

UNCLASSIFIED

012800718
Australian Army History Unit
16 July 2014



ARMY JOURNAL

No. 315 AUGUST 1975



ARMY JOURNAL

Editor

C F Coady

Staff Artist

D E Hammond

Printed and published for the Australian Army by The Ruskin Press Pty. Ltd. and issued through Supply Battalions on the scale of one per officer, officer of cadets, and cadet under officer.

Contributions, which should be addressed to the Editor, Army Journal, Department of Defence (Army Office), Canberra A.C.T. 2600, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers.

\$10 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of \$60 and \$20 respectively will be awarded to the authors gaining first and second places in the year.

The information given in this journal is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it.

UNCLASSIFIED

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 315, August 1975

Contents

- Weather as a Factor in Tactical Planning 3
Major M. A. Harvey
- Some thoughts on a Proposal for a Military
Presence in North West Australia 15
Lieutenant Colonel J. N. Stein
- Address by His Excellency The Honourable
Sir John Kerr, K.C.M.G., K.St.J., Q.C.,
Governor-General of Australia 19
- Philosophy, Psychology and the Army 24
Captain P. P. Manzie
- Citizen Military Forces — Strategic
Considerations 33
- Joseph Stalin the Man 43
Lieutenant Colonel D. R. Overstead
- Letters to the Editor 57
- Book Review 61
- Current Defence Readings 63

No article in this Journal is to be reproduced in whole or in part without authority.

The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and do not necessarily represent official opinion or policy.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1975



The Army's new Fire Support Vehicle. This ESV is basically an M113A1 armoured personnel carrier to which a British

Weather as a Factor in Tactical Planning



'If I had time and industry to study war, I think I should concentrate almost entirely on the 'actualities' of war — the effects of tiredness, hunger, fear, weather, inaccurate information, the time factor and so forth. The principles of strategy and tactics, and the logistics of war are really absurdly simple; it is the actualities that make war so complicated and so difficult and are usually so neglected by historians.'

Major M. A. Harvey

—Field Marshal Lord Wavell

Royal New Zealand Artillery

INTRODUCTION

PRIMITIVE clashes between groups of Paleolithic men took place in weather similar to that faced by modern armies. Weather has been a constant factor in war and it may be said with considerable validity that in all of history's battles, only man and the weather have been common denominators. The role that weather has played in warfare has been recorded as far back as the Peloponnesian Wars of Ancient Greece and it is certain that weather will continue to have a role in future engagements.

Commanders readily admit the decisive role that weather can have on a plan but they have often been slow to recognize the part that weather must play in tactical planning. Some operational plans have

Following service as a NCO Major Harvey graduated from OCS Portsea in 1963 and was posted to 16th Field Regiment RNZA. After attending the RNZAAC Flying Course at RNZAF Base Wigram in 1965, he was posted to 3 Battlefield Support Squadron, RNZAF, for duties as a pilot. In 1967-68 he served with 161 Battery NZVF in Vietnam. Until 1971 he served with 3 Battlefield Support Squadron. From 1971 to 1974 he served with the Army Training Group at Waiouru. Following attendance at Staff College, Queenscliff in 1974, he was posted to a staff appointment in Support Branch, Defence Headquarters, Wellington where he is currently serving.

been produced to suit ideal weather conditions only, with the weather taken for granted like night and day. The effects, good or bad, were a surprise which had to be coped with rather than a factor which had been allowed for.

The weather will often be the only element shared in common by the combatants. It must, however, not be viewed just as a neutral agent but as a factor to be properly evaluated and considered in relation to all other factors contributing to the method of conducting a specific operation. It is true that other factors such as ground or visibility often take the effects of weather into account, but since all operations are affected by weather it is most important that meteorological data and forecast services be utilized to the maximum extent by both commanders and staff.

The purpose of this article is to illustrate the importance of weather as a factor in tactical planning.

DEFINITIONS

Often meteorological terms are used loosely or are misunderstood. The following terms are defined to ensure clarity throughout the article.

Weather

Weather is the atmospheric condition prevailing at a place and time. It is an instant event and the effects are generally localized.

Climate

Climate is the impact that weather conditions have on a specific region. It is the trend over a chronological period of some years.

Meteorology

Meteorology is the science of weather and is the study of motions and phenomena of the atmosphere especially for the forecast of weather.

THE NATURE OF WEATHER

General

Weather is a complex subject and varies in type from morning mist to monsoonal typhoon. A study in depth would necessitate an analysis of calculations and mathematical formulae beyond the scope of this paper. Popularly however, weather is thought of in terms of temperature, humidity, cloud, fog, precipitation and wind. The discussion of weather will therefore be confined to these aspects.

Temperature

It is solar radiation which determines the temperature of the atmosphere. One half of solar radiation is absorbed or reflected by the atmosphere leaving less than half to be absorbed by the earth. This heat is then returned to the atmosphere as terrestrial radiation but on a different wavelength. Unlike solar radiation, terrestrial radiation is almost entirely trapped and absorbed by the atmosphere. Heat can also be passed from the earth to the atmosphere by molecular conduction in the turbulent overturnings of the lower atmosphere.

When water is evaporated, latent heat is absorbed from the atmosphere. This is why something feels cool when it loses water by evaporation even in the sun and it is this mechanism which provides the cooling principle of perspiration. Conversely when the evaporated water vapour condenses into droplets, latent heat is released into the atmosphere. Latent heat transfer is on the average more than twice as important as eddy convection in warming the atmosphere from the earth and, in summer in Great Britain, about half the sun's energy reaching the earth is used in evaporation.

If a parcel of air is heated by terrestrial radiation, the air within will expand and the parcel, like a balloon, becomes larger and less dense and will eventually break away from the ground and rise into the atmosphere. This, dependent on the humidity, is the beginning of cloud formation and will be discussed later.

Humidity

The warmer the air, the more water vapour it can hold. When it holds the maximum amount possible at a given temperature, the air is said to be saturated. The ratio between the amount of water vapour actually held in a parcel of air and the maximum amount of water vapour the parcel could hold, is known as the relative humidity of that air. Saturated air has a relative humidity of 100 per cent and near the earth the relative humidity rarely falls below 30 per cent. Since water vapour weighs less than other atmospheric gases moist air weighs less than the same volume of dry air. Warm moist air weighs least of all, a fact basic to the formation of clouds.

Clouds

If a parcel of air over a hot surface like a clearing in the jungle is heated more rapidly than the surrounding air, eventually the parcel

will become light enough to break away from the ground and rise into the atmosphere. As the parcel rises it will cool until the relative humidity reaches 100 per cent. The temperature at which this occurs is known as the dew point for if any further cooling takes place, the air can no longer hold the water in vapour form. The water vapour condenses into droplets and a cloud is formed. Clouds are, therefore, created by the cooling below dew point of a parcel of air. Such cooling may also occur in turbulence, mechanical lifting of air over rising ground, or by the slow ascent over a large area as in a depression.

Fog

Fog is basically cloud lying on the ground and by definition reduces surface visibility to less than 1000 metres. Fog is formed by the horizontal rather than vertical movement of air. Advection fog is created when a parcel of warm air with high humidity moves over a cold surface and is cooled past dew point thus causing condensation. This is how most sea fogs are formed. Radiation fogs form as the ground loses its heat during the night. The air close to the earth is cooled by convection and again condensation occurs. The prerequisites for radiation fog are high humidity, a clear sky to allow radiation and a slight breeze to mix the air and prevent the condensation falling as precipitation, usually dew.

Precipitation

Condensation is the direct cause of all the various forms of precipitation. Usually condensation forms on a foreign surface as in the case of dew or frost but in the free air, condensation begins around 'hygroscopic nuclei'. These particles can be dust, smoke, salts or other similar microscopic substances. Once condensation forms, the process of growth to precipitation is far from simple and much remains to be explained. However, by collision or other means, the original water droplets grow in size until by sheer force of gravity they fall as rain or showers.

When the temperature is low enough the droplets formed will freeze. Snow occurs when the freezing level is so near the surface that aggregations of ice crystals do not have time to melt before reaching the ground. The air temperature is around 1 or 2 degrees centigrade and is rarely warmer than 4 degrees. Sleet occurs in marginal cases where the flakes have partially melted. Hailstones are accretions of clear or opaque ice which begin as raindrops carried aloft in an updraft

and frozen. As the hailstone accumulates more ice and the weight becomes heavier than the force of the updraft, it then falls as precipitation. The final size is determined by the amount of accretion by collisions and by the amount of melting that takes place between the freezing level and the earth. Dew is formed when the temperature of the earth falls and causes an associated drop in temperature of the surrounding air past dew point. If the temperature of the ground falls below freezing either before or after condensation begins, the deposit will be in the form of frost.

Wind

Horizontal pressure in the atmosphere varies as depicted by isobars on a weather map. Pressure variations cause the air to move horizontally from the areas of high pressure to areas of low pressure. That is, in a cyclone (or low pressure area) air flows inwards and in an anti-cyclone (or high pressure area) it flows outward. However, the actual movement across the isobars is further affected by the earth's rotational deflective (Coriolis) force which causes the movement to be deflected to the left in the southern hemisphere. In fact the motion set up by the pressure gradient is exactly balanced by this Coriolis force and the wind blows more or less at right angles to the pressure gradient (parallel to the isobars). In the southern hemisphere the wind will flow clockwise around a cyclone and anti-clockwise around an anti-cyclone. But this is strictly correct only above 500 metres for below this height, the friction of the movement of air against the earth reduces the wind speed and, therefore, the effect of Coriolis force. It is now true to say that the wind blows clockwise around a cyclone and anti-clockwise around an anti-cyclone but towards the area of low pressure by 25 to 30 degrees over land and 10 to 20 degrees over the sea. Practically speaking if you stand with your back to the wind and turn 20 degrees to the left, the area of lowest pressure is on your right. And that is where the bad weather is likely to be. Although wind is primarily tied to pressure patterns, other winds can be created by local conditions. Monsoons are a result of the atmospheric adjustment of air confined to specific latitudes. Mountain ranges deflect the wind generally along rather than across them. During the day when the side of a mountain will be heated by the sun greater than on the valley floor, an anabatic wind will blow up the mountain face. At night there is a reverse process as the cold denser air at high elevation drains and a katabatic wind flows into depressions and valleys. Near the sea during the day the land

will be heated faster than the water, air close to the surface is heated and expands, lowering the density and, therefore, the air pressure over the land. The air over the sea will flow onshore to compensate and a sea breeze is created. At night the reverse takes place when the land cools more rapidly than the sea, and the night land breeze begins.

THE NATURE OF COMBAT POWER

Combat power is the total force that a commander may exert in battle. The make-up of such power is complex but each component can be categorized into one of three elements: firepower; manoeuvre; or moral strengths. Combining these three elements into the correct combination relative to the enemy and for a particular situation and therefore determining how a force will perform on operations, depends on the ability of the commander; an ability to recognize and evaluate those factors which will affect the elements of his combat power. Of all factors, ground is the most predominant. Ground is the stage on which the players perform, and it will often dictate where a battle is fought. The timing of a battle, however, is often determined by the weather while the combined effects of ground and weather often set the manner in which the battle will be fought. Weather is an ageless, if much less venerated factor than ground but it will nevertheless often have a decisive effect on firepower, manoeuvre and moral strengths.

THE EFFECTS OF WEATHER ON COMBAT POWER

Firepower

'It was now five o'clock and the heaven was black with clouds, which presently burst in a terrific thunderstorm. The English archers slipped off their bowstrings to keep them dry, and waited; while six thousand Genoese cross-bowmen, jaded by the long march, drenched and dragged with the rain that beat into their faces, conscious that they were almost disarmed by the wetness of their bowstrings, shuffled wearily into their stations along the French front.' (Crécy 1343)¹

Firepower can be affected by temperature in a variety of ways. When there is an inversion in the atmosphere and a layer of warm air sits over colder air, this inversion traps the surface air confining dust, smoke and other pollutants thereby reducing visibility which may prevent air operations or limit the observance and engagement of the enemy. During winter operations when temperatures are low, the visibility is

¹ The Honourable J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, Macmillan, London 1935.

likely to be better in the colder air but operating and maintaining the working parts of weapons will be more difficult. Oil consumption will increase and more time will be necessary for maintenance. In high temperatures special precautions must be taken in the storage of explosives and ammunition and the spoilage rate may be higher.

Humidity is likely to affect firepower only in regions of accompanying high temperature when equipment is subject to rust, rot and fungus. The rate of chemical reaction varies directly with the Kelvin temperature and is accelerated by the moisture associated with high humidity. In addition, electrical equipment must be protected from dampness.

Cloud and fog can also limit the ability to observe and engage the enemy and they can mask the advantages of moonlight or skyglow at night. In some areas early cloud, showers or fog can obscure mountain or hill-tops making low-level air operations quite hazardous. In tropical areas, air operations can be limited by the predictable shower activity in the afternoon. Both cloud and fog can limit the range of radio communications and, in the case of thunderstorms, become the principal source of external radio noise on frequencies below 15 megahertz. Propagation characteristics of the atmosphere vary under special weather conditions and such characteristics, good or bad, may last some considerable time.

Precipitation will also shield communications or reduce visibility and rain squalls can be used to obscure ships and aircraft to achieve surprise. In Normandy, alternations of rain and sunshine formed a very fine dust which on temporary airfields was stirred up by every plane and penetrated aircraft engines resulting in unexpectedly high rates of replacement of parts causing reduced availability of on-line aircraft.

Wind will affect the speed and course of a projectile and the bombing capability of aircraft. In more mountainous regions, the local wind conditions may prevent air activity entirely. Wind is an ideal means of dispersing fog, but over 80 kilometres per hour can disperse concentrations of ships and aircraft as well.

