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ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 316, September 1975

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The lone piper leading a column of APCs from 2 Cav Regt during a quiet moment at the end of the day during Exercise Irish Hussar held in the Broken Hill area.

DEPARTMENTAL ORGANISATION AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

- A Civilian Perspective

*Address to the Royal Institute of Public Administration in June 1975
by Sir Arthur Tange, CBE, Secretary, Department of Defence*

IN what I say tonight, I shall not be saying very much to you about the Profession of Arms. I am not competent to do so. I shall speak to you about administration, in the company of practitioners or students of administration, and I am afraid you will therefore be denied a picture of the great professional skill and organisational ability of our Navy, Army and Air Force which would be intrinsically more interesting.

But to comprehend what a Department does in association with the Defence Force, one must know something of the characteristics of the Defence Force today.

More particularly, I need to impress upon you the complexity of the technology which is involved. It is involved when a warship is assessing an invisible adversary at sea; or a long-range maritime patrol aircraft has to find and identify exactly an obscured or underwater object off our coast; or the Army engages in targeting in difficult terrain. In other fields, like the obtaining and sharing of information, highly sophisticated technologies are involved. It follows that we will find in the Armed Services a wide spectrum of professional and technical and managerial skills.

Sir Arthur Harold Tange, CBE, was appointed Secretary of the Department of Defence in 1970 and is the most senior civilian in Australia's defence establishment. From 1965-70 he served as Australian High Commissioner to India and Ambassador to Nepal; from 1954-65 he was Secretary of the Department of External Affairs. The reorganization of the defence group at present being carried out followed the submission to the Government of the Tange Report about which widespread comment has arisen. It is planned to publish in later issues further authoritative statements on the reorganization.

This address is published in the September issue of *Public Administration* and is reprinted in the *Army Journal* with permission.

But one of my purposes is to remind you of the wide spectrum of civilian skills which are called upon in the supply, support, advising and system of control and administration of the Armed Services and to draw to the attention of this Institute the interesting tests of administrative ingenuity that arise. Moreover, what we create to serve the priorities of peace has also to be capable of translation, in the relevant time period, to the requirements of low or high intensity conflict — in short, the kind of war that we have to prepare for.

Defence organisation in any country is much concerned with the framework and the principles within which the Services and Public Service advisers work together — the public servants being variously advisers to the Services or to the Minister, and, in certain material matters, executors of the Minister's policies and of the requirements imposed by Parliament or Statutory Rules (as in the case of expenditure and stores control).

Unlike other large employers, the administrators of the Defence Force have unique responsibilities for the supply, training, housing, welfare and morale of those in employment. Moreover, efficiency standards have to be found by the administrators and managers of annual Defence outlay of around \$1650M by means other than commercial accounting and profit results.

All these matters create challenges to good administration.

I could not now address more than a few of them.

Currently, there are some 69,000 uniformed members of the Permanent Defence Forces backed up by some 25,000 Reserve members. These are supported by approximately 31,000 civilians.

The activities and responsibilities in which these 100,000 full-time Crown employees are engaged vary greatly in intensity of skill as well as type of skill. They include our fighting force: men in the Army's field force, the Air Force's operational squadrons and those manning Navy's combat ships. They include the provision of clerical assistance and maintenance support to the Services in all the things they do in the field. They include those preparing intelligence and strategic assessments, and force structure options and policy advice at the level of higher command.

The use — and potentiality for use — of civilian manpower in support of the Defence Force can be better understood by observing

first, the broad categories of occupation into which the permanent members in the Defence Force are currently deployed:

<i>Service Employments</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage of Total</i>
Combat Forces	23,850	34.5
Stores, Supply, Communication and Logistic Support	12,920	19.0
Support to Reserve Forces	1,740	2.5
Training (trainers and trainees)	17,000	24.5
Scientific Research and Development	400	0.5
Central Policy and Regional Administrative Support	2,820	4.0
Computing Services	140	0.2
Service Command and District Headquarters	7,000	10.0
Dockyards, Workshops and Repair Facilities	3,300	4.8
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	69,170	100.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>

I now turn to the 31,000 civilians. Using the same classification as for Service personnel they are located as follows:

<i>Civilian Employment</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage of Total</i>
Direct Support of combat forces	670	2.0
Stores, Supply, Communication and other logistic support	7,680	24.5
Training (support to training of the Defence Force)	1,890	6.0
Scientific Research and Development	6,050	19.5
Central Policy and Regional Administration and Financial and Personnel Management	4,940	16.0
Computing Services	570	1.5
Service Command and District Headquarters	2,830	9.0
Support for Reserve Forces	180	0.5
Dockyards, Workshops and Repair Facilities	6,590	21.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	31,400	100.0
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These figures do not include salaried staff of defence factories which are a charge against Defence Outlay.

The popular concept of the Public Service clerk or storeman as an aide to the military man in preparing and training for war in our defence is true only as far as it goes. There are indeed some 15,000 civilians, mostly under the control of Service officers, who work in storehouses, repair facilities and communication centres and general maintenance. They are used to an extent for vehicle and aircraft maintenance and extensively for ship maintenance. Use varies between Services: Navy looks to civilians extensively on shore, RAAF less so.

Studies suggest that civilian manpower costs less than the equivalent number in uniform. But transferability is obviously limited. Civilians are not expected to fight; and they retain the right to withhold their labour, which the Serviceman does not. The assumptions that ought to be made about the probability of deployments to operational theatres of war are relevant. Expectation of performance by private contractors is another factor determining whether Servicemen will be used.

In the past two decades along with the escalating technology has gone a much enlarged reliance on support from civilians — in activities that change faster, perhaps, than fixed conceptions about the role of the Colonel's clerk. The Commanding Officer needs, depending on levels, a financial adviser to help him in his command. But, as an example, he is also now extraordinarily dependent on civilian computer operators and programmers and the people who maintain communications to enable him to call up urgently needed maintenance equipment or centrally held stores, or to tap personnel records to decide postings, or to have his troops paid, or to know what maintenance is due on an aircraft.

As we have seen, civilians are employed in other more professional activities in naval construction and in laboratories — eg, in naval design, in engineering assessment, in research and in engineering development, in quality control. The Defence Force is also heavily dependent on skills in the private sector.

Public servants also have a significant place in those activities which, under the Minister, shape the strategic objective, the intelligence assessments, deployment plans, international defence associations, planning and implementation of the physical infrastructure of the three

Services in Australia, the analysis involved in shaping their size and equipment, and the central policy control of expenditure and the use of funds. About 300 are so engaged, in association with uniformed counterparts up to the top level.

Of the remaining 4,000 civilians in central and regional administration the majority are concerned with financial management in a department of state which is a large employer and large spender and in respect of which the Secretary has functions in relation to the correct and proper use of funds. This includes financial advice and management (about 1,330 civilians) — personnel management to ensure conformity to approved scales and entitlements (about 670), provision of general office and management services (about 1,250) and other technical works and administrative support (about 1,400) to the Services.

I turn now to consider, first, the process for managing manpower levels (as distinct from the personnel themselves which, in the case of the uniformed manpower, is a professional function for the military profession); and, secondly, the Departmental process for bringing to Government decision, under the discipline of a five year rolling programme and the financial parameters of that programme, the equipment bids of the Services. The first involves an expenditure of about \$1,000M per annum on pay, allowances and pensions; while annual expenditure on equipment and its maintenance has averaged over the past five years some \$300M.

Manpower Management

Four years ago, when the Minister initiated the Five Year Defence Programme, it was clear that prospective costs per unit of manpower, and the levels of total manpower then employed, would put a great strain on likely financial resources. To a large extent, the choice was between keeping manpower and getting new capital.

A concerted effort, started in 1972, reviewed the use of Service and civilian manpower. The Chiefs of Staff supported this review. The process was available as a means to effect the objectives and parameters of the present Government when it entered office.

The process was iterative. From a scanning of bids to enter the Programme, an assessment was made of the potential trade-off between manpower and capital items. Manpower reductions were then allocated, necessarily tentatively, and pragmatically, amongst various

elements. Certain policy stipulations were introduced — for example, that in areas involving military operational capabilities the adequacy of the “core force” was not to be impaired. The selected and main sacrifice was the disbanding of one of the four squadrons of Mirage aircraft (storing the aircraft) and paying off HMAS *Sydney* a year earlier than previously planned.

The effects of potential reductions in hundreds of areas were explored. A marginal approach was used: the effect of giving up manpower in activities conceived to be lower priority was put to managers throughout the organisation for comment. They were required, in effect, to justify the use of their manpower. A Manpower Programming Group, set up centrally, helped to co-ordinate the exercise and assist in negotiations.

The final judgements, and options and recommendations to the Minister, were made by the Defence Force Development Committee, which includes the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, the three Service Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Department of Defence.

In the two years 1973/74 and 1974/75 civilian manpower has been reduced by just on 5,000, including some 500 in factories. Service manpower has been reduced by some 1,100 in the Navy and 1,170 in the Air Force. In the two years, Army volunteer manpower was increased by 350 while conscripted manpower fell by 2,800. The net movement in all forms of manpower was a reduction of 9,700. The civil reductions were made without retrenchment by adjusting recruitment to the loss of staff by normal wastage. This complicated the task, and some imbalance and loss of efficiency naturally results.

The manpower reductions made those years, have yielded a direct saving (ie, pay and allowances) of some \$70M a full year, in present-day prices. This would amount to \$700M over a ten-year period. It is a very significant amount of money.

Manpower reviews are continuing as an integral part of the Five Year Defence Programme. The new bulk establishment control system in the Department gives us much greater flexibility in the use of manpower. We are examining activities and organisation. We already know where some manpower savings could be made but we know also we would be spending more money on buildings (such as relocated stores) and equipment to achieve them.

The Defence Programming Process for Equipment

The essence of the Five Year Defence Programme system is to arrive at a budget for only the first year of the programme but in the context of a currently projected line of development of the force structure (ie, all the manpower, equipment, works, infrastructure and other resources which provide our defence capability) programmed over the subsequent five years — and, where feasible, substantially more.

Putting aside inherent theoretical problems of marginal trade-offs, programming in the Defence field has to adjust itself to three practical matters.

The first is that the lead time from financial commitments (eg, to construct a system of naval facilities or to order a complex aircraft system) to the time when significant expenditure and deliveries occur is often three or more years. Hence the necessity — on practical grounds — to make those forward estimates of strategic needs that attract much controversy. They are needed because we need all possible aids to help ensure that today's contractual commitments to certain future defence capabilities give us what we are most likely to need, but do not pre-empt future decisions on other capabilities which are made necessary because of changes in international situations or because of new technology or new financial levels.

Those more dogmatic Press editors who dispute the value of ten or fifteen year probability forecasts made by advisers to Governments might reflect on the fact that, with or without the help of those advisers, Governments of every political party make such a forecast implicitly in every decision in Cabinet to buy or not to buy defence equipment. What is involved is simply whether there should be an organised — and hopefully intelligent — process of throwing light on the subject for them with the benefit of the information, including intelligence, to which Government advisers have access. Whether we get it right should be the matter for debate.

The second practicality is that a Defence Force planned on the most rational evidence of the requirements of the future may not produce a present force which has a credible effectiveness to perform the tasks which various forms of public opinion claim it must be ready to perform now rather than await the future. That public or group opinion may be Parliamentary, or that of patriotic organisations, or expressed opinion of the involved Service professionals, or the expressed

opinion of commercial and industrial interests. It may be objective and it may not. I would offer the opinion that to avoid the dilemma through increasing the defence vote would be expensive beyond the willingness of either side of politics. The amount of objective public analysis and discussion of these rival claims on the taxpayers' money to defend Australia — with alternative emphasis on today or the future — is, in Australia, regrettably small. You are more likely to read in your newspaper about an alleged personality clash in Defence or the grievance of an employee.

The third practical matter is that although we conceptually put behind us the concept of "fair shares" for each Service, and we aim to satisfy needs on a Defence Force capability rather than a single Service basis, each Service is a living organism requiring the enthusiastic response of its members, and morale has to be watched.

The starting point for the Defence Programme is the endorsed statement of our strategic objectives — and more particularly their derived defence and defence force objectives, since not all of the strategic objectives need be met by defence responses.

We have had, in the past, different strategic assumptions in different Services, separately arrived at and on questionable capacity for research and objective analysis. Where contingent variations — for example, of threats — need to be assumed, these should derive from an organised process. This the present system provides.

