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# ARMY JOURNAL

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**Editor**

**C F Coady**

**Staff Artist**

**D E Hammond**

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# ARMY JOURNAL

*A periodical review of military literature*

**No. 299, APRIL 1974**

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
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*(Army Public Relations)*

Pilatus Porter aircraft and Kalkadoon helicopters fly over the Darling Downs, South Queensland, home of the School of Army Aviation, Oakey, where officers complete advanced flying training before becoming army pilots.



*Major R. D. Manley*

*Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers*

**'Knowledge is power'**

—Lord Bacon

### **Introduction**

**T**HE above statement, made by Lord Bacon over 400 years ago, is as true now as it was then. As a corollary to Bacon's statement, we could also add, 'and the key to that power is the ability to find the knowledge quickly'.

Today, the use of improved management tools such as the computer and modern communications, coupled with the increasing complexity of weapon systems and their support, has resulted in mountains of information on innumerable subjects. Obviously some of this information will have no worthwhile application to defence studies, but a great deal of it is, and will remain, of invaluable assistance in tackling defence problems.

Information is not only power but it is money. This is because ready access to information saves time, and time in any language is money. Do we wish to continue 're-inventing the wheel', or do we want

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*Following service in the CMF, Major Manley was commissioned in the ARA in 1956 and allotted to RAEME. Between 1956 and 1965 he served in several instructional and staff appointments including a posting as Adjutant HQ CRAEME 1 Div. In 1965-66, he served in Vietnam as Administrative Officer HQ AAFV, and as OC HQ Coy AFV.*

*After attending Staff College in 1968, he served as DAQMG, Ops and Plans, HQ Northern Command, and later as SO2 Plans, DEME, AHQ. Major Manley took up his present appointment as SO2 Trg, DLD&P, Army Office in 1972. During 1973 he was attached to the Australian Army Staff, Washington, for logistics training at the United States Army Logistics Management Center, and the United States Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia.*



to save time and money by preventing overlapping and duplication on research projects?

A central defence information retrieval and cataloguing system would enable officers of the armed services and allied departments, for example, the Department of Supply, access to information which may otherwise have to be obtained or 're-discovered' through painstaking and time-consuming research.

A Defence Studies Information Exchange System as proposed in this paper would ensure that worthwhile studies are widely disseminated among the armed services, as well as the other interested government departments and agencies, by compiling and distributing significant data on studies completed and on work in progress.

It is believed that the existing information service, the Australian Defence Science and Technology Information System (ADSATIS), run by Department of Supply for the Defence group, is not designed to provide a comprehensive information exchange system on the lines proposed in this paper.

### **Aim**

The aim of this paper is to state the requirement for, and outline the operation of, an Australian Defence Studies Information Exchange System, hereinafter referred to as the 'Exchange'.

### **The Existing Information Service — ADSATIS**

Although ADSATIS has been established for the Defence group its input is mainly from the Department of Supply. There is considerable acquisition of US, Canadian and UK material, but again this input is largely of Department of Supply interest.

ADSATIS philosophy is based on 'providing *active* means for transfer of recorded knowledge in an automatic fashion to support continuously, Departmental missions and tasks'<sup>1</sup> rather than providing an information service to departments and individuals on request, or what may be termed a *reactive* means.

The *active* means employed by ADSATIS is the periodic distribution of accession lists and *Current Awareness Service Bulletins*. The *Current Awareness Service Bulletins* do not normally include summaries

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<sup>1</sup> ADSATIS Bulletin No. 6, *Current Operations and Developments*, para 2.3, issued August 1972.

or abstracts of the documents received into ADSATIS libraries. Descriptors are used; however whilst these are necessary for library purposes they are of little assistance to a potential user in determining the worth of a document relative to his particular interest or problem.

The *reactive* means is used by such eminent information facilities as the Smithsonian Scientific Information Exchange, and the United States Defense Documentation Center. The latter virtually guarantees a 24-hour response to customers.

The adoption of *active* rather than *reactive* means is believed to be a basic flaw in the concept of ADSATIS. This, coupled with the absence of a requirement to report the existence of studies originating from within all elements of the Defence group, could lead (and probably already has) to a proliferation of Defence Department information systems with inevitable overlapping and duplication, as well as unnecessary expenditure.

### The Requirement

Consider the following two cases the author has experienced at first hand, and which no doubt have parallels in our Defence organization every day:

- *Case 1*

A student at the Staff College, Queenscliff, is attempting a thesis. Where can he get a comprehensive bibliography and appropriate extracts on previous and/or current studies related to his subject? For that matter, where can his directing staff obtain related studies for comparison and appraisal? Certainly not from the Staff College Library, for although it gives an excellent but very limited general military reference service, it has not the resources to collect, store, and disseminate information on the vast range of subjects that are the interest of the college. Our student then contacts ADSATIS who, through their accession list, may be able to provide him with a list of references that appear to deal with his subject. However, ADSATIS cannot readily, i.e. within twenty-four hours, provide a citation and abstract of these references to indicate their relevance or otherwise to the student's field of study. The student will either have to obtain and read the documents to find this out, a time consuming and more often

than not fruitless labour, or wait a considerable time to receive 'one off' researched information from ADSATIS.

- *Case 2*

A staff officer is carrying out a study for his branch at Army Office. Has any other branch, service, nation or individual attempted a similar study, or is there some document which can already provide the needed data, and save time and money by eliminating unnecessary research? Again, it has been the author's experience that the Army Office Library, which is an agent for ADSATIS, is not organized or staffed to collect, store, and provide information of this nature. Neither is there, to the author's knowledge, an agency in our Defence organization, including ADSATIS, which keeps a comprehensive bibliography of defence studies undertaken by ourselves, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada — our fellow ABCA nations.<sup>2</sup>

Also consider the case of a Member of Parliament who wants data to enable him to evaluate proposed defence legislation on which he may be required to formulate an opinion, speak and vote. Where can he find the information he seeks within say twenty-four hours? The Parliamentary Reference Service, a quite large and excellent organization, would no doubt appreciate the aid of a reactive, quick response Exchange to assist in the provision of defence information to Members of Parliament.

An allied nation seeks information on the climatic effects and the incidence of repair of, say, certain electronic equipments in a tropical theatre. Have the Australian armed services commissioned any studies on this subject? If so, are they completed or in progress? And where can they be obtained?

It is thought from the above experiences and examples that there is a valid requirement, in such a large complex organization as the Department of Defence, for a relatively small element to collect, store, and disseminate information about defence studies. The information should be about studies that are either:

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<sup>2</sup> ADSATIS advises that this has been considered by the Defence group, in relation to The Technical Co-operation Programme (TTCP), under ABCA auspices; however the author is unaware of any decision taken in the matter.



- planned,
- in progress, or
- completed.

To provide a comprehensive service, the proposed system would also need bibliographies of military technical journals, books, military studies by other ABCA nations, and indexes. To a large extent this reference book need is provided for by ADSATIS in its present service, and this could, with slight modification, continue under the proposed system.

The system envisaged would provide a category of knowledge identified by Samuel Johnson as 'Information about where to find information', not just merely a cataloguing and accession notification service. It would not be a library lending service. The Exchange would point to the sources of the studies, but would not provide the actual studies themselves. It would, however, provide each customer, whether individual or departmental, with a valuable abstract of the study etc. required, and could also provide a custom bibliography.

### **Operation of the System**

This paper will deal only with the broad operational concept of the proposed system, and does not include detail. The detail could only be determined after a very close study by a systems analysis and design team. A study of existing systems employed by allied nations, notably the United States Department of Defense system operated by the Defense Documentation Center (an element of the Defense Supply Agency), and its offspring, the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange, would be advisable before deciding on a system to meet Australian needs. From personal experience I recommend the latter organization as an excellent model for the study of our requirement.

### **Mission**

The following is considered to be the mission of the proposed facility:

To serve as a Department of Defence clearing house for identifying, collecting, and providing on request information about defence studies conducted by the armed services, and other elements of the Department of Defence, and to provide information about other documents that contain information related to, or of interest to, Australian defence.

## Concept

There exists at any given time a body of literature which describes in detail the *modus operandi* of any element of the Department of Defence. Some of this literature identifies problem areas in the system and contains ideas and facts concerning solutions to the problems.

There also exist bodies of literature originating in Australia and overseas from government and private sources about individual areas of military art and science. In addition, there is a body of general domestic literature, conceptual and theoretical in nature, that contains ideas and facts that should be considered by personnel who are contemplating changes or improvements to defence systems.

If the proposed system is to satisfy the information requirements of the research activities of the many Department of Defence elements, it must collect, process, and provide on request the information referred to above. Obviously, such a large inventory of information could only be speedily and efficiently processed with the aid of electronic data processing and/or microfilm storage. Access to a computer for cataloguing and retrieval is therefore a necessary requirement for operation of the system.

To enable the system to obtain visibility over the studies already completed, in progress, or planned, sponsors and/or originators of studies would be required to inform the Exchange of the particulars and status of their studies, and provide the facility with copies of completed studies. To be effective, this would require a Department of Defence directive.

## Personnel and Functions

### *Personnel*

The professional personnel, termed 'analysts', would need to possess comparable basic knowledge and background in order to function as a team. Together and separately, these analysts must have the capability to collect, review, analyse, abstract, index, compare, screen, synthesize, co-ordinate, disseminate, research, document and report any defence study or related document appropriate for inclusion in the exchange system. In addition, they would need to possess a working knowledge of computer operations so that they can develop the information storage and retrieval system.

### Functions

The scope of the functions of the analysts is:

- *Collecting.* The Department of Defence directive referred to above, would require the submission of all studies (planned, in progress, and completed) to the Exchange. The analysts would be responsible, through personal contact with appropriate defence departments, to ensure this is done. The analysts must ensure that defence departments understand the requirement by conducting personal interviews and briefings. In addition, the analyst must be alert for articles in magazines, professional publications and books dealing with defence subjects, research and management. Hence the completeness and effectiveness of the proposed Exchange will be dependent to a large degree on the abilities of the analysts to search out, identify, and describe material for collection purposes.
- *Reviewing.* Basically, this means scanning, but understanding each incoming study or document and mentally noting its essentials. Each such document should be concerned with some problem or potential problem in the area of defence management or research. The studies will vary considerably in format, content, disciplinary approach, and methodology. They may employ such techniques as inductive or deductive analysis, operations research methods, statistical evaluation, or theoretical mathematical analysis. No single individual can, of course, understand completely all of the material; however, the analyst must have the capability to grasp the essentials and know where to go and whom to see for clarification.
- *Analysing.* Next, the document must be analysed in whatever detail is necessary to separate the essential from the non-essential to provide an abstract and proper description.
- *Abstracting.* This step consists of the preparation of an indicative abstract of the study or document. The abstract must be written in such a manner and contain such information as will assist a potential user in determining whether or not he has a requirement for the study. This means the abstract must cover not only the purpose of the study and its conclusions, but must indicate in some manner the study techniques used. Since the abstract must be kept brief and still contain

pertinent information, considerable skill is required in its preparation.