Manoeuvre

The opening engagement of the Peloponnesian War consisted of a night-time infiltration by some three hundred Thebans into Platea a town allied with Athens. The Thebans hoped to seize the unsuspecting city before war was declared. But the Plateans attacked their enemy vigorously and the Thebans, confused by the unfamiliar surroundings, the darkness and the mud from an untimely spring rainstorm were unable to win or to

escape. Troops sent by Thebes to succour those in the city were delayed until too late by the river Asopos which had risen and was not easy of passage as a result of the night's rain! The attack was a failure, though Thebes was hardly eight miles from Plataea.' (Greece 437 BC)²

As the equipments relating to firepower are affected by low temperature, so are the equipments relating to manoeuvre. Motors will be hard to start and may have to be warmed frequently to keep them operational. Controls will be harder to move because of the stiffness of the grease, and fuel consumption will be higher and more time will be needed for maintenance. However, freezing increases trafficability in some soils and tanks may be able to cross swamps which are frozen. Troops may be limited in mobility by bulkier clothing and may be forced to move on roads thereby increasing the risk of ambush. In low temperatures, movement must be even more carefully planned and prepared. Roads must be kept in excellent condition with entrances and exits maintained and bypasses prepared around natural obstacles. Helicopters must be used for long-range reconnaissance. Thaws decrease off-road trafficability and may cause flash floods. Extremes of temperature will affect the laying of concrete and asphalt. In Alaska heating pipes were needed to set concrete while in Panama the heat delayed the setting of asphalt.

The visibility necessary for manoeuvre can be reduced by cloud or more dangerously by fog. Visibility is also reduced by the masking of moonlight and skylight. Cloud can also limit aerial reconnaissance while a really thick fog can bring movement to a halt. Fog rules out the possibility of combined armoured or airborne operations, at least until navigation, target acquisition and weapon systems have been developed to cope with the loss of visibility.

Perhaps the most damaging and well known effects of weather on manoeuvre are those caused by precipitation. As well as the obvious and well documented problems relating to mud, rain also causes landslides, washouts and other surface deterioration. The fordability of a stream or river can change dramatically when the stream rises as the result of a downpour. More severe precipitation may cause flooding which can destroy roads and bridges and otherwise limit or disrupt lines of communications. If the rain turns to ice, vehicles, especially tracked armoured vehicles, are likely to slide helplessly off the roads. But perhaps the worst precipitation is snow which limits mobility both

² Dr Peveril Meigs. *Some Geographical Factors in the Peloponnesian War*, The Geographical Review, July 1961.

on and off roads. Tank speed is reduced to 10 kilometres an hour and if the snow is deeper than 60 centimetres the tank will belly. Wheeled vehicles can move at normal speeds if the snow is less than 10 centimetres but if the snow is deeper than 30 centimetres the vehicle acts as a snow plough and cannot move.

Wind can have a significant effect on manoeuvre by reducing the stability of some vehicles by creating dust which reduces visibility and damages mechanical parts. Fog can be dispersed by wind. Winds over 80 kilometres per hour can cause land movement to be obstructed by blowing down trees or piling sand. Air transport may be limited, especially for airborne operations which cannot be conducted safely in winds over 25 kilometres per hour. High winds around airfields may exceed acceptable landing or take-off criteria and wind generated turbulence may prevent aircraft, especially helicopters, from operating. Wind can cause some significant ocean swells which affect not only amphibious operations but also the routine loading or unloading of supplies onto port or beach.

Moral Strengths

'During the wet monsoon it normally rains very heavily late in the afternoon. Night ambush patrols always started out about this time, getting thoroughly soaked in the process. In this condition they would squelch their way across country ensuring that they were not seen or heard, and at last light move into position. Throughout the night they would lie in their wet clothes trying to ignore the leeches attempting to extract their dues, waiting for the enemy. In the dry monsoon they would lie sweating throughout the night, thirsty and dusty, trying not to think of the abundance of snakes in the area.' (Vietnam 1967)³

While the effects of weather on firepower and manoeuvre are significant, the effects on the moral strengths, and therefore the fighting man, are dramatic. Morale and spirit can, in an extreme, be shattered; leadership be found wanting; clarity of mind dimmed; vigour and enthusiasm destroyed and even the advantages of tradition and training can be lessened. These moral strengths represented in a fighting soldier can play an even greater part in tactics than firepower or manoeuvre. But it is just these strengths which can be affected so easily by factors such as weather.

High temperature reduces the comfort of the soldier, causes a deterioration in physical well-being and increases the risk of sunstroke, heat-stroke, heat exhaustion and prickly heat. The associated fatigue

³ 6 RAR History.

affects physical capacities and general efficiency in carrying out a task. Low temperatures can have even worse effects; extreme cold dominates consciousness and distracts attention while perception and performance become inaccurate and irritability or depression ensues. Frost-bite and general exposure may be dangers and casualties in shock must be treated much more rapidly than is critical in warmer areas. It is also important in cold or even just bleak conditions to make adequate provision to protect nominated reserves especially from the wind. In cold climates the food consumption rate will increase. In extreme cold calorie intake increases by about 20 per cent above that required in the tropics. This represents an increased logistic burden of 10 tonnes per day for a division; finally, power requirements for heating will increase.

The main effect of humidity is on the soldier's physical well-being. When humidity is high the air is near saturation point. If the temperature is high also and the soldier perspires, the air cannot absorb the moisture, evaporation does not occur and he will not cool down. To aggravate matters the perspiration accumulates in the clothing adding to both burden and discomfort. Humidity also rusts a soldier's equipment and in extreme conditions a clean weapon can become heavily coated with rust in less than 24 hours. In these conditions, if care is not taken, clothing and other material may rot or develop fungoid growths and disease may become prevalent.

Cloud generally has little effect on the fighting man although it *may limit his visibility or provide shelter from the sun*. In cold climates cloud may trap terrestrial radiation and make a cold night warmer but overall the effects are minimal. Fog on the other hand can have dramatic effects. Surprisingly, fog, particularly when dense, is perhaps the only form of weather that can be easily turned to advantage and yet is so readily ignored. Night techniques can be used although fog is less favourable for battle than night due to fear which originates from the eerie environment. The use of fog can be very effective especially by small parties which are well grouped, properly trained and led, disciplined, well integrated and have proven themselves or at least had some experience by day. However, we do not train for operations in fog, and rarely consider such operations. If a first light attack is planned and the prerequisites for radiation fog are present, few commanders would be prepared to use night attack procedures in the fog.

Precipitation is always uncomfortable for the soldier. It creates mud, reduces visibility or produces dust which can cause dysentery as happened in Normandy. In many areas, leeches emerge after rain and the overall effect can be unpleasant.

Finally, a soldier on the battle-field can be seriously affected by wind. Cold can be increased, sand, dust and snow blown about and wind generated turbulence can cause motion sickness. Speeds over 80 kilometres per hour can seriously hinder a soldier and wind at any speed affects his hearing.

WEATHER AS A FACTOR IN TACTICAL PLANNING

'The difficulty of any planning in war is to arrive at a true picture of the situation, that is, strengths and dispositions of the enemy, his intentions, the weather and many factors which it is almost impossible to forecast. Given all these, almost anyone could make a good plan; without them there must be a considerable amount of guesswork and risk in planning.'

—Field Marshal Lord Wavell

The physical characteristics of an environment must affect the military activities in that area and there is danger in basing tactical thought on the conditions which prevail at a given moment. Particularly, this applies to weather. Before an operation therefore, the commander must examine the meteorological information appropriate to the operational area and within the selected time frame to determine the effects that weather might have on the combat power of his force. To achieve this the commander and his staff must have available to them daily forecasts or special forecasts relating to a particular operation or to a particular weather situation. The commander must also be provided with expert meteorological advice on the same basis as any other specialist advice. Lord Wavell recognized the importance of this advice but spoke of weather as almost impossible to forecast. Today, 35 years later, accurate information on our weather is commonplace. Unfortunately, such forecasts are not readily available to military users in the field and if wanted must be obtained on a temporary and unorganized basis usually from the air force. This is a completely inadequate situation especially as meteorological facilities in South East Asia and much of continental Australia are very limited. A Combat Development Study has examined this matter and made meaningful, constructive recommendations towards remedying this situation. The study was, however, completed 6 years ago.

Weather information is an element of intelligence and is, therefore, a general staff function and an intelligence staff responsibility. The intelligence staff, however, can never be responsible for the provision of meteorological information but must provide a translation service to change incoming meteorological data into weather information of use to the divisional and subordinate commanders. The forecast of 15 centimetres of snow must be passed to the commanders as the effects on their combat power — *reduced visibility, limited mobility, risk of exposure and the like.*

No staff should give, nor any commander accept weather intelligence in the form of a report, forecast or observation which is nothing more than a reproduction of meteorological data *unaccompanied by any translation of the information it contains.* Every forecast weather situation which will affect combat power must be isolated, translated into meaningful terms and issued to the appropriate commanders.

CONCLUSION

Commanders and staff must study meteorology to gain at least a basic understanding of this important and complex subject. To supplement this knowledge, up to date weather forecasts must be made available to both the commander and his staff. With knowledge and such forecasts the elements of weather can be related to the firepower, manoeuvre and moral strengths available to the commander, and his combat power determined. *Weather is one of the few factors which applies equally and simultaneously to both combatants. But like darkness and the jungle, weather must never be considered neutral.*

The success or otherwise of battles which win or lose wars depends largely on the integrity of the planning. As the environment plays a continuing and often decisive part in the outcome of battles, it follows that weather as an element of the environment must be treated as an explicit part of, and as a factor in, all appropriate tactical planning. ❧



Some Thoughts on a Proposal for a Military Presence in North West Australia

*Lieutenant Colonel J. N. Stein
Royal Australian Engineers*

"... Major variations in both the Allied and Japanese situations imposed significant modifications on the planning and construction of airfields and bases. Areas of great importance suddenly became of only minor value, and major installations built to meet foreseen needs proved to be outmoded and unnecessary as the situation changed."¹

Background to Proposal

THE concept of continental defence requires solutions to be found to the difficulties associated with conducting military operations in the vast remote areas of northwest Australia.

It is important that Australia develop, and be seen by others to possess, the capability to conduct military operations in the region. A part-time military presence occasioned by periodic major field force exercises would achieve some degree of image and capability, but I suggest that many more important advantages, both tangible and intangible, would accrue from a more active presence being established in the area.

The human environmental issues associated with the location of a major military base in the northwest of Australia would seem to indicate that it would be more desirable to stage military units through the area on an unaccompanied basis. This approach is supported, I suggest, by a number of economic issues (for example, the difficulty to justify new major facilities when there are in existence already three

Lieutenant Colonel Stein, B.A., F.R.M.T.C. (Civil), graduated from the Royal Military College in 1957. His regimental appointments include command of 21st Construction Squadron and of 2nd Field Engineer Regiment and cover RAE construction projects in Borneo, Papua, and many parts of Australia. He is a graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College. He is currently Staff Officer (Planning) in the Army element of Defence Facilities.

purpose-built task force bases in permanent construction with associated training areas, married quarters, community support facilities, etc, offering expansion capability well beyond present manning levels), and by a number of strategic issues (for example, the desirability of concentrating major permanent defence facilities within a secure, vital defence perimeter — as yet to be defined, but perhaps encompassing Iron Knob, Broken Hill, Mount Isa, and Cairns if some minimal essential level of food, mineral and other resources is to be included).

Proposal

- In northwest Australia, select five locations initially (perhaps more later) for development as outstations. Provide camps at these sites using RAE construction capability and existing Army stocks of prefabricated buildings. Master plan each camp from the outset for occupation by an infantry battalion, but build initially for an infantry company group at all locations except the base camp, where more extensive facilities would be required.
- Rotate all infantry battalions, and perhaps other major units, through these outstations on an unaccompanied basis. (At present, if limited to infantry battalions, this would involve one tour of outstation duty for four months in every two years.) Attach under command of the infantry battalion the necessary supporting arms and services. Require the battalion to plan deployment to and from the area, to submit for approval its own patrol and training programme, and to assume responsibility for the administration of all outstations whilst in the area.

Comments on Proposal

- If a large training area was acquired in the northwest, then perhaps the base camp for Battalion Headquarters, Support Company, Administrative Company and other support and logistic elements could be located there. An area presently under consideration at Yampi Peninsula would seem to be reasonably centrally situated with regard to possible outstation sites. It would have access to a major airfield at Derby, could be provided with a lesser standard air strip within the

¹ *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 1941-1945 Volume VI, Airfield and Base Development: Reports of Operations United States Army Forces in the Far East, Southwest Pacific Area* (Washington, United States Govt Printing Office, 1951) p. 418.

training area, would have impact areas available for firing of live ammunition, and would be accessible for RAN support.

- Infantry battalions, and indeed all elements of a Field Force, would be given an important sense of purpose by being offered a challenging tour of duty on a regular long-term basis.
- A military presence would be achieved in the northwest of Australia at minimal cost, and in a manner which could possibly gain ready acceptance in both political and non-political circles. The proposal could be implemented quickly, perhaps within two years. Camp development could be progressive (from shower buckets to reticulated water, earth or board floors to concrete, etc), being executed over a number of years by engineer elements under command of the infantry battalion. This would spread the overall cost of the proposal, and best suit the allocation of limited RAE resources.
- The Army would build up a level of expertise in operating in a new and vital environment. RAN and RAAF should also benefit through their operational and logistic support functions in conjunction with Army. This expertise would be developed over the full range of seasonal conditions whereas major field force exercises, the successful conduct of which cannot be jeopardised by selection of adverse seasons, are necessarily conducted to a predetermined time-table in hopefully ideal conditions.
- The permanent location in the area of a range of specialist equipments may be warranted, for example, a squadron of tanks, some armoured personnel carriers, some engineer construction plant, some Army aircraft, etc. Infantry/tank co-operation training could possibly be conducted in the area instead of at Puckapunyal. Perhaps the battalion could operate, whilst on outstation duty, in a mechanised role.
- The outstations would provide a firm base for:
 - .. deployment of additional military forces to the area in times of emergency, if necessary;
 - .. data gathering (water and gravel sources, going, gap measurement, etc) in an area of potential operational significance; and

... stockpiling of defence equipment, if considered to be necessary.'

