


UNCLASSIFIED

11206
Australian Army History Unit
16 July 2014



ARMY JOURNAL

No. 329 OCTOBER 1976



ARMY JOURNAL

Editor

K I Taylor

Staff Artist

D E Hammond

Printed and published for the Australian Army by Ruskin Press, and issued through Supply Battalions on the scale of one per officer, officer of cadets, and cadet under officer.

Contributions, which should be addressed to the Editor, Army Journal, Department of Defence (Army Office), Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers.

\$10 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of \$60 and \$20 respectively will be awarded to the authors gaining first and second places in the year.

The information given in this Journal is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it.

UNCLASSIFIED

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 329, October 1976


Contents

Foreword by the Chief of the General Staff <i>Lieutenant General A. L. MacDonald, CB, OBE</i>	3
Birth of the Army Journal <i>Colonel E. G. Keogh, MBE, ED (Retd)</i>	5
The Continuing Story of the Army Journal <i>The Succeeding Editors</i>	9
Lexington and Concord <i>P. H. Kitney</i>	11
Liberty and Discipline <i>Field Marshal Sir William Slim, GBE, KCB, DSO, MC</i>	29
Self-Propelled Guns or Towed Guns <i>Lieutenant Colonel S. N. Gower</i>	34
The Canadian Militia <i>Major W. A. Morrison</i>	44
Book Review	53
Letters to the Editor	55
Index for 1976	57

No article in this Journal is to be reproduced in whole or in part without authority.


The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and do not necessarily represent official opinion or policy.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1976



(Defence Public Relations)

The Band of Second Military District playing at Victoria Barracks, Sydney



Foreword to The Final Issue


Lieutenant General A. L. MacDonald, CB, OBE

For twenty-eight years the *Army Journal* — and the *Army Training Memorandum* even before it — has provided an effective forum for the sharing of experience and the exchange of ideas. The contribution it has made to our professional thinking can be measured by its unbroken record of editions published, and also by the fact that, during a period of the Army's history notable for major changes, it has always been abreast of the latest developments.

The active support of its contributors has always been an essential feature of the Journal's success. They have offered their views, often supported by thought provoking argument, on a wide variety of topical subjects. Through the selective presentation of articles, not always from members of the Army, the Journal has been instrumental in fostering a greater knowledge and wider understanding of the profession of arms.

Now, however, it is not enough for us to limit ourselves to matters of interest primarily within our own Service. The Army is but one arm of a Defence Force that has, as one of its aims, the achievement of closer working relationships between the Navy, the Army and the Air Force. The aim does not imply that we will lose our identity as soldiers, but it does require us to acquire a better understanding of our two sister Services. It is in this respect that I look on this — the final edition of the Journal — as but a stepping stone to a wider field of professional military expression in the *Defence Force Journal*.

I congratulate the editors, staff and contributors for making the *Army Journal* an achievement of which they, and the Army as a whole, can be justifiably proud. Their combined efforts have set a fine example for its successor.



Lieutenant General
Chief of the General Staff


* * * *

SALE OF BADGES OF UNITS OF THE BRITISH ARMY BRIGADE OF GURKHAS

Headquarters The Brigade of Gurkhas is offering for sale to interested collectors the cap badges of the four Infantry Regiments and three Corps Units of the Brigade. Additionally, there is the representative cross kukri badge of the Brigade itself. These eight badges are offered as loose items as a cost of £15 or equivalent which includes postage. Remittances should be made payable to "HQBG Fund" and should be sent to:

Major T. G. Blackford 7 GR
Headquarters The Brigade of Gurkhas
Victoria Barracks
Hong Kong, BFPO 1.

All proceeds will go to the Gurkha Welfare Trust, which exists to better the lot of the Gurkha ex-serviceman in Nepal when faced with hard times.



Colonel E. G. Keogh, MBE, ED (Retd)

First Editor, Australian Army Journal

ONE day early in 1948 I met by chance Major General Ian Campbell (then Brigadier and Director of Military Training) in the old Naval and Military Club in Alfred Place, Melbourne. The Brigadier told me that it was proposed to continue publication of the war-time Army Training Memorandum and that the VCGS (General Rowell) had suggested that I might be interested. Since I was indeed interested, the machinery for establishing the necessary civilian position in the Department of the Army was set in motion. Eventually I found myself installed in a small room in "M" Block, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, a CMF officer employed on the civil pay roll. I had the best — and the worst — of both worlds.

During World War II the Army Training Memorandum was produced monthly by the Directorate of Military Training and circulated to formations, units and training establishments. It gave the latest information about enemy organization, weapons and tactics gathered from many sources, including unit and observer team reports. It contained material on the latest developments on our own training aids, techniques and requirements. Generally, it was designed to keep all concerned up to date on all aspects of training activities.

It was clear, however, that in peace time there was not nearly enough material of this kind to produce a publication on a monthly or even a quarterly basis. Consequently we attempted to convert the old ATM into a magazine of general military interest. But it did not really go. The title was uninspiring and the format dull. It looked like a half-hearted attempt to pursue some ill-defined object.

So we put up a paper recommending the establishment of an "Australian Army Journal" having the following aims:—

- To provide a medium through which to convey to the officers of the army and the cadet corps the trends in military thought and developments at home and abroad.
- To provide information designed to assist officers with their personal studies and training problems.
- To stimulate thought and to encourage the study of military art.
- To provide the basis of an Australian military literature which it is hoped, in the fullness of time will equal in diversity and dignity the military literature of other countries.

The CGS approved the production of a journal, initially on a two monthly basis and eventually on a monthly basis when sufficient material was forthcoming and when satisfactory printing and production arrangements could be made.

Until funds became available the journal would have to be printed by the Army Headquarters Printing Press, a unit formed in the Middle East during the war and not really equipped for work of this kind. Although under pressure for the production of training manuals and other urgently-needed publications, they cheerfully undertook the additional task. AAJ No 1, June-July 1948, was distributed to Stationery Depots during the last week in June.

While the journal was generally well received, snipers soon began to take pot shots at the Editor. These usually took the form of telephone calls questioning the inclusion of some of the material on various grounds. Finally a senior officer objected strongly to an article on railway unification on the ground that it might encourage the government to divert defence funds to railway construction. We took that one to the VCGS. General Rowell said "Ah, the old bellyaching problem. Tell him to put it up in writing and we'll consider it. Very few will, you know, because when they have to commit themselves to paper — and the record — their argument seldom looks as good as it did over a couple of drinks in the mess."

Next day General Rowell followed up his advice with a paper which clearly and unequivocally established the Editor's responsibility and authority. The word soon got around.

During the first eighteen months pressure of work on the inadequately-equipped Army Headquarters Printing Press caused an ever-widening gap between publication dates and actual delivery times. Eventually, on the insistence of General Rowell, funds were made available for an outside contract. Wilke and Company Ltd were the successful tenderers. We took this opportunity to change from a two monthly to a monthly basis. The first monthly journal — No 12 — was published in June 1950.

Another problem in those early days arose from the fact that higher authority, particularly on the civil side, seemed to be firmly convinced that the Editor was practically unemployed. At any rate numerous odd jobs were constantly being thrust upon me. Perhaps the most frustrating was the presidency of a board set up to investigate the loss of books from the Defence Department Library in Melbourne and the apparent total loss of the small library established in Darwin just before the war.

We thought that Darwin was disposed of when we found that the Japanese had bombed the building housing the library to smithereens. Then some cad produced two miserable tattered and battered volumes that had turned up at Alice Springs. So we had to find an expert willing to put in a statement saying that the marks and stains on the books were undoubtedly caused by an explosive substance.

The missing Defence Library books turned out to be flimsy paperbacks about tropical diseases hastily produced for urgent issue to medical units and detachments in New Guinea. For some extraordinary reason they had been taken on charge by the library and then sent on loan to the units. Now after three years of war and five years of peace we were supposed to find the books or produce evidence to justify a write-off. We compiled a list of convincing explanations and proceeded to fire them one at a time. The file went back and forth for weeks and weeks and got fatter and fatter. But we never saw it again after we fired the round labelled "White Ants". That exercise in futility must have cost the taxpayer quite a packet.

In 1952 the Shenandoah campaign was set as a subject for study in military history. At the time only a few regular officers were involved. In September of the following year when the number of students was much greater, it was discovered that there were not nearly enough suitable books available. The Military Board ordered the DMT (not

the officer who set the campaign in the first place) to produce one for issue in January. Then the DMT found that there was not enough money in the printing and stationery vote though he had a little to spare in the fund allotted to the Journal. This was our big chance. We offered to write the book and produce it as an enlarged January 1954 issue of the Journal, provided the Editor was relieved permanently of all extraneous duties. We just made it.

If we got rid of those time-consuming jobs, we found ourselves more or less committed to producing a series of campaign studies to assist officers preparing for promotion examinations. Since this could fairly be regarded as a direct contribution to the aim of developing an Australian military literature and the programme was spread over ten years, we accepted it as a fair exchange for the distractions that always seemed to beset us at the worst possible moment.

From 1954 onwards production of the Journal proceeded fairly smoothly, though we had occasional tussles with people who raised objections to some of the material included. Perhaps the most memorable was the occasion when we were attacked for according a seven-pointed star a prominent place in the cover design. It was claimed this was a communist emblem and was in use as a distinguishing feature of the kit worn by the troops representing the enemy in training activities. We spun the discussion out for quite a while. Communist emblem or not, a deathly silence settled over the stricken field when we drew attention to the Australian coat of arms, our national flag and the coinage then in use.

In the new phase of its existence, the Journal will have an important contribution to make to the development of the intellectual atmosphere essential to the integrated organization envisaged in the new defence structure. May every success attend its efforts. ☞

* * * *

ARMY JOURNAL — BACK NUMBERS

There are back numbers available to collectors for most of the issues since the first (June-July 1948). Those interested in completing their collection should write to:

The Editor,
Army Journal,
Building I Room 1-32
Russell Offices
CANBERRA ACT 2600.

THE CONTINUING STORY OF THE ARMY JOURNAL

The Succeeding Editors

Colonel Keogh retired in February 1965 and was succeeded by Mr A. J. Sweeting, Senior Research Officer on the 1939-45 Australian Official History. The General Editor of the history, Mr Gavin Long, had resigned in 1963, and on his retirement Mr Sweeting had been appointed Acting Editor, an appointment he continued to hold in an honorary capacity as the result of an agreement negotiated between the Departments of the Interior and the Army. Mr Sweeting, who was co-editor of the noted RSL journal, *Stand-To*, introduced the biographical notes which have since accompanied the names of *Army Journal* authors, and sought original contributions in preference to reprint material from other journals. He accepted the premise that the Australian Army contained men who had something to say and knew how to say it, and this was demonstrated time and again in his two and half years term in office. He sought also to include historically important obituaries, written by their contemporaries, concerning officers who had gained eminence in their Service. Good examples of these are the contributions written by Generals Rowell and Beavis on Generals Sturdee and Northcott which have been widely consulted.

Australian involvement in Vietnam increased in 1965, and with war inevitably came censorship. Articles hitherto left to the judgment of the Editor to clear were closely scrutinised by senior officers both on the military and civil side. The Journal was placed in the Restricted category, but its circulation, paradoxically, continued to increase. Despite the scrutiny to which articles were wisely subjected and the occasional delays which resulted from inroads into the time of over-busy officers, it cannot be claimed that the functioning of the *Army Journal* was gravely handicapped or the quality of its contributions adversely affected. There was argument and discussion, and publication of an article might sometimes have been delayed, but only in the rarest circumstances was one ever suppressed.