- *Indexing.* To ensure quick and accurate retrieval of information bearing on a particular subject, problem area, or research technique, each document must be assigned appropriate descriptors. Descriptors are assigned to a study which categorize the study in depth. For example, descriptors to the fifth depth might be assigned to a document dealing with the repair of say MALKARA, as follows:

- (1) Materiel
- (2) Weapons
- (3) Missiles
- (4) MALKARA
- (5) Repair

By the use of the proper descriptors it should be possible to retrieve all studies pertaining to MALKARA weapons in general, or all information on its repair. If a customer is to receive all pertinent information and at the same time no superfluous material, the allocation of descriptors must be done with considerable foresight and imagination.

- *Comparing.* Each new document would have to be compared with others in the system on the same subject, problem area, or study technique to ensure compatibility of descriptors. This is an additional aid to retrieval, and would constitute a limited form of synthesis in that it should bring all related material together under one of several related headings. It would also serve a purpose in detecting obsolete, duplicative, and non-appropriate material already in the system.
- *Screening.* Continuous screening of material in the system would be necessary to cull out duplications, obsolete material, and non-pertinent information filed through error. Limited screening is accomplished during the comparing process, but additional screening would be required, particularly prior to the publication of an Exchange bibliography.
- *Synthesizing.* In its literal sense, this function would not be performed by the Exchange. Some synthesis would be carried out during the comparing and screening phase, in that like material is brought together by proper descriptors. Complete

synthesis, whereby information representing the body of knowledge on a particular subject or technique is available in a single volume or series, would be beyond the scope and resources of the facility envisaged.

- *Co-ordinating.* The analysts must co-ordinate with all departments involved in submitting to or receiving information from the Exchange. This is necessary to ensure that all pertinent studies and documents are received by the Exchange. Analysts must also ensure that contributing departments notify the Exchange when one of their studies becomes obsolete and should be removed. Co-ordination with users of the Exchange is necessary to ensure that they are getting the material they require, and for soliciting suggestions for improving the services of the Exchange.
- *Disseminating.* This function would be accomplished by the preparation and distribution of an annual bibliography and periodic supplements to update the bibliography. In addition, the Exchange could, upon request, develop custom bibliographies concerned with a specific subject or problem area. Since the analyst would usually receive only a general statement about the customer's needs, he must interpret the information provided and select appropriate descriptors for the retrieval search. The development of custom bibliographies would depend greatly on the judgement of the analyst as to what references the customer actually needs.
- *Researching.* Although the Exchange envisaged would be a functional system, its operations and services would be subject to continual refinement. In this respect the Exchange could be considered as a research project in the field of information storage and retrieval, which in turn is part of the serious national problem of information transfer. This function of the Exchange would require its analysts to take courses in Information Science, and keep abreast of the latest developments in the area of information storage and retrieval. Information Science is still in the developmental stage, but much is being learned and written on the subject. The analyst, to help in this area, must keep up-to-date on contributions from other sources, both government and private, in Australia and overseas.

- *Documenting.* The analysts must document their research efforts and co-ordinate these with other interested agencies in Australia and overseas.
- *Reporting.* The analysts would be required to report the findings of their research efforts through appropriate channels for consideration.
- *Computer Storing.* A data sheet containing the abstract, descriptors and other identifying bibliographic information would be required for each document. This information would be placed on computer magnetic tapes and discs and stored for retrieval for bibliographies. It would be essential to prepare the data sheet with great care to ensure that the data is stored accurately and properly for effective retrieval.

### **The Bibliography**

The value of the bibliography to the user lies in its ability to inform him of the studies, reports and other documents relative to his specialty or interest that he can have access to, and of the method for access.

Although the bibliography would include the titles of studies that are classified, no classified data from the items would appear in the bibliography or its supplements. This would enable the bibliography to be widely circulated under automatic distribution and make certain that it was available to all, and not another classified document locked away in a safe.

The Exchange would point to the sources of the studies and provide abstracts of their contents, but would not provide the actual studies themselves. The main purpose of the Exchange would be defeated if it were to provide study lending services, or be a requisitioning source for defence studies and related documents. This is why each bibliographic entry must provide definite information on how and where to get the document involved. If an article from a magazine is listed, the publication's complete street address would need to be given.

### **Relationship Between the Exchange and the User**

The success of the Exchange would depend on the service it provided to its customers. In turn, the customers' needs would influence the structure and development of the system used by the Exchange. Complete co-operation between the user and the Exchange would be

essential for the success of the system. The system would need to be under continuing surveillance to make certain that it met user requirements.

The co-operative effort would be a two-way deal, as the success of the Exchange would depend as much on the input as the output. Indeed, the existence of the latter is clearly dependent on the former.

### **Responsibilities of Users**

The Defence directive would need to impose on the users, i.e. the armed services and other defence agencies, the following responsibilities:

- Determination of the applicability of sponsored defence studies (planned, in progress, and completed) according to established criteria.
- Submission of available information for studies in progress or planned.
- Provision of timely information on changes affecting in progress and planned studies. These changes could include a new title, progression of the study through stages toward completion, modification of study objectives or scope, classification regrading, and new estimated completion date.
- Submission of completed studies.

### **Criteria**

The 'established criteria' in the first responsibility are used to define defence studies as 'objective and analytic inquiries directed toward improving or planning defence management'. Defence studies would include studies of defence systems undertaken in response to identified defence management problems, management type surveys in defence areas, and investigations of new methods, procedures, or techniques in simulated environments. Basic research studies and projects including matters of materiel, strategy and tactics would also be included.

### **Economics of the Exchange**


In these days of economy, it is imperative to critically assess the probable costs of new facilities against the benefits to be derived and savings achieved. The reader may wonder just how much the facility envisaged should cost to establish and operate. The answer is, relatively



little in relation to the benefits to be obtained. In fact, the organization required would not be more than eight personnel. The organization, personnel, equipment, time, and operating costs for the Exchange are assessed as:

### *Personnel*

#### Outline Organization



### *Equipment*

On line access to a computer would be necessary for effective operation of the Exchange. It is envisaged that the computer would be shared with other defence organizations from existing facilities, and that no additional capital outlay for hardware would be necessary. It is thought unlikely that the Exchange system would use more than about eight hours of computer time per week. Existing Department of Defence hardware, for example, Honeywell 8200, would meet the requirements of memory, tape drives, line printer, paper tape reader, and card reader (600 cpm). COBOL — 61 language would be suitable for the THESAURUS, and the system would require an Assembly System, a Micro Assembly System and a Batch Sorter.

### *Time*

The system envisaged would take about six months to programme, using 80 per cent of one man's time. Planning, and system

design are estimated between one to two man years. The four analysts would be capable of indexing and abstracting about 80-90 items per month. It is estimated that twenty-four hours of each analyst's time per week would be spent in retrievals and reference questions and review of demand bibliography printouts.

### *Operating Costs*

Operating costs, excluding salaries and wages, could not be accurately assessed without detailed study; however, based on costs of comparable overseas facilities, operating costs, including software, should be in the region of \$75,000 per annum. This is believed to be a very small price for the economies and benefits that would accrue.

### **Benefits**

The long term benefits to our Defence organization would be:

- Improved quality in the products resulting from defence research.
- Better inter-departmental co-ordination of effort among personnel engaged in defence research.
- Increased efficiency and economy of defence research effort.
- Elimination of unnecessary overlapping and duplication of defence research effort.

### **Conclusion**

It is concluded that:

- There is a wealth of defence and allied literature available which we must harvest if we aim to increase the efficiency of our defence organization. To save time and money, this information must be collected, processed and disseminated by a central agency such as the proposed Exchange.
- The existing Department of Defence information facilities, such as ADSATIS, are not capable of providing a comprehensive Defence Studies Information Exchange facility as proposed by this paper.
- The annual operating costs of (estimated \$75,000) a suitable facility would be infinitesimal in comparison to the benefits derived and savings achieved.

- Establishment of an Exchange on the lines proposed in this paper would be of positive benefit to both government and industry, and would be an important step in tackling the serious national problem of information transfer.
- In addition to its national importance, access to the Exchange by other ABCA nations could be arranged with reciprocal clauses, thus improving the overall defence capability of ABCA nations.
- A Defence Studies Information Exchange would ensure that all applicable published information is collected, maintained under bibliographic control, and widely disseminated to potential users, so that they do not have to 're-invent the wheel'.

In the first place, defence is concerned with the security and safety of a nation. The whole purpose of defence administration must be to produce and to have, by relation to the external and internal circumstances that face a country, the most effective, efficient and economical defence force. It is a corollary that the most effective and efficient use of resources for defence objectives maximises military capabilities. Such use is, as well, the most economical. Second, not merely are the demands that defence makes on resources great, those resources are the subject of competing community demands. And even where those other demands are susceptible to questioning, they are backed generally by more plausible and effective propagandists than any defence administration seems able to muster. To compound matters, forces are at work to induce a miasmatic delusion that the expense of defence, for others than the major powers, must be minimised. Third, the product of improved methods and techniques can be significant, meaning either a lesser demand on overall resources or an even greater defence effort for the same resources.

—Sir Henry Bland, *Former Secretary, Department of Defence, Canberra.*

# THE INDONESIAN ARMY —



## A Brief History Of Its Role In Indonesian Society

*Brigadier A. J. F. McDonald, RL*

Our commitment to achieving a closer, more intimate and lasting relationship with Indonesia within the wider context of our interests in the South-East Asian region is one of the basic commitments of the present Government's foreign policy.

—Gough Whitlam, PM.

### PART I

#### Introduction

THERE would be few today who would dispute the fact that Indonesia is a large and important country of growing significance in the modern world. For Australia it occupies a place of special importance.

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*Brigadier McDonald graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1943 and served with 218 Field Regiment during the 1939-45 War. After a brief period of service with Intelligence he served as Adjutant 2 Med Regiment RAA until he attended Staff College in Quetta. After graduating from Staff College in 1953 and serving in various RAA staff appointments he was appointed BMRA 3 Div where he served until being posted to the Australian Military Mission, Washington DC, in 1958. In 1961 Brigadier McDonald returned to Australia and after a period of service with A Branch at AHQ was posted as Instructor at the Staff College, Queenscliff. After commanding QRTB in 1967-68 he attended the RAAF School of Languages, Point Cook. In 1970 he was appointed Military Attache at the Australian Embassy, Jakarta, where he served until mid-1972. On returning to Australia he was posted as Deputy Controller, Army EDP Centre, at AHQ. In November 1973 Brigadier McDonald was granted furlough in order to accept an appointment as Parliamentary Officer, House of Representatives, Canberra. In March 1974 he was placed on the Retired List. This article will be published in two parts.*

It is large geographically, consisting of about 3,660 islands totalling some 737,000 square miles, which puts it among the thirteen largest countries of the world. Its land area of course is not compact, consisting as it does of thousands of islands; with its inland seas included, it covers nearly 4 million square miles (an area greater than the land surface of China or the USA). Indonesia's archipelago therefore is the largest island complex in the world.

