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
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ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 322, March 1976

Contents

Editorial	3
Equipment Management Policy <i>Lieutenant Colonel J. A. McDonald, MIE Aust</i>	5
The Late Major-General L. E. Beavis — An Appreciation <i>Major Warren Perry, R.L.</i>	16
Some Aspects of the Anglo-Maori Wars <i>John F. Fishburn</i>	29
Mental and Physical Fitness — A Necessity or a Luxury? <i>Major D. L. Byrne and Sergeant R. Payne</i>	49
Book Review	59
Letter to the Editor	62

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
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(Army Public Relations)

A Fire Support Vehicle of 4 Cavalry Regiment taking part in Exercise Iron Man in the Singleton Area of New South Wales,



EDITORIAL

THE loss of innocent lives in the current wave of kidnappings, hijacks and bombings is a reminder of the sickness of world politics. Whether boarding an aircraft or train, shopping or taking the dog for a walk, dining in a restaurant or working in a shop or office, no one in any part of the world can be absolutely sure that he will not be the victim of an insane killer, espousing a cause in which he has little knowledge or interest.

It is difficult to understand what these terrorists think they will gain from such outrages. The twentieth century has emphasized what has always been apparent — that people tend to come together and forget their petty differences when faced with a common danger. The bombings of Warsaw, London, Berlin and Hanoi only forged their populations' resolve to "see it through."

Governments are faced with a delicate situation when dealing with such incidents, particularly where foreign nationals are involved. Precipitous action could cause unnecessary death and injury amongst both the hostages and the Security Forces. Giving in to terrorists' demands could lead to further outrages, if it were felt that easy pickings were there for the taking.

Military forces have been used, and because of their specialist skills and equipment, will continue to be used. The spectacle of a London "Bobbie", helmet and all, in the turret of a Scorpion at Heathrow is something not easily forgotten. But it is, in the main, the Police Forces themselves on whom the burden of responsibility for action must fall. In this they need the co-operation and sympathy of the whole community.

It is to be hoped that minority groups will be discouraged, by resolute action by the Security Forces, and by the attitude of the Public, as reflected in the Media, from proceeding with such tactics. Then, perhaps, the acts of the terrorists of the 1970s will fade from the world scene as completely as did those of the Anarchists at the turn of the century. ✂

* * * *

People in Authority

Social and industrial progress is impossible where there is no one in authority. There must be someone in control of an operation if anything useful or distinguished is to get done.

“Authority” means having power to judge and act, to issue instructions and enforce obedience. These are not qualities that are found in committees, but in strong personalities.

A committee, the almost universal sanctuary of people who do not want to become personally involved in a proposed action, can explore and deplore, but if anything is to be done the job is handed to a person in authority. T. B. Macaulay, statesman, poet, historian and author, wrote: “Many an army has prospered under a bad commander, but no army has ever prospered under a debating society.”

The Royal Bank of Canada Monthly Newsletter, March 1975.

Equipment Management Policy

*Lieutenant Colonel J. A. McDonald; MIE Aust
Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers*

INTRODUCTION

THE generation, promulgation, implementation and variation of Equipment Management Policy is of considerable current interest to Logistic Command staffs and unit officers, as well as to Army Office staffs and other functional command elements. The activities encompassed are wide ranging, and dealt with in so many separate areas of activity that it is difficult to perceive and assimilate the central underlying themes.

At one extreme, the more philosophical level, management manual concepts tend to be quoted without necessarily establishing the link with the particular area under consideration. At another level, complex and minutely detailed administrative procedures, involving different interested parties are published, particularly in the field of new equipment provision.

Individual decisions about particular equipment problems continue to be made, and constitute most of the daily work of the technical directorates and Logistic Command divisions. To some extent, the individual detailed procedures used are jointly prepared and influenced by the people responsible for their implementation, but there is no available forum for adequately considering the important "middle level policy basis" in terms of the general management theory concepts needed to provide the underlying base for these detailed procedures.

Following service as an Army Apprentice, Lieutenant Colonel McDonald graduated from the First OCS Portsea course in 1952. After serving in W Comd Wksp and 17 NS Trg Bn he completed a Diploma in Mechanical Engineering course at Perth Technical College in 1959. He served at Townsville as the EME NQ Area in 1960, and in Wewak, New Guinea as OC LAD with 24 Const Sqn in 1962. From 1962 until 1964 he served in Bangkok, Thailand as a Project Officer with the Military Technical Training School and Base Vehicle Rebuild Workshop, and from 1964 until 1968 at DEME, MGO Branch, AHQ, as Staff Officer Equipment Entitlements. In 1968 he was posted to SVN as DADEME HQ AFV. In 1970 he served as CO N Comd Wksp, and in 1971 was posted on exchange to 43 Comd Wksp, REME Aldershot, UK as Production Manager. Since returning from UK he has been SO1 Mechanical Engineering EME Div, HQ Log Comd.

Some discontent is evident among staffs concerned, some of it inevitably and unavoidably arising from the reorganisation effects, but notwithstanding, some of it also because of concern that individual efforts do not result in meaningful activity. It is the intention of this paper to discuss the provision of a rational framework on which to formulate *Equipment Management Policy*, bring to notice areas where effort should be applied and propose specific solutions to some individual aspects of interest to the author.

MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

Modern management theory is light on in determining organisational objectives. Perhaps logically, whilst giving examples and stressing the importance of having organisational objectives, it gives only guidance in the selection of factors for possible consideration rather than answers and then proceeds to discuss the mechanical problem solving techniques, generally applicable however, to numeric type solutions only. However, if a logical basis for consideration of an Army Equipment Management system is to be established, then some assumption of Army objectives is required.

Defence forces exist in peace time in order to provide credibility to national Foreign Policy, i.e. their availability in war and, therefore possible use, is believable. The Regular Army may be used for civil emergency action, but it would not be seriously argued that its organisation or procedures should be tailored to meet this contingency at the expense of its primary objective.

Army Objectives

If it is accepted that the Army's task in peace time is to maintain itself in readiness for war, then the following organisational objectives may be postulated:

- a. Retention of a trained force able to be committed in sufficient strength to cover the period between the start of the war and the provision of land forces large enough to achieve the national aim.
- b. Possession of sufficient equipment to cover the period between the start of the war and its further provision in sufficient quantity to match the end user's needs.

- c. Retention of the capability to provide the necessary people and materiel items to meet this required expansion when needed.
- d. Retention of the philosophy of continued development of procedures, training, equipments and likely threat assessments such as to be able to "freeze" activity at any time when required to do so, but yet remain reasonably effective to meet the specific requirement presented.
- e. Achieve the above objectives in as efficient and therefore, economical manner as possible in order to require the minimum allocation of national resources in both peace and war situations.

EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVE

The aim of equipment management is to provide to the user the right type of "in-service" equipment in the right quantity and condition to meet his needs in as economical a manner as possible. The process is conveniently divided into the areas of:

- a. equipment provision,
- b. in-service management, and
- c. disposal/replacement aspects.

Equipment Provision

Equipment provision brings together consideration of the definition of need, equipment quantity, financial effects, availability and condition of in-service functionally equivalent equipment and the necessity or otherwise for fleet rationalisation.

Generally, in an imperfect world, equipment provision is adequately provided for in terms of requirement definition, prime costing and financial programming. Procedures have been established that should ensure that the Army gets what it requires in terms of equipment type. Improvement is still required however, in ensuring that the required use factors are correctly stated, rather than listing the capabilities of known hardware, still a characteristic of much user input.

In this area, no amount of detailed procedure or committee referral can take the place of old-fashioned intuitive thinking. This is hard to come by in any organisation, but it can be fostered by providing the

best possible environment for its generation, particularly in allowing sufficient time for an experienced staff to investigate and discuss with user directorates and units actual, as against stated, requirements. Two facets in particular need attention, that of statements concerning equipment reliability (or in user terms predicted availability), and freeing from this procedure commercial or developed equipments not significant to the field operation of the Army.

Reliability

Reliability statements are included at present in our specification documents. We do not have any system for determining how equipment or equipment systems perform in practice, and this in turn means that relevant predictions on the quantity required and the expected performance to the user are unknown. No rational yardstick is, therefore, available to determine the efficiency of the logistic elements, nor to indicate degradation of equipment with age. If reliability was factually based for Australian Army conditions, then users could usefully consider unit quantities required based on the predicted statistical availability and thus provide the basis for the provision of unit pool or supply depot pool equipments.

Commercial Equipments

At present, non-warlike and commercial equipments not required for field use are provided far more simply than are the more important classes, the selection being made in terms of both end use and financial expenditure. However, the generally accepted feeling for the need for standardisation should not be allowed to automatically influence the decision towards a central procurement system in these cases, unless economics of scale or administrative convenience can be shown to be worth while. Whether we like it or not, most equipment is bought on our behalf by the Purchasing Commission and this provides adequate safeguards against the more direct cases of procurement anomaly. There is no reason why a static workshop unit should not be able to specify and buy a replacement major machine tool without seeking Logistic Command or Army approval, provided financial budgeting and policy limits were constituted and available as a framework to operate within. Surely the rather conservative feeling that has tended to pervade our activities in peace time should be relaxed in order to allow for individual errors in judgement that will continue to occur from time

to time, without generally withdrawing the decision-making capacity from the lower management levels as has tended to happen in the past. Individual development requires that junior managers be given opportunities early to make their own decisions and it is naive to expect that they will always be the "safe" ones. All the expected benefits of decentralisation would accrue, in that the administrative and provisioning delays necessitated by centralisation would be eliminated and the manager responsible for operation, (the commanding officer of the unit) would be given a little more authority in his legitimate operating area. Not only would replacement activity here become more economical, since units would be able themselves to delay replacement versus repair decisions until economically justified, but it would also remove one small area of activity from central staffs such as Supply and EME, as well as improving the job satisfaction of unit officers concerned.

To develop the idea of decentralisation of decision-making further, it is possible to consider this process applying even to major equipments where either quantity required or use does not demand the full application of the field support procedures.

The Army is a hierarchical organisation both by traditional development and arguably, by necessity. Most middle-aged officers serving here developed from these, by present civilian standards, conservative backgrounds. It would be imprudent to attempt to radically alter this situation by any other than evolutionary means, and at least as far as the field force environment is concerned, possibly unwise in any case. It is difficult to imagine a tired, wet and hungry soldier crawling out of his sleeping-bag in the middle of the night to stand sentry duty without some autocratic framework, and it is equally hard to imagine a Task Force Orders Group being efficiently run in a truly democratic manner even in the Chinese People's Army.

Nevertheless, the field component represents the smaller part of the Army in peace time; even in war time the higher logistic echelons will continue to absorb a significant proportion of the war effort and in the effect of its decisions, influence the provision of the majority of the physical non-human resources needed. What is proposed is recognition that there is a need for differing management concepts in the higher level equipment management fields to that of the control of field units in operations. At the one end, in peace time, traditional management approaches could be used to advantage to provide economical solutions

to the extent possible throughout the Army, whilst recognising that application to field conditions may be inappropriate in war or training.

Having said this, and returning to the theme of equipment procurement, mention is necessary of the role of Supply and its primary offspring the Central Army Supply Agency. The Army needs and buys a large and diverse array of equipment items and manages one of the largest inventories within Australia. It is a very professional and within its field, expert entity, and it is a visible measure of this expertise that so few errors become apparent in spite of the quite arbitrary and whimsical restraints that are applied to its activities from time to time.

However, without in any way detracting from this it is surely open to argument that all equipment bought in peace time needs to be subjected to the full gamut of support planning, including cataloguing and spares assessment not to mention repair planning, before an equipment can be issued to a user. Whilst we have had our share of equipment problems in the past whenever we have tried to adopt this short-cut method, it is still difficult to believe that one replacement tractor bought under a decentralised system could not be supported using commercial documentation and back up support when other factors of relative economy, fleet standardisation or bulk buying permit.

At the other extreme we are still loathe to adequately provide for the necessary prior technical investigations needed to support purely Army equipments bought overseas. Perhaps less emphasis on the Australian-bought commercial equipments and more on the non-commercial type would be of benefit and more cost effective in the equipment management field.

National Source of Equipment

In line with the Army objectives stated on pages 6 and 7, it is reasonable to state that the provision of further equipment once war has started is more assured if its national origin is Australian rather than from an overseas source. The practical expression of this is, of course, inherent in the existence of the Department of Industry and Commerce, and in Ministerial statements to Army about utilising Australian industry. The fact remains however, that few of our prime equipments are manufactured in Australia and those that are, are generally derivatives of commercial pattern ones, e.g. vehicles.

The reasons are generally that the economic costs of development or order size, lead to reluctance on the part of both the manufacturers and the Army to provide warlike equipments within Australia. Whilst part of the blame may be laid at Army's door, in that equipment requirements are not specified early enough (i.e. perhaps five to ten years ahead), it is unrealistic not to also accept that manufacturing industry, both government and private, has been equally shortsighted in their handling and acceptance of Army requirements. Even government factories do not appear in practice to be willing to attempt to treat Army as a customer, by offering better service than is available from other sources, but frequently seem to want to change our stated requirements to those that they feel better equipped to provide. However, since it is the Army's objective to ensure that a basis for rapid equipment provision exists, not industries, then we must genuinely attempt to improve our record in this regard, and overcome the inbred feeling that the best equipments can only be acquired from other countries. Perhaps an Australian answer can be developed, unique and suitable for our size and industrial base, along the lines of tasking a manufacturer to propose an equipment solution to a requirements study rather than attempting to design an equipment from within our own resources.

Further, by upgrading and concentrating on our definition of requirements it is possible that some of the merely desirable equipment attributes that we often tend to specify because they are incorporated in an existing overseas equipment may be dispensed with, with a consequent reduction in complexity.