Clem Coady became editor in September 1967. To use his own words, he "was instructed in the dos and don'ts of being an editor of

an army journal." He goes on to say, "I came away from that meeting bleakly conscious that the don'ts outweighed the dos."

For eight years he fought for the right of the Journal's contributions to say what they wanted to say. It was a very difficult period. With the Vietnam War came the need for secrecy combined with high sensitivity, making the Journal a very bland mixture. The Journal, and the Editor, suffered in consequence. To quote Clem again, "it became a handsome package containing a modicum of substance."

Clem Coady himself, "having enough of the Irish [in him] to keep banging [his] head even though the pain became more intense," retired through ill-health, but is, I'm happy to say, now recovering slowly at Bermagui on the NSW south coast.

The gap was filled very expertly by Major Charles Winter, SO2 Editor, Inspectorate of Administration. Charles was not only involved in "ensuring that successive issues of the *Army Journal* were maintained with as little discontinuity as possible", but was also involved in "planning for the eventual appearance of the *Defence Force Journal*." He was a member of the working party. He says, "I was able to spread some enlightenment on the editorial function about which there appeared to be a surprising lack of understanding. No editor must forget that he works to serve the professional interest of his readers. It is therefore very necessary that effective communications be established between himself and contributors and readers, if the professional aims of the Journal are to be fulfilled."

Coming from the hectic world of the Marine Operations Centre, with its instantaneity at all hours of the day and night, to the comparatively cloistered calm of the Editor's office, was a pleasing contrast for the present incumbent. After twenty-two years in the Royal Marines, many of them in Joint Service posts, I shall be at home in the world of the *Defence Force Journal*. Nevertheless, I feel sad that I am presiding over the demise of the *Army Journal*, a publication which has had at times a troubled, but always a distinguished history. It may surprise many to know that the Journal is held in more esteem overseas than in its homeland. "A prophet is not without honour . . ."

May I join all the other Editors in wishing the new Journal every success. ☞

LEXINGTON AND CONCORD

19th. APRIL, 1775



P. H. Kitney

Assistant Registrar, Faculty of Military Studies, RMC Duntroon

“SIR: Having received intelligence that a quantity of ammunition, provision, artillery, tents and small arms have been collected at Concord for the avowed purpose of raising and supporting a rebellion against His Majesty, you will march with the corps of grenadiers and light infantry, put under your command, with the utmost expedition and secrecy to Concord where you will seize and destroy all the artillery —. But you will take care that the soldiers do not plunder the inhabitants or hurt private property.”¹ So began the orders from the British Army Commander-in-Chief in the American Colonies and Governor of Massachusetts, General Thomas Gage, issued to Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith, 10th Regiment of Foot on 18th April, 1775. As a military operation, Smith’s expedition was hardly worthy of the name. In fact the attempted execution of their orders by Smith and his troops might well have been described as farcical had not the consequences been so dramatic for Britain and the American Colonies. As events transpired, however, the first encounter between the troops and some citizens of the small township of Lexington, about six miles east of Concord in the early dawn of 19th April, led to the firing of “the shot heard round the world”² — the first shot in what was to become known as the American War of Independence.

Before proceeding to the events of the 19th April, it is necessary to examine³ the situation in Massachusetts leading up to General Gage’s

Mr Kitney’s article “The Establishment of the RMC of Australia” was published in the July 1976 issue of the Army Journal.

decision to send a force of British regular troops from the safety of Castle William in Boston out into the Massachusetts countryside. The colony of Massachusetts had been a thorn in the side of King George III and the British Parliament at least since 1763 when the Sugar Act had been passed. Numerous events since then had only served to strain relationships even further. These included the establishment of the American Board of Customs Commissioners in Boston which in turn led to the stationing of troops there and ultimately to the Boston Massacre in 1770. For the next three years differences were confined more to the Governor and the Boston House of Representatives but the "Boston Tea Party" of December 1773 led to the Coercive Acts, passed by Parliament as a punishment for the transgressions of the people of Massachusetts. Included were Acts closing the port of Boston, moving the capital to Salem, and other exclusions of rights. Additionally, Thomas Gage, then stationed in New York, was made Governor of the colony of Massachusetts and was authorised to bring troops into the colony to assist in maintaining law and order.

By the time Gage took up his appointment in May 1774, public feeling in the colony was so violently anti-Parliament and anti-army that he did not try to enforce the Coercive Acts outside the town of Boston, but set up his headquarters there and fortified the isthmus which, at that time, was the only link between the town and the mainland. In September 1774 Gage sent troops to seize powder belonging to the colony in storage outside the town. The alert colonists in the town quickly spread the word which was magnified by rumour and hundreds of armed Americans began to march towards Boston in the belief that fighting had begun. In the following February Gage sent a regiment to Salem to destroy a number of cannons there, but the expedition was abortive. The Americans hid their guns and a small force of minutemen turned out to oppose the British. However, Gage refused to be drawn into battle until he had received specific orders from London. The restraint shown by both Gage and the colony's leaders under such tense circumstances postponed hostilities for several weeks.⁴

Meanwhile the First Continental Congress was convened in September 1774 and drew up a Declaration of Rights which it despatched in the form of a petition to King George III. The petition requested the repeal or withdrawal of all the British laws and measures since 1763. But George III was obviously bent on subduing the colonies by force. In November 1774 he wrote to his chief minister, Lord North,

"The New England governments are in a state of rebellion, blows must decide whether they are to be subject to this country or independent."⁵ Cabinet almost to a man supported this statement and in January 1775 the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the Colonies sent orders to Gage authorising him to take some positive action to restore order. "The only consideration that remains is in what manner the Force under your command may be exerted . . . the first essential step to be taken towards re-establishing Government would be to arrest and imprison the principal actors and abettors in the Provincial Congress . . . any efforts of the People, unprepared to encounter with a regular force, cannot be very formidable . . . it will surely be better that the Conflict should be brought on, upon such ground, than in a riper state of Rebellion."⁶

Gage received these orders on 14th April.⁷ At the time the "unlawful" Provincial Congress was in session at Concord but was due to adjourn for the summer recess next day.⁸ Was there anything to be gained in trying to arrest the rebel leaders in the Congress?⁹ Gage thought not; such an action would not break the resistance of the people. But, if he deferred action until after Congress had arisen, the effective control of patriotic resistance would be weakened by lack of central leadership. Gage could comply with the spirit of Dartmouth's orders by mounting the expedition to Concord where the colonists had been accumulating military stores for some months past.¹⁰ Perhaps the knowledge that the Provincial Congress had agreed to the raising of an army provided they could be assured of the support of the other New England colonies helped Gage to settle on his course of action;¹¹ or perhaps, as seems more likely, Gage had already decided to raid Concord and merely waited on Dartmouth's orders to justify his action.¹² As he later wrote to Governor Trumbell of Connecticut, he had seen the raid on Concord as his "duty and the dictate of humanity to prevent the calamity of civil war by destroying these magazines".¹³


Having made his decision, Gage gave orders for the selected troops to be taken off their normal duties and for the launching of the boats which had been undergoing repair. Although carried out with the maximum discretion and security possible, these activities did not escape the notice of the vigilant patriots still in Boston. Dr. Joseph Warren, correctly, as it later transpired, interpreting Gage's intention, sent Paul Revere off to Lexington on 16th April to warn John Hancock and Samuel Adams.¹⁴ Hancock sent orders to the patriots in Concord to

hide the supplies in widely scattered areas. On the evening of 18th April Dr. Warren received word of the imminent departure of Smith's force. He again sent messengers out (see Map 1) — Paul Revere crossed by boat to Charlestown where a horse was held ready for him (the famous midnight ride in Longfellow's poem) while William Dawes went by horse across the isthmus and south through the town of Roxbury. Both warned the inhabitants of the towns through which they passed that the British troops were on the move. Revere reached Lexington first and gave the alarm. He was joined by Dawes and a Dr. Samuel Prescott and all three set off for Concord. They were intercepted by a British patrol and only Prescott was able to evade the patrol and carry the news to Concord.¹⁵

Meanwhile Gage, having given Smith¹⁶ his orders, sent for his brigadier, Hugh Percy, later Duke of Northumberland, and briefed him on the forthcoming expedition which, he said, was secret. Smith "knew that he was to go, but not where".¹⁷ As Percy was returning to his

THE MIDNIGHT RIDERS

Maps 1, 4, 7 and 8 were published in
Arthur B. Tourtellot's,
Lexington and Concord. (1963)




Map 1

quarters he passed a group of men discussing the expedition to Concord, and overheard the remark "The British troops have marched but they will miss their aim — the cannon at Concord."¹⁸ Percy returned and told Gage what he had overheard.¹⁹ Gage immediately ordered all civilian movement out of Boston to be stopped — but the order came too late to intercept Revere and Dawes.²⁰

Colonel Smith's force²¹ began to assemble on the Boston common at 8.00 p.m. on the evening of 18th April, and the first troops embarked

SMITH'S EXPEDITION



Map 2

to cross the Charles River estuary by boat at about ten o'clock (see Map 2). They landed at a spot known as Phipps Farm, east of the township of Cambridge and spent a cold two hours in the marsh waiting for the remainder of the party. It was almost 1.00 a.m. on the 19th before the troops began their march towards Concord. They had not progressed far when the ringing of church bells and occasional firing of shots made it obvious that the operation was no longer secret. At Menotomy Smith despatched Major John Pitcairn, his second-in-command, with the six light infantry companies, ahead of the main body to secure the two bridges beyond the township of Concord. At the

same time he sent a messenger back to General Gage requesting reinforcements.


Meanwhile the militia of Lexington, alerted by Paul Revere, had paraded on the town common under their commander Captain John Parker "to consult what to do" and decided "not to be discovered nor meddle or make with said Regular Troops".²² Parker then dismissed the men but at about 4.30 a.m., on a signal from William Diamond's drum, seventy-seven²³ men, some armed, some not, paraded to meet the advancing British troops.

Just outside Lexington, Pitcairn met up with the British patrol which had captured Paul Revere and was warned that a force of 500 men was assembled at Lexington. As a precaution, Pitcairn halted his troops and ordered them to load, but "on no account fire, nor even to attempt it without orders".²⁴ Then the advance was continued.

