate areas controlled by the Vietminh to ambush enemy units, destroy supplies, and collect intelligence'.[26] Ethnic differences between highland tribes and the lowland Vietnamese have been a feature of the Vietnamese human terrain for centuries, and exploiting these existing tensions was probably regarded as a valuable enhancement to the French strategy.

The French also applied their own lessons in irregular warfare from the war of resistance waged by the *maquis* against the Germans in World War II and their support for proxy forces across Europe:

> A very distinct type of commando was the Composite Airborne Commando Groups (*Groupement de commandos mixtes aéroportés,* GCMA), created by General de Lattre de Tassigny in April 1951 … The GCMA was organised along five regional representations (RR), each of which had one or more subordinate units called antennas … (typically consisting of

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25 Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt and Todd Helmus, 'Locals Rule: Historical lessons for creating local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond', RAND, at: www.rand.org, 2012, p. 10.

26 Ibid., p. 13. French capacity-building within these commando elements deliberately exploited ethnically homogenous tribes. These included, for example, Hoa Hao commandos, Thai commandos and, in some cases, former Viet Minh combatants.

one officer, four NCOs, one radio-operator, and a hundred local auxiliaries) … In reality, antennas often reached 400 men, and some had up to 1,000 men ... The main purpose of the GCMA was to establish *maquis*, defined as pockets of resistance near or behind enemy lines from where guerrilla action (ambushes, sabotage, attacks of posts) could be carried out.[27]

These irregular forces were exceedingly efficient (six French special forces operators mentoring indigenous forces of over 100) and allowed a much greater dispersion of forces across the difficult jungle-clad and mountainous terrain of northern Vietnam.

Vignette: French partisans in Vietnam

At the time that the French Army occupied Than-Uyen on the right bank of the Red River, to the north of Nghia-Lo in Thai country, the town and its airfield were defended by a fortified post atop a rocky peak, held by one regular company reinforced by some partisans. But its security was rather chancy, even around the immediate approaches of the town, and on numerous occasions the Vietminh were able to open fire on the planes parked on the airfield.

After the fall of Nghia-Lo, the town of Than-Uyen, which had been evacuated by air-lift, was occupied by the Vietminh. Then, in October, 1953, native maquisards from the right bank of the Red River, recruited from among people who had remained loyal to us, were able with their own resources to reoccupy the Phong-Tho region and its airfield, to launch a successful raid on Lao-Kay, and, finally, to seize Than-Uyen.

Our masquisards, recruited from among and living in the midst of the local population, watched not the airfield, but rather the Vietminh themselves. They placed their agents everywhere – in units of the Vietminh, in every village, in every house, and on all the trails of the area. The entire population was responsible for watching the enemy, and nothing could escape its observation. When the maquisards signalled us that the area was free, our planes were able to land without risk on the airfield, to which it was unnecessary to give close protection.

Source: Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French view of Counterinsurgency*, Praeger Security International, London, 1964, reproduced 2006, pp. 46–47.

However the building of such maquis was a long-term process: 'its establishment was already an eight-month process, and to build confidence among the population might take years.'[28] Despite this, the use of irregulars

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27   Long et al., 'Locals Rule', pp. 13–18.
28   Ibid., p. 27.

ultimately proved a sustainable influence on the security situation in Vietnam, as the maquis continued fighting with the weapons left behind by the French. Written in 1963, Roger Trinquier's final operations order to his men conveys the despair of a commander abandoning his partners in Vietnam, and his pride in realising that they had found the formula for tactical success:

> The total suppression of logistical support … will bring in its wake the progressive liquidation of our [infiltrated] elements. There is little hope of seeing the leaders of our maquis escape the 'clemency' of President Ho Chi Minh … their only consolation remains the pride of having won the last successes of that campaign, and of having created a veritable popular uprising against the Vietminh.[29]

It took Ho Chi Minh almost five years to wipe out the *maquis* trained by the French, providing some indication of the evolution in effective special warfare techniques.[30] Ultimately however, the French approach failed at the strategic level following their humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu, at a time when insurgency was growing in Algeria.

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29   Bernard Fall, Introduction to Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*.
30   Long et al., 'Locals Rule', p. 18.

AATTV: regular mentoring

The rationale for employment of the Australian Army Training Team – Vietnam (AATTV) in 1962 was to support US efforts to improve the Government of South Vietnam's ability to defeat the Viet Cong (VC), ostensibly in an irregular war. As Australia's commitment to the war in Vietnam increased, and a 'hybrid war' emerged, AATTV members were deployed nationwide without caveat, thereby gaining exposure to US major combat operations, US Special Forces partnering with Montagnard tribesmen, and the training

of local irregular forces — Regional Forces (RFs) and Popular Forces (PFs). Its first commander, Colonel 'Ted' Serong, was specifically selected for this role, and undoubtedly influenced this diverse operational design:

> Serong was perhaps the ideal choice to lead the group (AATTV) in this early period (1962). He had recently served two years attached to the Burmese Army where he became familiar with the types of problems that beset Vietnam. Before that, he was commandant of the Jungle Training Centre (JTC) at Canungra in Queensland, where Australian battalions trained for Malaya … Serong himself was to join Headquarters Military Assistance Command Vietnam (HQMACV) … appointed Special Consultant on Counter Insurgency.[31]

Diverse employment around the country led to a deep understanding of operational mentoring across the full spectrum of operations in Vietnam, with operatives performing both a solid intelligence function and maximising the asymmetry of Australia's contribution to the war effort. With the deployment of the 1st Australian Task Force however, tension arose between expectations of the AATTV's support for the national mission in Phuoc Tuy province, and its traditional role of remaining dissociated from the national mission.[32] Such tensions were not unique and re-emerged in Iraq and Afghanistan.[33] The Australian Task Force commander's perspective was generally that 'if Australian advisers were to replace American advisers then they could exert more pressure on the Vietnamese in Phuoc Tuy.'[34] It seems that the positives of a nationwide mindset for AATTV advisers (facilitating national intelligence collection, anticipating emergent enemy tactics, etc) were not well articulated in operational reporting at that time, if they were understood at all.[35]

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31 Ian McNeill, *The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1984, pp. 6–11.

32 The primary argument presented for a national remit was to 'spreads our national presence far and wide … and to achieve the widest dissemination of our expertise.' AATTV, Presentation on The Roles and Achievements of the AATTV at Chief of the General Staff's Exercise, 1970, pp. 30–31.

33 These tensions emerged between the Al Muthanna Task Group and the COIN Centre for Excellence in Taji, and the Special Operations Task Group effects external to Uruzghan province.

34 Major General John Hartley (retd), 'The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam' in *The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1962-1972*, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), proceedings of the 2002 Chief of Army's Military History Conference, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2002, p. 262.

35 McNeill retrospectively highlights this benefit: 'by spreading the team, the army would be able to gain a diversity of experience and at the same times achieve a broader understanding of the nature of the insurgency.' McNeill, *The Team*, p. 9. Furthermore, 'The spread of the Team [outside Phuoc Tuy] meant that information gained from Training Team reports was instrumental in providing the Defence Department with an independent means of assessment of the war.' (p. 95).

The Australian model for preparing AATTV members for deployment with the team initially consisted of selecting warrant officers and captains 'from the top of their profession'[36] to instruct South Vietnamese forces in 'jungle warfare techniques, village defence and related activities'.[37] Once identified, these soldiers 'were briefed on a range of topics which related to COIN operations in Indochina' at the Intelligence Centre, amounting to approximately two weeks of instruction, before being taught jungle warfare skills at the Jungle Training Wing (JTW), Canungra.[38] Language skills were attained by only a very few members of the respective contingents,[39] and where language training did occur, amounted to only three weeks in duration.[40]

By 1970, the preparation for AATTV members had evolved to 'a [six-week] Advisers course at JTW, three weeks at the Intelligence Centre being briefed and learning colloquial Vietnamese, and finally a week at the Infantry Centre being brought up to date on friendly and enemy weapons.'[41] This package further evolved by April 1972 to become the 'Advisers' course [the seven-week Tropical Warfare Adviser's course at the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra] … followed immediately by a five day AATTV [Foreign] Weapons Training course at the Infantry Centre, Ingleburn, and a four week Colloquial Vietnamese Language Course.'[42] Adviser 'attributes' and operational experience were highly valued in posting considerations — 'almost without exception, the first [36] men of the Team returned to Vietnam for at least a second tour.'[43]

Having conducted operations with ARVN battalions, advisers noted that 'the most damaging deficiency in the ARVN was in the lack of competent

36   Ibid. High-performing officers and SNCOs were essential due to the political nature of advisory tasks. 'After our initial deployment we found that there was a need for advisers to know a lot more about the political, racial and religious differences and other "delicate" areas in order to carry out their duties intelligently and without causing national embarrassments.' Terry Smith, *Training the Bodes: Australian Army advisers training Cambodian infantry battalions – A postscript to the Vietnam War*, Big Sky Publishing, Sydney, 2011, pp. 2–3. 'An Australian advisor working with the Montagnards on operations against the VC could find himself, unless he was aware of all aspects of the local situation, training and equipping a force to oppose the South Vietnamese Government and establish an autonomous Montagnard state!'

37   McNeill makes an important distinction in the training conducted at Canungra, that all members were 'trained in jungle warfare, they had been through these courses before. It was not so much learning the skills which the team needed but knowledge of the techniques of teaching those skills in a foreign setting.' McNeill, *The Team*, pp. 12–14.

38   John Hartley, 'The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam', p. 259.

39   'Most of our advisers did not speak Vietnamese. The few who did and those who tried got a reception out of all proportion to their efforts and were much more quickly accepted by the Vietnamese. It was obvious that a knowledge of the local language broke the foreigner-to-foreigner barrier more rapidly than anything else.' AATTV, Presentation on 'The Roles and Achievements of the AATTV at Chief of the General Staff's Exercise, p. 4.

40   Hartley, 'The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam', p. 259. ADF School of Languages currently conducts a 12-week course for complex languages, allowing students to acquire the minimum useful level of speaking and listening skills.

41   AATTV, Presentation on 'The Roles and Achievements of the AATTV at Chief of the General Staff's Exercise, p. 7.

42   Smith, *Training the Bodes*, p. 41.

43   McNeill, *The Team*, p. 32.

leadership at all levels.'[44] The advisers' intended role was 'to arrange support for ARVN – the helicopters, the gunships, the close air support, the MEDEVACS and fire support from artillery and naval gunfire. Secondly … for liaison and co-operation with U.S. units and with other advisory teams.'[45] These roles helped mitigate against ARVN's limited leadership experience and officer staff functions.[46] Despite this support, ARVN's systemic leadership problems persisted. The only effort to systemically influence the ARVN leadership capability came late in the war, through the establishment of a Vietnamese Jungle Warfare Training Centre.[47]

With the expansion of the Australian Task Force, 'conventional' soldiers were drawn into supporting the training of local Vietnamese units on a rotational basis. 'The experience of advisers, both U.S. and Australian, had taught them to be cautious concerning the proffering of combat unit personnel as part-time advisers to the Vietnamese. Where it had happened it was not usually successful, not because of the quality of the men in the combat units, but because of their orientation and lack of experience in the advisory field … Advisers themselves considered that it was only after three months of working with the Vietnamese that they could begin to win confidence and achieve results.'[48] While well meaning, the desire for quick results in Vietnam (and again in Afghanistan) undermined the long-term strategic objective. McNeill noted the challenge of maligned perspectives and the resultant requirement for advisers to be empathetic with their partners:

> Problems and solutions seen by a highly trained, well equipped and supported Task Force, in a foreign country, whose personnel only fought the war for one year, and who did not have families or a social structure to consider, could be quite different from the problems and solutions as they appeared to the Vietnamese. If the advisor was seen by the Vietnamese to be controlled by the Task Force he could have forfeited his credibility and thus no longer be of use as an adviser.[49]

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44   Smith, *Training the Bodes*, p. 1.
45   Ibid., p. 7.
46   'The Advisers established their own command post and their communications duplicated the ARVN command net right up to corps level.' Ibid., p. 9.
47   The JWTC focused on tactical skills and was a Vietnamese-led initiative to reduce their reliance on the British school at Kota Tinggi in Malaysia. McNeill, The Team, pp. 428–33.
48   Ibid., p. 217.
49   Ibid., p. 95.

AATTV irregular mentoring

While the AATTV was employed to advise a range of irregular forces,[50] there appeared to be little difference in the selection or force preparation of individuals for the role of advising regulars versus irregulars, despite the significant differences between the two.[51] 'The adviser was placed in direct contact with the population of the villages and hamlets (while advising Territorial Forces). There the conflict was waged between the peasants on the one hand and the guerrillas and the Viet Cong infrastructure on the other.'[52] Territorial Forces (TFs) consisted primarily of RFs and PFs.[53] The differing narratives of servicemen who operated with irregulars illustrate the specific challenges of such close proximity to the insurgency and its damage on the local population:

> Many problems were completely new to us. For example after the 1968 Tet, 8000 refugees moved into my district from remote areas (feeding, housing, cholera, exhuming those killed in war crimes, etc) … much of our work was concerned with civil affairs type activities.[54]

The PF course (the RF and PF training was the same) delivered by the AATTV in 1973 appears little different to a standard 'infantry minor tactics' package for Australian Task Force pre-deployment training.[55] The training for RFs and PFs emphasised offensive operations when arguably it should have focused on defensive village protection/intelligence tasks in accordance with their role.[56] In Vietnam (and subsequently Afghanistan), the conduct of systemic analysis to determine and deliver the training that the indigenous

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50   Their roles were defined as: 'The Territorial Forces, a term used to encompass the various types of units controlled by Province Chiefs … Consisting of RFs [who] were recruited by the Province Chief from within the Province and organised into companies, each about 100 strong … Their role was to provide security to the lines of communication and key installations within the province and to provide a reaction force for the Province Chief … PFs on the other hand were recruited by the District Chiefs from within the District, and organised into platoons. Each district or sub-sector would have from 20 to 40 platoons. Their role was to provide security for the hamlets and villages – in other words a local militia.' Smith, *Training the Bodes*, pp. 13–15.

51   Late in the war, the establishment of Mobile Advisory Training Teams (MATTs) changed this conclusion. 'Members of the MATTs attended the eighteen-day US Army advisers' course at Di An outside Saigon (in addition to the AATTV force preparation) … MATTs generally found that the coaching most needed in the Territorial Forces was in the elementary, routine aspects of battle procedure and techniques which were so important for successful operations and the preservation of life.' McNeill, *The Team*, p. 444. The late evolution of this consideration and the additional training liability it imposed only amplify the conclusion that adviser-specific training is essential.

52   Ibid., p. 221.

53   'Recruited in the province, RF remained under the control of the province chief. Their role was to provide security for the population centres against local guerrilla attack or enemy units, which had bypassed the regular army.' Ibid., pp. 221–22.

54   Smith, *Training the Bodes*, p. 14.

55   No training seems to have been provided to militia leadership on the importance of intelligence, both collection and dissemination, and disrupting collection by VC or VCI. 'Firepower demo's, enemy weapon demo's and house search are considered interest subjects only.' AATTV, 'Training Program for Tactical Night Operations for PF Platoon and Squad Leaders', Australian War Memorial, 852-1-6, 27 March 1973.

56   AATTV, 'Company Minor Tactics Course: RF Training Phuoc Tuy', Australian War Memorial, 852-1-7, 26 February 1973.

force required and that was sustainable without Western support appeared mediocre, and occasionally failed to align the target audience with its intended role and task.[57]

Hartley balances this narrative by providing a vignette of success — that of Captain Barry Petersen, tasked to supervise and develop Montagnard paramilitary groups in the central highlands — who was able to raise, train and lead a force of over 1000 Montagnards who wrought havoc against the Viet Cong.[58] However, to prove a causal link that preparation for AATTV members was improving would be erroneous given that Petersen was a veteran of operational service in Malaya, where he had conducted combined operations with indigenous tribesmen.[59] As for the importance of mentoring irregulars, 'they [RF/PFs] were clearly the best forces for securing rural villages … they absorbed only 2-4 percent of South Vietnam's war costs but accounted for 12-30 percent of all Viet Cong and NVA combat deaths.'[60]

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57   Nagl concurs in his analysis of American support to the RF/PFs: 'Rather than a counter-guerrilla force dedicated to providing local security, the American advisers sought to build a force that was a mirror image of the US army.' Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, 'Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organisational Culture and Learning' in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), Osprey Publishing, 2008, p. 132.

58   Hartley, 'The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam', p. 260.

59   Frank Walker, *The Tiger Man of Vietnam*, Hachette Publishing Australia, 2010. Another significant variance from most AATTV members was that Petersen was also trained by ASIS prior to deployment, and seconded to the CIA for his mission with the Montagnards.

60   Nagl, 'Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organisational Culture and Learning', p. 145. Indeed Nagl also notes that 'later evidence has shown that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong considered well-defended hamlets to be a genuine threat to their control over the population.' (p. 135).

Vignette: Australian irregular warfare against the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) — the fragility of growing an indigenous capability.

To counter the VCI, it fell on the US CIA (whose paramilitary elements adopted the cover name in the early 1960s of Combined Studies Division, CSD) to provide the advisers and the funds for the development of the third force … Captain Ian Teague (1 Cdo Regt) helped usher in a program against the VCI which in its final form was to be hailed by both Americans and Vietnamese as a major part of one of the more significant measures of the total counter-insurgency effort – Revolutionary Development (RD) … The team had three roles: combat, psychological warfare and civic action … the first condition, then, was that armed security be provided to the peasants … Intelligence centres were established, and agents were recruited and trained for each of the ten districts in the province. While always keeping to the role of adviser rather than commander, Teague was able to exert a strong influence over all the separate activities, including the operational role of the Combat / Psychological Warfare / Civic Action teams … Teague developed a simple set of rules for conduct. The idea was taken unashamedly from communist practice and with a shrewd eye on what would appeal. The four principles were: respect the people, help the people, protect the people and obey orders.

