


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# ARMY JOURNAL

No. 294 NOVEMBER 1973



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# ARMY JOURNAL

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Editor C F Coady

Staff Artist D E Hammond

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**COVER:** 'From the O Pip', Bougainville 1945: a pen and wash drawing by war artist H. F. Abbott at the Australian War Memorial. Looking down on the many activities of a camp, the Officers' Mess is the long building centre back, with the kitchen at the rear. Two soldiers are drawing water from a local-pattern well, consisting of two 44-gallon drums sunk to a suitable depth. In the immediate foreground are the tents of the transport lines.



# ARMY JOURNAL

*A periodical review of military literature*

**No. 294, NOVEMBER 1973**

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
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*(Australian War Memorial)*

Guns of all description which were captured from the Italians during the Libyan Campaign in early 1941.





# The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on International Society

*Lance Corporal P. A. Pedersen*

ON 6 August 1945 an atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later a similar weapon was dropped on Nagasaki. On 7 November 1952 a fusion bomb was detonated in the Pacific. The dominance of international politics by nuclear weapons was now confirmed. The two faces of international society, war and peace were profoundly altered. Pain and damage became important strategic concepts and the old Clausewitzian definition of war became obsolete. Society assumed new structural forms. Doctrines on the use of force were re-evaluated for the nuclear age. Alliances assumed a new complexity. The factors of uncertainty and instability became all-important: for example, what were the implications of a spread of

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nuclear weapons? If it was undesirable, how could it be prevented, especially in the case of countries such as Japan and West Germany who were but a technological stone's throw from a nuclear capacity. These are the questions that shed light upon the impact of nuclear weapons on war and international society. Aron has stated the situation as follows:

... weapons like the tools of labourers, are at the same time the reflection of a society and one of the factors that shape it.<sup>1</sup>

### **Nuclear Weapons and War**

War is a basic expression of international society. It can achieve ends beyond the reach of diplomacy or rendered impossible by the breakdown of the diplomatic system. But nuclear weapons have altered this. It is no longer a case of 'when the politicians fail then call the generals in'. The destructive capacity of these weapons has been the most important cause here. Indeed, this capacity hangs over every aspect of international society. It was an element new to human history as a whole. This was driven home in 1952 by the detonation of the world's first hydrogen bomb. It caused the complete disappearance of the small island of Elugelab on which it was exploded. In its place 'was left an underwater crater over one mile across and about 175 feet deep at the centre, or, as was publicly stated, large enough to hold fourteen buildings the size of the Pentagon'.<sup>2</sup> That such a weapon revolutionizes war should be readily apparent: advances such as the machine-gun, tank and aeroplane are minuscule in comparison

Nuclear weapons have introduced pain and damage as viable strategic concepts. Previously 'coercive violence' had not been decisive before military victory was achieved. Even during World War II the policies of strategic bombing and blockage were inadequate for the task. For,

airplanes could not make punitive, coercive violence decisive in Europe, at least on a tolerable time schedule, and preclude the need to defeat or destroy enemy forces as long as they had nothing but conventional explosives and incendiaries to carry.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> R. Aron, *The Great Debate — Theories of Nuclear Strategy* (Anchor, N. Y., 1965) p. vi (Introduction).

<sup>2</sup> B. Brodie, 'The Advent of Nuclear Weapons' in Smith and Johns (eds.) *American Defence Policy* (2nd ed., John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968) p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> J. C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966) p. 17.

The nuclear age ended this. The atom bombs dropped on Japan 'were weapons of terror and shock. They hurt, and promised more hurt, and that was their purpose'.<sup>4</sup> They were of little military value to the US but in the civilian sense they did much. The result of Hiroshima was a threat aimed at all of Japan: 'the political target of the bomb was not the dead of Hiroshima or the factories they worked in, but the survivors in Tokyo'.<sup>5</sup> They represented violence on the country itself, not merely an attack on Japan's industrial strength. This was the significance of the bomb and the age which it ushered in.

The dimensions of war were changed. An enemy could be destroyed within an hour of the button being pressed. The significance of this is enormous:

to compress a catastrophic war within the span of time that a man can stay awake drastically changes the politics of war, the process of decision, the possibility of central control and restraint, the motivations of people in charge, and the capacity to think and reflect while war is in progress.<sup>6</sup>

Previous wars have been fought on the principle that in order to penetrate an enemy's homeland to impose one's will on his nation, one must first destroy his military capacity. During World War I, the Allies could not impose a peace treaty on Germany until they had defeated her army. In World War II, Hitler could not invade England because he had not defeated the Royal Air Force. This concept is now obsolete. The sequence of warfare has been reversed and this has one important consequence. It means that deterrence, perhaps the basis of contemporary international society, 'rests today on the threat of pain and extinction, not just on the threat of military defeat'.<sup>7</sup> Hence war, a basic precept of our world, has changed and with this alteration in strategic doctrine comes changes in society itself.

### War and Diplomacy

All-out war is no longer feasible. But what of the ends which wars generally achieve? How are they to be realized now? Nuclear weapons have reversed the classic Clausewitzian definition of war. Now, it is no longer the continuation of diplomacy by other means; rather, diplomacy and more especially coercive diplomacy by the nuclear

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<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, p. 23.

powers, has taken on a warlike appearance. The aims of warfare are being pursued by other than violent means. The situation, greatly simplified, is that of two superpowers, each of which must fear that,

the temporarily stronger contestant will use its superiority to eliminate the threat from the other side by shattering military and economic pressure or by a war of annihilation.<sup>8</sup>

The possibility of the latter is remote. Hence international society has been reduced to each giant watching the other with suspicious eyes. They make every effort to preserve their military forces as this is all they have to count on. Could SALT, the possible counter to this argument, have been agreed upon if there was a nuclear disparity between the US and USSR? SALT merely limits missiles: it says nothing about the number of warheads they can carry and thus the basis for suspicion is preserved. In other words, contain or be contained, conquer or be conquered, destroy or be destroyed, become the watchwords of the new diplomacy.<sup>9</sup>

It has only been in the last few years that this situation has really changed. The visits of Nixon and Brezhnev to each other's homeland are symbolic of this US-USSR *détente*. But it is made possible by the nuclear arsenals of both countries. Indeed their nuclear weapons form an ever present backdrop to the thaw in relations between them and this cannot be forgotten by either side.

### **Nuclear Weapons and the Structure of International Society**

In past international systems the correlation between the military component of a country's power and its achievement in foreign policy has been of decisive significance. In this respect the nuclear age has introduced new features which make it impossible to explain the new system solely by reference to the systems of the past. Thus the effects of nuclear weapons are evident in the structural side of international society.

From the Second World War to the end of the 1950s this society was bipolar. Only two states had the capacity to destroy each other and everyone else (although not immediately after 1945). Only they had the economic and military resources that allowed them a world-wide presence and influence. Hence world tension was really confined to the tension between these two states. Each had its own

<sup>8</sup> H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y., 1968) p. 362.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, p. 362.



vision of a future world order which it did its best to promote. In the bipolar system,

each great power exerts hegemony in its camp but the intensity of the rivalry often puts the hegemonial master at the double mercy of its rival's moves and of its client's or servants blackmail.<sup>1</sup>

Since 1960 this has been complicated by the large number of nation states that have emerged since World War II, for it is only during this period that they have begun to assert themselves in international society. China has exploded her own bomb. The gap between the military component and objectives has widened. For new means that by-passed the nuclear question were found in order to achieve important objectives:

conquest, invasion, direct aggression and the struggle for territory have lost their appeal in a world in which hedgehogs, the organized resistance of a people, can wear down lions, and in which the peril of escalation 'depresses' even conventional war prospects in such a way as to foster self-restraint in each super-power....<sup>2</sup>

Thus there has been a reduction in the operation of power: the superpowers suffer from an inability to use that ingredient that puts them above all others. In other words there is a tendency towards a modified polycentrism, a world with several great powers, some of whom may not necessarily have nuclear weapons. The latter are termed great powers not only because of their own strength but, ironically, because of the weaknesses nuclear weapons impose on the superpowers themselves. Perhaps we are heading ultimately for a kind of nuclear multipolarity where there are three or four major nuclear powers instead of the two that exist at present. Should China develop a strong nuclear capability she may be able to wrest influence from the USSR and lead a concrete 'third world' instead of the loose conglomeration of second-rate powers associated with this term at present. Thus nuclear weapons have had an important bearing on the structure of international society. They have been partly responsible for the two changes in that society since World War II and as the numbers of such weapons increase there is likely to be this third change from a modified polycentrism to nuclear multipolarity.