The road forked at the eastern end of the Lexington common, the left fork being the Concord road. Pitcairn could have by-passed Parker's force (see Map 3). However, he chose to dispense with the possible threat to his flank which that force presented. The next few minutes of history are blurred despite the millions of words written about them. It seems logical that Pitcairn ordered his force to surround the militia and disarm them.²⁵ He, or another British officer, might well have said, "Lay down your arms, damn you, why don't you lay down your arms!"²⁶ But his order not to fire was still in force. Equally logical is the contention that Parker, having realised the futility of his position from a military point of view, ordered his men to disperse and not to fire.²⁷ Whether the militia did not react with sufficient speed to please some high-spirited British soldier or whether an American fired first from behind cover may never be known;²⁸ but a shot was fired and it was followed by a fusillade of shots from the British. Pitcairn and his officers tried to halt the firing without success and it was left to Smith, who had galloped forward on hearing the exchange of shots, to summon a drummer to restore order.²⁹ Within half an hour of reaching Lexington the British had formed ranks again and resumed their march to Concord, leaving behind eight American dead and ten wounded and having suffered only the lightest of casualties themselves. But "a war had begun — the United States was born in an act of violence lasting but fifteen or twenty minutes".³⁰


The residents of Concord had been alerted by Dr. Prescott between 1.00 a.m. and 2.00 a.m. and, reinforced by a company from Lincoln,

LEXINGTON



Map 3

CONCORD



Map 4

a militia force of about 150 took up a position on the high ground covering the approach to the town. Smith's force came into view about 7.00 a.m. He saw the militiamen on the ridge and sent his light infantry to dislodge them.³¹ (see Map 4). Realising they were outnumbered the Americans withdrew to the high ground north of Concord and subsequently to the high ground known as Punkatasset Hill, west of the river overlooking the North Bridge. Here they were joined during the morning by several companies of militia from other neighbouring towns until, by about 9.30 a.m. the force was over 400 strong.³²

Smith, his advance unimpeded, marched into Concord and began the real task allotted him by General Gage. His first orders were to secure the North and South Bridges.³³ He sent a company under the command of Captain Pole to South Bridge to guard that approach and dispose of any supplies they might find. The activities of this group were uneventful and in due course they rejoined the main body of the force in Concord. They had had slight success in their search for stores and "demeaned themselves nicely in this neighbourhood and were generous enough to pay for what food they took . . . In this home was one room pretty well filled with goods that were sought for. It was


locked, but the gallant officer, believing that women were hiding within, issued orders that none of his men should enter it."³⁴

For a similar task at the North Bridge Smith despatched six companies of light infantry under the command of Captain Parsons³⁵ and soon after sent a seventh. Smith had quickly appreciated that the Americans had withdrawn in this direction and would be most likely to attack from there (if at all). Also, Colonel Barrett's home, where quantities of ammunition were known to have been collected, lay about two miles beyond the North Bridge and Parsons' orders required him to search there. Smith remained in the town and supervised the activities of the main part of his command. They destroyed some cannon, and dumped casks of flour and hundreds of musket balls into the mill pond. But so eager were they not to offend the townspeople that they were easily put off by stories such as were told to Captain Pole's men "and for their pains missed as much contraband as they found".³⁶ Much of the flour was later salvaged as were the musket balls.

As Smith had foreseen, the major exchange between the British and the Americans occurred at the North Bridge. (see Map 5). Parsons left two companies at the Bridge (one each of 5th and 43rd Regiments) and set off for Barrett's farm with the other four. Conscious of the tactical value of the high ground covering the road, he posted two companies on it (4th and 10th), sent back to the Bridge for one of the two companies (5th) there, and when this and the recently despatched seventh company (23rd) joined him, he continued his advance.³⁷ The foray to Barrett's farm was of limited success and Parsons eventually rejoined Smith in Concord shortly before noon.

While Parsons had been manoeuvring his force, the American force had been building up and now moved to Buttrick's Farm closer to the Bridge. Seeing the smoke rising from the township of Concord, they resolved "to march into the middle of the town for its defence or die in the attempt."³⁸ As they began their advance the three British companies near the Bridge all assembled on the western side of the river, but in short order crossed to the eastern bank and a rear party began taking up the planks of the Bridge. Major Buttrick, commanding the militia quickened his pace and the detachment of plank-lifters rejoined their companies.

Captain Laurie who, by virtue of his seniority became commander of the British position at the Bridge, seems to have been undecided about how to deal with the Americans, a dilemma shared by the other



Map, 5

two company commanders. They were out-numbered by about four to one and it was clear to all three that they were in imminent danger of being attacked. Laurie sent a message to Smith requesting reinforcements but it was not until the Americans came down onto the road that he withdrew his force to the town side of the Bridge. However, he had left himself too little time in which to redeploy and his position proved untenable. As the Provincials approached within range a few ragged shots were fired by the British troops,³⁹ followed by a more concerted volley. The Provincials returned the fire whereupon the British retreated towards the town. This short exchange cost two lives and a number

wounded on each side. As Laurie retreated he was followed at a respectable distance by the Provincials. However, he met up with Smith who was bringing reinforcements and the sight of the larger force discouraged the Americans. They retired over the river and did not trouble Smith's force again that morning.⁴⁰

Smith went back to the township (about 10 a.m.) to organise the return of his force to Boston and to await the return of Captain Parsons. It seems incredible that, having been so close to the North Bridge, he did not occupy a covering position to assist Parsons' force to negotiate the Bridge. However, Parsons returned safely, traversing the road perilously close to the American position,⁴¹ and crossing the Bridge safely. Parsons' men must have seen the British soldier who had been "scalped" by an American⁴² and no doubt the story of this atrocity spread through the British ranks and lost nothing in the telling.


By mid-day Smith's force was ready to return to Boston. For the first mile the retreat was orderly. Smith posted a flank guard on the left which kept the increasing numbers of Provincial troops at a respectable distance. His right flank was protected by a stream. But as the force neared Meriam's Corner, a road junction a mile from Concord, the nature of the country forced the flank to close in, in order to pass the defile caused by the hills and the bridge. But the provincial militia, still converging on Concord now headed for this spot, and some of those who had been engaged in the North Bridge battle earlier in the day came across country through "the Great Meadows". They took advantage of the natural cover available and as the British column was crossing the bridge the Provincials began a steady fire. The British rearguard, once it had crossed the bridge, returned a hasty volley and continued its march. But the British had suffered a number of casualties in that sharp exchange and were to be mauled two or three times more before they reached Lexington. From Meriam's Corner to Lexington they suffered the indignation of "dishonourable and murderous attacks from the militia"⁴³ — a type of fighting they had never before encountered. As they neared Lexington their ammunition was almost spent, their casualties were increasing, and their morale, already undermined by the scalping incident, had crumbled. But the reinforcements which Smith had requested almost twelve hours earlier were at hand. Percy's brigade supported by two artillery pieces had taken up a position just east of Lexington and the bark of the guns was a signal to Smith's men to break into a run for safety.⁴⁴

Although Smith had sent for support about 3.00 a.m., and Gage had even anticipated the request, the most unbelievable sequence of events prevented Percy's brigade of some 900 troops from setting out until 9.00 a.m.,⁴⁵ some five hours later than Gage might have expected him to move. Because the boats were still moored at Cambridge whence they had transported Smith's force, Percy had to march south through Roxbury and on to Cambridge. Here the planks of the bridge had been taken up and further time was lost while they were replaced. Thus Percy might well have reached Concord before Smith's retreat had begun; instead his advance guard met Smith's advance guard at Lexington about 2.00 p.m. Percy's quick appreciation of the countryside led him to deploy his brigade making use of the high ground about half a mile east of Lexington (see Map 6) from which position he "had the happiness of saving them (Smith's force) from inevitable destruction".⁴⁶

The remnants of Smith's force, having been on the move almost constantly for eighteen hours or more, were sorely in need of rest, but Percy could allow them little more than half an hour if he was to reach safety by nightfall. His aim must have been to "conduct his command safely to Boston with the minimum of loss" and it was equally obvious that the American aim at this stage was to destroy the British force. It was during this phase of the battle that Percy ordered the burning of a number of houses which were too close to the axis of his withdrawal and thus offered too much cover to the Americans to be allowed to remain standing. For these actions Percy has often been accused of brutality and vandalism, but they would appear to have been perfectly sensible and legal acts of war.⁴⁷

The rescue of Smith's force at Lexington and the subsequent withdrawal to Charlestown were the only true military actions of the day. From the time they began their retreat at about 3.15 p.m., (see Map 7), Percy's brigade fought off a number of raids and skirmishes made by the Provincials, aided in large measure by the presence and use of the artillery pieces. At Menotomy the heaviest fighting of the day is reported to have occurred, when about 1800 fresh American troops engaged the weary British. Over-eager, careless or unversed in the art of war, a large party of Americans were caught between the flank guards and the main body, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. The Americans suffered more than half their fatalities for the day in the fierce fighting at Menotomy.⁴⁸

RESCUE AT LEXINGTON



Map 6

As Percy continued his withdrawal, General Heath who had by now reached the battlefield made one last effort to trap him. He ordered the bridge over the Charles River at Cambridge to be demolished and then led troops to the road junction north of that town in an endeavour to force Percy to turn south into Cambridge. But the militia had no heart to oppose Percy's artillery which quickly came into action again and the British were able to take the short-cut into Charlestown.⁴⁹ This was the last concerted effort made by the Provincials, but it was 8.00 p.m. before Percy's force reached Charlestown and the protection of the guns of His Majesty's man-o'-war *Somerset*. During the evening the troops were transported by sea back to Boston.⁵⁰ Percy had displayed outstanding leadership ability from the time he first encountered the Americans and to him must go full credit for the execution of the withdrawal.


The opening battles of the American War of Independence were over. By the next morning *Lexington and Concord* had taken their place in history and the siege of Boston had begun. Lieutenant Barker probably summed up the feelings of most British soldiers when he wrote: "Thus ended this Expedition, which from beginning to end was as ill planned and ill executed as it was possible to be . . . For a few trifling stores the Grenadiers and Light Infantry had a march of about 50 miles (going and returning) through an Enemy's Country and in all human probability must every man have been cut off if the Brigade had not fortunately come to their assistance".⁵¹ But Lord Percy's words on the following day were probably more significant and more prophetic:

"During the whole affair the Rebels attacked us in a very scattered, irregular manner, but with perseverance and resolution, nor did they ever dare to form into any regular body. Indeed, they knew too well what was proper, to do so.

Whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob, will find himself much mistaken. They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about . . .

You may depend upon it, that the Rebels have now had time to prepare, they are determined to go thro' with it, nor will the insurrection here turn out so despicable as it is perhaps imagined at home. For my part, I never believed, I confess, that they would have attacked the King's troops, or have had the perseverance I found in them yesterday."⁵² The American forces lived up to Lord Percy's revised opinion of them and the British finally conceded defeat in 1783. ♁

PERCY'S RETREAT



Map 7

Notes

- Allen French: *General Gage's Informers*, Greenwood Press, 1968. (Reprint of original, 1932), p. 31.
- Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Concord Fight", in A. C. Hearn (ed), *Emerson's Complete Works*, W. P. Nimmo, Hay and Mitchell, 1907, pp. 1036-7.
- Background details may be found in varying degrees in most historical writings of the American Revolution. I have drawn mainly on John Richard Alden, *The American Revolution 1775-1783*, Harper and Row, 1954, pp. 1-21.
- Richard Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston*, Da Capo Press, 1970 (Reprint of original, 1849) p. 49n.
- Sir John W. Fortescue (ed), *The Correspondence of King George the Third*, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967. (Reprint or original 1927-28), 6 Vols, Vol. III, p. 153, No. 1556.
- Clarence E. Carter (ed), *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage*, New Haven, 1931-33, 2-Vols., Vol. II, p. 181.
- Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, Macmillan, 1971, pp. 52-53. Most historians agree on the date, but Arthur B. Tourtellot, *Lexington and Concord*, W. W. Norton & Co., 1963, p. 87 says Gage received his orders on 16th April, i.e., after he had decided to destroy the stocks of supplies at Concord.
- Allen French, *op. cit.*, p. 22 and p. 27 suggests strongly that the adjournment was engineered by a loyalist in the Congress — Benjamin Church?
- In retrospect it may have been prudent for Gage to have detained Dr. Joseph Warren, a member of Congress, who was in Boston, and who, as we shall see, sent out couriers to warn the neighbourhood of the British intentions.