In early 1965, Teague named the platoons People's Action Teams (PATs), Biet-Chinh Nhan-Dan … Although the PATs were from the districts in which they worked, it took about three months for them to gain the confidence and trust of the villagers. This came with the realization that they were there to stay. Teague was concerned at the eagerness by which the scheme had been grasped, force-fed and thrust on people [by the US]. Where picked men were needed for a sensitive role, now quality suffered in favor of quotas; where a nexus was important between teams and villagers, now recruits were removed for training and often strangers returned; and where sound administration was needed to build confidence and morale, now the system was strained and corruption was appearing … Brockett [Teague's replacement] attributed the final downturn in his province to the beginning of centralised training at Vung Tau.

Source: Ian McNeill, _'The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972'_, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1984, pp. 378–88.

US advising in Vietnam

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program did not initially have a dedicated force generation program, relying instead on experienced sergeants and captains to be detached from their parent organisations to fill an adviser role.[61] Over time, the Corps moved away from this approach, and sought volunteers specifically for this mission. The scale of support was always minimal, amounting to approximately 1–2% of the USMC presence in Vietnam.[62] In 1966, expansion of the CAP program commenced, building on the concept of a joint action company, through the decision to embed a Marine squad in a PF platoon.[63] 'The Marines who participated in the joint action company were all volunteers. 1st Lieutenant Ek (its Vietnamese-speaking commander) personally vetted all volunteers. He also spent several weeks instructing the Marines about Vietnamese life … the Marine squad leader became the combined platoon commander, with the PF commander his deputy. Ek also had a South Vietnamese warrant officer as his deputy. However, the Vietnamese district chief retained administrative responsibility for the unit, while each platoon had to work with the chief of the village it was securing.'[64]

The genesis of this program is unclear. 'Training was limited, often just a few weeks of basic Vietnamese culture and specific skills for living in an austere and dangerous environment … The Marines continued to maintain the CAP program as the war continued, although the program's expansion remained slow due to continuing shortages of personnel, both Marine and PF — more the latter than the former.'[65] Despite these limitations, the AATTV noted that 'under this concept, the PF platoons, deployed for the defence of villages and hamlets … The task of the Marines was to bolster the fighting capability of

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61 'In contrast to the advisors who worked with the VNMC, CAP personnel received relatively little in the way of formal training.' See William Rosenau, Melissa McAdam, Megan Katt, Gary Lee, Jerry Meyerle, Jonathan Schroden, Annemarie Randazzo-Matsel, Cathy Hiatt and Margaux Hoar, *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, CNA Strategic Studies, US, 2013, p. 33. Furthermore, 'American advisers were unanimous in their recommendation that the best men for assignment to this form of duty should be in the age range of 25 to 30 years old … Command and control of PRU-type units required objectivity, maturity and sound judgment – all traits that can only be developed with time and experience.' Nagl, 'Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organisational Culture and Learning', p. 14.
62 'The number of US military PRU advisers was small; perhaps no more than 400 were assigned to the program from 1967 to 1971.' Ibid.
63 Long et al., 'Locals Rule', p. 66.
64 Ibid., p. 65.
65 Ibid., p. 68.

the PF platoons as well as to train and advise them … This concept worked very well.'[66]

The CAP program worked so well that Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd, the commander of the AATTV at the time, proposed that the US Marine system of CAPs be adopted as the 'best and fastest method of upgrading the Territorial Forces' (this envisaged a platoon of 30 soldiers from the Task Force working full-time with an RF company).[67]
The theory behind the effectiveness of the CAP was that through integration into the village social structure, Marines were able to identify strangers and would be reluctant to call for fires that might result in collateral damage on themselves and their village 'kinsmen', while the Vietnamese were serving in or near the place of their birth, and were intimately entwined in the local society. However, it must be noted that this positive perception of the CAP program was not unanimous, even within the USMC.

Programs such as the CAP initially fell under the CIA/US Special Forces (CIDG) program 'that sought only to have villagers defend themselves. The Special Forces trained village defenders in basic small arms, and they were expected to fight only if attacked …
By July 1962, the program had 3,600 village defenders and 650 men in strike forces across the Central Highlands … by November it had armed 23,000 men (including both village defenders and strike forces). In less than a year, a small army of local defenders had been successfully established with only 24 Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs – 12 USSF, commanded by a Captain) and a relative handful of CIA personnel.'[68] This program appears to have built on the French experience of utilising irregular forces, particularly highland tribesmen. Despite its innovation and cultural nuance, the US military regarded such programs as a threat and sought to exert the principle of 'unity of command':

> Ultimately, those fearing the failure of the CIDG after SWITCHBACK [transfer from CIA to MACV control] were proved correct. MACV proved unable to manage the political dynamics between the provincial and central government

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66   AATTV, Presentation on 'The Roles and Achievements of the AATTV at Chief of the General Staff's Exercise, pp. 15–16.
67   McNeill, *The Team*, p. 258.
68   Long et al., 'Locals Rule', pp. 57–58.

and between the lowland Vietnamese and the highland tribes required to make CIDG viable … the quality of the training and support fell. This focus on speed of expansion and total number of villages rather than quality of the village militia was consonant with an approach that emphasised quantitative rather than qualitative measures of success.[69]

In this case, the principle of unity of command was counter-productive as the US Army was fighting a conventional 'search and destroy' war, while the CIA was fighting yet another 'small war' on the communist periphery. The transfer of irregular programs to military control saw a 'shift in emphasis from expanding village defense systems to the primary use of area development camps or centers (CIDG camps) as bases for offensive strike force operations … Combined with the shifting of camps far from their homes, this misuse contributed to "recruiting problems and high AWOL and desertion rates".'[70] Such misemployment generated is own vicious cycle of lowered morale, lowered performance and further misemployment that ultimately destroyed multiple irregular formations.

In 1967, when Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) took over operation of the *Phuong Hoang* (Phoenix) program and its action arm of Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU),[71] 'the PRU advisers had a great deal of control over how and when their PRU teams were employed … [indeed] the job required a level of maturity and sophistication not commonly found.'[72] Over time, selection criteria emerged for a Marine being assigned to such roles: rank (ideally that of senior enlisted man or captain), experience, language proficiency, cultural and political sensitivity, and personality traits (maturity, patience, integrity, aggressiveness and moral leadership).[73] However, the effectiveness of the

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69   Ibid., pp. 59–60.
70   Ibid., p. 61.
71   Andrew Finlayson, Marine Advisers: With the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units, 1966-1970, History Division, USMC, Virginia, 2009, p. 8. 'Units [PRUs] served in their native provinces, giving them a depth of knowledge about local conditions unmatched by any other South Vietnamese government [let alone US forces].' 'Successful PRUs', according to a CIA study, 'developed [their] own sources of information, such as defectors, informants, and personal contacts in contested areas … 75% of the time, the PRUs did their own targeting.' William Rosenau and Austin Long, 'The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency', RAND, 2009, p. 11. 'PRUs emerged in 1966. Their mission was to gain intelligence of the VCI and conduct operations to destroy it by encouraging defections, killing and capturing, or neutralising its effect through counter-propaganda … another scheme, developed at the same time as the PRUs and which worked with them, was the census grievance (CG) organisation … they acted similarly to ombudsmen and assisted in overcoming grievances against the government and smoothing over grievances between the peasants themselves … and had the covert role of collecting information which would lead to the identification of members of the VCI.' McNeill, *The Team*, p. 392.
72   Finlayson, ibid., p. 13.
73   Ibid., pp. 54–59.

PRU in their mission of disrupting the VCI was due primarily to excellent intelligence systems.[74]

The US Special Forces, grown from the US Army, were specifically trained to work with irregulars, and consequently invested heavily in language and small unit tactical skills.[75] Notably, the US Special Forces were credited with several significant operational innovations, including the RECONDO School[76] and the local recruiting of tribal Montagnard militia forces to serve within their home region.[77]

The USMC advisory effort directed towards its conventional counterparts, the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), was regarded as more successful than USMC efforts within the CAP program.[78] 'Looking over the 1955-1973 period, it is possible to generalize about what made a good advisor. These traits included experience and personal maturity, at least some level of cultural and linguistic awareness, and a willingness and ability to operate effectively in isolated environments':[79]

> The handbook for American advisers stressed the advantages of a locally raised security force because they understood local political context, social conflicts and terrain … Ironically, Vietnamisation was the only approach which effectively unified attrition and pacification [efforts].[80]

74　'PRU undercover agents were usually unpaid informants, often family members, and importantly, typically old women … Many PRU were adept at recruiting former VC to provide information about the VCI in their villages, and some were even able to convince these former VC to return to their villages and spy on their former colleagues … and thirdly, labour-intensive data mining from the Census Grievance cadre.' Ibid., p. 54.

75　Then 'Army Chief of State, when asked to train soldiers for counterinsurgency operations, allegedly insisted, "any good soldier could handle guerrillas" … President John F. Kennedy disagreed and established the Special Warfare Centre and School at Fort Bragg specifically training small teams for small wars, unconventional warfare and FID'. Lesley Warner, 'Vietnam (1959-1972)' in *Money in the Bank: Lessons learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations*, RAND, 2007, pp. 32–33.

76　In Vietnam, the RECONDO (Reconnaissance-Commando) School was an in-country, indigenous reconnaissance school manned by a US Special Forces training cadre.

77　'Each camp [astride infiltration routes] contained an "A" team of ten US Special Forces troops and between 200 and 700 indigenous soldiers – these local Montagnards or Vietnamese were recruited from the district around the Camps.' AATTV, Presentation on 'The Roles and Achievements of the AATTV at Chief of the General Staff's Exercise, p. 23.

78　CNA concluded that the reason for this success was the 'careful selection and training of advisors, the ability to communicate across cultures, and the sustained nature of the advisory program.' Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, p. 31.

79　Ibid., p. 31.

80　Timothy McCulloch and Richard Johnson, 'Hybrid Warfare', JSOU Report 13-4, August 2013, at: http://jsou.socom.mil (retrieved 10 October 2013), p. 80.

During the Vietnamisation period late in the war, the US Army sought to maintain 'touch' to develop ARVN, RF/PF and other formations. This emotive desire to continue a limited advisory footprint led to the employment of Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs), a construct within which the AATTV made specific contributions. However MAT teams, assigned to a given RF/PF unit for roughly a month, were constrained in their ability to improve their partner's capability. Instead MATs 'reflected the Army's quick-fix approach to counterinsurgency and its desire for quick results'.[81]

The American experience of mentoring in Vietnam was imperfect and one of learning and organisational adaptation to the requirement of the mission. Nagl cites an Army staff paper written in March 1966 titled 'A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam' (referred to as PROVN) which noted that 'creating an ARVN in the mold of the US Army … was flawed. The key to success in Vietnam was the creation of security forces[82] [such as the CAP, RFs/PFs and PRUs] … [Nagl drew attention to] individuals attempting to implement changes in counter-insurgency strategy and doctrine, but failing to overcome very strong organisational cultures predisposed to a conventional attrition-based doctrine.'[83] PROVN's recommendations are particularly noteworthy given US experience post-2003.

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81   Long et al., 'Locals Rule', p. 73.
82   Nagl, 'Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organisational Culture and Learning', p. 140. McNeill appears to agree with this conclusion: 'Considering that the role of the Territorial Forces could be regarded as the quintessence of the military resistance to the insurgency, it is a damning observation that these forces were the most neglected.' McNeill, *The Team*, p. 263.
83   Nagl, 'Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organisational Culture and Learning', p. 131.

Second-order effects from the war in South Vietnam

The French influence in Indochina extended into Laos and Cambodia, and so the influence of anti-French nationalism similarly extended beyond Vietnam's borders. 'Lamented as "the forgotten war", the insurgency in Laos was heavily influenced (and often overshadowed) by the conflict in neighboring Vietnam.'[84] For political reasons, Western support was not extended to the Royal Lao in any meaningful way. The US did attempt dissociated support however, primarily through bombing campaigns:

> Beginning in earnest in 1959, fighting pitted variously rightist Royal Lao forces supported by *Hmong* guerrillas against the leftist *Pathet Lao* (indigenous communists) and their North Vietnamese supporters … Periods of heavy North Vietnamese involvement, however, always led to significant gains by the insurgents, who were fought off only with significant intervention on the government's side … By the time of the 1973 cease-fire and neutralization, the government of Laos controlled little more than the capital and the Mekong River valley – and that only by virtue of the Hmong and US air power. With the withdrawal of U.S. support (both air power and funding) in 1973, the *Hmong* were demobilised and the Lao government was left to its fate.[85]

At the time of the conflict, Laos was underdeveloped, its government corrupt and ineffective, the economy dependent on support, and the military likewise corrupt and incompetent.[86] This description is remarkably similar to descriptions of the government of Afghanistan, and hence may offer some insight into broader counter-insurgency doctrine. In this context, a blithe 'let them do it with their own hands' mentality will not stamp out endemic corruption. Instead it simply prolongs the inevitable.

In Cambodia, the challenge of denying the Viet Cong sanctuary along the South Vietnamese border was beyond Cambodian capability. 'Cambodia's mercurial Prince Norodom Sihanouk walked a tightrope of pseudo-neutrality, allowing the North Vietnamese to operate unopposed in his country's

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84   Paul et al., 'Paths to Victory', p. 30.
85   Ibid.
86   Ibid., p. 31.

hinterland but refusing to be drawn further into the war.'[87] This approach ultimately failed as 'Sihanouk's balancing act ended up alienating many key stakeholders both within and outside Cambodia … The new government declared war against the communists and joined the broader conflict on the side of the South Vietnamese and the United States, a move that dissolved the tenuous restraint previously shown by the North Vietnamese.'[88]

Having suffered at the hands of the North Vietnamese, the Cambodian Army was clearly in need of assistance. The AATTV was tasked to expand its role to include training support to the Cambodian Army, utilising its facilities in Phuoc Tuy province, alongside US instructors. Reflections on this role highlighted concern over the rapidity with which Cambodian battalions were pulled together into a fighting force, received training, and were then employed operationally. This is in contrast to the communist method employed in Cambodia which saw first-year recruits employed as soldiers, second-year soldiers as commanders, and third-year soldiers as higher commanders or instructors for new cadres. It is worthy of note that this communist method represented a systemic approach with potential for exponential increase in size, while also promoting competence through a process of Darwinian selection.

A notable lesson in the use of proxies was evident once Cambodia (then Kampuchea) fell to North Vietnamese military forces in 1975. The Khmer Rouge (with Chinese sponsorship) had seized power across Kampuchea and challenged the South Vietnamese border regions. 'Fed up with the policies and cross-border incursions of Kampuchea's Khmer Rouge government, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea (Cambodia) in December 1978 … After several years of expensive stalemate, [involving also a Chinese limited war along the Vietnamese northern border] Vietnamese forces abandoned Cambodia to their indigenous proxies in 1989.'[89]

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87   Ibid., p. 40.
88   Ibid.
89   Ibid., p. 50.

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Vignette: US mentoring in El Salvador

In 1983, the government of El Salvador, with the encouragement of the United States, initiated a program to create local self-defense forces (known as *Defensa Civil* or Civil Defense) to combat the FMLN. [The] MILGRP was small, constrained to fewer than 100 personnel, but it contained a high proportion of U.S. Special Forces and intelligence personnel. The limitations on the MILGRP in El Salvador meant that the MILGRP adopted a 'train the trainer' approach to Civil Defense.

A 1986 inspection rated 40 percent of the units in poor condition (essentially ineffective), 30 percent in satisfactory condition, and 30 percent in good condition. In 1987, with help from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a new program was created to channel development funds directly to mayors. Known as Municipales en Accion (Municipalities in Action), the program called for projects to be identified by an open town meeting … insurgents were often unwilling to attack projects requested by the local community.

While the exact extent to which Civil Defense was a cover for 'death squad' activity is unknown, even the appearance that the program was associated with such action was detrimental. According to a senior Salvadoran military officer, the recruiting pool for Civil Defense was frequently composed of individuals who had been kicked out of the military, could not join the insurgency, and had no skills for civilian work. One of the biggest weaknesses that resulted was a lack of a quick reaction force for the Civil Defense forces, particularly at night.

The experience of El Salvador highlights the fact that local defense forces cannot be considered in isolation from the community where they take root. Civil Defense, however, was equally distrusted by the government and the regular army of El Salvador. As a result, it did not receive the support it needed and was not given the means to be an effective ally of the state in counterinsurgency … Poorly monitored, lightly trained, and considered with suspicion by those it was meant to support—state and non-state actors alike—Civil Defense proved of limited use in the response to the Salvadoran insurgency.

Source: Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt, Todd Helmus, 'Locals Rule: Historical lessons for creating local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond', RAND, www.rand.org, 2012, pp. 97–106.