Surely we must invest money in the future regardless of how limited our resources are if we are not to be caught out at our time of greatest need. Physical stockpiling is an expensive and less desirable alternative, and the theoretical basis of war usage and reserve calculations should take into account the country of origin to reflect the cost penalty of overseas procurement.

However, if we are to allow for the existing situation, then the need will continue to exist for maintenance buys of spare parts for the support of equipments of overseas origin. This is often the determining factor in our decisions to replace an equipment, because generally our inventory is small in numbers compared to that of the manufacturing companies' own country Army, and insufficient to induce the manufacturer to continue spares production once the bigger customers have ceased to use the equipment.

This is one area where the government factories should be looking for orders, since we often obtain manufacturing data as part of our initial procurement, and may, if we required it, also negotiate manufacturing rights once the prime manufacturer has ceased production. Perhaps more direct contact between manufacturing industry and the technical directorates would lead to more activity in this field, rather than relying on edicts from above to achieve viable operations.

Finally a note of caution: However good our management system, it is still unlikely that our actual hardware problems associated with new equipment provision will disappear. It is still very much a case of "green fields" in the tendency of the uninitiated to compare our own known problems with commercial users based on the assumption that somehow, their equipments do not suffer from the same defects.

IN-SERVICE MANAGEMENT

In-service management is concerned primarily with ensuring that a user's needs for equipments are met by in-service equipments. Obviously, satisfaction or otherwise with equipment performance will have an effect on the equipment procurement cycle, both in terms of timing and in providing data against which future needs can be evaluated. The need for equipment reliability information has been mentioned; however, operating information is equally necessary if any form of effective management is to be undertaken. Starting at unit level, reliability, state, quantity, predicted maintenance arisings and inherent failure to meet reasonable user requirements are also required to provide the basis of a management system. Collation of this fundamental data at each controlling HQ is required at each level up to and including Department of Defence, and its provision must be on a routine basis to allow for normal limits to be established.

Whilst the same basic information will be interpreted and used by differing elements for their own purposes, it is logical that a common acceptance of the parameters to be reported upon be fixed centrally, if operating elements are to be spared an undue burden in its provision. At present, this facet is receiving attention in connection with individual directorate and corps EDP system requirements, but a major study is required to ascertain these parameters before proceeding to EDP system detail.

Costing

A further fundamental area requiring attention is that of operating costs. Because, again referring to Army objectives, we are obligated to consider the costs of our equipment management decisions then it is necessary that a reasonable basis be available for determining them. Ideally, our organisational groups at least down to unit and possibly to sub-unit level, should have available cost information to parallel other equipment management information. Providing this systematically allows for the development of a budgetary type of activity and possibly in the future, to a realistic determination of alternatives outside the present artificial constraints, then its provision should be more than justified. Too often uneconomic solutions are adopted because actual specific expenditure is incurred rather than overall expenditure, i.e. using an Army vehicle uneconomically rather than civilian transport because the travel vote is short, or spending more to repair an equipment than is economically justified rather than buying a new one, as no replacement is available.

To say that a major study is required in this area is trite. What is required is a new role for the Secretary's Branch, to provide this costing basis and preferably operate it, in order to guarantee its authenticity all the way up to Defence and Treasury level, as well as to obviate the necessity for operating elements to be burdened with more administrative load. The traditional countersigning role and the tendency to exert authority without responsibility undertaken by Secretary's Branch is no longer relevant if responsible management is to become a reality within the Army, and a more positive function of assisting Army managers to both determine and utilise more economic solutions should be adopted. More management accountants in the field and fewer internal auditors at HQ should be the aim.

Finally, provision of rational information and an auditable costing basis is of itself only warranted if it provides a more economical and better utilisation of resources, i.e. if positive benefits accrue from its use by senior managers.

To recapitulate, the projected equipment management functions now being considered for the Army Repair Committee or its replacement should include resource determinations based on better informed predictions of equipment reliability, repair arisings for both Military District and Logistic Command programmes, equipment replacement factors, actual costs and Army priorities.

EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT

Equipment Replacement Policy is a necessary and related function of both new equipment provision and in-service equipment usefulness. Obviously, decisions in this area will have a marked effect in both those preceding areas, and the details of the actual phasing out of particular equipment types must be adjusted to the circumstances pertaining once the policy basis has been determined. However, whilst the policy basis needs to be influenced by user needs in the sense that a functionally newer equipment type may render obsolete the existing in-service equipment, most equipments are replaced on the basis of age, reliability and consequent usefulness, or on economic grounds.

A rational economic basis is now available for determining equipment replacement criteria which while variable in its mechanics, basically determines the point in an equipment's life cycle where the cost of ownership is at a minimum. Its use in practice is dependent upon the availability of in-service operating cost data, and the feasibility of purchasing a replacement equipment. Nevertheless, it appears to be the philosophical basis now used by the USA, UK and Canadian Armies and should be adopted by Australia. Again this is an area where further study could usefully be done, to determine if the relative merits of buying reserve equipments can be economically compared with the necessity for undertaking base repair activities.

SUMMARY

In summary then, this paper envisages:

- a. *Decentralised Authority and Accountability.* Decentralisation to unit commanders of authority over equipment procurement unless centralisation can be shown to be genuinely more economical, and implementation of a budgeting and financial accountability base in conjunction with the provision of a Secretary's Branch costing system.
- b. *Provision of a Secretary's Branch Costing System.* Give to Secretary's Branch the responsibility for devising and implementing a costing type framework to units, HQ and Central Offices in order to assist responsible managers to make decisions with the knowledge of the economic implications of alternatives.

- c. *Improved Statements of Equipment Requirements.* Place more emphasis on investigations into equipment requirements, including provision of operating type reliability data, and less on selection of hardware as a starting point.
- d. *Improved Australian Provision.* Provide a more meaningful opportunity for Australian industrial provision, by allowing for participation in determining an equipment solution rather than by designing equipments ourselves or asking for manufacture of overseas designs.
- e. *The Determination and Implementation of an Information System.* Determine the parameters required for an Equipment Management Information System for Army-wide use.
- f. *An Equipment Replacement Policy.* Adopt an economic repair and replacement policy in conjunction with better and longer range equipment planning predictions.

Conclusion

Finally, providing a rational data base and decentralising real decision-making will of itself achieve little unless the corresponding "open style" of management is adopted. A system binds not only the lower levels of decision-makers, but also those at the top, since it generates the need for providing policy parameters rather than ruling individually on cases referred up the levels of authority. Traditionally, it is fair to say that the Armed Services have tended to be in the forefront of enlightened management practices in the personnel field but this may not be the situation in the equipment management field now or in the future.

We need less of the philosophy of saying "Army's electric light bill is too large, everybody save electricity", and more of the system where the unit commander, knowing his electricity costs, achieves provable economies because he is aware that this activity is a legitimate and necessary part of his command function. Finally introducing economical cost considerations into the decision-making process does not mean that the cheapest solution needs to be adopted — rather, that the additional cost for selecting any other solution can be compared against the benefits to be obtained. ☞



The Late Major-General L.E. Beavis —an appreciation

MAJOR-GENERAL LESLIE ELLIS BEAVIS
CB, CBE, DSO, psc. pac. (1895-1975)
The Master-General of the Ordnance, 1942-46

Major Warren Perry, R.L.

IN analysing persons of a certain group Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer once said: "They think rarely of what is right in the abstract: they do usually what is best at the moment. They never play the greatest part among their contemporaries: they almost always play a great one: and (they) . . . generally retain considerable importance, even during the most changeful circumstances, and most commonly preserve in retirement . . . much of the consideration they acquired in power." This analysis fits admirably the character and achievements of the late Major-General Leslie Ellis Beavis,¹ a distinguished wartime Master-General of the Ordnance, who died at Heidelberg in Victoria on Saturday 27 September 1975, aged 80 years.

Les Beavis, the name by which he was known among his friends, was born at Bathurst, 145 miles west of Sydney, on 25 January 1895. It was six years before Federation; it was a time when the military forces of the Colony of New South Wales had fallen into a state of neglect and inefficiency; and, in 1893, Major-General E. T. H. Hutton, as he then was, had been brought out from England to command, re-organize and re-vitalize them. Beavis began his military career in Bathurst as a school cadet. There, on one occasion, after having won a prize for rifle shooting, he was presented to the visiting District

Major E. W. O. Perry, ED, MA, B.Ec. Editor of the Victorian Historical Journal. Major Perry has written several articles for the Army Journal the latest appearing in the September 1975 edition.

Commandant, Brigadier-General J. M. Gordon. On another occasion he was selected to join the New South Wales Contingent of Cadets which went to England to take part in the ceremonies connected with the Coronation of King George V.

Under the command of Major G. W. Wynne the Contingent marched from Victoria Barracks at Paddington through the City of Sydney to the place of embarkation. From there the Contingent sailed, on Friday afternoon 21 April 1911, in the *Themistocles* for London via South Africa. When it reached Durban on 21 May 1911, the Government of the Union of South Africa arranged for the cadets to visit battlefields of the South African War of 1899-1902, including Colenso and Ladysmith. This was a stimulating experience for Cadet Beavis. The Contingent reached London on 15 June 1911; it was met on arrival at Fenchurch St. Station by the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator G. F. Pearce; and it was encamped in the grounds of the Crystal Palace at Sydenham.

King George V was crowned in Westminster Abbey a week later, on Thursday 22 June 1911. On that day Cadet Beavis's Contingent was on street-lining duty opposite the entrance to Buckingham Palace and, on the following day, it was on a similar duty at Westminster Bridge. On Wednesday 28 June 1911 a team from the New South Wales Contingent of Cadets distinguished itself at Bisley where it won a cup in a competition open to all cadets of the Empire. On a third occasion, on Friday 30 June 1911, this Contingent provided a guard of honour for King George V when he visited a children's fete at the Crystal Palace. Another one of the highlights of Cadet Beavis' visit to England on this occasion was a lecture to the cadets from New South Wales by Lieutenant-General The Earl of Dundonald about his experiences in the South African War of 1899-1902.

Beavis' Contingent sailed from London on Saturday 2 September 1911 in the *Demosthenes* for home and again via South Africa. The cadets landed in Sydney, after an absence of six months, on Saturday morning 14 October 1911. From the ship they marched through the City of Sydney to Victoria Barracks at Paddington where they were welcomed home by the District Commandant, Brigadier-General Gordon. For this bloodless campaign, Cadet Beavis and his fellow cadets of the Contingent

¹ Major General Leslie Ellis Beavis, CB (1952), CBE (1942), DSO (1918), psc (1930), pac (1921), mid. An Artillery officer of the Australian Staff Corps. Born 25 Jan., 1895. MGO from 6 Apr., 1942 to 1 Dec., 1946. Died 27 Sep., 1975.

were, in November 1911, invested with King George V Coronation Medals at Government House in Sydney by the Governor-General, Lord Denman.

Two years later, at the age of 18 years, Beavis became a cadet of a more professional kind. On Monday 10 March 1913 he entered, as a staff-cadet, the Royal Military College at Duntroon, then commanded by Brigadier-General W. T. Bridges. Other members of this "Third Class", who afterwards attained distinction in various capacities included the future Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, Lieutenant-General Sir William Bridgeford, Major-General E. J. Milford, Major-General G. A. Vasey, the two Chapman brothers — Major-General John A. Chapman and Colonel James A. Chapman — Brigadier J. H. Crombie, Brigadier I. G. Fullarton and Brigadier R. M. "Wingy" Thompson.

Beavis' course at the College was outstanding. He was one of the five cadets of his class in 1913, 1914 and again in 1915 who was classified as "most distinguished academically"; and he attained the rank of sergeant. The course of the "Third Class", because of the war, was shortened. The first three places on graduation on the 28 June 1915 were won by L. E. Beavis, A.T. Hatton (k.i.a.) and F. V. Brown of N.Z. (k.i.a.). Beavis was also one of the twelve Australian graduates allotted to the Artillery.

Beavis was commissioned in the Permanent Military Forces on 29 June 1915 with the rank of lieutenant. Then, on 1 July 1915, he was seconded to the A.I.F. and posted to the A.F.A. On 18 November 1915 he sailed from Sydney in the *Persic* for Egypt. He would have arrived in Egypt about the time of the return there of the A.I.F. from the Gallipoli campaign in which one of his brothers had been killed as an infantry captain.

Beavis was the Adjutant of the 5th Field Artillery Brigade for a short time from March 1916 to May 1916. During that time Lieutenant-Colonel (later Major-General) H. W. "Bertie" Lloyd — a versatile personality renowned for his dash and efficiency and his love for "spit and polish" — assumed command. By September 1917 Beavis had attained the rank of major in the A.I.F. and that was, according to regulations then in operation, the "ceiling" for "Duntroon" graduates. When the "Cease fire!" sounded on the Western Front in November 1918 he was serving regimentally as O.C., the 53rd Field Battery of the 14th Brigade, A.F.A. and he had been decorated with the D.S.O.

In 1919 Major Beavis did not return to Australia as many of his brother officers did. Instead he entered the Ordnance College, then located at Woolwich, in February 1919 for the 20th Ordnance Course of twelve months duration. During that time, on 12 August 1919 at All Souls Church at Hampstead in North London, he and Miss Ethel Blumer of Hunter's Hill in Sydney, were married. His course finished in February 1920. It was followed by another course in Woolwich at the Artillery College at Red Barracks where he attended the 37th Advanced Class. This course was also of twelve months duration and it terminated in March 1921 when he gained the symbol "p.a.c." after his name.

Major Beavis's next posting was also in London. It was to the Australian High Commission as a Staff Officer and he held this appointment from April 1921 to January 1922. Mr Andrew Fisher relinquished the High Commissionership officially in April 1921. Then in November 1921 he was succeeded by Sir Joseph Cook.