It can be argued that these structures already existed before the second world war. During World War I the German group opposed Britain and France and it was the same in the 1939-45 conflict. How-

<sup>1</sup> A. Buchan, *A World of Nuclear Powers* (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1960) p. 92.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 94.

ever, these seemed to be restricted to Europe. There was no conscious feeling of the necessity to be on one side or the other. The US, for example, stayed out of World War I until 1917 and World War II until the end of 1941. This has changed. Today countries tend to feel involved — long range destruction makes protection a motivating factor here — so that it is virtually impossible to stay aloof. It is in this sense that bipolarity and multipolarity apply. A strong China, however, may change the situation again, introducing a new set of conditions for consideration.

### Force in the Nuclear Age

The use of force has undergone fundamental changes in the nuclear era. How does force affect behaviour today when compared with its role in the pre-nuclear age? There are four areas affected here: peace-time diplomacy, crises, conventional war and nuclear war. The existence of thermonuclear weapons has forced the superpowers to review their position. Under the old 'balance of power' structure, they could be expected to be constantly opposed to each other and perpetually seeking support from other countries. But war was a central and indeed essential part of this concept. However, both superpowers want to avoid a nuclear war, an over-riding link between them that is a pressure for *détente*. Hence they seek to control the instruments of force, the nuclear weapons, while ensuring that there is no commensurate loss of power by one *vis-à-vis* the other. This control reduces the likelihood of a general nuclear war and has manifested itself in the partial test-ban treaty, the 'hotline' and the SALT talks. All this says Halperin 'must be attributed entirely to their [nuclear weapons] destructive potentialities'.<sup>3</sup> And Khrushchev himself realized the danger when he said 'the atom bomb recognizes no class differences'.<sup>4</sup>

Fear of thermonuclear war has led to both sides trying to avoid situations of intense political crisis. They have refrained from pressing political advantages that might upset the military balance and have taken care to avoid a direct conventional confrontation, especially since the Cuban affair of 1962. This is opposed to previous eras when the dominant power would not hesitate to use this power to correct a situation that it felt was abnormal. Britain, France and Russia are

<sup>3</sup> M. H. Halperin, *The Role of Force in the Nuclear Age* in Smith and Johns, *op. cit.* p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 19.

examples here. But the superpowers have taken an extremely cautious approach to crisis situations. They seek to contain quickly any spontaneous crisis. Even in a crisis induced by a superpower, such as in Cuba, a desire to end the conflict as quickly as possible can be seen after a certain point. It is not that the superpowers do not seek political advantages from such situations, rather that 'their willingness to manoeuvre and to seek political advantage has been severely limited by the nature of the overall military balance'.<sup>5</sup> Because of this fear of nuclear war and the desire to end conflict quickly, local conventional military power which can be brought to bear rapidly has tended to be critical in crises such as Hungary or Cuba. However, neither side seems to attach much probability to the likelihood of a large-scale conventional war along the lines of World Wars I and II. The possibility of its escalation has rendered this remote. But local conventional wars in which the superpowers generally have an indirect role have increased and assumed a new prominence and significance. They are, an instrument of international political change and have become, to a large extent, the ultimate arbitrator of political conflict because nobody wants to use the real, ultimate weapons, the nuclear weapons.<sup>6</sup>

Hence a fantastic paradox emerges, for 'total ideological conflict plus total means of destruction have produced a situation in which a total solution is impossible'.<sup>7</sup> War cannot be abolished for there will always be issues for which men feel are worth fighting. But war in its modern context leads to such destruction that it is not worth fighting. Thus force has assumed new forms in international society. Simply speaking, it is dominated by a reluctance to use it — certainly in a direct confrontation. Czechoslovakia-type operations are always possible however, and local wars will constitute part of the world scenario for many years to come. It is generally through these methods in some cases and resistance to them in others that the superpowers can exert military pressure to see their aims realized.

Aron supports this. He feels that 'the most truly effective if also the least visible, influence of [nuclear] weapons is reflected in the extreme caution that the Big Two have exercised in relation to one another . . .'.<sup>8</sup> Hungary occurred at a time when SAC was at peak strength and the Soviet strategic missile force was relatively weak. The US would have

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>8</sup> Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 26.



had a crushing superiority over the USSR. Yet there was no intervention. And though elections were looming and Suez was in full swing 'it does not seem likely that, even if circumstances had been different, the US would have intervened in Hungary, or that Western Europeans would have clamoured for it'.<sup>9</sup> Neither the US nor the USSR wants war. However, each wants to make life as difficult as possible for the other and exploit any difficulties the other is having. Even during the 1950s Khrushchev was careful not to provoke any crisis with the US which might lead directly to war. Those incidents that were provoked were carefully controlled. Hence nuclear weapons have imposed several restrictions on the use of force, restrictions which the relative impotence of yesterday's weapons made impossible to exert.

### **Nuclear Weapons and the Smaller Powers — Alliances**

Alliances have undergone a series of changes during the nuclear era. Hoffman has expressed one aspect of change:

the impact of nuclear weapons exacerbates the strains that have always marked contractual ties between nations.<sup>1</sup>

But conversely, the existence of nuclear weapons makes alliances more necessary than ever: a clear commitment to some form of retaliation seems the only way to protect allies and provide deterrence. However, several counter factors exist. In the first place,

... too rigid a commitment may give the smaller ally too much of a hold on its protector, and create among the smaller allies the fear of being dragged against their will into adventures in which their interests could be crushed or ignored, and in which their existence could be obliterated.<sup>2</sup>

If a balance of power exists, the smaller allies will harbour doubts about their protector's willingness to carry out an obligation that may result in its own obliteration. Then again, the dominant power may restrict its allies freedom of action by resisting moves that may threaten the nuclear balance. But there does seem to be an increased dependency upon the superpowers. This was illustrated by the Suez crisis of 1956. It showed that,

powers like France or even Britain (minor 'nuclear power' though she is) have little discretion in the conduct of their affairs even toward a minor country, if the latter is backed up by the nuclear threat of its protector.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>1</sup> Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

<sup>2</sup> Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

<sup>3</sup> J. H. Herz, *International Politics in the Nuclear Age* (Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1962) p. 175.

There are other factors to consider here. The superpower depends upon these smaller allies for bases and support. Such bases incur grave risks for the nation providing them. Hence it seeks to influence the superpower as much as it can, demanding at least consultation — 'no annihilation without representation'<sup>4</sup> as the British have said. They tend to want US bases as guarantees of US involvement and US troops in Europe to act as hostages, but on the other hand they do not want them as their presence might pull them in and make them possible targets of nuclear attack. Hence alliances have become much more complex and delicate since the advent of nuclear weapons. They involve a didactical relationship, especially in NATO. Would the US defend Europe today, for unlike the 1950s she can be annihilated herself? In view of European vulnerability would it want American defence? What would happen if the USSR demanded neutrality from the European powers, threatening them with nuclear attack while she attacked US troops there? These are some of the questions which emerge from this complexity and in many cases they are unanswerable.

In relation to these smaller powers a paradoxical situation has emerged — a product of the nuclear age. For while they are ultimately dependent on the superpowers for their protection, their importance in the world has increased as a result of their non-nuclear standing. Indeed an uncommitted 'Third World' nation seems favoured today. In the immediate context its absence of commitment lessens the risk of its becoming involved in a conflict while remoteness or backwardness may render it less worth a big-power attack. Compared with their larger or aligned brothers, these units have a wider area over which to manoeuvre. It is interesting that Herz says they 'may now have more of a chance to provide their inhabitants with protection than superior and even nuclear powers possess for theirs'.<sup>5</sup> In many cases, though they may be inclined towards one camp, their position is strong in the diplomatic sense as well. They can enjoy the benefits of being extremely powerful conventionally but once they join the nuclear club they slide down the scale for they join it as its weakest and smallest members.

Thus to some considerable extent, nuclear weapons have hamstrung the superpowers and given the middle powers a much greater freedom of action than previously. But the dependence of the latter on the superpowers for their conventional armoury has arrested this

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 175.