In terms of population too Indonesia is significant. The present population—something in the order of 124 million—ranks fifth in terms of world population, after China, India, Russia and USA. In the year 1990, if the population growth-rate characteristic of recent years persists, Indonesia's population could well total 190 million.

Indonesia's geographical situation in South-East Asia is noteworthy. A glance at the map shows that she commands the routes east-west from China and Japan to the Indian sub-continent, the Arab world and the West, and north-south from the South-East Asian mainland to Australasia and the Pacific. It was this favourable position that enabled the ancient Indonesian Kingdoms and Srivaja and Madjapahit to play such a large part in early international commerce in commodities and ideas.

Indonesia possesses important reserves of petroleum, tin, bauxite, manganese, coal, iron and a number of minor though industrially important metals. In addition, her production of tobacco, copra, agricultural products and timber are also significant. She has in fact a bigger and more diversified resource base than any other country in the region — the known resource base is quite adequate to sustain industrialization. In this context one must remember that vast areas are yet to be explored for oil and mineral resources; for example, in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi — not to mention the area of Nusatenggara; the Eastern chain of islands.

Thus it is clear that Indonesia, if only because of her size, situation and potential must be considered a power to be reckoned with in South-East Asia, the Pacific and, indeed, the world.

Because of Indonesia's importance in the South-East Asian region it is clearly in Australia's interest to seek closer ties and relationships with her. This has been demonstrated both by the previous Government and the present one, and our contacts have become increasingly close in an ever widening variety of fields since the late 1960s. The Prime

Minister, during his recent visit to Jakarta, made it quite clear that it is in Australia's interests, and indeed in the interests of all the non-communist countries of South-East Asia, to see a prosperous and an economically and politically stable Indonesia retaining its present non-aligned foreign policy. It was also made clear that Australia would continue actively to assist Indonesia to achieve these aims through closer trade, defence and other forms of co-operation and assistance.

Perhaps one of the most puzzling aspects of Indonesian governmental organization and policy making machinery for Australians to understand is the role played by the Services in Indonesia today. Why are there so many service officers scattered throughout the administrative organization, what influence do they exert, to what extent do they control the country; do they exert political influence, and if so, how much? These, and no doubt many other similar questions arise.

It is not easy to provide ready answers but I would like to answer some of these and try to put the whole matter into its correct perspective.

I can think of no other country, including the other developing countries of South-East Asia, where the services (primarily the Army) have played such a vital part in the establishment of the post colonial state and its subsequent development, as in Indonesia, and where their areas of interest and involvement have been so widespread and diversified. The services have played a major role in Indonesia's recent history, are continuing to do so today, and will no doubt in the future.

My aim therefore, will be to attempt to explain how and why this situation came about, to describe in outline the situation the armed services occupy in Indonesian society today, and to hazard a guess as to what the picture might be in the future.

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

To begin to understand the present day situation it is necessary to go back to the latter part of the Dutch colonial period, for from that time the origins of today's Indonesian Army can be traced. Throughout I will be referring mainly to the Army, as it is by far the largest and most influential member of the armed services. Further, in general terms what is applicable to the Army holds true for the Navy, Air Force and Police.

The Dutch raised a colonial Army, the KNIL, which was recruited from two main areas, namely Minahasa in North Sulawesi and Ambon

in the Moluccas. The reason for this was the fact that these two areas were, and are still, basically Christian. In islands such as Amboina, where Islam never gained a foothold, most of the inhabitants became converted to Christianity early in the colonial period. This common religion with the Dutch led, in Amboina, as in Minahasa, to a subtle integration with the Dutch which provided them with a source of reliable manpower during colonial times, but which had extremely important political consequences subsequently.

During the latter years of the colonial period the Dutch established a military academy in Bandung where a limited number of better educated Indonesians could gain commissions. In addition, an even smaller number of Indonesians attended the Dutch Military Academy in Holland. Although few in number these ex cadets were, in 1945, destined to play a significant part in the establishment of the National Army. Incidentally, President Suharto, though not an ex cadet, was a sergeant in the KNIL prior to the Japanese invasion.

### THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

Early in 1942, after the Japanese occupied the Netherlands East Indies following the ignominious collapse of the Dutch, they were looked on as welcomed liberators. Indonesians were for the first time permitted to fly the red and white flag, sing their national anthem and read the daily press in their own language. Many Indonesians were given senior administrative positions previously held by Dutchmen and thus gained for the first time an opportunity to learn the business of running their country. At the same time the Japanese widened the opportunities for the average Indonesian to acquire education -- an opportunity which previously was open to only a very few of the Javanese nobility and gentry.

Although the Japanese saw the wisdom of promising eventual self government and of providing some outlet for nationalist sentiments, initially at least, they were apparently unaware of the true strength of the Indonesian underground movement organized by Sharir, which was dedicated to complete independence for Indonesia. Sukarno and Hatta meanwhile kept up the facade of co-operation with the Japanese. Gradually the initial feeling of relief at being free from Dutch colonial bondage turned to one of disillusionment and eventually outright opposition towards the Japanese.



In the meantime, however, the Japanese had formed many quasi-military organizations, especially among the youth. In March 1943 all the Indonesian organizations were merged into the P.U.T.E.R.A. (*Pusat Tenaga Rakyat*) Peoples Power Centre. This organization, the chairman and vice-chairman of which were Sukarno and Hatta respectively, was an umbrella organization which covered a variety of activities — all of them regarded by the Japanese as contributing to their war effort. Many of them did. There were for example the mobilization of *Hei Hos*, who were conscripted into the Japanese Army, the *Peta*, the home (Indonesian) defence organization, the *Seinendan*, a youth corps, and others. The result of the formation of these military and semi military organizations was the training of a large proportion of the youth of Java and Sumatra in Japanese military techniques. The largest group, the *Peta*, had a strength of about 120,000 by 1945 and they formed the basis of the present day Indonesian Army.

Although Java was obviously their main administrative centre, the Japanese paid a great deal of attention to the other islands, notably Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan, where considerable developmental work in agriculture, mining, communications and education was carried out. This activity of course was not a philanthropic exercise — for the Japanese increasingly needed food, raw materials and minerals. Nevertheless it provided much needed administrative experience for those Indonesians who were working under Japanese direction. Further, in these areas for the first time the Indonesians were given the opportunity to develop politically through the formation of Advisory and Provincial Councils.

As time went on and the tide of war began to run against the Japanese in the Pacific, their increasingly harsh demands for labour, food and raw materials began to generate gradually increasing opposition from the Indonesians, who by now appreciated that the occupation was but another form of colonization. As the prospect of defeat became more and more clear the Japanese granted concession after concession to Indonesian nationalism. By March 1945 a Committee of Investigation for Indonesian Independence (with Sukarno and Hatta as leading members) was set up in Jakarta. The first task of this committee was to draft a constitution for Free Indonesia of the future — how far in the future of course could not be forecast at that time but there was no doubt in the minds of the 60 members of the committee that there

would be an Indonesian Republic when the war ended. In the event they did not have long to wait.

Following Australian landings at Tarakan, Balikpapan and Brunei, the fall of Burma to the British Fourteenth Army, and finally the entry of the USSR into the Pacific War on 9 August 1945, the Japanese defeat was already in sight. At this point the Indonesians were allowed to form a Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, on which every part of the country was represented.

This was of historic importance as for the first time nationalist leaders from Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Moluccas and the lesser Sunda Islands came together. This committee agreed on the text of the declaration of Independence which was read publicly by Sukarno in Jakarta on the morning of 17 August 1945 and subsequently broadcast by Indonesians working in the *Domei* Indonesian wireless headquarters.

From that moment, thousands who had worked secretly in resistance organizations, and those who had collaborated with the Japanese, now showed their true sentiments. Civil servants, the Army (*Peta*), police and many organizations showed their support for the Republic and armed clashes took place between the Japanese and the Indonesians when the former ineffectually ordered the disbandment of *Peta* and the surrender of their arms. In many places, but particularly in Java and Sumatra, *Peta* units, supported by the local population, attacked Japanese garrisons — partly prompted by the desire to settle old scores and partly in order to seize weapons and ammunition. Thus the Indonesian Army was born, when the BKR (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*) Peoples Security Corps was formed from troops in the *Peta* units and from the ranks of the numerous armed youth organizations. In the first instance, the Army was created for the specific purpose of defending the Republic's claim of independence. It was organized from the bottom upwards, and consisted of virtually independent constituent units which were responsible for territorial divisions of the Republic. It was truly a Peoples' Army.

### BRITISH INTERLUDE

Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, there was considerable concern at Mountbatten's SEAC Headquarters over the possibility of the Japanese in Indonesia attempting to continue hostilities independently, and, in this event, the fate of the 130,000 Dutch prisoners

of war and internees in Java. This concern was caused, first, by a lack of intelligence regarding the recent political developments and secondly, by the attitude of the Dutch authorities in London and Singapore, who were unable or unwilling to accept the fact that the Indonesians had established a considerable degree of local control even before the Japanese had formally surrendered.

In the event, when the first British troops arrived in Jakarta in September 1945, they found the new Indonesian Government fairly well in control of the situation, although clashes between the Indonesians and the Japanese were still frequent and bloody. The British position was unenviable to say the least. General Christison had the primary task of maintaining law and order, disarming and repatriating the Japanese, releasing and repatriating the Dutch prisoners of war and internees, and finally handing over internal security to the Dutch.

His interest in local politics was minimal. As he said on his arrival:

We have no interest in their politics; British and Indian troops will not become involved in national politics. I intend to see the leaders of the various movements and tell them what we are coming for. Until a change is made in their political structure they must co-operate.

He also made it clear he expected the Dutch Government to accept the necessity of granting some form of self government and to co-operate with the Indonesian authorities to that end. However, this was not to be — the Dutch Government regarded the Sukarno Government as 'non representative of a spontaneous Nationalist movement — a Japanese puppet government of a totalitarian character dependent on the Japanese military organization'.

Things went from bad to worse as Dutch troops landed and NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) began to try to take over. Christison was in a difficult position — he was under orders to hand over internal security to the Dutch on the one hand while on the other he had been warned by Sukarno that if he continued 'his calculated policy to reimpose Dutch rule the ultimate result would be a blood bath'.

In a number of Javanese towns, Bandung, Solo, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Surabaya, the Indonesians were fighting the Japanese to gain control, while the Dutch under SEAC protection were attempting to take over. Serious trouble arose when Japanese troops were used by SEAC to fight Indonesians. In Semarang, for instance, the Indonesians had suffered 2,000 casualties fighting the Japanese to gain control,

in which they were partially successful, only to find other Japanese troops used by SEAC to get the town back for the Dutch.