- ¹⁰ Allen French, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-30 gives details of the quantity and location of these stores, details which were known to Gage weeks before 19th April.
- ¹¹ *ibid.* Arthur B. Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 88 also follows this line of argument.
- ¹² Michael Pearson, *Those Damned Rebels*, Heinemann, 1972, pp. 63-4.
- ¹³ Richard Frothingham, *op. cit.*, p. 56n.
- ¹⁴ Paul Revere's "Letter to Dr. Jeremy Belknap (1798)" in H. S. Commager and R. B. Morris (eds), *The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six'*, Harper and Row, 1967, p. 67.
- ¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 68.
- ¹⁶ There has been much speculation over the selection of Colonel Smith as commander of the expedition. Portly, physically a slow-moving man of conspicuously generous bulk, Smith had no concept of time at all (Arthur B. Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 104). The troops were ordered to parade on Boston common at 8.00 p.m.; Smith arrived at 10.00 p.m. The force moved out from Cambridge about 1.00 a.m., already three hours later than could have been expected. At Concord, Laurie sent for reinforcements — "the Colonel . . . put himself at their head by which means stopt 'em from being time enough, for being a fat heavy man he would not have reached the Bridge in half an hour, tho' it was not half a mile". . . (Lieutenant Barker's Diary in H. S. Commager and R. B. Morris (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 72).
- Smith's apparent desertion of Parsons at the North Bridge is indefensible; his wasting of time (two hours) in Concord organising his return to Boston is inexcusable as it allowed the ranks of the American forces to be swelled by the arrival of companies from more distant areas. He began the return journey about noon, by which time he could already have been over halfway back to Boston. His only positive contribution to the British effort seems to have been sending for reinforcements. There is little doubt that Francis Smith contributed in large measure to the humiliation suffered by the British on April 19th. However, Harold Murdock, *The 19th of April 1775*, Houghton Mifflin, Co. 1923, p. 52, defends Smith saying, "he does not appear to have been guilty of serious blunders or neglect," and adding that his early request for reinforcements prevented a real disaster.
- ¹⁷ Charles Stedman, *The History of the Origins of the American War*, New York Times and Arno Press 1969, (Reprint of original 1794) 2 Vols., Vol. 1, p. 119.
- ¹⁸ *ibid.*
- ¹⁹ As to the betrayal of the British plan, Gage is reported to have said that he had told only one other person (See Charles Stedman, *op. cit.*, p. 119). Suspicion fell on Gage's American born wife but John Alden, *General Gage in America*, Louisiana U.P., 1948, pp. 247-50 shows that this was unfounded.
- ²⁰ Richard Frothingham, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
- ²¹ Estimates of the strength of Smith's force varied from 600-1200. Harold Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 47n, calculated the force at 588 and Allen French *General Gage's Informers*, p. 38, puts the strength at 672. Most reliable historians say about 700.
- ²² Deposition by Captain Parker, 25th April 1775 in Papers of the Continental Congress No. 65, Massachusetts State Papers 1775-87 (A National Archives Facsimile).
- ²³ Again estimates of numbers vary. Sylvanus Wood's deposition in H. S. Commager and R. B. Morris (eds) *op. cit.*, pp. 82-3, taken in 1824 gives a figure of 38, but F. W. Coburn, *The Battle of April 19th, 1775*, Kennikat Press, 1970 (Reprint of original, 1912) p. 63, says there were 77 and explains how Wood miscounted. As Coburn compiled a Muster Roll of those involved, we must accept his figure. Gage, in his "Circumstantial Account" (see Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 34 copy attached) said "about 200" were present.

The question has often been asked, why did Parker change his mind? His actions were criticised by the American Commanding General of the day,

- William Heath, who said: "This company continuing to stand so near the road after they had certain notice of the advancing of the British in force, was but a too much braving of danger; for they were sure to meet with insult or injury which they could not repel." (Harold Murdock; *op. cit.*, pp. 23-4). Arthur B. Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 23, explores the possibility that Parker was influenced in his decision by Samuel Adams. The most powerful man in Lexington at the time was the Reverend Jonas Clarke; his house guests until the early hours of the morning of 19th April were Samuel Adams and John Hancock. Since 16th April they had knowledge of Gage's intentions and this was confirmed at midnight on 18th April. Adams, the opportunist, could have suggested to Clarke that the time was ripe for direct action; and Clarke controlled sufficient respect to influence the men of Lexington to reverse their earlier decision.
- ²⁴ Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, Little, Brown & Co., 1925, p. 105.
- ²⁵ Allen French, *General Gage's Informers*, pp. 52-54 contain Pitcairn's report to Gage.
- ²⁶ Harold Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 33 and F. W. Coburn, *op. cit.*, p. 64 have different opinions about who might have said these words.
- ²⁷ Arthur B. Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 131. Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, p. 109, also supports this and quotes Parker's deposition as his source.
- ²⁸ Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, pp. 110-111 and 114-128 examines the question in detail. It seems certain that neither commander ordered his men to fire and both are strongly defended by later historians as men of integrity although Pitcairn was once looked upon as a "bloody butcher" (see Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 34). An interesting sidelight on Pitcairn's character might be interpreted from his letters to the Earl of Sandwich (C. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen (eds) *The Private Papers of the Earl of Sandwich, Vol. I*, Navy Records Society, 1932, p. 58 and p. 61) — "... but we have no orders to do what I wish to do . . . seize them all and send them to England . . ." — "... one active campaign, a smart action and burning two or three of their towns will set everything to rights . . .". Pitcairn was obviously convinced that military action was indicated but it is not likely that a professional soldier and strict disciplinarian would act impulsively in such a situation. Allen French, in *General Gage's Informers*, pp. 57-8, produced evidence probably for the first time ever, to suggest that the Americans could have fired first.
- ²⁹ Michael Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 71, supported by Arthur B. Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
- ³⁰ Don Higginbotham, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
- ³¹ "Lieutenant Barker's Diary" in H. S. Commager and R. B. Morris (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 71.
- ³² Harold Murdock, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.
- ³³ *ibid*, p. 58.
- ³⁴ F. W. Coburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92, and Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, p. 178. The incident described is apparently typical of the half-hearted manner in which the British went about their search, (see also French p. 179 for the search at Barrett's farm and p. 177 for how one, Timothy Wheeler, was able to convince the British that all the flour in his barn belonged to him; also Murdock, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71).
- ³⁵ The most recent writers, Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 155 and Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 72, both state that Parsons had seven companies under his command, although Tourtellot adds (p. 159) that the seventh company joined Pearson's force at the Bridge. This figure is based on Captain Laurie's account of the fight at North Bridge, (see French, *General Gage's Informers*, pp. 95-99). Earlier

- writers said the force consisted of six companies and probably base this figure on the details given in *Lieutenant Barker's Diary* (in H. S. Commager and R. B. Morris (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2). In support of the modern writers, I have gone into some detail regarding dispositions.
- ³⁶ Arthur B. Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
- ³⁷ Allen French, *General Gage's Informers*, pp. 95-6.
- ³⁸ Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, p. 187n.
- ³⁹ "Lieutenant Barker's Diary" in H. S. Commager and R. B. Morris (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 72. The question of who fired first at Concord has never been in dispute, although Gage's Circumstantial Account states that the Americans fired first.
- ⁴⁰ Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, p. 209, suggests the Americans, apart from needing breakfast, were so disorganised following the shock of their encounter as to be of little value as a fighting force for some hours.
- ⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 212. See also Richard Frothingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71, who suggests that the Provincial troops held off because war had not been declared and they were not sure of their legal position.
- ⁴² Harold Murdock, *op. cit.*, p. 76, notes that Smith and Percy both reported the "scalping" incident, as did Gage (see Circumstantial Account). For the true story see Allen French, *Day of Concord and Lexington*, pp. 213-4.
- ⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 221.
- ⁴⁴ H. Peckham, *The War of Independence*, University of Chicago Press, 1963, p. 11.
- ⁴⁵ Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, pp. 226-7. Forgetfulness on the part of the Brigade Major's orderly prevented the orders reaching Percy before 7.00 a.m., but even more unbelievable, the orders to the marines were delivered to Major Pitcairn's quarters.
- ⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 233.
- ⁴⁷ Harold Murdock, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-92.
- ⁴⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 95-6.
- ⁴⁹ Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, pp. 252-4.
- ⁵⁰ Arthur B. Tourtellot, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
- ⁵¹ "Lieutenant Barker's Diary" in H. S. Commager and R. B. Morris (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 74.
- ⁵² Allen French, *The Day of Concord and Lexington*, pp. 269-70.



LIBERTY AND DISCIPLINE

*Field Marshal Sir William Slim**

GBE, KCB, DSO, MC

IF you get up from that chair you are sitting in and take out your car or bicycle, you can choose where you want to go, your own destination. That is liberty. But as you drive or ride through the streets towards it, you will keep to the left of the road. That is discipline.

You will keep to the left without thinking very much about it, but if you do think for a moment, you will find that there is a connection between liberty and discipline.

First of all you will keep to the left for your own advantage. If you insist on liberty to drive on any side of the road you fancy you will end up, not where you want to be, but on a stretcher. And there is not much liberty about that. So you accept discipline, because you know that in the long run it is the only way in which you can get where you want to, quickly and safely.

Now other people have as much right to go where they want to as you have. If you career all over the road you will get in the way, delay them, and put them in danger. So for their sakes as well as your own you keep to the left.

But it will be no use your keeping to the left if others on the road don't do the same. You will expect them to. You will trust to their common sense. You will rely on their discipline.

This is a verbatim report of a broadcast delivered by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, over the Australian Broadcasting Commission's national network on 17 June, 1950.—Editor.

Originally printed in the October 1950 issue of the Australian Army Journal.

** Governor-General of Australia, 1953-60. Created Viscount in 1960.*

Lastly, even supposing you are tempted to go scooting about on the wrong side, you probably won't. At the back of your mind will be the thought "If I do the police will be after me." In the last resort there must be some force which can punish disobedience of the law.

There are thus four reasons why you will keep to the left—

- (i) Your own advantage.
- (ii) Consideration for others.
- (iii) Confidence in your fellows.
- (iv) Fear of punishment.

Whenever we put a curb on our natural desire to do as we like, whenever we temper liberty with discipline, we do so for one or more of those reasons. It is the relative value we give to each of these reasons that decides what sort of discipline we have. And that can vary from the pure self-discipline of the Sermon on the Mount to the discipline of the concentration camp, the enforced discipline of fear.

In spite of all our squabbles we of British stock are united when it comes to most of the things that matter — and liberty is one of them. We believe in freedom to think as we like, work at what we like, and go where we like. Discipline is a restraint on liberty, so most of us have a very natural inclination to avoid it. But we cannot. Man, ever since the dim historic past when he got up on his hind legs and raised a human family, has had no option but to accept discipline of some kind. For modern man, living in complex communities in which every individual is dependent on others, discipline is more than ever unavoidable.

The problem is not shall we accept discipline, sooner or later we have to. The question is, how shall we accept it? Shall it be imposed by physical violence and fear, by grim economic necessity, or be accepted by consent and understanding? Shall it come from without or from within?

It ought not to be difficult for us, the British, to choose. We are not good at standing in masses and yelling in unison for a dictator, but we can conduct quite a brisk political argument without recourse to grenades and Sten guns. While we are not much given to goose-stepping in serried ranks to show how united we are, we do generally file out in a quiet and orderly manner when the theatre takes fire.

That sort of discipline is within us, thank God, a tradition. And like all traditions, it has been a plant of slow growth. It is worth cherishing. Up to now the British way of life with all its faults, has, compared with most others, been full, free, and fair. It has been so because we have managed to hold the balance between liberty and discipline. It is that balance which will decide in the future whether it is still to be full, free and fair.

Let us beware of taking a word and tagging a picture on it. For some the word discipline flashes on to the screen of the mind jack-booted commissars and gauleiters bawling commands across the barrack square at tramping squads. Some kinds of discipline are that and nothing more, but not real discipline, not our discipline, not even on a barrack square.