<sup>5</sup> Herz, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

decline in nuclear importance to a certain degree. The superpowers still have the final say.

### **Restraints on Nuclear Weapons**

New methods of restraint have been introduced and the old ones overhauled to give them credence in the nuclear context. The conditions under which nuclear weapons were introduced themselves provide a restraint. Their advent 'has taken place in such a way that none of the new nuclear powers would have been able to gain a significant advantage by using its atomic weapons'.<sup>6</sup> Hence the US had a defensive strategy governed by the Russian conventional threat to Europe. Russia has never had a first-strike capability against the US. France and Britain have no enemies necessitating the use of their nuclear capacity. China, faced by a powerful US and a hostile USSR must remain prudent. The military establishments themselves have provided a new restraint in the form of flexible response. They have strategies which enable them to proceed several rungs up the ladder before the rung of nuclear holocaust is reached. As Hoffman says:

the superpowers have provided themselves with a kind of protective cushioning that allows for collisions without catastrophe.<sup>7</sup>

The nuclear taboo — the fact that these weapons have not been used since 1945 and the threat of their use for expansionist purposes has never been laid down — is itself a new form of restraint.

### **The Problems of Instability and Uncertainty**

International society has also been altered in other fields by these weapons. The element of danger has become both permanent and instantaneous.<sup>8</sup> In the past, aggression has rarely proved decisive since time has always allowed the marshalling of forces for a counter-attack. This is no longer the case. Countries will fight with what they have at the start of hostilities, hence we get an arms race to ensure that what they have is adequate. An element of uncertainty has been introduced that limits planners to educated guesses on the effects of war. The weapons have never been tested under actual wartime conditions. Hence, What would really happen in the event of a massive attack? Would the command and communications networks remain intact?

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<sup>6</sup> Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>8</sup> See Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 187.



Would the leader of a half-destroyed country insist on revenge rather than try to save part of his nation?<sup>9</sup>

These imponderables have affected the concept of stability. Politically the international system since 1945 has been afflicted with a radically different sort of instability than that up to 1939. The conflict among the victors gave rise to the Cold War with nuclear weapons as its dominant theme. Ideological rivalry was heightened by the imbalance between their arsenals; *de facto* territorial boundaries in Europe were tolerated but not officially recognized; competition for the allegiance of non-aligned countries increased. The possibility of war arising from miscalculation or accident became a sober fact of life. In spite of the present *détente* vestiges of all this still remain.

### Deterrence

Deterrence as opposed to defence has assumed a new prominence. It is essential in the nuclear context to persuade an enemy that the risks of attack are greater than the prospective gain. Retaliatory capacity has become important. Hence today we see the superpowers limiting the invulnerability of their weapons in order to decrease the pressure on them to mount a first strike.

### Proliferation

Finally, proliferation must be considered, for through it nuclear weapons have had and will continue to have their most dangerous impact on society. Some smaller powers may feel that their acquisition will give them a new freedom, an independence from the superpowers. But this is not necessarily the case as the Suez affair has shown. The independence they afford is minimal. What is important however is the impact of proliferation on society. If India acquired nuclear weapons then Pakistan would feel she needed them; the developments in China have increased the desire for them in India and Japan, even though in the latter case this desire is still small. It could make the solution of political problems impossible as countries might feel they were unable to act because of the risk their weapons impose on them. Should smaller nations acquire them there is no guarantee that one may not act as a 'maverick'. Such a nation, whatever the consequences for the world at large, might be inclined to utilize its nuclear capabilities for the attainment of the most narrow, but to it the most vital, objective. The world would be at the mercy of this nation, or more specifically

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, p. 213.

the power-group within it that controls these weapons. Though his country might be exposed to annihilation, if it was led by a Hitler or Mussolini, who would be willing to call the bluff? Hence 'proliferation would introduce formidable new dangers into the international system and further weaken it at its weakest point'.<sup>1</sup> And Herz comments:

Among all the various possibilities of future development, this is the most unpleasant to envisage, and at this point it seems to be the most likely to materialize.<sup>2</sup>

### **The Sino-Soviet Split in the Nuclear Context**

Together with the Cuban crisis the Moscow-Peking rift symbolizes the shadow that thermonuclear weapons have cast upon diplomacy. These problems and the responses to them have perhaps set a precedent:

Never before have the giant powers had so much trouble containing their small and weak neighbours but never before have the countries in possession of the decisive weapon been so determined not to share their secrets, even with their closest allies.<sup>3</sup>

It is difficult to determine the degree to which nuclear arms have been the determinants in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Despite close co-operation between the two countries (which included Russian assistance in the development of a Chinese nuclear weapon) the USSR did not support the Chinese over Quemoy and Matsu, operations which ended in resounding failure. Khrushchev 'was not anxious to let the recklessness of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage drag him into an adventure against a "paper tiger with atomic teeth"'.<sup>4</sup> From 1960 on, the two powers stood poles apart on most issues.

The problem lay in the Chinese adoption of policies which Moscow regarded as dangerous. It was a particular case of what seems to be a general rule:

Whenever the diplomacy of an ally risks triggering a nuclear conflict, the principal partner in the alliance will reassert his monopoly on nuclear weapons or, failing this, will invoke discipline in matters of strategy.<sup>5</sup>

But this does not go completely in one direction. The superpower has to grant concessions. Hence Khrushchev allowed Eastern Europe increasing autonomy in areas ranging from collectivization to industrialization. China would have gained these concessions had she been prepared to accept the discipline of Russian strategic doctrine. The Sino-

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<sup>1</sup> Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Herz, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>3</sup> Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 227.

Soviet split illustrates the problems of both non-nuclear and superpower in the nuclear age. It shows the new complexity of alliances and the problems of protection for the smaller power, and self-protection, indeed self-preservation, for the superpower. Other factors, namely ideological differences, have played their part in causing the split but essentially 'the break dealt with the very essence of international relations, the matters of strategy and weapons'.<sup>6</sup>

### Conclusion

This then is the impact of nuclear weapons upon international society. Their destructive capacity has made a rethinking essential. The character of war has been so transformed that its objectives have to be sought by peaceful means. Hence diplomacy has been restructured as has the international society of the nuclear age. The use of force is now more carefully defined than previously. Alliances have become more complex and the smaller powers under them enjoy perhaps more independence than in bygone years. New restraints necessitated by these weapons have emerged and deterrence has become an important consideration. Proliferation is a problem that threatens to destabilize international politics and hence increase the chances of global nuclear war. The process does not stop here. The SALT talks and the *détente* between the conflicting powers may have lessened tension. However, the nuclear backdrop is still there and though its influence may have become latent, it will continue to dominate international society. □

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 228.



# ***Is an Army Career Still Worth While?***

*General Maxwell D. Taylor  
United States Army (Retired)*

**W**HILE reluctant to draw general conclusions from a few cases, I must confess to having detected of late unmistakable indications among some of my young Army friends of lowered morale and sometimes of a disturbing (for me) questioning of the value of a military career. The prime cause, although not the only one, appears to be the popular disesteem into which the armed forces have fallen and the anti-military bias which permeates a large segment of the public. To members of the armed forces, and particularly of the Army, there seems to be an organized campaign of defamation of the military and of the men who wear the uniform. Such treatment is hard to bear for dedicated soldiers proud of their profession who have returned from the dirtiest, most unpleasant and least glorious war in our history, never defeated by the enemy but rarely applauded by the nation which sent them into that war. It is not surprising that a few are wondering whether a military career is still worth while.

I would be inclined to view this attitude as a mood which would pass quickly had it resulted from the usual kind of anti-military feeling which in the past has often followed our wars but has shortly disappeared. The war just over is always the most senseless and unjustified of history, to the citizens who have been required to participate in it, and the professional soldier who remains in uniform at war's end becomes the symbol of their recent unhappiness.

At the close of World War II, now often cited as a relatively popular war which enjoyed unified national support, I was not infrequently booed in public because I wore the uniform of the Army 'brass' who for the moment it was fashionable to denounce. My contemporaries and I did not enjoy this kind of treatment any more than do today's

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*From ARMY magazine February, 1973. Copyright 1973 by Association of the U.S. Army and reproduced by permission. General Taylor was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1955-59 and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962-64. His distinguished military career, which included command of the 101st Airborne Division in World War II and the Eighth Army during the Korean War, was followed by service under two presidents as an ambassador and adviser.*

veterans, but we accepted it with at least a modicum of philosophy in recognition of the fact that anyone who gives his life to the military service must expect some boos as well as plaudits, resigned to being a hero today and a bum tomorrow. Certainly lack of public gratitude never led many of us to reconsider our commitment to a lifetime military career. But the difference now is that the Vietnam veterans have never had their day as heroes. Few can remember a band playing when a Vietnam Johnny has come marching home.