A crisis occurred when the second wave of British/Indian troops arrived in Surabaya. Large scale fighting broke out with heavy casualties on both sides. These events led to the now famous, or infamous, Battle of Surabaya, when the Fifth Indian Division, supported by artillery and naval gunfire, together with air support, entered the city. Fighting continued for several weeks until the city was occupied street by street. This battle was an important event for the Indonesians as it was a proof of their national unity and their armed strength.

Unfortunately the British Government failed to take the opportunity presented by this operation to pressurize the Dutch to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, and it was decided to extend General Christison's mandate over the whole Indonesian territory. To this end more British and Indian troops were brought in.

This naturally provoked bitter Indonesian resistance, and resulted in some instances of atrocities, perpetrated in the main by youth gangs such as the originally Japanese sponsored terrorist organization, the 'Black Buffaloes'. Such organizations were not at that time under the authority of the Army and their activities did a great deal of harm to the infant republic. It must also be remembered that at this time there were many instances of cruel and harsh behaviour, including many murders perpetrated by the Dutch military and NICA officials.

*For the great part there was no complaint of the attitude of the British and Indian troops, and indeed there were many instances of close co-operation between them and the Indonesian authorities in the day to day administration of the country. For example, it was agreed that the Indonesian Army was to be made responsible for the 150-mile stretch of road between Jakarta and Bandung, where previously many incidents had occurred. In addition, it was agreed between General Christison and Sharir's Government that Indonesian troops should undertake the disarmament of 25,000 Japanese in East and Central Java. A wise decision, which reflected the growing confidence in the republic to maintain law and order.*

1946 was a year of consolidation for the new republic in all fields; not of least importance was the consolidation of the organization of the Army (the TNI as it was now called). It will be recalled that the Dutch and British only occupied a comparatively small part of the republic

at that stage; this occupation being mainly limited to the larger centres — Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya in Java and Padang, Palembang and Medan in Sumatra. Outside these areas republican armed resistance continued; particularly fierce opposition occurred in Bali and in North and South Sulawesi.

Despite many problems, including internal political power struggles, much progress was made. During this period of consolidation the Army became more and more closely identified with the daily life of the republic, being responsible for law and order in republican territory, for the training and equipping of its soldiers and for providing advice and assistance to the civil authorities. In many instances the local territorial commanders virtually became the local representatives of the central republican government in Yogyakarta. Due to lack of adequate communications they were, to varying degrees, isolated from close control and generally their local influence became predominant. Nevertheless, despite any feelings of local orientation they were fiercely pro-Sukarno and the ideals of their new republic.

These sentiments were soon to be put to the test, for with the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, the British and Indian troops left Indonesia on 29 November 1946, and the unfortunate Indonesians were left to their fate with 92,000 Dutch troops in the country.

It is worth recalling that the British/Indian force during its 14-month stay had lost 600 killed, 1320 wounded, 320 missing, and 600, mainly Indians, deserted to join the guerillas. Despite a most difficult period of duty the British, on the whole, carried out their duties with admirable restraint, sympathy and patience. Despite the sometimes bitter and bloody clashes, particularly during the latter part of 1945, they earned the gratitude and respect of many Indonesians.

The period of the British occupation was of particular importance in the growth of the Indonesian Armed Forces, for it was during this period their pattern of development emerged. This pattern, in general terms, has remained up to the present. This period saw the development of the TNI from the Japanese sponsored *Peta* into a considerable, though fragmented, force officered in the main by a mixture of Dutch and Japanese trained personnel. It was, by force of circumstances, a loosely organized group of virtually independent commands coinciding with the eight regions of the civil administration into which Indonesia was then divided.

It lacked experience, communications and equipment. What equipment it possessed consisted of a mixture of mainly Japanese and some Dutch and British small arms — it had virtually no heavy equipment. However, what the TNI lacked in expertise and equipment it made up in morale and determination to defend the republic to the death. In this it had the active support and assistance of the local population throughout the country. The Army gained considerable prestige and self confidence as a result of its very creditable performance during the Battle of Surabaya in 1945.

However, it must be appreciated that at this time there developed seeds of factionalism within the Army. Factionalism has proved a major problem for the Indonesian Army throughout its comparatively short history, and it exists today, although to a lesser extent than before the coup of 1965. It is easy to appreciate how factionalism developed, when one recalls the origins of the TNI, which evolved from spontaneously formed military bodies, and originating from such diverse groups as ex cadets of the Dutch Military Academy, ex *Peta* officers, members of various political and religious groups and students. In order to fight effectively against the Dutch, the many and often antagonistic groups had to be unified, at least in a region; or as a minimum their actions had to be co-ordinated to the extent that their energy would be spent more in fighting the Dutch than each other.

In Java the first two divisions to be formed were the Siliwangi (West Java) and Diponegoro (Central Java) divisions — the East Java (Brawidjaja) division was formed towards the end of the revolution. The nucleus of the Siliwangi leadership was ex cadets from the Dutch Military Academy and under them were members of the West Java student armies, most of whom had had contact with the ex cadets during the Japanese occupation. It was much more difficult to form the Diponegoro division — partly due to there being less experienced leadership available. All through the revolution factionalism and differences between these two divisions and armed groups caused conflict, including personal rivalries, ideological differences and territorial conflict.

I mention this problem of inter group/command conflict as it gives an indication of the difficulties faced by the High Command in welding the Army into an effective co-ordinated body on the one hand, and an indication of the close ties which existed then (and still do to

some degree today) between the territorial commanders and their local civilian counterparts on the other.

### THE DUTCH POLICE ACTIONS

Predictably the Linggadjati Agreement failed. The Dutch went ahead with their plans to recolonize the country as if the agreement did not exist. The continued presence of 92,000 Dutch troops heightened tension and many armed clashes took place. Following months of inconclusive discussion, with the Indonesians offering many concessions, the final deadlock was reached and Dutch troops moved into action on 21 July 1947.

This first Police Action, as it was termed by the Dutch, resulted in widespread international criticism, particularly from those Asian countries, such as India, which had themselves only recently obtained independence. Australia too, was amongst the most vociferous in denouncing the Dutch action. Meanwhile the Dutch had extended their control but it was limited to urban areas and the major communication networks. They had little or no success in establishing control in the rural areas.

The subsequent signing of the Renville Agreement in January 1948 actually gave the advantage to the Dutch as it recognized the Van Mook demarcation line — an imaginary line linking up the points the Dutch spearheads had reached prior to the ceasefire. The Indonesians were thus left with an area described as the rump end of Java and Sumatra. In political terms the Renville Agreement defined the Republican areas as a unit or part of the United States of Indonesia — a federation to be incorporated with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The United Nations had frustrated Dutch plans for a complete comeback but it had not changed the nature of their policy, which now clearly pointed to the complete destruction of the republic. The Dutch went ahead with their plans to establish a federal state; meanwhile their tight naval blockade was producing intolerable conditions, with serious food and clothing shortages and an almost complete lack of medical supplies.

Conditions within republican territory became critical and because of this and because of his fear that republican morale would crack, the then Prime Minister Hatta offered more and more concessions to the Dutch. This policy was strongly opposed by the left oriented political parties, including the PKI.



With a view to the reorganization of the Army, the Hatta Cabinet, in February 1948, embarked on a Rationalization Programme. The plan was to reduce the Army to a small, compact, well trained and armed mobile force of regular troops — this force to be supplemented by a territorial militia, whose members were to be drawn from the local peasantry and trained on a part-time basis. The majority of regular and irregular troops were to be demobilized and returned to rural communities or trained for more skilled occupations in the towns. This proposal met with considerable opposition from the left wing elements, including the Peoples Democratic Front (FDR), and from the Army itself. The FDR had considerable influence in some of the irregular units, and even in the regular force, and it so happened that some of these were listed for demobilization. Political control of the Army was an important part of the strategy of the left wing political parties, and in the Hatta proposal they saw their aim threatened. Officers were reluctant to lose their position of prestige that goes with command, for the uncertainty of satisfactory employment in the chaotic economic situation at the time. For the other ranks, demobilization meant a return to the agricultural communities whose customs, traditions and working conditions were now less attractive. The result of these attitudes was that the discontented elements began to look to the FDR for leadership.

Prompted by their political patrons, dissident units resisted attempts to disarm them and armed clashes occurred when the government resorted to force. The Hatta rationalization scheme became a major political issue within the Army, with tension mounting between the *pro* Hatta Siliwangi Division on the one hand and the *pro* FDR, *Pesindo* (Indonesian Socialist Youth) units and the Diponegoro Division on the other.

The dispute came to a head late in 1948, with the so called Madiun affair, when some leftist oriented Diponegoro Army units plus *pro* PKI (Communist) marines, attempted a coup. Despite some initial successes, the PKI troops under Colonel Djokusjono and Colonel Suadi were defeated by Siliwangi units commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sadikin and Colonel Gatot Subroto. Militarily, the PKI troops had the advantage; most *pro* Hatta units were deployed in positions facing the Dutch and many had already been demobilized. However the communists miscalculated the extent of their influence amongst the irregulars. A great many were opposed to demobilization, but by no

means all were prepared to fight for a communist cause in a civil war and many deserted as a result of an appeal broadcast by Sukarno. Following the Madiun affair the Army disarmed and dispersed the troublesome elements and began to cleanse 'itself of Communist sympathisers' — a process which was unfortunately interrupted by the Second Dutch Police Action.

The Madiun affair, though promptly dealt with, had lasting effects. It highlighted the influence of politics within the Army itself, the difficulty of exercising effective control by a central authority, and it generated mistrust and further factionalism which persisted for a considerable time.

Meanwhile, fruitless negotiations had been going on; the Dutch attempting to impose their policy of Federalism. The Indonesians, whilst attempting to resist, had nevertheless been forced to make a number of concessions. Hatta however was not willing to give way on one vital point, which was the suggestion that the Republican Army should be under the ultimate authority of the Dutch High Commissioner during the duration of the provisional Federal Government. Negotiations finally broke down and the Second Dutch Police Action commenced.

In December 1948, Dutch paratroops and armoured units moved swiftly into republican territory, captured Yogyakarta and took prisoner Hatta, Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders, who were taken to Sumatra. The Army, though intact, fell back into the jungle, from which they conducted guerilla warfare.

World reaction to Dutch moves was rapid and vociferous. The Security Council passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire within the month — this was ignored by the Dutch. However, a conference of Asian nations, some 16 in all, met in New Delhi and unanimously passed a series of resolutions, the most important of which called for a complete transference of power to the United States of Indonesia by 1 January 1950. The Security Council passed an almost similar resolution itself and it became clear that world opinion was *pro* Indonesian.

The Dutch attack also had the effect of strengthening Indonesian determination to fight, and alienated those Indonesians who might have been prepared to co-operate with the Dutch in setting up the federation. Therefore, when Yogyakarta was bombed, the governments of East Indonesia and Pasundan (West Java), the most important federal areas,

resigned, while others refused to support Dutch military action. Thus Van Mook's federal empire began to crumble. Meanwhile, military observers attached to the newly set up United Nations Commission began to report well organized guerilla resistance, systematic and co-ordinated.