Afghanistan advising — making mistakes that should not have been made

The Australian adviser capability: post-Vietnam to Iraq/Afghanistan

In the post-Vietnam period, Australia's lessons from Vietnam were captured in counter-revolutionary warfare doctrine, yet were not readily to hand to prepare advisers for their roles during subsequent conflicts. The AATTV noted that 'most officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs in the Australian Army could be trained as advisers — but not all, for some soldiers — and good ones at that — do not have the temperament needed.'[90] In the inter-war period, the Australian Army, unlike the US Special Forces model, did not maintain an adviser course. Regrettably, atrophy of the adviser course and JTW at Canungra as a whole, occurred despite their 'irregular warfare' lessons that were highly pertinent to Australia's primary offshore interests:

> Those Australians who had served with both Special Forces in Vietnam and with the Pacific Islands Regiment in New Guinea were struck by the similarity of the deep patrolling roles and the problems encountered within these units. A study of the techniques employed by the 5th Special Forces (advising in Vietnam) could perhaps prove of value to our operational concepts in New Guinea.[91]

In the post-2003 period in Iraq, Australia deployed several instructors to complement US efforts to train the Iraqi Army. Australian nominations to such positions apparently did not follow the model of the AATTV, as captains and warrant officers across the Army deployed as instructors, with few selection criteria applied. The AATTV lessons included the fact that 'language training [for advisers] is vital, but it takes a long time to build up a pool of linguists, and we must begin this training well before a crisis occurs.'[92] Evidence suggesting this lesson was assimilated is questionable given the limited language training provided to advisers prior to operations in Iraq. Likewise, despite the opportunity presented through long-term, predictable deployment schedules, nominations for Australian mentoring deployments to Afghanistan included no expectation that Pashto or Dari

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90   AATTV, Presentation on 'The Roles and Achievements of the AATTV at Chief of the General Staff's Exercise, p. 34.
91   Ibid., p. 28.
92   Ibid., p. 35.

language training would be completed. Deployment lengths were no different for those undertaking advisory roles, a flaw noted by Clegg's observation that 'tours of duty [need to be] long enough to permit them to develop thick bonds of trust' with their indigenous force.[93] An adviser course was not (and has not been) re-implemented, effectively undermining doctrinal and contextual understanding of the advisory mission.

Soviet advisers in Afghanistan

While many scholars emphasise the heavy-handed approach adopted by the Soviets, they certainly made efforts to pursue proxy governance and SFA. This approach had a rich history for the Soviets, maturing through control over Eastern European states under the USSR, having quelled numerous insurrections during that period. As early as 1951, Major General Donovan noted that:

> The Soviets have perfected the art of breaking the will of their victims to resist. It seeks its end by political and economic attack (as in Yugoslavia), fifth column penetration and terrorist tactics (as in Germany, Italy and France) with periodic violence by proxy as in Greece and Korea.[94]

During the Afghan campaign, the Soviets attempted to utilise their experience from the mid-1920s, when the Red Army campaigned for years against Basmachi tribesmen in Central Asia.[95] Furthermore, the Soviet war in Afghanistan began following an initial effort to establish a client state (a proxy war) before the Marxists of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in a coup:

> Following the coup, the PDPA leadership signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviets and began a dramatic campaign to modernize Afghanistan, in particular focusing on socialist land reform, women's rights, and decreasing the role of Islam. All three of these issues provoked a violent response among the rural Afghan population in the summer of 1978, which soon spread to provincial cities … In December 1979, Soviet forces

93   Will Clegg, 'Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Warfare', *Security Challenges*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 2009, p. 25.
94   Donovan, Lecture on Partisan Warfare, p. 32.
95   Lester Grau, *The Bear went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*, National Defense University Press, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 199.

launched a coup against the current PDPA leadership as well
as dispatching combat forces to support the Afghans against
the revolt … Soviet operations were frequently conducted
without the Afghan army. The Afghan army was relegated to
static defense, in part because it was viewed as incompetent
and in part because its loyalty was highly suspect.[96]

The Afghan Army never started from a position of strength, indeed, 'the
weakness of Afghan units was apparent well before Soviet intervention,
when the 17th Division exhibited a paralysis of will by failing to intercede
effectively during the riots in Herat in 1978.'[97] This starting point of
incompetence was never reconciled, hence an 'us and them' mentality
developed within the Soviet contingent, eventually manifesting in a garrison
force that ceded control of the country to the Mujahidin. Following the Soviet
intervention in 1979, desertions and combat operations reduced the Afghan
Army to perhaps 50% of its total strength. 'The factional split and general
discontent was so great that even as late as the autumn of 1981, Afghan
army units were refusing to participate in military operations.'[98] Such events
understandably reinforced the Soviet belief in the suspect nature of these
Afghan institutions and limited the ability to develop Afghan security forces:

A major reorganisation in 1984–1985 standardized the [Afghan
Army] force to a large extent. By 1987, the army had nearly
tripled in size and the Ministry of Interior had expanded nearly
fivefold … Morale and factional problems remained, but
the security forces were at least functional with substantial
Soviet assistance.[99]

A key component of this growth was investment in the Afghan intelligence
service, known as KhAD (for *Khadamat-e Etela'ate Dawlati*, the State
Information Agency). 'KhAD received enormous amounts of resources
and training from the Soviet KGB … KhAD was incredibly ruthless and
increasingly effective, penetrating Mujahedin organisations and limiting urban
subversion. Along with the KGB, it also worked to turn insurgent groups

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96   Long et al., 'Locals Rule', pp. 132–33. Furthermore, what was officially known as the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces
      in Afghanistan, principally comprised the 40th Army, which consisted of units created for fast-moving war on the plains of
      Europe.
97   Dr Robert Baumann, *Russia-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus*, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Leavenworth
      Papers, Number 20, April 1993, p. 166.
98   Long et al., 'Locals Rule', p. 134.
99   Ibid.

against their brethren.'[100] This line of effort was quite effective in disrupting Mujahidin organisations, generating genuine fear among Mujahidin leaders of KhAD agents penetrating their organisation.

The growth and development of the army, the interior ministry and KhAD reflected a Soviet model of security forces in which no single security service held sufficient power to seize control over the other services. A deliberate fragmentation of unity was thus created, which subsequently exasperated US forces seeking to establish unity of effort and unity of command a quarter of a century later. The Soviets further broadened the Afghan security apparatus through the creation of local defence forces, generally referred to as militias.[101] This model resembled the Village Stability Operations (VSO) model subsequently employed by the US, although it assumed a feudal aura. Importantly, this was the Soviet application of their own experience gained in the 1920s, employing so-called National Regiments. The National Regiments employed men who were charged with the defence of specific, generally local, territory.[102] With a similar intent, the government of Afghanistan employed tribal volunteer units in the regions of Nangarhar, Badakshan and in Paktia:[103]

> The two main forms of ideological militias were the Sepayan-I Inqilab ['Soldiers of the Revolution'] and the Revolution Defense Groups, [GDR] … They were intended not only to provide local security but also to propagandize the population in favor of the revolution … the GDR becoming the dominant form of ideological militia. By 1987, there were some 33,000 members of the GDR … In 1987, they were said to be responsible for 'repelling 2,707 attacks against their villages, but they also carried out 281 independent operations and 209 joint ones' … The most famous example of a regional force was led by Abdul Rashid Dostum from the area around Sherberghan in Jowzjan province. Dostum, an Uzbek former army officer, initially led a small militia protecting gas fields in the north. Over time his militia grew in size and capability until it was eventually converted into the 53rd Army Division … However, it fundamentally remained Dostum's force. Its

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100 Ibid., p. 135.
101 Ibid.
102 Baumann, *Russia-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, p. 167.
103 Ibid.

members refused to wear army uniforms and owed loyalty to him, not to the state.'[104]

The emergence of Dostum's militia was the genesis for the US unconventional warfare strategy in 2001 and was indicative of second-order problems that emerge from the accelerated development of indigenous forces. Failing to safeguard the state's monopoly of violence encourages the emergence of 'warlordism'. This is worthy of note given Australia's experience in drawing Matiullah Kahn into the Uruzghan security institution.

The Soviet campaign was similar to the subsequent American-led campaign circa 2004 to 2007. Gorbachev opted to allow escalation of the conflict during the period 1985 to 1986 while Soviet troop numbers were constrained. 'Activity along the border with Pakistan, including cross-border activity into the Pakistan sanctuary (first conducted in 1984) was increased. This took the form of Spetsnaz [Soviet special forces] air assault raids and aerial bombing … At a November 1986 Politburo meeting, the Soviet leadership quietly changed its overall strategic goal in Afghanistan from maintaining a friendly socialist regime to ensuring a neutralist settlement and ending the war in two years or less.'[105] A 'surge' in operational tempo and offensive orientation did not work for the Soviets. Once they commenced their withdrawal, the Najibullah regime was expected to fall within months if not weeks:

> In February 1989, as the last Soviet combat forces left the country, the insurgents formed the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), expecting a rapid victory. The AIG decided to seize the strategically located town of Jalalabad, near the Pakistani border and on the road from the Khyber Pass to Kabul, as its capital. This attempt to move from guerrilla warfare to more conventional warfare was disastrous … after several months the siege was called off.[106]

For all the flaws in the Soviet approach to developing indigenous capacity, enough was clearly achieved for the effective repelling of the siege of Jalabad. However, systemic flaws in the AIG (such as corruption) remained, serving as a self-defeating mechanism that allowed the Taliban

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104 Long et al., 'Locals Rule', p. 135, pp. 136–38.
105 Ibid., pp. 139–40.
106 Ibid., p. 141.

to consolidate popular discontent with the excesses of the AIG.[107] The second-order effect of empowering militias came home to roost when (General) Dostum emerged in 1993 as the most powerful force in the country, consolidating control of the northern areas around Mazar-i-Sharif. Dostum began advocating separatism, before promoting a highly decentralised federal Afghanistan.[108] At the same time 'ethnic identities hardened … no party or militia had a substantial mixture of ethnic groups, although there were partial exceptions, such as Dostum's militia, which contained some non-Uzbek Ismailis.'[109] Thus the decision of the international community to support a highly *centralised* federal Afghanistan in the period soon after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, is questionable.

The Soviet experience resonates with the rapid unravelling and fall of the ARVN following the US departure from Vietnam, despite the near defeat of the VC insurgency. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan amplifies Western failure to learn from local history and the importance of developing sustainable institutions that can support government, not undermine it.

ISAF advisers in Afghanistan

The period of political transition following the arrival of the Taliban commenced with the unexpected success of the US-led unconventional warfare strategy. This strategy exploited the pre-existing fractures in the human terrain, but cannot be described as a function of inspired strategic insight or leadership. The coupling of airpower with Special Forces A Teams was a decision based on expediency due to climatic, logistic and mobilisation limitations associated with projecting conventional US power. Unexpected success served to re-educate a generation of officers from the post-Vietnam War era. Arguably, this organisational ignorance led to endorsement of a centralised federation model, which when coupled with the subsequent excesses of the Karzai family, sowed the seeds for the subsequent insurgency.

Force generation efforts moved at the bureaucratic pace of Washington and Brussels, which believed mission success had been achieved in early 2002. There was 'no fundamental reexamination of the types of forces needed,

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107 Najibullah's 'commanders were increasingly forced to turn to coerced resource extraction, otherwise known as banditry, and in some cases opium production.' Ibid., p. 142.

108 Ibid., p. 146.

109 Ibid.

how they operate together (if at all), and how they work with other important governmental functions, such as the judiciary and corrections systems or traditional forms of justice and security provision.'[110] RAND identified this fault, comparing it with similar SFA actions in the post-World War II period:

> Lessons identified in studies of security sector reform are consistent in calling for two things: a comprehensive assessment of the security needs of the country, and ensuring that reform efforts are based on realistic understandings of what is sustainable 'financially, operationally, and logistically'.[111]

It would seem that such an assessment did not occur in Afghanistan, or if it did, that such analysis was lost in the politics of competing national interests with the shifting CENTCOM focus toward Iraq.[112] Consequently, 'most [SFA] efforts from 2001 through 2009 have sought to build Afghan military forces that closely resemble Western military forces, and have similar capabilities' often without appropriate consideration of their sustainability post-transition.[113]

The centralised model of a federal Afghanistan in early 2002 was at odds with the tactical situation outside Kabul. 'There were approximately one million men serving in private militias in Afghanistan … the anti-Taliban militias were generally referred to as the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) … This meant that regional warlords could operate with impunity throughout most of the country … these forces were ethnically based and operated independent of the nascent Afghan government.'[114] Efforts to assimilate these militias into the Afghan security apparatus focused on military development with policing as a secondary concern.

The initial plans for the Afghan National Army (ANA), developed in early 2002, called for 70,000 troops with the ambitious goal of commencing operations within 12 months, as a political expedient to re-orientate military operations to the Iraq theatre. In an effort to undermine the militias, the

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110 Terrence Kelly, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', RAND Arroyo Center, www.rand.org, 2011, pp. xv–xvi.

111 Ibid., p. 9.

112 Somewhat brutally, Anthony Cordesman notes: 'The work of historians and independent US government assessments of the war in Vietnam, the work of GAO (Government Accountability Office) and the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) in Iraq, and work of GAO and the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in Iraq, all have common threads. They show a consistent lack of effective planning, a lack of proper audits and financial controls, and a lack of meaningful measures of effectiveness.' Anthony Cordesman with Aaron Lin, *Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Lessons of the Longest War*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, New York, March 2015.

113 Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', p. xvii.

114 Ibid., pp. 18–20.

warlords and ethnic divides, 'ANA units were deliberately designed to include recruits from all parts of the country, so that they would be ethnically balanced and could become a truly national force rather than one in which specific units had loyalties to particular ethnic or tribal groups.'[115] While good in theory, it was opposed by those whose power was being eroded by fervently adhering to this ideal. Ties remained between regional powerbrokers and the men who were once under their command. In other areas, militias did not assimilate into the ANA; Matiullah Khan's KAU private security firm was an obvious example.

The Gordian knot of the developing Afghan security apparatus experienced arguably its greatest setback at the April 2002 Group of Eight (G8) conference. 'Participants agreed … the United States would lead military reform efforts; Germany would lead police reform efforts; Italy would lead reform of the justice sector; the United Kingdom would lead efforts to combat drugs; and Japan would lead the process of disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR).'[116] Splitting efforts in this manner exacerbated the pre-existing divides in the Afghan security apparatus. Differing perspectives, cultures and resource expenditures exacerbated fractures within the coalition.

Divides within the coalition also exacerbated the failure of NATO to apply sustainable development in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, John Sopko, announced on 12 September 2014:

> To date, the United States government has provided over
> $104 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction which has been
> intended: to build the Afghan government and its security
> forces, bolster Afghanistan's economy, build its infrastructure,
> expand its health and education sectors, and improve
> Afghanistan's quality of life and rule of law … at the end of
> this year we will have committed more funds to reconstruct
> Afghanistan, in inflation-adjusted terms, than the US spent to
> rebuild Europe after World War II under the Marshall Plan …
> Reconstruction programs must take into account a recipient
> country's ability to operate and sustain the assistance provided

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115 Ibid., p. 21.
116 Ibid.

> … Unfortunately, Afghanistan is a case study in projects and programs set up without considering sustainability.[117]

Sustainability was hindered from the outset, a result of the desire of some nations to offload outdated equipment while ostensibly supporting the international political agenda. 'Most of the donated and salvaged equipment turned out to be worn out, broken, or not interoperable with other equipment … At the time [2002–2003], the only mechanisms in place to provide funding and equipment to Afghanistan on a large scale were the [US] Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs … because these programs were not designed to surge for immediate wartime requirements, there were lengthy delays in providing equipment and other forms of support for the ANA.'[118] The credibility of efforts to support the nascent Afghan military was therefore compromised from the outset.

Many militia members had been fighting since the Soviet occupation, and therefore were not viable conscripts for the Afghan Army due to their age. Other militia members resented the fact that their experience of fighting the Taliban was ignored and that they were now obliged to conduct training in what was to them a foreign military system. 'The attrition rate during training for an average battalion was approximately 15 percent during the summer of 2003. The yearly desertion rate for the ANA as a whole was 22 percent in 2003 and was largely motivated by concerns about low pay and problems with following military regulations.'[119] The focus was on mobilisation rather than systemic growth and retention of experience to fill command and senior NCO appointments, exemplified at the Kabul Military Training Centre. 'In January 2004, training capacity was increased so that three kandaks could be trained simultaneously … By May 2004, four *kandaks* could be trained simultaneously, and by January 2005, that number had increased to five.'[120]

Rapid mobilisation extended to the establishment of ANA commands, the initial plan for which involved sequential establishment over a two-year period. However this program 'was scrapped in favor of a plan to simultaneously establish these commands'.[121] Despite the effort necessary

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117 Anthony Cordesman, *Losing the 'Forgotten War': The need to reshape US strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, at: www.csis.org (accessed 6 October 2014), pp. 6–7.

118 Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', pp. 23–24.

119 Ibid., p. 25.

120 Ibid., p. 32. The tenets of 'mobilisation' could also be seen from the Western side. 'The Transformation effort in Afghanistan also suffered from the legacy of the problems inflicted by the rapid rotation of both inexperienced military and civil personnel.' Cordesman and Lin, *Afghanistan at the Crossroads.*

121 Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', p. 33.

to establish these commands, they were clearly incapable of functioning. 'By April 2005, the commands responsible for recruiting, education and training, acquisitions and logistics, and communications and intelligence were only staffed at 10 percent of their authorized levels.'[122] In the self-generated chaos of rapid Army mobilisation, the purpose of providing security to the population was lost. 'When the Taliban started returning to villages and towns in Afghanistan in 2004, they encountered no organised military or police opposition. ISAF forces remained limited to Kabul, US military forces remained focused on directed counterterrorism missions rather than population security, and the nascent Afghan forces had little capability to deploy and conduct operations throughout the country.'[123] It could be argued that the lesson in this case concerned an inappropriate prioritisation of organisational effort or an exclusively enemy-centric counter-insurgency strategy.