True discipline is not someone shouting orders at others. That is dictatorship, not discipline. The voluntary, reasoned discipline accepted by free, intelligent men and women is another thing. To begin with it is binding from top to bottom.

I remember, when I was a very young officer, being told by my colonel, "Remember, discipline begins with the officers." And so it does. The leader must be ready, not only to accept a higher degree of responsibility, but a severer standard of self-discipline than those he leads. If you hold a position of authority, whether you are the managing-director or the charge-hand, if you are really to do your job and lead, you must impose discipline on yourself first. Then forget the easy way of trying to enforce it on others, by just giving orders and expecting them to be obeyed. You will give orders and you will see that they are obeyed, but you will only build up the leadership of your team on the discipline of understanding.

That is the crux of the matter. Discipline is something that is enforced, either by fear or by understanding. Even in the Army it is not merely a question of giving orders. There is more to a soldier's discipline than blind obedience. To take men into your confidence is not a new technique invented in the last war. Good generals were doing that long before you and I got into khaki to save the world.

Julius Caesar when he "exhorted the legions" may have stood on a captured British chariot, while the modern general climbed on the bonnet of a jeep, but I will bet that each said much the same thing.

So did Oliver Cromwell when he demanded that every man in his New Model Army should "know what he fights for and love what he knows". If you substitute work for fight you have got the essence of industrial discipline, too, to know what you work for and to love what you know.

I can recall one occasion on which a man flatly refused to obey an order I gave him. I was young and he was old. I, perhaps was too young, he was certainly too old to be a private in Kitchener's Army. He was one of a company digging a road through a cutting. I watched him shovel earth into an old tin tub and stagger off to empty it. I noticed that it was only a quarter full, so when he came back I told him, "This time fill it to the top." "Eh," he said, "if I do that I won't be able to carry it." "Never you mind that," I answered. "Do as you are told. Fill it." "But that's daft," he protested. "I tell you I can't lift it full." Then in exasperation he flung down his shovel with the historic gesture of the man who will soldier no more. If I had only told him at the start that I intended to help him lift the full tub he would have obeyed cheerfully.

That minor incident of long ago brought me up against one of the foundations of discipline — mutual confidence. If the old soldier had had more confidence in me he would have carried out the order realizing that, although he could not see the reason for it, there probably was one. If I had had more confidence in him I should not have been so ready to attribute hesitation to mere cussedness. Neither in war nor in peace can all orders be explained beforehand. That is all the more reason to explain them when it is possible. You will not have to give orders twice if people understand, the first time, why they are given.

It is only discipline that enables men to live in a community and yet retain individual liberty. Sweep away or undermine discipline and the only law left is "that they should take who have the power and they should keep who can." Security for the weak and the poor vanishes. That is why, far from it being derogatory for any man or woman voluntarily to accept discipline, it is ennobling. The self-discipline of the strong is the safeguard of the weak.

Totalitarian discipline, with its slogan-shouting masses, is deliberately designed to submerge the individual. The discipline a man imposes on himself because he believes, intelligently, that it helps him to get a worth-while job done to his own and his country's benefit, fosters

character and initiative. It makes a man do his work without being watched because it is worth doing.

In the blitz of the last war not a man of the thousands of British railway signalmen ever left his post. They stood, often in the heart of the target area, cooped up in flimsy buildings, surrounded by glass, while the bombs screamed down. And they stayed at their posts. They knew what they worked for, they knew its importance to others and to their country. They put their job before themselves. That was discipline.

Democracy means that responsibility is decentralized and that no-one can shirk his share. We all have to take some of the strain. It is no goodfunking it. Some of us, a lot of us, in all walks of life, don't. If everyone — not only the other fellow we are always pointing at, but you and me — really worked when we were supposed to be working, believe me, we would knock any economic crisis for six. That takes discipline based not only on ourselves, but backed by a healthy public opinion that is not too gentle with the man, whether at the top or the bottom of the ladder, who is ready to let those he works with carry him.

The choice is between the imposed discipline of the police state or the self-discipline of free men and women voluntarily accepted, with its equality, fairness and dignity. We know more than any other race about freedom allied to responsibility. We still have throughout all our people of every level, a vast fund of neighbourly kindness and thought for others. Let us keep to those things and in the common factor between liberty and discipline — confidence in one another.

We are apt these days to think more of liberty than of responsibility. We all want liberty, but in the long run we never get anything worth having without paying for it. Liberty is no exception.

You can have discipline without liberty, but you cannot have liberty without discipline. ✂



Self-Propelled Guns

or Towed Guns

*Lieutenant Colonel S. N. Gower**

Royal Australian Artillery

Introduction

A SELF-PROPELLED (SP) gun can be defined as a gun designed for the indirect fire role, but with a certain amount of protection and a track chassis that gives it a superior cross-country performance compared to a towed gun.

Except for a brief period when some elements were equipped with Yeramba, an Australian-conceived hybrid with a 25 pounder gun mounted on a Grant chassis, the Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery has never possessed an SP capability. This is in sharp contrast with many other armies in the world, where the operation of SP artillery has long been regarded as an accepted practice. At present, the British Army has both field and medium SP guns, the US Army is equipped with a variety of field, medium and heavy SP artillery, and a range of SP equipment is possessed by the Soviet Bloc.

Recently, the whole posture of Australian defence changed from that of active involvement in the South East Asian region to a concentration on matters relating to the defence of continental Australia.

Lieutenant Colonel Gower is a previous contributor to the Army Journal. He is currently the Director Trials (Army) within the Service Laboratories and Trials Division of the Department of Defence Central Office). Recent appointments have included service as a battery commander in 12 Fd Regt and as SO2 (Policy) within the Directorate of Artillery.

* RAA Association (NSW) Prize Essay for 1975.

With this fundamental change in direction, it is an appropriate time to examine whether Australia should change its attitude towards SP artillery, however well founded past beliefs may have been.

The aim of this article is to consider whether SP or towed guns, or indeed both, are required for continental defence. In this context, continental defence considerations have been restricted to those relating to the Australian mainland. Accordingly, it is necessary first to consider the threat likely to be facing Australia and to draw deductions from an analysis of it. Such considerations form the first part of this article. Succeeding parts involve a comparison of mobility, protection and logistic aspects of both SP and towed artillery.

The timeframe for consideration has been taken as the 1980-1990s period. This has been selected for several reasons: most importantly, replacements for our current range of equipment could enter service then; and guns as we know them are still likely to be the prime means of providing timely, intimate close and general fire support.

The Threat

Although the probability of Australian involvement in military hostilities has been assessed as low,¹ several scenarios can be advanced that require the possession by Australia of particular forms of military capability. For the purposes of this article only two opposing scenarios will be considered.

The first, and by far the most likely, scenario postulates the eruption of low-level violence from regional disputes, the activity of foreign guerilla groups, population expansion or urban terrorism for political purposes.² Such violence could occur at short notice and requires adequately equipped forces to protect Australia's sovereignty and of such a size to deal with limited infringements of her territories. It requires the maintenance of strong surveillance elements to control our national waters and coastline, backed by mobile, quick-reacting defence forces. It is unlikely that such a force would need SP guns to carry out its tasks; rather the emphasis would be on light, airportable equipment.

The second scenario foresees an invasion threat of Australia by a major power arising from either the collapse of detente between the super-powers, or from coercion for economic reasons. Although the ANZUS Treaty has been re-affirmed as a fundamental part of our defence posture,³ the alliance does not necessarily provide a shield to

protect Australia under all circumstances. It could happen that the US might not wish to become involved because of possible effects on its other world relationships.⁴ Hopefully, the necessary aid would be forthcoming, but Australia would need to be capable of defending herself in at least the initial stages of a medium to high intensity war. This would demand a measure of self-sufficiency, and the existence of military forces strong enough to carry out effective military operations for the period until help arrived, or the pressure of world opinion stopped the conflict.

Although priority should be given to countering the outbreak of low intensity conflicts, Australia would be most unwise to ignore the requirement to acquire competence and equipment to conduct higher level operations. It is also worth considering the form that such operations could take.

An examination of the geography of Australia reveals a vast coastline with a large and empty region to the north and north-west of the continent. Most of the population is concentrated in a coastal fringe to the south-east, and communications away from that area to the remainder of the continent are poor.

In the event of an invasion, logistic limitations would probably force an enemy to make an initial lodgement in the northern or north-western regions of Australia. Such a landing could then be followed up by a series of coastal hops, or an inland advance, depending on our reaction. Should a landing take place in the suggested regions, the movement of a large Army force to the area of operations would pose serious problems. On the one hand, to take advantage of the speed of air deployment, there would be a desire for light scales and air-mobile equipment. However, a force organised on this basis could well prove inadequately equipped for a mid-intensity conflict, especially if confronted with a balanced enemy force that possessed armour, mechanised infantry and air superiority over the battlefield.

The sheer magnitude of the difficulties associated with a speedy deployment of a large force into a remote area suggests that incursions in depth by an enemy would have to be accepted before containment and subsequent offensive action would be possible. If the foregoing proposal of containment in depth is accepted, then the Army has a requirement for a highly mobile surveillance element behind which a heavier equipped force could be grouped to carry out the initial defen-



(Captain J. D. Phillips ED)

The Yeramba SP Gun on Puckapunyal Range during 22 Fd Regt (SP) Exercise in 1955.

sive and subsequent offensive operations. The overall strategy would be to draw the enemy so that he over-extended his lines of communications, contain his progress and then interdict to his rear. The initial containment phase could take up to several months.

As offensive operations would be carried out over long distances and would involve wide outflanking sweeps across broken and trackless terrain, an organisation capable of sustained cross-country movement would seem necessary. This suggests a predominance of armoured and mechanised forces possessing organic artillery that is capable of providing fire support at all times. If artillery is to be used to support armoured forces, the calibre of a 105 mm field gun is inadequate, and the heavier weight of fire together with the anti-armour capability of medium artillery would be required to provide effective close support.

Although the towed medium gun equipments under consideration for possible introduction to service in the 1980s will have a greatly increased range compared with present equipment, it is doubtful that this range would be sufficient to offset differences in mobility between towed guns and the supported armoured forces. The foregoing analysis

of the threat provides broad support for the contention that an SP capability should be possessed by medium, if not field, artillery. This will be examined in detail in the next section.

COMPARISON

Mobility

Mobility can be defined as that quality which permits military forces to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission.⁵ Although it is very difficult to qualify mobility requirements⁶ several relevant comments can be made. For the purposes of comparison, mobility can be considered as having two aspects: ground and air.

With respect to the latter, towed artillery has a far higher degree of mobility than SP field or medium guns. Weight and bulk are the problems with SP guns; for example, neither the UK 105 mm Abbot nor the US 155 mm M109 guns are airportable in even a medium range transport aircraft, such as the C130 Hercules. The use of SP artillery would impose severe strategic restrictions in Australia where, owing to the gross inadequacies of the existing transport infrastructure, rapid deployment is only possible by air. Apart from sea movement, SP artillery would have to be moved to the combat zone by road, either under its own power or by transporter, or by rail. This would be a time-consuming process, for all transport resources would be stretched in providing the necessary logistic build-up without the additional burden of moving SP guns. The pre-location of strategic equipment dumps could offset this problem, but would involve the costly duplication of equipment for training and contingency use. Towed guns would not cause the same strategic movement difficulties.

Although tactical deployment by air might be possible in the 1980s for medium towed guns, it is by no means certain. As a general rule, deployment will be restricted to those areas having vehicular access. However, this could be a serious limitation in the suggested invasion area. Extended independent cross-country operation by armoured forces will require medium artillery support at all times, and it would be unacceptable to have the scope of their operations prescribed by the inability of artillery equipment to carry out its tasks. The good cross-country performance and wading capability of a medium SP gun would therefore seem highly desirable to support offensive armoured operations.