Major Beavis returned to Australia, probably early in 1922, for the first time since he had sailed from Sydney in November 1915 for Egypt. After a twelve months tour of regimental duty with the R.A.G.A. in the 2nd Military District he took up duty on the Base Commandant's staff in that district as an I.O.O. — a post he held officially from March 1923 to November 1928. During this time he served under three Base Commandants with widely different personalities — Major-General C. H. Brand, Major-General Sir Julius Bruche and Major-General T. H. Dodds.

Again Major Beavis returned to England for further higher training. He attended the Staff College at Camberley during the years 1929 and 1930 when its Commandant was Major-General Sir C. W. Gwynn who had been Duntroon's original Director of Military Art and who was still in that post when Beavis joined the College in 1913. After completing his course at the Staff College, which terminated on 21 December 1930 and gaining the symbol "p.s.c. with dagger" after his name, Major Beavis remained in England. But this time he remained as an *Exchange Officer* with a posting to the Imperial General Staff at the War Office in London where the CIGS from 1926 to 1933, was Field Marshal Lord Milne. There, from January 1931 to December 1932, Beavis gained valuable experience in the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence as a GSO (2).

Then Major Beavis returned to duty once more at the Australian High Commission in London where Mr S. M. (later Viscount) Bruce had in September 1932 begun his 23-year tour of duty as High Commissioner. There, from January 1933 to June 1933, Major Beavis was the Australian High Commission's Junior Military Representative; and from June 1933 to January 1936, he was its Military Liaison Officer. It was during this latter posting that he was granted, in July 1935, the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel.

Lieutenant-Colonel Beavis' next posting took him back to Australia. There, from April 1936 to April 1937, he was Chairman of the Defence Resources Board in the Department of Defence. The Permanent Head of the Department of Defence at that time was Mr Malcolm Lindsay Shepherd. But this posting soon turned out to be an unhappy one. He clashed over policy matters with the Controller-General of Munitions Supply, Mr A. E. Leighton, who was also the Chairman of the Principal Supply Officers' Committee. Leighton was indeed, at that time, a powerful official. An outline of the main facts in this clash will be found in Professor D. P. Mellor's *The Role of Science and Industry* — a volume of the official history of Australia in the War of 1939-45. Beavis was recalled from this post in April 1937 to field duty in the Australian Army. From April 1937 to September 1937 he was Brigade-Major of the 2nd Infantry Brigade in Melbourne.

In October 1937 Beavis went to the Adjutant-General's Branch at Army Headquarters in Melbourne where, at that time, the Adjutant-General was Major-General Sir C. H. Jess. His posting there was that of D.A.A.G. for Personal Services and his Director was Colonel (later Major-General) R. E. Jackson. This was the only "A" staff appointment that Beavis ever held and he relinquished it in August 1938.

In March 1938 Colonel V. A. H. Sturdee became the Australian General Staff's first Director of Staff Duties. Later in that year, in September 1938 and in succession to Major H. F. H. Durant, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Beavis was posted to that Directorate as a GSO(I). The War of 1939-45 began on 3 September 1939. Then, in November 1939 and with the rank of colonel, Beavis succeeded Sturdee as Director of Staff Duties. But he only remained in this important and demanding post for the next five months.

On 4 April 1940 Colonel Beavis was seconded to the A.I.F. and appointed ADOS, Headquarters, 1 Australian Corps which was then

commanded by Lieutenant-General Blamey of whom Beavis said: "I had the greatest admiration and respect for him as a commander. He had his shortcomings. Aspects of his personality caused some of the personal clashes in which he became involved; and he manifested a degree of ruthlessness when he felt sure he was right. These qualities, combined with an incisive manner and an apparent brusqueness which was sometimes intentional were facets of a Churchillian strength of character. This character, reinforced by judgments of clarity and wisdom, enabled him to stand firm in a crisis irrespective of whatever praise or odium he received." (*Stand-To*, Jan-Feb., 1964).

After serving in the A.I.F. for seven months Beavis became, in November 1940, DDOS of the A.I.F. in the Middle East. Then, in December 1940, he became Director of Ordnance Services of the A.I.F. in the Middle East. He had obviously succeeded in the previous postings he had been given. Writing of this period Brigadier G. H. S. Moran, sometime Director of Mechanical Engineering at Army Headquarters in Melbourne, said:

My brief meetings with General Beavis during the Middle East period were often fiery but he always won the respect of officers. He fought continuously for more and better equipment for the A.I.F. I recall, clearly, well after the war while on a visit to the United Kingdom, a former senior officer of the R.A.O.C., saying to me: "How is your fiery brigadier who fought everyone to get the A.I.F. equipped?". His job, particularly on the Stores side, was almost insoluble. Major-General Sir Bertram Rowcroft, the wartime D.M.E. at the War Office, told me that the job of the R.E.M.E. was difficult enough but that of the R.A.O.C., whose task was to get stores always in the quantities required and when required and place them where required and yet remain within the limits of the nation's Budget, was quite impossible.

With Japan's invasion of Malaya in December 1941, Australia was placed in dire military straits and the A.I.F. was brought back from the Middle East to take part in the War in the South West Pacific Area. In the major re-organization which took place in Australia in circumstances of great urgency, to cope with this changed strategical situation, Beavis was given in April 1942, in succession to Major-General E. J. Milford, the difficult and expanding job of Master-General of the Ordnance.

Although the Master-General of the Ordnance is an ancient title and it was once held by the Duke of Wellington, the title was not used in Australia until recent times and in the re-organization at present in progress the title has been abolished. The first general officer in the Australian Army to bear the sole title of *Master-General of the Ordnance* was Major-General T. R. "Toc" Williams who was appointed on

13 October 1939. His predecessor in the post, Major-General O. F. Phillips, was also the *Quartermaster-General* and he bore the dual title of Quartermaster-General and Master-General of the Ordnance. The second occupant of the post of Master-General of the Ordnance was Major-General E. J. Milford. He was followed by the third occupant of the post, General Beavis, who also bore the sole title of Master-General of the Ordnance.

What then was the nature of the duties of the Master-General of the Ordnance in Australia during the period that General Beavis occupied the post? First of all it should be said that general officers in peace and in war discharge their duties in accordance with the demands of the niche into which they are placed by the demands of the principle of the division of labour. Second, this niche occupied by the Master-General of the Ordnance neither demanded nor gave scope to the "Charge of the Light Brigade" type of general officer who often recommended himself as one who loathed "desk work".

Now as Master-General of the Ordnance, General Beavis was in fact the managing director of an enterprise more vast than any enterprise that existed in the private sector of the nation's economy. As such he spent a lot of time at his desk for, like his subordinates and those he served in the field and elsewhere, he had to learn and to grow with the job, he had to think and to plan, he had to direct and to control the execution of plans, he had to promote experimental and developmental schemes and he had to supervise. These were not duties which demanded a white horse and a loud voice. They were duties which demanded both physical and intellectual fitness and the sustained application of much trained mental labour.

Although this is not the place to set out his duties in that post in the form of a duty statement it can nevertheless be said that they included responsibility for the efficient performance of the tasks of his Branch as a whole. These tasks were divided up and allotted to the Branch's Central Office and its four divisions — its Equipment Division, its Design Division, its Inspection Division and its Maintenance Division. Within each of these divisions there was an enormous range of duties all of which demanded on the part of General Beavis' principal subordinate officers high standards of technical knowledge and skill in Administration — a difficult art is Administration which, contrary to beliefs widely held in his time and even in unexpected places, may only be acquired by

study, by training and by long practical experience. Again Brigadier Moran said:

I believe that General Beavis's hardest time was as M.G.O. in Australia when the fear of invasion had passed — or most believed it had — and rather petty issues of an obstructive and time-wasting character had cropped up. This is why service in the Field Force rather than at LHQ was so much more attractive during the war. Nevertheless, in this as in other critical situations he took charge, he gave clear-cut orders, he produced timely results and he made good decisions.

From April 1942 General Beavis was Australia's Master-General of the Ordnance, in war and peace, for more than 4½ years. He still occupied the post when the war in the Pacific ended in August 1945 and he finally relinquished it, sixteen months later, in December 1946.

But before stepping down from the high office of Master-General of the Ordnance a few important changes had occurred in earlier months which should be noted here to show how General Beavis fitted into the changed organizational picture. First, General (later Field Marshal) Sir Thomas Blamey relinquished command of the Australian Army in November 1945. He was succeeded as Acting C-in-C for a period of three months by General Sturdee. Then on 1 March 1946, the Military Board which had been in abeyance since 27 March 1942 came into operation again. General Sturdee joined this Board for the second time as Chief of the General Staff and First Military Member. General Beavis joined it for the first time as Master-General of the Ordnance and Fourth Military Member. Colonel A. N. Kemsley also joined the Military Board as its Business Member.

But at this stage the Australian Army was winding down and in April 1946 Colonel Kemsley relinquished his appointment on the Military Board. He marked the occasion of his leaving by writing a letter dated 18 April 1946 to General Beavis and it began by saying:

I cannot leave the Army to resume my civil interests without expressing words of goodwill to you. All through my three years as Business Adviser you have not only shown a grand spirit of goodwill to me on your own account but you have encouraged a similar attitude right through the vast organization you have controlled. My appreciation of that spirit of co-operation has been expressed at various times in various ways and I repeat my thanks now.

Your task as M.G.O. has been a colossal one which extremely few people could possibly have carried out at all, and fewer still could have held the confidence of all authorities as effectively as you have done. I am in a position to know the reactions of other senior executives within and without the Army. You have just cause for pride in the universal respect in which you are held for your really amazing achievements. And I may say I accept second place from no one at all in these praiseworthy tributes.

Colonel Kemsley went on to say to General Beavis in this letter that:

Many times you were justified in various stages of annoyance at the interference or meddlesomeness of the various reviewing authorities, of whom I have been one of the most troublesome. No one has realised more than I how even the most careful reviewing authority can clog the machinery. But you have always tempered your views by a full appreciation of the fact that others also had their allotted duties to perform. I choose to believe that you went further insofar as my actions were concerned by recognising that at least they were dictated by honest motives.

The Australian Army by this time was facing up to and coping with its post-war problems and so henceforth General Beavis' official life was to follow different and often unfamiliar paths. But he was to be engaged in work which utilized the valuable and varied and high level experience he had gained, often under desperate conditions, as Master-General of the Ordnance. Colonel John P. Buckley, a former regular officer of the R.A.E.M.E., who served in the Middle East, in the South West Pacific Area, in North West Europe, on the Australian Army Staff in London and on the wartime headquarters staff of the M.G.O. Branch in Melbourne and who later became, in a civil capacity, First Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defence, had a long and close association with General Beavis during and after the war. He said that: "In December 1946, at the conclusion of his meritorious Army service, General Beavis was seconded to the Department of Defence, then in Melbourne, where his outstanding ability was recognised by the late Sir Frederick Shedden and the then Chiefs of Staff."

In the Department of Defence in this immediate post-war era much of its important work was done through the medium of committees and this was the kind of work that General Beavis was to be engaged in for the next five years. The two main kinds of committees on which he was to serve in the Department of Defence from December 1946 onwards were: first, permanent committees under Departmental chairmen; and second, permanent committees on which the Department of Defence was represented but for which it did not necessarily provide the chairman. In addition there were a variety of ad hoc committees and inter-departmental committees on which General Beavis was to serve. He also represented the Department of Defence on top level committees administered by the Department of Supply and Development. On any committee on which he served he was always a dynamic force.

Colonel Buckley again said of General Beavis' post-war work that: "His responsibilities included the formulation and implementation

of Defence policy in regard to Defence research and development, Defence production planning; and Defence supply." Colonel Buckley went on to say in his letter, dated 28 October 1975, that: "The early planning involved lengthy negotiations with major Allies in both the Scientific and Production fields, after our own organization had been created and was working. General Beavis was a firm and skilful negotiator and was highly regarded by International authorities."

With which of these committees then was General Beavis connected? In December 1946 he became Chairman of the New Weapons and Equipment Development Committee in the Department of Defence and he held this post until December 1948. During that period the Permanent Head of the Department of Defence was Sir Frederick Shedden. Concurrently, General Beavis was also in the Department of Defence, from December 1946 to February 1947, Chairman of the Australian Committee on Guided Projectiles. Also, from February 1947 to February 1950, General Beavis was the Representative of the Department of Defence on the Long Range Weapons Board of Administration. This Board was administered by the Department of Supply and Development and its Chairman was Mr N. K. S. Brodribb who was the Controller-General of Munitions Supply. Another Committee of the Department of Defence was the Principal Administrative Officers Committee (Maintenance and Materials) and General Beavis became its Chairman in May 1947 and he retained this position until his retirement from the Army in 1952. Then, from December 1948 to October 1950, he was the Representative of the Department of Defence on the Defence Research and Development Policy Committee in the Department of Defence under the part-time chairmanship of Professor Sir Leslie Martin. In December 1948 General Beavis became Deputy Chairman of the Joint War Production Committee of the Department of Defence under the part-time chairmanship of Sir John Storey; and in December 1948 General Beavis became Chairman of the Joint War Production Planning Staff of the Department of Defence.

For his outstanding post-war work in the Department of Defence, General Beavis was created a Companion of the Order of the Bath and this honour was announced in the King's New Year's Honours List in 1952. On the same day the Minister for External Affairs, Lord Casey, announced his appointment to the post of Australian High Commissioner in Pakistan.

So after these two joyous announcements Major General Beavis' long and successful career in the Australian Army was about to come to a close. On 26th January 1952, at the age of 57 years, he was placed on the Retired List. In looking back over General Beavis' post-war Defence work, Colonel Buckley wrote recently that:

The organization he set up on the Defence Production Planning and on Defence Research have stood the test of time and some 25 years later the J.W.P.C., now known as the Defence (Industrial) Committee, with Sir Ian McLennan as Chairman and Sir Charles McGrath as Deputy Chairman, fulfils the same functions as envisaged by General Beavis.