Quality was sacrificed for quantity, which set conditions for the long-term, misunderstood capability impediments that plagued the ANA over the period 2007 to 2014. 'In 2003, ANA training focused on preparing a relatively small number of well-trained forces. In 2004, ANA training focused on rapidly building up as many forces as possible.'[124] This change in approach highlights the key difference between the previous US Special Forces-led approach and that of the subsequent ISAF-led approach. By focusing on mobilising rather than retaining, a number of challenges exerted a deleterious effect on ANA/ANP capability:

> Reenlistment started to become an issue in the spring of 2005, when the first soldiers who had signed up for the ANA reached the end of their three-year commitment. Initial reenlistment rates were approximately 35 percent, much lower than the 50 percent that was expected … By 2006, no mechanisms existed to track the personnel [ANP] who had received training, so it was impossible to determine how many trained personnel remained in service or how they performed compared to those who had not been trained or those who received a different training package … 95 percent of the police equipment that had been donated was considered nonstandard, which caused great problems for training, maintenance, and supply of spare

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122 Ibid., p. 35.
123 Ibid., p. 39.
124 Ibid., p. 40.

parts … since the MOI lacked effective internal systems for accountability, misuse and theft of police equipment became a considerable problem and reduced ANP capabilities even further.'[125]

In the face of what was regarded as a failing course of action, proposals were drafted to develop new arms of government. These new arms were again under-funded, under-resourced or under-prioritised, given that their very establishment threatened the extant power bases and funding lines within the Afghan government. Thus, a vicious cycle was perpetuated:

> The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) was established in September 2006 as a way of temporarily expanding police capabilities to counter the growing insurgency in the south … ANAP personnel would man checkpoints and police local communities so that the ANP could focus on countering the Taliban … This initiative proved less than successful. The problems that soon surfaced limited the ANAP's capabilities, and in some cases, exacerbated the very problems the ANAP was supposed to address. Planned careful vetting of all recruits proved impossible to implement, and the fact that all ANAP members were locally recruited meant that most owed their primary allegiances to local powerbrokers rather than to the national government.[126]

These well-meaning but poorly executed initiatives resulted in negative impacts, but ultimately still inched ISAF toward the necessary goal of population security and population control. These counter-insurgency initiatives represented a threat to the Taliban, evidenced by the emphasis now placed on hostile action against the ANP. Statistics of significantly higher ANP casualties vice ANA was the result, demoralising ANP personnel, dampening recruiting and depriving the ANP of police with operational experience.[127]

Logistic planning for the Afghan Security Forces appeared to be an after-thought. 'The ANA continued to prefer equipment from the former Warsaw Pact, which took a long time to procure and which would also complicate maintenance and ammunition supply over the long term.'[128]

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125 Ibid., pp. 41–48.
126 Ibid., p. 52.
127 Ibid., p. 54.
128 Ibid., p. 59.

Most donor countries were NATO members, which further complicated such long-term issues. Donated Western equipment did not integrate within the Afghan logistic system, an issue compounded by the limited investment of advisers in non-combat functions compared with commensurate investment in combat-related functions.

The NATO challenge in Afghanistan can be summarised as a 'mismatch between the design of ANSF systems and the capabilities of Afghan soldiers and police to run them, the ANSF struggle when they have to function without significant ISAF help, and there are real questions about their sustainability after coalition forces depart.'[129]

Vignette: Misaligned SFA to indigenous requirements in Afghanistan.

In February 2002, Germany pledged €10 million for police reform … which subsequently included rehabilitating the Kabul Police Academy (KPA) … Germany's plan for police training was based on the European model of police academies. Officer cadets were required to have completed twelfth grade before entering the KPA, which provided a university-level education over three years, and NCO candidates were required to have completed ninth grade before entering the nine-month training program … unfortunately, this approach did not work in practice … First, most of the senior police positions had been rapidly filled by Northern Alliance members through patronage networks after the fall of the Taliban. Many of these officials lacked professionalism and were corrupt according to Western standards … Second, focusing almost exclusively on the police academy meant that the vast majority of police personnel received no training at all … One author critiqued the entire German approach by arguing that 'there was no evidence of strategic thinking in choosing rehabilitation of the police academy, and training officer and non-commissioned ranks, while initially ignoring the mainly illiterate and conscripted soldiers [sic] who have more contact with ordinary Afghans …' Finally, only one German advisor was assigned to the MOI, despite the fact that the ministry lacked even the most basic systems needed to manage and oversee the police.

Source: Terrence Kelly, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', RAND Arroyo Center, www.rand.org, 2011, pp. 29–30.

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129 Ibid., p. 78.

Coalition SFA efforts in Afghanistan

Other coalition partners applied successful, long-term, systemic growth models, exemplified by the battalion-sized, Ministry of the Interior (MoI) National Mission Units (NMUs), consisting of CRU222, CF333 and ATF444. British, Norwegian and New Zealand Special Forces, adhering generally to the principle of 'quality over quantity', developed and grew these NMUs. NMU investment included the posting of promising soldiers to Western officer academies to become the future leaders of their forces, and setting conditions for future independent operations. By 2014, CRU222 had resolved numerous terrorist attacks in Kabul independently, thus demonstrating a true transition of sustainable and effective capability. This niche effort (advisory teams of fewer than 100 men) represents a benchmark for an Australian model of special warfare.

Vignette: But some good work had been done …
Case Study: ODA361 in Orgun, Afghanistan

In the summer of 2002, U.S. Special Forces (USSF) Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams of twelve personnel were deployed by helicopter into 'contested' Afghan villages on the Pakistan border. Their mission was to find and destroy remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, collect intelligence, and provide local stability. ODA 361 was one of these A-teams, sent to occupy a former Soviet airbase near the village of Orgun in June, 2002.

One of the first problems ODA 361 had to deal with in Orgun was a local Afghan warlord called Zeke. Zeke was a disreputable commander with the Northern Alliance who had 'pacified' Orgun following the demise of the Taliban. His main source of income and power was a 'customs house' which he ran on the main road into Orgun. ODA 361 kicked Zeke out of town at gun-point and turned his 'customs house' on the main highway over to the council of village elders in Orgun. This act immediately established rapport between ODA 361 and the council of village elders, as Zeke was both feared and hated for the 'customs taxes' that he extracted from travelers.

With the local warlord marginalized, ODA 361 now focused on building a paramilitary security force to provide stability in Orgun. It organised, equipped, trained, and advised three 100-man Afghan Militia Force (AMF) companies. Eager recruits were not hard for ODA 361 to find; in fact, many former mujahadeen with ample combat experience against the Soviets signed up. A USSF non-commissioned officer advised each AMF company, which performed the following missions:

However, despite sound advisory concepts, the implementation of this initiative was far from perfect. In one example, the British provided top-up pay to CF333 and ATF444 police officers, initially as incentive payments which grew from four to six times what soldiers would earn in their regular salaries. As this was a British incentive, NMU police officers serving in other units did not receive the top-up pay. While touted as a retention mechanism, there was no evidence of a significant difference in retention rates between the various units.[130] Furthermore, as British funding of top-up pay began to evaporate, reports of extra-judicial narcotics seizures became commonplace.

During 2009, NATO sought to overcome such differences in coalition approaches and enhance coalition capability by improving pre-deployment training. This 'involved three phases: training in the country of origin;

firebase defense, security operations, basic patrolling, cordon and search, reconnaissance, and intelligence collection.

The AMF, who lived in the local community, provided ODA 361 with an excellent flow of intelligence. AMF payday, when all the troopers would return home, provided ODA 361 with some of their best intelligence tips.

The senior engineer on ODA 361 employed a local 200-man work force that was used to build bunkers, fill sandbags, string concertina wire, and construct walls for improved firebase defense. Salaries paid to the work force, contractors, and even the militia force, went directly back into the local Orgun economy. ODA 361 hired a contractor with a dump truck to move stones from a nearby river to pave the bazaar in Orgun, greatly reducing the dust and making the bazaar a better place for hundreds of local residents. The shura, which now had a modest income from Zeke's customs house, could pay for their own local public works projects.

Development projects had two important effects. First, life in Orgun got better than it ever was before. People began to appreciate the Americans' help. Second, the Orgun population at large reached a tipping point. Locals now willingly gave *actionable intelligence* to the USSF at the slightest hint of Taliban or Al Qaeda presence in Orgun, which allowed ODA 361 to target these threats before they could act.

For all practical purposes, the Orgun area of operations (AO) was pacified by September 2002.

Source: John Dyke and John Crisafulli, *Unconventional Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006, pp. 53–56.

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130 Austin Long, Todd Helmus, Rebecca Zimmerman, Christopher Schaubelt and Peter Chalk, 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', RAND, at: www.rand.org, 2015, p. 14.

NATO training at either the Joint Multinational Readiness Centre (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, or at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland; and three days of training in Kabul before deploying with ANA units.'[131] The culmination of training in Kabul mirrored the 'COIN Centre for Excellence (CFE)' model utilised in Taji, Iraq.

Other coalition SFA efforts in Afghanistan.

Despite a rich heritage in special warfare, US Special Forces still made mistakes during the conduct of activities in Afghanistan, highlighting the complexity of the operating environment. 'Unlike many of the international SOF units that partner with GDPSU units, US special operations commanders have not instituted a policy of routinely returning the same SOF teams to partner units.'[132] This was an expedient which resulted from the operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite a system of areas of responsibility against which special forces groups were permanently arrayed, the sheer size and scale of the commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded 'out of area' deployments, thereby undermining the organisational advantages of cultural familiarity, language and repeat deployments in the region. Repeated rotations helped mentors understand how the Afghans had reached their current level, as identified by an Afghan General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) officer: 'We have ten years' experience, who are you?'[133] Nevertheless, positive observations were made concerning the ability of US Special Forces operational detachments 'equipped with significant resources, funding and weapons to influence every aspect of their area's political and security infrastructure. The result was a small footprint of soldiers wielding a significantly disproportionate effect in the battlespace that created a grassroots approach to security.'[134]

During his command tenure, General Stan McChrystal advocated an ambitious level of advisory support in the 'Afghan Hands' program,[135] similar in concept to the World War II-era 'China Hands', the British Foreign Service

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131 Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', pp. 59–60.

132 Long, et al., 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', p. 39.

133 Ibid., p. 18.

134 Captain Gareth Rice, 'What did we learn from the War in Afghanistan?' *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Winter 2014.

135 'We decided to field a cadre of several hundred American military officers and NCOs – "Afghan Hands", after the "China Hands" of the 1930s and 1940s – who would be trained in the languages, history and cultures of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then employed there over a five-year period. On rotations in country and back in the United States, their focus would be the same region or topic.' Stanley McChrystal, *My share of the Task: A memoir*, Penguin Group, NY, 2013, p. 307.

and the US Foreign Area Officer programs.[136] Ultimately the scale of US investment in Afghan Hands (approximately 723 personnel in late 2012, with a third deployed to Afghanistan and Pakistan) proved its own undoing, as selection criteria were disregarded to meet operational quotas. Indeed, the late identification and force generation of this requirement in 2009 exacerbated this challenge. General McChrystal further advocated that:

> After almost a year in command, I was more convinced than ever that a cadre of language-trained professionals, steeped in the culture and assigned for multiple tours to establish genuine relationships, would be the single most powerful asset we could field.[137]

Australia grappled with the strategic issues surrounding the legitimacy of its partnered forces, most notably, the known corruption and 'warlordism' of the Provincial Chief of Police.[138] Mentoring work, particularly of paramilitary or policing forces, is incredibly complex, but appears not to have been recognised as such by Australia's force preparation regime. Such conclusions frustratingly present as a 'lesson forgotten' from the service of the AATTV in South Vietnam almost four decades earlier. Australian advisers noted that the Afghan leadership, like that of the South Vietnamese, was generally poor, occasionally corrupt and often self-serving. In similar fashion to the introduction of the Joint Warfare Training Centre in Vietnam, it was only late in Australia's commitment that systemic efforts were made to improve leadership within the ANSF. The 'Sandhurst in the Sand' initiative (led by the UK) also came too late, as did efforts to facilitate NCO promotion courses and specialised planning courses.[139] Unlike AATTV policy, the Afghan mission did not have a formalised process of rotating advisers through attachment to a field element, then into a training establishment.[140] In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, excessive enthusiasm to address short-term goals undermined long-term strategic objectives. 'A country's specific

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136 Indeed in his *People's Army of Vietnam*, Presidio Press, CA, 1986, pp. 4–5, Douglas Pike describes himself (or the US Foreign Service) as having grown up with the Viet Cong over 15 years of service. He elaborates, 'a person with a background in political science (especially Marxism-Leninism), social psychology, and the communication of ideas can better explain the unrolling phenomenon of the Vietnam War than one schooled in military science.'

137 McChrystal, *My share of the Task: A memoir*, pp. 385–86.

138 Brig Matiullah Khan's private militia links are discussed at: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/09/30/aust-us-back-ex-warlord-head-policeman (accessed 4 October 2013).

139 While the need for an ANA officer academy was first identified in 2001, the then strategic counter-terrorism focus saw it remain unsupported.

140 'It was usual policy of Training Team commanders to rotate advisers between two postings during their tour of duty. More commonly an adviser fresh from Australia was posted direct to an operational unit. After six months he might then be posted to a training centre, where he could assist in remedying weaknesses observed on operations.' McNeill, *The Team*, p. 194. Australia's commitment to Afghanistan involved very limited investment in training centres prior to the establishment of the ANAOA which might otherwise have served this purpose (such as the Special Police Training Wing in Logar Province).

situation will determine both what its security needs are and what it is reasonable to expect from its security forces given capabilities and resources … That is not a matter of "good enough", it is a matter of appropriate.'[141]

Vignette: US Village Stability Operations (VSO) Program in Afghanistan

In June 2009, U.S. special operations forces began exploring other opportunities to create local defense forces. This new program was initially called the Community Defense Initiative, with the first efforts in Day Kundi, Herat, Nangarhar, and Paktiya established between August and November 2009 … the new program did not involve the Ministry of Interior. Instead it sought to work directly with village level leadership who had decided to resist insurgent influence by placing a special operations team in a village to support that local leadership. In March 2010, the U.S. special operations role in the program was renamed Village Stability Operations, reflecting the idea that the goal of the program was more than just the creation of local defense forces but included strengthening the local and district government and economy. In mid-2010, Coalition and Afghan leadership agreed to bring the local defense force under the Ministry of Interior, so in August President Karzai signed a decree establishing the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

Forces are nominated by a village shura and then vetted by the Ministry of Interior with support from the National Directorate of Security (the Afghan internal security intelligence organisation). By transforming the local defense initiative into village stability operations, U.S. special operations have substantially mitigated (though not eliminated) central government concerns about the program. The combination of Afghan and U.S. oversight likewise mitigates the potential for abuse. In terms of appropriate tactical employment of the ALP, U.S. special operations forces seem to be following the lessons learned. While there is a frequent use of the ALP as checkpoint security, this is often combined with patrolling and intelligence collection.

The relative success of the program created substantial pressure to expand it quickly. Rapid expansion, as the case studies demonstrate, is seldom associated with long-term success. It is only when the populace is motivated to support local defense for reasons internal to the community that lasting success is possible.

Source: Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt, Todd Helmus, 'Locals Rule: Historical lessons for creating local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond', RAND, www.rand.org, 2012, pp. 180–85.

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141 Olga Oliker, 'Security Force Development in Afghanistan: Learning from Iraq', RAND, at: www.rand.org. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on Oversight and Investigations, 18 July 2012, pp. 6–8.

Key requirements for special warfare — Fundamental Inputs to Capability

Best practice recommendations for special warfare

> *While the direct approach captures everyone's attention, we must not forget that these operations only buy time and space for the indirect and broader governmental approaches to take effect. Enduring success is achieved by proper application of indirect operations, with an emphasis in building partner-nation capacity and mitigating the conditions that make populations susceptible to extremist ideologies.*

<div align="right">

Admiral William H. McRaven
Commander US SOCOM, 2012[142]

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This section features a series of RAND lessons in the conduct of special warfare which supports the primary arguments of this paper, amplifying these with vignettes and accounts of personal experience.

Lesson one: manage the trilateral relationship

The politics of local defense are particularly complicated for the United States as local defense frequently involves a trilateral relationship between the United States, a host-nation government, and local political actors … For example, in South Vietnam, CIDG required a deft balancing act between CIA/Special Forces, the Montagnards, and the South Vietnamese government … When this relationship was neglected, an uprising took place that, along with general neglect, greatly reduced the effectiveness of the local defense program.[143]

A focus on stakeholder mapping is necessary given the complexity of operating within the human domain. Anticipating likely responses through this understanding of local interests is difficult and hence requires strong focus from the Western practitioner. Indeed, the repeated uprisings (a total of five) in Anbar before the US-supported 'awakening' is indicative of how insight can be gained and opportunities created through understanding the causal factors behind local actions. In a similar manner, the Anti-Taliban Militias (ATM) in Afghanistan represented an emergent phenomenon

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142 Admiral William H. McRaven, 'Q&A with Admiral William H. McRaven', *Special Warfare*, April-June 2012, Vol. 25, Issue 2, p. 10, at: http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/10170 (accessed 3 July 2013).
143 Long et al., 'Locals Rule', pp. 165–69.

rather than a Western-orchestrated effect. A key challenge is that such emergent phenomena will often occur regardless of Western intentions. Marginalisation of Western interests, as occurred under the Maliki regime in Iraq during the US drawdown and exit in 2010–2014 is indicative of this challenge. 'Local defense programs therefore become a means to "outflank" these political and organisational limitations by bypassing them and going directly to locals … In El Salvador, Civil Defense and the related Muncipales en Accion similarly sought to outflank both the national government and the Salvadorean Army.'[144] However:

> The Soviets in Afghanistan and the British in Oman were somewhat less interested in outflanking the central government. Instead, they sought to access loyalties, such as ethnic or tribal loyalty, that were deeper and more effective than loyalty to the central state. Combined with material support, this strategy proved effective, at least in the short term.[145]

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.