The presentation of data from the Services and Department on the physical and financial aspects of defence planning is related not to automatic replacement of an existing capability but to the capabilities or objectives or end purposes being sought — such as, for example, air defence or maritime surveillance or heavy lift.

In this way, we try to get to grips with the costs of definable defence activities. It is our hope to present Parliament with more meaningful financial statements of what purpose is served by expenditure (but there is the familiar problem of attributing the cost of multi-purpose expenditure).

We make an explicit quantitative analysis, as far as possible, of alternative ways of achieving given objectives, weighing up costs and capabilities. Both new and existing defence capabilities are examined. For example, you can conduct surveillance by buying ships or aircraft as vehicles (and each will have their advocates) for electronic and other

measures; or you can do certain things from land; or you can combine them. Specific attention is given to the increment in capability achieved by an increment in cost, so that trade-offs at the margin can be made not only within any one capability area but also between different capability areas.

Application of Analysis

There are substantial difficulties in expressing, in sufficiently quantitative terms for cost-benefit and other forms of systematic analysis, the defence responses called for by the strategic assessment. But many factors can be quantified, and we find the resulting analysis of great value in illuminating issues and answering questions that arise in what is, at the end, very largely a judgemental process — in which those who will be using the weapons have a powerful voice. It is of course, true that the closer we get to decisions on particular generic weapons and equipment, within a given defence capability area, the more applicable operational and systems analysis becomes.

When the strategic outlook in Australia's region presents no evidence of an imminent serious threat to our sovereignty or dangerous contingency, and when Government spending policies emphasise social objectives, the proportion of defence money available for force development (which is not all of it) will permit only relatively gradual change in the structure of the Force, in an incremental or marginal manner.

There are two consequences for force structure methodology. It leads to the concept of the "Core force" — a force adequate for our limited present needs and foreseeable contingencies, within which we can maintain the necessary military skills and provide an effective basis for expansion if demanded by future external events. Secondly, and in the analytical domain, it calls for a new range of analytical studies to do with the feasibility of force expansion — and timely expansion in the right direction, which is a vital matter for our security. Thus we are exploring an approach to force structure recommendations which supplements the conventional one based on scenarios of threat to Australia or its allies.

Strategic and military judgement will remain the predominant influence. This is not the least because the "terminal force" — the force to which we may expand if events make it necessary — can only be estimated with difficulty, because we are dealing with the much

longer term in respect of which strategic and technological projections are notoriously uncertain.

Administrative and Organisational Method

To incorporate well based and experienced judgement, our planning system at Defence is fully consultative. Defence policy advice, which is presented to the Minister for Defence by the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee or the Secretary of the Department of Defence, is founded — in respect of major policy matters affecting the interests of the Services — on committee minutes. The process culminating in these minutes draws on relevant areas of professional advice and in this connection there are 340 Service officers working in all major areas of the Department and these are being progressively increased to 440 with the progressive implementation of the Defence reorganisation. Dissent is provided for and expressed as necessary.

Now those who make a fetish of avoiding inter-departmental or inter-authority committees may disapprove of this. But I do not know what could be put in its place except either an authoritarian system or one which puts an elite of policy advisers close to the Minister, and which relegates managers to the function of receiving policy direction. This concept enjoys some support in the contemporary discussion of future government administration — from, in particular I imagine, those who presently enjoy the exhilaration of policy advising rather than the tests of being managers. The concept would not work in the Department of Defence — which is why I avoided it in my recommendations — and I predict it will not work elsewhere unless it accepts two different facts of life. The first is that men of experience and knowledge want an adequate voice in the direction of their affairs. The second is different. Oppositions do tend to hold Ministers accountable — however unreasonably — for knowing what goes amiss in operational and action areas; and separating them away from the policy area is likely (on past Defence experience) to aggravate the Minister's difficulty and risks.

Administrative reforms within Defence since the early 1970s, involving the as yet incomplete reorganisation of five Departments, have sought to strengthen consultation in policy advice and, by changing procedures, to introduce a *more direct relationship* of operational users/managers (the Services higher Commands) with the policy analysis and advising process.

Service Boards of Management — management by committee ostensibly under Ministerial supervision as to individual Service policy — are to be abolished. I see nothing but advantage in this. Fragmented responsibility, potentially working to different Defence policies because of the problem of ensuring consistency, and too removed from the policy machinery of the Department and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, will be replaced by a dyarchy if Parliament approves the legislation. Under the Minister's general control and administration of the Defence Force a single military officer would have command of the Defence Force and he and the Secretary would jointly have the administration of the Defence Force except for matters falling within the chain of military command or any matter specified by the Minister.

The Department will have unique features in several respects. While remaining formally under a Permanent Head, its resources are available to advise also the Chief of Defence Force Staff; the Department has, in a number of positions, senior Service officers, some of them bearing two-hatted responsibilities concurrently to the Secretary and their own Chief of Staff; and the Secretary to the Department is enjoined in directives which the Minister of the day will be asked to sign at the relevant time to be responsive to the operational requirements of the Chiefs of Staff in his management of the resources and the control of that part of the advisory machinery which reports to him. To aid this responsiveness and the comprehension by the Secretary's organisation of the military and Service considerations involved, he is expected to use a system of committees for the development of policy advices to the Minister. This machinery of collective advice is expected to operate particularly where matters of military judgement on the most effective way of conducting operations of war, or preparing and training for them, have to be reconciled with general government policies (diplomatic, social, economic, federal, and so forth) and with the requirement to conform to the requirements of financial regularity and correctness of expenditure.

On professional matters, the military profession will have its own means of consultation and of direct access to the Minister — in the form of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

In each Service, the authority now diffused among five or six senior Service officers and a senior departmental officer comprising the Board will be concentrated in a line of command from the Chief of Staff (who will be subject to the Chief of Defence Force Staff).

The result of all this will be that machinery for collective deliberation and consultation will be preserved but, for the Government, there will be a clearer definition of where responsibility rests for anything that may be done or which fails to be done in the Defence Force.

For many years, we had a clumsy, divisive system of separate Service administration, each with its own Minister, with the Department of Defence trying to exercise Prime Minister Menzies' direction to impose on them the policies of the Minister for Defence.

A principal object of the reorganisation has been to bring the doers closer to defence policy and to become defence policy advisers. The object has been not simply to satisfy a single Service interest; but to give them the responsibility to find collective solutions that involve yielding some single Service objective. More than that, the method will help ensure that policy advising officers — in uniform or Public Servants — are exposed to the practical intuition of officers of Services whose use in war of the weapons under debate will determine the country's safety and sovereignty. The process also ensures greater access by all to studies and analyses in support of the judgements which, at the last, prevail.

In a defence system, I see no way of separating policy making and operational management one from the other without generating the all too familiar "we and they" situation, with attendant suspicion and disrespect for each other's contribution. We have turned our backs on this course — I hope finally.

In a defence system, it is not surprising if the advisory process tends to be stratified hierarchically. But within the constraints of an inherently hierarchical system, ideas for reform do emerge and are encouraged. By way of an example, within the past week the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary have formally endorsed the concept of working groups or working teams, particularly at the levels which correspond broadly with the top end of the Third Division of the Public Service to work — as the text says — and I quote:

“ . . . as teams where experience in military, professional and administrative expertise is required to satisfy the function of the particular organisational element. In these cases a rigidly defined superior/subordinate situation is not required or desirable as it is better for the positions to work as teams with the most appropriate for the task in hand being designated as team leader by the head of the organisational element concerned.”

At the same time, I hope that not too much will be made of this as a model in circumstances different from the peculiar relationship of the Third Division public servant and a Service officer. Work value and rank/classification (with attendant salary) are assessed by separate authorities with some fundamentally different criteria. The meeting ground is shared responsibility and pooled experience and policy judgement, and the organisational solution is a pragmatic one.

Where formal committees are used, much emphasis is placed on providing them with competent staff work, which in most cases is a Departmental responsibility. This reform — inaugurated by my predecessor some six years ago — greatly improved the quality of committee work in Defence, and improved its relevance to the on-going requirements of Minister and Government, and its responsiveness to change.

When, as happens, the value of a recommended organisation is questioned because it does not conform to an overseas model — and, dependent on age, political outlook and a few other things, the models tend to be British or American or Swedish or Irish or Canadian — I am bound to say that I would be happier if Australians had more confidence in their own capacity to devise the administrative apparatus and principles suited to our own isolated, continental, federated country.

The imitative urge is strong.

When the Committee of Enquiry into Government Procurement Policy reported in May last year, it wrote a section on purchasing for the Department of Defence. While its recommendation to treat defence procurement like any other procurement has subsequently not been accepted in the Government's legislation, it is the argument of the Committee which illustrates my point. In its Chapter 8 it accepted, as the foundation for its solution for Australia, what it believes works well in Canada and what the Rayner Report had to say about experience in the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Committee listened to argument but did not make case studies of contemporary defence procurement practice in Australia, which has been extensively modified during the past five years and not least since the implementation of the Tange Report. Nor, I think I can safely say, did our British/American/Canadian friends think it relevant to study Australian defence procurement in deciding what their domestic situation demanded.

The significance of Australian industrial interests in influencing Australian defence procurement — such as the influence may be — has no connection with the influence exercised on their government by firms of two major industrial systems (the United States or Britain) whose government policy is to develop large weapons production with the intention and ability to export to the world's markets. Our problems (and intentions) are I believe of a different — even opposite — kind. In any case, the strategic situation of Canada has little obvious relevance to Australia's.

As another example, our own Service organisation has grown under, as one would expect, a considerable influence of British tradition and of the values and ethics of the British Services. But we should not accept all their models; and I have to disagree with those who want a Defence Council in Australia because the British have it — not least because I know it never meets. But already many organisational forms suited to the Australian scene have been introduced by our Services and I would predict many more.

Shifting to a wider scene my focus on imitative wisdom, I have lately read denigratory opinions about the unwillingness of the Australian Public Service to respond to policy changes whose authors claim for their writing a suspect academic scholarship. They appear to me to rest their sometimes quite morbid judgements on regurgitations in Australia of the *New Statesman* and *Nation* and the published frustrations of certain of Mr Harold Wilson's Ministers about their inability to reform British society and economy in the 1960s.

There seems to be an unnecessary amount of to-do about the existence of ministerial advisers and about the so called exclusiveness of relations between Minister and Department — as one important personality described it. I suggest that to talk of abolishing non-existent exclusiveness is an Aunt Sally — if the argument is about whether Ministers have sources of advice other than public servants. A more constructive subject for discussion would be whether we can afford to await the conclusions of the Royal Commission before there is a *reaffirmation of the important continuing values* which political parties want to see preserved, and which they will respect, in the Public Service; and which they want to see defined for the first time to govern *the new apparatus of advising*. I do not believe that any political party that has been in power in Australia has adequately defined the obliga-

tions and ethics of service expected of Ministerial advisers. There is one indisputable fact — the public is paying for all of us.

Leaving that digression, I doubt whether the advocates of the adoption of American legislation requiring publication of government administrative papers perceive that the inevitable consequence of publication of policy advice by a Department would be, under our system of Opposition pressure on Ministers, that any public servant whose opinion would carry public weight would be a political embarrassment unless the Minister had confidence that his publishable opinions would conform to the party political convenience of Ministers at the time. I believe Ministers of any party would choose Permanent Heads accordingly.

I am one who believes that, if the top end of the Service of which I have been an officer carrying some responsibilities to various governments since the late 1940s, is to be politicized, it ought to be done by conscious decision — and serious debate about the consequences — and not be the accident of adopting ideas from a fundamentally different system.

This lecture does not purport to deal with military command organisation. But it is under review — and it needs to be, given the historical fact that in war Australia's Services have tended to be absorbed individually into the command arrangements of greater allies.

An unavoidable consequence of this is that we could not develop and exercise Australian higher command arrangements. I know that progress is being made by my Service colleagues in studying various contingencies.