There are many existing monuments to the vision and tenacity of General Beavis, both within the Army and in the production and scientific fields. The large Army Depots and Workshops scattered throughout Australia, the Woomera Range and some of the Government factories were his brainchild. There are many others in which his influence and guidance were a major factor in obtaining approval for their construction.

General Beavis had that very rare quality, a man of vision — great vision — and who had the drive, tenacity and ability to make his dreams a reality. I will remember him as a kindly man, a modest man and a great Australian.

In the years that lay ahead, when he came home to Melbourne in 1954, after having completed his diplomatic duties in Pakistan, General Beavis chose not to be idle in retirement. He took an active interest in the local affairs of Ringwood where he resided and where he became a well known and a much respected citizen. A former GOC of the 3rd Australian Division, Major-General K. D. Green, has recently said:

General Beavis became associated with our CMF Engineer unit, the 10th Independent Field Squadron (Armoured), later 10th Field Squadron, by virtue of his residence in Ringwood and because of his deep interest in Army matters. He was always welcome at special activities and was an honoured guest at the annual Army Ball, which was quite an event at Ringwood in the 1950s.

We could always count on General Beavis for some wise advice, and his concern for the welfare of the CMF Engineers persisted for many years until failing health caused him to gradually sever his contact with us. He will be sadly missed as a kindly man and a good friend.

General Beavis took an active interest in R.S.L. affairs too and for many years he was a familiar figure at the annual Anzac Day March in the City of Melbourne until failing health compelled him to drop out. In 1965, at the invitation of the Auckland Returned Servicemen's Association, he led the Anzac Day March in Auckland.

In retirement he also did much reading and some writing. Here his intellectual interests were centred mainly in books published on World Wars I and II. His writing usually took the form of book reviews. But there was nothing ephemeral about these reviews. They were writings of substance and they were based on much study and filled with fruits from his own wide experience of men, materiel and warfare.

A subject he often discussed was the status of Administration in military training. In his review of Gavin Long's *The Final Campaigns* he set out some of his views on the subject when he said:

The material requirements for our five divisions in France and the cavalry divisions in Palestine in 1914-18 were almost entirely looked after by the British Army for which we paid the British Government. We had no Base or Lines of Communication set-up behind the fighting divisions, except for personnel depots in the United Kingdom and Egypt.

Perhaps, if there had been a history of the administration by Australian and British authorities of the first A.I.F., at the outset of the War of 1939-45 we would not have been without the organisation to provide the material requirements of a force in the field based on Australia. Such a history might have helped the military authorities between the wars to avoid their failure to obtain in peacetime an organization which could have expanded when war came. As it was, the organization to look after the arms, ammunition and equipment of the field force based on Australia had to be created at the same time as it was required to function, and it was largely a case of "the blind leading the blind" until with some experience and training an efficient organization came into being: (*Stand-To*, Jan-Feb., 1964, p. 22.)

When his wife died in March 1974 after a long illness, General Beavis's own health was already a cause for anxiety among his friends. He bore too the ever increasing pain of a wartime injury in a forward area in Syria with great courage and fortitude. The battle against declining health ended on Saturday 27 September 1975 when General Beavis died in the Repatriation General Hospital at Heidelberg in his 81st year.

A military funeral took place in Melbourne on 2 October 1975.

Leslie Ellis Beavis will be remembered by his friends for many reasons. He will be remembered for not only the quality but also for the style of his performance as a Soldier in peace and in war; he will be remembered for his co-operativeness in team work; he will be remembered especially for his work during the War of 1939-45 as Director of Ordnance Services in the Middle East and later as Master-General of the Ordnance in Australia; he will be remembered for his short career as a diplomat; and he will be remembered for his public work as a private citizen. Nature endowed him with a natural and friendly manner, a great capacity for sustained and productive work, a temperament for the ready acceptance of responsibility and for the making of timely decisions, and an ability, based on knowledge matured by experience, to relate ends to means or plans to available resources in manpower and material. In short he did the best he could with the means available and he did not waste time as men sometimes do in "crying for the moon."

The work of Leslie Ellis Beavis is now finished and he has gone from among us. He was a modest man who did not advertise himself. Indeed, he disliked publicity and he took as much pains to avoid it as some persons take to attract it. Nevertheless, his personality, the manner of his performance and the nature of his achievements did attract attention and so to those officers of future generations with careers to make and reputations to preserve he will serve as an example of the best type of Australian officer. ✕

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CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

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France's aircraft industry: 1976 Defence Budget: costs shrink programmes. *Flight International* (UK), 20 November, pp. 765-766.

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
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SOME ASPECTS OF THE



A Maori Pah

ANGLO-MAORI WARS

John F. Fishburn

A technologically superior power invading an already occupied land must surely invoke a reaction from the indigenous inhabitants. If this statement is valid then it must surely have been inevitable that British settlers and the Maoris of New Zealand would have eventually come into conflict. An investigation of the history of Anglo-Maori relations will show a gradual drift towards the harsh realities of war between the leading industrialized Western power of the day and a group of native people considered primitive in comparison. Having established the inevitability of conflict between these rivals for the fertile lands of New Zealand, examination of their material strengths and weaknesses together with their campaign tactics reveals some surprising features.

From the initial contact between the two peoples when Captain Cook circumnavigated the islands in 1769 to the British annexation of 1840 a slow but steady increase in contact is evident. At first, most contacts resulted from visits by whalers and traders and very soon changes in Maori culture could be seen. Cook gave potatoes which soon became the principal crop and Governor King of New South Wales in the 1790s gave pigs and potato seed.¹ Trade developed most readily between the Maoris, efficient native farmers, and their maritime visitors. In exchange for food the European visitors provided muskets which became most influential during the inter-tribal warfare of the 1820s. Missionaries followed closely behind the whalers and traders and it was largely through their efforts that in 1832 James Busby was appointed

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British Resident in New Zealand. They were prompted to act in this manner to forestall a possible French annexation and also to guard the Maoris from the outrages of escaped convicts and deserters.²

Maori society was changing at an accelerated pace in the 1820s and 1830s both because the numbers of Europeans were increasing and because each change reacted on Maori society in unexpected and manifold ways.³ With the continuing increase in the European population greater control was necessary particularly as Busby had no force with which to support his actions.⁴

The British Government moved in 1840 when Captain Hobson signed the Treaty of Waitangi with some fifty Maori chiefs. This signing was extended later to another four hundred and fifty chiefs and the Treaty was the formal basis for the proclamation of British sovereignty over the North Island on 21 May, 1840. Sovereignty over the South Island was proclaimed simultaneously by right of discovery.⁵ This treaty was an attempt to guarantee Maori welfare and from then on there was the almost inevitable insistence of successive British Governments that Maori interests were not to be subordinated to those of the settlers. This view saw the appointment in 1841 of George Clarke as Chief Protector of Aborigines with essentially two main duties, Protector of the Native Race and Commissioner for the purchase of such waste lands as the natives may alienate without prejudice to their own interests. Not entirely successful, the position was abolished by Governor Sir George Grey soon after his arrival in 1845. Nevertheless, at this early stage land was recognized as the basis of problems and this continued for the rest of the century.

Part of the European problem with regard to land was to come to grips with the Maori system of land ownership, so very different to the British system. The ancient Maori system of land tenure was communal, not individual. Private ownership of land was entirely unknown. Thus the alienation of tribal land required the consent of all free members of the tribe. This territorial right could only be destroyed by conquest and perpetual enslavement, followed by the permanent occupation of the land by the conquerors, but, as became most evident later, occupation was an elastic term and claims came to be based on the flimsiest foundations.⁶

Prior to Waitangi there had been many purchases of land from the Maoris and speculators from New South Wales were most prominent;

however, under the terms of the treaty, the Maoris agreed to sell land only to the Crown. This provision generated problems with land, for as well as the Sydney speculators there was Colonel Wakefield's New Zealand Company which had established numerous settlements round the coasts on lands purchased from the Maoris. Through the use of inferior personnel such as one Richard Barrett, a whaler, Wakefield does not appear to have been well versed with Maori custom as is evidenced by his purchase, three times, of land in the Taranaki area.⁷ Confronted by these mammoth purchases, the government set out to investigate their validity using such men as Commissioner Spain who disallowed many claims largely because of the doubtful manner in which some purchases had been made.⁸ The disallowance of many claims such as those in Taranaki were to long remain the source of much European discontent, and their willingness to use force, if necessary, to gain their ends.⁹

Before 1840 the Maoris had dominated and Europeans had been guests, useful people to have around a village. It was not long, however, before tensions began to develop and the first major incident was the Wairau massacre which resulted from an attempt to serve a warrant on Wairau natives over the burning of a surveyor's hut in July, 1842. The massacre was not replied to by European forces as Governor FitzRoy attributed blame to the Europeans.¹⁰ It is also significant that at this time the newcomers were still in the minority without sufficient military protection. This was being steadily built up so that by the end of 1845 there were five British ships-of-war and nearly 1,000 Regular troops, together with a local militia which was armed with old Tower flint-locks, exactly of the same vintage as guns used to purchase lands in the Wellington area.¹¹

The land provision of exclusive Crown purchase was deviated from temporarily by Governor FitzRoy for which he was censured by the British Government. His successor, Grey, built up considerable influence with the Maoris during this, his first term as Governor, which was of great assistance in his native administration but it left no machinery or system to be continued after his departure. The first reluctance to sell by Maoris became evident during Grey's first term and to this he had no answer which cannot be said for his handling of the first outbreak of warfare between the two peoples with the Hone Heke-led attacks in the Bay of Islands. Peace came with Grey's amnesty to the warring Maoris.¹²

It has been decided to use the term "war" throughout this paper rather than "rebellion" because, despite the Maoris granting sovereignty to Queen Victoria by the Treaty of Waitangi, the concept was completely foreign to them such that they never completely considered themselves as British subjects.¹³ Grey's handling of the conflicts in his first term in office won him great acclaim in London and a most notable reputation.

From Waitangi to 1852 New Zealand was a Crown Colony with the power centred on the Governor who was a representative of the Queen but by the Constitution Act of 1852 the colony received a representative constitution. Throughout this term and, in fact, throughout most of the rest of the century the resale of land to settlers was a main source of revenue for which the government had no alternative. As Bishop Selwyn put it, "The government wished to buy land as cheap, and to sell it as dear as it could".¹⁴ This period also noted an accelerating pace of cultural change in the Maori reaction to European contact. Here is characterized the enthusiastic and wholesale adoption of European cultural forms and conversion to Christianity. At the end of 1853, just before Grey left New Zealand, a Maori national movement appeared which was to lead to the rejection of co-operation with the Europeans.¹⁵

This was the beginning of the King movement whose two principal advocates were Wiremu Tamehana and Matene Te Whiwhi. The former becomes more important as the story unfolds and Matene was a disciple. Tamehana was a mission-educated Maori who saw the need for a national symbol and this became synonymous with efforts to oppose the sale of lands to Europeans. Prominent Anglican clergyman, Octavius Hadfield, wrote to Governor Browne, Grey's successor, in 1856 stressing the danger from many young men who had grown up without the influence of the church or subject to old native law and wanted to fight Europeans particularly with the history of Maori defeats of the settlers. This fertile ground for the King movement was largely ignored by Browne and his chief adviser in Maori affairs, McLean. Their hope was that if it was ignored it would go away.¹⁶

This situation was not the only difference from the period of Grey's term. Browne arrived to find the first Representative Assembly functioning and also found that now this Assembly had control of native matters which formerly had been handled by the Governor. Because of the settler's desire for land the policy as advocated by the British Government and by humanitarian interests diminished and, coupled with

increasing resistance to selling land, increased the likelihood of war. Browne was aware of the situation and even reported to London of the Europeans' covetous eyes for Maori lands and their determination to acquire them by fair means or foul. He took little action however, for, while recognizing the right of Maori owners to refuse to sell their land, Browne also shared the view that it was in their own interest to sell what they could not use themselves. He further recognized the inevitability of war if the Maori's refusal continued and realized the disaster it would be for the natives.¹⁷

One of the major hotbeds of settler agitation for land was in Taranaki round the settlement of New Plymouth. In close proximity to the settlement was a block known by the name Waitara which was offered for sale to Browne on one of his visits to the area. The problem was complex however, as the person offering the land, Teira, was not in a position to make the offer and did so in order to avenge himself against a high chief, Wiremu Kingi, for what he considered was a private wrong.¹⁸ Browne had made the statement that he would buy land from individuals despite his knowledge of the communal nature of Maori land and when negotiation began on the Waitara block, Kingi walked out — his manner of expressing finality — but offending Browne. This made the Governor more determined to make the purchase particularly as he had been led to believe that Kingi had no claim to the land.¹⁹ This action which help to precipitate fighting in Taranaki also drove Kingi to the King movement despite his earlier lack of interest. The First Taranaki War actually started when Kingi's supporters tried to prevent survey of the Waitara. Hadfield remarked that the war had been "brought about by the offended pride of Governor Browne."²⁰ The Anglicans generally encouraged the Maoris not to sell their land which is one reason why their clergy as a body opposed Browne.²¹

Grey prohibited the sale of arms and ammunition to Maoris in 1847 but this did not prevent them obtaining supplies through lack of police vigilance and ships, notably American whalers, smuggling such items in through quiet coastal bays. Browne, suspecting underhand dealings in this matter, yielded to pressure and partially lifted the regulations by permitting the sale of gunpowder.²² The effect of this action was quite profound, for government returns in 1861 stated that Maoris had purchased and stored not less than £50,000 worth of arms and ammunition following Browne's action four years earlier.²³