The Emergency Government set up in Sumatra by Sharifuddin, following the capture of Sukarno and Hatta, worked efficiently as the core of a military organization, with Colonel Hidayat as Chief of Staff and Territorial Commander of Republican Forces in Sumatra. General Sudirman held a similar position in Java. Both islands were divided into military territories under military governors, who received orders from, and reported to, the Emergency Government. This military organization was closely co-ordinated with the civil administration, and had the fullest support from the people. It was able to administer justice, collect taxes, keep schools open, to open new ones, and maintain its own republican currency.

The Dutch army was unable to give a strategic reply to these guerilla tactics, because their forces were insufficient to cover the whole area. The Indonesians avoided pitched battles; clashes with Dutch troops were regarded only as incidental to the main task of preventing them from benefiting from the areas they occupied. The widespread, centrally organized guerilla warfare, and complete scorched earth policy, surprised and seriously affected the morale of the Dutch troops. Only one month after their attack they found themselves in the midst of a hostile population, short of supplies, lacking in communications and subject to continual sniping and harassment.

Resistance was not confined to Java and Sumatra. Guerilla warfare broke out in Bandjermasin (South Kalimantan), Tabanan (South Bali) and Makassar. As time went on it became increasingly obvious to the Dutch that their military adventure was doomed to failure; world opinion became increasingly opposed to Dutch policy and resistance in Indonesia was increasing, while the hitherto *pro* Dutch Federalist leaders were showing more and more support for the republic. Finally, in June 1949, following the Rum-Van Royen Agreement, the republican leaders were returned to Yogyakarta, following a ceasefire and withdrawal of Dutch troops from that city. War was officially ended on the night of 10 August in Java and on 14 August in Sumatra. The implementation of the Rum-Van Royen Agreement called for a Round Table Conference, under United Nations auspices, which officially

opened at The Hague on 23 August 1949. After a considerable amount of haggling, the Dutch agreed unconditionally to transfer sovereignty to the Government of the United States of Indonesia before the end of the year and a Union Statute was agreed. It was also agreed that all Dutch forces, about 85,000 men, would be withdrawn as quickly as possible.

From a military point of view, one of the principal results which emerged from this period of guerilla warfare was the further growth of the concept of regional military autonomy among local commanders. This was reinforced by the fact that when independence was finally granted, a federal constitution was introduced, and in the constituent states Army units made up of natives of the areas were called on to play the major administrative roles. Furthermore, in the remote areas, loyalties of the troops became strongly directed to their local commanders, thereby strengthening their independence and encouraging a kind of 'warlordism'. In the first twelve months of her independence, one of the most difficult tasks facing the Indonesian Government was the problem of regularizing the Army and placing it under the effective political control of parliament.

### THE SUKARNO PERIOD

We have seen how independence was granted to a Republic of the United States of Indonesia in 1949. The constitution of the RUSI was federalist in character and as it turned out quite unworkable. Its defects were obvious. Nationalists saw in this arrangement an attempt by the Dutch to perpetuate their control by classical colonial divide and rule tactics, for several of the smaller component states had been carefully fostered by Holland. In a few months the federal system collapsed as member states, one by one, opted to merge with the Republic of Indonesia. A new unitary constitution was proclaimed on 17 August 1950, the fifth anniversary of the original proclamation of independence, and the country became simply the Republic of Indonesia.

A multitude of problems faced the government. Years of occupation and anti-colonial war had devastated the country. Sukarno and his Prime Minister Hatta faced many difficulties, not the least of which was the shortage of trained and experienced people to assume responsibility for all the varied matters requiring attention. In 1940, the last normal year, only 240 Indonesians graduated from high school, and 37 from college, out of an estimated population of about 70.5 million.

All in all, the number of people in 1950 (population then about 79.5 million), who had had a genuine higher education could be numbered only in the hundreds.

This incredibly small elite had to man the highest offices in the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the armed forces, the professions and politics. Moreover, these men had been engaged for many years in activities other than those for which their training had prepared them. Because of this chronic shortage of expertise many officers from the armed services, and particularly the Army, found themselves called on to undertake tasks in the civil administration, sometimes in conjunction with their normal service duties, sometimes instead of them. In the outer islands, and more isolated areas, it often fell to the local commander and his staff to provide the very framework of a new civil administrative system. It is probably true to say that without the Army's co-operation and assistance in the period after Independence, Indonesia would not have survived as a viable entity.

However, there were still many internal problems to be faced by the Army. In 1950 there were still numerous irregular and undisciplined military units in Java and Sumatra, and some of these were engaging in bandit activities and terrorism. Many of them, disillusioned with the failure of the government to pay them and to provide satisfactory rehabilitation arrangements, moved into the interior and joined the outlawed Darul Islam movement. In addition, with the transfer of sovereignty, the government was faced with the task of repatriating tens of thousands of former KNIL troops, whose loyalties were uncertain.

There followed several attempts to stage local revolts in South and South-East Sulawesi, and also in the Moluccas, where former KNIL troops attempted to set up the Republic of South Moluccas early in 1952. All these attempts were eventually crushed by the Army but only after considerable effort and time. The local territorial commanders were operating under extreme difficulties, as there was little forthcoming from Jakarta in the way of material support. They were thrown on their own devices to provide arms, ammunition and supplies needed to fight their local wars. This practice was to cause many problems in the future.

# THE BRIGGS PLAN



*David Wilson*

**M**URDERED by three Chinese guerilla assailants after 8.30 a.m. on 16 June 1948 at Elphil Estate, Arthur Wells became the first victim of the Malayan Communist Party's insurgent efforts to expel the British from Malaya.<sup>1</sup> Within two days the High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, had declared a State of Emergency throughout Malaya, and it is the aim of these introductory paragraphs to briefly sketch the highlights of events before the advent of the Briggs Plan, which incorporated some of the decisions made in the first years of the Emergency.

As Secretary General of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), Chin Peng based his hopes on the overthrowing of the British on Mao Tse-tung's three phases of guerilla warfare. The 16th of June ushered in phase one, aimed at 'driving all Europeans, government officials and police in from the isolated parts of the interior to allow the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army (MPABA) to step into the void and call them liberated areas'.<sup>2</sup> The methods used in this period were violent, despite the fact that Chin Peng, in his 'Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War' had stated that the revolution had 'popular character because its revolutionary spirit rests in the broad masses of people of many races and classes'.<sup>3</sup> From the evidence available, it is

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*David Wilson is a clerk in Special Deputy Army Office (Branch), Department of Defence (Army Office) and is a part time student at the Australian National University, studying for a Bachelor of Arts degree. Prior to joining the Australian Government Service, he served six years as a technician in the Royal Australian Air Force.*

certain that Chin Peng had over-estimated the standing of the Communist party within the population, for it was never to achieve a popular base, and was to rely on narrow support from a minimal number of Chinese. Of more importance from the purely military point of view, he had under-estimated the swift British reaction. General Boucher had so ably and energetically conducted the British counter-measures that the largely untrained MPABA was in an unenviable position by the end of July 1948, losing men to security force action and desertion. It was only the two-month pause caused by the failure to name a successor to Sir Edward Gent, who was killed in an aircraft accident on 2 July 1948, that allowed the MPABA time to consolidate its position. This lack of higher direction played into the Communists' hands, but the arrival of Sir Henry Gurney in September 1948 brought resolution back into British counter-measures.

Even so, through 1949 the MPABA, now known as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) was able to operate in units from 200-400 strong. Its methods were still those of terror and '... the objective was simple — to brand innocent, frightened people with the trademark of terror. It did not matter whether the attacks were large or small — like wildfire the news spread along the Asian grapevine that if ordinary men and women wanted to stay alive they must do one thing — obey. The alternative was death — and only if one was lucky would the killing be swift'.<sup>4</sup> The signs of authority, such as the police posts, were being attacked in a second wave of violence, which commenced in an effort to negate government activity.

In retrospect, the MRLA had lost the initiative by 1951, when the guerilla army, during the period which Clutterbuck calls the battles of 'the big battalions',<sup>5</sup> were broken up into small units. The security forces had expanded, including the police. The authority's decision to impose registration and identity cards on all of the population further limited both overt and clandestine Communist activity. Chin Peng had, on 16 July 1948, lost Lau Yew to a policeman's bullet, thus losing 'a

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<sup>1</sup> Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs*, Collins, London, 1971, pp. 19-21.

<sup>2</sup> Edgar O'Ballance, *Malaya, The Communist Insurgent War 1948-1960*, Faber & Faber, London, 1966, p. 81.

<sup>3</sup> Gene Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1954, p. 101.

<sup>4</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War*, Cassell, London, 1967, p. 42.



brilliant guerilla fighter . . . [who] Chin Peng never hesitated to charge with the military conduct of the war'.<sup>6</sup> While the MRLA lost its military leader, and struggled to maintain its strength, Chin Peng rescinded his earlier statement and realized that he did not have the popular support his revolution required. The Party Directive of October 1951, in which 'Members are reminded that their primary duty is to expand and consolidate the organization of the masses, which is to take precedence over the purely military objective of destroying the enemy',<sup>7</sup> was too late. Already Gurney had established his Squatters Committee, and the decision to re-locate the squatters in new villages had been taken. The first and most important decision made by Gurney was that the control of the Emergency was to remain in civilian, not military hands.

Gurney realized how important the Chinese squatters, situated on the jungle fringe, were to the MRLA, which had been forced into the jungle by military activity and population control methods. The squatters were 'outside Government control . . . [and] became the commissariat and the "popular base" '<sup>8</sup> for the insurgent movement. The MRLA could control these villages, with little effort, and the *Min Yuen* (Communist infrastructure) could use them as a bridge between the two Communist arms. Gurney's aim was to remove the bridge, and by so doing, destroy the link between the *Min Yuen* and MRLA. The MRLA would then be without support, and the task of exterminating the pestilence of *Min Yuen* infrastructure simplified, as the coercive force inherent in the MRLA would not be available to the *Min Yuen*. By repositioning the squatters, it was possible to improve their economic state and to give them security and protection, the latter to be supplied, eventually, by the village's own Home Guard Unit. So Gurney's 'patience, tact and understanding which persuaded the Malay rulers that it was to their advantage to give away land title to form new villages',<sup>9</sup> paved the way to a strategy which was to be the mainstay of the Briggs Plan.

To expedite his aims, Gurney needed a man who would have the authority to co-ordinate the civil and military effort involved. This was important, as in the Malay Police a state of friction existed between the

<sup>6</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>7</sup> Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1966, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

Malayan 'veterans' and the new faces from Palestine, who felt superior. Even bureaucratic elements of the police and military headquarters were working at a peacetime tempo, with little co-ordination between them.<sup>10</sup> A man was needed to weld the factions of government into unanimity and single purpose; this man was a retired army lieutenant general, Sir Harold Briggs.

Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in April 1950, with 'authority over all Security Forces — Army, Police and Air Force — and power to co-ordinate actions of Civil Departments that affected the war'.<sup>11</sup> He was a quiet man, who had had jungle experience with the Fourteenth Army in Burma as the commander of the 5th Indian Division and was well suited for the role which he was to play. Having spent most of his army life in Asia, Briggs was imaginative and incisive, but possessed modesty and tact. All these attributes were necessary for his role. The result of Briggs' intensive efforts was that he died a short period after completing his task, without the knowledge that his efforts had irreversibly turned the tide against the Communists.

Like Gurney, Briggs saw the Chinese squatters as the keystone of any plan to defeat the Communist insurgency. He agreed that the whole set of operations and procedures should be under civilian control. For, once in the new villages, the squatters could be protected, and because of this protection gain confidence in the government and themselves. The whole aim of the plan was to outbid the Communist parallel hierarchy in the 'competition of Government',<sup>12</sup> by giving the squatters a high standard of local government and increased prosperity. Briggs, therefore, was cognisant of the fact that 'arms alone would never win a guerilla war but that political stability was a major key to victory — that normal workaday government had to function, to make decisions, but had to be seen to function, otherwise there would be no hope for the millions of bemused, bewildered bystanders caught up in the turmoil of a war of terror. And without hope, without belief in government, the only alternative would be Communism'.<sup>13</sup> This was the aim of the Briggs Plan — to bring government to those outside the government's authority, and provide protection to allow the government to be seen at the business of governing, at all levels.

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<sup>10</sup> Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 56-7.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>13</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

The four vital rules for conducting the war, expounded by Briggs were:

- 'To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security therein which will in time result in a steady and increasing flow of information coming from all sources.
- 'To break up the Communist organization within the populated areas.
- 'To isolate the bandits from their food and information supply organizations which are in the populated areas.
- 'To destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground.'<sup>14</sup>

From the above it is apparent that military operations were to be of a secondary nature, and carried out in co-ordination with the police and civil authorities. In fact, the physical destruction of the MRLA units was of low priority, for, without the support of the *Min Yuen* infrastructure and the rise in the quantity and quality of intelligence to the security forces, they could be controlled and annihilated almost at will. To remove MRLA units without taking steps to prevent their regrowth was like cutting the top off an iceberg. The units were the minority of the numbers involved in the insurgency, and were dependent upon the *Min Yuen* and sympathizers for all their vital necessities. The Briggs Plan aimed at severing this link — once the infrastructure was removed the jungle units would die on the vine or become easy prey for security force operations.

Co-ordination between the various authorities and organizations was the backbone of the whole plan. To provide this co-ordination Briggs established the War Council (later Emergency Operation Council —EOC). The commanders' sub-committee of this body consisted of the Chief Secretary of the Federation, the Commissioner of Police and the service commanders, with Briggs presiding with the High Commissioner's authority. This council had its counterparts in State War Executive Committees (SWECS) and District War Executive Committees (DWECS). In these latter committees the chairman was always a civilian — the state prime minister or the district officer respectively. The concept of civilian control was therefore maintained, and to enable committees to expedite decisions the police and army representatives

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<sup>14</sup> Barber, op. cit., p. 97.

were the respective commanders, not just staff representatives. In addition there were always the police special branch officer, information officer (who handled psychological warfare), home guard officer and food control officer present in advisory capacities. The latter were later augmented by the addition of local dignitaries or community leaders, who represented the main industries, racial groups and religions.<sup>15</sup> So the instrumentalities which controlled the war had the major ethnic and economic groups represented, giving them a voice in the actual implementation of the Emergency Regulations and, by their structure, maintained the precedence of civilian above military control.

'Morning Prayers', as these meetings became known, took place every morning to examine the current situation and to plan future actions. Thus, the relevant committees 'awoke the people of Malaya to the fact that they were in effect helping to direct the war, that everyone had a part to play because they knew it was their war, a civilians' War . . . in these little war cabinets . . . Briggs took the strings that were tugging in all directions and wove them into a rope of co-ordination . . . Ideas were pooled. The good ones went all the way up to the Federal War Council to be examined, approved and disseminated all over the country'.<sup>16</sup> This was the philosophy of the Briggs Plan — to involve the population in the defeat of the Communist insurgents by giving it something to lose if Communism was successful in its aim. There were also tangible schemes put forward to alienate the population from the Communist cause. During 1950 the Employees Provident Fund was established, which paid a substantial sum of money to persons over 55 years of age, or those permanently leaving the country and the dependants of the deceased. By guaranteeing payment when it was due, the government kept the contributors on its side.<sup>17</sup> The MCP also attempted the same type of scheme, and it is significant that it was not supported, proving that the Malayan authorities were winning the competition of government.

Within the overall framework of the Briggs Plan, there was considerable flexibility when dealing with problems at various levels. State and district authorities could use innovation and their own initiative, thus being able to react to a peculiar situation as they thought

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<sup>15</sup> Clutterbuck, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-9.

<sup>16</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-9.

<sup>17</sup> Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-7.

fit. If the innovation proved successful, it may well have been used throughout Malaya; if not, those responsible had to explain why. This flexibility was vital, for the Emergency became an intelligence war, and to use the available intelligence called for a sustained degree of co-operation and mutual trust between the civilians, police and service personnel involved. The simplicity of the aim expounded by the Briggs Plan made this possible, for as long as the basic aim was achieved, the method, as long as it was within the law, did not matter.

Flexibility was desirable for 'great care was necessary to avoid Sino-Malay racial incidents, and a major political effort was required to convince the bulk of the Chinese population that they had a stake in Malaya as Malaysians and not as Chinese with the Communists'.<sup>18</sup> This statement shows how those administering the Briggs Plan had to be sensitive to the Malay and Chinese views. To the Malays the resettlement of approximately 430,000 squatters could be seen as a threat to Malay hegemony, as the squatters were being encouraged to become involved in politics and public life. To appease the Malays, in August 1950 the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) was established. Used, 'partly to comfort the Malays',<sup>19</sup> the RIDA programme was designed within the overall concept of giving the population something to lose if Communism was victorious. A self-help programme, its aim was to help the Malays help themselves.<sup>20</sup> As in all the major projects undertaken during the period of Briggs' term as chief of operations, the aim was to have total involvement by the population and, by such involvement, make the Communist cause less attractive to the population. This programme also removed any contradictions which could be of propaganda value to the insurgents.

The Briggs Plan was simple in concept, but complex in its application, and examples of how Briggs' four suggestions to counter the insurgency were implemented may amplify this point.

The domination of populated areas was the role of the police, for they were the legitimate arm of law and order available to the government. It was the responsibility of the Special Branch to expose and destroy the *Min Yuen* infrastructure. To accomplish this aim, the police were forced to gain the full trust of the population and show that

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<sup>18</sup> Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>19</sup> Vernon Bartlett, *Report from Malaya*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1955, p. 55.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, p. 57.

they could protect it. During December 1952, Colonel Young, the Commissioner of Police, initiated 'Operation Service'. He explained the aim of the operation to the individual members of his force, 'that with your help the Federation Police are going to demonstrate to the world that they are the friends of the public whom they wish to serve. The police depend upon the public for co-operation and good-will. Let us win this by our own merit'.<sup>21</sup> Aimed at keeping the population at least tolerant of the police, 'Operation Service' made a climate in which the *Min Yuen* infrastructure was less likely to survive. An example of the painstakingly thorough and dangerous technique of infiltrating and breaking up Communist organizations is the effort of a Chinese policewoman, Irene Lee, who was responsible for the capture of Chin Peng's top courier, Lee Meng, in July 1952.<sup>22</sup> This type of activity was only effective after Chinese members were recruited into the Special Branch, for the police force had been predominantly Malay.

Perhaps the best example of co-operation between all factions of government was the isolation of the bandits from food and intelligence. It was the concept of new villages which made this possible. Protected by police posts, and later by their own home guard, the squatters had been resettled by troops, but in a friendly manner. The troops carried out their job with firmness and tact, and the squatters were encouraged to rebuild on leased land in village sites. They were compensated for any loss involved in the move and, later, involved in local government. They became citizens of Malaya even if, initially, the new villages were subjected to strict controls, such as curfews and food control. On leaving the village personal identity cards were checked and items searched for food and other contraband. At times these measures would extend over a whole district, with troops and police combining in the operation. Rice was the major item sought by the MRLA in the jungle as 'in its raw, uncooked state rice will keep indefinitely and is easily stored'.<sup>23</sup> For this reason, rice was sometimes cooked on a communal basis and rationed to the population, for cooked rice deteriorates rapidly.

Food denial forced the MRLA to take risks in its efforts to overcome the problem. It also gave the Special Branch officers a chance

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<sup>21</sup> Vernon Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>22</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, Ch. 15, p. 162.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Miers, *Shoot to Kill*, Faber and Faber, London, 1959, p. 161.

to use valuable intelligence to arrange an ambush. For example, a timber *Kongsi* was ambushed by troops from the Green Howards



because it was known that it was a food collection point for the local MRLA unit, and resulted in the death of two insurgents.<sup>24</sup> The war became one of intelligence and trust, for troops had to have faith in intelligence obtained from Special Branch sources and be able to react quickly enough to use the available material. An excellent example of co-operation between all involved was the pin-point bombing of an

insurgent camp near Klaung on 21 February 1955. Here one can see the absolute trust shown by the army commander on the spot and the local Special Branch officer, as well as the inter-service planning necessary for success.<sup>25</sup> Thus, the fourth point of Briggs was accomplished — the insurgents were being forced to react to these food denial measures, and thus fight on security force grounds and terms, and the security forces took great care to know their ground intimately by constant patrolling, or 'jungle bashing', as it became known.

From the foregoing summary of the Briggs Plan in action, it is evident that it depended on mutual trust and co-operation at every level. One cannot leave a discussion of the plan without some mention of General Sir Gerald Templer, who became High Commissioner after the murder of Sir Henry Gurney. Taking up his post in February 1952, Templer was the right man at the right moment, and gave the dynamism which led to this trust and co-operation. The Briggs Plan had reached a stage of virtual stagnation and, as Briggs himself said at a press conference on his retirement, he 'was not completely satisfied with [his] powers',<sup>26</sup> having no direct control over the police. The SWECs and DWECs were somewhat ineffective because of the lack of agreement among some of their members.

<sup>24</sup> Arthur Campbell, *Jungle Green*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1953, p. 163 ff.

<sup>25</sup> See Miers, *op. cit.*, p. 56 ff. and Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 239 ff.

<sup>26</sup> C. Northcote Parkinsin, *Templer in Malaya*, Donald Moore Ltd, Singapore, 1954, p. 9.