Defence programming is a method ready at hand for a government that wants to change the direction of spending. It has been so used since December 1972. A government can achieve such a change in a more orderly way than if obliged to rely solely upon the clumsy and inherently short sighted Parliamentary estimating procedure. A large employer and contractor cannot effect a large change in a period as short as August to June 30 without the probability of an overshoot into the following year larger than wanted. The foundation of a Defence Rolling Programme is, of course, the willingness of Government to make a deliberate judgement on financial guidance (meaning the limit of funds in each of five succeeding years) and to give it to the Defence Minister as a guide to him — a best estimate without commit-

ment — in planning the future. Within it he can require his Service Chiefs and civilian advisers to make the logical choices among competing weapons and manpower and installations which, within collective judgement, produce the more advantageous Defence result. The alternative to a Defence Programme can be a scramble and propaganda campaign for funds. ✕



CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.

Australia's Maritime Services — a need for forward planning. *The Navy*, May-June, pp. 3-9.

Question marks over Nato. *German International*, April, pp. 6-8.

The neutrality tightrope. *Sweden now*, 2, 1975, pp. 5-6. (Sweden's foreign policy difficulties, related to IEP, OECD and export of war materiel).

South east Asia must rechart future now. *The Mirror* (Singapore), May 19, pp. 1, 7 and 8. (Excerpts of a speech by Lee Kuan Yew in Kingston, April 30. Includes comments on the 'nuclear arch').

Central Registry for Small Arms. *Army Logistician*, May-June, p. 37.

The New Military power of Vietnam. *Pacific Defence Reporter*, June, pp. 2-3. (A reporter's tally of men and equipment.)

Commentary after Vietnam. (Denis Warner). *Pacific Defence Reporter*, June, pp. 10-11.

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Indian Ocean Naval Arms Race. *Pacific Defence Reporter*, June, pp. 29-31.

S.E.A. scene: Thailand and the next problem area. *Pacific Defence Reporter*, June, pp. 34-35.

Chinese-Soviet rivalry in Vietnam. *Foreign Report*, 18 June, pp. 4-5.

A Vietnamese Fatahland? *Foreign Report*, 18 June, p. 6.

Detente and Atlanticism. *New Times: A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs*, June, pp. 4-5. (NATO)

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Weather control: an instrument for war? *Survival*, March/April, pp. 64-68.

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Strategic Survey, 1974. Contents:

—Perspective, pp. 1-11;

—The Middle East, pp. 12-22;

—Economic crisis and security, pp. 23-32;

—New factors in international security, pp. 33-56;

—The super powers and detente, pp. 57-68;

—Conflicts, pp. 69-93;

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President Ford calls for seapower second to none. *Shipyard Weekly*, 24 April, 1975, pp. 1-2.


The Commonwealth. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, March, 1975, pp. 112-120.

Australia/U.S.S.R. scientific agreement. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, March, 1975, pp. 130-132.

DOD command and control activities (U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense). *Signal*, May/June, 1975, pp. 18-21.

Defence policy (British). *Survey of Current Affairs*, April, 1975, pp. 131-136.

(Current Defence Readings also appear on pages 46 and 60.)



ORIENTEERING: **a sport of military value,** **or military training?**

Captain L. O'Dea
Royal Australian Infantry

IN order to assess any military training value in orienteering one must understand at least what orienteering is all about.

Orienteering derived its name from what Swedish Army Major Killander in 1918 described as the 'sport of orientation'. It is the application by individuals of map reading, navigation and observation skills under competitive conditions which in turn demand and develop physical fitness, mental alertness, determination and the ability to make decisions whilst under stress.

There are many varieties of orienteering competitions but they can be grouped under two broad headings:

- a. events which require the individual to select his own route, and
- b. events which require the individual to follow a given route.

However, two factors remain constant for all adaptations of orienteering competition:

- a. the ability to know one's location at all times, and
- b. the ability to move at speed over varying types of terrain.

In military terms, map reading and physical fitness.

Orienteering Competitions

Three examples of competitions will be detailed to allow the reader to identify and evaluate points of military training significance,

Captain L. O'Dea graduated from OCS in 1965 and has served as a platoon commander at 3TB, 5RAR and the Infantry Centre until 1969. He was posted to 3RAR as a company second in command 1969-71 and then as Adjutant 1RVF until 1972. He completed one year of training at the British Army School of Physical Training in 1973 and is currently SO2 (P&RT) at the Directorate of Army Training, Army Office.




Figure 1

and to compare orienteering to current map reading practice undertaken by all ranks in the Army. The physical training benefits are obvious and remain true even if the less physically fit competitors walk.

Cross-country or Free Orienteering (see Figure 1)

At the start point, the competitor is given a map on which a number of control points are marked and the sequence in which he (she) must locate the control points is indicated in numerical order. The competitor also receives an event card on which to mark the colour or punch mark allocated to each control point, and a brief written description of the area surrounding each control point. Competitors are then required to select their own route to each control point and navigate around the course in the quickest possible time. Generally, competitors depart at one or two minute intervals to avoid congestion and to ensure individual effort is achieved. The competitor who locates all controls in the quickest time is the winner.



(Army Public Relations)

L/Cpl K. Martin of 6 RAR locates a control point during the 1974 Orienteering Championships in the ACT.




Figure 2

Line Orienteering (see Figure 2)

At the start point the competitor is given a map upon which a line is marked from start to finish point. The competitor must navigate along the given route. A number of stands are established along the route at which the competitor must identify his (her) location on the map and perform a set task, eg strip and assemble a weapon or calculate a bearing and range to a distant object. Points are allocated for correct identification of each stand and accurate completion of each task. The competitor who accumulates the most points in the quickest time is the winner.

Score Orienteering (see Figure 3)

Each competitor is given an event card and a map at the start point. This map may have up to 30 to 40 control points marked on it, and each control point is allocated a points value depending on the distance from the start and the type of terrain in which each is located. The object of such an event is for the competitor to accumulate as many points as possible within a given time frame by selecting and locating as many control points as possible. Alternatively the competitor may be required to locate all controls in any order.

The essence of good orienteering is the correct use of the compass and map, coupled with the physical and mental determination of the participant to quickly locate successive control points and to complete the course. Such a sequence involves techniques in map orientation, compass setting, decision-making in the selection of the fastest route after consideration of vegetation and terrain information depicted on the map (the shortest route is frequently not the fastest route) and the physical and mental determination to complete the given course.

The navigational aspect of orienteering generally relates to the principle of fast movement to an easily identifiable point close to the control point, and then precise navigation to the control point. This principle is illustrated in Figure 4.

a. Principle of orienteering:

(i) determine routes available, eg:

(a) direct route (Route 1),

(b) follow track and power line to saddle (Route 2),

(c) follow creek (Route 3), and

(d) follow high ground (Route 4);




Figure 3

- (2) select an attack point to be located before attempting to locate the control, eg:
 - (a) creek junction, or
 - (b) saddle;
- (3) check the vegetation and terrain:
 - (a) Routes 1 and 3 cross thick vegetation but perhaps the edge of the vegetation would assist navigation,
 - (b) Routes 1 and 4 require competitor to climb a hill unnecessarily, and
 - (c) Route 2 is a longer route;
- (4) the competitor must now select the route best suited to his navigation skill and running ability;
- (5) having selected the best route it is divided into two parts:
 - (a) course orienteering which entails the quickest possible movement to an attack point; and
 - (b) fine navigation to the control point, usually by compass bearing and pace counting.

Compasses

The most suitable types of compasses for orienteering are those which are constructed of light transparent material and incorporate a protractor in their construction. Military prismatic compasses and protractors are not normally used in orienteering competitions because of their bulk, replacement value and the fact that two separate items are required to work from the map.

Maps

Orienteering activities can be planned using standard military maps at 1:50,000 scale; however, much of the value of an event is lost at this scale. In national and international orienteering competitions scales of 1:15,000, 1:20,000 and 1:25,000 are accepted as standard. Major differences between orienteering maps and standard military maps are:

- a. Eastings on orienteering maps are aligned to magnetic north so that magnetic variation is of no consequence in calculations. These maps should be re-gridded at intervals of about 10 years.
- b. Vegetation conditions are illustrated in terms of restriction to movement and observation.




Figure 4

- c. Individual features which could aid accurate navigation are illustrated on orienteering maps, eg termite mounds, unusual trees and rock formations.
- d. Track conditions are shown varying from all weather roads to animal foot pads.

The reason for this comprehensive field-work and map illustration is simply to ensure that participants have the maximum amount of information on which to base route selection and facilitate speedy navigation.

The development of orienteering as a sport in the Australian Army has been effected over a period of six years, during which individuals and some units have provided sufficient impetus to warrant competition at Army level followed by participation of an Army representative team in the Australian Orienteering Championships in 1974 and 1975. WRAAC and RAAMC were also represented in the women's division of the National Championship in 1975.

Conclusion

There are fundamental differences between orienteering and most military situations:

- a. In orienteering it is the individual who is subjected to stress rather than the tactical group of a section or platoon.
- b. Speed over the ground is of greater importance than stealth.
- c. The competitive success replaces survival as the ultimate objective.

There are however, sufficient points of similarity between orienteering and many tactical situations which involve navigation, to support the use of orienteering as one of the most objective training activities available to the Army to attain and maintain military proficiency.

One generally associates orienteering with movement on foot, but the concept could be expanded to include mechanized movement by cycle, motor cycle or across country vehicle. Such a concept could allow greater numbers to gain an intimate knowledge of the terrain and conditions in the northern areas of Australia, where control points could consist of POL and rations pre-positioned by air.

It is contended that there is great sporting and military training value in orienteering and, regardless of what concept is applied the fundamental military skills of map reading and navigation are not only exercised, but are essential for success. ✂



Its Inauguration and Immediate Military Problems

Major Warren Perry (RL)

PRIOR to 1870 the military defence of the Australian colonies was the responsibility of the British Government in London and it stationed British troops in Australia for that purpose. By arrangements with the Australian governments these troops were withdrawn in 1870 and thereafter these colonial governments became responsible for their own land defence.

The demands of defence were among the strongest reasons for bringing about the federation of the Australian colonies. These demands manifested themselves in a variety of forms for more than 40 years before the inauguration on 1 January 1901 of the Commonwealth of Australia. The inaugural ceremonies took place in Centennial Park in Sydney on that date when the first Governor-General of the new Commonwealth of Australia, Lord Hopetoun, and his first Ministry, under the leadership of Mr Edmund Barton,¹ were sworn in.

The Commonwealth's first Minister for Defence, Sir James Robert Dickson, a former Premier of Queensland, died in Sydney nine days after he had been sworn in. His successor, Sir John Forrest,² was sworn in a week later on 17 January 1901. Forrest was obliged to inform

Major E. W. O. Perry, ED, MA, BEc, FRHSV (RL), Military Historian, Editor of the *Victorian Historical Journal*, and contributor to the *Army Journal*, Canberra, and *The Australian Dictionary of Biography*.

himself quickly of the political, technical and administrative problems of his Defence portfolio. But in doing this he was handicapped in two major ways. He was without the necessary machinery of Government with which to get on with the job; and he had no Federal Defence advisers, either civil or military. But largely by the effluxion of time he was able to overcome some of his handicaps in three main stages. He was:

1. until 1 March 1901:
 - a. without a permanent departmental head to advise him on the civil aspects of Defence administration;
 - b. without an organised and operating Department of Defence; and
 - c. without any naval and military forces to administer;
2. until 9 May 1901:
 - a. a member of a Cabinet without a Parliament; and
 - b. because of no Federal Parliament the Federal Cabinet was without the means for enacting urgently required Defence legislation;³
3. until 29 January 1902:
 - a. without a Federal military adviser;⁴ and
 - b. without a Commander-in-Chief to command the Commonwealth's military forces and to execute the Government's Defence policy in so far as it concerned the land forces.

When the Federal Government assumed control of the Defence forces of the several States, on 1 March 1901,⁵ the Minister for Defence said, in a message to these newly acquired Naval and Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, that: 'By the assumption of the control of the Forces by the Commonwealth, one organisation and one control will take the place of the six separate controls with differing organisations.'⁶ This transference of Defence powers and responsibilities from the States to the Commonwealth brought two immediate benefits to the Federal Minister for Defence:

1. he was provided in fact on 1 March 1901, as he had been in law since 1 January 1901, with a Department of Defence; and
2. he was provided with a civil adviser who was, of course, the Permanent Head of this newly acquired Department of

Defence, which had formerly been the Department of Defence of Victoria.