The Colonial Office in London, pacific in policy, and watchful on any actions affecting native peoples in the colonies, had become alarmed by the fighting and replaced Browne with Grey who had earlier been successful and was strongly supported by the Aborigines' Protection Society, a humanitarian group in England.²⁴ In initially implementing policies acceptable in Britain he found himself in conflict with the New Zealand ministers who wanted his help in obtaining more land.²⁵ Because of his earlier success Grey felt he would again be able to handle the situation with the Maoris but their views had changed rapidly in the time he had been away. His patronizing attitude to his "Maori children" was greeted, especially by the Kingites, with utter disdain. His attitude also prevented him, at first, from communicating with Tamehana.²⁶

Despite Browne's hopes, the King movement grew in strength and finally, in 1858, the aged and venerated Waikato chief Te Whero Whero was chosen King assuming the title Potatau I. Initially he had been unwilling to accept the title as he had always been a friend of the Europeans but because of poor handling of native policy by the government he accepted the position. Tamehana also wished to remain at peace with the pakeha but he realized their contact was fatal to his race. He was poorly treated by the authorities on a visit to Auckland in 1857 when he sought developmental finance.²⁷

One of the Maoris' objects in setting up their King was to stop inter-tribal quarrelling and give the Maoris the unity that was obviously the strength of the Europeans. The idea had also been suggested earlier by the missionary Samuel Marsden. He had seen the idea as a means towards inter-tribal order.²⁸ Despite all good intentions the movement was fundamentally weak as Potatau was too old to exercise firm control and his supporters were split into several factions. A further drawback was the reluctance of some important chiefs to submit to outside dictation. Greater unity was secured later once the war had started in the Waikato but even there co-ordinated action was not achieved. Its main strength lay in the form of resistance to land sales where Kingite supporters placed their land under his authority. This allowed him to forbid sales and was the main reason the settlers had for opposing the King movement.²⁹ Grey's reason for opposition will be seen below. Maori opposition to land sales was largely for two reasons. Firstly, their agricultural methods and food habits required large areas of land and secondly, to the Maori, the land was a symbol

of well-being, of success and of life itself. They well understood that the pakeha settler wanted to burn the bush and mine the soil for profits.³⁰

Grey was similar to Browne in his desire to assert British authority and for this reason he was opposed to the King movement. He was an autocrat and the movement threatened to prevent him from reaching his goal of racial "amalgamation".³¹ He was therefore determined to precipitate its fall. The Waikato was the chief centre of Kingite support and co-incidentally its rich lands were eagerly sought by land speculators in Auckland. Thus, when a military road was constructed south from the city over the Pokeno Ranges towards the Waikato River and then metalled for all-weather use, the Maoris justifiably became alarmed and decided that further extension of the road be opposed.³² Tensions rose as frontier peoples, both Maori and pakeha, feared attacks. Grey brought the matter to a head by ordering all Maoris to swear an oath of allegiance to Queen Victoria on the grounds that they could not be loyal to both Victoria and Potatau. Most Maoris retired to Waikato territory taking their stores of arms and ammunition with them and burning anything worthwhile they were unable to carry. The European settlers crowded into Auckland. The stage was now set for Grey to unleash his military commander, Lieutenant-General Cameron, against those who defied him.

It is interesting to note, at this point, that Browne was replaced over war whereas Grey was not. Principally, in the early 1860s, he was trusted by the Colonial Office because of his good record during his first term in office. In fact the Colonial Office made it clear that he was to exercise his own judgement if New Zealand ministers' policies involved the use of imperial troops or were "marked by evident injustice towards Her Majesty's subjects of the native race". Thus, the decision to send troops into the Waikato rested squarely with Grey and it, in part, rested on pressure on him to attack the Kingites as they were a potential threat to Auckland.³³ As well as the humanitarian nature of British policy already noted there was the tight budgetary policy which demonstrated the unpopularity of British troops garrisoning colonies on the score of expense.³⁴

Finally, before examining the military position, a brief examination of European attitude to the Maori as people will be considered. Sympathy for the Maori tended to be in direct proportion to the amount of education and it was found that the barely-literate who predominated amongst most migrants held an irrational fear of the native. This

attitude was largely imported, conjuring up a stereotype based on experiences in other colonies and bearing little resemblance to the real Maori.³⁵ The frontier settler was often of this classification and inclined to settle real or imagined grievances against the Maoris by direct action. As he assumed Maoris to be his inferiors he felt justified in shooting pigs if they trespassed and answering Maori complaints with a curse or a blow.³⁶

In their own way, the so-called better settlers held views which were not dissimilar. The Legislative Assembly was habitually jealous of any expenditure on Maoris and this was particularly applied to money for missionaries working with the natives. Money raised from the sale of land was spent almost exclusively on works benefiting the colonists. Generally speaking their attitude was that Maoris should become Englishmen if they wanted to progress.³⁷

As the Waikato War was the largest of the Anglo-Maori Wars it will be examined to ascertain the military potentialities of the Maoris in comparison with the British but there will be instances in other conflicts which will be considered. It is not intended to examine the war chronologically because of the inevitability of British success through superiority in weaponry and manpower but it will be noted that on a number of occasions this inevitability received a severe jolting.

Population statistics in the early part of the nineteenth century are practically non-existent but it is estimated that in 1840 the Maori population was in the vicinity of 100,000. Other estimates range from double to half that figure.³⁸ There was not, however, an even distribution throughout the two main islands for it was further estimated that approximately 80 per cent of the total population was concentrated in the present Auckland province and the coastal littorals of Taranaki and Hawkes Bay. It is then obvious that the South Island had very few Maoris and to further complicate matters demographically, the native population was declining.³⁹

The Waikato War which is being examined will be defined as the conflict which was initiated by Cameron's invasion of the Waikato area in mid 1863. This conflict lasted approximately one year and was brought to a halt when Cameron refused to advance still further into increasingly difficult country. By that time large areas in the Waikato had been captured and campaigns then went forward in the Wanganui area.⁴⁰

Grey estimated that there were never more than 2,000 men in arms against the government at any one time. Never using more than six hundred in each battle they possessed two distinct advantages. Firstly, they were usually in the centre with the troops in the circumference thus enabling them to move easily to attack any settlement they chose and secondly, they were not concentrated in any one district. Maori forces were not united either as not more than two-thirds of the Maori people ever joined the anti-government forces.⁴¹ Maoris took to the war-path early for from twelve years of age a well-grown boy was considered fit to take his place in a fighting expedition.⁴²

Maoris, fighting in their native bush, possessed further advantages. Firstly, they had an intimate knowledge of the bush, particularly in the thickest parts and secondly, they carried far less equipment and clothing than their British opponents giving them greater speed and manoeuvrability, most obvious in the bush. Cameron is reputed to have made the statement that two hundred Maoris could stop five hundred Queen's troops and that it was altogether "unsafe" for the latter to follow them into the bush.⁴³ As will be revealed later, Cameron evidenced no particular desire to fight in the bush.

Opposed to this relatively small number of Maoris were some 15,000 men including 6,000 Militia. These troops were a very mixed batch including some first rate regular British regiments and very low rate Militia who were only up to standard by the end of the campaign.⁴⁴ These forces also included a large number of Maoris especially the Arawa people who consistently fought on the government side. The most significant group of Militia were the four regiments known as the Waikato Militia which were raised largely on the Australian gold fields on the promise of a block of farming land on the completion of the campaign. The amount of land promised ranged from four hundred acres for a field officer down to a private with fifty acres. These troops were used as garrisons in the areas where they were to settle once the territory had been cleared of Maoris. Sailors also fought as soldiers in a number of battles. One reason for the recruiting of Militia in Australia was the unwillingness noted amongst some sections of European settlers to join the forces at the outbreak of the fighting.⁴⁵

Throughout the campaign budgetary tightness continued. As previously stated the British Government was unwilling to pay for campaigns and only grudgingly sent reinforcements.⁴⁶ The New Zealand

Government was not any better and the principal reason for settling Waikato Militia quickly on captured lands was that they were auxiliary troops and were, therefore, not paid for by the British Government. Cameron, the commander, had a good record before coming to New Zealand, having led the Black Watch with distinction in the Crimea and was regarded as one of the most brilliant of the younger British Generals.⁴⁷ Once the conflict was over in the Waikato, Weld, the new Chief Minister, began to plan for campaigning with reduced forces as the main areas of Maori opposition were reduced or contained. His plan was for a force of 2,000 men armed with the "best rifles possible".⁴⁸ It was also strongly stressed that there be a great emphasis on training in bush fighting, the need being emphasized with the heavy defeat of some of these forces under Colonel McDonnell in 1868.⁴⁹

Coupled with the discrepancies in numbers was the differences in armaments. The basic Maori fire-arm was a double-barrelled fowling piece which was only effective at short range. However, as most battles were only conducted in the bush at short range this disadvantage was lessened. There was a variety in weaponry ranging from the old flint-locks which dated back to Waterloo to current British rifles. As has been previously stated there had been an accumulation of ammunition in the term of Governor Browne; however, the continued campaigning depleted their stocks which at times reduced them to firing old lead, brass eyelets, and in the defence of Orakau pa, wooden ammunition.

Tamehana once said that the ambush which they used frequently, and to effect, was the only artillery the Maoris had.⁵⁰ There were occasional instances however, when the Maoris found old guns. One such occasion saw them using two old ships guns which they had picked up from some wreck on the coast and had dragged or carried some two hundred miles. They were instructed in their use by an old Indian artillery man who had been captured by them. He was later able to escape. For shot the Maoris used sash weights and pieces of old iron which would fit into the muzzle.

Shineberg asserts that while the Iron Age took a long time to evolve in Europe it came virtually overnight in the Pacific. Because of this there was a limit to the amount of technical improvements these societies could absorb.⁵¹ This is undoubtedly the reason for errors made by the Maoris in handling their weapons. It was common for them to fire too high at close range and also to use too high a charge of powder. Two aspects however, they were able to master. They had

learnt to restrict their fire to volleys when facing a charge and used their double-barrelled weapons singly thus giving two shots per man.⁵²

The British forces were able to bring the full force of technology to bear against the Maoris. The current issue weapon was the Enfield muzzle-loader. It was a very good weapon over long distances but under ambush conditions this advantage was nullified and actually was less effective because it took a long time to load and cap it and was only a single barrel.⁵³ Attached to the Enfield was a bayonet which proved most successful in hand-to-hand fighting and proved more than a match to the Maori close weapon, the tomahawk.⁵⁴ A small force which was used most effectively was the Forest Rangers and these became the forerunner to the small forces spoken of by Weld. They were issued with two fire-arms, a Calisher and Terry Carbine which was breech-loading and effective at four hundred yards, together with a five-shot revolver.⁵⁵ This carbine, being an early model breech-loader gave some trouble for after a few shots the heat generated made the breech-block difficult to work.⁵⁶

Cameron was well supplied with artillery. He had a variety of weapons including various sized Armstrong guns from six pounders through to a one hundred and ten pounder, and a variety of howitzers and mortars.⁵⁷ These appear to have been muzzle-loaders but firing round projectiles once again had a variety of solid shot and hollow balls which could be used as explosive types by filling with gunpowder. In fact, during the siege of Merimeri pa he had forty pounder Armstrongs firing explosive types with fuses over a considerable distance so that they exploded in the air, raining down fragments of iron, a forerunner to the airburst shells of this century. Similarly, grape and canister shot also had a devastating effect. Where the occasion offered, Cameron was able to fix small Armstrongs onto boats, even down to rowing size, for patrols along streams.⁵⁸ On at least one occasion, namely at Maketu pa, naval bombardment was also used.

To maintain this technological supremacy further technology had to be employed. The fortified pa at Merimeri was strategically in a most advantageous position commanding both land and water approaches. Realizing the problem in storming this fort from the front he decided to bypass it and transported considerable forces beyond the objective by river. Had his vessels not been armoured considerable havoc would have been wrought amongst his troops as they steamed by. These vessels were iron-clad paddle steamers of small enough size to navigate

the river yet large enough to carry sizeable numbers of troops. The largest, the *Pioneer* had been built from a local design in Sydney and had made the Tasman crossing under its own power. Coal was mined for these steamers locally.⁵⁹ These vessels had other refinements such as armoured compartments from which men could fire without fear of wounding and a system of steam pipes running round the ship so that a boarding party could be met by blasts of steam.⁶⁰

As well as carrying troops these steamers which eventually totalled eight ensured uninterrupted carriage of supplies on the river. This then obviated the need of road building and then forming protection for it as he had to do on the military road over the Pokeno Ranges.⁶¹ Because of the large numbers of troops and the extended lines of communication, transport became an important part of operations. Stores had to be loaded and unloaded many times because of different modes of transport which included steamers, drays, and boats. All this effort placed increased demand on the Commissariat so that a large transport group was formed from volunteers from both Regular and Militia sections.

The Maoris, on the other hand, had an extremely simple Commissariat. Fighting in the home territory, their necessities were close at hand so that when required, large supplies of flour, potatoes, and kumeras could be sent down the river from the upper Waikato. Should these supplies be wanting, there was always "bush" food readily at hand.⁶² To free as many men as possible for fighting, women played a very active role in Commissariat duties but they also did some of the fighting.⁶³

Throughout the War there were numerous examples of bravery on both sides. The British military tradition had come to expect bravery from its soldiers as was evidenced in many assaults on fortified pa and not the least was the assault on the Great Pa near Tauranga where, despite great courage, the attacking party (British) was repelled by the Maoris.⁶⁴ As the Maori fighting qualities at this time were unknown they will be considered carefully.