- In the event of hostile operations, loss or abandonment of the temporary outstations to an enemy would constitute a lesser blow to national morale and to residual defence capability than would be the case for a major permanent defence facility.
- In the long term, as the size of the Australian Army grows significantly, camps could be expanded to cope with outstation duty of a task force.
- Army Reserve units could possibly be programmed through the area for annual camp training. This might help bolster recruiting into the Army Reserve.
- There would be an increased opportunity to exercise responsibly a heightened independence of command from section level through to battalion level which would be of significant value.
- Outstation duty has been employed successfully for many years by the Pacific Islands Regiment in Papua New Guinea. The concept is not new.

Summary

Against a backdrop that some operational capability in north-west Australia should be developed and displayed, three options have been briefly commented upon and I have suggested or implied that:

- periodic major field force exercises offer limited value;
- establishment of a permanent major base is inhibited by cost and by environmental issues, would offer limited flexibility, and is a *strategically dubious proposition*; and
- outstation duty offers important advantages, both political and military in nature, at a reasonable cost.

Conclusion

It seems to me that in a period when the Defence Forces are looking for a role which is *relevant* and *challenging*, outstation duty in the north-west of Australia offers a practicable proposition which has important inherent advantages for the achievement of our long-term Defence capability objectives. ✕

Address by

**His Excellency The Honourable Sir John Kerr,
K.C.M.G., K.St.J., Q.C.,**

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA

**At the Graduation Parade of The Royal Military College,
Duntroon, Canberra.**

TUESDAY, 10 DECEMBER 1974

Major-General Hay, Graduating Members of the Corps, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Last week I had the privilege of being present at the passing out ceremony at HMAS *Creswell* and tomorrow I shall have a similar privilege in the case of those passing out at Point Cook. These two occasions, together with the graduation ceremony here this morning, have provided me with an opportunity to think about what is involved when one undertakes a career in the profession of arms. All of you who are this morning passing out of Duntroon are entering that profession.

One theme which I discussed at HMAS *Creswell* was what is involved in movement out, as a professional officer, into a branch of the Armed Services — in other words, I talked about the nature of the profession upon which you are now embarking. I said then, and I say again, that we should think about what is involved in the idea that there is a profession of arms. It is this concept that I should like to develop in more detail in my comments this morning.

As the chairman of the Committee of Inquiry into the Financial Terms and Conditions of Service of Members of the Regular Armed Forces I considered, with the other members of the committee, what was involved in the idea of a profession of arms. I think, although it will take a minute or two, that I should talk to you about this subject.

My committee discussed the concept that officers of the Armed Forces belong to a profession. Arguments along these lines had their beginning following certain arbitration cases. Officers who were professional engineers wanted the benefit of the new outside engineers' rates of salaries and officers who were not engineers argued that their professional, military and other skills were worth as much as professional

engineering skills. Those of this mind sought to retain the concept of the same pay for officers of the same rank.

The concept that all officers are members of the profession of arms stemmed from a desire for status in the community and for recognition of the character of the calling of arms.

We accepted that officers need to master a body of professional knowledge and keep themselves up to date. They participate in the educational training activities necessary to pass on this body of knowledge to juniors and they have codes of ethics and conduct which are special to their profession and which are firmly enforced. These are criteria often found in other professions.

We had no doubt that because of these factors, they could fairly be said to be members of a professional class and that the 'profession of arms' was an adequate title for the military profession. We had visited the cadet colleges of each of the Services and had discussions with lecturers and other academic staff. We also examined the curricula of the colleges. We were aware that, after being commissioned, at various times throughout their service all officers are required to attend courses and carry out other types of training to improve their knowledge and qualifications and to keep up to date with changes and developments in their profession.

A professional career generally extends over a lifetime and professional work becomes more complex, difficult and responsible as the years go by.

There are various elements in the profession of arms which have to be specially stressed. First, but not most important, the profession has traditionally espoused certain ethical and conventional notions which are comprised in the phrase 'gentlemanly conduct'. You have to be both officers and gentlemen.

The profession is also a highly disciplined one in which the notions of command are stronger than they are in other professions. This is very important.

Command involves the ability to give orders and to have them obeyed. It also involves the idea of receiving orders and carrying them out. Command is exercised at all levels in the Army and the other Services. It involves as one of its ingredients the capacity to lead and control men and the duty to follow and obey.

In the lower officer ranks members of the profession are in close contact with their men and the process of command is a fairly direct one. But as an officer rises in the ranks the direct personal element in many instances is diminished and replaced by a broader concept of command from a distance — the personal tie is less direct. However, in the field, command still has an important personal aspect and different types of officer give leadership, direction and control to the men under their command in different ways and from various distances. Great commanders always make their presence and personality felt — even from afar.

The higher one rises the more the techniques of man management, as used in all big organisations, have to be faced up to. There are many principles of organisation and control which are common to many large institutions.

One of the reasons why officers successfully claimed to my committee that their work was truly professional was because of the mixture of professional arts connected with the handling of equipment and the conduct of warfare on the one hand and the problems of administration and control — of command — on the other.

Many officers in all three Services prefer to be in the field even when they achieve high rank and to be involved in that very special relationship that exists between commander and troops in the field. Nowadays, looked at from the top, there is only one profession of arms to which all of the officers of all of the three Services belong. There are not three separate professions.

As in other professions the big and difficult questions have to be handled by the leaders of the profession. In the case of the profession of arms, not only here in Australia but in most places, leadership at the top makes it necessary for many officers in all three branches of the profession to become accustomed to wearing two hats — one as an officer within their own Service and the other as a co-operating member of a joint team engaged in forward thinking and planning for the whole defence of Australia.

It becomes necessary therefore for many officers to broaden their horizons by coming to appreciate and understand the problems of the other two Services. They have to realise that their task is to co-operate in evolving a balanced defence force and policy which, because of financial, economic, foreign policy and other considerations and the

limited resources available, have to be based on co-operative effort and, in many cases, compromises.

You have, opening up before you in your profession, a lifetime career as a member of the profession of arms. You will, in the course of your professional lives, be handling at various levels within your Service the defence problems with which the country will be faced over the next quarter of a century.

The evolution of a defence policy is a combination of various skills of government — political skills, economic skills, skills in judging the likely development of world affairs, scientific and engineering skills and of course, from your point of view, military skills. As a government evolves its defence policy it strikes a balance in all of these matters.

The best way for this to be done is for all those concerned in advising the government to work as a team — leaders of the profession of arms working with financial, administrative, foreign policy, scientific and other professional experts, to evolve a line of policy which will be consistent with the circumstances in the real world.

Settling a defence policy is like any other great governmental decision. It is an exercise in the art of deciding what is possible.

You are embarking on this career today. Some of you will rise to high rank. We may have sitting here with us today a future Chief of the General Staff. I urge you to broaden your horizons and to master your own profession in its technical aspects, but also to furnish your minds with wider and more detailed understanding of all the elements that mould and control what is possible in tackling the task of defending Australia.

Learn to understand the political and other circumstances which have to be taken into account. Learn to co-operate with your fellow professionals in the other Services. Learn to co-operate with the highly skilled civilian advisers of the Crown. I would, if I were addressing a group of such civilian advisers, be urging them to learn to co-operate with you and to accept your specialist skills as an important part of what has to be taken into account.

For most of you it will be difficult, at this stage, to think beyond the practical things that you have to master as young officers, but keep the distant horizon before your eyes as well as the immediate foreground. A quarter of a century passes very quickly. This does not seem likely when one is young but I assure you that it is.

The world changes with ever increasing rapidity. Technical problems become more and more complex. The factors which affect the evolution of a defence force, and the policy it is to pursue, change with great speed. But it takes time to produce the equipment necessary to support a policy decided upon.

Those of you who prefer the practical life of a soldier in the field will, I have no doubt, obtain great satisfaction. Those of you who aspire ultimately, in the full flowering of your career, to make contributions in the top councils of the nation on the defence side, will also find that work, if you are called to it, most rewarding — though, of course, like all hard work, most demanding.

I congratulate you all. I encourage you to go out into your work and into the world with a firm belief in the proposition that you are professional men of a special kind, with special work to do — work of enormous national importance. Never forget the ethical basis of your profession, including the duty to help and teach other members of your professions, the duty to keep your knowledge up to date and the duty not to become hidebound and conservative, thinking only of past ways of solving past problems. I urge you to be flexible, co-operative and creative where you can be.

It is not given to everybody to be creative but we should all be able, within limits, to recognise the potentiality of others for creativity and to pay due homage to that quality.

I have arranged for you to be handed your commissions as officers in the Army here today. I have signed them and have asked the Chancellor to hand them to you with your other documents of achievement.

Congratulations and good luck. ✂

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the March and April 1975 issues of the journal to:

March: Lieutenant Colonel M. M. van Gelder (A Canadian Experience) \$10.

April: Lieutenant Colonel C. C. M. Peters (Urban Guerrillas) \$10.

PHILOSOPHY,

PSYCHOLOGY and

THE ARMY

*Captain P. P. Manzie, B.A., M.B., B.S.,
Royal Australian Army Medical Corps*

AN OFFICER or NCO of enquiring mind will speculate on the basic qualities of the human material in his care. He may expect to be guided by science — naturally, as our age is the creation of the scientific method. Disappointment awaits. Psychologists mainly concern themselves with the individual: can measure intelligence, discover aptitudes, and estimate the likelihood of breakdown under stress. They have only begun to analyse group conduct. Strangely, they ignore the army — one of the oldest and most complex of organisational efforts, and easily available for study.

Thus, man-management in the Australian army, as in all armies, remains a pre-scientific mystique; an art, a vast store of know-how, expressed in customary ways and attitudes, amassed through the ages from the experiences of every army that ever marched.

Much has been lost by lack of record. We know, roughly, what Hannibal said to his motley force, before his great victory at Cannae; we are ignorant of the techniques of the Carthaginian officer corps, which made possible his incredible successes. Caesar himself tells with what words he nerved his troops to cross the Rhine. Of the millions who served in Rome's armies, not one has left a diary, describing day-by-day military life. And so, the secret of the six hundred year supremacy of the legions died with them.

Ancient failure to report need not surprise, for until lately man has not looked objectively at his own doings. What demands explanation is the fact that the spirit of this age — the insatiable urge to examine and dissect — recoils from the army. Why should Australian intellec-

This article originally appeared in the Army Journal in January 1965 when Captain Manzie was a member of the CMF. He has since retired from the CMF and it is understood that he is now in private practice in Sydney.

tuals lack interest in an institution on which their very life may soon depend? Their aversion has doubtless affected community thinking; active hostility is rare, indifference common. Amongst civilian soldiers, those of leadership calibre are more likely to sense community disinterest and to contact intellectual disapproval. Herein lie the seeds of disaster; for a country's war potential depends on a confident and dedicated cadre of leaders.

A key to the problem can be found in certain concepts of human nature, which shape the politics — and the scientific thinking — of the modern world.

Eighteenth century philosophers, living in an age of extravagant privilege and inhuman exploitation, powerfully restated the ancient dream of a golden age. Beneath the dross of civilisation, they discerned "natural man" — peaceful, inclined to own goods in common, and to live without rank. Somewhere, history had gone wrong, had suppressed and perverted man's true character. Rousseau proclaimed, "Man was born free, is everywhere in chains." Later, Marx took over the ideal of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." With social justice the state would wither away, wars would end. These revelations erupted into energies which shook the world; but their working-out ended in cosmic contradictions. French revolutionary armies, crusading for liberty, equality, fraternity, enslaved Europe. The Communist revolt against privilege and war has fathered today's most hierarchy-ridden and aggressive states, dowers in Mao-tse-Tung's ultimate cynicism — "truth springs from the barrel of the gun".

In fact, the alibi has failed. Once again, man faces what he cannot admit — that his troubles are due, not to aristocracy, or capitalist conspiracy, or armament cartels, but to his own restive nature.

Nevertheless, the "noble savage" still shadows our thinking, and may weaken the resolve of an army leader. He could feel that his task is unnatural and immoral; that he has to pervert a peaceful being into ways of violence, make a true democrat accept inequalities of rank.

The purpose of this article is to look critically at "natural man"; and to list more modern, perhaps more valid theories of group behaviour.

Firstly, how does the peaceful Adam stand against long horizons? An ancestor of man has been found, almost certainly. A four-foot tall running ape, he roamed the plains of Kenya, one million years ago. His teeth were as inoffensive as ours: yet his small remains are found

amongst vast bone-piles of his prey. Beyond doubt, this slight creature was the most formidable predator of those savage times. With him are the secrets of his success — simple weapons of stone and bone. Another faculty he surely had — the art of combining to use them. And he seems to have not been reluctant to kill and eat his own kind. Man was an instinctive maker and user of weapons, even before he was man. When he settled in villages, he stocked them with weapons. The more civilised he became, the more effectively he made war. Ultimate verdicts on his affairs have always been made on the battle-field. Sadly, the philosopher's pacific Communist never was.

What of the natural democrat? Observation of primates in their natural state — in fact of many mammals — finds addiction to rank. Disputes between male animals, thought by Freudians to be sex-fights are, in fact, struggles for status. Sociologists have long noted that in communities without formal rank, unofficial differences appear, based on membership of secret societies, wealth, sporting prowess, and so on. It is hard not to suspect that rank lies deep in the human make-up, with its two aspects striving for personal status, and conforming to it in others.

Finally, what of national boundaries — frequent causes of war? Naturalists — and increasingly, students of man — find useful the concept of territoriality. They note that most birds and mammals, and particularly our primate cousins, tend to define territories for family or tribe, battling fiercely against those of their own kind who cross the lines. Strangely, an animal loses confidence and fighting ability when he trespasses on another area — which may explain why nations going to war invariably think of their action as defensive.