It was in these circumstances that Captain Collins⁷ was translated from the smaller stage of the former Colony of Victoria to the larger one of the Commonwealth of Australia; and in coming he brought with him a future Permanent Head of the Department of Defence, Thomas Trumble. Collins thus became the first of the Department of Defence's eight permanent heads since Federation. At this time he was 48½ years of age; he had originally been an officer of the Royal Navy; later, in December 1878, he became an officer of the Victorian Navy; and in 1888 he left the Victorian Navy to become the Permanent Head of the Colony's Department of Defence *vice* the original occupant of that position, Major General Downes,⁸ who had vacated it at his own request. Collins was dynamic, industrious, articulate and efficient.

In Collins' time the Department of Defence in Melbourne, which administered Australia's naval and military forces and long after his time also its air force, had no counterpart in Whitehall. There the Admiralty, the War Office and in later years the Air Ministry were independent departments of state and their activities were co-ordinated in a variety of ways at Cabinet and ministerial levels until the creation in 1947 of the additional Ministry of Defence.⁹

Collins, as Permanent Head of the Department of Defence had laid upon him the threefold responsibility of managing the Department as a whole and its civil staff, of administering government and departmental policy and advising the Minister. The role of a permanent head in a service department was a difficult one in some ways. He had to live and work with service officers who formed a professional class with their own expertise; and he was never quite the master in his own house as was the case of a permanent head in a non-service department; and his official life, in dealing with his minister, service officers and civil officials called for infinite tact and patience based on a sound knowledge of human behaviour. Lord Salter, who was a civil officer in the Admiralty before the War of 1914-18, made an interesting comparison between life in a service and a non-service department for a civil servant in *Memoirs of a Public Servant*. He said: 'An ambitious and competent entrant would in general do much better to enter a civilian office, like the Treasury or Home Office, in which he could aspire to the highest place and the best work, rather than a service department, like the Admiralty or the War Office, in which he would

find a professional class . . . always on top'. Lord Salter went on to say that: 'In my early days no naval officer of however junior a rank was ever placed under the orders of any civilian official, whatever the latter's rank and seniority'; and that 'The civilian felt himself a member of a helot race'.¹⁰ But in Melbourne the Department of Defence's workload increased with the transference of Defence functions and responsibilities from the States to the Commonwealth and so Collins could dwell no more than momentarily on personal difficulties in conducting official business.

An appreciation of the situation before the opening of the first Federal Parliament in May 1901 would have shown Collins and his Minister, in so far as the military forces themselves were concerned, that:

1. The military forces in the various States were not in satisfactory conditions of preparedness for war in matters of organisation, administration, equipment, training and numbers.
2. These former State forces lacked uniformity in their systems of organisation and administration and these systems needed to be standardised.
3. On the whole the arms and equipment of these newly acquired State forces were obsolete; and they needed to be replaced by up to date arms and equipment of standard patterns.
4. The standards of training of all ranks, both in the permanent and part-time forces, were poor and uneven. This situation needed to be remedied in three main ways by:
 - a. the establishment of a military college for the training of cadets for subsequent commissions in combatant branches of the permanent military forces;¹¹
 - b. the provision of competent instructors for the training of regimental officers and other ranks; and
 - c. the conducting of courses of instruction, with reasonable frequency and regularity, at suitable centres throughout Australia.

There were hardly any reserve forces suitable for use in times of emergency.

However, the Minister's attention was deflected temporarily from the problems of this kind to a problem of a different kind. When the

Duke of Cornwall and York visited Victoria, he opened the First Session of the First Federal Parliament in Melbourne on Thursday 9 May 1901 with a pomp and ceremony to which Australians were unaccustomed. But before this day a minor crisis arose within the Forces over the command of the Australian troops in Melbourne during this royal visit. The incident involved the Commandant of the Forces in Victoria, Major General Downes, and the visiting Commandant of the Forces in New South Wales, Major General French. It arose over a mistaken order, issued in good faith by the Minister for Defence, which appointed French to command the parade at Flemington Racecourse on Friday 10 May 1901 when the Duke of Cornwall and York reviewed the troops. The incident was resolved satisfactorily by Sir John Forrest's skill and wisdom.¹² But it would not have arisen if there had been a Federal GOC-in-C; and it was another indicator of the urgent need for the Federal Government to appoint one.

The opening of the Federal Parliament had the effect of putting pressure on the Government to take the following action:

1. to inform Parliament of its Defence policy;
2. to enact the necessary legislation to enable this policy to be authorised and paid for; and
3. to provide the necessary machinery of government to execute this Defence policy. This involved, among other things, the following steps:
 - a. the appointment of a general officer to command, organise, equip and train the military forces of the Commonwealth; and
 - b. informing this general officer when appointed, of the means available to him to carry out the Government's Defence policy in so far as it concerned the military forces.

One of the dominant thoughts of Parliament was expressed by Senator Fraser of Victoria on 21 May 1901, when, during the debate on the Governor-General's Speech, he urged the need for a statement of Defence policy by the Government. He said: 'I have come to the conclusion that the first question for the Commonwealth Government, supported by the Commonwealth Parliament to seriously consider, is what form of defence we shall adopt ultimately?'¹³ Again, during the debate in the House of Representatives on the Supply Bill's proposed

Defence Vote, Mr Watson¹⁴ put the following proposition, on 12 June 1901, to the Minister for Defence:

'I would like the right honourable gentleman who has control of this Department to give some idea of the policy that is going to prevail in respect of defence. Before we pass any vote of this description we ought to know generally the lines which it is proposed to follow in regard to the expenditure. In this connection we might well be told the plan upon which the defences are to be based.'¹⁵

At this stage there was a wide gap between what the Minister for Defence should do and what he could do; and for reasons already indicated this question was not an easy one for him to answer in any way satisfying to the House. Sir John Forrest could not, therefore, say much, but he did say that:

'The Policy of the Government in regard to defence will be regulated by the Bill which we propose to introduce in a very few days.'

The Minister presumably had in mind here the introduction of the Defence Bill, on 9 July 1901, for its second reading; its first reading had already taken place a week earlier, on 5 June 1901.

When introducing the Defence Bill for its second reading, Sir John Forrest informed the House that: 'When I took charge of the Department of Defence, I was under the impression that I had not a very arduous duty before me, and that the Department would not give me a great deal of work or trouble'; but 'I regret to say I find that I have undertaken to control one of the most difficult and one of the most expensive departments of the Commonwealth'; and that 'I feel myself in the unfortunate position of controlling a department which takes everything in the way of money and gives nothing back and therefore, not a department to receive that support and assistance from the general public on ordinary occasions which are received by what are called paying departments.'¹⁶ This comment did not reflect the idle thoughts of an idle fellow, for Forrest was one of the most competent, forceful and experienced ministers in the first Federal Cabinet.

Although the Government subsequently withdrew this Defence Bill, on 26 March 1902, after it had been debated at some length in the House, it does contain features which show the Federal origins of parts

of later Defence legislation and practice. The Bill is, therefore, of considerable historical interest today and the following features of it are worth noting:

1. It vested the command-in-chief in the Governor-General.
2. It recognised that the Commonwealth's system of land defence was to be based largely on a part-time field force.
3. It provided for a general officer to command the forces and for a district commandant in each military district.
4. It provided for the creation of military districts the geographical boundaries of which corresponded, initially, with those of the States.
5. It provided that officers of either the permanent or citizen forces were eligible for posting to the appointment of District Commandant.¹⁷
6. It provided that in time of peace no officer was to have a higher rank than that of colonel with the exception that any officer holding a higher rank at the time of Federation could retain it.¹⁸
7. It provided for the determination of the seniority in the Commonwealth Military Forces of all officers on the Active List who were transferred from the military forces of the former Australian colonies.
8. It provided for the publication of an Australian Army List.

In the debate in the House of Representatives, which followed the introduction of the Bill, the problem was examined of:

1. obtaining a general officer on loan from the British Army to command Australia's military forces; or
2. selecting an officer for this purpose from those already serving in Australia's military forces.¹⁹

In the House of Representatives on 4 July 1901 the matter of the appointment of a GOC-in-C had been raised by Mr Watson and answered, as follows, by the Minister for Defence:²⁰

- Q. Have any arrangements yet been made relative to the appointment of a Commandant for the Australian Defence Force?
- A. Communications on the subject are in progress with the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, Lord Roberts.

Q. Is it proposed to confine the selection to Imperial officers?

A. This will depend on the outcome of the communication in question.

Q. What salary and allowances are proposed to be paid?

A. This has not yet been definitely settled.

By this time the Federal Government had, in fact, wisely decided that there was no officer in the Australian forces suitable for this appointment and five days later, on 9 July 1901, the Minister for Defence addressed the House again on this subject. He said: 'I would like to say one word with regard to the chief command of the forces. Whatever we do in the future, I think it is obligatory upon us now, to place at the head of our military forces, one of the most distinguished officers in His Majesty's Army — one who has seen active service and who has distinguished himself in South Africa.' Mr Watson interjected to say: 'There are plenty here who have done that.' To which the Minister replied: 'There are not many here of vast knowledge and experience perhaps. We want one of the best men in the Empire to start this machine, whatever we may do afterwards. We want a really good man to initiate our system of defence. We also want a man who is known to have a great regard for citizen soldiers. I believe, in fact I have reasons to know, that we can obtain such a man, and if I remain at the head of this department, I intend, whoever is appointed, to do my very utmost to see that the defence forces are placed upon a really solid foundation — a foundation upon which we can build and which will be likely to endure.'²¹

The Australian Press announced, in September 1901,²² that General Pole-Carew²³ had declined the Federal Government's offer of the appointment on the ground that the salary offered was insufficient. Later that month it was announced in the press that General Hildyard,²⁴ a former Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley, had also declined the Federal Government's offer of the appointment. Early in the following month it was said in the press that 'Interesting uncertainty continues to cloak the long delayed appointment of the commandant of the Federal forces'; that 'The Minister for Defence is determined that the fittest officers are to have the preference'; although 'Who are the fittest he will not undertake to say'; but 'he states that the Government intends to secure as Federal Commandant a 'strong' man, who, coming here free from all prejudice, favouritism and poli-

tical pressure, will see for himself, and then advise upon the officers to be appointed to the more responsible posts.²⁵ In the following month a cable from the Governor-General, dated 11 November 1901, to the Colonial Office in London read in part: 'Have reason to believe appointment of Hutton²⁶ would be well received if willing to come and if considered suitable.' About three weeks later, on 2 December 1901, the Prime Minister, Mr Barton, announced in the House the long-awaited news that:

'I promised the House a little while ago to make an announcement as to the command of the Federal Forces as soon as I was in a position to do so. I am now in a position to say that Sir Edward Hutton²⁷ . . . will be appointed to the command of the federated forces.'²⁸

Hutton was appointed, with effect from 26 December 1901, to command the Commonwealth Military Forces of Australia; and his salary was fixed at £2,500 per annum, exclusive of travelling allowances.

Despite the belatedness of Hutton's selection, his appointment was a popular one in Australia. About a week before the announcement of the appointment, two former Premiers of New South Wales, Sir George Dibbs and Sir George Reid, under whom Hutton had served before Federation,²⁹ expressed approval in press interviews of his suitability. Reid, who was at this time the Leader of the Federal Opposition, was reported to have said: 'I know of no other officer whose appointment would be likely to give greater satisfaction. He has always been a man with the power . . . of bracing officers and men up to a high pitch of efficiency'.³⁰

With the making of this decision to appoint Hutton to command Australia's military forces the Barton Government had arrived almost at the end of its first calendar year of office. An inspection of its Defence ledger for that year would have shown both debits and credits. But, nevertheless, it was much too early to strike a balance from which any reasonable conclusions could have been drawn about the first Federal Government's performance in the field of Military Defence. Such conclusions would have to wait until after General Hutton had taken up duty and been given a policy to implement.