The Regular British forces which fought in the Waikato had seen action in various parts of the world including the Crimea and without doubt had experienced brave adversaries. From that point it is most surprising to note the comments from such Regular soldiers, made on the bravery of their Maori adversary. Colonel H. H. Green, officer-in-charge at the battle at Te Ranga near Great Pa wrote, "I must not

conclude without remarking on the gallant stand made by the Maoris at the rifle pits. They stood the charge without flinching and did not retire until forced out at the point of the bayonet."⁶⁵ Many instances are quoted where Maoris, having fired their weapons, were caught without time to reload and stood and fought with their tomahawks, only withdrawing from the bayonet for which they had no answer. As one wounded Maori told Cameron, "What would you have us do? This is our village; these are our plantations. Men are not fit to live if they are not brave enough to defend their own homes."⁶⁶ Troops in admiration for the Maori fighting ability took the unusual step of erecting a memorial tablet in the little church at Te Awamutu particularly to the dead of Rangiaohia and Orakau.⁶⁷ The Maoris, in their turn also had a healthy respect for European fighting ability but only recognized them as superior by virtue of their more efficient weapons.⁶⁸

There were a number of ideas peculiar to the Maori. They had an antipathy to being abroad after sunset, being superstitious and afraid of the evil spirit Taipo.⁶⁹ They also never fought over a ground where they had once been defeated.⁷⁰ Neither of these points, however, diminished their fighting ability. Sinclair asserts that in both societies, Maori and British, war was a custom appropriate in many circumstances. These included defence of property, to achieve objectives for which other means had failed, or as an expression of feelings of frustration and aggression. Among both, he states, it was considered that war could in certain circumstances be necessary, just and ennobling.⁷¹

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Maoris' ability to defend themselves was the military engineering genius displayed in their fortified pa. Almost invariably these pa occupied a commanding position and varied in shape to suit the terrain. The Moturoa pa, for instance, presented a concave face to approaching attackers and herein displayed another aspect of understanding things military. The horns of the concave enabled the defenders to pour enfilading fire onto the face of the pa. This was also a feature common in other pa. The genius did not stop there for often deep and wide trenches protected the walls of the forts and other lines of trenches on the inside enabled the defenders to sit or lie low and still pour effective fire onto the attackers. One example of these trenches was Puraku pa, Tarukenga where the loose soil was thrown behind the trenches lest the bullets of the enemy strike the loose, soft soil and temporarily blind the defenders.⁷²

The outside fences of these pa were consistently made of stout timbers, often whole trees being used. Large quantities of native flax were then cut and tied in bundles which, in turn, were closely and tightly lashed to the face of the timbers forming a padding. This padding being smooth and tightly packed prevented any bullets from entering through crevices in the war-fence. The pa at Ohacawai was one of many built in this way.⁷³ So stout were these palisades often that artillery fire had extreme difficulty in piercing them. At Ohacawai, artillery placed one hundred yards from the stockade made no impression on it.⁷⁴ The attack on the Great Pa near Tauranga was facilitated by a breach in the palisading made by howitzers but when earthworks were used in combination with stout palisades as at Rangiriri the artillery was not as effective as the attackers would hope.⁷⁵

To overcome this problem artillery began firing into the pa but the Maoris were also able to overcome this problem. They made use of underground living quarters and covered ways to protect the garrisons. Such tunnelling and trench digging was most common.⁷⁶ The Paterangi pa was a source of wonder to Cameron and his officers in the engineering skill displayed in its construction. Cameron declined to storm this pa and an Imperial officer who had fought in the Crimea claimed this pa was stronger and more skilfully designed than even the redan.⁷⁷ Only when pa were incomplete was storming easy as was the capture of Katikara during the Second Taranaki War.

Throughout the war the Maoris fought a retreating action, steadily withdrawing into the Waikato region. If, then, a pa was bypassed then the Maoris retreated rather than be cut off from their food supply. In this way the heavily fortified Merimeri position was taken. As a further compliment to Maori skill, the citadel at Auckland, Fort Britomart, used in the revets their idea of having sods reinforced with layers of fern.⁷⁸

The British also used fortified positions called redoubts but these were usually centrally situated in an area so the settlers could retire there in an emergency. These outposts were also used as bases for further operations.

Maori tactics were usually the same. After defending a fortified pa and inflicting the greatest possible loss on the enemy they would withdraw.⁷⁹ Ambush, as previously mentioned, was also a favourite tactic as was the attacking and burning of settlers' houses and farms. In

the First Taranaki War, for instance, 187 farming premises were destroyed. Because of their scattered nature, defending them was almost impossible.⁸⁰ Quite out of the ordinary was an attack, in the Wanganui area in January 1865 when Maori forces attacked Cameron's camp in broad daylight as troops were at dinner. This attack was under Hau Hau influence which will be considered below.⁸¹ As in old Maori warfare, the picked men, the young toas, fought a hard rearguard action, then vanished into the bush to rejoin the main body.

It became consistent practice to destroy houses and cultivations after villages and pa were captured. Naturally this was effective against an agricultural people but this action aggrieved the Maoris greatly. The planting season became the main period when it was possible to inflict material damage on the elusive enemy who persisted in the efficient use of guerilla tactics.⁸² As will be seen below well-armed and lightly accoutred flying columns tended to be most effective in the bush. Cameron instituted these during the Waikato war but they were developed to the full later.⁸³

After the Waikato campaign the full force of the Pai-marire faith began to be felt. This was a blend of the ancient faith in spells and incantations and magic ceremonies with smatterings of English knowledge and English phrases and perverted fragments of church services.⁸⁴ The term "Hau Hau", by which disciples of the new faith were known, had its origin in the exclamation "Hau!" used at the end of the choruses chanted by the disciples. Literally it means "wind", but it has another and more esoteric significance, for it was the term applied to the life-principle of man, the vital spark.⁸⁵ Pai-marire supporters used incantations to ward off bullets by shouting, "Hapa! Hapa!" which meant pass over. They also extended the right hand with palm outwards. The increasing losses thus sustained only seemed to add fuel to the fire.⁸⁶ It was common among Hau Haus to revive the practices of the cannibal era and half-forgotten rites of paganism. One Mr Volkner, a missionary at Opotiki, had been held in high regard but Pai-marire everywhere produced a strong revulsion of feeling against Christian ministers. This missionary became a victim of cannibalism.⁸⁷ One reason for this sense of betrayal was the sight of once-trusted missionaries serving as chaplains in the field.⁸⁸

Both sides were not without their faults. The skilfully built pa could be surrounded quite often and if this tactic was used, as at Orakau, then the defenders could not hold out long as almost always no provision

was made to ensure a supply of water.⁸⁹ Discipline was generally lacking which put the Maoris at a distinct disadvantage against his disciplined opponents. Though tribes frequently combined, there was no unity of command and no strategical plan. As has been previously stated, the most common form of conflict was to fight and then withdraw; rarely did they initiate an attack. The Europeans were most vulnerable in their lines of communication but the Maoris made no attempt to cause disruption there.

Throughout Cameron's campaign in the Mt. Egmont area there was a *pronounced failure to pursue the Maori into the bush*. For this the Maoris called him "the lame seagull".⁹⁰ In his favour, however, he had proposed punitive patrols in the bush in this area but Grey refused permission.⁹¹ Later, Cameron's successor, Chute, used such a device in his campaigns and was applauded for it. The difference was that Chute was to use mainly Maoris in his campaign while Cameron preferred Europeans.⁹² It is noted that Cameron's successor was a Major General which was in line with the British Government's policy of reducing Imperial troops in New Zealand.

As Grey was Governor of New Zealand, Cameron was subordinate to him which created difficulties as Cameron felt the wars were merely for land-plunder and he felt Grey's extension of campaigns into the Mt. Egmont area and the Wanganui were merely devices to retain Imperial troops.⁹³ Coupled with this was distaste for fighting the Maoris whom he recognized as superior and there tended to be common distaste amongst the Imperials for killing this fine warrior. The conflict between the two came to a head when Grey captured the Wereroa pa after Cameron had refused to invest it.⁹⁴ There was a succession of heated letters both between them and to the British Government and finally Cameron resigned and left with the first Imperial troops withdrawn.

Grey's capture of Wereroa pa, though a personal triumph, did not endear him to the authorities in London. He had committed the unpardonable offence of winning in an irregular manner.⁹⁵ Later it was discovered that his reports to London were not completely accurate and that he disobeyed repeated instructions by delaying the departure from New Zealand of Imperial troops. Therein lay a weakness in the Colonial Office at the time whereby he was able to obstruct these withdrawals for over a year before being detected.⁹⁶ He was eventually recalled.

The cost of the Waikato War was immense. Over five hundred Europeans had been killed and wounded and some eight hundred Maoris

met the same fate.⁹⁷ The monetary cost was more than £3,000,000 and an attempt to pay for this from confiscated lands was not entirely successful.⁹⁸ Most serious was the loss of confidence by the Maoris in the European and in themselves. European institutions, like the Church, lost support.⁹⁹ There was also a period of economic stagnation and generally speaking the military settlements in the Waikato were not successful.¹⁰⁰

The real bitterness of racial feeling dates from the period of guerilla warfare of 1866-1871. This was the period of campaigns against Hau Haus in the West Coast War and the campaign against Te Kooti. By the time these campaigns were well underway Government forces consisted of forces of Maoris under European officers although Ropato and Kepa were two Maoris who served credibly as officers.¹⁰¹ An armed constabulary was formed in divisions of one hundred men but the campaigns against rebel forces became increasingly waged by Maori contingents. The leaving of campaigns to almost exclusively Maori contingents was in itself a tremendous compliment to the native's fighting ability. In their campaigns they were not expected to live off the land which they could have done, nor did they rely on the complicated supply system of the Europeans, they simply carried their supplies on their backs.¹⁰²

Te Kooti's case became a lesson in itself. Whilst serving on the government side he was arrested on two occasions and although not brought to trial was shipped off to Chatham Island.¹⁰³ It became increasingly clear that this turbulent character would, for certain people in Gisborne, be better out of the way.¹⁰⁴ This was not the end of his problems for several promises to release him never eventuated. Increasingly bitter, he developed a ritual out of Paimarire jargon which became known as the religion of the Wairua-Tapu or Holy Spirit.¹⁰⁵ He escaped from Chatham and caused tremendous havoc in the North Island before he retired into King Country where he was eventually pardoned.¹⁰⁶ He, alone among the Maoris, fully grasped rifle tactics and fire discipline and also became a commander in the European style as his word was law. He made his plans carefully and executed them with enterprise, energy and completeness.¹⁰⁷

The King country to which Te Kooti withdrew was under the leadership of King Tawhiao and existed beyond the confiscated lands. They plotted for years to retake the Waikato but in 1881 abandoned this policy and surrendered their weapons.¹⁰⁸ In the intervening period the

only Europeans allowed into King country were those on friendly terms with the Maoris but government officials and land-seekers were very firmly discouraged.¹⁰⁹ McLean's policy was to leave them alone even when Europeans trespassing beyond the boundary line were killed.¹¹⁰

These latter years saw Maori land legislation as the key factor in New Zealand politics. The powerful politicians, the men who formed ministries, tended to be the powerful speculators, whose legislative programme and economic policy might be bent to serve their private interests. To keep Maori land on the market, legally and without force or fraud, required, during these years, tinkering and experimentation with the land laws.¹¹¹

Some Maoris were prosperous. These were mainly chiefs drawing their income from sheep-runs in Hawkes Bay or in gold royalties in the Thames region and the tribesmen who earned pay on active service.¹¹² The very fact that Maoris were economically independent and the pakeha did not develop racial attitudes of "white masters" boded well as a basis for the future of the two races in New Zealand, despite initial difficulties.¹¹³

It is most obvious then that the Maoris defended themselves well throughout the campaigns against them and only succumbed through superiority of technology and numbers of the invading army. That the conflict was inevitable has been established through the proven desire of the pakeha for Maori land and the latter's refusal to sell. The European's solution to the problem had been to take it by conquest. ☞

NOTES

¹ W. H. Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand* (London: Faber, 1960), pp. 38-9.

² *ibid.*, p. 27.

³ J. A. Williams, *Politics of the New Zealand Maori* (Auckland University Press, 1969), p. 10.

⁴ Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵ B. J. Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand 1855-1870* (Sydney: University Press, 1967).

⁶ A. W. Shrimpton and A. E. Mulgan, *Maori and Pakeha* (Auckland: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1930), p. 105.

⁷ K. Sinclair, *The Origins of the Maori Wars* (Wellington: New Zealand University Press, 1961), pp. 20, 28.

⁸ J. Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars and the Pioneering Period* (Wellington Government Printer, 1922), Vol. I, p. 432.

⁹ Sinclair, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

¹⁰ Shrimpton and Mulgan, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹¹ Cowan, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹² *ibid.*, p. 83.

- 13 Oliver, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
- 14 Sinclair, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- 15 *ibid.*, pp. 42-3.
- 16 *ibid.*, pp. 78-9.
- 17 Dalton, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
- 18 Shrimpton and Mulgan, *op. cit.*, p. 214.
- 19 A. D. Ward, *The Origins of the Anglo-Maori Wars: A Reconsideration in New Zealand Journal of History*, Vol I, No. 2, October 1967, p. 149.
- 20 Sinclair, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
- 21 Dalton, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
- 22 Sinclair, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
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Mental and Physical Fitness



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'ARE YOU STRONG WILLED ENOUGH TO BE PHYSICALLY FIT?'

FITNESS has been described as 'that state of an organism which will permit the completion of a given task'. To achieve a state of fitness in humans there must be a balance amongst good food, exercise and sleep. Obviously, we take one thing for granted: *good health*. Because good health is so tied up with fitness, we have a vicious circle. Do we need to be physically fit? We all see the need to be mentally fit to carry out our particular trade or duty in our unit, but when we are physically fit we can better carry out our duties. There is an obvious

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Sergeant Payne joined the Junior Leaders' Regiment, Royal Artillery in 1959. He transferred to the Parachute Regiment in 1961. From 1961 until 1966, he saw service in Cyprus, Malaya, Aden, Bahrein and Kuwait. From 1966 to 1968 he was an instructor at the Parachute Regiment Depot. From 1968 to 1970 he served in Germany, Canada, The United States and Northern Ireland. He enlisted in the Australian Army in 1971 and was posted to 2 RTB as Physical Training Instructor for which he qualified in the British Army. In 1973 he was posted to DSG and is currently serving in DSU Puckapunyal.

link between being both mentally and physically fit; in fact without physical fitness, mental fitness is an impossibility. Two men who amply illustrate this fact are Bobby Fischer (*one time World Chess Champion*) and Phil Tarrant (*Australian Billiards Champion*). Both these champions need no physical strength for their respective sports and yet to attain maximum mental alertness they train like footballers.