There are other differences, too, in the current vendetta against the military, new factors which I do not believe have existed before. In addition to being the symbol of a particularly unpopular war, the Army is held responsible for drafting unwilling young men and forcing them to fight and sometimes die in an 'immoral' war. It is held liable for most of the brutalities and cruelties of that war as it has been portrayed by press and television. The tragedy of My Lai is taken as irrefutable evidence of war criminality deserving the Nuremberg kind of justice meted out to Hitler's lieutenants. Few respected voices have been raised to defend the Army, although it is an institution which ultimately guarantees the preservation of our Constitution and the American system based upon it. If such slander goes unrefuted and leads good men to decide against the worth of an Army career, it is national security which suffers the major loss.

Nevertheless, regardless of the justification for resentment, I would urge my Army friends not to take too seriously the adversities of this bleak period. Like truth crushed to earth, the record of Army achievements in Vietnam will eventually rise and overcome the present animus and, while awaiting this change of public heart, we can do well to review that record to restore confidence in ourselves.

The Army has much to be proud of—let us never forget it. From the time they landed in Vietnam in 1965, Army units provided defense for many of the principal military bases of the country, and no such base was ever lost to the enemy. They contributed mobile strike forces which destroyed major enemy units wherever found and in the many combat actions which ensued never lost a battle. In conjunction with the South Vietnamese, American forces inflicted such losses on the enemy in the prolonged ground campaign that the Viet Cong are no longer a military threat and the North Vietnamese have lost their capability for sustained offensive action.

Army achievements have not been limited to combat. Its technical

units are responsible for the construction of the vast logistical system—airfields, posts, highways and telecommunications—which has made possible the projection of American military power throughout this remote, underdeveloped country. As a result of its timely construction in phase with the arrival of American forces, those forces never lacked for the facilities, supplies and equipment needed to perform their tasks. When the war is over, much of the permanent construction, such as the great port of Cam Ranh, will be of inestimable value to the peacetime economy of Vietnam.

In the long run, the Army's most important contribution may have been in advising and training South Vietnamese forces. It has been a long and often discouraging task which involved training our allies to cope with conventional, guerilla and terrorist warfare, training often conducted in insecure areas exposed to the bullets and bombs of the enemy. But the end product has been the success of Vietnamization and the replacement on the battlefield of American soldiers by South Vietnamese. The armed forces of South Vietnam, now numbering almost a million men, are henceforth a most significant political and military factor in the power balance of Indochina—a source of strength not only in the field but also at the negotiation table.

I mention these achievements not in a boastful spirit but to remind Army men inclined to despondency that they should be of good cheer; their record is a sound basis for pride in the past and confidence in the future. And let us not be timid in speaking up when our service is under attack. At this moment, we need the voices of our friends, particularly those out of uniform. As Edmund Burke said: 'When bad men concert good men must associate.' Now is a time for an association on the part of friends of the Army.

So much now for ruminations over the past. What are the prospects for the future? For an Army career to have continued importance, there must be a role of continued importance for the Army in national life. While that role may change in many ways in the coming decade, with the many threats to our national values which are to be anticipated, I have no doubt as to its enduring importance.

It has been apparent since World War II that the scope of national security is widening, that it has come to connote far more than the protection of the national values, interests and assets by the armed forces from foreign military threats. These valuables, as I shall refer to them, have increased in number and are scattered more widely about the

world than in times past. They include intangibles such as principles, alliances, reputations, national unity and national morale. Some are institutional—our Constitution and the government, society and the economic system based upon it. Others are spiritual and intellectual—ideals, leadership, brain power, culture, science and technology. Still others are tangible and material—our wealth, investments, trade, currency and natural resources. All such valuables require protection wherever found; they are the proper objects of concern of an adequate national security.

Apart from the increase in their number, our valuables are exposed to threats in varied forms, many of which do not involve military means or methods. The threats include acts of war in their traditional forms, but also the tactics of cold and irregular war—propaganda, psychological, economic and guerilla warfare, political subversion and terrorism. Also of late, we have become aware of the dangers arising from social and environmental factors such as excessive population growth, pollution and the despoiling of natural resources. In combination these non-military forces and environmental factors constitute a potentially powerful reinforcement to the internal threat to the American system of which we have become aware in the course of the Vietnam war.

If this evaluation of the expanding scope of our security is reasonably accurate, it strongly suggests a widened role for the Army and the need for Army leaders of broad perspectives—who can shape flexible, versatile forces with a ready adaptability to a spectrum of threats extending from nuclear war at one extreme to subversion and environmental plundering on the other. They must learn from the Vietnam conflict without falling into the mistake of preparing to repeat it. A review of its lessons will tax their ingenuity to separate wheat from chaff, abiding truth from transitory appearance. I hope that they will remember that we Americans are a volatile people and that many things which today we insist we will never do again, we will find ourselves repeating tomorrow. I often recall how quickly we put aside the slogan of 1953; 'No more Koreas,' to accept involvement in South Vietnam in 1954.

Without attempting to forecast the many problems the new Army leadership will confront, I would like to mention a few which seem to me the most pressing.

The first is obvious: the need to restore the pride and confidence of the Army in itself and, in so doing, to regain the national prestige

which it has enjoyed in better days. While some of the wounds from which our service is suffering are the doing of others, we ourselves are responsible for not a few, and these should receive our first attention.

The first step would be to purge the Army ruthlessly of marginal people, to enforce a standard of excellence for officers, noncoms and soldiers regardless of the limitation on the final size that such a standard will impose. The major advantage of the all-volunteer Army, as I see it, is the opportunity to eliminate the malcontent and the substandard, and to replace them with people who are, or show promise of becoming, loyal soldiers capable of doing their part in carrying out the increasingly complex Army missions.

The payroll cost of a volunteer force will be so high that we will not be able to afford a large Army; either a shortage of dollars or of volunteers, or of both, will impose a reduction in size below the level which the importance of the Army mission would justify. But I, for one, would accept such a reduction without complaint, feeling like Gideon that a few reliable men are more likely to defeat the Midianites than a horde which included 'the fearful and afraid'.

There must be quality not only in Army personnel but also in their equipment and in the military environment in which they live and work. With respect to their environment, I am thinking not primarily of the comforts of the barracks or the variety of stock in the post exchanges but in the quality of life to which a soldier is exposed and the standards by which he learns to live. Army life, in my view, should not be an extension of the civilian life which lies just over the fence of the military reservation, but something quite different which reflects the unique requirements of military life.

I am unalterably opposed to the concept that the Army is merely a segment of American society which wears a uniform but which otherwise should live as nearly as possible as civilians live. That standard is not good enough for the military profession which, like the church, the law and the medical profession, has a special commitment which requires special standards of behavior. Newton D. Baker, President Wilson's secretary of war, in defending the West Point honour system, eloquently expressed the need for military standards different from those accepted in civil life:

Men may be inexact or even untruthful in ordinary matters and suffer as a consequence only the disesteem of their associates or even the inconveniences of unfavorable litigation. But the inexact or untruthful soldier trifles with the lives of his fellowmen and the honor of his government.



To accept the truth of Secretary Baker's view, one has only to reflect on what the conduct of one platoon leader at My Lai has done to the reputation of the Army and the honour of the United States.

If the Army insists that its men must live differently from their fellow citizens, it should be able to explain why these differences are necessary. A convincing reply must show that the difference is one arising from the special requirements of a profession which must be ever ready to use disciplined violence to oppose an armed enemy in response to the lawful order of the President. Any military habit or custom is defensible if it reinforces that purpose; it is indefensible if it works against it. The purpose is strengthened by those things which improve readiness and effectiveness in combat, create esprit de corps, induce confidence and respect for leaders and comrades, and imbue men with an appreciation of the importance of their mission. It is weakened by those things which undermine discipline and loyalty, alienate officers from their men, create internal cliques and cleavages, and destroy the public's confidence in their armed forces.