NOTES

- ¹ Later the Rt Hon Sir Edmund Barton, PC, GCMG. Born 18 January 1849. Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia from 1 January 1901 to 24 September 1903. Died 7 January 1920.
- ² Later the Rt Hon Baron Forrest of Bunbury and Fifc. Born 22 August 1847. Minister for Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia from 17 January 1901 to 7 August 1903. Died 3 September 1918.
- ³ Even with the opening of the Federal Parliament in May 1901, the first Defence Act, *The Defence Act 1903*, was not assented to until 22 October 1903; and it did not come into force, with Regulations and Standing Orders issued thereunder, until 1 March 1904.
- ⁴ This was the strict legal situation. In practice, until the arrival of the Federal GOC-in-C, the Military Commandant in Victoria, Major General Downes, probably discharged these duties of military adviser in so far as he was able and was invited to do so by the Federal Minister for Defence.
- ⁵ *Commonwealth of Australia. Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution*. Printed by the Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1929, p. 119.
- ⁶ General Order of the Commandant of the Military Forces in Victoria, No. 22, dated 5 March 1901. The right of State Commandants to issue *General Orders* ceased when the Federal GOC-in-C assumed command.
- ⁷ Later Captain Sir Robert Henry Muirhead Collins, CMG. Born 20 September 1852. Secretary of the Department of Defence of the Colony of Victoria from 18 April 1888 to 28 February 1901. Secretary of the Department of Defence of the Commonwealth of Australia from 1 March 1901 to 28 February 1910. Died 19 April 1927.
- ⁸ Major General Major Francis Downes, CMG. Originally a regular officer of the British Army. Born 10 February 1834. Secretary of the Department of Defence of the Colony of Victoria from 7 April 1885 to 31 March 1888. Died 15 October 1923.
- ⁹ In 1940 Mr Churchill, with the approval of the King, assumed the title of Minister of Defence; but this action did not involve legislation or the creation of a Ministry. See *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay*. Heinemann, London, 1960, p. 158 and p. 405. In Great Britain today there is only one service department of state, the unified Ministry of Defence, it having, in April 1964, absorbed the functions of the now disbanded first Ministry of Defence, the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry.
- ¹⁰ Lord Salter, *Memoirs of a Public Servant*, Faber and Faber, London, 1961, p. 43.
- ¹¹ The Royal Military College of Australia was officially opened at Duntroon on 27 June 1911. See Perry, 'The Royal Military College of Australia: Its Golden Jubilee'. *United Service Quarterly*, Sydney, Vol. 15, No. 2, October 1961, pp. 2-6.
- ¹² Warren Perry, 'Major General M. F. Downes: A Biographical Sketch of Colonial Commandant.' *The Victorian Historical Magazine*. Vol. 41. Nos. 3 & 4, August-November 1970, pp. 466-467.
- ¹³ C.P.D. Session 1901-02. Vol. 1, p. 37.
- ¹⁴ The Hon John Christian Watson, M.H.R. Born 9 April 1867. Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia from 27 April 1904 to 18 August 1904. Died 18 November 1941.
- ¹⁵ C.P.D. Session 1901-02. Vol. 1, p. 1016.

- ¹⁶ C.P.D. Session 1901-02. Vol. 2, p. 2159.
- ¹⁷ I know of no instance, before the War of 1914-18, where a Citizen Force officer was posted to the appointment of District Commandant, except temporarily.
- ¹⁸ At the outbreak of the War of 1914-18 the two highest ranking officers in the Australian Military Forces were the Inspector General, Brigadier General W. T. Bridges and the Director General of Medical Services, Surgeon General W. D. C. Williams. Colonel J. G. Legge was the Chief of the General Staff.
- ¹⁹ The Esher General Staff system had not, of course, been introduced at this time, 1901, into either the British or Australian Armies. Australia's first C.G.S., Colonel W. T. Bridges, R.A.A., was appointed on 1 January 1909. See Perry, 'Diamond Jubilee of the Australian General Staff'. *Army Journal*, Canberra. No. 246, November 1969, pp. 24-28.
- ²⁰ C.P.D. Session 1901-02. Vol. 2, p. 2064.
- ²¹ C.P.D. Session 1901-02. Vol. 2, p. 2173.
- ²² *The Chronicle*, Adelaide, 14 September 1901, p. 34.
- ²³ Lieutenant General Sir Reginald Pole-Carew, KCB, CVO, DL, JP. Born 1 May 1849. Private Secretary to Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of New South Wales, 1878-79. Died 19 September 1924.
- ²⁴ General Sir Henry John Thoroton Hildyard, GCB, psc. Originally an officer of the Royal Navy. Born 5 July 1846. GOC-in-C, South Africa, 1905-08. Died 25 July, 1916.
- ²⁵ *The Age*, 2 October 1901, p. 6.
- ²⁶ In the previous month it had been announced in the press that: 'Although nothing definite is known, it is believed with good reason, that the choice will ultimately fall upon Major General Sir Edward Hutton, whose qualities, knowledge and experience, apart from his brilliant service record, peculiarly suit the conditions to which he would be called.' See *The Age*, 2 October 1901, p. 6.
- ²⁷ At this time Colonel Hutton had been on the half pay list of the British Army since 4 January 1901.
- ²⁸ C.P.D. Session 1901-02. Vol. 6, pp. 8064-8065.
- ²⁹ Perry, 'Military Reforms of General Sir Edward Hutton in New South Wales 1893-96'. *The Australian Quarterly*. Vol. 28, No. 4, December 1956, pp. 65-75.
- ³⁰ *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 November 1901, p. 6. ✕

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MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the prize for the best original article published in the May 1975 issue of the Journal to:

Brigadier J. H. Thyer, CBE, DSO, (RL), (Foreign Policy and a Credible Defence).

No prize was awarded for the June issue.

Darwin



A Platoon Commander's Experience

*Lieutenant P. A. Pedersen
Royal Australian Infantry*

Introduction

ON Christmas Eve 1974 Darwin was struck by Cyclone Tracy and the city was largely destroyed by the fury of winds that reached a velocity of 180 miles per hour. Fifty people were killed and scores injured. Military assistance to the civil community was quickly provided in response to the disaster.

All three Services made significant contributions. This article deals with the activities of the Army's Field Force Group which served in Darwin from 18 January to 8 March 1975. This group consisted of over 650 men mostly from 5/7 RAR but also including squadrons from 2 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Engr Regt. This Field Force Group was relieved by a second group of similar size from 6 RAR and the Army Reserve who worked in Darwin until the end of April 1975. Specifically, I shall deal with the experiences of 12 Platoon, D Company, 5/7 RAR.

The highpoint of a cadet's four years at the Royal Military College is his graduation. Meeting the Governor-General, receiving the Queen's Commission, watching the days-to-go board change to zero — these all go towards making an unforgettable day. If the cadet graduates into the Infantry an even greater highpoint comes when he meets and takes over his platoon. The feeling is one of trepidation. What is it going to be like? Who is my platoon sergeant? What is the daily routine of the battalion? How long will it take to settle in? These thoughts were

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running through my mind when I marched into 5/7 RAR on 20 January 1975. But things were different from what I had expected. My company was already engaged in the relief work in Darwin following Cyclone Tracy. Two days later, surrounded by the rubble of a ruined city, I joined them.

My initial impression of the effect of the cyclone was much the same as most Australians would have felt. Many buildings were unroofed — many more were completely demolished. This was particularly evident in the northern suburbs of the city — Moil, Nightcliff, Casuarina and Rapid Creek — which were devastated. It is no exaggeration to say that these areas looked like photographs of Hiroshima taken after the bomb had been dropped, such was the extent of the destruction. Iron telegraph poles were bent parallel to the ground and refrigerators tossed about like match-boxes. The wonder is that the death toll was not higher. I was staggered by the magnitude of the damage.

Our quarters in Darwin were at Larrakeyah Barracks with the rest of the Field Force Group. It was a beautiful place, surrounded on three sides by the sea. I remember leaving my room on the first morning I was there and walking out onto the verandah that overlooked the harbour. It was a perfect day, the sun beating down on a sea as smooth as glass. As I stood there I imagined I could see aircraft — aircraft with red markings under their wings. The date was not 22 January 1975 but 19 February 1942 and around me was not the destruction wrought by Cyclone Tracy but the havoc inflicted by Japanese bombs. This impression remained with me for the seven weeks that I was in Darwin. It was interesting to talk to people who had experienced the bombing in 1942; to see on the ground where the bombs had actually fallen; to hear how the Zeros would fly low over the city with their undercarriages lowered to attract machine-gun fire. To an observer with an historical bent it was fascinating, akin I think, to visiting an old battle-field.

Back to reality! At about 1145 hrs on that day I met my section commanders. We were having lunch as a Company underneath the remains of the Fannie Bay Gaol and my platoon sergeant pulled the section commanders aside and introduced them to me. They had been working all morning and were covered in grime and sweat. By the time we had exchanged a few words it was time to resume work. From then on we were together. I would work with each section for one day,

rotating through the platoon every three days. My sergeant would work with a different section. In this way I got to know my platoon far better and much quicker than would have been the case at Hols-worthy. This was one of the great benefits of the Darwin operation and I will have more to say about it later.

What was a typical day in Darwin like? Occasional rest days apart, one day was much the same as any other. We would finish breakfast as close to 0700 hrs as possible and then go over to the company orderly room. This was simplicity itself, consisting only of an FS table and a stores area. We would then confirm our allotted tasks with our company commander and plot these on the CQMS's map. He had to know the locations of our work sites so that he could bring fruit juice and ice to us. This was extremely important when one considers the arduous nature of our task and the heat in which it was performed. Then we would check our platoon lines. A section had its own room, the soldiers sleeping on stretchers. Accommodation was primitive but in post-Tracy Darwin this was normal. These inspections were also important, for dirt meant sickness and sickness might rapidly spread. The need for clean living quarters was paramount. Following my inspection the platoon would do down to the CSM's parade and pick up the stores needed for the day's work.

In the meantime trucks would start to arrive. The transport compound was located next to the orderly room and by the time we left Darwin it had become one of the landmarks of Larrakeyah. All traces of grass had disappeared from its surface and the daily arrival and departure of 120 trucks had transformed it into a quagmire. Each section had its own truck which assumed the personality and character of the soldiers who rode on it. This was illustrated by the graffiti painted on the side of the vehicles; F Troop or Sunny's Slobs to Cuthie's Mob. One truck had flames painted around the radiator in Flying Tigers fashion. Every conceivable colour was used. 'Darwin Here We Come', 'Darwin or Bust' and 'Fred's Mob' emblazoned its sides. 'This Five-Ringed Circus' was quite a colourful affair — some of the artistic creations that emerged would have put 'Blue Poles' to shame.

At the conclusion of the CSM's parade soldiers boarded their vehicles and headed off to the task allotted them by their platoon commander. Upon arrival at his particular location the section commander met the home owner (it was a requirement for those seeking Army help to be present when a clearance team arrived), ascertained what had to

be done and then commenced the task. In the early days a team averaged two houses cleared per day but as weeks passed this figure rose to three and occasionally to four. We tried to finish as close to 1600 hrs as possible. This gave us time to return to Larrakeyah, clean up and receive orders for the next day. Stores would be returned and a fitness inspection conducted by the platoon commander. This was essential, for rashes, tinea and so forth were fostered by the conditions under which we were working.

At about 1630 hrs the platoon commanders would get their orders. The highlight here and the part most eagerly awaited by the soldiers was the score! How had our company gone against the others? What was the Force's total for the day? How many houses had the Engineers roofed? As time went on we tended to look upon the score as indicating the results of a race. Indeed it was for the more houses that were cleared the sooner Darwin became habitable. On a good day the force could clear over 100 houses. The contribution of our platoon could be as many as 10.

After the platoon commanders gave their orders the soldiers were stood down. In most cases this meant a nightly pilgrimage to the 'Koala', one of the few pubs that was open and close to the barracks. It soon became a soldier's pub; indeed they were employed as bouncers and barmen as well as drinkers. The Koala was famous for its swimming pool and this facility was used to the full. As the night wore on many a soldier took a dip, whether he wanted to or not. After initial protests the manager gave up and the Koala became a way of life in Darwin for the battalion. Needless to say 5/7 RAR has ensured its financial success for years to come.

This then was a typical day in Darwin. The next day would signal the start of the same routine. It was easy to become bored and this is where the efforts of the section commander to keep his men going became important. Section commanders really earned their keep in Darwin. It was upon them that success or failure depended.

Upon arrival at a job it was the section commander who met the owner. He made the appreciation that determined the best, most efficient way of approaching the task. He decided on what equipment was needed, on whether to call for additional trucks or front-end loaders. If the task seemed too big for his team alone it was up to him to call for extra teams. When roving teams were introduced later on it was the section commander who would drive around looking for work.

Each section had its own radio and this gave him his flexibility. But the section commander's most important task was to keep his men going. It was dull, hard work, and the routine seldom varied. He had to motivate his section, keep them enthusiastic, ensure the job was done properly.