One of our biggest problems in the Army today is the almost total neglect of our physical fitness. If the majority of the Army is physically unfit then that majority is also mentally unfit and operating at a level below their best and below that for which they are paid. We somehow have come to the conclusion that modern warfare is a computerised, mechanised affair that will require only a mental approach on our part. We assume that we will naturally adapt to the physical and mental strains of modern warfare, or that our bodies will automatically be able to cope with the long hours of gruelling kilometres we will have to march when transportation has either ceased to exist or just isn't capable of going where we have to go. We obviously have something magic about us that our counterparts of World War II never had, instant fitness, a pill that CSIRO has developed for the Army!

You may laugh at these obviously ridiculous statements, but look around you. How many people do you know that could make this kind of instant change? This is the change that they would have to make if they were going to be able to cope with a wartime situation. How many military members are physically unfit? One, fifty, a hundred? Surely not more? How many could pass the BE tests given 24 hours notice? When we talk about physical fitness in these terms, we are talking of a soldier's ability to maintain not only his physical strength but a total awareness that is so essential to all soldiers when fatigue becomes a constant factor. A complete mental and physical awareness which, when coupled with strength and natural aggression, weld him into a formidable fighting machine.

We often complain that, due to a lack of foresight on the part of the government, we are totally unprepared and equipped to fight a war of any duration; that their amateur outlook on Defence is destroying our professionalism! Yet we, by our own lack of professionalism, neglect that which for years has been the backbone of all the great armies of the world — the ability to maintain a very high standard of physical fitness. Slim, Montgomery and Alexander were all advocates of physical fitness and were themselves as fit as the youngsters they led. Field

Marshal Lord Wavell commenting on what qualities make a soldier fit for war concluded that there were four — to be placed in any order — discipline, physical fitness, technical skill in the use of his weapons and battlecraft. He, himself, was always physically fit and possessed great physical endurance.

Obesity we encourage as if it were an honour to be fat. We condone both physical and mental weakness in a man. But why? In most cases, could the answer be that we ourselves suffer from that great human weakness that we in the Army should be able to control: laziness? One has to be strong willed to be fit. It takes strength of character and will-power to commence and maintain a physical fitness programme.

The programme never ends because, once we achieve an acceptable state of fitness, we need to keep at it to maintain it. It is like the search for knowledge — it should never cease. If the search for physical and mental fitness does cease, we begin to stagnate either physically or mentally.

If the conclusions drawn are correct, we can assume that at all levels of the rank structure we have large numbers of unfit men. To be fit is to our advantage for many reasons. Some reasons are:

- a. facts and history bear out that the fitter we are the less prone we are to mental and physical fatigue,
- b. our reactions are quicker,
- c. we are better able to cope with the changing situation, and
- d. discipline and morale *benefits* are high.

ANNUAL PE TESTS

How do you assess a unit's or an individual's team spirit, endurance and fighting efficiency all at once? ATIs tell us that a good general guide is the annual physical efficiency test. It also tells us that every soldier who is classed as FE and is under 40 years must complete these tests every year. The key word here is 'MUST', which, according to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, means: 'A thing that cannot be missed'. If we look further we also find that, if a soldier fails the whole or part of these tests there are certain procedures, physical or medical, that should be implemented. In other words, he either does the tests again or he is put on a medical board for reclassification. It is quite obvious that these tests were designed to give everyone a good indication of individual and unit abilities. If a unit training

programme has been successful, it will show in these tests as they combine all the major necessary military skills in one explosive effort so that all the strengths and weaknesses can be observed.

These statements sound good; if we are able to believe them we must assume that if we carry out the tests correctly we should arrive at a good method of assessing both individual and unit efficiency ratings. Why then do we ignore, either wholly or in part, the requirements that are laid down? The tests as they are run by most units are of no value and, in a number of cases, they are medically hazardous. Units either do them incorrectly or miss certain parts out, or just don't do them. Large numbers of men are totally unprepared physically to do the tests and become medically unfit for days afterward. What is the point of men from one unit doing the tests when in another they don't? We take no notice of the results when we have them. All we achieve is to cripple large groups of men for no reason at all when they could be better employed elsewhere. It is obvious that we have to choose between two alternatives: firstly, we scrap the tests altogether or, secondly, we do some drastic re-thinking on how we intend running them in future.

We believe that the tests themselves need modification and the method of implementing them is wrong. Any soldier should, at a moment's notice, be able to complete the tests required of him. In war he would have to, and we are training for war so our requirements should be as for war. There cannot be any lasting value in giving a man up to one month's notice of a test. If he has any common sense, he goes out and does some training for the test. After he passes it he lapses back to his usual unfit self for the next eleven months of the year. By way of improvement, the following is a suggested way of conducting annual BE tests, regardless of the unit or its role, be it a field force, logistic, training unit or a headquarters:

- a. two 3¼ km runs (2 miles) as is currently defined in Battle PE Tests, run at least three months apart; and
- b. the Battle PE Test complete.

There should be no requirement to give any unit or individual more than two to three days notice of the tests. Other hard line 'limitations' should include:

- a. failure to complete the tests would mean an automatic medical board to decide whether a soldier be retested or medically downgraded;

- b. if downgraded medically, that member automatically forfeits his chances of promotion temporarily or substantively until he is capable of and has qualified at the tests; and
- c. a sliding scale based on age and time; reducing after 45 years until retirement.

The tests and the methods of conducting them, as well as the restrictions on the soldiers, are deliberately hard as it is pointless setting a test if anyone can pass it without any effort. The restrictions no doubt will cause many people to suggest an unfair, if not brutal, punishment for any person just because he cannot maintain a given fitness level. But if we look at it from the point of view that, by promoting a man who is obviously unfit, over a number of men who are fit, in a given situation of great stress and strain that man is not going to be able to command and is, therefore, valueless. We are in the business of war in which we get no second chance. We have to demand the best from everyone all the time, not part of the time.

What is the best way to motivate a man to lose fat (not weight, you'll notice!) and to exercise to an acceptable state of physical fitness? Late 1974 and early 1975 at Puckapunyal, the ideal, we believe, was found and proved. The following is a resumé of the 'Baby Whales Course' by Sgt R. (Taffy) Payne.

THE BABY WHALES COURSE CONDUCTED AT PUCKAPUNYAL IN LATE 1974 AND EARLY 1975

The Baby Whales Course came into being because of the lack of success in treating soldiers who were obese due to lack of exercise and/or overeating. There are large numbers of men who are grossly overweight and have no success in reducing this weight by conventional methods, dieting, etc. Getting the average soldier to diet and still carry on with his work is almost an impossible task in most cases.

Lack of will-power, no incentives and far too many temptations make the task and final goal too great. Obviously, if we had a regular exercise programme throughout the Army there would be few soldiers with this problem. As we don't, there had to be another answer to solve this particular problem that enforced the diet and solved the exercise deficiency.

It was decided that the answer might lie in conducting a course where soldiers with this problem could be sent and removed from their

normal environment, to reduce fat weight and to exercise all at the same time. After some months of discussion on the best methods of running the course, it was decided that we would ask units to let us have men for a period of fourteen days, as this would be the shortest time in which it would take us to answer most of the questions we had posed ourselves.

There would be a number of problems which we couldn't overcome: Firstly, complete isolation from others not on the course when not working. Due to lack of staff and accommodation, we had to house the course in a normal hospital ward and use the hospital staff to supervise the course during the evening and night-time hours. This made the weight reductions side of the course harder to maintain as, in a number of cases, the course members were able to get extra food due to the poor supervision on the part of some of the hospital staff. There was also the problem of having only one PT instructor to control the course during working hours which started at six in the morning and finished at five at night.

The day started at 0600 hours with a run and walk of up to 1.5 miles. The distance walked each day was decreased until, on day fourteen, they could all jog most of the distance. They then showered and prepared for breakfast. At 0730 hours, they marched $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the local indoor swimming pool to begin their morning activities. During the first hour of swimming and sauna, each man had to complete ten laps of the pool using different types of strokes in a given order, but he was allowed to rest for up to twenty seconds between laps. Each day the laps increased until each member was swimming 25 laps of varying strokes. Non-swimmers or poor swimmers were given flotation aids but still had to complete the laps, although in their cases they could use any strokes to do so. No one man failed to cover the distance required although some unusual strokes were observed. Out of the four non-swimmers who started the course, two could swim quite well unaided at the end of the course.

From 0900 hours to 0930 hours each day the course played volley-ball, a game that proved very popular. At 0930 hours, the course participated in circuit training for up to twenty minutes. This was followed by a long mid-morning break from 0940 hours to 1030 hours. The break was followed by team games until 1115 hours. It was then time to don boots and march. The distance increased daily until everyone completed the 5 mile PE test, near the end of the course.

The marches always ended up at the swimming pool, so everyone could shower and change before lunch. They then marched up to lunch, a further $\frac{1}{2}$ mile. After lunch the afternoon programme began with 5 laps of the pool. The course then played sport for the whole afternoon: basket-ball, volley-ball, soccer, in fact any game which would keep their interest and still make them work. At 1600 hours each day the course ran and marched up to 1.5 miles. They would then shower and change and march the final $\frac{1}{2}$ mile of the day back to the hospital for dinner.

We calculated that each man would lose 1 lb per day in body weight, a total of at least 14 lbs throughout the whole course. In fact, the course average was 15.87 lbs, the lowest weight loss being 13 lb 13 oz, and the highest was 23 lbs 1 oz. We had no real way of calculating the increase in muscular size, although in nearly every case the muscular definition around the shoulders and legs was good. The overall picture was extremely encouraging in each case. Each man was a lot fitter, stronger and had reduced his body fat to an acceptable level.

The problems that occurred other than the ones that we have mentioned before, could be solved if the course was a little longer with a slower build-up and more staff. The course needs to be housed in an area on its own. We found that chest pains occurred in one or two of the course members. This was found to be caused by the body not being able to get rid of certain enzyme matter, due to the constant workload, which collected in the area of the chest. Injuries were another problem, which, due to the shortness of the course, made it very hard on anyone who had an injury. Visitors were our biggest problem. They were forever trying to bring in food. It angered us a great deal because the course members, after the first few days, didn't crave greatly for extra food. They adapted surprisingly well to the diet of 1100 calories a day. The fussy eater soon stopped being fussy and ate everything. They were allowed to drink as much soda-water as they liked and soon began to enjoy even that! But there was always the constant chasing of any visitors who came to ensure that they did not smuggle any food in.

The course members themselves enjoyed the notoriety that was attached to the name 'Baby Whales'. They marked their shirts with the name and associated themselves completely with it. Everything they did, they did as 'Baby Whales'. Whenever any one of them showed any signs of stress, they helped him as a group. We encouraged

this identity, as it helped the course in many of its initial problems. Every man who went on the course said it was of great value to him and we had many requests to run more, but a number of problems stopped us from investigating better methods of doing so. The final analysis proved that this type of course can be of great value both to the Army and the soldier. Obviously, there has to be an already built-in system of PT existing in the Army to continue where the course leaves off. The limited resources available for use at the time prevented us from following up the course with a further PT programme for each man. They had to fend for themselves again. Here we failed them and only three out of the original 23 have maintained the weight loss to this time.

The final statistics of the course were:

Number of men taking part	23
Duration of course	14 days
Daily calorie intake	1100 per man
Total weight loss for course	365 lb
Average weight loss per man	15.87 lb
Top individual weight loss	23 lb 1 oz
Lowest individual weight loss	13 lb 13 oz

(Sgt Payne continues on the 'elite' band of PTIs.)

PHYSICAL TRAINING INSTRUCTORS

Physical training instructors are their own worst enemy. They deal in a product, health, that cannot be bought, made or induced by taking pills. They have to be 'A' grade salesmen and advertise what they are selling by being a product of it themselves. The biggest problem with the product that they sell is that everyone knows he should buy it but the cost seems to be too high. If the PTI presents the product wrongly even once, he will never be able to sell it to that customer again.

Health or fitness, whatever you might like to call it, has always been a hard product to sell, and it always will be. But the presentation or method of instruction, has in the past been very poor in a number of cases. It only takes one bad instructor to coach fifty men and you have fifty potential anti-fitness salesmen. If only twenty of these get into positions of authority, they can affect the selling ability of a thousand physical training instructors. We are now reaping some of these bad selling practices. For many years, we have strangled the growth of the

physical training wing and its instructors, basically because the older, more senior men in the Army still have a vision of the old 'bully' standover type of instructor who made their lives hell when they were younger.

Surely it is time we put that theory to rest and did something about promoting and encouraging the growth of physical training and its instructors. They have so much to offer the Army. Of the three Services, we should be the best, but are we? We have an attitude that by penny-pinching in our distribution of instructors, knowledge and courses, we can maintain just enough interest and growth to expand in an emergency. The approach is: 'Give the dog just enough meat to keep it alive'. We need a strong, healthy, growing physical training wing with enthusiastic highly trained instructors and officers who are permanently posted to the wing. There is no sense in having a chief instructor who, as soon as he begins to comprehend the problems, has to be posted out of physical training after two years so that he can gain promotion and advancement.