Concurrent with the final years of the Vietnam War, the British military similarly failed in Aden (Yemen) and were faced with the challenge of insurgency in Oman. MAJGEN Jeapes (UK) reflected that 'Vietnam had shown that there is no future for a foreign army of intervention in a national revolutionary war'. This mindset captures the British approach in the southern Omani region of Dhofar from 1971 to 1976, wherein 'Dhofari solutions were found for Dhofari problems' through an indirect strategy. Jeapes describes this strategy over three iterative phases:

> The first phase is raising and training them (Dhofari Firqat militias), sorting out their tribal problems and establishing a leader. The second phase is the main operational phase, getting a company or battalion of SAF (Sultan's Armed Forces), and as many BATT (British Army Training Team – SAS mentors) as we can, and establishing them in their (Firqat) tribal area and helping them to clear it. The third phase is getting civil action going, a well drilled, a clinic, school and shop built, and so on. That's when we withdraw and hand over to Firqat forces, freeing our men to start again with another firqat.

Assimilating such a model, the USMC term 'small wars' is entirely appropriate to the lessons of the Dhofari campaign, as the three phases above are applied to a specific tribal area, as its own small war, within the much larger campaign. Non-kinetic (information) actions were central, exemplified by 797 guerrillas defecting to the government and joining the *firqat* between 1970 and 1974, via an effective reintegration campaign. For an Australian Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) that was far larger than the British SAS SQN constituting the Dhofari BATTs, operating over a similar sized area to Uruzghan province, the ability to raise an 800-man independent force in under five years, in Islamic, tribally-orientated, and highly rugged terrain, is instructive.

Source: Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East, Greenhill Books, London, 1996.

A note of caution should be sounded here with the truism that loyalties cannot be bought, only rented. This was apparent in the early phases of the US support to the Moderate Syrian Opposition. The arming of such forces with the highly capable TOW missile system made these groups extremely valuable to their competitors, resulting in Jabhat Al-Nusra targeting such groups for incorporation into their enterprise. The loyalties to their US allies were quickly overlooked when it came to the practicalities of survival. What is essential to note from such examples is that once a decision is made to partner with a force, its actions will appear to the world as a reflection of Western interests, regardless of culpability or intention.

Any given conflict which requires the provision of capacity-building efforts is generally a result of the failure of governance. Indeed, the deliberate use of irregulars may be a political means of pressuring the indigenous government to adjust self-defeating policies and to better leverage the trilateral relationship.

Lesson two: capitalise on intelligence collection.

Recent operations have highlighted the level of awareness within threat forces of Western ISR capabilities. As the world continues to urbanise, the challenges of meeting Western forces' intelligence requirements will continue to burgeon unless human intelligence (HUMINT) networks can be established to overcome technical limitations in complex terrain. 'The value of local defenders comes primarily, though not exclusively, from their ability to provide intelligence rather than from their efficacy as combat forces.'[146] Local defenders will have a much greater ability to access HUMINT than foreigners.

Lesson three: beware of local history.

Cultural differences represent a particular challenge, as certain cultures may carry a grievance for centuries, and Western context may only extend as far as several years. An example of the efficacy of such knowledge is apparent in 'the limited U.S. presence in El Salvador [that] prevented the kind of detailed understanding that CIA, Special Forces, and Marines were able to develop in South Vietnam, which in turn limited the expansion of effective Civil Defense units.'[147] The recommendation to be wary of local history assumes a particular resonance in the context of evolving systemic dynamics in failing states and considerations of the 'accidental guerrilla'[148] response to typically blunt Western interventions, as Figure 4 illustrates:

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146 Ibid., p. 171.
147 Ibid., pp. 173–74.
148 See David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2009.

Left diagram (ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA SYNDROME):

AQ establishes a presance in a remote, ungoverned or confict-affected area — **1**

INFECTION

Local population reacts negatively rejecting outside intervention and allying with AQ — **4**

REJECTION

ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA SYNDROME

CONTAGION

AQ uses the safe haven to spread violence and takffiri ideology to other regions — **2**

INTERVENTION

3 — Outside forces intervene to deal with the AQ threat and disrupt the safe haven

Right diagram (ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA INOCULATION):

AQ establishes a presance in a remote, ungoverned or confict-affected area — **1**

INFECTION

ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA INOCULATION

Local population embraces the security provided by *its* government and works with local forces to reject AQ — **4**

REJECTION

SQF discretely works with local security forces to foster professionalism and buildcompetency and capability

PRECRISIS

CONTAGION

AQ uses the safe haven to spread violence and takffiri ideology to other regions — **2**

INOCULATION

INTERVENTION

3 — *Local* forces intervene to deal with the AQ threat and disrupt the safe haven

Figure 4: Kilcullen's model of the accidental guerrilla syndrome above left, and Peterson's advocacy of the value of early intervention to the right.[149]

Preventing the accidental guerrilla with an inoculation that is tailored to the host in an effort to mitigate unintended consequences requires deliberate effort. An excellent case study in a successful 'inoculation' is that of the Dhofar campaign in southern Oman. In this case a small British special forces intervention is analogous to the subtle use of force advocated by David Kilcullen.

149 Peterson, 'The Use of Special Operations Forces in Support of American Strategic Security Strategies', pp. 6–7.

Vignette: Anbar Awakening

The nationalist insurgents and tribesmen who had previously supported the AQI began to have second thoughts beginning in early 2005. As AQI spread out through the province, many of the nationalists were beginning to consider participation in the political process, since the alternative seemed to be more battles like Fallujah to no gain. Tribesmen were increasingly angry as AQI took over their lucrative gray and black-market activities, such as smuggling.

Mohammed Mahmoud Latif (MML) and other nationalists also decided to turn against AQI at some point during mid to late 2005. These nationalists, operating under a new umbrella organisation called the Anbar People's Council (APC), fought against AQI and also sought to help the Coalition protect the elections for the new national government in December 2005. AQI's response to the APC was ruthless and devastating … they assassinated key personnel, including the well-respected Sheikh Nassir al-Fahadawi, the leader of both Abu Khattab's and MML's tribe.

Around the Haditha Triad, Coalition forces partnered principally with members of Albu Jughayfi; in Karmah it was with local tribesmen led by the Albu Jumayli … Other anti-AQI nationalists, possibly including remnants of the APC, formed the Anbar Revolutionaries (often known by its Arabic acronym TAA) at about the same time. TAA used a combination of targeted killings and propaganda, such as graffiti and leaflets, in a campaign intended to weaken and discredit AQI … The year 2007 saw almost all of AQI's gains in Anbar reversed. Though successful in assassinating both Sheikh Sattar and Faisal al-Gaoud along with many other Anbaris, AQI's intimidation failed this time … The relationship between local security forces and the Coalition posed a dilemma for AQI. If they dispersed, the local security forces could defeat them in detail with ease, picking insurgents off one at a time. If the insurgents massed to overwhelm the local security force they would become vulnerable to Coalition firepower.

Source: Austin Long et al., Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt, Todd Helmus, 'Locals Rule: Historical lessons for creating local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond', RAND, www.rand.org, 2012, pp. 149-154.

Lesson four: maintain relationships with conventional security forces.

The Vietnam War's CAPs represent an example of the lack of a defined relationship between conventional and irregular forces. The CAPs were misemployed against NVA regular force units, resulting in heavy casualties for little gain, and sapping the willingness of irregulars to fight. A relationship should instead have been forged with ARVN units that would combat NVA regular forces, while CAPs conducting counter-VC duties secured their lines of communication. Conversely, in Iraq in 2014, it was the enabled CTS units

that took the fight to the enemy ('clearing' actions), but which were left poorly supported by the Iraqi Army for conventional 'hold' functions.[150] Indeed,

> Units assigned to support local defense forces need flexibility, particularly in terms of logistics and autonomy, but they also need support and good relations with the conventional forces who provided logistic and other support. Flexibility and autonomy are needed in order to tailor support to local defense to the unique local conditions … Algeria, Oman, El Salvador, and Lebanon show how developing local forces too quickly, with too few leaders and trainers, resulted in increased numbers but poor quality. Meanwhile, those forces in Algeria that received the most training, as well as proper equipment, proved remarkably useful for the counterinsurgency effort.[151]

Lesson five: leverage other government agencies.

Engagement with other government agencies to provide specific effects is a key consideration given the complexity of capacity building and the generally limited capacity of government agencies to independently deliver deployable advisory capabilities. 'The CIA and USAID have unique skills and/or authorities for political and economic activity that can be crucial to local defense forces. CIDG would have been nearly impossible without the CIA, and when CIA involvement was curtailed the program experienced serious problems.'[152] In a similar vein, the Reserve component of the Army brings to a military domain significant depth in policing, trades, nursing, legal experience and local governance expertise, the benefits of which were readily apparent in Solomon Islands.

Lesson six: transition forces with care.

Successful transition takes time and care but, as illustrated in the case studies cited in this paper, can be rapidly undone with unwise decisions. 'Successfully transitioning local defense forces, either through demobilisation or other employment, seems to take substantially longer than anticipated and faces many more difficulties … Local defense forces with strong ties to the community performed well with little or no pay … Local defense forces, while often vital to counterinsurgency, are more difficult to manage than they

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150 'Today, CTS is deeply involved in the fight against the Islamic State and has retained its cohesion and effectiveness while other Iraqi Security Forces have collapsed.' David Witty, *The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service*, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings, Washington DC, 2015, p. 5.

151 Long et al., 'Locals Rule', pp. 174–75.

152 Ibid., p. 175.

might seem to be on the surface.'[153] Iraq represents the prime example of the risks involved in transitioning forces too quickly, for reasons of expediency or without due consideration of sectarian politics.

Lesson seven: avoid insurgent strongholds.

While Western military bias is naturally orientated to deny sanctuary to insurgents when identified, a counter-insurgency 'oil spot' strategy encourages population-centric expansion to indirectly constrain such sanctuaries. 'Insurgency need not be weakened by the counterinsurgents' direct military action alone. Defections from insurgent ranks or infighting can be a powerful tool for weakening the insurgency. In Oman, the defection by the men who would make up the *firqat* provided this needed weakening. Similar patterns can be seen in Algeria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, with defectors or disgruntled insurgents not only forming the nucleus of local defense in some cases but also weakening the insurgency sufficiently to provide an opening for the creation of local defense.'[154] By recognising that, at the strategic level, there is a contest for control, it is possible to identify that there has to be value propositions to entice and retain loyalty at individual, tribal and collective levels:

> Defectors from the insurgency who immediately join local
> defense forces can be extraordinarily useful … [however] the
> possibility of re-defection or infiltration of the local defense
> force is very real. Such an 'insider threat' can be damaging to
> the counterinsurgency in multiple ways.[155]

In the context of applying an 'oil-spot' counter-insurgency strategy, it must be recalled that the politics is local. As noted earlier, there has to be an intelligence focus on local issues, often within the human domain. Separating a newly recruited soldier from his or her local familial networks is not possible if the security in the local area is poor, as this is where that soldier's loyalties will lie. 'Several cases show the importance of employing local defense forces close to their region of origin. In the case of Indochina, it prevented defections and reduced the risks that these forces would commit exactions against local populations.'[156]

Summary — best practices for special warfare.

The Columbian government's war on the hybrid threat of insurgency, transnational narcotics and border insecurity presents an excellent case

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153 Ibid., pp. 175–76.
154 Ibid., pp. 177–79.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.

study in the application of political will through a special warfare campaign. Colonel Brian Petit quotes then US Ambassador to Columbia, William Brownfield, who in 2009 highlighted the value of understanding Plan Columbia by describing it as 'the most successful nation building exercise that the USA has associated itself with in the past 25 to 30 years.'[157]

Vignette: US advising in Columbia – PLAN COLUMBIA

The most intensive engagement with Columbian Armed Forces was between 1998 and 2006, when US Army Special Forces (SF) played a key role in training and assisting partner units in counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) spearheaded American Joint Combined Exchange for Training (JCETs) missions in Columbia, exploiting the Spanish language orientation of 7th SFG and establishing routine engagement from the American mentors. The number of military personnel and civilian contractors allowed into Columbia at any one time was capped at 400 each, and all activity was confined to a strict train and assist function. President Andres Pastrana launched Plan Columbia in 1998. The centerpiece of this initiative was militarized counter-narcotics strategies to completely disrupt and destroy their production and shipping capabilities. From 2002-2006, the Columbian Government then implemented Plan Patriota, which focused on reestablishing national control over all Columbian municipalities and major tracts of rural territory.

Several lessons can be drawn from the American experience in Columbia. First, engagement is far easier if there is a history of military-to-military ties and no major linguistic barriers. Second, the ability to impart training very much depends on buy-in from the host nation – the willingness to not only accept assistance but also internalize and build on it. Third, engagements are far easier when they involve career-orientated professional soldiers as opposed to conscripts. Fourth, establishing a viable NCO cadre is extremely important for building a force contingent that is adaptable and capable of innovative, proactive thinking. Fifth, rapport is indispensable to fostering trust, solidarity and long-term relationships. Sixth, SOF operations should not be considered in isolation but, rather, as a subset of a larger military strategy that combines and integrates specialised units with general-purpose forces.

Source: Austin Long, Todd Helmus, Rebecca Zimmerman, Christopher Schaubelt and Peter Chalk, 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', RAND, www.rand.org, 2015.

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157 Brian Petit, *Going Big by Getting Small: The application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero*, Outskirts Press, 2013, p. 125.

Command and management of special warfare

Command and management of special warfare missions should be established in a manner conducive to applying best practice that encourages dispersed forces to be intimately integrated with the indigenous force. Such a posture will facilitate intelligence collection from partnered units performing a HUMINT network function. The decision to accompany indigenous forces on operations must consider that 'a small tactical defeat of foreign security force (FSF) has serious strategic consequences. If the FSF fails, the local populace may begin to lose confidence in the host-nation government's ability to protect them.'[158] Command will be challenged in this environment; possibly sensing that it is operating close to the 'edge of chaos', the partner force must make mistakes, learn from them, and gain resilience as a result, but at the same time, cannot be permitted to fail lest the critical vulnerability of popular opinion turn against its partners. Mission command is clearly critical in such circumstances, as the adviser will often be under competing pressures due to the tactical necessities of supporting the partnered force. The mutual trust required from a commander to enable such mission command, and from the adviser to understand that the insider threat is being closely managed, reinforces the necessary individual adviser attributes of competence and experience.

Strategic orchestration of a special warfare campaign. The US doctrinal model for the phases of an unconventional warfare or guerrilla warfare mission provides a useful construct for campaign planning for special warfare. The phases are:[159]

a.   **Phase I. Psychological preparation:** psychological operations are initiated well in advance to prepare the local populace to receive foreign personnel.

b.   **Phase II. Initial contact:** a recon or pre-deployment site survey confirms partner force abilities, dispositions, requirements and living arrangements and negotiates common interests. The investment in a recon is critical to expediting rapport, as negotiated requirements can be directly addressed during the subsequent phase, thereby demonstrating the value of a special warfare team to an indigenous force. This phase may also establish evasion and escape

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158   FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance*, US Department of the Army, 2009, p. 2-6.
159   FM31-21: *Special Forces Operations*, US Department of the Army, 1965, pp. 61–62.

mechanisms to assist in the recovery of friendly personnel during subsequent phases.

c.   **Phase III. Infiltration:** this phase sees the infiltration of the team, its enablers and the potential caching of equipment for subsequent phases.

d.   **Phase IV. Organisation:** this phase involves setting the conditions for future success with partner forces. It may include the identification of leaders, the segregation of nominated personnel for specialist training and the building of facilitation networks to sustain future operations.

e.   **Phase V. Build-up:** this phase may include work-up training, or it may include 'confidence targets' aimed at developing the capabilities required during Phase VI, while achieving shaping effects in support of a wider campaign plan.

f.   **Phase VI. Combat employment:** the employment of partner forces to conduct raids, ambushes and sabotage can provide significant disruptive effects in support of conventional maneouvre, exemplified by partisan operations during World War II. The guerrilla campaign may also be the decisive operation, exemplified by the Northern Alliance advances on Kabul in 2001. 'Guerrilla forces may be assigned rear area security missions with various tactical commands or within the theatre army logistical command area. In assigning guerrilla forces a rear area security role, they should be employed within areas they have previously operated in.'[160]

g.   **Phase VII. Demobilisation:** demobilising forces is a long process due to animosities that will remain raw once conflict has abated. In many cases, guerrilla forces are incorporated into legitimate security forces (military, paramilitary or police forces). 'Guerrilla forces are adapted by experience and training for use in counter-guerrilla operations ... Their knowledge of guerrilla techniques, the language, terrain and population are important capabilities that can be exploited by conventional commanders engaged in counter-guerrilla [counter-insurgency] operations.'[161] Countering a resurgent movement should be anticipated as power structures are realigned. Considering

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160 Ibid., p. 155.
161 Ibid., pp. 155–56.

the ability of guerrilla forces to eventually be integrated into the organs of the state is a valid long-term consideration, as actions undertaken during the campaign may one day politically preclude such options.

Although differences will exist between missions, a campaign focus on a deliberate, long-term building of capacity and capability ensures alignment with many of the recommendations in this paper. To contrast this model with recent history, the US experience in Iraq was fatally undermined by the poor decision to build from scratch the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defence after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded both on 23 May 2003. Furthermore, this construct expands on classic Maoist guerrilla warfare theory, which holds that: 'following Phase I (organisation, consolidation, and preservation) and Phase II (progressive expansion) comes Phase III: decision or destruction of the enemy. During this period a significant percentage of the active guerrilla force completes its gradual transformation into an orthodox establishment capable of engaging the enemy in decisive battles'[162] It is worth noting that the Maoist model for guerilla warfare likewise emphasises that it takes time, 'confidence targets' and deliberate development to grow cadres into a military force.