Templer put the Emergency to the forefront and, by the time he left Malaya in 1954, flagging spirits had been bolstered and the backbone of the insurgency broken. He did not change the Briggs Plan, but he made it work, leaving his civilian deputy, D. C. MacGillivray to deal with the civil administration. A man of action, Templer advised the members of the relevant state and district committees to 'thrash out your problems over a bottle of whisky in the evenings. If you can't agree I don't want to know why. I'll sack the lot of you and bring in new chaps'.<sup>27</sup> His attitude was in tune with the whole concept of the Briggs Plan for, in his first circular to Malayan government officers, he stated that 'any idea that the business of normal government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are utterly inter-related'.<sup>28</sup>

Templer brought high level authority to all levels of Malayan life, making appearances at villages and speaking with the population when they visited Kings House. His 'red minutes' were aimed at correcting weaknesses, and recipients were expected to report back within a certain time, or else. A man who was capable of ruthlessness when necessary, as, for example, his action at Tanjong Malin, when he placed a collective punishment of a 22-hour day curfew on all the population when no information was forthcoming regarding the ambush of a pipe repair party. He did, however, instigate the procedure of declaring 'white' areas on 5 September 1953, thus setting a precedent that was to be followed until virtually all of Malaya was free from Communist insurgency. This meant all Emergency Regulations were nullified in an area, and that 'the bandits (insurgents) would be the most unpopular visitors imaginable, for they would certainly be followed by the re-imposition of the restrictions'.<sup>29</sup> The first such 'white' area was in Malacca.

The Briggs Plan was successful because it reacted to the Malayan situation in two main areas — those of civilian government control and the narrow base of Communist support. Added to these are factors which although of lesser importance, need to be noted in analysing the success of the plan.

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<sup>27</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-1.

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.*, p. 152.

<sup>29</sup> M. C. A. Henniker, *Red Shadow over Malaya*, William Blackwood and Sons Ltd, London, 1955, p. 289.



The Briggs Plan itself worked within the framework of the Emergency Regulations and, by so doing, had the respectability of legality. The Emergency Regulations thus gave the Briggs Plan its force, for it was within the framework of these regulations that the plan acted. It was cognisant of these regulations and used them to further its aims. For example, re-settlement, food denial and the identity card system made it simpler for Communist members to be isolated, and this was important when one considers that the movement of the population in the new villages had to be tightly controlled. Most important of all, the security forces had to act within the law, and to be accountable to the law, to have maximum effect within the community. So, the population knew that it had recourse to the law to right a grievance, even if the security forces used the law to restrict the people's activities. This was important to the success of the Briggs Plan — to be seen as acting within the law.

While the Briggs Plan acted within the law, its over-riding concern with civilian control of its operations meant that the government had to be seen as governing. To this end 'the District Officer [was] encouraged to sit under a tree or in the village hall, rather than his own office, to listen to people's complaints or questions'.<sup>30</sup> By so doing, the government official became the symbol of authority, whether he was a police constable or civil servant, and as long as he was visible and able to make decisions at his level, the MCP had a difficult course in controlling that particular area. The Briggs Plan, aware of this, protected the people and their officials. Templer himself was the symbol of government authority. By making personal appearances at all levels of authority, he gave the people faith in the government's measures for controlling the insurgency, and thus made the basic aim of the Briggs Plan — to isolate the insurgents from the population — a real issue to the grass roots population of Malaya.

The inability of the MRLA to establish liberated areas prior to the advent of the Briggs Plan simplified the problem of maintaining an authoritarian presence at the grass roots level. Even in the trying period of the early 1950s, government control was not really threatened. Most police posts and government officials at the village level, even though under considerable pressure, remained effective. Perhaps the planters symbolized this aspect best of all, and their attitude is interest-

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<sup>30</sup> Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

ing. A planter's wife is recorded as saying 'we're not going to be slaves to the situation. We're going to carry on with our jobs in the home and in the districts despite the Communists. It's very important that we shouldn't be useless parts of the machine against the bandits. Our biggest value is from the point of view of morale. I'm quite sure it makes a difference to the labourers and the other people in the district to see that we're carrying on normal lives'.<sup>31</sup> It is evident that people were aware of what was expected of them in countering the insurgency. This spirit embodied itself in the retention of control in the majority of populated areas, and the Briggs Plan consolidated this control, but did not have the task of re-establishing government authority.

Tied closely to this feeling of service is the fact that, during the height of the Korean War, the price of rubber and tin stood at 77c (US) and \$2.20 (US) a pound respectively. Even though, in 1951, these prices had dropped to 19c (US) and 77c (US) a pound,<sup>32</sup> the economic gains which could be made in the early period of the Emergency were an added incentive to stay. Although prices dropped dramatically in 1951, the inflated prices previously had made it possible for the surplus to be used to counter the insurgency.

Further, the underlining theme of civilian control embodied in the Briggs Plan was further enhanced by the role of the military forces. At all times they were used to support the civil power, and were controlled by that power. Military operations in Malaya were, during the period after 1952-53, of predominantly platoon or section sized operations acting on Special Branch intelligence and away from the populated areas. It was the police, or home guard, who were responsible for law and order in populated areas, not the military forces, although the presence of soldiers had a certain morale value to the people, giving them a sense of security. By having the military forces under civilian control, greater flexibility could be achieved in reacting to district or state pressures. The fact that the MRLA had been forced into the jungle meant that, with projects such as food denial, large scale military operations were not necessary. The MRLA lost the military initiative early, were forced into small groups and, due to poor communications and leadership, were unable to make a co-ordinated effort to retrieve this advantage. Whereas the MRLA units were confined to a given area, the security forces had

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<sup>31</sup> Barber, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-6.

<sup>32</sup> Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

the advantage of rapid communications and flexibility to be able to concentrate in a given area until it was declared 'white'.

The other factor which the Briggs Plan took into account was the narrow base of the MCP. Briggs was aware that the squatters were being coerced into supporting the MCP and MRLA, and knew that once the squatters were established in new villages, MCP influence would be mostly destroyed. With Communist influence removed from the squatters little support would be available from the rest of the population. 'The Government was fortunate that the Communist movement was identified with the Chinese and was therefore regarded as alien by the Malay population,'<sup>33</sup> and did not have support from the Malays as a race. In fact, even the Chinese did not support the MCP to a marked degree. For example, 95% of the MRLA were Malayan Chinese, of whom 40% spoke the Hakka, or kheh, dialect of south China, and another 20% spoke the Hainan Island dialect, Hylam. So 60% of the MRLA strength was drawn from a little over one fifth of Malaya's Chinese population.<sup>34</sup> The support which the Communist party could rely on was only from a small proportion of the Chinese population, and was clearly defined. This meant that the Briggs Plan had a definite target at which to aim when the supporters of the Communist party were to be uncovered. In fact, Chinese support for the British was made obvious when, in February 1949, Sir Chen Lock Tan founded the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) which, by 1950, was assisting in resettling squatters and rehabilitating surrendered enemy personnel.

The Briggs Plan will be remembered for the new village programme. The success of the programme can be seen as the symbol of the whole counter-insurgent role of the plan. The editorial in the *New Republic*, dated 22 May 1961, gives the reason for the success of the new village programme. 'The Chinese in Malaya' it states 'were primarily employed in rubber plantations and in the tin mines. The "squatters" who had turned to agriculture to supplement their income and who proved the most available collaborators for the Communists did not have a way of life that held them by sentiment and mystique to a particular place. Thus when the British introduced the new village

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<sup>33</sup> Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>34</sup> *Insurgent War Selected Case Studies, Chapter 2*, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969, p. 11.

programme under which the squatters were brought together in new communities which could be isolated from the terrorists, there was some complaining but not the extreme reaction of a people whose way of life was altered. . . .<sup>35</sup>

The Briggs Plan evolved, and was adapted to the situation current in Malaya at the time. It incorporated much which would have been introduced, plan or no plan, but did co-ordinate all the decisions and put them to effect. In so doing, the Briggs Plan adapted itself to changing conditions, which were peculiarly Malayan. In the final analysis, the Briggs Plan can be seen as a method of countering a certain type of insurgency. Whether the plan as a whole (although one cannot deny its basic principles) could be transferred into another scenario is open to conjecture. ❧

#### MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the January and February 1974 issues of the journal to:

January: Major Warren Perry ('General Sir John Monash') \$10.

February: Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Johnson ('The Need For An Australian Amphibious Force') \$10.

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<sup>35</sup> Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet Nams*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1963, pp. 340-1.

# BOOK REVIEWS



## STRATEGIC THINKING AND ITS MORAL IMPLICATIONS.

Edited by Morton A. Kaplan, (University of Chicago, 1973).

*Reviewed by Colonel P. C. Gratton*

*Army Office, Canberra*

**M**AD is the acronym for Mutual Assured Destruction, a term used to describe roughly, if aptly, the nuclear policies of the two super-powers in the late 1960s. These policies have been enormously costly, yet are unsatisfactory in many ways, and to a degree logically absurd. That the two nations could reach such a position is partly due to the apparently insoluble dilemmas inherent in nuclear confrontation, where each opponent must base his strategic position on what he estimates the other will do. If each could only be certain of the other's moves, both could co-exist with low level nuclear forces. But no such certainty exists, and each is obliged to react to improvements real or imagined in the other's position. The result has of course been the spiralling and incredibly costly nuclear arms race, which, SALT notwithstanding, seems about to enter yet another round.

MAD, or any other policy of nuclear deterrence, inevitably raises serious questions of morality. Bearing in mind the traditional just war criteria of avoidance of injury to non-combatants and 'due proportion', the question must be asked whether it is acceptable for a nation professing to be defending higher human values to base its defence on threats to the lives of millions of civilians, and the possible destruction of the very fabric of its society.

This and other questions are given a thorough airing in Kaplan's new book, in the form of a debate between strategists and anti-strategists. In this context strategists are those theorists advocating the type of deterrence policies followed at present, and undertaking strategic analysis

to substantiate their claims. They are represented by Kaplan himself and Paul Wolfowitz, both political scientists. The anti-strategists, for want of a better term, are those who consider that all strategic analysis is not only immoral, but downright dangerous, in that it is inaccurate and misleading, and inevitably causes further escalation in the arms race. Phillip Green, author of *Deadly Logic, The Theory Of The Nuclear Deterrent*, puts the anti-strategist view.

The models and methods of analysis of the strategists come under fire. Green insists that as they do not accurately portray the real world, they are positively misleading. By appearing to be based on scientific method, and by incorporating scientific trappings such as matrix presentation and the liberal use of mathematical probabilities, they assume an authority and influence that is quite undeserved. The strategists do not really disagree with this, and readily admit that their models are only approximations of the real world, and certainly should not be used *in isolation* by decision makers. They argue with conviction however that their models are essentially heuristic in nature, and an invaluable aid in strategic analysis.

A more important but equally inconclusive issue is the matter of rationality. Deterrence theories by their nature must assume some degree of rational behaviour by the protagonists. The anti-strategists claim that this is an unrealistic assumption, and that rational decisions will simply not be forthcoming at times of severe national crisis. Theories such as limited retaliation are therefore unrealistic and dangerous. The strategists reply that the object of their strategies is to create so convincing a deterrent that little rational thought is needed, and anyone but a raving lunatic would be deterred. They point out moreover that minimum deterrence, the alternative offered by Green, requires far more rational behaviour than does a MAD policy. Green is quick to return however that to seek such an overwhelming deterrent is to pursue a phantom, since in the process the nuclear balance becomes so skewed that the opponent must take corrective action.