Seeing the section commanders perform under these conditions was also important from my point of view as the platoon commander. I got to know them in a way that I could not have done at Holsworthy and the converse is true as well. Hence we understood each other far better than would normally have been the case. This really applied to the whole platoon. You found out why people had the nicknames they did, how they worked under pressure, who had the quick temper, who was popular and who was less so. It was said to me that the seven weeks in Darwin were worth a year at Holsworthy. Looking back I can now see how true this was.

One of the problems with a MACC operation such as Darwin is that it interrupts a unit's training considerably and calls for a reorganization of activities planned for the remainder of the year. But for the platoon commander this was more than compensated for by the knowledge he gained of his section commanders and the rapport he achieved with his platoon by constantly working with them. One of the temptations was to take over completely, to go out with a section and run it instead of leaving the section commander in charge. I was guilty of this and indeed the line of distinction is fine. How much latitude did the platoon commander give his section commanders when the method of operation was essentially at section level? Here again the training was invaluable for it was a platoon commander's problem and he had to find the answer. This also extended to soldiers' personal difficulties. Keeping a man's morale and confidence high while enquiries were being made over 2,000 miles on his behalf was not an easy matter.

How was a typical task carried out? In most cases a team would arrive at a house which had been unroofed and whose interior was completely waterlogged. Plaster peeled from the walls. Debris — wall and window frames, smashed stairs and the like — was scattered throughout. Remains of the roof could often be found in the backyard. The section commander would start by guiding his truck into the yard and clearing it. Strong winds were still blowing in Darwin and debris that could be flung about was quite dangerous. Indeed we were told that most of the cyclone casualties were injured in this manner. The

team would then move inside and clean out the interior of the house. This could be a difficult task for a roof might be hanging precariously or a wall seemingly about to fall. The section had to decide what to clear first and the safest way of doing it. Front-end loaders proved invaluable for lifting large items — complete walls for example — onto the back of a truck. Having been loaded, trucks would dump debris at one of the many tips and then return to the work site where this process would be repeated. Anything from 5 to 10 truckloads were needed to clear the average house.

Techniques were improved during our stay. Vehicles were always in short supply and to overcome this we used truck/front-end loader teams. If these were available the soldiers cleared a house and threw all the debris into the street. This would be loaded onto the trucks by the loaders which then proceeded to the next job. It was the most efficient method of operation but could only be used on a limited scale because it caused disruption to traffic.

Opportunity tasking was another method introduced. If a team happened to be uncommitted it would seek work. The section commander would ask an owner if he wanted his house cleared. Invariably he did and thus the team and truck were ready and waiting to do the job.

The Darwin operation was not without its humour and I still retain vivid impressions of incidents that had those there laughing a long time after they had occurred. I remember one particular day — it was late in the afternoon and really hot. Tempers were becoming frayed. It seemed that we would not finish the job and teams were progressively called in until there were five teams working on the site. An inept front-end loader driver who could not lift a thing did little to help matters. Finally one of the soldiers, who had decided in the meantime that he was an expert on front-end loader operations, felt that he could show the civilian driver how it was done. He jumped up onto the loader and moved it forward. However, he did not see the jagged water pipe protruding from the ground and the inevitable happened. There was a tremendous explosion as the huge rear tyre blew out and the loader settled slowly on its side. Frayed tempers disappeared in an instant as everyone greeted this with great hilarity, especially when the soldier concerned looked up as if to say 'What's that pipe doing there?'

Although we went to great pains to ensure that clearance operations were conducted in the safest manner possible, one episode would

have made the writers of Safety Instructions wince. One team loaded a wheelbarrow onto their truck (which had no tail-gate) upon completion of their task. A soldier sat in the wheelbarrow. The truck had to negotiate a hill. Gravity dictated that the wheelbarrow would go in the opposite direction and it did. Wheelbarrow and bewildered occupant went sailing out of the back of the truck. Again this was greeted with great hilarity for the sight of a soldier flying an airborne wheelbarrow is quite rare. Fortunately he was not hurt.

Several groups of people are worthy of mention. The first of these are the 'blowflies', the battalion hygiene squads who were invaluable in making our effort a success. A team would often arrive at a site where a refrigerator full of meat had lain untouched since Christmas Day, or where refuse had become rotten and maggot-infested. The smell was overpowering and made working extremely unpleasant. This was a job for the hygiene teams who went in with their gas-masks and cleared out the mess. Theirs was a sterling effort indeed.

The civilian truck drivers became identified with the sections with whom they worked. Initially they were suspicious of our methods and organization just as we looked askance at their dishevelled appearance and unruly behaviour. But as both groups began to understand each other, firm friendships were formed and a splendid working relationship established. When we left Darwin they made a presentation to the Battalion in a moving ceremony.

The people of Darwin did much to help us help them. They invariably gave us a beer after we had completed a job, invited us to their functions and showed us a real appreciation for our efforts. Despite all they had undergone they still remained cheerful and held their heads high.

Above all there were our soldiers. Without their untiring efforts the relief operation could not have been the success it was. Their task was difficult and monotonous, yet they never flagged. I retain an impression of one of my sections working to clear a house which had been unroofed and from which half the walls were missing as well. It was raining heavily and very cold. I can still see them, freezing and sopping wet, working against the backdrop of an angry black sky. To me this symbolized the whole effort of the Field Force Group in Darwin.

Our time in the city came to an end on 9 March. It had been a unique training ground where I got to know my platoon and they got

to know me. During those seven weeks the Force cleared over 3,000 houses, numerous flats and several schools. But the effort did not end there — it was to be continued by 6 RAR and the Army Reserve who relieved us. While we were justly proud of our contribution we were none the less glad that our 'tour' was about to conclude. Trower Road, Ross Smith Avenue, Fannie Bay, Nightcliff — the household names of the Darwin campaign — were finally behind us. ✂

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THE MULTI-PURPOSE INFANTRY COMBAT DOG ASSET OR LIABILITY?

Second Lieutenant J. B. Sands

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Introduction

Dogs Tracking Vietnam. It is by following this narrow line of reasoning that many infantrymen have dismissed dogs as being of no value to the infantry battalion. It is my aim to show that this reasoning is incorrect and that dogs have more relevance today than ever before.

To achieve this aim, I intend to compare dogs to the available alternatives. These are the infantrymen and the various sensor systems which are available to the US and Australian services.

Background

The term "multipurpose infantry combat dog" does not refer to the Labradors which were used in Vietnam. It refers to the German Shepherd. These dogs were introduced to the Corps by the Infantry Centre in 1973. Enough dogs were obtained to provide two for each battalion. As it turned out, 3 RAR was the only unit to accept them. The other battalions refused them either because they couldn't see a requirement or because they had Labradors already and couldn't understand the reasons for changing.

The main reason for the change was that German Shepherds are a much more versatile dog. The Labrador was bred mainly as a water retriever and is a very docile dog. Accordingly, it is only useful as a tracker dog, which was relevant to Vietnam but not to limited war in

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Australia. The German Shepherd, on the other hand, is a more powerful and aggressive dog which can fulfil a greater number of roles.

Officially the dogs are able to fulfil any of five roles. These are:

- a. sentry dog,
- b. patrol dog,
- c. guard dog,
- d. mine and booby trap detection, and
- e. tracking.

In 3 RAR we place emphasis on the first three roles.

Capabilities — Dog Versus Man

The change in the Army's role from stalking through the jungles of South East Asia to driving around Central Australia in APCs ended the need for dogs in many people's minds. What they failed to realize was that in this new role we may be operating with an adverse air situation and that consequently we may operate by night. They should also realise that working with armour does not mean that infantry will never again have to patrol on foot. We will have to patrol and we will have to do it between dusk and dawn.

It is in the area of dismounted night operations that the dog comes into its own. On a dark night, the average infantry patrol will not detect a careful enemy until he is, at most, twenty metres away. The presence of a dog with the patrol would increase the distance substantially. In fact, with its superior hearing and scenting ability a dog can be relied on to detect movement at 100 metres. Trials conducted during 3 RAR exercises have confirmed this. They also indicated that under good conditions the contact distance could be as much as 300 metres.

The additional warning time allowed confers obvious advantages on the side using dogs. When patrolling, the dog would warn the patrol commander that contact was imminent. Thus he could ambush instead of being ambushed. Dogs would also be useful to patrols engaged in probing enemy positions. In the sentry or listening post situation the additional warning time would be sufficient for the whole unit to be alerted prior to contact taking place.

It is obvious that, without early warning, the risk involved in night operations is much greater. The question remains of course, what is the best form of early warning system?

Capabilities — Dog Versus Sensor System

There is some form of electronic sensor system in production for almost any task one might care to name. There are image intensifiers, radars, seismic detectors and infra-red systems, to name a few. The great advantage of these systems is that they allow the operator to interpret exactly what is occurring. He either sees with his own eyes or his instruments give readings which indicate definite things. For instance, a seismic system will tell the operator that a certain object is passing his position moving in a definite direction at a definite speed. By presetting the degree of sensitivity he can also determine the minimum weight of the object.

A sniffer system will detect various animate and inanimate objects by the chemical nature of the odour they give off. Examples are the scent of a man or the smell of a vehicle exhaust.

Radar will detect both stationary and moving objects down to man size at considerable range. It will also show the exact location, direction of movement and speed.

An infra-red system will measure the intensity and extent of a heat source. This will give an exact location and also an indication of the nature of the target.

When these various systems are brought together to form a balanced one they will tell the operator exactly what is going on in a given area. They are capable of operating over a much greater range than any dog can see, hear or smell. Unfortunately the use of these systems presents problems. These can be summed up as cost, manpower, deployment, availability, jamming and versatility.

The cost aspect is vital when discussing anything related to the acquisition of defence equipment. In particular electronic equipment is very expensive. Without dabbling in figures too much I think it would be reasonable to assume that the cost involved in completely equipping the army would run into millions. I also believe that we would be unlikely to get as much equipment as we need.

The use of German Shepherd dogs provides an attractive low cost alternative. A good dog costs about \$150 and the only other costs involved are feeding and the occasional veterinary account. There is also no requirement for expensive training facilities.

The manpower aspect also deserves attention. In order to get the best results from these sensor systems it is necessary to have highly

trained operators. There is also a requirement for a large backup of RAEME personnel to maintain this equipment. It is also necessary for a dog handler to be highly trained if he is to use his dog correctly. However, since this training is not of a technical nature the instructor and training equipment requirement is not as great. Also dogs, quite obviously, require no RAEME or other support.

Deployment of electronic sensors can present problems for the user units. Most systems function by detecting enemy movement and then transmitting the results back to the user. Since many of the systems are not air droppable and, since we would almost certainly have to recover them anyway, getting them into position could present problems. This would be particularly so when a unit moved into position by night and was expecting contact. Also since these systems are electrically operated there is a requirement to change batteries frequently. This could lead to the sensor position being compromised.

In some circumstances, it would be impossible or at least impractical to use most types of sensor. For instance it would be difficult for a sub-unit patrol to use them when moving or during short halts. On the other hand a dog is ideally suited to this type of work. It does not need to be separated from the patrol, it does not have to be carried and it does not require battery changes.

The more expensive and complex a piece of equipment is, the more availability becomes a problem. The more expensive it is, the smaller the number we can afford to purchase. The more complex it is, the more likely it is to malfunction and be unavailable at a critical time. In addition, a shortage of trained operators can sometimes prevent effective use of the equipment. A dog is not susceptible to mechanical breakdown. In addition, cost should not be a significant factor when considering how many dogs we require.

Another limitation of electronic sensor equipment is susceptibility to jamming. A well equipped enemy can quickly locate our frequencies and, since most sensor equipment operates on a fixed frequency counter-measures are difficult to implement. This problem obviously does not occur with dogs.

It is in versatility that a dog picks up a lot of points. An electronic item is restricted to one role. For example, it either detects vibration, heat or smell. It does not do all three. A dog, however can see, hear

and smell at the same time. In addition a dog can perform other functions. It is capable of mine/booby trap work. It can be used as a guard dog. It can be used for tracking.

Some of these roles, particularly tracking, have considerable relevance in peacetime. For instance 3 RAR's dogs have been used to search for people lost in the bush.

Organization of Dogs

I think it is reasonable to say that dogs are an asset. They do not replace electronic sensors but they are an invaluable supplement.