The US M109 155 mm SP Medium Gun, well-known to those who served in South Vietnam.

SP artillery also offers the very considerable advantage of speed into and out of action. This is of particular importance when operations are mobile, fluid and cover a large area. It is of interest to note in the Yom Kippur War that the Israeli artillery, which is predominantly SP, averaged at least four moves a day.⁷ Moves at this frequency can be achieved by towed artillery, but it is far easier and quicker with SP guns.

The benefits of increased tactical mobility that would be conferred by SP artillery in continental defence suggest that such a capability should be possessed by the medium regiment recently proposed as organic to the divisional artillery.

Protection

It is essential that artillery is capable of surviving counter-battery (CB) fire. Digging will help towed artillery to survive the effects of CB fire, but the preparation of a gun position capable of withstanding sustained fire takes considerable time and effort, even with the availability of a bull-dozer. SP guns possessing an unrestricted top traverse

can be dug in quicker, as a smaller pit is required. Additionally, most SP guns have fully enclosed armoured protection which increases their chances of surviving CB fire.

It has been suggested that the increasing availability and diversity of gun locating devices will dictate that guns will require frequent redeployment to alternative positions.⁸ The use of SP artillery will enable such moves to be accomplished more quickly and safely.

The protection offered by SP artillery is also of advantage during deployments and when there is a likelihood of air or local ground attack on the gun position. The built-in protection against small arms and shell fragments provides an increased degree of protection for the gun detachment, ammunition and stores. The facility to mount a dual-purpose machine gun on the commander's cupola is an advantage in these circumstances.

Protection, coupled with mobility, permits a SP gun to be deployed closer to the forward edge of the battle area. This not only allows a greater range penetration behind the enemy's lines, but also suggests the occasional secondary use as an assault gun for SP artillery.

A fully enclosed SP gun also enables protection for the detachment against nuclear and chemical attack. Although this is not perceived currently as a threat, the possibility should not be dismissed.

Protection and mobility considerations weigh heavily in favour of SP artillery for continental defence. This then leaves the final major comparative factor, logistics.

Logistics

There are many aspects that come within the scope of logistics.⁹ However, the major ones as far as this comparison is concerned are cost, reliability and maintenance. Discussion will accordingly be restricted to these aspects.

The basic procurement cost of a SP gun, is between two and three times that of its towed equivalent.¹⁰ This is a significant difference that is magnified subsequently by operating costs. Studies suggest that all-of-life operating costs are proportional to the initial cost of the equipment.¹¹ Thus, not only will an SP gun cost more than a towed gun, so will its operating costs be higher. These costs are significant, bearing in mind Australia's limited defence budget. On a cost-effectiveness basis, it is doubtful that the greater availability of fire support arising

from better mobility would offset the adverse cost differential sufficiently to justify the large scale adoption of SP artillery. Operations research could perhaps provide a guide in this matter.

Reliability factors favour towed artillery, which is more robust and less prone to failure than SP guns. However, the margin is not as great as would appear on first examination. For example, should a gun towing vehicle fail, it seems a simple matter to obtain a substitute. This may be the case for field guns, but medium gun tractors are specialist vehicles, and a replacement might not be readily available. There is therefore the probability of a medium gun being immobilised should its tractor fail or become damaged.

SP guns are more complex, having their own integral chassis, power pack, transmission, hydraulics and electric power circuits. The overall reliability of these components is such that a SP gun is more liable to breakdown; and as repairs could take longer, its availability is less than a towed gun. However, armoured corps everywhere have lived with similar problems and have learnt to overcome them. Consequently, there appears no reason why reliability or maintenance considerations should be given undue emphasis. The adoption of a SP gun with a similar chassis and as many common components as the main battle tank would confer maintenance advantages.

Notwithstanding the reservations concerning the cost-effectiveness of SP guns, there is sufficient doubt as to the ability of towed artillery



The US-developed XM198 155 mm Medium Gun, which is currently undergoing trials within Australia.

to provide close support for armoured operations that the procurement of some medium SP artillery would seem warranted. The remainder of the divisional and corps artillery would accordingly remain towed.

The number of SP guns that could be procured would be subject to the constraints of the defence budget. Although a fully SP medium regiment might be desirable, realism suggests that a somewhat restricted goal might be all that could be expected. However, this does not alter the position that the SP gun, as well as towed artillery, has a place in continental defence.

CONCLUSIONS

The nature of the threat facing Australia ranges from the probability of low-intensity regional violence arising at short notice to the possibility of a full-scale invasion of the Australian continent. Although there is not a high expectation of the latter, Australia would be most unwise to ignore the possibility.

Preparation to counter the latter threat would require the availability of strong armoured forces capable of offensive, flanking operations. Such forces would require artillery to provide close support. The necessary fire support could only be produced effectively by medium guns.

Although medium guns with ranges in excess of 30 km are likely to become available in the 1980s, they probably will be restricted to areas having vehicular access. Only an SP gun would possess the mobility necessary to provide the required fire support.

SP guns also afford better protection for the detachment and have a far better ability to withstand CB fire than towed guns. They are faster into and out of action than towed guns, and this leads to a greater availability and speed of response.

Offsetting their advantages, the initial procurement and operating costs of SP artillery are far greater than towed guns. There is doubt therefore that the widespread employment of SP guns is cost-effective. However, it seems that their value is sufficient to justify their inclusion within the medium regiment of divisional artillery.


In conclusion, in answer to the question, 'Are self propelled or towed guns, or indeed both, required for continental defence', it would appear that there is a place for both, with cost considerations restricting the number of SP medium guns. ✕

Notes

- ¹ Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1973*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973, p. 6.
- ² Two kinds of Security Threats, *The Australian*, 8 July 1974. This article was written by Dr R. J. O'Neill, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra.
- ³ Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, Volume 44, No. 8, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973, p. 541.
- ⁴ 'Two Kinds of Security Threats', *The Australian*, 8 July 1974.
- ⁵ JSP(AS)101, Glossary, p. 1-149.
- ⁶ As an example to back this statement, the difficulty lies in quantifying for a given area what percentage of movement is going to be cross-country and, of this percentage, what would be critical to the outcome of an operation if movement was not possible.
- ⁷ Morony, Brig T. L., *Artillery Support in the Yom Kippur War*, as reprinted in the RAA Liaison Letter, March 1975, p. 6.
- ⁸ Williams, Maj P. D., 'Space-Age Artillery', *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1, March 1971.
- ⁹ See JSP(AS)101, Glossary, p. 1-135, for definition of 'logistics'.
- ¹⁰ Sewell, Col E. R. A., 'Wants and Needs', *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol. XCIX, No. 2, September 1972.
- ¹¹ Salmon, Lt Col G. T., 'Australian Surface-to-Surface Artillery Requirements 1980-2000'. Australian Staff College Thesis, 1974, (unpublished).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Australian Government, Department of Defence. *Defence Report 1973*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973.
- Department of Foreign Affairs. *Foreign Affairs Record*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973.
- Morony, Brig T. L., 'Artillery Support in the Yom Kippur War', as reprinted in RAA Liaison Letter, March 1975.
- Salmon, Lt Col G. T., 'Australian Surface-to-Surface Artillery Requirements 1980-1990', Australian Staff College Thesis 1974 (unpublished).
- Sewell, Col E. R. A., 'Wants and Needs', *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol XCIX, No 2, September 1972.
- Williams, Maj P. D., 'Space Age Artillery', *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol XCVIII, No 1, March 1971.
- The Australian, 'Two Kinds of Security Threats', 8 July 1974.



Major W. A. Morrison

Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

THE Canadian Militia is an element of the Primary Reserve. (See Table 1). It was first organized over 300 years ago when, in 1651, the inhabitants of New France (Quebec) banded together to provide protection against Indian raids.

Later, during the War of 1812, the militia served with distinction. The American Civil war was a factor in the bolstering of the militia and they were also called into service during the North-West Rebellion of the 1880s. Militia personnel were individually utilized to form the nucleus of the Canadian Expeditionary Force for The Great War 1914-18 and the militia units of today commemorate those of that conflict.

Mobilization in 1939 was accomplished efficiently only due to the attitude and state of readiness of these part-time soldiers.

Major Morrison was commissioned into the 1st Bn The Black Watch of Canada in 1962. He transferred to Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in 1970. He is a graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College and obtained a Bachelor of Arts Degree in 1968 at Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick. He has served with 4 Canadian Mechanized Infantry Brigade Group in Germany and with Headquarters United Nations Forces in Cyprus. He is currently Staff Officer Infantry/Infantry Doctrine at HQ Mobile Command, St Hubert, Quebec.






TABLE 1 - ORGANIZATION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

From the cessation of hostilities of the Second World War in 1945 until 1970, the militia underwent at least five major re-organizations. Realizing the detrimental effect of such moves, the Department of National Defence has for six years resisted any further change.

The purpose of this article is to outline the role, tasks, organization and training of the Army Reserves of the Canadian Forces — The Militia.

Role

In a presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons in March of 1974, the Minister of National Defence succinctly stated the role of all the Primary Reserve Forces (and so the militia) to be "to support the Regular Force".

Such a role provides for the maximum utilization of militia resources. There are many training and learning views which can be explored when one considers what must be done to be able to live up to this mission.

In the case of the militia, five tasks are allocated. Each allows for a different type of training, but individually and collectively, they are in support of the Regular Force.

Tasks

As listed in the Department of National Defence publication — DEFENCE 1974, militia tasks are:

- Augmenting and reinforcing Regular Force headquarters and units for the maintenance of national sovereignty, the joint defence of North America, and NATO.

Example: Militia are employed full and part-time at various headquarters, they exercise regularly with regular units and each year more than 250 are attached to our Brigade in Europe.

- Peacekeeping and Truce supervisory operations, military training assistance and international development.

Example: At the present time more than 100 militiamen are in the Middle East as part of the Canadian United Nations Emergency Force Contingent.

- Augmenting the Civil Emergency organization.

Example: Militia assist in the manning of Regional warning centres and are available for call-out in times of national disasters.

- The provision of a basis for mobilization and a general reserve.

Example: Individuals will be used to flesh-out regular units and militia units will form the nucleus of new formations.


- Contributing to national development.

Example: Militia assist regulars in construction of airfields in the Canadian Arctic. Also each summer thousands are employed on community assistance programmes as part of a Student Summer Employment and Assistance Programme (SSEAP).

Organization

Mobile Command commands and controls the militia under the terms of direction received from National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).

At NDHQ there is a Director-General Reserves and Cadets (DGRC), an officer in the rank of Brigadier-General who is responsible for co-ordinating all aspects of Primary Reserve activity. Specific militia activities are the task of a Lieutenant-Colonel, the Director of Militia.



In addition, to ensure that the Chief of the Defence Staff receives the necessary and pertinent advice to enable him to make decisions with regard to the militia, he has the services of the Major-General Reserves (MGENRES). This officer acts as a consultant and his area of responsibility covers all reserves. There is also a Senior Reserve advisor to deal strictly with militia matters. Below the level of Mobile Command, militia are commanded and controlled by militia. This is effected through an organization of areas, districts and units. (See Table 2).

At Mobile Command Headquarters there is a Senior Staff Officer Militia Training who oversees training activities but all other militia matters (logistics, administration, pay etc) are handled by the same staff officers who serve the regular formation and units.