How does this philosophy provide guidance as to what traditional Army practice should be preserved and what is 'Mickey Mouse' and should be discarded? How much spit and polish is too much?

I must say that I cannot get excited over such current issues as the length of a soldier's hair. The historical record as to the merits of the case affords little guidance. Samson's downfall resulted from lack of hair, Absalom's from too much. Civil War generals who look to us like hippies apparently won battles as readily as their closer-shaved successors of later wars. But I can defend a lot of spit and shine on the basis of the effect of the personal appearance of a soldier on the taxpayers who support our armed forces. No citizen can believe he is getting his money's worth of protection from a soldier whose slovenly appearance shows lack of respect for himself, for his unit and for his service. I agree with that judgment. If this is support for 'Mickey Mouse', make the most of it!

Inevitably, the quality of the officer corps establishes the standards of the Army. I have an uneasy feeling that something is missing nowadays in officer-soldier relationships. One hears so much about difficulties of communication between commanders and their men that I must assume the difficulty is real. But one wonders whether there is any barrier which cannot be overcome by the officer who is deeply and

sincerely concerned about the welfare of his men. Such concern cannot be feigned; it must be the real thing.

Is it beside the mark to suggest that, in the present emphasis on advanced academic degrees for officers, there may be a loss of officer interest in such prosaic things as the fit of a soldier's shoes, the health of his family and his need to understand the why of the military orders he receives? I have always admired the code of the old-time cavalry officer which decreed that he must first look after his horse, then after his men, then after himself. I hope that some similar code will survive in this bright, new Army we are contemplating—something that recognizes that an officer's insignia of grade is not a badge of privilege but one of servitude to his men.

If to Army ears all this sounds like sermonizing on the obvious, I offer the excuse of an old officer who loves the Army and owes much to it. *There is a permanent quality in the appeal of military life which I wish I could convey to a young generation of Army men who have not yet grown to sense it.* At the same time, I would like to strengthen the dedication to Army life of the older men who, as a result of Vietnam, may have come to doubt their profession.

So many of the satisfactions of Army service are beyond the here and now of today's tribulations and disappointments. There is an enduring value in military life which has appealed to men of a special sort throughout the ages. Such men have found the pleasure of association with comrades of a common motivation and life style who seek their rewards not in money but in difficult tasks discharged among congenial spirits in an environment of danger. They have sensed the feeling of growth and expanding capacity which arises from the wide variety of their duties, opportunities and places of assignment. Many have borne the awful responsibility of commanding men in battle and have reaped the compensation of sharing in the camaraderie of arms which unites men of all ranks and backgrounds who have together endured hardships and dangers in a common cause.

These are but some of the lasting values of a soldier's life. Like the ruler, prophet, priest and judge, the soldier represents a primordial social function which must be performed by strong men if civilization is to survive. The function may change in mode but not in essence. To fulfil it will always require many of the best citizens of any nation. □



# MILITARY SOCIOLOGY ?

*Captain G. L. Hulse*  
*Royal Australian Engineers*

ONE of the 'in' words which has gained popularity in the 1970s is SOCIOLOGY. It's a nice word — rolls off the tongue, sounds good, and gives the utterer an air of knowledge. Sociology is becoming increasingly important in every aspect of human relations, and this includes housing, assimilation of differing ethnic groups, and recognition of root causes — their effect and probable reaction in relation to problems involving the human race. Any wonder why sociology sounds good. A study of sociology reveals that much information about a group of people can be gleaned from some simple principles. This group can include a township, a nation, or just people with a common interest, such as a social club. The sociological information which is available in any group can aid in recognizing current or potential social problem areas, assist in avoiding the problems for the future and indicate how to overcome present social problems. Some simple principles required to start sociological investigation are that the subject group needs to be recognized as a group; the group's individual activity with each other is known; and the group's activity with external or 'other' groups can be observed. Such a group within Australia's society is the Army.

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*Captain Hulse enlisted in the ARA in 1960 and served with 2 RAR and 3 RAR in Malaysia (1962-64) as a junior NCO. On graduating from OCS Portsea he was allotted to the RAE and after completing the Officers Basic Engineering Course at SME in 1965 was posted to 2 PIR, Wewak as assault pioneer platoon commander until 1967. A period with 24 Construction Squadron followed until April 1968 when he was posted to 1 Field Squadron in South Vietnam. On his return he went to SME. From January 1971 he was OC of the mine detecting dog research wing at SME and while here wrote the article 'We're Going to the Dogs' which appeared in the September 1971 issue of Army Journal. In January 1973 he was posted to 1 Field Engineer Regiment as adjutant and is still in this appointment.*

Recognizing the Army as a social group in Australia's society is easy. An 'Army wife' is a well known term and one which includes princesses and commoners alike. An 'Army brat' is one seen by 'non-Army brats' as the being which haunts those mystical looking Army villages. The Army, in social terms, includes Army families with their special problems, and not just soldiers and military hardware. The Army society works and lives in its own social infrastructure and has many contacts with external or civilian groups. This means that the Army society can be sociologically analysed as one which is unique, and develops itself to suit current problems as it makes contact with 'outsiders', and from inside pressures. Since national defence puts pressure on the Army for certain defence requirements, and these in turn create social problems for Army families, it remains for the Army to practice sociology on its own society and not rely entirely upon civilian sociological authorities. It would be imperative of course for a military sociological authority to work with civilians in their respective social fields. But the fact remains, the Army recognizes and has taken steps to create a sociological service which is geared to analysing the Army society's problems, and making positive observations which are brought to the attention of commanders who are capable of taking remedial sociological action. Why is this necessary?

Under the current organization, a soldier's problems are referred to his platoon level commander in the first instance. Theoretically, problems beyond the ilk of the junior leader are passed through the *chain of command until the answer is produced*. Information is being passed up and back, and while it may improve the general knowledge of officers at various levels, it may be changed in interpretation and the soldier may get 'the wrong drum'. Then we have the Chaplains' Department as an alternative who are always willing to receive the soldier who has been told to 'tell it to the padre'. In fact our chaplains are probably more sociologically minded than most officers.

The soldier's family is cared for by a mixture of civil social welfare, Army family liaison organizations and semi-official Army village type news bulletins. This means that the Army considers a soldier's family important enough to have some sort of backing in order to keep the soldier and his family happy in the service. The organization as it stands now works well enough, but it is robbing the Army of essential information for the future. Most of the information gained from officers working for soldiers is kept in the officer's brain,

and the overall service does not receive the benefit of this knowledge, on an organized basis. Good for lots of individual officers — not so good for the service. Recently a group of officers visited various commands explaining the role of an intended 'Community Services Project', and while this is a step in the right direction, it has certain limitations which are based on seemingly set down criteria. Sociology has no limitations, the criteria is as broad as the human relations involved within the society, and any strengths or weaknesses are recognized and acted upon for the betterment of future members in the society. Therefore, it is essential that executive level personnel have a knowledge of sociological processes and background. Executive level means all officers. To become conversant with sociology, officers should be encouraged to read widely on subjects in this field, and to participate in community services projects as they occur. To give a very broad background of sociology the following brief history and methods of sociological investigation are offered.

### **A Brief History of Sociology**

There are literally hundreds of sociological champions who have made a place for themselves in the field of sociological philosophy. The few mentioned here are only presented to give a general coverage of sociological thought.

Plato lived in Greece from 429 to 347 B.C. He examined the theory of establishing the ideal state on the assumption that the quality of society could be judged from the quality of its individuals. His philosophy was that if the individual was given the opportunity to better himself in such things as religion, physical fitness, mental activity and appetite, he would be more responsive to group organization and co-operation. Greece is the birthplace of democracy.

Aristotle was a Roman philosopher who lived between 384 and 322 B.C. His ideas were closely aligned with Plato's, however Aristotle used an organic approach in that he referred to 'heads' of state, 'arms of the law' etc. He wrote a book which is entitled *Politics* and this book was used as a sociological reference for centuries later.

Jesus Christ brought about a new sub-culture based on the equality of men in the eyes of the Maker. Christianity has survived almost 2,000 years and provides the basis of individual rights in the 'free' world.



Since the time of Christ, there have been numerous philosophers and sociologists who have contributed theories for the betterment of their societies in the USA, USSR, Britain, Europe and Mediterranean countries. Two particular sociologists are Frenchmen Charles de Secondat Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (Montesquieu 1689-1755) and Auguste Comte (1798-1853).