If they are to be used correctly it is essential that they be properly organized. I believe the best place for them is in the Surveillance Platoon of the infantry battalion. It would be pointless centralizing dogs at Task Force or higher level because the average infantryman would hardly ever see them, thus would not know how to employ them. Also if a dog and handler are to work efficiently they must be intimately familiar with the way a unit operates.

I believe that the number of dogs required is two per rifle coy thus giving a total of six on restricted or eight on war establishment. This allows permanent affiliations to be formed and also permits one dog in two to be rested. This is necessary because dogs, like humans, require rest. Also as their level of endurance is not as high as a man's it is better to work them hour on hour off. This ensures that they remain at peak efficiency.

Summary

It is apparent that a dog cannot provide the detailed information which can be obtained from a properly balanced sensor system. It is also apparent, however, that to establish a balanced sensor system will not always be possible particularly at rifle company level. The ideal solution to this problem is a dog. It can move with the unit either on foot or in APCs and it requires no extra administrative or technical support.

Even when sensors are deployed, dogs are valuable because they can fill gaps and, they cannot be jammed. In addition dogs are more flexible. They can perform tasks, such as tracking, which no sensor system is capable of. ✕

THE JUNIOR COMMAND and STAFF COURSE



Captain A. Nutt-Caise

I DO not normally read the British Army Review which I find insipid and uninspiring, but lately, when the Adjutant had seen fit to require my presence in barracks for a more prolonged period than usual, I flicked over the pages of an old number. In it I discovered an article on the Junior Command and Staff Course, apparently by one of the instigators of that establishment. Having just returned from a course there, my immediate reaction on reading it was to write a complete refutation of the author's eulogistic claims. However, on reflection, I believe it would carry more weight with the Director General of Military Training who, I understand, is responsible for both Warminster and the British Army Review, if I were to make public in his own journal the comments made by a member of the Directing Staff on my first test paper. I give them in full in all their squalid, stark, unimaginative torpor:

"I am returning your test paper and thought that a few additional comments would be appropriate. I was more refreshingly intrigued in marking it than I have been in many a long year. Your approach to tactics is decidedly unconventional. I must warn you that whilst that quality may, on occasion, win real battles, its value is too intangible to impress those responsible for the paper battles of the Junior Command and Staff Course. However, I should think you will have a fine career as a senior officer, if you manage to survive as a junior one.

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I was interested in your account of the performance of the Brigade, of which your Regiment formed part, during the Winter Exercise in 1970. Your comments, as a Troop Commander at the time, on the Brigade Commander's performance, although a trifle irrelevant in the context, should not be wasted. I have therefore taken the liberty of passing them to the main subject of your criticism, Brigadier (now Major General) The Honourable Arthur Hulle-Down. He, as you may not know, has just taken over as Commandant of the Staff College.

I am sure you realised that the interview was to give you practice in writing an appreciation of a simple tactical situation and an operation order. In writing the setting for these Exercises we have to use Regimental and Formation titles. Those old favourites, the Loamshires and the Blankshires, do get over-used and rather hackneyed. So, on this occasion, we used the names of actual units. It was not very helpful of you to start by pointing out that you are never likely to be the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards. I cannot agree that it makes the whole paper of purely academic interest. I do realise, I assure you, that it would be highly unusual for any one other than an officer of the Household Division, to command that Battalion. I enjoyed your rather lengthy dissertation on the promotion prospects of Guards officers, but it would be better for your personal promotion prospects if you could let your imagination run riot. If an Exercise setting portrays you as commanding the Grenadier Guards or even, Heaven forbid, as the Chief of the General Staff, accept the accolade gracefully. If it is any consolation to you, I happen to know that the Major General Commanding the Household Division shares your conviction that you will never, in fact, command the Grenadiers.

I must correct you on one small point. Guards' Officers are not promoted according to the size of their private incomes.

Your answer to Problem I owed a good deal to the Dauphin of France's plan for his conduct of the Battle of Agincourt. I suspect that it would have had about the same measure of success. The essence of the plan which emerged from your ten page appreciation could be summed up in the words: "Follow me". Whilst this says something for your personal bravery I would point out that even on the Somme they did not attempt daylight frontal attacks uphill, against a well dug-in enemy, without benefit of an artillery barrage. The British Army tried it during the Crimean War, you may recall. The results were scarcely likely to encourage recruiting.

I notice that you position your Headquarters within range of direct enemy fire. This is unwise. It is even more unwise, believe me, to give the map reference of your Headquarters as a Defensive Fire target for your own artillery. The Royal Regiment is damned accurate and you may not survive long enough to rectify your mistake.

Problem II was intended to see how you would cope with a situation in which your leading Rifle Company had suffered a mauling at the enemy's hands and had been unable to reach its objective. A Field General Court Martial for the Company Commander is, I suggest, a trifle severe, and in the circumstances highly impracticable. The charge sheet was strong meat but we stopped doing that sort of thing in the British Army years ago. In any case, had you looked ahead to Problem III, you would have seen that the Company Commander succumbed to his wounds. It is probably as well that you did not. I do not think I could have borne a citation for the Victoria Cross.

Problem III was intended to be very simple. Major Gallant having been killed, who should you send to replace him as Officer Commanding the leading Rifle Company? Much as I appreciate the sterling qualities of Royal Army Ordnance Corps officers, and I too have read accounts of the fighting in the Administrative Box in Burma in 1944, I do think that an Infantry Officer would have been a better selection. Apart from any other consideration, I assume that the RAOC officer whom you managed to produce was the Officer Commanding the Brigade Ordnance Field Park. You would not be very popular with your Brigade Commander for sending him off to take over one of your Companies. If you read the Exercise setting again, you will see that Major Wright-Phlankin, who had rejoined the Battalion a week earlier after a tour as DS at the Staff College, has no particular job.

I think your counter-attack would have stood more chance of success had you not dismounted the crews of the squadron of tanks, allotted to your battalion and sent them back to assist in setting up the Mobile Bath and Laundry Unit. This latter unit was introduced into the situation as a "red herring". It was not intended that you, as a Battalion Commander in battle, should pay too much heed to the Bath unit's plea for labour to help with its plumbing. Hygiene in the field must be kept in perspective and never overdone.

We have had, throughout our history, many fine Generals who were remarkably devout. I cannot recall one, this side of Oliver Crom-

well, who held a divine service on the start line of an attack. I advise you not to try it in anger. It does tend to draw the enemy's attention.

The British Army stopped using Bicycle Troops in about 1919, I have always believed that the decision to do so was right and proper, bearing in mind not only the inherent instability of anyone, short of Blondin, when balanced on two wheels, but also the blatantly high target profile one presents. Furthermore, I discovered at Sandhurst, that the Army bicycle is nearly as responsive to a stick thrust through its back wheel as a tank is to a direct hit from a 15-inch Naval gun. I was fascinated therefore by your plan for mounting your Army Catering Corps cooks on requisitioned bicycles and using them, dressed in plain clothes, as a diversionary force behind the enemy's lines. Such a scheme might well boast the pedigree, "by Wingate out of Blyton", but I fear the enemy would have suspected something and that your Battalion would have been undermanned in the kitchen as a result.

Prisoners of War should be got out of your battalion area as soon as possible. Your proposal for dealing with them might just have passed muster at Amritsar but would provide the International Red Cross with a positive battle honour in this day and age.

The logistic questions were not intended to do more than make sure that you knew how your Battalion would be supplied with ammunition, rations, water and fuel and how the wounded would be handled. I think you must have been studying some rather out of date manuals. I would have expected you to know that the Royal Army Service Corps vanished in 1965 and that, even longer before that, it stopped using horses and mules in North-West Europe. In the circumstances, your two Annexures on the muting of mules and the cremation of dead horses were somewhat superfluous.

I am pleased to confirm that the Royal Army Medical Corps is still in existence but assure you that, regrettably, they have quite enough to do in battle, tending the wounded without being given the job of counter-attack force. The Geneva Convention rather discourages that sort of thing and even Hippocrates had something to say on the subject.

Homing pigeons are not a satisfactory substitute for radio communications. There is a perfectly reasonable system for obtaining replacement batteries and Problem V was set to give you the chance to show that you knew of it. Other considerations apart, you have conveniently forgotten that a homing pigeon will only fly to its particular

home. It cannot be detailed off to go wherever you want. Doctor Dolittle may be able to talk to the birds and the animals, but we cannot, and this, together with the distractions of hunger, thirst, weather, sex and sheer cussedness, make pigeons unreliable as a means of battle communication. You are, however, perfectly right in your comments on the limitations of the heliograph in North-West Europe. But time is limited in answering any question paper and it is unwise to drift off the subject, particularly if you intend going as far as communications during the first Afghan War. For the same reason, it is always unwise to introduce extra elements into a tactics test paper. Of course one never knows what the enemy is going to do, but it antagonises hard-worked DS to have a straight forward skirmish turned into a full scale nuclear holocaust. Why, for heaven's sake, did you feel the need to introduce an enemy Parachute Brigade dropping behind your area? Without being too unkind, I would have thought that your Brigade Commander had had quite enough trouble heaped on his shoulders having you as a Battalion Commander, without a gratuitous stab in the back from the air.

If ever you visit the National Army Museum you should ask to see the third order written at the Battle of Balaclava. It has much in common with your answer paper as a harbinger of potential disaster, as well as being vague, ambiguous and almost indecipherable. As far as the latter is concerned, at least General Airey, who wrote it, had the excuse that he did so whilst sitting on his horse. However . . . possibly you did too?"

(Tailpiece.—When Commandant of the Staff College, General Sir Dudley Ward used to tell the story of an appreciation written some years earlier. It had been corrected by a member of the Directing Staff who was not known for his tolerance but whose military genius was not in doubt, even at that stage of his career. The red-ink endorsement read something like this "You have taken a great deal of time and trouble over this exercise, as the twenty-five pages you have written go to show. Your plan is ingenious. However, I do not think you would have surprised the enemy. You would undoubtedly have astonished him. BLM" Editor). ♫

Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

Dear Sir,

Over the past 10 years or so there has been shown a considerable amount of concern over marksmanship in the Australian Army. Lt Col R. F. Stuart's article in the June issue of *Army Journal*, "How to Hit the Barn Door or the Competitive Side of the Coin," is the most recent and probably the most interesting answer to the problem I have read.

Although not wishing to condemn Lt Col Stuart's article, I feel that he has overlooked a most important factor and that is teaching the soldier the basics.

I know that the soldier is taught a certain amount of the basics. How often have you heard the platoon corporal or sergeant say, "I am going to teach you enough about this weapon that it will become a part of you, an extension of your arm". This does not happen with the majority of soldiers as results have shown. I feel that the soldier should be taught in more detail so that he obtains a better understanding of his weapon and ammunition, eg the theory of fire; how to adjust for wind; how to diagnose faults and to correct them; to name a few that could be taught in more detail.

Lt Col Stuart's article could be summarised as saying, give a soldier motivation and plenty of practice and he will improve. That is right; but only to a point. If a soldier doesn't know all of the basic fundamentals he will not be able to overcome his faults and therefore even with continual practice will only improve to a certain point.

Lt Col Stuart in his article refers to other sports and sportsmen. I would like to refer to a book written by one of Australia's greatest sportsmen, Frank Sedgman, "How to Play Tennis". He continually refers to the basic fundamentals and says that unless a player grasps the basic fundamentals no amount of practice will make him a good player.

My point then is that competition alone will not make a good rifle shot. So why not combine the two, more in depth teaching, competition with coaching/revision.

Department of Defence (Army Office)

G. W. Lander
Sergeant ☞



The excellent article by Maj J. R. Clarke in your issue of Jul 75 certainly encouraged this "military mind" to give thought to a concept previously never even considered. The possibilities of using motor cycles should be pursued with vigour for the very logical and practical reasons outlined. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see the considerable potential for reconnaissance and anti-tank defence alone.

In particular the use of the motor cycle could be the answer to many of the training problems of the Army Reserve. In fact it would appear to be tailor made for Reserve units. It has, amongst others, the advantages of being economical, reliable, easy to maintain and above all *interesting*. Reserve training would be given a tremendous impetus, particularly Infantry units who could be tasked with intimate local reconnaissance and the development of the techniques suggested in the article.

It is a task the Army Reserve could tackle with relish. Let's give it to them.