Assessments. Measures of effectiveness, performance and impact are critical for the command and management of special warfare. The lack of organisational reframing was a factor in the sub-optimal operational results in Afghanistan, and highlights the value of focusing on the conduct of assessments (partner force, own force, indigenous governance, campaign strategy, etc) if a planner is to employ 'strategic optionality'. In Iraq, cautionary lessons can be drawn from the manner in which advisory efforts became misaligned with strategic assessments in 2009. 'When it became clear that initial goals could simply not be met by the time of withdrawal (2011), coalition leaders adjusted standards to align with what they thought might actually be possible. Their initial goals had been based on measures reflecting coalition, primarily US views of what forces should look like and do. They were developed with limited Iraqi input and it should not be surprising that they proved both unrealistic and unpalatable to Iraqis.'[163]

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162 Griffith, *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 19.
163 Paul et al., 'What works best when Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?', p. 8.

Organisation for special warfare

Theatre command. In order to coordinate guerrilla and unconventional warfare tasks, US doctrine advises the establishment of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Headquarters.[164] This model is utilised in Special Operations Command – Korea where a permanent Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force exists to coordinate efforts on a permanent 'pre-crisis' basis.

From an Australian perspective, there may be value in establishing within standing operational headquarters, such as JTF633 or HQJOC, a J5 (or J9) component focused on long-term capability assessment, capacity building and operational performance and harmonising extant international engagement activities. In terms of the operational art employed during Plan Columbia, the 'emphasis was less on decisive points and more on *decisive relationships* … Relationships have an ephemeral quality that is hard to qualify within doctrinal concepts or pure physics-based military problems. Yet recognising relationships as *decisive* expresses their value in familiar military language. It also promotes the pursuit of relations vice just transactions.'[165] These long-term considerations lend themselves to permanent headquarters' responsibilities to judiciously invest in language skills, cultural familiarity and key leader engagements to achieve a 'warm start' in future adviser deployments.

In-theatre training/mission-specific training (MST). The US applied the Malaysian model of a forward-deployed training centre through which new contingents rotated. In Iraq, this was called the COIN Centre for Excellence and was located at Taji, directly addressing the specificities of the COIN environment, but importantly serving as a vehicle for disseminating lessons across contingents and harmonising the commander's intent. This proved of immeasurable value at the time Al Qaeda in Iraq found itself challenged by Sunni nationalists in Iraq as the US counter-insurgency system was postured to exploit this opportunity:

> The local forces were incorporated into the formal Iraqi state
> as quickly as possible … The Marines were able to accomplish
> this due to their high levels of effective engagement with locals,

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164 FM31-21: *Special Forces Operations*, pp. 13–14. According to this doctrine, 'there are innumerable advantages to be gained by the JUWTF being established prior to actual operational commitment.'
165 Petit, *Going Big by Getting Small*, pp. 148–51.

supplemented by intelligence collection about local dynamics, the Marines' relations with special operations forces, and — it seems likely — other government agencies. In contrast, Army units outside Anbar did not incorporate into the formal security forces the former nationalist insurgents with whom they had begun to cooperate in Baghdad and Diyala provinces. Instead, they formed ad-hoc groups, which were referred to as Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) and then the Sons of Iraq (SOI) and were paid directly by the Army … the Anbar Awakening was the result of a series of local initiatives, and therefore had little pressure to rapidly expand, the SOI program did face pressure to grow rapidly as it came to be viewed as a major element of the counterinsurgency effort.'[166]

It could be argued that the delivery of 'just-in-time' training at Taji facilitated the necessary mission command to enable initiatives under the Anbar Awakening to be harnessed. Where it is impractical to establish a COIN Centre for Excellence in country, the effect should be achieved through appropriate MST, at an intermediate staging base, or through the development of special warfare expertise in the form of an adviser course and management.

Organisational partnerships. In the context of establishing 'decisive partnerships', Australian operational art must consider long-term opportunities that might not immediately be apparent. An interesting example of an unorthodox partnership that emerged in the latter years of the Afghan counter-insurgency was Task Force 10 which 'seeks to not only train and mentor Afghan PRC units but also enhance the SOF skills of the contributing Eastern European nations.'[167] The use of 10th Special Forces Group members (of the European area of responsibility) to enhance Lithuanian, Romanian, Hungarian and Estonian special forces capabilities to form composite advisory teams that in turn partner Afghan Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) may prove a useful model for future theatres. The potential applicability of this model to operate with certain partners in Australia's Pacific region, South-East Asian neighbours or Middle Eastern partners (such as UAE special forces) may strengthen relationships, enhance the size of international contributions to the coalition and mitigate 'accidental guerrilla'

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166 Paul et al., 'What works best when Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?', pp. 155–56.
167 Long et al., 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', p. 22.

effects, where such partners have an enhanced cultural affinity with the local inhabitants. Similarly, the ADF has learned to welcome integration of Australian government elements (such as the Australian Federal Police) in military contingents to bring these organisational skills to the operational effort.

Advisory partnerships. Recommended advisory partnership ratios can be gauged by a review of recent practice in Afghanistan. US doctrine for special warfare historically assigns a single ODA (12 men) to mentor a battalion-sized element; however by 2013, experience in Afghanistan had increased this ratio to two ODAs (24 men) assigned to every Special Operations *Kandak* (SOK).[168] Considerations of an appropriate rank for mentoring a *Kandak* commanding officer (Afghan lieutenant colonel) prompted consideration of either assigning an O-4 commander to these two ODAs, or assigning an AOB (Advanced Operational Base — a company headquarters equivalent element). Order of battle sizes in Afghanistan varied considerably, commensurate with threat environments, partner force role and adviser training and experience. For example, in 2013, the Australian 200-strong TF66 mentored a single PRC and an NDS (National Directorate of Security) element, while a 60-strong Lithuanian mentoring element was employed for two PRCs, highlighting the fact that the order of battle will be tailored to the types of operations undertaken by different task forces.[169]

A 'standard' order of battle is recommended as a four to six-personnel capability brick. In the context described above, the scalable terminology discussed below should be used for advisory teams:

a.   **Training Assistance Team (TAT)**: a four to six-person element drawn from a pool of trained advisers. This terminology is used almost exclusively for training roles (such as international engagement serials or support to training establishments within a theatre of operations). A TAT may also exist as a command mentoring function to a mature indigenous force. A Special Operations Force TAT would perform a similar function, but may extend beyond purely training roles due to organic JTAC, sniper and medic enablers.

b.   **Advisory Team (AT)**: a 12 to 15-person element, built on a core of two TATs, but with additional weight to allow it to also perform operational advisory roles accompanying a partner force, generally

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168   Ibid., pp. 33–34. The USMC also reached this conclusion: 'In general, Marines found that 12 advisors were not enough to advise an entire IA battalion.' Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, pp. 39–40.

169   Long et al., 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', p. 29.

between platoon and company size. Such a team should be commanded by a captain or warrant officer, with specialist enablers, operating under rotary wing medical evacuation and indirect fires coverage. A Special Forces Advisory Team would be similar in size, perform a similar role and consist almost exclusively of special forces personnel or enablers to support force projection into remote locations paralleling the US Special Forces ODA model for unconventional or guerilla operations in particular.

c. **Special Operations Advisory Team (SOAT)**: a 30-person element, able to detach one to two SFATs from a firm base if necessary, based on the 'operational detachment' model of OSS.[170] It is therefore commanded by a major and consists of organic JTAC, C4ISR, sniper and indirect fires capabilities, partners a battalion to brigade-sized organisation, usually operating from an indigenous forward operating base, for unconventional or guerilla operations in particular.

d. **Advisory Group (AG)**: this is defined as being larger in size and capability than an AT. It is commanded by a lieutenant colonel or above, commensurate with the operational-level advice being provided. The group would retain design considerations that allow the deployment of TATs and ATs (or SOFTATs, SFATs and SOATs in the case of special operations elements) from the parent organisation for specific accompanied missions or to meet disparate organisational demands (e.g. support to force generation courses, support to expeditionary partnered battalion operations, etc). The group is also distinguished by the requisite 'staff advising' function necessary to enhance an indigenous battle group, brigade or formation-sized organisation.[171] This 'staff advising' function requires the indigenous force to conduct its own battle tracking, medical evacuation and call for fires processes, with advisory elements facilitating the growth of enduring battle-management capabilities. An AG (or SOAG) may be sufficient for independent employment in theatre in the event of a deployment with a light footprint.

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170 'This was in the nature of an officers' patrol of 5 officers and 30 men. We Americans called our units "Operational Groups" and used them as activating nuclei of resistance groups in the different theatres.' Donovan, Lecture on Partisan Warfare, p. 18.

171 A USMC example of such a structure was employed in Iraq between 2004 and 2006: 'At the highest level, a division MiTT (Military Transition Team) generally consisted of 15 men led by a colonel; a brigade-level MiTT usually consisted of ten men led by a lieutenant colonel; and at the lowest level, a battalion MiTT was generally composed of eleven men led by a major.' Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, p. 39.

e.   **Australian Army Advisory Team (AAAT)**: this team is commanded commensurate to the target organisation that is being advised and is equivalent to theatre-level command of special warfare missions. The team is likely to have a core AG, but with additional TATs/ATs operating in other regions of the country supporting indigenous capacity in a holistic sense. For example, such a team may resemble a core AG supporting an indigenous brigade, a TAT nested within coalition mentoring at an infantry school and at an NCO school, a TAT nested within coalition mentoring at the indigenous Army or Regional Command Headquarters and an AT operating with an indigenous helicopter detachment, servicing the AG-mentored brigade, and commanded in theatre by an appropriate-sized headquarters staffed at colonel or brigadier level.

The final organisational consideration concerns the rank requirements for those advising foreign forces. The demands of special warfare are best met by leveraging the experience that is gained through time to develop rank. For example, a TAT involved in force generation training should be commanded by a sergeant, assisted by two corporals to meet range supervisory qualifications for the officer in charge of a field firing range, with two safety supervisors. Ideally, the remaining three members of the team will be lance corporals or senior privates, qualified to deliver lessons or with a specialist skill that can be utilised to deliver advisory effects. Similar considerations will cascade into higher advisory formations, commensurate with the mission and the specialist skills the partner force requires.

Operations: the conduct of special warfare

There are some clear best practices for those conducting BPC, clear best traits for desirable partners, and clear best practices for recipient partners. The results demonstrate that when all three have been followed, effectiveness has ensued. *If BPC is consistently funded and delivered, supported and sustained, well matched to partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports the effort and is healthy economically and in terms of governance, prospects for effective BPC are very good.*[172]

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172   Paul et al., 'What works best when Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?', p. 22.

The conduct of special warfare tasks therefore, should apply the following considerations, termed '5Ps for advisory tasks':

a.   **Purpose**. Australian strategic objectives for the mission must be clearly understood for their effect on tactical actions. 'When SFA supports a host nation, it also supports that host nation's strategy.'[173] Australian objectives, however, must seek common interests and not be subordinated to that of the host nation. It is imperative to avoid being exploited or inadvertently crossing a 'red line' by keeping a weather eye on these Australian strategic objectives while supporting the partner force.

b.   **Partner-force knowledge**. Understanding partners' history, culture and language is essential. Key personalities within the partner force must be recognised along with their broader connections. 'Tactically, successful SFA requires identifying the friendly and hostile decision-makers, their objectives and strategies, and the ways they interact.'[174] Planners must understand that the term 'friendly' may cover a number of groups with varying levels of 'friendliness' which may change rapidly — a subtlety that is echoed in complexity by graduated levels of the term 'hostile'. The complexity of the operating environment requires understanding of white space (governance), red space (insurgents/subversives), green space (partner force hierarchy), black space (criminal networks), yellow/purple space (other military forces supporting indigenous forces) and the common nodes between such networks.

c.   **Parity**. Advisors should be prepared to live, eat and fight in the same conditions as their partner forces. As RAND explains, 'embedding and partnering also provide a better context for assessments – the closer one is to the host nation unit, the better one can understand how local personnel think about challenges and approaches.'[175] One example from the Afghanistan experience holds that: 'spending the money needed for adequate wages and producing quality security forces is less costly than ending up with corrupt and abusive forces that alienate the populace.'[176] Short-term tactical risk is therefore required to mitigate long-term strategic risk. To simplify such

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173   FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance*, US Department of the Army, 2009, p. v.
174   Ibid., p. 2-1.
175   Oliker, 'Security Force Development in Afghanistan: Learning from Iraq', p. 9.
176   FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance*, p. 2-4.

planning, the goal of military advisers must remain fundamental to all efforts: to increase capability, capacity, competency, confidence and commitment (known as the '5Cs'), all tasks that are difficult to undertake remotely.[177]

d. **Persistence**. The quality of a relationship is directly proportionate to the amount of time invested. Operations should aim to build a relationship that can sustain the shock of casualties, and key here is the building of confidence within the indigenous force. 'Newly trained units should enter their first combat operation in support of more experienced foreign units.'[178] The Western bias for short-term focus on immediate operational effect must be offset by recognition that 'all SFA types tend to be more effective if they are long-term efforts'.[179] By planning operations that gradually test, validate and improve these 5Cs, reliance on CF capabilities can be better mitigated. Promoting from within the ranks may also mitigate the influence of external stakeholders within government or criminal elements. Training the next generation of selected officers is also difficult. 'One method of selection identifies the most competent performers, trains them, and recommends them for promotion. The second method identifies those with existing social or professional status within the training group, then trains and recommends them for promotion. The first method may lead to more competent leaders but could be resisted for cultural reasons. The second method ensures the new leader will be accepted culturally but may sacrifice competence. The most effective solution comes from combining the two methods.'[180] This is due to two competing tensions. First, 'The effectiveness of FSF directly relates to the quality of their leadership.'[181] Second, to maintain influence, advisers must maintain access (persistence). If politically connected individuals are shunned to the ire of the indigenous leadership, a force is unlikely to retain access.

e. **Patience**. Patience is essential for the development of specialist skills within the indigenous force, such as HUMINT, communications and logistics. 'A central consideration includes the host nation's long-term ability to support and maintain the equipment … Primary

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177 Ibid., p. 3-7.
178 Ibid., p. 2-6.
179 Ibid., p. 3-8.
180 Ibid., p. 2-4.
181 Ibid., p. 2-6.

considerations should include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term sustainment costs. Few developing nations can support highly complex equipment.'[182] Facilities for partner forces should likewise be sustainable and developed with a long-term focus, as their fight may last for decades longer than that of the coalition force advisers. 'If possible, garrisons should include housing for the host-nation soldiers and their families; government provided healthcare for the families; and other attractive benefits' that may not seem warranted under a short-term focus.[183] There is, however, a sizeable history of insurgent intimidation, kidnapping and murder of families of those serving within security forces.

Partner force operational capabilities. In terms of planning operations to support an indigenous force, RAND uses a metaphor to describe the ideal process: '"find the right ladder, find the right rung" … Effective U.S. BPC efforts (in the 29 case studies surveyed) almost always address capability areas that are central to both U.S. and partner nation (PN) interests (the right ladder) and build on existing baseline PN capabilities, without providing more sophisticated equipment, assistance, or training than PN forces are able to absorb (the right rung). When both the U.S. and PN leadership have been enthusiastic about developing and improving capabilities, and when assistance has been well matched to the PN's context and baseline capabilities, success has followed.'[184] Australian strategic interests may also seek to place upper limits on the 'rung' to which a partner force will ascend with Australian support. Initial assessments on motivation, interests and objectives will require routine reassessment to ensure that the methods employed by advisers do not become counter-productive.

Incorporation of militia forces. The incorporation of militias mobilised during the campaign into the legitimate national security forces was a key lesson in Iraq. 'The key strength of Sons of Iraq (SOI) has been this placement and access to intelligence, rather than simple numbers of armed men.'[185] However, the effectiveness of this force generation stream was undermined by political considerations from the predominantly Shi'ite

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182 Ibid., p. 2-7.

183 Ibid. This lesson was also well noted by the Selous Scouts, established in November 1973 in Rhodesia. 'Those who chose to join the Scouts were formally absolved of any crimes they may have committed while serving in the insurgent ranks, were paid an attractive salary, and had their families relocated to special, protected, and comparatively luxurious encampments.' Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer Taw and David Arnold, 'Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience', RAND Arroyo Centre, 1991, at: www.rand.org (accessed 17 January 2016), p. 32.

184 Long et al., 'Locals Rule', pp. 29–32.

185 Ibid., p. 161.

parliament. 'In terms of the arrests of former SOI leaders, the government of Iraq is less sympathetic … many if not most of those leaders have been criminals or insurgents. A formal amnesty for previous crimes or insurgent activity would have eliminated this concern (and potentially encouraged greater incorporation in the security infrastructure). Without amnesty, the threat of arrest hangs over the head of almost all SOI leaders in perpetuity.'[186] Such tensions were never successfully addressed, and provide a cautionary lesson given the subsequent decline in Iraqi Army capability after 2011.[187]

Personnel appropriate to special warfare missions

> Working to influence foreign partners, collect intelligence and, on occasion, surgically apply violence requires a unique mix of maturity, cross-cultural competence and creativity, and it is a mission better conducted by seasoned veterans than by 19-year-olds spoiling for their first fire-fight … Amid today's hyper-globalised media environment, a single person in the wrong job can uproot entire campaigns and undo years of progress … 'The wrong man can do more harm than the right man can do good'.[188]

In the context of today's globalised information environment and the words of President Kennedy in 1962, special warfare requires maturity and vastly different nomination considerations. From the US perspective, special warfare has historically been specific to special forces, allowing appropriate personnel to be selected and trained for that role. [189] Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have not treated advisory missions as a special role, arguably delivering sub-optimal results as a consequence:

> The selection of advisors is also critical. Not all Army officers are equally able to work with indigenous forces. The current system cannot adequately capture such critical issues as

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186 Ibid., p. 160.