Montesquieu wrote over thirty books on sociological thought entitled 'The Spirit of the Laws'. He believed that a society can not be gauged by the merits of its deeds in any one particular point in time; but by conducting a comparative analysis of a society's historical background which has led to the current acceptance of political, social, religious and generally ethnic characteristics. Montesquieu pointed out the importance of historians in the accurate recording of historic facts, so that over a period of generations a 'national character' could be generalized in relation to particular aspects within the social complex.

Auguste Comte is said to have coined the term sociology in order to distinguish it from other disciplines such as philosophy, history, etc. He thought this to be necessary because by the eighteenth century certain facts about individual human behaviour (later psychology) had become apparent and could now become a 'positive' science. Positive sciences include mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology. Comte reasons that because sociology is a science dealing with human beings in contact with each other, it will become increasingly complex as people begin to design things for people and not for aesthetic value. Thus in time, sociology will become the central influence of every form of planning for people, and is destined to become the single most important science for people who deal with other people. Comte must be admired for his foresight, because there are not many enterprises which do not affect people. Engineers, architects, ecologists, psychologists, medical doctors, military forces are only a few of the groups who deal with people in the final analysis. How they fare in future years will largely depend on their knowledge of the group for whom they are in business. Comte divided sociology into static and dynamic laws and although a division is made, the two 'laws' interact with each other. One static law of society is the psycho-sympathetic pull of the family group on an individual. Although the individual is held as the linchpin of a society, if the family group can be reached by a social influence, then the chances of motivating those individuals within the family group in favour of this social influence are strong. Social Dynamics is the

co-operation and interaction of the family groups in order to develop and improve the overall society or community.

### **Modern Methods of Sociological Investigation**

Since Montesquieu and Comte, many schools of sociological thought have arisen. Some of them are listed here for interest only:

- The Geographical and Environmentalists.
- The Organic and Evolutionists.
- The Formalists.
- The psychological school.
- The economic school.
- The anthropological school.

It does not really matter to which school of sociological thought one aligns oneself due to the main aim of sociology which is: 'to understand, pinpoint and examine social phenomena in an effort to recognize social causes and effects, and then to recommend or bring about potential solutions based on researched or assumed sociological facts'. The investigatory methods by which this aim can be maintained are as varied in as many different forms as any other scientific method of investigation. However, by and large, sociological data can be gained from five main methods of investigation which are:

1. *Questionnaire and Interview.* This method is probably the most widely used. It requires the filling out of a form or the eliciting of information by an interviewer in direct contact with his subject. This is not a good method if used alone, due to either party's bias, misinterpretation or psychological problems between interviewer and subject, or between the subject and his attitude towards putting his information on paper.
2. *Case Study.* This method is normally used where an in depth investigation into an individual or group is required. The case study can aid in recognizing the causes of problems and their effect in relation to the reaction behaviour of the individual or group being studied. The questionnaire and interview method can be used in conjunction with the case study if co-ordination is required between the individual or group's known history, the information gleaned from referees, and the subjects' own admissions.

3. *Social Survey.* This method can be used to examine overall social problems confronting groups of people, or societies at large. It can point out the strengths and weaknesses of a society and isolate causal social problems. Once isolated, the problem can then be identified and appropriate action taken to remedy it, avoid it, or warn the society of its nature and danger. The data required for a social survey must be gained from as close a representative of a cross-section of the community as possible. Ideally every individual in the group being surveyed should be contacted both in individual confidence and as a group interview.
4. *Sociometry.* This method attempts to identify and measure those social influences which attract people and those which repel. This method is used mainly in observation of children at play, but can be applied to any group of people be they at work, play, or in a housing situation. Once the attractions are established as being generally accepted as such by the majority in the group being observed, and the repulsions analysed, a flexible equilibrium can be established and be reckoned as being the 'norm' for a particular point in time, or criterion of social acceptance. The observers using sociometry as a method of sociological investigation should preferably be detached from the group they are observing, but be people who have had experience in a similar group under similar circumstances.
5. *Statistics.* In time, most methods of investigation provide such a weight of data material, that the information required becomes either inaccessible or too time consuming to elicit. A way around this problem is to arrange the information into a relative system, so that quantitative categorizing will enable a mathematical analysis to be undertaken. In this way, information can be expressed in terms of percentage influence, by graphs, or by arithmetical deduction. Statistics can become useless unless some form of qualitative and quantitative expression is offered to the reader before the statistics are read.

The five main methods of sociological investigation mentioned here can be put to good use in every unit in the Army. There must be countless interviews between soldiers and key officers in the Army daily. By and large, the information raised at these interviews is retained by the officers as 'experience' — or forgotten. If the pertinent points

raised in this valuable direct soldier/officer contact were put on to paper (yes, I know — another piece of paper warfare), a unit would, over a period of time, build up its own number of case histories which would not march out with the soldier's personal file, or the officer's brain when they left the unit. A CO would be able to call for statistics on any form of sociological service such as the AMF Relief Trust Fund, or problems in removals, and then back up his information with case studies.

Let me explain this further. Imagine a piece of paper designed to show a member's regimental particulars, the type of service the member has applied for (TRA, removal etc), the problems and complaints the member has in relation to the services applied for, and the interviewing officer's observations. The number of services on one piece of paper could be as many as the layout would allow showing relevant dates and brief background information. As members of a unit apply for certain assistance, the officer who advises on rights and limitations etc. — say a company level 2IC or unit Adjutant — would note the basic application on his interview sheet. If the application was successful or otherwise, this information would be put on to the sheet in the form of a brief explanation. If the member had any constructive points or complaints he wanted to raise, the main gist of these would be noted, and followed up by the interviewing officer's comment. If this method of sociological data collation was maintained over a period of say twelve months, case studies of individuals could be undertaken, and statistics on the value of the services applied for raised.

But how would these statistics help the Army? If we take a hypothetical example of applications for AMF Relief Trust Fund Loan and we were to note that over a period of twelve months some thirty applications were lodged by members in the unit, we could quickly compute how many applications were successful or not. We could also see how long it takes—on the average—for certain types of applications to be processed, and any main faults in the system where applications were not processed correctly due to administrative mishandling. The example quoted here is the Relief Trust Fund, but it is applicable to any other service available to a member. In the instance where those thirty applications for financial assistance in our hypothetical example were successful, it would not be good enough to accept that the system must be functioning well and leave it at that. We should interview some of the thirty to see if the assistance did in fact, assist or not, and try to draw

out any information which may help to improve the service. This could be another way that the Army would be assisted in the provision and implementation of benefits to members, especially if the sociological data sheet were an EDP form capable of donating information to the memory bank of a computer. The work of committees of inquiry into service conditions would certainly benefit from this.

In becoming sociologically minded about our soldiers we must realize that what we do to that person will eventually affect his family. With single men the problem is not serious. Married men are a different proposition. Whether we like it or not, the day is past when a wife is considered as a long term kitchen hand and general baby producer with prattle to talk about and very little to think about. Today's women are thinkers who are more likely to accept marriage as being a long term and binding contract involving two people equally. In short, try to convince a soldier that he ought to re-engage, without convincing his wife, and you are probably wasting your time if she is 'anti-Army'. How do we overcome that? It is not easy, but the least we (the Army) could do would be to give every wife (especially newly married) a book on general information about the Army. Such general information should include, the reasons why a soldier requires to gain qualifications on courses of long duration in far off places for promotion or skill pay, the DFRB benefits after the qualification period, a general rundown on the procedure for removals with provision for telephone numbers for authorized direct contact; who to contact in her husband's unit if an emergency occurs at home; some general information on the various corps and why an engineer sapper, an infantry private, an armoured corps trooper etc, are the same rank but have different names. I suppose the general information could go on and on until an encyclopaedia would be required, but, here is an opportunity to use a sociological method of investigation to find out what a soldier's wife wants to know about the Army.