Summing up: man inherits from the ages an inclination to make and use weapons; to unite for hunt or battle; to structure his combinations with rank; to define and defend territory. The army instructor has to teach weapon-skill; team work in exercising it; and the resolute, ingenious and complete carrying out of orders. His job is already half done — the polite bank-clerk strips down, not to a peaceful individualist, but to a soldier born. The fact may be regretted, but remains a fact. A military leader shares with all men the desire for a utopia of peace. His job in hand is to ensure that his nation survives to enjoy it.

Worth mention is a strange by-product of the noble savage myth — the carrot and stick theory of motivation. Nineteenth century

economists conceived that industry had to convert an amiable loafer into a worker. Two inducements only were thought to apply — threat of punishment, promise of reward. The fallacy exploded in industrial upheavals. "Efficiency experts" still lean towards this sterile creed. It may enter the thinking of the army officer who resorts routinely to loss of temper.

The Basic Group

Humans identify with groups ranging from friendships between two to nations of millions. In fact, a personality can be thought of as a condensation in the matter of society — a kind of overlap of the groups to which the owner belongs. Of all such arrangements, large or small, permanent or fleeting, one has dominating importance — the primary, basic or face-to-face group. This is society's unit of action, the doer of the world's work, wherein the individual finds fulfilment, or unhappiness. Here, then, is the background of abnormal, or neurotic behaviour, and a logical start-point for social and psychological enquiry. Efficiency of a military unit can be thought of as the sum of the effectiveness of its component primary groups, its morale as the common factor of the spirit of these groups. Thus, the concept offers a systematic and rational approach to the problems of command, and merits detailed consideration.

To precisely define the primary group is difficult. There are innumerable examples — the school class, the work-shop, the road-gang, the football team, the family, the infantry platoon. Some are for life, others last a few weeks; some may be voluntary or compulsory, have vital function, others a trivial purpose; membership. Features common to these diverse collections are:

1. Recognition.
2. Predictability.
3. Common purpose.
4. Personality interaction between members.

Let us focus down on the essential requirements.

1. *Recognition* consists of shared attitudes, applies both to members of the group and to outsiders in contact with it. Recognition expresses in various ways — titles, rank structure, badges, uniforms, ceremonial drill. Symbols and rituals of unity satisfy deep emotional needs, can be used deliberately to build esprit de corps.

2. *Predictability* is the practical effect of shared attitudes. Members of a group know how fellow members will act in a variety of situations; and outsiders expect certain behaviour of them. When a soldier, or a platoon, is called "dependable", "predictable" is largely what is meant. Conditions of predictability are, the effective teaching of the relevant attitudes, and the willingness and ability of the individual to conform to them.

Here, we come close to the central process of human society — the allotting and learning of roles. A role is a pattern of response to a complex of related situations; woven into the pattern are particular purposes. Every man has many roles — for example, husband, father, son, banker's clerk, member of a bowling club, and so on. It will now be apparent that when we study groups and roles we look at two sides of a coin — at equivalent structure and function. To what a man belongs, and what he does, reduce to the same thing.

Education consists largely of learning roles. Army training has to define roles very precisely, and teach them very thoroughly, for the stakes are high.

3. *Common Purpose*. Purpose can usually be subdivided almost to infinity. The main purpose may be so wide as to define the relationship of the group with the rest of humanity. Intermediate targets could alternately be termed methods. Purposes and methods may be written in detail, or may be implicit. The formal purpose need not be the main, or real purpose. A philosophic objective can have decisive military value. Conversion to Islam triggered the explosive seventh century conquests of the Arabs. Communist movements make indoctrination part of their military structure; daily ideological sessions possess the soldier with the demonology and world objectives of Communism. Like the old Moslem mullah, the commissar aims to create fanatics; although the heaven he promises is rather different.

The commissar system must be the key to understanding the peculiar strength — and probably the weaknesses — of our possible Asiatic enemies.

To us, military evangelism is not congenial. Nevertheless, communication of purpose remains essential. At all levels the good leader puts his subordinates in the picture — both of the daily pattern, and as much as can be, of the long perspective. Especially vital is the

informing role of the leader of the primary group; from him the soldier gets his sense of direction.

4. *Personality Interaction.* Something must take place between group members before they become a team. Two processes effervesce side by side: each member getting to know other members; and each member, guided by the knowing, making adjustments to his own attitudes. The phenomena are emotional, not intellectual, and instinctual rather than deliberate. On them most depends the effectiveness of the basic group. Main conditions of the interaction are size and time.

(a) *Size.* The desirable size of a primary group rests partly on the technical demands of the purpose, limits being set by the fundamentals of human nature. Under military conditions, the range seems between five or six and something over a hundred — roughly, from a 1939 section to company. Ancient Egypt won the world's first empire with an army structured in hundreds. The basic unit of the Roman army paraded about eighty men. The irresistible Mongols formed their battle-line in tens, and multiples of ten.

Armaments change, men do not; Army reorganisation must consider, not only weapons and the tactics derived from them, but the rules by which men work together.

(b) *Time.* New units are allowed a "settling in" period. Just-commissioned warships go on "shake-down" cruises. On analysis, the purpose of the marking time is to allow basic groups to take form, to gel. The human chemistry is hottest, most turbulent, when it begins; behaviour disturbances and disciplinary problems reach their peak. Leaders — and medical officers — need to grasp the reality of the "hot" phase in the evolution of their unit, otherwise good material may be labelled insubordinate, or neurotic, because of what amounts to a stumble on strange ground. An intelligent NCO can often avoid a head-on situation without loss of authority, and shepherd his man over the hump. The conscientious RMO does not stop at the diagnosis of malingering; he looks for reasons and solutions, both in the army and civilian situation. In fact, his duty extends to assessment of personality and military potential.

There is surely room for systematic thought on the pace of training programmes. When too much is asked too soon, loss and damages reports mount, and sick parades swell with acute neuroses of a type rarely seen in private medical practice — panic attacks, frank

hysterias, excessive concern with minor injuries. An RMO should be as alert for a rise in functional complaints as for an increase in gastro-enteritis cases; his CO could find warning of the first epidemic at least as valuable as of the second.

When the basic groups have stabilised into smooth working, morale crystallises. Then, the unit has found itself, can take almost any strain — including, up to a point, decimation by battle and disease. As to this point, and related questions, historical study could probably give answers. How much can a primary group be diminished, and still function? How quickly can it absorb replacements?

Three more facts of group psychology need attention.

5. *The Natural Leader.* The primary group readily accepts its appointed commander. However, an informal spokesman tends to emerge. He reflects the current tone of the group, and may be replaced as the situation changes — in the same way, perhaps, as nations seem always to dismiss their war leaders when peace comes, and vice versa. An immature officer can think he is a rival. Actually, the appointed and “natural” leaders function in different areas. The perceptive officer becomes more effective by understanding and using the phenomenon.

6. *Contact.* Good leaders forge a bond of feeling with their men. The ability to make contact defies formulation. It is separate from technical competence; and certainly, is the essence of man-management. Industrial research finds that remote control, even if superbly planned, performs badly. Great generals have, one and all, excelled in generating vital warmth — an achievement quite compatible with rigorous discipline. At primary group level, the junior leader who fails in contact fails in everything.

The art can be cultivated. Commercial and industrial experience recommends the seminar programme. About twelve executives meet regularly, under a non-committal chairman, for free discussion of day to day problems. From the to-and-fro emerges, at least for some, better insight. Improved self-knowledge relieves the need to be infallible, lessens preoccupation with internal tensions, releases energy for relationships. Perhaps the method could be adapted to army leader-training.

7. *The Bad Apple.* A discordant personality cripples normal group development. The misfit may be a solitary, or of rigid disposition; his value may emerge when he is transferred to a suitable niche. Or, he may be a true inadequate, and should, with all kindness, be returned

to civilian life. Some seriously disturbed men slip through any system of recruit examination; the screening process, and the assessment of aptitudes must continue after enlistment. To recognise the inadequate is not usually hard; consistently poor performances and frequenting of sick parades are the give-aways. Some of these unfortunates develop engaging personalities, as part of their defence. Moreover, they seem to attract more than a fair share of bad luck. Sympathy may tempt a leader to waste effort on hopeless material. The RMO stands in the best position for detecting such futile situations; he will be put on the scent when a particular face haunts his RAP.

Concluding, I do not imply that equations can be applied to human behaviour. There are myriad qualifications to any explanation of conduct — especially to a widely applicable theory like that of the primary group. However, the concept offers a logical approach to problems of discipline and morale. Complex technique has imposed on the army a bewildering variety of organisation. A unit commander considering the human material scattered through his forest of equipment can begin by asking himself what is, or what promises to be, the basic group; by following the ancient rules he can set about turning a crowd of technicians into a fighting force.

Some statements in this article could seem brashly unorthodox. They may be evaluated in the main source-books:

1. *Prehistory and the Beginnings of Civilisation* — Hawkes and Wooley.
2. *African Genesis* — Richard Ardrey.
3. *The Social Psychology of Industry* — Browne.
4. *Human Groups* — W. T. H. Sprott.
5. *The March of the Ten Thousand* — Xenophon.

This work merits comment. A band of Greek mercenaries was left stranded in the heart of Asia by the defeat of their hirer, a pretender to the throne of Persia. They fought their way to the sea, traversing a thousand miles of mountain and desert, through numerous and warlike tribes. One of their generals, an Athenian, tells the tale; it demonstrates the miracles inherent in good discipline and good leadership. On a deeper plain, it offers fascinating comment on the dynamics of rank. Strategic decisions were debated by the whole Greek army. Popular vote appointed and dismissed leaders. Yet the rank-and-file, having set up their officers, gave them complete obedience.

Finally, one other fashionable concept needs challenge: that nations rise, and inevitably decline. Could a foreboding of historical doom enervate the Australian will to live — partly explain our curious pursuit of the sweet life under gathering storm clouds? Truly; all human affairs have an end, and the earth is littered with the wrecks of empires. But their destructions are dated by hind-sight, not by prophecy. The story tells also of peoples who looked up from their feasting, saw the moving finger, stood to arms, and survived. ✕

TENDERS

RANGE FINDERS FOR INFANTRY, FOR H.M. SERVICE
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
is prepared to receive

Proposals from persons desirous of submitting for competitive trial RANGE FINDERS, which shall fulfil the following conditions, viz.:—

(1) The instrument must be strong and simple and must not require frequent adjustment, nor extraordinary precautions against the exigencies of Field Service and effects of climate and weather.

(2) It must be possible for one Infantry Soldier to carry the entire apparatus, in addition to his rifle and ordinary equipment, both on the march and in action.

(3) A person of ordinary intelligence and normal vision must be able to become an efficient range taker after a month's training.

(4) The system must be suitable for the observation of moving objects, especially troops of all arms in the usual formations up to 1200 yards distance.

(5) It must be practicable to make at least four observations per minute with an average error, at 1000 yards, not exceeding 4 per cent of the range.

(6) The range must be read in yards without recourse to calculation.

(7) The number of observers required for each instrument or set of instruments must not exceed two.

(8) Other considerations being equal, preference will be given to those instruments which

(a) Can find the range of fixed objects up to 2500 yards with the greatest rapidity, but with an error not exceeding 100 yards; this to be effected either by the normal mode of operations, or with the aid of extra appliances.

(b) Require only one observer.

(9) The instruments submitted for trial must be complete, with full description, and instructions for use.


(10) Proposals must be sent in, addressed to the ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Horse Guards, War Office, before the 1st August, 1888.

(A request for tenders made by the War Office in May 1888.)



CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES

Strategic Considerations



IT is always difficult, in peace time, to justify preparations for war. When limited national funds are to be allocated more immediate needs or desires often claim priority. Strategic considerations, which influence governments and might influence public opinion, are known to be based on a mixture of fact and conjecture, always relate to the future rather than the present, and are in any case often too confidential to be revealed or too esoteric to be discussed.

In a number of countries, including Australia, the idea of using force to resolve international disputes has become over the past few years increasingly unrespectable and unpopular. Some of the reasons for this, and the implications for raising reserve forces, are explored in the next chapter, but the fact remains that such aspects of nationalism as have customarily been manifested in public displays of patriotism, readiness to serve in the armed forces, and willingness to accept as internationally valid the perceived national interests of one's own government, have come under critical challenge and increased opposition.

This challenge has been impelled partly by uncertainties as to the propriety, the purpose and the results of Australian participation in the Vietnam War; partly by increasing and closer cultural and tourist contacts by Australians with Asian peoples, from whom it was long believed any threat would come; and partly by an international movement of ideas — especially but not solely attractive to young people — opposed to war and other major overt acts of violence. The need of so large a proportion of mankind for better food, shelter, education and health is much more obvious than the need of the same people for protection from international aggression.

Since World War II, people have tended to relate the prospects for peace to the psychological climate of superpower politics, and in the

Reproduced from Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces Report, March 1974 (Chairman; Dr T. B. Millar M.A., Ph.D.) with the permission of the Australian Government Publishing Service.

past two or three years words such as 'detente' and 'strategic arms limitation' have epitomized what many believe to be a much less tense relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, and thus an international society less likely to erupt in major war. Further, the emergence of the European Economic Community, of Japan as the world's third industrial power, and of China as an active member of the international states system, has appeared to create a multiple balance of power, offering by its greater flexibility a more stable international society.

Countries of the various economic and ideological groups are now trading between the groups on an unprecedented scale, thus creating an international economic society as well as sub-systems of states heavily dependent on the continuing movement of resources, manufactures, investment and aid. Even multi-national corporations, sometimes subjected to criticism on grounds of improperly influencing the decisions of national governments, would seem overall to stabilize rather than destabilize the international economic system. On these economic grounds, therefore, there are strong reasons for governments generally to believe that economic interchange is more likely to produce political peace than to produce tension or conflict.

While not discounting any of these considerations, we also cannot set aside others which tend in different directions. Historically, governments embarking on war have often done so in the face of what seems to outsiders or even to many of their own citizens to be logical, sensible, or profitable. It has to be demonstrated that modern governments make wiser decisions than their predecessors.