Department of Defence (Army Office)

R. V. Musgrove
Lieutenant Colonel, RAAC ☞



Dear Sir,

In his letter to the June issue of the *Army Journal* Mr Godsall has raised some useful points about the plans for the employment of 1 Aust Corps in the last year of the Pacific war. His letter offers valuable first-hand memory which can be added to the record so far published. As I hinted in my original article, there is clearly a great deal of research still to be done on the policy decisions about those last 12 or 18 months of the war as they affected Australia's land forces in particular. Not only do I have in mind 1 Aust Corps, but also the questions of the size and activities of the forces deployed in New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomons.

To revert to Mr Godsall's evidence. I went back to Long's *Six Years' War* and to his *Final Campaigns*, the last volume in the military series of the Australian war histories. The broad point is clear that the American planners and commanders were suspicious of *British* participation in the Pacific, whether naval or military. Many of them saw Australians as part of the British presence. Curtin and Blamey (*Campaigns*, p. 8) saw Australia as the representative of the British Empire in the Pacific and hence resisted the idea of 'English' commanders superimposed on Empire, ie Australian, troops in this area.

Macarthur personally may possibly be excused this general suspicion, though at this point I follow Long's generally hostile assessment of Macarthur, most fully expressed in his biography of that flamboyant general (*Macarthur as Military Commander*). The evidence is certainly clear that Macarthur proposed on 12 July 1944 to use Australian forces in the Philippines operation. By August it was a different concept, but still in the Philippines. Long lists at least seven different concepts on pp. 28-9 of *Final Campaigns*. But he brings out two limiting factors: one was the possibility of alternative US naval support. The other was attitude. I quote Long (p. 28):

'If Macarthur had adequate naval support the Aparri operation [by 1 Aust Corps] would be cancelled. Indeed it was becoming apparent to those Australians who were close to G.H.Q. that G.H.Q. would prefer not to have Australians playing any notable part in the reconquest of the Philippines. On 7th October Berryman recorded in his diary that Macarthur's Chief of Staff, Lieut-General Richard K. Sutherland, had informed Blamey that "it was not politically expedient for the A.I.F. to be amongst the first troops in the Philippines".'

The process of defining a role for 1 Aust Corps went on until February 1945, when Borneo targets were promulgated. Long summarises this story in *Six Years' War* on pp. 405-6.

Meanwhile, and very properly, large scale training and planning was going on in which Mr Godsall was involved. Normal prudence required concurrent effort of this sort. Long's account emphasises the doubt, the variation, the political factors. Mr Godsall experienced the certainty of a soldier tasked with a specific responsibility. What we still need to investigate is the relative balance of influences, and in particular Blamey's role in all this.

What we do know is that Blamey *did* refuse to send troops to the Philippines, if they were not to be a coherent force commanded by Australians. (*Final Campaigns*, p. 1, fn 2). We also know that Blamey was aware of the pressures on Macarthur, and of the suspicion of the British Empire. Further, he accepted Macarthur's insistence that the Australian force deployed in New Guinea and the Solomons be in excess of 4 divisions, despite his previous suggestion of about half that strength. Finally, we know that he accepted and promoted the Borneo operations despite substantial criticism in Australia of their validity.

I do not claim to have yet fathomed Blamey's thinking. Mr Godsall's comment about his disappointment with Morshead's rejection of the outline plan for the Luzon operation is interesting. But we need more evidence: Berryman's diary was used by Long. What else can we collate? Where are the survivors for interview? There is a substantial research project here. This is in addition to the scheme identified by Mr Godsall of the training and preparation for sea-borne operations.

The Flinders University of South Australia

Brian Dickey
Major ✕



CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.

Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (summary of proceedings). *International Review of the Red Cross*, May, 1975, pp. 219-222.

The heat's off in Bougainville as leaders soften their hard line. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, August, 1975, pp. 3-4.

Australia and New Zealand: the Pacific neighbours. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, April, 1975, pp. 160-164.

Indo-China (8 April Prime Ministerial statement to House of Representatives). *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, April, 1975, pp. 172-179.

Australian defence — the reality (23 April speech by Mr Barnard). *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, April, 1975, pp. 189-197.

Australia's treaty relationships from 30 June 1974 to 1 February 1975. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, April, 1975, pp. 215-218.

Current Communist tactics in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. *Lugarno Review*, 1975/2, pp. 25-35.

Normalization in South Asia and its opponents. *New Times*, July, 1975, pp. 12-13.

Ford's Peking trip and Free China. *Intelligence Digest Weekly Review*, 30 July, 1975, first and second pages.

A star-studded summit spectacular (Helsinki Conference). *Time*, 4 August, 1975, pp. 8-15.

DIA: the unglamorous but crucial role of satisfying the foreign military intelligence requirements of DoD (US). *Commanders Digest*, 24 April, 1975 (whole issue).

BOOK REVIEWS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1939-1940, by Brian Bond (Davis-Poynter, 1975).

Reviewed by Professor L. C. F. Turner
Royal Military College, Duntroon

BRIAN BOND is Lecturer in War Studies at King's College, London, and has a reputation as a promising military historian and an expert on defence problems. His book is part of a new series on the strategy of the Second World War.

This is essentially a book for experts, and the reader who does not already possess substantial knowledge of the Battle of France will find it difficult reading. Bond concentrates rigidly on the strategy and planning of the campaign and makes no attempt to describe the course of the fighting. There are a number of sketch maps, but no general map of the theatre of war. None of the maps is provided with a scale.

Surprisingly enough Bond makes no attempt to assess the relative strengths of the opposing armies, although such an analysis is essential to an appraisal of allied and German strategy. There is no evaluation of the total number of divisions on each side, the strength and composition of the armoured forces, or the number of squadrons available to the *Luftwaffe*, the R.A.F. and the *Armée de l'Air*. The reader who wants information on these matters will have to consult Shirer's magnificent book, *The Collapse of the Third Republic*.

It is certainly relevant that 136 German divisions faced 103 French and 10 British divisions. (The 22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions had little fighting value.) The armoured forces were almost exactly equal in numbers of tanks — 2,600 German, 2,300 French and 300 British tanks, but the allied tanks were far superior in armour and gunpower. On the other hand many French tank battalions were dispersed among infantry divisions, and the Germans had ten well co-ordinated panzer divisions to oppose seven newly raised French armoured divisions and a British heavy tank brigade. The *Luftwaffe* had a 2:1 superiority in bombers and a slight advantage in fighters.

The odds certainly favoured the Germans in an encounter battle, but with good strategy and sound planning the allies had reasonable prospects of halting the German offensive.

Making considerable use of unpublished documents, diaries and memoirs, Bond provides an illuminating analysis of the preliminary planning. The French C-in-C, General Gamelin, had little alternative to advancing into Belgium to oppose the German advance on the line of the Dyle east of Brussels, and his plan might have worked if the Germans had adhered to their original strategy of concentrating their armour north of the Meuse. But after the crash of a German aircraft in Belgium on 10 January 1940, with operation orders on board, the German High Command adopted Manstein's proposal for concentrated armoured thrusts through the Ardennes between Dinant and Sedan and subsequent exploitation across northern France to the mouth of the Somme.

Bond censures Gamelin on two major counts — his belief in the impassability of the Ardennes for armoured units, and his decision to dispatch the Seventh Army into Holland. He left his Ninth Army, composed mainly of low category divisions, to hold a long front on the Meuse south of Namur, and by sending the Seventh Army into Holland he deprived himself of any mobile reserve. Gamelin's chief subordinate, General Georges, tried in vain to dissuade him from this fatal course, which was to lead to the isolation of the B.E.F., the Seventh Army, and the *élite* First Army north of the Meuse and Sambre. Gamelin's strategic dispositions were so faulty that it would be true to say that the Battle of France was lost before the first shots were fired on 10 May 1940.

Gamelin showed extreme obstinacy in discounting intelligence reports that the Germans would attack through the Ardennes, while his insistence that the air forces 'would burn themselves out in a flash', led to the extraordinary situation that most French aircraft were kept in reserve and not committed to battle at all. Indeed the *Armée de l'Air* was considerably stronger when France surrendered on 22 June than it was at the beginning of the battle.

Gamelin's organization of his chain of command was described by General Pownall, Gort's Chief of Staff, as 'a really clownish arrangement'. He was on bad terms with General Georges, the commander of his 'north-east front', and was thoroughly distrusted by Paul Reynaud, who became Prime Minister in March 1940. Reynaud tried in vain to get rid of 'this nerveless philosopher', as he called him, but was thwarted by Daladier, the Minister of Defence, and a strong supporter of

Gamelin. Moreover, Reynaud had no confidence in Georges, who had never recovered from wounds he received in 1934 during the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia.

Unlike many of his colleagues, Gamelin remained calm and unruffled during the storm and stress of battle. On 10 May he displayed 'serene confidence' and, even after the breakthrough at Sedan on 13 May, he expounded the situation to Churchill as though he was delivering 'an academic lecture'. Bond says that on being dismissed on 20 May, 'he departed imperturbable and self-righteous to the end'.

In contrast, General Georges gave Gamelin's successor, Weygand, the impression that he was 'like a man who had received a violent blow in the stomach and finds it difficult to pull himself together again'. On 14 May he burst into tears at his headquarters when talking to General Doumenc. His conduct was not exceptional. General Billotte, the commander of the French northern Army Group, so angered General Ironside, the British C.I.G.S., during a visit to his headquarters on 20 May, that the gigantic Englishman 'lost his temper and shook the French general by the button of his tunic'. General Blanchard, commander of the First Army, is described by Bond as 'a military professor rather than a man of action' who by 25 May 'was already "punch drunk" from the influx of depressing news'. At a conference on 20 May, General Altmayer, commander of V Corps, is described as 'tired out, thoroughly disheartened and weeping silently'. The Battle of France was not the most bloody, but it was certainly the most tearful battle in history.

Bond devotes close attention to the B.E.F. and the leadership of Lord Gort, and many of his comments are highly critical. Gort's decision to split his headquarters on 10 May is described as 'an administrative disaster'. On 17 May Gort decided to form a scratch force to protect his rear areas and chose as commander his Director of Military Intelligence, General Macfarlane. Montgomery described this as 'an amazing decision', and Bond says that it had 'particularly serious consequences'.

Gort has been harshly criticised by his subordinates. Alanbrooke described him as 'a lance-corporal', while Montgomery said that he was 'entirely unsuited' to the job of C.I.G.S. and, as C-in-C of the B.E.F., was always worrying about 'fighting patrols in no man's land'. General Neame V.C. said: 'I gave Gort no marks at all as C-in-C. He had the mentality of a Guards platoon commander'.

On the other hand Gort's biographer, John Colville, brings out his fantastic courage in battle — he won the V.C. in 1918 — and his complete imperturbability in a crisis. Colville declares that in the Dunkirk campaign Gort 'exercised a clear, unvacillating judgement on every occasion that an issue of vital importance was at stake'. Bond's analysis tends to confirm this verdict. Gort certainly saved the B.E.F. by rejecting Churchill's order to march southwards towards the Somme on 20 May, and by his decision to switch reserves to the Belgian front on the 26th.

Making use of the unpublished memoirs of Brigadier Davy, the British liaison officer at Belgian headquarters, Bond shows that many of the accusations levied at King Leopold were unfounded and that Churchill treated him very unfairly in his speech to the House of Commons on 4 June 1940. Bond demonstrates that the collapse of the Belgian front on 26/27 May was partly due to the failure of the B.E.F. to attack the exposed flank of the German troops, who were assaulting the Belgian positions on the Lys. Both Gort and his Chief of Staff, Pownall, were very prejudiced in regard to the Belgian Army. On 23 May Pownall told Davy in Gort's presence: 'We don't care a b... what happens to the Belgians'. On 26 May Pownall noted in his diary: 'The Belgians show every sign of running fast northwards — they are rotten to the core'. In 1942, when he was Chief of Staff to Wavell in Java, Pownall made similar comments about Australian troops in Malaya.

Bond discusses the decision to halt Guderian's panzer divisions on 24 May and in contrast to the British official historian, Major Ellis, regards Hitler as primarily responsible for this fateful error. He also makes the point that, contrary to Churchill's orders, the French provided the rearguard at Dunkirk, and that the escape of many thousands of British troops was due to the stubborn resistance and heavy sacrifices of elderly French reservists.

This interesting book makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the Battle of France, and deserves the close attention of students of strategy. Unfortunately it terminates very abruptly, and nothing is said of operations south of the Somme or the final collapse of the French Army. ❧