Sociology is not a passing fad. In the last thirty years the study of this subject has gained such momentum that large business corporations and governmental institutes in the USA and Europe now have university qualified sociologists employed full time to ensure that what they produce has *people* as the main consideration before they implement or design anything for human usage. This trend has arrived in Australia and is *gaining momentum*. Army officers must be aware of sociological trends and progress, especially if it is intended that civil



areas be placed under military control through the actions of war. This does not mean that any Army officer need be an expert on the subject, but a requirement exists that he/she be conversant with sociological philosophy. Perhaps the time will come when 'military sociology' will become a subject at officer production schools. □

### MILITARY AND NAVAL AUTHORS

Late years have introduced a new species of authorship to the world to which it has been indebted for much interest, considerable amusement, and a certain quantity of valuable information. Those works are the penmanship of military and naval men — two classes of society, among whom it was once the fashion to ridicule all authorship, and not an individual of whom would have dared to lift his head without a blush, at the mess or in the ward-room, if he had been found guilty of writing the *Iliad* or the thirty-five plays of Shakespeare. But this folly has fortunately passed away, and we have now all the advantage of the opportunities which a service spread around the globe gives to intelligent and lively men of telling us a thousand things which we should never otherwise have known, of telling them with the freshness of eye-witnesses, and, what is scarcely less valuable, of telling them with the freedom, ease, and vivacity of men engaged in the most animating of all professions. But we must acknowledge that we greatly prefer their journals, narratives, and tours to their novels. The construction of a clever romance is not for every man: what is more, it deprives us of the especial object which we have in view in the works of the soldier and sailor: it wants the reality, the truth, the newness, the substance which we long for in everything, and which we expect from them *par excellence*.

*Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 December 1842. (Reprinted from *Blackwood's Magazine*).

# Training for Leadership: An Approach

*Major N. J. Braun*

*Australian Army Psychology Corps*

MAJOR W. L. H. Smith in his article 'Leadership and the Australian Army Officer' (*Army Journal*, February 1971), points to the emphasis which the Australian Army nominally places on leadership qualities in the selection, training and professional advancement of its officers. Leadership qualities are seen as important in officer candidate selection. Leadership theory is taught at RMC, OCS and OCTU, whilst an officer's leadership qualities are assessed annually in his Confidential Report.

This matter of leadership concerns officers of both the ARA and the CMF. Training leadership has perplexed the staff of OCTU Southern Command since its inception. As so much of an officer's time is concerned with leading and directing the activities of his men, this subject is of great importance for OCTU students. Yet such an important, though rather intangible and difficult to define subject, has received rather unsatisfactory treatment in the past. Discussing and lecturing on the qualities necessary to make a good officer (and leader by implication) were considered by students on review of courses to be of little or no value.

The approach outlined by John Adair\* presented a breakthrough for the development of a concentrated leadership course appropriate to OCTU students. His is the functional approach which indicates that the leader is the one who, by virtue of his personality, knowledge and training, is able to promote the functions necessary at a given time to enable a group to achieve its task and to hold it together as a working team. Officer cadets acquire their knowledge of this subject of leadership in a number of ways — by absorbing and observing the general tone and atmosphere of the unit, by observing the example set by their officer

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instructors, by filling command appointments during all aspects of training, by the discussion of leadership with their senior instructors, platoon commanders, guidance officers, and among themselves by the example of fellow students with prior relevant experience.

The functional approach to leadership training differs from the assumptions and theories underlying traditional approaches. The qualities approach is perhaps the one most commonly held to leadership and is encompassed in the widely held general idea that leaders are 'born', not 'made'. There are certain inborn qualities, such as initiative, courage, intelligence and humour which together predestine a man to be a leader. By the exercise of willpower, itself seen as an important leadership trait, and the rough tutorship of experience, some of these qualities might be developed. But the essential pattern is given at birth.

Although this qualities approach contributes positively to an understanding of talent for leadership, it has disadvantages for leadership training. First, there is no real agreement upon what are these qualities which will enable a man to dominate his fellows in any situation. The reader can check this lack of agreement in Table A, where he may compare the lists of leadership traits advocated by various armed services in the western world. Secondly, reference to the table indicates 'courage' and 'initiative' as common traits. But all soldiers, regardless of rank, need to be brave and resourceful. There are many soldiers who possess both courage and initiative but who in no way could be called leaders. Thirdly, the qualities approach is ill-suited to act as a basis for leadership training. Intrinsically, it hardly favours the idea of training at all, but concentrates on selection. It implies that the ability to recognize a born leader is all important, and attempts to train leaders are viewed with suspicion.

The evidence supporting the Situational Approach suggests that leadership is a relationship that exists between persons in a social situation, and that persons who are leaders in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in another. The man who becomes the leader in a group depends upon the particular task, the organizational and environmental setting. For example, let us imagine some shipwrecked survivors on a tropical island. The soldier in the party might take command if natives attacked them, the builder might lead the work of erecting

• Adair, John: *Training for Leadership*, Macdonald & Company, London, 1968.

TABLE A: COMPARATIVE TABLE OF LEADERSHIP QUALITIES

<i>US Marine Corps</i>	<i>US Army</i>	<i>Field Marshal Lord Harding</i>	<i>RAF College</i>	<i>British Navy</i>	<i>Field Marshal Lord Slim</i>	<i>RMC Canada</i>	<i>Australian Army (leadership 1957)</i>
Integrity	Bearing	Fitness	Efficiency	Faith	Courage	Loyalty	Loyalty
Knowledge	Courage (physical and moral)	Integrity	Energy	Courage	Willpower	Professional competence	Sense of honour
Courage		Courage	Sympathy	Loyalty	Judgment	Courage	Sense of responsibility
Decisiveness	Decisiveness	Initiative	Resolution	Sense of duty	Mental flexibility	Honesty	Intelligence
Initiative	Endurance	Willpower	Courage	Integrity		Commonsense	Technical knowledge
Tact	Initiative	Knowledge	Tenacity	Humanity	Knowledge	Good judgment	Courage
Justice	Integrity	Judgment	Personality	Commonsense	Integrity	Confidence	Initiative
Enthusiasm	Judgment	Team Spirit		Good judgment		Initiative	Decisiveness
Bearing	Justice			Tenacity		Tact	Tact
Endurance	Loyalty			Fortitude		Self-control	Dependability
Unselfishness	Tact			Physical and mental fitness		Honour	Endurance
Loyalty	Unselfishness			Self-control		Personal example	Enthusiasm
Judgment				Cheerfulness		Energy	Unselfishness
				Knowledge		Enthusiasm	Bearing and appearance
						Perseverance	
						Decisiveness	
						Justice	

houses, and the farmer organize the task of growing food. That is, leadership varies from member to member according to the situation.

However, this approach too has drawbacks as far as leadership training is concerned. First, it is unsatisfactory in most organizations, particularly the army, for leadership to change hands in this manner. Secondly, certain men seem to possess a general leadership competence which enables them to exercise influence over their fellows in a variety of situations. Although many attempts have been made to analyse, without much success, this general quality there is no denying its existence as a reality.

Following the approach developed by John Adair, the leadership training of OCTU Southern Command has utilized one general theory which might be termed 'a theory of group needs'. By continuing and developing this theory with the positive contribution from the *qualities* and *situational* approach, Adair produced the *functional approach*, as a comprehensive and integrated theory having significant relevance to leadership training.

To grasp 'functional leadership' it is necessary to look at the concept of group needs. If we look closely at any working group we may become aware of its distinctive corporate life, its difference from others even in the same organization. Just as individuals differ in many ways and yet share common attributes and needs, so also do groups. There are present in the life of working groups three important areas of need at any given time. There is a need to achieve the common task or purpose and this is why groups come together. Secondly, they need to be held together as a team and establish group identity. Thirdly, the individual members of a group have personal needs which must be satisfied if the group is to be fully effective. Groups are formed to complete *tasks* (e.g., to climb a mountain) which are too difficult for individuals to tackle alone, and all groups need to be held together as a cohesive team. People have to get along well enough with each other to work in harness. This is sometimes known as the *team maintenance* needs.

Individuals also bring their personal needs into the group and these needs must be met if the group is to work as a team. Example of individual needs include — the need for status, achievement, recognition, besides the more basic needs such as food and rest.