Each of the five areas is commanded by a militia Brigadier-General. To assist him he has a combined staff of militia and regulars. The regulars are part of a Regular Support Staff (RSS) which will be discussed later.

The area commander has a number of districts, each commanded by a militia colonel and the area staff is also comprised of regular and militia officers and non-commissioned officers. Under the 21 districts are the units. There are approximately 150 units which are classed as

major (battalion size), minor (company size) and bands. The militia is heavily combat arms oriented and has some 100 of these major units, with the majority being infantry.

Although steps are currently being taken to align the militia to the same establishment concept as is now used by the regular force, the present organization of a unit provides only for the bare essentials. Table 3 shows one example.

All members of a unit are militia. As is the case at area and district headquarters, RSS are available to advise and support, foster self-sufficiency, and provide expertise and continuity. RSS work during



Winter Warfare Training.

the day and also on the two training nights per week and the at least one weekend per month that the militia parade.

At area and district level RSS are members of the normal operations, logistics and controller branches. At unit level, there is a Captain Training Officer, a senior NCO instructor, a chief clerk and a driver-




TABLE 2 - MILITIA ORGANIZATION

storeman. It is emphasized that all RSS are outside the militia command chain.

Training

Each year, a certain number of man-days is allotted for local headquarters training. This figure usually allows units to train 30 to 40 days. In addition man-days are set aside for trade progression courses, district and area activities and annual concentrations. By attending training at every available opportunity, a militiaman could receive as much as 80 days pay per year.

Unit training is mainly concentrated at individual through company level. Three years ago a major revitalization programme was instituted and this has resulted, among other things, in such equipment as new jeeps, 60 and 81 mm mortars, .50 cal mgs, 84 mm Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons, sniper rifles and a cine target apparatus being issued to the militia.

As may be imagined, such equipment presents many opportunities for training at the unit level. Districts and areas conduct officer and NCO qualifying courses and trades advancement training. Mobile




TABLE 3 - EXAMPLE OUTLINE ORGANIZATION OF A MILITIA INFANTRY BATTALION

Command is directly concerned with the course which qualifies to the rank of Major and with the Militia Command and Staff course. Officers from the Militia Training Section visit all courses for quality control purposes.

Area concentrations, (MILCONS) are conducted annually for one to two weeks and training progresses to Battalion level exercises. In 1975 Pacific area staged its MILCON at Fort Lewis, Washington and hopes to do the same in the summer of 1976.

Exchange Training weekends between the Militia and the US National Guard are becoming more and more frequent as each force recognizes the advantages to be gained from such ventures.

Perhaps some statistics for 1975 will serve to illustrate the intensity of the training carried out by the militia, which has a strength of approximately 16,000.

EVENT	NUMBER ATTENDED
Courses at Regular Force Schools	420
Area Rank and Trade Schools	2700
National Rank and Trade Schools	600
MILCONS	6500
Reserve Entry Scheme — Officers	425
Militia Command and Staff Course	42
Training in Europe	420
United Nations Emergency Force — Egypt	120
Parachute Training	150
Changing of The Guard on Parliament Hill — Ottawa	200

On any given weekend, up to 30% of the total strength can be found engaged in varying training activities.

Other Areas

FEMALES. The Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC) has been abolished and women are integrated into all units. They are permitted in the militia up to 10% of the establishment of a combat arms unit and up to 15% for service support units. They undergo the same training as the males but it is not envisaged that they be employed as combat arms personnel. One point to note is that for parachute training they must meet the same standards as the males in every aspect.

MILITIA PAY. Philosophy has been revised as part of the revitalization programme and now pay rates more closely approximate that of the Regular Force.



The first female militia to receive their wings (September 1974) with CO Canadian Airborne Centre.

THE IMAGE of the militia has been improved tremendously in the past few years. Some of the contributing factors have been the supportive public statements of the Minister of National Defence, the issuing to the militia of the regular force uniform, departmental efforts to have employers recognize the community contribution made by individuals, production of films and speaker kits designed to make the militia better known.

Internally, a newspaper — **THE RESERVIST** — is published periodically by Mobile Command. Its purpose is to report on all facets of militia life and to serve as a clearing house for matters of interest to the citizen soldier.

PERSONAL STABILIZATION. The militia in past years has suffered from a high rate of personnel turnover. This has now been arrested and retention and recruiting are both on the rise. Extensive efforts are being made to persuade those who are released from the regular force and who are still eligible to serve to join the militia. This effort is succeeding and is providing a great degree of much needed expertise.



Syndicate problem at the Militia Command and Staff Course.

Conclusion

When Lieutenant General J. Chouinard assumed command of Mobile Command July 4, 1975, his first major speech outside of his headquarters was delivered to the Militia Command and Staff course. He emphasized need of the country for the militia and stated that he placed the highest importance on the revitalization programme.

He pledged the full support of the regular force to the militia and presented the view that the militia must continue to fulfil its role of support to the Regular Force.

The future is bright for the militia. The Canadian public is aware of its importance in times of peace as well as in time of war. The regular force values it highly and recognizes its potential in time of need.

With all three groups: the regular force, the militia and the public — displaying such positive attitudes, one need not worry unduly about the future. ✕

BOOK REVIEW

HALF TO REMEMBER by G. H. Fearnside, Sydney, Haldane, 1975.

Reviewed by Lt C. A. Jones

RMC Duntroon.

PERSONAL accounts of World War II by Australian front-line soldiers are scarce; thus G. H. Fearnside's book is a welcome addition to the slender collection of eyewitness testimonies of that international holocaust. Presently a journalist in Sydney, Fearnside saw action in the Middle East as a sergeant with 2/13th ("Devils Own") Battalion, and in New Guinea as a subaltern with a 2/3rd Battalion.

Half to Remember was written, "primarily as a reminiscence for Australians who served in World War II, particularly those who were infantry soldiers . . ." With this in mind, the author adopts a style which reflects both the humour and the pathos of the Australian soldier in action. Those who were absent from such vividly described encounters as El Duda, Tobruk and El Alamein, however, are not precluded from enjoying such sensitively recorded experiences.

Two men sharing one pair of trousers on a freezing night presents a seemingly ludicrous picture, but it illustrates Fearnside's ability to order his experiences to make his reader understand the hardship and comradeship which precipitated the "unique experience" such men had, but "one which, paradoxically, those who shared it hope will never be repeated". Episodes such as that involving the Maison Daree, featuring "Vera the Turk", are both candidly and cleverly handled by use of wry humour with an inherent pragmatic twist.


Juxtaposed with the humour there is, inescapably, the tragedy and horror of war. The episode of a callous soldier shaking hands with a cadaverous hand poking from a shallow grave is balanced by the pathos caused by the psychological turmoil Fearnside experienced when capturing a wounded enemy soldier immediately after hearing of his own brother's death. Such equilibrium, achieved by a balanced portrayal of human attitude in time of war and reported with an emotional intensity, gives *Half to Remember* a high credibility.

Not surprisingly, Fearnside's book deals with courage. Respect is accorded to an enemy who fought bravely. The hardships of the

Japanese 18th Army are recalled, while the position of the Italians in the Middle East is equated with that of the Americans in Vietnam. Fearnside does not neglect controversial issues of the time. The antagonism of the 2 AIF towards the newly raised Militia is examined; and a brief study is made of how Montgomery was able to surmount the initial reservations of the Australian soldier in North Africa.

Perhaps it is a degree of objectivity lent by hindsight which serves to make this book a more mature work than earlier works such as *Sojourn in Tobruk*. Yet this objectivity does not prevent Fearnside from injecting a subjective element to rival that in Guy Chapman's *A Passionate Prodigality*. Unlike Chapman, however, Fearnside lacks the meticulous care bred of scholarship and is prone, in his writing, to careless errors. The misnaming of the Brenner Pass, a description of the Americans liberating Geneva, the use of kilos instead of kilometres and the inconsistent use of the terms "British" and "English", though minor faults, nevertheless detract from the book. These faults are not enhanced by a poor cover design, the printer's dated layout and illustrations whose quality leaves something to be desired.

But it is the incomparable eyewitness accounts of the battle around Tobruk which make this book a memorable one, one which will be appreciated by those who like their military history on a personal level. The whole tone of Fearnside's book indeed makes it seem that, "Things that were hard to bear," as Seneca said, "are sweet to remember." ☞



LETTERS to the Editor

I take the greatest possible offence at your deformatory* Editorial in the July issue of the Journal. The State President of the New South Wales Branch of the RSL is not without blame either!

I am a simple soldier — not a social disease; and as for people “throwing off their apathy”, I hope that they do not have a tall building in mind.

* I DO know how to spell defamatory!

Army Office, Canberra

R. Apathy, Major

Which only goes to prove you can't be too careful! Editor.

* * * *

Your editorial of May puts the Battle of the Coral Sea out of perspective.

The Japanese did not lose the War at that time and place. It was not the final check to Japanese expansion into the Pacific, rather the first. Nor is it correct to say that the Japanese “were never able again to threaten Australia with invasion.” The intention was not there.

The Japanese, fortunately for us, halted at Rabaul in January and failed to push quickly to Port Moresby, Tulagi and New Caledonia.

In March, the Japanese Navy saw the desirability of occupying Australia, but the Japanese Army stated very denitely that such a task

was beyond them. The Navy then planned, amongst other things, to occupy New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa to cut the U.S. supply line to the Australian Base.

The capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi was to be the first step. The sinking of *Shoho* caused the Port Moresby invasion fleet to turn back, giving the Allies a definite strategic victory.

The Japanese might be considered to have gained a tactical advantage in causing the loss of U.S.S. *Lexington*, destroyer *Sims* and oiler *Neosho* and 66 planes, with severe damage to U.S.S. *Yorktown* — for the loss of *Shoho* and a destroyer with severe damage to *Shokaku* and the irreplaceable loss of 77 planes with trained pilots.

However, due to the Japanese difficulties in replacing trained pilots and in effecting repairs to their ships, this tactical advantage was no more than theoretical.

Had the Japanese won the battle, their intention was to bombard the Townsville, Newcastle, Sydney areas, much as they attacked Darwin to prevent our using it as a base from which to hinder their assault on Timor.

Because most of the population of eastern Australia was terrified at what appeared to be an invasion attempt, the defeat of the Japanese fleet was hailed with extreme delight, and has since been the subject of rather unjustified annual celebrations.

If there were a single day on which the Japanese lost the war they could not win, it was 4th June 1942, at Midway — in fact, three fateful minutes at 1030 hours when three Japanese fleet carriers were fatally hit.