187 In August 2014, 'with the combat losses and desertions, 60 of the Iraqi Army's 243 combat battalions were gone, along with their equipment, which likely ended up in the hands of the Islamic State. Five of Iraq's 14 Army divisions were rated as ineffective, or had disappeared completely. U.S. advisors rated remaining units as infiltrated with Shi'a militias and Sunni extremists.' Witty, *The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,* p. 35.

188 Ibid., p. 27.

189 'The missions of special forces are to develop, organise, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare and to advise, train and assist host country forces in counter-insurgency operations.' FM31-21: *Special Forces Operations*, US Department of the Army, 1965, p. 17.

personality and does not consider such important issues
as experience with advising (or other relevant experiences)
when advisors are selected … Lessons may be available
from US Army Special Forces because this is what they have
traditionally been selected, structured and [trained] to do.'[190]

Selection. A consistent theme in AATTV, CAP and US Special Forces
experience has been the requirement for a selection process —
a requirement that remains unchanged from Vietnam to today. The *SFA
Introductory Guide* 'identifies maturity, professional competence,
cross-cultural negotiation and problem-solving, leadership and
region-specific skills as ideal advisor traits.' Elaborating on the importance
of selection, US Army doctrine identifies that the critical function of rapport
building relies on 'being confident, competent and capable'.[191] Competence
is not a universal trait. Proving oneself capable against dynamic and
challenging selection criteria almost always results in an improvement
in confidence (a key consideration for special forces selection courses).
These variables are entwined. Major Fernando Lujan (US Special Forces),
in his analysis of the Afghan Hands program, defines the crux of such
programs as: 'Select hard, manage easy'.[192] This advice encapsulates the
trust invested in such individuals, particularly when advising foreign militaries.
The ISAF SFA guide concurs:

> Selection of the right personnel for the SFA mission implies a
> de-selection of the wrong personnel. A significant percentage
> of personnel demonstrate exceptional professional merit; they
> are competent, courageous, and dedicated to their professions
> … however the personal traits that make an effective advisor
> [are]: empathy; generate influence; and the ability to work
> 'within shades of grey'.[193]

US Special Forces doctrine notes that 'training of Special Forces personnel
for counterinsurgency missions involves developing skills and techniques
which must in turn be taught to indigenous personnel with a cultural
background vastly different from that of the US soldier.'[194] RAND analysis

190 Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', p. xxi.
191 FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance*, US Department of the Army, 2009, p. 9-2.
192 Major Fernando Lujan, *Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention*, Center for a New American Security, 2013, p. 24. Major Lujan is an Army special forces officer, Foreign Area Officer and AF-PAK Hands participant completing a visiting Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs fellowship at the Center for a New American Security.
193 NATO (U), *ISAF Security Forces Assistance Guide*, 20 December 2013, p. 8.
194 FM31-21: *Special Forces Operations*, Department of the Army, 1965, p. 206.

criticises the recent US approach to preparing advisers for Afghanistan and Iraq, noting that 'not all soldiers are well suited by character and personality for the advisory role … there is nothing in the Army or Marine Corps personnel selection process that seeks to select those better suited for this mission to be advisors.'[195] Clearly a selection process is an essential component of an Australian special warfare capability.

Specialist advisers. Individuals selected to perform special warfare tasks may be termed 'advisers', and this could become a corps specialisation (similar to an officer/NCO mortar qualification) or an Army officer stream. Such personnel may fit the Army's 'generalist plus' officer model and would therefore require a form of tailored education for the operational and strategic challenges of planning a special warfare campaign.[196] Legendary British operative T.E. Lawrence personified the potential benefits that can be leveraged from specialist personnel to enhance the conduct of a broader campaign. Indeed Lawrence was not a conventional soldier; he was an Arabic linguist, a reserve intelligence officer and had significant life experience in the Levant, Mesopotamia and Arabia.[197] These are all essential adviser attributes for the conduct of special warfare and are crucial for success given the characteristics of special warfare missions as illustrated in Figure 5.

195 Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', p. 83.
196 I explored this concept further and in greater detail in 'Strategic Planners: A response to operational complexity,' *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, Autumn 2016.
197 See T.E. Lawrence, *Seven pillars of wisdom*, Penguin Group, UK, 1962.

The Spectrum of Special Warfare

| Permissive | ENVIRONMENTAL | Denied |
| Friendly | GOVERNING AUTHORITIES | Hostile |

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Reluctant Partners

Non-Ally Partner States

Volatile States

Regional Organisations

Isolated Powers with regional influences

Expeditionary Capable Allies

Peer competitors with global influences

Competencies specific to the country or mission

Core tasks and skills that are common to all special warfare missions – language, cultural competencies, etc.

Capabilities that apply to most missions, but may not be relevant to all operational environments

Regionally focused tasks or skills relevant to similar missions

*Overlapping Characteristics of Special Warfare Missions*

Figure 5: Personnel specialisation support to a broad range of operational contingencies

(Source: US Army SOCOM, SOF *Campaign Planner's Handbook of Operational Art and Design*, Version 2.0, Fort Bragg, NC, 2014, p. III-6).

The conduct of operations in Afghanistan in the period 2001–2005 represents a cautionary tale. During this period the paucity of such selection and education processes may have contributed to poor choices within the coalition strategy. 'The challenges of creating security institutions for a nation in the midst of an insurgency demand that senior ISAF leaders possess skills that span the security, political, economic, and social sectors; when taken in tandem with the requirement to actually conduct campaigns in Afghanistan, those skills exceed those normally associated with the operational art.'[198] The development of such personnel must combine human resource selection factors, formal education, experience and exposure to foreign cultures to enhance the special warfare capability.

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198 Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', p. 70.

Personnel management strategies for special warfare have generally relied on an individual's experience. 'For British SOF mentoring CF333 [an Afghan special forces battalion], color sergeants (OR-7) served as primary mentors to the individual squadrons … generally with between 12 and 15 years in service, much of it running training for their home units.'[199] In Oman, a similar emphasis on advisory support from experienced soldiers was apparent in the use of SAS soldiers. The theme for successful capacity building is clearly that regional understanding, developed over time, is a key enabler. As David Petraeus notes, 'Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.'[200]

A RAND report focused on best practice, specifically for *preparing forces* for the Afghanistan theatre, recommended the following:[201]

• operations must be subordinated to capability development

• focus on sustainable operations

• deliberately wean Afghan SOF from unsustainable support

• link SOF to existing intelligence infrastructure

• promote deep partnership through extensive rapport building[202]

• use mentorship networks and the chain of command to your benefit

• assign senior and experienced individuals to key mentorship positions

• maintain effective continuity across rotations

• pre-mission training should include a mock partner force

Incorporating such considerations for personnel selection and development should be factored into organisational design and also apply a necessary rotation system. A cadre of specialist advisers may fit naturally into the DCP, postings to Regional Force Surveillance Units (RFSUs) and, over time, defence attaché roles, aligned to their language and cultural experience.

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199 Long et al., 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', p. 8.

200 Lieutenant General David Petraeus (retd), 'Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq', *Military Review*, January-February 2006.

201 Long et al., 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', pp. ix–xv.

202 Rapport building itself consists of six key factors: 'units that returned time and time again to work with the same partner unit reported unusually positive rapport. Second, rapport benefits when special operators engaged in non-transactional relationships with Afghans … Third, respect for Afghan culture was critical … Fourth, commanders must set a clear intent among subordinates on the need for and importance of rapport … Fifth, enhance language capability of SOF mentors so that they are able to communicate with indigenous SOF counterparts. Sixth, where security conditions permit, mentors should live in close proximity to SOF counterparts.' Ibid, p. xi.

Vignette: The 'railroading' of US Special Forces development of Iraqi Special Forces

The training of the ICTF (later the Iraqi Special Operations Forces) was initially conducted in Jordan … used until proper Iraqi facilities could be constructed. It was understood that developing trust and rapport with the partner force was the best force protection measure. Instances of operators learning Arabic and cultural norms were common and enhanced by the multiple rotations that US Special Operations Command sustained over Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Rotation lengths varied to some extent but were typically about six months, a duration that supported multiple tours, but hampered rapport-building efforts. In the environment of rapid lessons learnt assimilation, pre-mission training (PMT) quickly led to the use of a mock partner force, which was noted as being especially helpful for orientating to mission.

In an effort to support targeting operations, intelligence and targeting packages [were being] provided by US forces [which] allowed a 'spin and grin' approach wherein everything was handed over to the ISOF … The Iraqis were somewhat better with HUMINT but SIGINT, pattern analysis, predictive analysis, etc were lacking. This handoff inhibited the growth of Iraqi SOF intelligence capability, particularly within a 'rule of law' framework.

Coalition concerns of sectarianism were beginning to emerge in April 2007 after the Iraqi Prime Minister signed Directive 61, declaring ISOF independent of both the MOD and MOI. ISOF was placed under a Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC), which in turn reported to the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS). The CTS reports to the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) – an extra-constitutional body that has not been approved by the Council of Representatives and reports directly to the Prime Minister – instead of the MOD. Additionally, the government of Iraq began an effort to triple the authorized size of the ISOF and CTS from about 1,600 in May 2006 to approximately 4,800 by January 2008. In May 2008, CTS authorized strength was again doubled to more than 8,500, adding force structure that included four regional commando battalions that were each authorized 440 soldiers. The ISOF subsequently went from units with some of the highest assigned strengths and best retention rates to experiencing problems with recruiting and retention.

These reported concerns only grew with time, as the Iraqi government took full control over its various SOF elements. Nepotism and politicization were frequently mentioned problems. USSF personnel stated that they believed there was an implicit rule implemented after coalition forces lost oversight of the ISOF - all targets must be Sunni and that the Prime Minister would not allow the CTS to target Shi'a threats.

Source: Austin Long, Todd Helmus, Rebecca Zimmerman, Christopher Schaubelt and Peter Chalk, 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', RAND, www.rand.org, May 2014, pp. 33–40.

Facilities and training areas

During a deployment, it will often be more cost effective to use locally procured facilities. In Afghanistan, 'the Norwegian mentor team has built a small and relatively unsecured enclave inside the larger CRU [Crisis Response Unit — a battalion-sized special forces unit] facility. The enclave was adjacent to the CRU's living quarters and allowed unfettered interaction between the mentors and the CRU operators.'[203] Such a relationship was also key to the development of an Iraqi special forces (ISOF) capability.[204] The purchase, rental or occupation of a 'team house' may be the most expeditious means of establishing partner capability to protect the population while also paying dividends in a longer term commitment to capacity building. Roger Trinquier describes the value of this arrangement:

> In the villages, however, we often find one or two empty houses, where the bands usually stay while in transit, which we can occupy … We then organise not just the defense of a sole military post, but that of the entire village and its inhabitants, making it a strategic hamlet.[205]

Procuring facilities is also a necessary element of the small team adviser tasks in support of indigenous forces. In Iraq, 'by 2007, basic training for both police and military units was carried out primarily by Iraqis. Coalition forces were assigned in advisory/transition teams to the Iraqi police and military forces, with whom they ideally ate, slept and worked.'[206] While living with Iraqi forces incurred a risk of insider attack, the development of rapport clearly served to mitigate this risk, within this cultural context.

It would be remiss not to benchmark the US Special Forces 'Robin Sage' model when considering training areas for the development of special warfare capability. The Robin Sage model is an immersive unconventional warfare training environment located in the North Carolina countryside where people both live and work. The maturity of this model demonstrates that immersive environments are workable and afford training opportunities for the development of cultural understanding and nuance. The use of

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203 Ibid., p. 12.

204 'Under the formal command of the U.S. led Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) and trained, equipped, advised, and led by USSF, ISOF had the most continuous U.S. attention of any unit in Iraq. Modelled on USSF doctrine, it became a professional force. USSF advisors and teams lived at ISOF bases and were collocated with ISOF down to the company level and at ISOF's training facilities.' Witty, *The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service*, p. 7.

205 Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French view of Counterinsurgency*, p. 62.

206 Oliker, 'Security Force Development in Afghanistan: Learning from Iraq', p. 3.

Operation Resolute patrols in Far North Queensland is an excellent example of a means to effect a similar outcome from an extended duration patrol to a two-year posting to an immersive special warfare training environment. Australian Army postings to the Pacific Islands Regiment served a similar purpose, and contextualise the potential for embedded officer postings with foreign forces (with the exception of the current UK and US exchanges).[207]

Individual training

US doctrine describes the role of the military adviser in a manner that highlights the requirement for the selection, development and preparation of that individual: 'the military advisor has three roles involving different responsibilities. First and foremost, advisors are members of a U.S. military organisation with a well-defined chain of command and familiar responsibilities. Second, advisors embed themselves with their counterparts. Third, advisors are interpreters and communicators between U.S. forces and their foreign counterparts.'[208] Consequently, the three tenets of individual training for specialist advisers can be described as:

a.   They should be drawn from and familiar with the military organisation (sergeant, warrant officer, captain and above).

b.   An adviser course to prepare individuals to embed within foreign organisations is essential.[209]

c.   Communication skills, including foreign languages, non-verbal communication, negotiation techniques and conflict resolution are crucial.

Foundational US Special Forces doctrine suggests that individual training consist of: methods of instruction, physical endurance, leadership, communications, intelligence, language training, improvisation of training aids, medical training, small unit tactics, organisation and development of a village defence system, use of air support and artillery, and psychological

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207   'By 1946, the PIR had raised 4 Battalions, and a Depot Battalion to facilitate training. Its posted strength was 83 Officers, 163 ORs (European), 1929 ORs (Pacific Islanders) with 240 recruits. Overall this was representative of a 1:9 ratio of Europeans to Pacific Islanders.' James Sinclair, *To find a Path: The life and Times of the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment*, M. Pears (ed), Boolarong Publications, Bowen Hills, Queensland, 1990.

208   FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance*, US Department of the Army, 2009, p. 7-1.

209   The USMC model for adviser training is 'based at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California. ATG was established in 2007 to prepare Marines to deploy to Afghanistan. Its mission is to "train Marine Corps advisor teams to advise, mentor, and train foreign military, police and border units in operational techniques and procedures to combat terrorism and counter an insurgency [in Afghanistan]" … Before attending the ATG, Marines will have completed the Advisor Training Cell (ATC) course at their resident MEF.' Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, p. 79.

operations.[210] The USMC equivalent from the same period utilised a three-month course that 'stressed military skills that were in particularly high demand in Vietnam, such as fire-support and air-ground communications.'[211] It also emphasised the Vietnamese language. Such trends remain prevalent in contemporary models for adviser training.

Individuals should be carefully selected for the advisory role and managed as specialists — in the same way as the AATTV advisers or US Special Forces personnel — if the Army is to reap the second-order benefits of aligning the right person with the right advisory role. It is notable in this context that the Army's Future Land Operating Concept directs that 'the Army is to regard cultural, societal and language capabilities as combat multipliers and as such, these skills need to be developed across all corps and managed as a resource across the Army.'[212] Regardless of the training scheme, graduates should be deployed for a 12-month mentoring tenure, allowing them to learn from their mistakes and develop rapport with their partner force, as well as providing the requisite 'return on investment' to the Army for adviser training.

Individual training of foreign forces. There are a number of lessons critical to the provision of individual SFA training to foreign forces:

a. Establish a baseline capability with the indigenous force through 'off-site' training (such as the US SOF support to ISOF in Jordan in 2003 and 2014) while training facilities are being established or prior to the completion of Status of Forces Agreements.[213] This allows accelerated progression, growth of rapport and development of English language skills without the competing pressure of operational tempo. This 'baseline' group will become the future NCOs of the indigenous force, and hence quality is more important than quantity during these initial stages.

b. Conduct talent-spotting while building baseline capability coupled with appropriate analysis (vetting parochial relationships, English language ability) of potential leaders within the indigenous force. These people should be sponsored through 'off-site' officer and

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210 FM31-21: *Special Forces Operations*, US Department of the Army, 1965, p. 206.

211 Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, pp. 32–33.

212 Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning – Army, 'Army's Future Land Operating Concept', Army Headquarters, Canberra, 2009, p. 64.

213 'In 2014, USSF and Jordanian Special Forces began training small numbers of CTS forces in Jordan. The training was modest but allowed the U.S. to again avoid the SOFA issue at a time when CTS was beginning to suffer significant combat losses.' Witty, *The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,* p. 25.

NCO training or at a third country military academy (which may be appropriate to offset language barriers) to set the conditions for a professional force.[214]

c.   Those personnel from the baseline capability who are unsuited to leadership positions (or with desired attributes for supporting roles) should be screened for their suitability to commence building the key enablers of intelligence, logistics, signals, medical and transport. These enablers take such a long time to mature that early prioritised development is essential to ensure that such a capability will exist by the time the advising force leaves. From the outset, these enablers need to be grown with sustainable practices in mind, based on indigenous enablers, not those of the advisers.[215]

Language and cultural preparation for advisers. The AATTV initially identified seven weeks of 'soft skills' training, and then increased its investment to almost 80 days by 1972, implemented through an adviser's course and tailored language training. The US Special Forces model invests approximately six months' training (with a further four to 12 months' language study). An investment between the US 'high-water mark' and the AATTV 'low-water mark' would be appropriate for complex special warfare roles and assimilation. 'For some, breaking away from doctrine and standard operating procedures is an impossible task and counterintuitive to everything they know.'[216]

Major systems

A key aspect of special warfare is that minimal demand exists for major systems. It therefore lacks the political implications of major acquisitions that routinely draw senior leader focus. However, a lack of specific major systems requirements does not imply an absence of requirement for key capabilities. Advisers will need to draw on broader military capabilities

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214 'It is noteworthy that the British SOF have made a concerted effort to educate key Afghan commanders at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst … This education seemed to help these commanders improve English language skills as well as enhance understanding of British military tactics.' Long et al., 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', p. 13. During the Vietnam War, 'Vietnamese officers and senior NCOs were sent to U.S. Marine schools, including the Basic School and the Amphibious Warfare School.' Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future*, pp. 28–29.