Green also challenges some of the underlying assumptions of the strategists' position. He is particularly concerned that no conduct is absolutely prohibited in achieving ends that are unlimited. In other words, given the possession of nuclear weapons, the strategist can always postulate a military solution for any goal, no matter how limited its real importance. Even with the suicidal risks inherent in nuclear confrontation, the strategists never advocate abandonment of a position.

Due proportion goes out the window, and military solutions are divorced from political realities.

Paul Ramsey, a theologian, offers an ethical analysis, which he terms 'mytho-poetical', of both the strategist and anti-strategist positions. While conceding many of the anti-strategist points, he believes both they and the strategists are in error. The latter assume unlimited international animosity and prepare only for the worst; the former prepare only for the best in a world of unlimited international trust. Nations do have a moral responsibility to ensure their own survival, and in a system in which expectation of the opponent's response is a primary causal force, some mid-way policy should be found. He demonstrates the logical absurdity and immorality of a permanent MAD policy, and seems to suggest that some form of counter-force deterrence is the least immoral of the immoral alternatives offering. From this dilemma, Ramsey concludes that the central issue for strategic thought in the next generation should be to address the problem of how what is morally right in war and deterrence can be made feasible.

The book of course reaches no conclusions, nor was this the intention. Despite some elegant arguments from Phillip Green, his case is hard to sustain in entirety, and Kaplan's concluding and very brief chapter on Moral Primitives is well if not very subtly directed. What has been done is to present some thought provoking ideas, and to air the principal issues in nuclear strategic thinking today. And lest at times the reader feels that it is all too academic, it is worth re-collecting that the dilemmas discussed here in such detached academic fashion are harsh reality in the real world, and are at this minute causing the two superpowers to continue the nuclear arms race apparently unabated and at staggering cost. ❧

MAN IN ISOLATION AND CONFINEMENT, edited by John E. Rasmussen (Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1973).

*Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Skelton, Australian Army Psychology Corps, Director of Personnel Research and Psychological Services, NZ Defence HQ, Wellington.*

FOR the behavioural scientist, this book fulfils a need for a comprehensive survey of research on human behaviour under conditions of isolation and confinement. It is also likely to be of interest, however, to others interested in applications of psychology relevant to Defence.

Psychological research in this area, most of which has taken place during the last twenty years, was initially stimulated by the concern with 'brainwashing', that arose from the Korean War and been sustained by the technological advances that have allowed men to enter into isolation situations previously unattainable — in remote places on the earth's surface, under the sea and in outer space. Defence behavioural science research establishments, particularly in the USA, have been prominent in research in this field from the start. It is worth noting that the Australian Army Psychology Corps has also made a significant contribution to isolation research through its studies of individual performance in ANARE (Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition) groups since about 1960.

In view of the prominence of military researchers in this field, it is appropriate that this book should have had its origin in a NATO Human Factors Symposium on Man in Isolation and/or Confined Space. The editor and most of the chapter authors are (or were) military psychologists — mainly with the US Navy, which has been in the forefront of research in this area over the past fifteen years. The various chapters clearly illustrate the variety of research strategies; ranging from the observation of groups in isolated 'real-life' field settings (for example, Antarctica and the Sealab underwater habitat) to highly controlled laboratory studies of individuals and groups in isolation; and the interplay between basic and applied research necessary to achieve increased understanding of the complex behavioural phenomena involved.

Most of the chapters should not prove too difficult for interested general readers, but those without any special training in the behavioural sciences could well be daunted by the scholarly but highly technical review of experimental work on sensory and perceptual deprivation which appears early in the book. For this reason, such readers would be well advised to turn straight from the editor's introduction to the final chapter by Dr Walt Wilkins, where they will find a lucid overview of the book's subject matter; this should prove an adequate guide to enable them to follow their own specific interests amongst the various chapters of the book. ❧



# Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

## Women in the Army

Since the publication of my 'Open Letter to Female Officers'\* in the September 1973 issue of *Army Journal*, I have taken the opportunity to observe at first hand the organization and operation of women in the armies of the United States and the United Kingdom. This experience has emboldened me once again to recommend most strongly for the Australian Army to act now to give its women the opportunity to contribute equally in all fields of service. This action would give the Australian taxpayers more value for their money from the 1,000 women now serving. Also, our army would earn recognition for an equally enlightened policy with the world's major military forces.

Notwithstanding the negative attitude of some incognizant male and female officers, these changes will inevitably come to the Australian Army. Also, notwithstanding the equally inevitable protest from those officers, allow me to state a few facts.

The United States Army has implemented a plan to increase the number of servicewomen from the present 20,000 to approximately 50,000 by 1979. Women are now being trained for and employed in 90% (434 out of 482) of the Army's Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Army-wide training requirements and performance standards have not been lowered. These changes have been brought about by the realization of women's ability to perform effectively many tasks previously considered beyond their capacity or 'inappropriate' for their sex. US Army manpower planners have come to realize that a trained soldier is just that; a person motivated to do a job, trained to do it and capable of doing it.


The British Army's commonsense utilization of women in Northern Ireland is a continuation of their distinguished contribution to active defence that has long been rated so highly. Many other nations,

including, presciently, the Communist nations, have realized the worth and value of female troops and are employing them most wisely.

Organizationally, the Australian Army already has a head-start to a fully integrated force. We have wisely avoided organizing our women into separate units for the purpose of command and control. Unlike the US WAC or the British WRAC (both of which are formed into companies of women), our female troops are on unit establishments of the corps by which they are employed. This gives us a chain of command directly related to employment and allows for greater operational flexibility, particularly at unit level.

The time is now for the Australian Army to achieve full effective use of its excellent personnel resources. The dual goals of equal opportunity and operational efficiency must go hand in hand. The Army must consider not only what it can do for women, but also what women can do for the Army and our national defence. Presently, we are not asking them to do enough.

Victoria Barracks  
Paddington, NSW

Captain L. J. Gregson 

\*This article to be republished in an early issue of US WAC Journal—*Editor*.

### **Monash as Administrator**

There is always the possibility that January issues of the *Army Journal*, more than other months perhaps, may at best be hastily skimmed by readers returning from holidays. Hopefully this letter might encourage those yet to read Major Warren Perry's commendable essay on 'General Sir John Monash: A Glimpse at His Career and Methods of Command' (*Army Journal*, January 1974, pp. 22-39) to do so, and invites those who have already read it to reflect on Perry's concluding thought that:

The scientific analysis of Monash's methods of command for training purposes has hardly yet begun.

This call by Major Perry for a fresh look at the place and meaning of administration in our army and defence training system is no idle semantic exercise. Look at *Army Training Instructions* (ATI) if you will, and the dearth of administrative training guidance, except for ATI

2-10, and then look at the Joint Services definition of Administration. We compartmentalise Administration with administrators at our peril.

Perhaps we need to consider modifications, at least initially at regimental staff level, to our administrative training system.

*Lieutenant Colonel A. R. Howes* ✕

Department of Defence (Army Office)  
Canberra

### **It's Time For A Change**

With reference to the article by Captain Beveridge (*Army Journal*, December 1973) I wish to submit my suggestions regarding the Army uniform:

- The present polys and greens with suitable modifications are good and adequate for all military purposes.
- The tie is only a nuisance and contributes nothing to efficiency or military bearing. If we must have something around the neck for, say, mess functions, then a white silk cravat should be sufficient.
- Discard the lanyard — regimental badges provide enough discrimination. The RAAF has had no need for either lanyards or badges to maintain *esprit de corps*.
- Introduce the cloth pin-on collar badges for all ranks, and dispense with the present methods. Surely the only persons really interested in the visible indication of rank are those in face-to-face conversation.
- Retain the slouch hat for ceremonial dress only. And I like the idea of jungle greens for parade ceremonial dress — they create the impression of a fighting force.
- Delete the present heavy peaked cap and introduce a light-weight soft-peaked style khaki cap as the uniform headgear.
- Retire the winter battle dress and greatcoat. Polys and khaki bush-jacket with insertable liner would be lighter and more comfortable.

- Present mess dress is uncomfortable. Polys and the bush-jacket, minus liner, with the white silk cravat if desired, could make the evening more enjoyable.
- If a new uniform must be designed, let it be by consultation with the men who will have to wear it, not by some *couturier*, whether of international repute or otherwise.

OCTU

*Captain M. Hutchins* ✂

E Comd Trg Gp

# From The Past

## FEMALE SOLDIERS

After this procession which consisted altogether of about eight thousand women, well armed and clothed, had passed, the King asked me to go and see what his women soldiers were about to perform. I was accordingly conducted to a large space of broken ground, where fourteen days had been occupied in erecting three immense prickly piles of green bush. These three clumps, or piles, of a sort of strong briar or thorn, armed with the most dangerous prickles, were placed in line, occupying about four hundred yards, leaving only a narrow passage between them, sufficient merely to distinguish each clump appointed to each regiment. These piles were about seventy feet wide and eight feet high. Upon examining them, I could not persuade myself that any human being, without boots or shoes, would, under any circumstances, attempt to pass over so dangerous a collection of the most efficiently armed plants I had ever seen. Behind these piles already mentioned, were yards or large pens, at the distance of three hundred yards, fenced with piles seven feet high, thickly matted together with strong reeds. Enclosed therein were several hundred slaves belonging to the King. It may be well to state that this affair was entirely got up to illustrate an attack upon a town and the capture of prisoners, who are of course made slaves. After waiting a short time, the Apadomey soldiers made their appearance at about two hundred yards from or in front of the first pile, where they had halted with shouldered arms. In a few seconds the word for attack was given, and a rush was made towards the pile with a speed beyond conception, and in less than one minute the whole body had passed over this immense pile, and had taken the supposed town. Each of the other piles was passed with equal rapidity at intervals of twenty minutes, after which we again returned to our former station in the market place. Here we found his Majesty waiting for us. He anxiously inquired how I was pleased with the performance of his female soldiers, and asked if I thought the same number of English women would perform the same. I of course answered, *No*, we had no female soldiers in England; but we had females who had individuality and voluntarily equally distinguished themselves ★ ★ ★ I may be permitted to make a few remarks on the Army of women. It is certainly a surprising sight in an uncivilized country. I had, it is true, often heard of the King's female soldiers; but now I have seen them, all well armed, and generally fine strong healthy

women, and doubtless capable of enduring great fatigue. They seem to use the long Danish musket with as much ease as one of our grenadiers does his firelock, but not, of course, with the same quickness, as they are not trained to any particular exercise, but, on receiving the word, make an attack like a pack of hounds, with great swiftness. Of course they would be useless against disciplined troops, if at all approaching to the same numbers; still their appearance is more martial than the generality of the men; and, if undertaking a campaign, I should prefer the females to the male soldiers of this country. From all I have seen of Africa, I believe the King of Dahoméy possesses an army superior to any sovereign west of the Great Desert.—*Duncan's Africa*.

—*Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 February 1848.