While it is true that neither of the superpowers has used nuclear weapons against the other, and observers may reasonably conclude that a balance of terror exists, progress towards limiting the construction or deployment of strategic nuclear weapons has been barely perceptible. The conventional armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, and their respective allies, still confront each other in Europe, nearly 30 years after the end of World War II. The main fact of any balance of power is the power which each part of the balance possesses, or is believed to possess.

Since 1945, there have been four sizable wars in the Middle East, one in Korea, and one in Vietnam. The Soviet Union has crushed nationalist movements in East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, facilitated the North Korean attack on South Korea, Egyptian

attacks on Israel, and India's invasion of East Pakistan. The United States has provided much of the means for Israel to launch and maintain its armed forces against its Arab neighbours and for Pakistan to make war against India, has intervened on a small scale in several Latin American states, and massively in Indo-China against forces supported and sustained by the Soviet Union, East European countries, and the Chinese People's Republic. Significant wars have been fought between India and Pakistan, China and India, Malaysia (with Commonwealth help) and Indonesia (with Soviet and Chinese help). China has occupied Tibet and fought in Korea, had a border conflict with the U.S.S.R., and aided revolutionary movements in various Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries. There have been scores of minor international incidents involving the use of armed forces, and new outbreaks are reported almost daily. Dozens of civil wars have taken place — in Northern Ireland, southern Europe, Latin America, and Africa — often with external aid. And several countries have seen the mass slaughter of their own citizens — hundreds of thousands of people within religious, ethnic or ideological minorities considered a threat to the ruling group.

It is perhaps marginal but still relevant to add to this condensed catalogue of violence the public acts of terrorism carried out by groups or individuals seeking to exert international political leverage, exact vengeance, or extort funds. No country, and no airline, can be confident that it is wholly secure against threats or acts of this kind, and yet many governments have such sympathy with the methods adopted that they have hitherto prevented effective joint international action.

Changes in the pattern of power between the largest states do not seem to have reduced the incidence, or the level of violence, of these lesser hostilities. Whether such changes have reduced the likelihood of major war is impossible to determine. The European Economic Community is not a strategic entity, except as it overlaps the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Japan, despite the growth of its economy and — to a much lesser extent — of its armed forces, remains at least for the time being committed to 'self-defence' and to strategic dependence on the United States. China's wider participation in international discourse and the American withdrawal from Vietnam have led to greater flexibility in the relations of both the United States and Japan with China and with the Soviet Union, but have barely if at all reduced the possibility of Sino-Soviet conflict — a conflict in which the United States had indicated in advance that it would be neutral. The rapproche-

ment between China and Japan has not removed the greatest potential source of tension between them: ownership or control of off-shore sea-bed resources, some of which (e.g. in the Senkaku Islands) are occupied by Japan and claimed by China. Against South Vietnamese resistance, China recently occupied the Paracel Islands, claiming that they were part of a large area of the South China Sea which is Chinese territory, an area stretching to within a few miles of the Borneo coastline. The extension of Soviet military and economic interests into the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific could be either a source of tension or of restraint, depending on the circumstances. The reduction of American physical involvement in South East Asia could just as easily stimulate rival bids for power (as in Korea in 1950) as sublimate them. And the reduced significance of the Five Power Agreement between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain is a factor for further change in the strategic situation in the Malaysian archipelago. What could be the first stage of competitive escalation of American and Soviet military power in the Indian Ocean has begun.

We are not, therefore, living either in a region or a period of international stability. Quite the contrary. On the other hand, no major power appears interested in committing acts of direct aggression. No major war is apparent on the horizon. What seems true may be true — that the nations have developed and refined over the past few years a greater capacity to manage international crises, using a variety of international machineries including the United Nations, select international conferences, and ad hoc group or personal diplomacy. Success in this area is perhaps as much a matter of perspective, or psychology, as demonstrable fact. Many people seem to 'have the feeling' that the tide is running for peaceful settlement of disputes. Current historical evidence supports such a feeling only selectively, except in respect to direct superpower confrontations, where nuclear war would be madness and suicide.

History also does not confirm without reservation the thesis that economic interdependence or cultural contacts will inevitably reduce political competition. At times, and for the most part, they may do so, but inequities in an economic sub-system, or checks to expansion of particular industries or economies, can promote resentment, envy or acquisitiveness. Europe in the 1930s was packed with tourists and businessmen from other parts of Europe.

There are always forces and voices of reason and restraint against public international violence, and they probably succeed more often than they fail. At this time there seem to be three general sets of circumstances which increase the likelihood of international instability:

- a. Governments and peoples have become preoccupied with the problem of apparently fixed limits on natural resources related to almost unlimited increases in population. This has produced two effects:
 - (1) 'resources diplomacy', whereby resource-rich individual states or groups of states bargain for higher economic returns or for political and strategic advantage; and
 - (2) competition in exploring and acquiring access to those natural resources not currently within accepted state boundaries, i.e. in the sea or the sea-bed, and Antarctica.

Both of these offer incentives to use force — in the first case to redress the balance, in the second to stake claims and protect them. There has been almost no progress in the international management of the sea-bed. One also cannot ignore envy of natural resources within the boundaries of other states.

- b. With the exception of areas rich in oil, most of the less developed states have found the gap between their standards of living and the standards in the developed countries to be widening steadily, despite international aid programmes and spasmodic attempts to use terms of trade to help the poorer countries. At the same time, almost any less developed country has been and still is able to obtain arms in quantity from either the Soviet Union or the United States, on attractive financial terms, whatever the political cost.
- c. The great majority of states — over 80 per cent — have strongly authoritarian systems of government. While democracies are not immune from temptation to acts of violence, it is evident that free discussion, access to diverse sources of information, and institutionalized political change provide restraints not existing in totalitarian states. Many states have military governments with little experience in governing, inadequate civil services, and traditional resort to corruption or violence as instruments of administration. Many of the former colonial countries have fragile central administrations imposed

on fissiparous societies, with strong regional or tribal links crossing national boundaries.

The collective restraints envisaged in the United Nations Charter have operated on numbers of occasions, and must be a factor to consider in the prevention or resolution of any future conflict. Unfortunately, in the 29 years since the Charter was agreed, the United Nations has been ineffectual many more times than it has been effectual in meeting threats to or breaches of international peace and security. This does not provide a reason for ignoring United Nations machinery, but rather for using it to the greatest extent possible without letting the existence of the machinery arouse false optimism and prevent the taking of *adequate national measures for self-protection*.

Only a few years ago, the concept of effective group bargaining by the oil-producing states was ridiculed by most Western commentators. It is now a significant if perhaps not a permanent phenomenon. Nations move up and down the scale of strategic significance. Military power is intruded into one area, withdrawn from another. Internal pressures, even within dictatorships, force alterations in the leadership, and in the foreign and defence policies of the leadership. The one thing certain about the international scene is that it will continue to change, and new factors will enter it.

These circumstances complicate the problem of forecasting the situations in which armed forces may be required. Few governments and — so far as one can deduce — few intelligence services have shown significant skill in predicting outbreaks of conflict. Major wars cast their shadows ahead, but are more clearly discerned retrospectively than at the time. Unforeseen crises do occur. Despite continuing assessments of the strategic intentions and capacities of other countries, governments are often surprised by military developments, and take time to react even to what is plainly written on the wall. We would estimate that, for most countries, the lead time in which they can foresee with any assurance international conflict in which they are not directly involved, ranges from a few hours to a few weeks; for conflicts in which they are directly involved, the warning would probably be between a few months and a few (3 to 5) years.

Australia's Situation

Except for a very limited amount of bombing and shelling during World War II, Australia's continental territory has never been attacked.

But during the past 90 years, several hundred thousand members of the Australian armed forces have served and fought overseas — in the Soudan, China, South Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Korea, and South East Asia. Australians have taken part also in breaking the Berlin blockade, in United Nations truce observation teams in India, Pakistan and Palestine, and in the United Nations Force in Cyprus. In 1973 the Australian Government offered to contribute to a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Middle East, but the offer was not accepted.

The context of these contributions has changed as the World scene has changed. From being a collection of Australian colonies, to a single country whose foreign policy was that of the British Empire, to an independent state capable of negotiating alliances and of acting at variance with declared British policy, Australia has nevertheless consistently seen its defence as being at one remove — working with major allies to prevent the need physically to defend Australia itself. The major allies have been first Britain, in Europe, the Middle East, and the Malay archipelago; and secondly the United States, in the South West Pacific, Korea, and Vietnam. Initially, Australian contributions were virtually automatic, as a reaction to a threat to a single political unit — the Empire and (later) Commonwealth. More recently two other considerations have predominated: that by participating in joint arrangements Australia would:

- a. encourage the major powers to remain committed to the security of existing political alignments in this region; and
- b. encourage them to help in defending Australia itself should that necessity arise.

A third aim was to work with countries of the region in a common effort for common defence.

But circumstances have substantially eroded the basis on which Britain and the United States have been involved in South East Asia. The British contribution to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore is still locally significant but small in size and limited in objective. All but a few of the several hundred thousand American servicemen in Vietnam have been withdrawn, and seem unlikely ever to return. Although acting from different premises, because of different historical associations, Britain and the United States share the belief that responsibility for the security of friendly or allied states in South East Asia should be primarily and principally with the states themselves.

The present Australian Government has accepted this as a fact of life, and appropriate to Australia's national dignity and strategic priorities. It saw overtones of imperialism in the maintenance of Australian forces in Asia in conjunction with major 'white' powers. For the first time since 1940, we do not now have a battalion serving overseas, although other contributions under the Five Power arrangement remain, in modified form. There is little Australian input and effectively no operational commitment to the South East Asia Treaty Organization. The Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty does not require the despatch of forces to Asia or anywhere else except (if necessary) New Zealand, although it remains the cornerstone of Australian defence policy.

It is difficult to foresee situations in which either the present or an alternative Australian Government would again commit combat forces to operations in South East Asia, although the unforeseen tends to happen more often than the foreseen, and expeditionary forces — perhaps small in scale — cannot be eliminated entirely from military calculations. Similarly both Government and Opposition would be reluctant to despatch forces to Papua New Guinea, in the event of a deterioration of security in that territory, but they could not rule out the possibility altogether. Both would consider sympathetically the use of Australian forces overseas in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Opposition would also support policies enunciated by the present Minister for Defence, Mr L. H. Barnard, in August 1973, when he said that the Government policy called for 'a strong and valid defence capability that will demonstrate beyond all doubt the nation's intention to defend itself and its vital interests. There can be no neglect of defence. In determining policy regarding the shape and size of the defence force and its capabilities, at any time, the government of the day will give first consideration to the strategic prospect facing the nation . . . We must maintain a defence capability that accords with our foreign policy'.¹ This Committee, on the basis of the information available to it, and at a later point in time, shared, but to a higher degree, the uncertainty that the Minister expressed elsewhere in his statement over the possible deterioration in Australia's strategic environment.

Except in the event of nuclear attack, Australia's strategic position is in fact a highly favourable one compared with many countries. Any

¹ House of Representatives Debates, 22 August, 1973, pp. 237-9.

invader would have to cross hundreds or perhaps thousands of miles of sea, involving massive logistical problems. Much of the continent is inhospitable, with little water and no food crops. The vital south east corner, where the bulk of the population, industry and government lie, is furthest from an invader. The country is able to support itself in food, and in most of its mineral requirements; it produces two-thirds of its own oil, but it imports much of its sophisticated industrial and military equipment. It has many friends and no obvious enemies, small or powerful. But virtually all its foreign trade is by long sea routes.

The size of the Australian continent — three million square miles — and the dispersed pockets of population require defence forces capable of quick deployment over long distances. This is no island fortress, but an archipelago of settlements, forces and resources connected by a huge land mass, and by the sea above the continental shelf.

An invading force with adequate logistical and air support might be able to obtain a foothold in a remote part of the continent, but its supply lines would be highly vulnerable to interdiction. To subjugate the whole country, while local forces remain, would be a further major operation. There are few if any countries currently capable of mounting and sustaining such an invasion, and no apparent motives for their doing so. Smaller incursions would be simpler.

Australia needs defence forces, therefore, not to meet a presently perceived threat to the country or to our national interests, but because threats can develop and historically have developed more quickly than the capacity to meet them; because key national installations must be able to be protected; because defence capacity is part of the complex resources and mechanism by which governments negotiate with other governments on behalf of their people; and for other reasons discussed in the first chapter of this Report, especially to maintain 'the state of the art', and to be available for civil emergencies.

In the light of these circumstances and assessments, the Committee estimated:

- a. that it is highly unlikely that any substantial Australian forces will be deployed overseas within the next few years;
- b. that strategic warning of at least three years and probably much longer could be expected of any major invasion of Australia;

- c. that nevertheless a regular force must be capable of quick (a few weeks) deployment either within Australian territory, or to participate in United Nations peace-keeping, or even possibly to help a neighbouring state in trouble;
- d. that there could develop within six months from any point in time in peace a requirement beyond the capacity of the Australian Regular Army; and
- e. that Australian capacity to forecast with accuracy a larger requirement does not extend beyond about three years.

We see the focus of defence planning, training, equipment, and doctrine as being primarily on the defence of the Australian continent, maritime environment, and island territories, with expeditionary capacity a secondary although not insignificant consideration. We consider that the Citizen Military Forces or their equivalent should be capable of mounting at least an operational task force (brigade group) within six months of a decision, and able to be expanded if necessary to about 60,000 within three years, with appropriate provision for all arms and services. We feel its main objective should be the defence of Australian territory.

At a time when the combat section of the Army is small, it is essential that naval forces and maritime air elements should be adequate to give warning of any changes in our strategic environment, and should demonstrate a capacity to bring force quickly to bear on any situation affecting the security of the continent and continental shelf. They should 'gain time' for the deployment of the Regular Army, just as one function of the Regular Army is to gain time for the training and deployment of the army reserves.