Brian Clerehan

Elwood, Victoria

Colonel (RL)

ARMY JOURNAL

INDEX

1976

No. 320 JANUARY 1976 — No. 329 OCTOBER 1976

Part 1 — TITLE INDEX

TITLE	PAGE	ISSUE
Address by His Excellency The Honourable Sir John Kerr, A.C., K.C.M.G., K.St.J., Q.C.	5	321 Feb
Air Defence Artillery	45	324 May
Alexander and Eisenhower: Their Career Lines of Ascent	5	325 Jun
Asia — <i>The Dynamics of a New Order</i>	55	323 Apr
A Systems Approach to Training	4	320 Jan
Australia's Immediate Post-Federation Military Forces	29	328 Sep
Away with the Birds	5	326 Jul
Birth of the Army Journal	5	329 Oct
BOOK REVIEWS		
An Annotated Bibliography of the British Army 1660-1914	48	325 Jun
An Australian Nuclear Weapons Capability	61	328 Sep
Arnhem — A Case Study	63	323 Apr
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49 Vol I: 1937-38	57	327 Aug
Half to Remember	53	329 Oct
Iven G. Mackay Citizen and Soldier	62	324 May
Military Strategy and Tactics	56	327 Aug
Montgomery of Alamein	60	327 Aug
Riot Control	58	327 Aug
Strategy and Society	59	326 Jun
The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion AIF	54	327 Aug
The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West, Four Studies in Global Strategy	62	326 Jul
The Rise of the Luftwaffe 1918-1940	49	325 Jun
The Strategic Nuclear Balance — An Australian Perspective	51	320 Jan
The War of Atonement	61	326 Jul
Too Serious a Business?	59	322 Mar
Urban Terrorism: Theory, Practice and Response	59	328 Sep
Volunteers at Heart — <i>The Queensland Defence Forces 1860-1901</i>	47	321 Feb
Command and Control of Artillery	34	327 Aug
Defence Equipment Procurement Primer	27	321 Feb
Defence Policy Making in Australia	4	323 Apr
Equipment Management Policy	5	322 Mar
Exercise Winter Sun — Training in Canada	51	326 Jul
Files	14	326 Jul
Foreword by CGS to the <i>Final Issue</i>	3	329 Oct
Foreword to "The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion AIF"	50	325 Jun

TITLE	PAGE	ISSUE
For Exceptional Gallantry	28	328 Sep
Grassroots and Main Causes of Insurgency	27	320 Jan
Japanese Aims and Actions in the Pacific War December 1941 — August 1942	17	323 Apr
Let's Start Using Our Guns Again	15	326 Jul
Lexington and Concord	11	329 Oct
Liberty and Discipline	29	329 Oct
Logistics Can be Logical — Maintenance Areas, Operating Stocks and Reserves	23	325 Jun
Marihuana	23	321 Feb
Mental and Physical Fitness — A Necessity or a Luxury?	49	322 Mar
New Warfare Concepts for the Industrial Society	31	325 Jun
Oil Supply and National Security	5	328 Sep
Principles of War as Methodology	20	326 Jul
Riot, Resistance and Revolution	47	328 Sep
Self-Propelled Guns or Towed Guns	34	329 Oct
Some Aspects of the Anglo-Maori Wars	29	322 Mar
The Army at Sea	43	320 Jan
The Australian Defence Forces: Their Peace-time Roles — A Young Officer's Experience	45	323 Apr
The Canadian Militia	44	329 Oct
The Changing Challenge of Our Defence Force	5	324 May
The Chrysanthemum that Broke the Sword	19	320 Jan
The Continuing Story of the Army Journal	9	329 Oct
The Defence of Port Phillip Bay in 1858	39	327 Aug
The Establishment of the Royal Military College of Australia	25	326 Jul
The First Battle of the Next War	33	321 Feb
The Fat Canary — A Unique Leadership Challenge	28	325 Jun
The Hearing Damage Risk to Passengers in an M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier	40	326 Jul
The Improvement of Management Skills Written and Verbal Communication	51	327 Aug
The Late Major-General L. E. Beavis — An Appreciation	16	322 Mar
The Nature and Consequence of the Relationship between the Regular and Reserve Soldier	8	321 Feb
The Role of Guerrilla Warfare in the Defence of Continental Australia	5	327 Aug
The Yom Kippur War — In Retrospect Part I — Operations	31	323 Apr
Part II — Technology	15	324 May
Women in the Services: A Majority View	43	321 Feb

Part 2 — SUBJECT INDEX

TITLE	PAGE	ISSUE
ANIMALS		
Away with the Birds	5	326 Jul
ARMY JOURNAL		
Birth of the Army Journal	5	329 Oct
The Continuing Story of the Army Journal	9	329 Oct
ARMY RESERVE see CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES		
ARMY WOMEN		
The Fat Canary — A Unique Leadership Challenge	28	325 Jun
Women in the Services — A Majority View	43	321 Feb
ARTILLERY		
Air Defence Artillery	45	324 May
Command and Control of Artillery	34	327 Aug
Let's Start Using Our Guns Again	15	326 Jul
Self-Propelled Guns or Towed Guns	34	329 Oct
ASIA		
Asia — The Dynamics of a New Order	55	323 Apr
BIOGRAPHICAL		
Alexander and Eisenhower: Their Career Lines of Ascent	5	325 Jun
The Late Major-General L. E. Beavis — An Appreciation	16	322 Mar
BOOK REVIEWS see TITLE INDEX		
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF		
Foreword to the Final Issue by the Chief of the General Staff	3	329 Oct
CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES		
The Canadian Militia	44	329 Oct
The Nature and Consequence of the Relationship between the Regular and Reserve Soldier	8	321 Feb
COMMUNICATION		
The Improvement of Management Skills Written and Verbal Communication	51	327 Aug
Files	14	326 Jul
DEFENCE		
Australia's Immediate Post-Federation Military Forces	29	328 Sep
Defence Procurement Primer	27	321 Feb
Defence Policy Making in Australia	4	323 Apr

TITLE	PAGE	ISSUE
Oil Supply and National Security	5	328 Sep
The Australian Defence Forces: Their Peace-time Roles — A Young Officer's Experience	45	323 Apr
The Changing Challenge of our Defence Force	5	324 May
The Defence of Port Phillip Bay in 1858	39	327 Aug
The Role of Guerrilla Warfare in the Defence of Continental Australia	5	327 Aug
ECONOMIC WARFARE		
Oil Supply and National Security	5	328 Sep
GOVERNOR-GENERAL		
An Address by His Excellency The Honourable Sir John Kerr, AC, KCMG, KStJ, QC Governor-General of Australia	5	321 Feb
GUERRILLA WARFARE		
Grassroot and Main Causes of Insurgency	27	320 Jan
Riot, Resistance and Revolution	47	328 Sep
The Role of Guerrilla Warfare in the Defence of Continental Australia	5	327 Aug
INFANTRY		
Exercise Winter Sun — Training in Canada	51	326 Jul
The Hearing Damage Risk to Passengers in an M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier	40	326 Jul
LEADERSHIP		
Liberty and Discipline	29	329 Oct
The Fat Canary — A Unique Leadership Challenge	28	325 Jun
LOGISTICS		
Logistics can be Logical — Maintenance Areas, Operating Stocks and Reserves	23	325 Jun
Oil Supply and National Security	5	328 Sep
The Yom Kippur War — In Retrospect Part II — Technology	15	324 May
MILITARY HISTORY		
Alexander and Eisenhower: Their Career Lines of Ascent	5	325 Jun
Australia's Immediate Post-Federation Military Forces	29	328 Sep
Foreword to "The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion AIF"	50	325 Jun
For Exceptional Gallantry	28	328 Sep
Japanese Aims and Actions in the Pacific War December 1941-August 1942	17	323 Apr
Lexington and Concord	11	329 Oct
Riot, Resistance and Revolution	47	328 Sep

TITLE	PAGE	ISSUE
Some Aspects of the Anglo-Maori Wars	29	322 Mar
The Chrysanthemum that Broke the Sword	19	320 Jan
The Defence of Port Phillip Bay in 1858	39	327 Aug
The Establishment of the Royal Military College of Australia	25	326 Jul
The Late Major-General L. E. Beavis — An Appreciation	16	322 Mar
The Yom Kippur War — In Retrospect		
Part I — Operations	31	323 Apr
Part II — Technology	15	324 May
MILITARY PLANNING		
Defence Policy Making in Australia	4	323 Apr
Equipment Management Policy	5	322 Mar
MORALE		
Marihuana	23	321 Feb
Mental and Physical Fitness — A Necessity or a Luxury?	49	322 Mar
OPERATIONS		
The Yom Kippur War — In Retrospect		
Part I — Operations	31	323 Apr
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY		
The Army at Sea	43	320 Jan
STRATEGY		
Defence Policy Making in Australia	4	323 Apr
New Warfare Concepts for the Industrial Society	20	326 Jul
Oil Supply and National Security	5	328 Aug
Principles of War as Methodology	20	326 Jul
TACTICS		
Command and Control of Artillery	34	327 Aug
Let's Start Using Our Guns Again	15	326 Jul
The First Battle of the Next War	33	321 Feb
The Yom Kippur War — In Retrospect		
Part I — Operations	31	323 Apr
TECHNOLOGY		
The Hearing Damage Risk to Passengers in an M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier	40	326 Jul
The Yom Kippur War — In Retrospect		
Part II — Technology	15	324 May
TRAINING		
A Systems Approach to Training	4	320 Jan
Exercise Winter Sun — Training in Canada	51	326 Jul

NAME	PAGE	ISSUE
MANLEY, Lieutenant Colonel R. D.	17	323 Apr
MOOIBROEK, Sergeant F.	23	321 Feb
MORRISON, Major W. A.	44	329 Oct
NORTON, Brigadier P. J.	15	326 Jul
NORTON, Brigadier P. J.	34	327 Aug
O'NEILL, Captain M. D.	8	321 Feb
OVERSTEAD, Lieutenant Colonel D. R.	27	320 Jan
PAYNE, Sergeant R.	49	322 Mar
PEDERICK, Wing Commander F. O.	27	321 Feb
PERRY, Major Warren	16	322 Mar
PERRY, Major Warren	29	328 Sep
PHILLIPS, Lieutenant Colonel P. R.	47	328 Sep
PLUMMER, Lieutenant Colonel T. F. Jnr	4	320 Jan
SELWAY, Sergeant N. C.	28	328 Sep
SENDEN, Lieutenant Colonel T. H.	14	326 Jul
SLIM, <i>Field Marshal Sir William</i>	29	329 Oct
SMITH, Captain M. G.	45	323 Apr
STARRY, Major General Donn A.	33	321 Feb
STUDHOLME, Corporal R. A.	40	326 Jul
SYNNOT, Rear Admiral A. M.	5	324 May
TANGE, Sir Arthur	4	323 Apr
THYER, Brigadier J. H.	50	325 Jun
VIKSNE, Lieutenant Colonel J.	31	323 Apr
VIKSNE, Lieutenant Colonel J.	15	324 May
WALBECK, Lieutenant Colonel Carl D.	31	325 Jun

Part 3—AUTHOR INDEX

NAME	PAGE	ISSUE
BALL, Lieutenant Colonel M. J.	5	328 Sep
BYRNE, Major D. L.	49	322 Mar
DAR, Brigadier E. H.	20	326 Jul
ESMONDE, Major E. P.	45	324 May
FISHBURN, Mr John F.	29	322 Mar
GOWER, Lieutenant Colonel S. N.	34	329 Oct
GRACO, Captain W. J.	5	325 Jun
GREGSON, Captain L. J.	28	325 Jun
GUY, Doctor T. B.	40	326 Jul
HORNER, Captain S. I.	43	321 Feb
HOWE, Captain A. J.	51	327 Aug
HULSE, Major G. L.	5	326 Jul
JANS, Major N. A.	4	320 Jan
JEANS, Major J.	43	320 Jan
JONES, Lieutenant C. A.	39	327 Aug
KEOGH, Colonel E. G.	5	329 Oct
KERR, Sir John	5	321 Feb
KITNEY, Mr P. H.	25	326 Jul
KITNEY, Mr P. H.	11	329 Oct
LETTS, Major R. D.	51	326 Jul
LONGHURST, Lieutenant A. H.	55	323 Apr
LOUGHTON, Lieutenant Colonel G. J.	23	325 Jun
McCULLAGH, Major S. F.	5	327 Aug
MacDONALD, Lieutenant General A. L.	3	329 Oct
McDONALD, Lieutenant Colonel J. A.	5	322 Mar
MANLEY, Lieutenant Colonel R. D.	19	320 Jan