We need stability which we can get only with our own corps. Failing that, enough autonomy and growth so that both officers and NCOs can make a career of physical training. The whole spectrum of fitness, health and remedial training should be covered by trainee instructors and if any man shows aptitude in any of these fields he should be given specialist training as in other corps. We cannot afford to remain 'jack of all trades and master of none'. Our field is too sophisticated. Far too many improvements in physical education have been made over the last few years for us to give just the basic grounding in each of the physical training skills. In the field of athletics alone, so much knowledge is needed to coach that a man could easily be employed full-time just teaching that. Yet it is only one of five major skills that a physical training instructor is supposed to be conversant with and coach on. All this with only twenty weeks of courses behind him! Compare the PTI and what is expected of him with the physical education teacher who is required to do a diploma course. It is no wonder that more and more physical training instructors are getting entirely demoralised with the whole system and are considering corps transfer or discharge, taking experience and knowledge, that we just cannot replace, with them.

What has been written pertains, of course, to physical fitness. We realise that physical fitness is only one aspect of our training. Any

unit or sub-unit in our corps or Army which concentrates solely on physical fitness and neglects specialist training would be foolish. We cannot beat the enemy on physical fitness alone. If this article serves no other purpose than to make people think about physical fitness, then it has achieved something. We need our whole unit or sub-unit to fight as a team so we must all be fit. Montgomery said: 'We are all in this together and we will see it through together'. The one high standard of physical fitness will be a firm basis from which to begin.

Finally, a word on sport:

Army life lends itself to the fostering of sport. The aggressiveness and team spirit cultivated within the service makes sport a natural outlet for our energies. We excel in the ability to cripple one another on the field of play and be gentlemanly about it. All this, and yet our approach to sport is so amateurish as to border on stupidity. Our potential is so vast, yet untapped. The number of Army persons competing at national level in their sport could be counted on the fingers of one hand, out of 32,000 mind you. We have some of the best training facilities in the country. Time and equipment are available to train in any sport we wish, yet we remain almost unheard of out on the international scene. Everything we do is on a unit level, where it remains.

Coaching is inferior or non-existent in most cases. Again we have the 'instant' man; instant high jumper, instant pole vaulter and instant runner. We have a great knack for 'instant' men in this Army. Coaching is a highly sophisticated skill whatever you teach. Coaching clinics are a must for any athlete if he is to improve. Both these are neglected in the Army. Why? The reasons are too numerous to put down. Basically, it boils down to sheer apathy on everyone's part. Sport could be one of the biggest potential recruiting methods. By encouraging coaching courses, forums and clinics, we could build our potential and standard. Inter-unit, inter-area and inter-service sport becomes such a high standard competition that it would naturally follow on that the civilian organisations would willingly compete with us. Obviously, this would be a completely selfish approach for improving our sporting standards, but anything has to be an improvement on what we are doing now.

THINK ABOUT IT!!! W

BOOK REVIEW

TOO SERIOUS FOR SOLDIERS? CERTAINLY TOO SERIOUS FOR CIVILIANS

By Christopher Foxley-Norris

A review of *Too Serious a Business* by Donald Cameron Watt (Temple Smith), reprinted with permission from the June 1975 issue of RUSI (Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies).

THE real interest of history lies not so much in the description of the events and personalities of the past but in the drawing of lessons for the present and future from that past. The politico-military history of the years between World Wars I and II derives perhaps its greatest importance from its relevance and often close similarity to the situation of today.

As described in Professor Watt's recent book *Too Serious a Business*¹ which is based on his 1973 Lees Knowles Lectures, the inter-war years saw a gradual but inevitable drift away from the established regimen and balance of the European power structure; and at the same time the failure of the military element of that regimen to make its proper contribution to the security of the nations of Europe, individually and generally. This failure is attributable partly to their alienation from new and unpalatable political movements, but largely to the fact that the politicians in power deprived the military of the resources necessary to build and train forces adequate to maintain that security.

The seeds of political instability were sown and ripened during World War I. At first sight World War II, after the subsequent closure and acceptance of the Iron Curtain, produced less dramatic changes. The national boundaries of the States of Europe have not varied in any major respect in the last 25 years; and the governments which rule the countries outside that Iron Curtain, although showing marked changes of political flavour and party influence, have not in the main altered radically. It may be suggested, however, that this apparent stability is approaching its end in many of those countries. Which way will Portugal go now? Which way post-Franco Spain or

¹ This book is now available in the Defence Library.

post-Tito Yugoslavia? Indeed what developments may be expected in the majority of the nations of Western Europe under imminent energy and economic pressures?

It was the economic pressures of the late 1920s and early 1930s that disrupted the political pattern of Europe and facilitated the seizure of power by totalitarian regimes. It was the same economic pressures that were largely responsible for the reluctance of governments to provide enough money for even the minimum armed forces their national security required (though pacifism and anti-militarism also played some part). Today the threat of economic stringency, crisis and perhaps collapse is just as imminent and alarming as it was then. It has already had the effect in many NATO countries, including our own, of persuading hard-pressed governments to deny their armed forces sufficient resources to provide security. It may in many countries (perhaps Italy first?) result in the disintegration of the present political system, either accompanying or following the emasculation of the armed forces. Consequently Professor Watt's book has a double interest, as an exposition of past history and as an indicator toward future developments.

His thesis is that World War II amounted to a civil war among the established fraternity of European power groups; and that by failing to maintain and up-date that system, the armed forces, and in particular their General Staffs, must bear a major share of any culpable responsibility. This is an interesting argument and it is deployed with much brilliance, although not always with consistency. He fires off his critical arrows with much fluency and bravura; but does not always seem quite sure of his targets, who appear sometimes in the guise of the civilian Palefaces, sometimes as the political Indians, sometimes the military buffaloes. It is not easy to follow a main theme or thread; but he acknowledges this defect and attributes it to the fact that the book is to some extent a synthesis of other men's work (its bibliography is indeed monumental), and that there are nevertheless considerable gaps in the supporting literature, e.g. on the social position and role of the British officer-class and the political influence (or lack of it) of our General Staff.

This influence was certainly far less than it had been before World War I. This can be attributed partly to the enfeeblement of the military machine by the denial of the resources needed to give it any reality; and partly to a conscious withdrawal by military leaders from

what they saw, often justifiably, as the dirty and degrading business of politics, cf. the German *Nursoldat*. Whether their consequent ineffectiveness in policy-making was involuntary and inevitable or voluntary and irresponsible is a matter of opinion. Certainly it left the field open to civil servants and politicians, whose expertise in military matters was unproven to put it mildly, but whose influence became paramount. However, even so, Professor Watt may be thought sometimes to exaggerate it, particularly in the case of Sir Warren Fisher of the Treasury. He is credited with a revision, indeed total reversal, of our air strategy; with the introduction of the Hurricane and Spitfire (although elsewhere in the book it is admitted that these, with radar, were originally developed outside the official world); and even with responsibility for our victory in the Battle of Britain — "Fisher, Air Marshal Dowding and Sir Robert Watson-Watt's radar saved Britain in 1940". In that order?

In passing it may be noted that on air matters Professor Watt seems most often wide of his target. He invents a non-existent rank of "Group Commander" for Winterbothom the Secret Service expert: he appears to believe that carrier-borne Japanese aircraft sank the *Repulse* and the *Prince of Wales*, and that our own Fleet Air Arm pilots and observers were always drawn from the Royal Navy; and he refers to the technical excellence of the Messerschmitt 110, which in fact had to be largely withdrawn from daylight operations because it was not up to the job. He also claims that defeat in the air in the West drove Hitler eastwards against Russia. This was surely not a case of cause and effect? Certainly Hitler was planning his invasion of Russia long before the outcome of the day and night air operations against Britain was resolved.

These however can well be regarded as minor blemishes in an otherwise very valuable and thought-provoking study. One of its most interesting sections describes the universal pessimism and apprehension among the military staffs of the potential combatants when faced with the prospect of major war in the 1930s, based admittedly to a large extent on exaggerated intelligence reports of their various enemies' strength. Consequently, in sharp contrast to the period before World War I, the unanimous advice of the military chiefs to their political masters was to avoid going to war. Partly because of the degradation of military staffs after the shambles of World War I and partly because of their sometimes self-imposed alienation and isolation from the main

stream of affairs, their advice was ignored. It was the politicians who moved Europe inexorably toward war, dragging the military reluctantly behind them. "Political miscalculation based on misinformation took the civilians into war."

It is consequently surely surprising and paradoxical how often the military are still portrayed as war-mongers, thirsting for the blood of the battle-field; and how many people still believe it.

Perhaps in view of its argument the title of Professor Watt's book was oddly chosen. War may or may not be too serious a business to be left to soldiers; but at least they are trained professionals in that field. It is indisputably too serious to be left to civil servants and politicians who are amateurs. ..

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CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.

Communists prepare to challenge for power in Spain. (*Washington Post* extract), *The Guardian Weekly* (London), 30 November, p. 17.

British Defence's bone and muscle; the debate begins on further cuts, but there is little fat. *Economist* (London), 29 November, pp. 19-20.

Greece: (Defence) costs up, security shaky. *Economist* (London), 29 November, pp. 55-56.

United Arab Emirates — we like our armies. (Problems of merging). *Economist* (London), 29 November, pp. 59-60.

Phasing out SEATO (editorial from *The Japan Times*, 2 October 75). *The Mirror* (Singapore), 27 October, p. 4.

Defence preparation in an age of violence. (Dr Goh Keng Swee, Deputy PM and Minister of Defence, stresses the importance of continuing with Singapore's defence preparation). *The Mirror* (Singapore), 3 November, p. 1.

Singapore's potential as a naval logistics base. *The Mirror* (Singapore), 10 November, p. 1.

Under the CIA cloak. (Importance of the present proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities). *New Statesman* (London), 17 October, pp. 461-462.

Russian arms flood Angola. *The Observer* (London), 30 November, p. 9.

The strategic process: in theory and practice. (The formulation and execution of national strategy has come to be recognized as a blend of military and political factors... but this may prove ultimately unsatisfactory to both parties.) *Naval War College Review* (US), May-June 1975, pp. 2-8.

Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

The Defence of Australia

Concerning the address by Colonel D. H. Wynter "The Defence of Australia and its Relation to Imperial Defence" (*Army Journal*, No 319 December 1975), because it was accurate and clearly reasoned, it offended greatly the "powers-that-were". As a direct result of his address, Colonel Wynter, then DMT, was "punished" by transfer to Queensland, changing places as GSO with Colonel Plant. I served under both of them there.

Wynter was a marvellous, fearless and likeable officer. Later, when General Wynter became LGA at LHQ I was his offsider (DQMG Plans). As General Blamey's senior administrative representative at LHQ General Wynter was extremely powerful, though a sick man. Before he left Palestine early in the war, he told me he was "being sent back to Australia to die".

As the war made clear, Wynter's views, so ably set forth in 1935, were the correct ones.

1 Mosman Terrace
MOSMAN PARK, PERTH

C. M. L. Elliott

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MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the October, November and December 1975 issues of the Journal to:

October: Lieutenant Colonel K. M. Fowler, AM (The Changing Role of Women in the Armed Services), \$10.

November: Lieutenant W. Fitzherbert and Mr H. Sargeant (A Calculator for the Mortar Fire Controller's Pocket), \$10.

December: Brigadier J. H. Thyer, CBE, DSO, (RL) (National Morale and National Survival), \$10. This article was in two parts. Both parts were considered separately and an average mark taken.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District Libraries.

Soviet perceptions of detente and analysis of the American political process. *Naval War College Review* (US), May-June 1975, pp. 24-42.

Peking's provocations against India. *New Times* (Moscow), 46/1975, November, pp. 12-13.

Bangladesh: the crisis has not passed; Toaha's call for unity; uprising; mutiny; the "Twelve Demands". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 December, pp. 24-34.

China's aluminium deal (intrigues Western intelligence sources). *Foreign Report* (*Economist*, London), 3 December, pp. 5-6.

Lance tactical warhead ordered. (Belgium, Netherlands agree to pay start-up costs of production to counter Soviet SAM capability; Israeli order also expected.) *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 6 October, pp. 14-17.

NATO protests Dutch Defence slashes. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 6 October, p. 18.

GAO upholds Navy in choice of F-18. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 6 October, p. 19.

A Soviet view of heliborne assault operations. *Military Review* (US Army), October, pp. 3-15.

Satellite technology and deterrent strategy. (Need for realistic modification in deterrent strategy arises out of recent changes in remote-sensing technology — approach academic rather than technical.) *Military Review*, October, pp. 27-38.

Running the qualitative [arms] race (and not losing). (Includes graphs comparing US-USSR defence expenditures, armed forces strengths, total force loading, military R & D expenditures.) *Military Review*, October, pp. 58-68.

Independent research critics countered (US Defence Dept. accused of secrecy on R & D contracts to private industry.) *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 6 October, pp. 47, 50.

New propellant evaluated for Trident second stage. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 13 October, pp. 15-19.

Defence equipment notes. (Includes comment on Australian acquisitions.) *Flight International*, 4 December, pp. 817-819.

US Army thwarted on binarics (nerve-gas re-armament — editorial comment.) *New Scientist* (UK), 16 October, p. 131.

Spot on around the globe (US Navy has implemented two navigational systems to provide world coverage. The first Omega, is close to completion despite international controversy. Incl. comment relating to the system in Australia.) *New Scientist*, 16 October, pp. 164-168.

NATO'S gap in the air. (Airborne Warning and Control System sought.) *Economist*, 6 December, p. 61.

Fight for peace. (Excerpts from remarks by former Defense Secretary Schlesinger, and a response to his challenge by Senator Edward Kennedy.) *Guardian Weekly* (UK), 7 December, p. 11.

Rebel conscripts rounded up. (French conscripts accused of attempting to demoralize the Army, Socialist Party accused of subversion.) *Guardian Weekly*, 7 December, p. 11.

Sweden — a Soviet ally? *Intelligence Digest* (London), 1 December, p. 6.

Anti-tank helicopter training spurred. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 20 October, pp. 41-45.