In the most critical situation — a major assault upon Australia in an attempt to dominate the whole nation — the ultimate combat takes place on the ground, in a struggle for physical control of centres of population, communications, and industry. Here, every trained man counts, every disciplined sub-unit of the Citizen Forces makes a vital contribution. ✕

JOSEPH STALIN

THE MAN



'The organization of the Party will take the place of the Party, the Central Committee will take the place of the organization, and finally the dictator will take the place of the Central Committee.'

—Leon Trotsky¹

*Lieutenant Colonel D. R. Overstead
Royal Australian Signals*

HE foresaw it all. He warned that it would happen, and it did. He must have been a remarkable man; perhaps the greatest Russian of them all... Leon Trotsky. He said a great many things about the dictator who *did* take the place of the Central Committee, and who became his most bitter opponent, enemy and executioner. Of that man — of Joseph Stalin — he said 'a man compounded of one-third Machiavelli and two-thirds Judas.'² He may have been right. A great many people would agree with him, and yet there is much that would indicate that he deserves his place in history — Russian history perhaps — as a great man. He and he alone may have been capable of thrusting the Soviet Union through the harsh modernizing process in the short time frame of two decades. The achievement stands despite all criticism. Certainly no weakling could have tackled the task. Certainly no ordinary man

Lieutenant Colonel Overstead graduated from OCS in 1953. Between 1953 and 1963 he served in instructional and staff appointments. Following an overseas posting to the UK from December 1963 to March 1966, he attended Staff College in 1967. After further regimental and staff appointments he was posted to USA where he is currently the Australian exchange instructor in the Department of Strategy at the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas.

could have carried it through. But in declaring that he was no ordinary man, how should he be classified... brilliant?... a born leader?... a dictator?... a madman? Obviously there can be no short answer.

The aim of this paper is to examine a range of books currently on the market, to provide an independent study of Stalin *the man*, to shed more light on this colourful Soviet leader. An attempt will be made to highlight his main personal characteristics, to understand his motives, and to determine whether he was caught in a political web from which he could not escape, or whether — as so many people argue — he was a monster or madman.

Name: Iosif Vissarionovich Djugashvili.

Also known as:

Soso	K.
J. Besochvili	Nizheradze
Chizhikov	Ryaboi
David	Oganess Vartanovich Totomyants
Ivanovich	Vassily
K. Kato	Vassilyev
Ko.	Stalin
Koba	Uncle Joe ³
K.St.	

He had as many sides to his personality as he had names — good, bad, saviour, devil, soft, hard, colourful, austere, intellectual, plodder, complex, simple, puritanical, vulgar and many more. To the naive Western observer, the general Russian character is hard enough to understand, let alone a particular Russian of a particular environment and in particular circumstances. Indeed, it is easier for the naive Westerner to classify him as a powerful madman and leave it at that. But, should the discerning Western observer transcend cultural values and look at the real Stalin — the product of his environment — then a fascinating story unfolds, and he may be judged differently.

He was of humble origin (his father was a cobbler), and from an early age was exposed to a coarse way of life. He was educated in

¹ *Stalin: A Self Portrait* (New York: Farar, Straus and Young, Inc., 1953), Preface.

² Isaac, Don Levine, *Stalin's Great Secret* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1956), p. 16.

³ *Stalin: A Self Portrait*, facing plate 5.

profanity, family fights and the struggle for survival. At one time he threw a knife at his father to protect his mother from yet another beating. He was always ambitious. He was one of the best pupils in his primary school, and obtained a scholarship to the Tiflis Seminary. He loved games and dancing, and had an excellent singing voice (he often sang solo chants at solemn mass). His mother had high hopes for him to become a priest.⁴

During the third year at the seminary, not only had his grades dropped, but he was expelled as a young revolutionary. Apparently life in the seminary stifled him. He was ambitious; and a realist, and instruction was not keyed for this. He took to reading 'revolutionary books', and became an extreme sceptic, a cynical realist with a passion for practical answers, and a devotee of total materialism. He decided that men were not inherently good and kind, but intolerant, coarse, with numerous faults and few virtues⁵ who deceived, lied and cheated. His philosophy was to use the revolutionary movement — any revolutionary movement — not for high ideals, but for himself. He was on the bottom of the ladder, and knew he had to work hard and use *any* means possible to better himself. And so equipped, he faced his adult future.

His early adult life was typical of that of a dedicated revolutionary. He organized strikes and demonstrations and spoke for Lenin. He was married during this time to Keke — 'the only person in the world to whom he showed affection and humanity'. When she died soon afterwards Stalin was to say 'She was the only creature who softened my stony heart'... but he forgot her and his son as he left the cemetery.⁶ At about this stage, he was noticed by Lenin, who quickly summed up his work and character, and bestowed the name of 'Stalin' on him, that is, 'man of steel'. His character was developing — hard worker, decision-maker, organizer, and a man who was also level-headed and unemotional.

An interesting period began at this time; a period many writers overlook. It appears that the man of steel had soft loins. He sought out women for his own purposes, and even organized a chain of brothels 'for the Party'. His overall philosophy was that *all* methods for the betterment of the Party were justified, and he carried out this philosophy ruthlessly. He exploited immorality, and indulged in it himself. He

⁴ Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only One Year* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 362.

⁵ *ibid.* p. 361.

⁶ Jack Fisherman and J. Bernard Hutton, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin* (Gateshead: The Northumberland Press Ltd., 1962), p. 26.

also organized professional criminals into a 'protection racket'. He was a top organizer for the Party, and yet had to be warned several times to 'keep the Party name clean'.⁷ He was one of the few to agree with Lenin that 'violence was the only means of conflict, and blood the fuel of history'.⁸

It is also interesting that at this time he was arrested and deported five times, escaping and returning each time. A claim has been registered that Stalin was in fact working for the Okhrana — the Tsar's Secret Police — and that this 'secret' of his was to haunt him for the rest of his life and be responsible for the murders and executions of friends and high officials.⁹ This is an enticing theory and does appear to fit in with the man's character and actions, but by and large there is no evidence to substantiate the claim, and it is fairly safe to discount it.

Lenin soon used him to run the Party whilst he (Lenin) was outside the country, and made no secret of the fact that Stalin was a man of action with courage and experience who could handle underground groups very efficiently. He was regarded as one of Lenin's principal deputies at the time of the October 1917 revolution. In 1918, as 'Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Southern Front', he became 'the Hero of Tsaritsin'. He organized the G.P.U., and was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 11th Party Congress.

Despite all this, Lenin on his deathbed was to denounce Stalin as unsuitable to succeed him. The Party was asked to find a man 'more legal, more courteous, more considerate and less capricious'.¹⁰ This may have held more weight to the historian had he not also denounced Zinovyev, Kameniev, Bukharin, Pyatokov, and Trotsky as well. Stalin *did* succeed him, since as General Secretary he wielded more power than the others, and 'organized' himself into the empty chair. As a realist, he knew he had powerful enemies and that his position — despite the power — was precarious. As Khrushchev was to say many years later, he had to learn to live with rivals and threats, and became a very distrustful man — sickly suspicious — who saw enemies, spies and

⁷ Fisherman, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin*, p. 33.

⁸ *ibid.* p. 38.

⁹ Levine, *Stalin's Great Secret*.

¹⁰ Fisherman, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin*, p. 56.

'two-facers' everywhere.¹¹ Anyone in Stalin's position would have had a similar phobia. To begin with, 80 per cent of the old Bolsheviks had turned against him,¹² his telephone calls were tapped, his mail and visitors were censored. He lived in a strange environment where he had to be on his guard continually.

He soon emerged as a ruthless pragmatist. He lied to keep Trotsky away from Lenin's funeral, he blackmailed; and if some authors are to be believed, he *poisoned*. He is known to have had a good, almost expert knowledge of poisons, and there is a suggestion that he poisoned Lenin,¹³ the Minister of War Mikhail Frunze¹⁴ (a likely leader of a military *putsch*), and even his second wife Nadia.¹⁵ Some writers have raised the list to include several more poisonings.

His personal life left a lot to be desired. He drank excessively at times, used foul language, had little time for his wife and family, was sullen, sometimes violent, and under the influence of drink would bring young women home to his own bedroom. At home he was thoroughly *bourgeois*. He enjoyed good food, good drink and good company. At a time when peasants were starving, he imported delicacies from around the world, and his colourful, noisy and drunken parties are well documented. He liked listening to records, singing, taking photographs, and playing many social games.

His lovely wife Nadia was either poisoned by him, or committed suicide (there are equal cases for both arguments). The rift between them was widening for some time, and after her eyes were opened to him as a brute politically as well as a brute domestically, she argued with him and became a thorn in his side. She died at the age of thirty-one and soon after her death he was laughing and joking with typists and clerks from the Kremlin.¹⁶

Stalin's attitude towards labour was precisely the same as that of the early Russian capitalists towards the serfs. It was the peasant and the worker who paid the price for industrialization and modernization, and Stalin exacted their payments in produce, taxes and long working

¹¹ Nikita S. Khrushchev, *The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: The New Leader, 1962).

¹² Fisherman, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin*, p. 63.

¹³ *ibid.* p. 60.

¹⁴ *ibid.* p. 62.

¹⁵ *ibid.* p. 77.

¹⁶ *ibid.* p. 68.

hours, coupled with hunger, punishment and strict controls over all facets of life. Brutality and inhuman terrorism were rife.

Again the philosophy of 'all methods for the betterment of the Party and socialism are justified' was rigorously applied. The 'Godless Five Year Plan' was part of this. In essence it prescribed:

- a. *First Year.* All churches and religious communities to be closed.
- b. *Second Year.* Religious family cells to be liquidated. All religious literature to be prohibited. One hundred and fifty anti-religious films to be prepared.
- c. *Third Year.* Activism of 'Godless Cells' and expulsion of remaining religious persons.
- d. *Fourth Year.* Churches, synagogues and the like, to be converted into cinemas, club-rooms, etc.
- e. *Fifth Year.* Consolidation of the above.¹⁷

Stalin continued to direct and organize, organize and direct. Nothing should impede the march to socialism and communism. He was rude, he could fly into a temper, but he was *not* insane. He made level-headed, if ruthless, decisions, and was coldly efficient.

He was also cold with his family except perhaps for his daughter Svetlana (who eventually turned away from him in disgust). Children by both wives and numerous girl-friends were forgotten. He could not respond to love. He was not interested in his grand-children. He wanted blind devotion and absolute submission to his will. One author claims he disowned his son Jacob when he 'allowed himself' to be taken prisoner by the German Army. The son then committed suicide by throwing himself against an electrified fence.¹⁸ (Another author claims Stalin grieved for his lost son and offered a huge reward for news of his son's grave. Presumably his daughter's version should be the one accepted.) He was becoming more intolerant, more dogmatic, more pragmatic, would not compromise, and was making swift decisions not backed by logical or philosophical thought. He had no pangs of conscience, no doubts about his righteousness, considered himself infallible, and had a tremendous thirst for power.¹⁹ He was selfish and always self-centred.

¹⁷ *ibid.* p. 75.

¹⁸ Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only One Year*, p. 370.

¹⁹ *ibid.* p. 389.

His fifteen-year old son seduced a seventeen-year old Kremlin clerk. She was shot as a traitor. Another clerk Yolka Andreyevna with whom he had an affair, simply 'vanished'. He had numerous affairs with clerks, typists, and ballerinas. Malenkov at one time remarked 'There were so many (women), one lost count'.²⁰ He lived with Yevgeniya Movshina for six years. He had her and her secret lover shot when he found them in bed together.²¹ In 1952 he took Lyda Vavryna as his unmarried wife. He enjoyed 'blue movies', and they were obtained on a regular basis for him. His attitude to women was that they were to serve man's sexual needs. There are many stories concerning his sexual appetite.

Stalin is regarded as a monster for his dispassionate management of Soviet Union internal affairs. Thousands were shot without trial, thousands were imprisoned, thousands took the easy way out and committed suicide. New criminal procedures facilitated arrests, viz:

- a. Investigations were to last no more than 10 days.
- b. Indictments were to be communicated to the accused no more than 24 hours before the trial opened.
- c. The accused was to say nothing in court, and could not be represented by a lawyer.
- d. No appeals, or reversion of sentences were to be allowed.
- e. Immediate execution of punishment was to follow the verdict.²²

Evil was heaped upon evil. Mass arrests included prominent members of the Party, government officials, police and military. No one was safe. The N.K.V.D. was everywhere. Everyone 'confessed' to his alleged crime, and there were methods of torture skilfully applied to assist those who would not confess. A drug was developed to destroy the minds of Party members who hesitated to confess. Gorky was liquidated — he knew too much. Abel Yenukidze, a long-time Georgian friend was shot — he tried to help the people. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, another long-time friend warned Stalin that his methods would affect the image of the Party, and he met a sudden unexpected death. Kalinin, a personal friend of many years died suddenly after disagreeing with Stalin on the execution of eleven 'traitors' — including General Vlasov, a one-time hero. Kirov and Bukharin, both old friends

²⁰ Fisherman, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin*, p. 150.

²¹ *ibid.* p. 162.