215 'It would seem to be better to emphasise building these "tail" capabilities (logistics, intelligence, signals, planning, medical, aviation) much more in the beginning, accepting that this will reduce the speed of "tooth" development'. Long et al., 'Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond', p. xiii.

216 Andrew George, 'The Security Force Assistance Team: Selecting the right soldiers for the job', *Infantry Magazine*, 1 November 2012, p. 10.

such as ISR, CAS, OS and engineer support, either independently or in support of their partnered force. Indeed, according to US doctrine for special forces operations, an Unconventional Warfare Task Force includes an aviation company. This company is tasked to provide aerial delivery of personnel, supplies and equipment, exfiltration of selected personnel, spot aerial photography, limited aerial fire support and other aviation support (surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, liaison, limited logistical support, administrative support and participation in psychological operations).[217]

Supply

Advisers will often need to be embedded within the indigenous force to ensure the building of rapport. As discussed earlier, sharing risks is critical to developing rapport and credibility with the partner force. Accompanying partnered forces implies a requirement to procure and operate foreign weapons, to dress similarly to the partnered force, and to reduce the signature of vehicles. The principle of camouflage within human terrain is essential if the adviser is not to be marked as a high value target to adversaries.

At present, supply of such items clearly challenges Army culture, long lead-time procurement systems, and constrained logistic support (e.g. sourcing foreign weapons). The supply of similar equipment is more achievable and the ADF is capable of providing an indigenous force with the necessary items when commencing an advisory role (exemplified by materiel support provided to the Peshmerga in 2014). Supply of common equipment to both indigenous forces and advisers under a streamlined military assistance program can mitigate the logistic challenges to an assisted force during an insurgency. During the Vietnam War, the AATTV's Barry Petersen procured camouflage uniforms and a self-designed pin for his Montagnard tribesmen, marking the force as different. It had the desired effect, distinguishing his operatives from the VC, and becoming a source of pride for his irregulars. As the leader of the Montagnard force, Petersen also wore the uniform.

217 FM31-21: *Special Forces Operations*, US Department of the Army, 1965, p. 32.

> ### *Vignette:* Unconventional Warfare in Afghanistan
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> Pakistan, and specifically its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), has been engaged in an incredibly long-term unconventional warfare campaign that provides an illuminating view into how such a strategy can be used to indirectly achieve a state's national objectives … Evidence that the ISI continues to support and direct the Taliban is voluminous, indicating a continuation of the UW campaign, with or without the direct permission of Pakistan's elected leaders during the period 2001 to present.
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> The doctrinal phases of UW consist of: 1) Psychological preparation, 2) Initial Contact, 3) Infiltration, 4) Organisation, 5) Buildup, 6) Combat Utilisation, 7) Transition / De-mobilisation. UW Phase 1 (Psychological preparation) was intensified through the radicalization of Afghan refugee youth in the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam madrassas, and the Afghan general population's desperation caused by the Pakistani-sustained civil war. Consistent with Phase 2 (Initial Contact) of the doctrinal UW model, the ISI approached Mullah Omar sometime in 1991 or early 1992 to offer its services for the achievement of the Taliban's goals in Afghanistan.
>
> Given the lawless nature of southern Afghanistan between 1992 and 1994, Taliban and Covert Action Division (CAD)/ISI forces were able to freely move between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Because of this, Phase 3 (Infiltration) of the UW model was similarly easy for the ISI to accomplish. Phase 4 (Organisation) of the doctrinal UW model, as it was executed by the Pakistani ISI, went through several revisions over the course of the UW campaign. Often, the religious leader, or mullah, of each madrassa would serve as the military commander for the students under his care, a system that lent itself well to the paramilitary organisation necessary for training/equipping and conducting guerrilla operations. The ISI simply adopted and adapted this organisational structure,

Summary: Fundamental Inputs to Capability

The adviser's key personality traits are identified in the US doctrine publication FM3-07.1. These include: tolerance for ambiguity, ability to withhold judgement, flexibility, self-reliance, strong sense of self, and the ability to accept and learn from failure.[218] While experiencing mixed results, programs with a form of personnel selection such as the AFPAK Hands program 'made an earnest attempt to address the paralyzing criticism that Afghanistan was "not a ten year war, but a one year war fought ten times" … [as a result] the military may need to re-evaluate the incentives for advisory work, foreign languages and overseas duty in support of small-scale missions.'[219] Within this context, FIC analysis identifies a tiered approach to preparing for special warfare:

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218 FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance*, US Department of the Army, 2009, p. 7-3.
219 Lujan, *Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention*, p. 31.

providing as much training as possible to overcome the lack of military experience from which many of the mullahs suffered.

Starting in 1992, the ISI began an intensive training regimen for the Taliban in Pakistani camps designed to build up and prepare them for battle against the Afghan transitional government, a clear indication of the ISI engagement in UW Phase 5 (Build up) … the Taliban conducted its first 'confidence target' operation in the spring of 1994, in the village of Sangesar, located near Kandahar. Each raid or ambush on Afghan government troops or other militias built up the Taliban's confidence in and the ISIs validation of the training completed, while also attracting additional recruits to the cause. With Phase 5 complete, the ISI was ready to release the Taliban wholesale into Afghanistan for the purposes of achieving Pakistan's national objectives during Phase 6 (Combat Employment). The Taliban entered Kabul on 26 September 1996, having successfully overthrown Rabbani and seized power. The capture of Kabul marked the end of Phase 6 (Combat Employment) as the ISI UW campaign entered into the last and possibly most critical phase, Phase 7 (Transition) … Pakistan, followed only by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, quickly recognised the Taliban movement, their own creation and UW proxy force, as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

The Taliban conquest of Afghanistan provides a fascinating and complete doctrinal example of modern unconventional warfare … Armed with Pakistani weapons, trained by Pakistani advisers, sympathetic to Pakistani interests, and eventually with Pakistani soldiers fighting directly beside them, the Taliban conquered Afghanistan.

Source: Douglas Livermore, 'Pakistani Unconventional Warfare against Afghanistan', *Small Wars*, 4 February 2014, at: www.smallwarsjournal.com (accessed 13 October 2014).

a. **Army advisory missions in support of a foreign conventional army (SFA)**. This tier requires an adviser course that can provide mission-specific training, language instruction, foreign weapons familiarity and location-specific historical, cultural and military strategy topics. Such a tier could leverage the posting positions within the RFSUs that maintain a pool of personnel who are qualified and experienced in advising and mentoring forces with a markedly different operating culture.

b.   **Special forces conducting guerrilla warfare**. This tier utilises the skills, qualifications and experience of special forces personnel to conduct operations either independently or with indigenous forces against a state-centric threat. No additional qualifications are stipulated beyond existing reinforcement cycles. Inclusion of special warfare topics within the special forces officer and SNCO trade courses would fully enable this tier. FIC considerations applicable to higher tiers are also useful in the conduct of guerilla warfare, but not critical.

c.   **Special forces conducting unconventional warfare**. This tier recommends that personnel become specialised in a geographic area of responsibility. This is a scalable recommendation and the low end of the scale may be the designation of an area of responsibility in which an individual deploys for routine international engagement activities. The high end may be the specialisation of personnel in an area of responsibility over complete posting cycles including specific cultural studies, insertion skills relevant to the area and the completion (and maintenance) of specific language qualifications.

d.   **Army personnel identified as special warfare experts ('strategic planners')**. This tier expands adviser training and is enabled through specific talent-spotting for individuals to exploit the DCP, language study tours and advanced language study tours, and overseas command and staff college appointments to build strong relationships with regional partners. This streaming would specialise soldiers at SNCO level. For officers, however, this streaming would enhance the ability of the organisation to plan strategic outcomes within the complex human terrain of likely future operating environments (hence the term 'strategic planners'). This may eventually resemble the US Foreign Area Officer model of regional specialisation, enabled with advisory and specialist planning skillsets. Given the requirement for advisers across a number of specialisations (S2, S3, S4, S6), the use of all-corps personnel under a 'generalist plus' officer model, drawn from all-corps army advisers (Tier A) and special forces (Tier B/C) talent pools is ideal. Such personnel would be capable of planning the conduct of special warfare campaigns and applying knowledge of local cultures, history and traditions to assist in constructing coherent campaign plans.

The efficiency of indirect special warfare methods as opposed to the 'surging' of Western security forces is immediately apparent in any examination of recent operational history. 'As of December 2010, the government of Iraq reported that it had transitioned nearly 40,000 (almost half the total number of SOI), but these were mostly in Baghdad.'[220] 'For the surge in Afghanistan we spent $30 billion to deploy 30,000 troops for 18 months – or $1 million per man.'[221] By comparison, the Iraqi 'CTS was cheap; of the more than $19 billion U.S. Congress appropriated in the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) Fund to support the development of ISF, only about $237 million was spent on CTS', which proved an effective partner against the IS advance in 2014.[222]

Conclusion – a strategy for special warfare employment

> *Allies, altogether, are really very extraordinary people. It is astonishing how obstinate they are, how parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing how they fail to see how broad-minded you are, how clear your picture is, how up-to-date you are and how cooperative and big-hearted you are. It is extraordinary. But let me tell you, when you feel like that about allies – and you have even worse allies than the British, believe me – when you feel like that, just remind yourself of two things. First, that you are an ally too, and all allies look just the same. If you walk to the other side of the table, you will look just like that to the fellow sitting opposite. Then the next thing to remember is that there is only one thing worse than having allies – this is not having allies.*

Field Marshal Sir William Slim[223]

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220   Long et al., 'Locals Rule', p. 159.

221   James Roberts, 'Building the Capabilities and Capacity of Partners: Is this Defense Business?', *PRISM*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2013, p. 68.

222   Furthermore, 'In September 2014, CTS spearheaded an offensive supported by tribes, police, MoD forces, and U.S. air to secure the Haditha Dam in Anbar province, which was threatened by the Islamic State … With the exception of the Peshmerga, CTS appears to have spearheaded all major combat operations, and as of this writing, remains the most effective military organisation that GoI possesses.' Witty, *The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service*, pp. 36–38.

223   Field Marshal Sir William Slim, 'Higher Command in War', *Military Review*, May 1990.

The human resources preparations for the AATTV compared to force generation for contemporary operations represent 'lessons forgotten' by the Australian Army. Despite individual ingenuity, operational adaptation and learning, the Army could well be responsible for the same organisational failures in the post-Afghanistan/Iraq environment as in the post-Vietnam era.

Within a primary operating environment of urbanising littoral, geography favours the urban guerrilla warfare approach exemplified by recent operations in Mogadishu, Basra, Mumbai, Aleppo and Tripoli. Increasingly complex urbanised terrain in the littoral will be met with increasing adversary employment of guerrilla methods that seek to negate Western technological advantages. 'Boots on the ground' will be essential in this environment to understand what is occurring in the battlespace and this is a function that advisers will increasingly be required to perform.

The pressures of manning operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan prompted debate within the US military over just how 'special' special warfare actually is. RAND commentators noted that:

> Then-Brigadier General Stanley McChrystal, who was chief of staff of Combined Joint Task Force 180, which oversaw all OEF efforts, reportedly opposed transferring this responsibility [advising Afghan forces] to the Army because he felt that advising indigenous forces was a key mission of Special Forces and should remain so. As the ANA was becoming more formalized, however, it was decided that ANA training should be conducted by regular Army forces rather than Special Forces. The 10th Mountain Division, which was preparing to deploy to Afghanistan during the summer of 2003, was assigned to take on this mission and to develop a plan for advising Afghan forces through embedded training teams (ETTs).[224]

The long-term implications of the decision to employ military members as advisers in Afghanistan and Iraq may vindicate General McChrystal's opinion that special warfare should be viewed as such. However, the Australian Army has a solid institutional foundation for the conduct of special warfare missions, stretching over half a century. It is not practical to apply the model that advisory missions are a traditional special forces role given that demand for advisers to work towards the achievement of Australia's strategic

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224   Kelly et al., 'Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying lessons for future efforts', pp. 25–26.

objectives now far outstrips supply.[225] In 2007 John Nagl advocated that the US Army 'create a permanent standing Advisor Corps of 20,000 Combat Advisers – men and women organised, equipped, educated and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad.'[226] Nagl's recommendation is commensurate to approximately 2% of the US military. A similar approach for the Australian Army would represent some 300 personnel. Under a 'generalist plus' and SNCO streaming model, developing such a pool may be entirely plausible given long-term defence attaché, DCP and RFSU requirements.

Army's adoption of Plan Beersheba may encourage Defence to holistically review such historical campaigns as those fought in Palestine in World War I. The advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was significantly assisted by T.E. Lawrence's unconventional warfare operation with Saudi tribes. This operation tied down numerous Ottoman forces across the Levant in security details to protect the flanks and lines of communication of their various bases. The Light Horse charge at Beersheba from which the plan takes its name should serve as a reminder that the famous frontal charge — for all its audacity — may have ended in disaster had operations 'through, by and with' Arab partners not already weakened the Ottoman forces arrayed against General Allenby.

At the time of writing, Australia has recommenced advisory operations in Iraq and is debating force preparation requirements and whether to accompany Iraqi forces on combat operations. Understanding why the Iraqi Army fractured so quickly and the ISOF did not is crucial to unlocking the key lessons to building partner force capacity and to informing military planners on the considerations of accompanying partner forces. The key factors in the Iraqi collapse were corruption and sectarianism. These suggest that the 'stand-off' approach of funding and enabling local design of security forces will be ineffective in Iraq. Following the US withdrawal, Iraqi forces were purged, and 'suspicions of loyalty were typically cited as the reasons for the dismissals [of competent officers], which often targeted

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225   'In most instances we rely on US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to conduct these training, equipping and advisory missions. However, we are also discovering that SOF, and the Department of Defense, lack many of the requisite authorities for well-structured capacity building and for providing the necessary strategic enablers to make these advise and assist missions what they could and should be.' Roberts, 'Building the Capabilities and Capacity of Partners: Is this Defense Business?', p. 68. This argument is amplified by Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, *Institutionalising Adaptation: It's time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps*, Center for a New American Security, 2007, p. 5, who argues that FID is now a core competency of all services.

226   Nagl, ibid. This position is supported by Will Clegg, 'Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Warfare', p. 25.

officers who were not Shia Arabs or were favored by U.S. training officers.'[227] This sectarianism can be expected to recur, despite its self-defeating nature:

> An ISOF deserter said his unit could no longer be considered a regular military force: 'None of my officers were the same men I trained with; some were killed and some were replaced for being Sunni … The men they sent us are militia fighters. They are brave and have plenty of ammunition from the Iranians, but they are not professional fighters. And one day Iraq will have to fight them because they won't just go home. So there will be no Iraqi Army, just a giant Shiite militia.'[228]

The conflict with IS has highlighted the fragility of operations conducted with a military recovering from significant trauma. Advisers can provide the confidence necessary to add resilience to partner units through their ability to coordinate ISR, fires and potentially employ specialist weapon systems while accompanying their partnered forces. The lesson lies in the general necessity to 'accompany', to push advisers to points of vulnerability to prevent failure. In Iraq, influence over partnered Iraqi forces was not guaranteed, but instead competed with Shi'a militia groups, the Iranian Quds Force (themselves conducting SFA or proxy warfare) and human terrain factors that were never fully understood. When competing for influence, access gained through accompanying partnered security forces becomes crucial. Similarly, negotiating the complexity of the operating environment requires the grassroots involvement that only accompanied operations can provide:

> As distinctions separating war and peace blur and challenges to security increase, we must seek to help our multinational partners successfully confront their security challenges. Security force assistance builds our multinational partners' capability to defeat regular, irregular, and hybrid threats prevalent in an era of persistent conflict … [229]

227   Mitchell Prothero, 'Baghdad breakdown', *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 51, Issue 31, 30 July 2014.
228   Ibid.
229   Martin Dempsey, then Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, cited in FM3-07.1: *Security Force Assistance*, US Department of the Army, 2009.

Unconventional warfare strategies were successfully utilised in Afghanistan in 2001 (and by the Pakistani ISI in the 1990s[230]), in Iran, using state and non-state proxies to advance its regional interests since the 1980s revolution[231] and by the Russians in the Crimea in 2014. Such success demonstrates that there remains a strong role for special warfare in the contemporary age. As retired colonel David Maxwell, an Associate Director at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, writes eloquently: 'This is a type of warfare (revolution, resistance and insurgency) that is timeless, timely and something that we can expect to occur over time in the future.'[232]

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230   Jerry Meyerle, *Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: A Brief History*, Strategic Studies Division, CNA, 2012, p. 1, argues that 'since Pakistan's creation in 1947, the country's leaders have relied on Islamic guerrillas as a "low-cost, high-return" means of achieving strategic objectives. Religious militants of varying persuasions developed an enormous infrastructure across Pakistan, as a result of state patronage and a permissive environment.' Thus, unconventional warfare might be termed a key component of Pakistani military strategy.

231   Dan Madden et al,,'Special Warfare: The missing middle in U.S. Coercive options', RAND Research Report 2014, at: www.rand.org (accessed 15 February 2015), p. 2.

232   David Maxwell, 'Do we really understand Unconventional Warfare?', *Small Wars*, 23 October 2014.