²² *ibid.* p. 90.

were murdered. Security Chief Pauker, for 15 years a confidant, procurer of women for him, and friend, was accused as a spy and shot.²³ Rosa Kaganovich, and numerous Kremlin clerks and typists 'disappeared' with more than a hint that Stalin had 'lost interest in them'. Lenin's wife Nadiezhda proved troublesome and was eliminated. Yezhov the head of the N.K.V.D. was declared insane and committed to an asylum. Zakovsky his deputy was convicted of sadism and shot. Up to 20 million people were sentenced to service in slave-labour camps.²⁴ No one was insulated from the reign of terror. The U.S.S.R. was not following Marx so much as 'Ivan the Terrible', or Hitler. Purge followed purge, anti-semitism raged, and murders were ordered. Neither did his family (wife and in-laws), lovers, friends or Party leaders escape the blood-bath. Stalin reasoned... 'if the old Bolsheviks, the group constituting the ruling caste in the country, are unfit to perform this function, it is necessary to remove them from their posts, to create a new ruling caste'.²⁵ It has been determined that of 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the 17th Congress, 98 persons (ie 70 per cent) were arrested and shot.²⁶ Stalin appears to have had some sadistic delight in managing these and other 'eliminations'. He himself said 'To choose the victim, to prepare the blow with care, to slake an implacable vengeance and then go to bed... there is nothing sweeter in the world'.²⁷ To aid in this unholy occupation, he ordered an intercommunication system to be installed for use by members of the Politburo, then arranged for a telephone engineer to provide him with monitoring facilities. He spent whole nights in eavesdropping and plotting his revenge against disloyal (to him) Party members. It is typical of the man that he was aware of the facilities modern communications systems could provide, and that his telephone engineer also 'disappeared'.²⁸

The writer Ilya Ehrensburg sums up the period by saying that '... no one was sure of the next day... many kept suitcases packed... lifts were disconnected at night... no name-plates were put on the doors of government offices because the officials may be here today but "gone"'

²³ *ibid.* pp. 93-108.

²⁴ *Stalin: A Self Portrait*, Preface.

²⁵ Robert V. Daniels, ed., *The Stalin Revolution — Foundations of Soviet Totalitarianism* (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972), p. XVIII.

²⁶ Nikita S. Khrushchev, *The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, (New York: The New Leader, 1962), p. 21.

²⁷ *Stalin: A Self Portrait*, facing plate 31.

²⁸ Fisherman, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin*, p. 54.

tomorrow... you no longer knew whom to trust... it is essential to work — nothing but work... now a man can only talk openly with his wife, and then only at night with heads under a blanket...'²⁹

But Stalin had *his* troubles too. He was always on his guard regarding dissent in the Party, or dissatisfaction with his rule. He demanded and got rigid subordination, strict differentiation of rank and glorification of discipline (all the devices on which the old Prussian and Austrian ideas of government service were based). Food was short and thousands starved. Corruption and apathy were widespread. The rise of Hitler and World War II burdened him with worries. The Japanese on his Eastern flank kept him occupied. His farm collectivization programme kept breaking down, and people were demanding better living and working conditions. It needed an enormous effort to push ahead with his rapid industrialization programme — characterized by police terror, superhuman work assignments, minimal rewards for the populace, eradication of conflicting values and traditions, re-education, and the use of human beings as an expendable resource.

Did Stalin have any other option than to get on with his job of *pushing* the Soviet Union into the 20th century? Lenin had bequeathed a closed system based on a monopolistic and monolithic Party dictatorship. The Bolsheviks were forced to undertake the massive and painful task of forcing the mass labouring population to pay for industrial development. If toughness in executing unpopular orders became the highest quality for the Party officer, then surely Stalin should be at the helm of the Party. Collectivization of farming lands was not popular, and could not be left on a voluntary basis. Rapid industrialization meant reduction in living standards. Under these circumstances coercion *had* to be used, and Stalin obviously felt he could not act through persuasion, explanation and patient co-operation with the people, but had to impose his concepts and demand absolute submission. In actuality, whoever opposed these concepts was doomed to moral or physical annihilation. He fought to win at any price, borrowed other's ideas, indulged in ceaseless underground manoeuvring and intrigue, and was thoroughly Machiavellian in character. Trotsky said of him 'The immediate administrative task always loomed before him as greater than all the laws of history'.³⁰ Could any human being have followed a better approach under the circumstances? Many people watched him

²⁹ *ibid.* p. 193.

³⁰ Arthur E. Adams, *Stalin and His Times* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1972), p. 79.

at work — few lived to describe his methods. One of the few was his daughter who loved him for what he was until she too reached breaking point and could no longer stay with him. According to her, he was the instrument of the totalitarian ideology created by Lenin, and he made the U.S.S.R. into a terrible national prison — a prison of suffering and death from which she had to escape. But she made frequent claims that at no time was her father insane. What he did was in his nature, for he was a cold, cruel, calculating and ruthless man — a man with an utter lack of restraint and moral scruples, and with an inability to suffer with other human beings.³¹

What an enigma he must have been. He was only five feet four and a half inches in height and wore heel-pads to increase his stature. He coupled these with a military tunic to command authority and attention thus appeasing his inferiority complex over his height. He liked chess, dominoes, hunting, fishing, talking, singing, music, volleyball, croquet, food, wines, mending shoes and tending his vineyard.³² He had a remarkable insight into how far he could push the Soviet peoples. He was shrewd enough to try and prevent war with Germany by signing a peace treaty — a 'marriage of reason' to gain time to mobilize his forces. He remained quite unruffled when told that Germany had attacked. He realized he may go down in history as a tyrant who ended his days in defeat and humiliation, and therefore directed the war effort against Germany with great zeal.³³ He continually expressed gratitude to *soldiers* for their efforts to save the nation, and he became a father-figure to many people. He was clever enough to create a statue of the body of Lenin to lie in state, at a time when the body was decomposing and the nation needed it as a symbol of national will.³⁴ When he wanted to be he was kindly and wise. On several occasions Churchill said openly that he admired his abilities. Mao Tse Tung was always impressed.

He had great reserves of energy, was persistent, resilient, knew when to exert his will, and when to ease the pressure. He had the courage and willingness to undertake risks, and an incredible mind for detail.³⁵ He was proud to the point of conceit and took great delight

³¹ Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only one Year*.

³² Budu Svanidze, *My Uncle Joseph Stalin* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1953), p. 157.

³³ Fisherman, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin*, p. 141.

³⁴ Budu Svanidze, *My Uncle Joseph Stalin*, p. 187.

³⁵ T. H. Rigby, ed., *Stalin*, (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966), p. 2.

in having towns named after him, watching busts and statues being fashioned, and in praising himself in his writings — for example, in his 'Short Biography', he wrote 'Although he performed his task as leader of the Party and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire lowest people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit and self-adulation'.³⁶

He encouraged his generals, and urged his troops to 'hold on'. At the victory of Moscow, he scored a personal triumph which nearly made him into a saint in the eyes of the populace. He became Marshal of the Red Fighting Forces. He is credited with having handled several tactical situations well — attacking only after German attacks had been beaten off. Undoubtedly he won the war politically. He knew the value of the atomic bomb, and at once created his own 'Committee of Atomic Research'.

On the other hand, many things can be said against him. He literally 'beheaded' his army in 1937 by purging 30,000 of its officers. This undoubtedly resulted in the Russian Army's inglorious performance in the Finnish campaign of 1939, and the disastrous losses against the Germans in 1941.³⁷ According to Khrushchev, Stalin had definite evidence Hitler would attack, and yet no serious attempt was made to prepare defences on the Western front. He also claims Stalin lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers through his tactical 'genius'.³⁸ His early attempts to assist the Chinese communists failed. He clearly suffered from xenophobia and would trust no one to deal with Great Britain or the U.S.A. but himself. He handled Tito and the Yugoslavia incident poorly, and was primarily responsible for their break away from the Russian communist movement. 'The Doctor's Plot' failed and gave him and the Party a lot of adverse publicity.

At the age of 73, Stalin's spirit broke. After a lifetime scheming, demanding, ordering and directing, his closest friends and associates demanded that murder, and the deportation of Jews and decent Soviet citizens should stop. He died the way he lived — he fought death for four days, remained cool and level-headed, and managed to give an account of who should succeed him. Some say he was poisoned, but there is no evidence to support this. The fox outwitted his hunters for

³⁶ Nikita Khrushchev, *Crimes of the Stalin Era*, p. 54.

³⁷ Hellmut Andies, *Rule of Terror*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 132.

³⁸ Nikita Khrushchev, *The Crimes of the Stalin Era*, pp. 41-42.

73 years. In his last years, his daughter, nephew and close associates could see that he was embittered against the whole world, and no longer believed anyone. People were becoming afraid to speak. And yet he could not be described as a madman. People close to him, and particularly Svetlana, felt only relief when he died. She says she could feel no remorse, could not kiss him, and could not visit the grave.³⁹ She subsequently escaped from the country to be free of Stalin and all the things he represented.

The Party sought escape too. It realized words of explanation were in order. People wanted to be free of their chains, to be free of injustice, punishment and terror. Khrushchev took the bit between his teeth and denounced Stalin in his 'secret speech' (which soon became known publicly), and stated that Stalin had applied his leadership incorrectly and was guilty of the serious crime of developing a 'cult of personality' — setting himself above the Party, receiving all the glory, and making dictatorial decisions. Such a person, Khrushchev claimed, should not be looked upon as one of the great leaders, and should not be placed bodily or spiritually beside Lenin.⁴⁰ The Party denounced Stalin's use of terror in eliminating 'traitors, spies and political criminals', and between 1954 and 1956, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of them posthumously. Khrushchev's speech contained many examples of personal injustice by Stalin, and it is interesting to note that Mikoyan gave Svetlana the chance to look at the speech before it was released, and she agreed that her father was capable of all the inhumanities recorded, and was able to confirm many.⁴¹ Khrushchev was dynamic enough to accuse him of personal glorification and inhumanity; shrewd enough to say he was always working for the interests of the working class, his country, socialism and communism; and honest enough to say Stalin was not mad and his aims were good.

That he suffered from an acute persecution mania is fully admitted — particularly in his later years — but his life was stalked with fear. A lesser man would have given in years before. The man of steel knew he was hated and why this was so, and learned to live with fear . . . or nearly so.

Was Stalin mad? Surprisingly few writers claim that he was. Moralists cannot identify themselves with his environment, problems,

³⁹ Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only One Year*, p. 154.

⁴⁰ Nikita Khrushchev, *The Crimes of the Stalin Era*.

⁴¹ Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only One Year*, p. 162.

actions and methods, and quickly classify him as inhuman and abnormal, and therefore insane. This conclusion is for the lazy analyst. There is little or no evidence to say he was insane, but on the contrary, there is much to say he knew what was to be done for the good of his country, his Party and his ideology, and he did these things efficiently. Many close associates feared him and hated him, but did not describe him as insane. This is usually left to the Western observer.

This essay may suggest that Stalin was forced into taking the line he did. Certainly Lenin can be held responsible for framing the ideology behind the Party, thus creating the power for the individual. Certainly Lenin and the Bolsheviks intended to make use of mass terror as a weapon for revolution and modernization. Certainly the Party was as guilty as Stalin for yielding all power to him. And certainly Khrushchev was forced *out* of power because he did not follow Stalin in dominating the Party, encouraging feuds between his lieutenants, trusting no one and using fear and terror to preserve power. It would seem that Lenin's fear of factionalization and penetration of the Party started the monstrous machine that kept running after the creator's death.

Say what you will about Stalin — in less than two decades (1928-1945), he produced a world power second only to the U.S.A., and his system offers a model to lesser developed countries, and particularly to the young, or the oppressed of these countries, for a quick path to industrialization without 'imperialist exploitation'. The following figures are solid evidence of almost incredible advances:

<i>Production per Year</i>		1938	1953
Pig-iron	(million tons)	3.3	27.4
Steel	(million tons)	4.2	38.1
Electricity	(million kilowatts)	5.0	134.4
Oil	(million tons)	11.6	52.8
Coal	(million tons)	35.5	320.4
Cement	(million tons)	1.8	16.0
Tractors	(thousands)	1.3	111.3
Cotton Cloth	(million metres)	2.7	5.3
Leather Foot-wear	(million pairs)	58.0	238.1
Potatoes	(millions of rubles)	31.9	72.6
Milk	(millions of rubles)	29.4	36.5 ⁴²

⁴² All figures from Arthur E. Adams, *Stalin and His Times*, pp. 208-209.

In addition he gave the U.S.S.R. a nuclear capability, quadrupled the number of wage earners, expanded education greatly, and trained specialists of all kinds. The list can go on. . . .

Ruthless? Cold? Stark? Cruel? All these he may have been, but the evidence is clear that such measures could only have been carried out by a powerful dictator ruling against the will of the people. By Western standards — uninhibited by communist ideology, Stalin was insane. But this is unfair. He must be tried by his own kind, and it is sad to say that the results of such a trial may never be known. History — Russian History must try him, and it is known that the Party creates history in its own image. Stalin in his own trial must suffer the same consequences as he imposed on others . . . the trial will be 'fixed.'

This paper concludes with a thought from Boris Pasternak:

'The Russian people never really saw Stalin as the man responsible for the tremendous bloodsheds which periodically occurred in our country . . . he was regarded by our people as the man who converted Russia from a backward country, into a highly developed agricultural, industrial and military state. Is it then surprising that their dead leader lies in their hearts as the greatest man Russia ever had?'⁴³ ❧

⁴³ Fisherman, *The Private Life of Josif Stalin*, pp. 202-203.

* * *

In marching, our soldiers carry a weight of between fifty and sixty pounds each — about four stone. The musket is one stone — then sixty rounds of ammunition — the means of carrying it — biscuit for three days — their clothing; in short, altogether we used to make it out four stone. As to marches, that is not, I should say, our men's forte. In India they became good marchers from necessity: changing one's quarters to others five or six hundred miles off makes one a good marcher at once; but in England we are in the habit of conveying them, by steamboats or canal-boats, and never letting them walk. First it saves the public money — that is one thing — and then it saves the commanding officers trouble.

—Duke of Wellington.

Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

Foreign Policy and a Credible Defence

I congratulate Brigadier Thyer on his excellent article in the May issue of the *Army Journal*. I believe that our present defence preparedness for defence of mainland Australia in any major invasion is inadequate and requires urgent action now to enable any capacity for defence even in 10 years time.

Continuing strategic assessments of our defence requirements take into consideration the capabilities of our potential enemies. However, we live in an age of technical advancement. It would not be beyond the realms of possibility for a Chinese Force to hijack two Boeing 747 aircraft in Peking, travel non-stop to take over Sydney and Canberra. We certainly would be powerless to prevent such an occurrence. In such an event we would still retain a defence potential. However, the existing structure of Government, Defence and Industry could be so disorganized that effective resistance in the short term would not exist and in the long term would require complete re-structuring. A potential invasion threat, therefore, could exist even now.

It is my belief that five basic questions need to be answered in any examination of the defence of Australia:

- a. Who are our potential enemies?
- b. What would they gain by attacking Australia — minerals? space? industry, etc?
- c. What other resources do we possess which would be attractive to an enemy?
- d. What ability do they have either actually or potentially to succeed in any attack?
- e. Considering the implications of any threat and the force necessary to counter it, could we plan on the allotment of sufficient funds to build a suitable Defence Force?

Brigadier Thyer stated that the probable areas of any invasion would be in the north and north-west of Australia. I am not fully convinced that this would be the case. An enemy could well invade the eastern seaboard with a concept of living off the country and taking over the major industrial and government centres. I believe that a full appreciation of methods to defend Australia would create so many enigmas that we would be forced to rely upon centralization of forces in the west, north and east of Australia with 'standing patrols' stationed at the most likely avenues of invasion, to provide early warning and to enable mobilization of the major force in each area to meet this threat. The history of most free nations shows that the allotment of funds, building of industrial potential, improvement of communications to provide such a means of defence, occurs at the last minute. A look back at Australia's position prior to World War II serves to confirm this view.

There appears no doubt that we should have a force, possibly Regular, capable of defeating small incursions say up to a task force strength. What do we do if the enemy is in greater strength? We should prepare and build up our capability as Brigadier Thyer suggests — but will we? In our 'Lucky Country' we live in a politically apathetic, socially oriented community which places emphasis on the good life. I doubt whether public opinion worries too much about any threat until it occurs. Theoretically, Government policy is based on public opinion. Any defence build-up to meet a future threat could, therefore, be at a reduced and consequently insufficient level.

No matter how politically or militarily unpalatable it may seem, should we not be building up our Reserve Forces, (while still retaining a Regular Force to counter small incursions) trained by a proportion of the Regular Army so that they can:

- a. be established in likely areas of threat,
- b. know the country intimately, and
- c. as a consequence provide firm bases for the conduct of guerilla warfare should such an event become necessary.

Obviously any acceptance of the possibility that we neither have the population nor sufficient funds to 'repel boarders' indicates a requirement for an alternative. Nuclear systems could be the only such alternative.

Improvements to our communication systems and industrial potential based upon a defence plan are an essential part of our future and should not only be based on short-term political pragmatism.

In conclusion, planning for the defence of Australia must take into account not only the normal factors but also the examples of history to ensure that should our defence preparedness be negated or limited by lack of funds, our potential to resist on a planned basis still exists.

Department of Defence (Army Office)
Canberra

A. B. Perriman
Lieutenant Colonel ✕

* * *

The Amiens Gun (Army Journal, April 1975)

Off its railway mounting, the Amiens Gun is just another big gun; on it, it would be unique in Australia, one of what must be a handful of surviving examples of this rare ordnance class in the world, and of tremendous interest to gunners, military historians, ordnance specialists and military hobbyists.

The army has had the mounting under its control since 1942, despite the assurance given to the Australian War Memorial that the gun would be restored to its complete state at the end of World War 2. Surely 33 years is sufficient time to extract any secrets of the mounting's now 60-year old technology, and it is hard to accept with a straight face that the mounting is even now needed for "defence purposes" — if indeed it ever was.

I am sure that those interested in such matters would strongly support any move to have the mounting returned, complete, to the War Memorial where it belongs.

P.O. Box 99
Singapore

J. C. Armstrong
Major, Army Reserve ✕

The Director of the Australian War Memorial replies:

Sir,

Thank you for showing me Major Armstrong's letter concerning the Amiens Gun mounting.

The article in question was reproduced from one published in *Stand-To* in July-August 1962. The writer of the article was then

employed by the Australian War Memorial. His omission to record the facts concerning the ultimate disposal of the mounting and bogies was probably an oversight, but I am sure he would be first and loudest in his apologies for inadvertently appearing to show the Army in a bad light.

The facts in brief are as follows: In 1954 the Australian War Memorial was advised by the Director of Inspection, Department of Supply, that the mounting was no longer required at Port Wakefield. Then began discussions as to the ultimate disposal of the gun barrel, mountings and bogies, extending over some years. The A.C.T. Tourist Bureau and the R.S.L. were briefly involved. At one stage consideration was given to assembling the complete equipment on Mount Pleasant. In 1964, the then Director of the War Memorial wrote that "after long consideration the Board of Management . . . decided to exhibit only the barrel. In reaching this decision the Board took into consideration the enormous cost involved in the removal of the component parts, and there was considerable doubt, because of its immensity, as to the suitability of the gun as a whole as an exhibit in the grounds of the memorial". The gun's bogies were sold for scrap in 1961; the mounting was similarly disposed of in November 1963.

N. J. Flanagan

Director, Australian War Memorial ☞

* * *

It is much to be regretted that all officers in passing out of the Staff College should not be obliged to learn how to shoe a horse.

—Field Marshal the Viscount Wolseley.

BOOK REVIEWS



OPERATION SEA LION, edited by Richard Cox. (Thornton Cox Ltd, 1974).

Reviewed by Professor L. C. F. Turner
Royal Military College, Duntroon

THE greater part of this book is based on a War Game, presumably played in 1974, at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. The participants and umpires were British and German officers, some of whom had faced each other in 1940, and the purpose of the game was to determine whether an invasion of England was a feasible operation in September 1940. The German operation orders for the invasion and the projected British counter measures were followed exactly in determining the rules and conduct of the game.

Richard Cox has presented the results of the game in the form of a novel, which is written with considerable skill and makes fascinating reading. In addition several military historians have given their own views in independent chapters on the probable outcome of "Operation Sea Lion".

The unanimous verdict of the British and German umpires, who included the famous air ace, General Galland, was that substantial German forces could have been thrown ashore in Kent and Sussex in September 1940, but that they could not have been maintained and would have been crushed by British counter-attacks.

After its losses off Norway in April 1940, the German Navy was far too weak for a hazardous operation in the English Channel and David Shears says: "Throughout the summer of 1940, the three months

from late June to late September when an invasion of Britain might have been attempted, the Germans had only one heavy cruiser — the *Hipper* — three light cruisers and at most nine destroyers available". In contrast the Royal Navy had 14 capital ships, five aircraft carriers, 16 heavy and 46 light cruisers, 180 destroyers and 54 submarines. To carry the 90,000 troops of the first wave, and the additional 170,000 men who were to be landed by D+3, the Germans had assembled 1,910 barges, 419 tugs, 1,600 motor boats and 168 ships totalling 700,000 tons. Shears says: "... the improvised armada was considerably less seaworthy — at least so far as the barges were concerned — than the galleons of Philip II of Spain."

In August 1940 General Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, asked Admiral Ruge what he thought of "Sea Lion's" prospects and received the reply: "Frankly as long as you plan to cross the Channel at a somewhat slower speed than Caesar's legions 2,000 years ago, I don't think much of it". In fact no senior German general or admiral seems to have had any faith in the enterprise.

Hitler's attitude was curiously indifferent. He certainly took the invasion seriously or he would not have assembled so many barges, whose removal from Germany's rivers and canals had detrimental effects on industrial production. But he remained throughout at his headquarters in the Rhineland and showed no trace of the ruthless drive he displayed in most of his major undertakings. On 17 September he postponed "Sea Lion" indefinitely.

Goering alone was resolute and confident, and it is certainly true that in the great air battles fought between 12 August and 6 September the R.A.F. Fighter Command was brought perilously close to exhaustion and destruction, although at heavy cost to the *Luftwaffe*. It is often said that Goering threw away his chance of victory by switching his attacks on 7 September from fighter airfields to massed bombing of London. However, Corelli Barnett points out that Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the AOC Fighter Command, had no intention of allowing his squadrons to be systematically destroyed in south-east England. When losses reached a certain point, Dowding intended to break off the battle and withdraw most of his fighters to the north of England. Barnett says that Dowding would have allowed the *Luftwaffe* a free rein in attacking targets in southern England but, "when the German invasion was actually in progress, he would launch Fighter Command back into the battle to cover the navy and army".

With fighter support, the Royal Navy and Bomber Command could have inflicted fearful destruction on the convoys of slow-moving barges, which would have had virtually no naval protection. If the invasion had been launched as scheduled on 22 September, beach-heads could have been gained between Dover and Brighton, but rising seas in the Channel would soon have halted the flow of supplies and reinforcements, even if the R.A.F. and Royal Navy had taken no counter-action at all. General Brooke, the C-in-C Home Forces, had an excellent plan involving deliberate and heavy counter-attacks on the German beach-heads by his best divisions.

The conclusion to be drawn from this book is that from the German point of view the Battle of Britain was an unwinnable battle, and that "Sea Lion" was never a feasible operation.

The real danger to Britain in the summer of 1940 was not posed by the *Wehrmacht*, but lay within the inner councils of the British Cabinet. After Dunkirk, Chamberlain, Halifax, Hoare and other appeasers favoured opening negotiations with Hitler. Churchill's supreme service to the British nation and Empire lay in his total and absolute rejection of this infamous proposal. ☞

* * *

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.

Coalition favors buildup of military. *Air Force Times*, 23 April, p. 21. (Policy of the U.S. party Coalition for a Democratic Majority).

American arms Bill passed almost uncut by Senate. *The Times*, 9 June, p. 5.

South Africa linked with NATO defence. *The Guardian Weekly*, 14 June, p. 6.

Ban banned. *Economist*, 14 June, p. 28. (Arms sale to South Africa — Security Council decision).

Power projection 1990: the role of U.S. Military power. *Military Review*, May, pp. 3-11.

US Position on chemical warfare disarmament? *Military Review*, May, pp. 12-23.

The Vital Center. *Military Review*, May, pp. 25-34. (NATO and the threat of increased Soviet Military Power).

The Australian All-Volunteer Force. Part II. The impact on Force levels. *Military Review*, May, pp. 78-83.

Indo-China. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, April, pp. 172-177. (Ministerial statement on background events and present Australian policy).

Australian Defence — the reality. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, April, p. 189. (Policy speech by Mr Barnard).

Militarism versus the Third World. *Soviet Military Review*, May, pp. 50-52. (Viewpoint of a Soviet academic).

- "Powderkeg" in South Korea. *Soviet Military Review*, May, pp. 54-55. (Comment on U.S. involvement).
- The case for cruise missiles. *Aviation week and Space Technology*, 21 April, p. 9. (Pentagon's justification).
- Japan's non-nuclear policy: the problem of NPT. *Asian Survey*, April, pp. 313-327.
- Soviet Defence spending up 27% in last ten years, U.S. only 4%. *Armed Forces Journal International*, March, p. 18.
- India unhappy over Soviet arms. *Armed Forces Journal International*, March, p. 14.
- The trouble with soldiers. *Economist*, 31 May, p. 35. (A critique of the status of Portugal's AFM government.)
- Soldiers won't do. *Economist*, 31 May, p. 36. (Similar critique on Lebanon situation.)
- The spread can be slowed. *Economist*, 31 May, p. 37. (Comment on Geneva conference on nuclear arms.)
- Don't rationalize. *Economist*, 31 May, p. 38. (Comment on NATO.)
- Sob story. *Economist*, 31 May, p. 38. (Australia's attitude to Vietnamese refugees.)
- Who's behind him? *Economist*, 31 May, p. 42. (Japanese rearmament a possibility...)
- Clausewitz and limited nuclear war. *Military Review*, (US), April, pp. 15-28. (Discusses the application of the principles of war to limited nuclear war.)
- The Australian All-Volunteer Force. Part I. The political evolution. *Military Review*, (US), April, pp. 34-41.
- Future trends of Communist China's strategic policy. *Military Review*, (US), April, pp. 61-70.
- Loopy loopholes. *Economist*, 7 June, p. 34. (Geneva conference on nuclear arms.)
- Moscow's Asian strategy. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 13, p. 24.
- Articles on the Sino-Soviet dispute as it affects Japan, China, Thailand, Pakistan, India, Laos; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 13, pp. 25-30.
- Yemen: Israel, Taiwan and South Korea threatened. *Weekly Review* (Intelligence Digest), 25 June. (U.S. Defense Dept. assessment of YAR military requirements, in relation to Soviet aid to the PDRY).
- The mushrooming nuclear menace. *Time*, 7 July, pp. 17-18. (The Bonn-Brasilia agreement, and more on SALT).
- The short cut. *Economist*, 28 June, pp. 46 and 48. (Implications of the Bonn-Brasilia agreement and IAEA supervision).
- Indochina: the victory of the patriots. *Soviet Military Review*, June, pp. 46-47.
- What's wrong with the marines? *U.S. News and World Report*, 12 May, pp. 39-40.
- The case for more nuclear carriers. *U.S. News and World Report*, 12 May, p. 41.
- Land Warfare Centre Named. *Australian Government Weekly Digest*, 23-29 June, 1975, p. 429. (Minister for Defence, Mr Bill Morrison comments on new role for Canungra).
- A turn in foreign policy? *China News Analysis*, June 6, 1975, pp. 1-4. (America's withdrawal from South-East Asia).
- The new structure of the German armed forces. *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Spring, 1975, pp. 13-17.
- Britain's allies will be spending more. *The Economist*, 10-16 May, 1975, pp. 64-66.
- Army presses SAM-D Flight Tests. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 19, 1975, pp. 34-38. (U.S. tests capability of surface-to-air missiles).
- The Defence Budget: more, more, more. *New York Times Weekly Review*, 15 June, p. 2.
- Salt and the Soviet Military. Part 2, Soviet Military Programmes. *Pacific Defence Reporter*, July 1975, pp. 26-28.
- Military development in NATO. *Rusi*, March 1975, pp. 14-21.
- Current Education in the Chinese army. *Rusi*, March 1975, pp. 30-34.
- Defence decision-making in Britain and the determinants of Defence Policy. *Rusi*, March 1975, pp. 42-48.