When all the needs of a group have been satisfied, the three areas

may be considered to be balanced. Imbalance occurs, therefore, when a deficiency exists. It is the primary responsibility of the leader to see that these needs are met. He is the man who, by virtue of aptitudes and training, can promote the necessary *functions* to satisfy these needs. A function in this context can be defined as any action which effectively helps the group to achieve its goal, or maintain it as a working team. Examples of task functions include clarifying the aim, providing an acceptable plan, initiating group activity, controlling the rate and quality of work. Maintenance functions include setting work standards, giving praise to the group as a whole, maintaining standards of discipline, building unit and interdependence of individuals. Any meeting of individual needs, such as providing help in a domestic problem, is also, and at the same time, a team maintenance function, as it enables the individual concerned to participate more fully in the work of the group. The key functions which the leader must perform in a military environment are outlined in Table B.

TABLE B: KEY FUNCTIONS OF A LEADER

<i>Planning</i>	<i>Supporting</i>
Getting available information	Encouraging group/individuals
Defining group task	Disciplining group/individuals
Making a workable plan	Creating team spirit
<i>Briefing</i>	<i>Informing</i>
Explaining Reason Why, Aim and Plan	Giving information to group—
Allocating tasks to group	keeping in the picture
Setting work standards	Receiving information from group
<i>Controlling</i>	<i>Evaluating</i>
Maintaining work standards	Evaluating group performance
Influencing tempo	Helping group to evaluate its own
Ensuring all actions contribute to aim	performance

The functional approach to leadership promotes a useful formula with which to assess an individual's performance as a leader. By establishing that an individual has failed to perform one of these functions in relation to a given objective, one may determine the reason for the failure of his group to achieve its aim. In essence, it serves as a basis for more effective leadership training.

Using this basis, a concentrated course on functional leadership has been developed at OCTU Southern Command. This course follows closely the outline suggested by John Adair in *Training for Leadership*. The course contains a number of sessions, four in number, which look at various aspects of the functional approach to leadership at the end of

each session. Students are asked what they have learnt of significance during the session. Their reactions to the course as a whole are also taken. They are required to state which sessions were most, and least, valuable and why.

Let us look briefly at the content of this course. The aim of the first session is to awaken thought and interest in the subject of leadership in the minds of the officer cadets. After a few words by the instructor on the importance of understanding leadership, the class is divided into syndicates to discuss the question, 'What does a leader have to do to lead?' Although the students are advised that their answer should not include a list of the qualities which a leader ought to possess, they frequently go about tackling the question in exactly this way. This suggests that in general the qualities approach is deeply ingrained into general thinking about leadership.

Generally the officer cadets are puzzled by this session. The syndicates discuss the question for about forty minutes and then the class assembles to give their reports. The instructor makes no approving or disapproving comments and only asks questions to clarify points. The students are expecting a stronger approach or even a 'DS' solution. However, the object of the session is to stimulate thought, therefore the instructor takes a minimum part. He would say in summary that they have practised some interesting points, that the course is designed to provide the answers and that is why the sessions are concentrated together.

Session 2 introduces the officer cadets to the function approach to leadership. The session is in three parts. First, the instructor delivers a lecture on the other approaches to leadership and their limitations along the lines discussed in this paper. He then introduces the functional approach and the key functions which a leader must perform in a military environment, as shown in Table B. The second part of the session is designed to practise officer cadets in the analysis of the sessions for an individual success or failure as a leader by the use of the key functions formula. A series of command tasks are given, which are carried out in turn by one syndicate while the remaining syndicates act as observers. These observers assess success or failure using an aide-memoire of functions. They have to collect evidence for their analysis and speak from facts. Action has to be assessed objectively in relation to how they help the group to achieve the task or hold the team together.

Thirdly, a debriefing is conducted to confirm that officer cadets have grasped the functional approach. Examples of leadership experienced during the observation exercise are discussed.

Students thoroughly enjoy this session. They become very involved (and enthusiastic) in the attempts to solve the tasks and their ratings on the value of the session are significantly higher than those of Session 1. In general they found the short debrief after each task the most valuable part of the session; hence they discussed in detail the functions observed, and in particular those which the leader omitted.

Session 3 gives further practice in the analysis of the reasons for the success or failure of an individual as a leader. This session consisted of a showing of the film *12 O'Clock High*, and the subsequent discussion. It is an observation exercise in which the officer cadets analyse the reasons for the success or failure of the characters portrayed in the film. They do this by checking whether or not they fulfil the leadership functions outlined in Session 2. The film compares two leaders in command of an American bomber unit based in England during World War II. In the discussion the officer cadets state why in their opinion the first leader failed and the second succeeded.

The officer cadets found this session particularly stimulating and expressed surprise that a feature film could have such value as a training aid. The analysis of the different styles of two leaders brought out considerable discussion. Cadets were able to identify themselves with the two leaders and the problems they encountered, and saw the film as a practical application of leadership techniques. For many it was a highlight of the course, and provided a vivid illustration of the general theory of the course.

Session 4 gives the officer cadets practice in dealing with some peacetime leadership problems by using their knowledge of the functions of leadership. This session takes the form of a leadership exercise *without troops* (LEWT?) and poses some realistic and practical problems which the cadets are invited to solve, diagnosing the deeper sources of the low morale of a unit and treating these rather than the symptoms. This case study method is valuable as it allows the officer cadets to scrutinize data, diagnose courses and make decisions on appropriate remedies. It sparks off plenty of discussion, and is usually rated highly by the cadets. The 'practical' approach of dealing with a concrete problem makes the session an effective one.



The final session gives the officer cadet an opportunity to summarize what he has learnt and to assess how he might apply it. In syndicate discussion, the students answer the question: 'How will you apply your knowledge of functional leadership at OCTU?' In the closing session the instructor stresses the fact that one of the aims of the course has been to give each officer cadet certain tools which he can use to deepen his own knowledge of leadership in all the activities and training exercises at OCTU, such as greater awareness and the ability to observe the 'whys and wherefores' of success or failure in all the activities of OCTU. They have been given a simple 'sketch-map' which may guide them in the exercise and understanding of leadership.

It is difficult to establish valid criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the Functional Leadership Concentrated Course. However, both the written and verbal reactions of the students involved in the course were positive and very favourable. Students were asked to evaluate not only each session but the whole course, and the strong interest suggests that the course has fulfilled its purposes. On a ten-point rating scale, the great majority made overall assessments ratings in the 7, 8 and 9 categories with an average rating of 8.1. In their written comments students saw the course as 'well balanced', 'of great value', whilst their statements on what they had learnt about leadership showed a depth of understanding of the leadership problems likely to face the future young officer. Furthermore, the informed opinion of OCTU instructors who possess experience of the type of situations the students will be required to handle supports the effectiveness of this course.

How the student will perform later as a leader is, of course, a major problem in determining the effectiveness of this course. It is usual of students to express enthusiasm and interest after an unusual course which has stimulated them with new ideas. So often, however, the novelty wanes and the enthusiasm dies, genuine though it may be at the time. Whether the officer cadet who is exposed to the functional approach to leadership actually applies, either in his own practice or to analyse other leaders, can scarcely be measured. However, the functional approach is a significant move away from the old style qualities approach of training for leadership. □



# THE NATURE OF BLITZKRIEG:

## FRANCE 1940

*Lieutenant A. L. Graeme-Evans  
Royal Australian Infantry*

### Introduction

**B**LITZKRIEG in English means 'lightning war'.<sup>1</sup> Since her creation as a Nation State in the 1860s, Germany has planned five such wars, all of which have had varying degrees of success. The first three; the Danish, the Franco and the Austro-Prussian wars were decisive. The fourth, the First World War, a modified 'Schlieffen Plan', almost succeeded in 1914, but with loss of movement degenerated into trench warfare, a war of attrition which lasted a further four years. The fifth, the Second World War, was also to be one of bluff and manoeuvre. Initially Germany was devastatingly successful; however once more she 'took on the world' and had to pay in terms of blood and misery for such ambitions.

In the past, only sea-powers such as Britain could afford to have long wars, i.e., blockades. For continental land powers such as Germany there was no option but to plan for quick wars, otherwise time

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and materiel would weigh against them. Furthermore, these wars would be the only ones acceptable to their politicians and industrialists, suggesting as it does a quick and profitable victory.

Thus the important distinction to make at this stage is that whilst the concept of lightning wars is not new, contemporary historians in the past thirty years have given the word a specialized meaning. They use it to refer to the military techniques behind only one of Germany's offensive campaigns — the most recent, the most revolutionary — the opening phases of the Second World War.

### The March of Progress

At the turn of the century the technological revolution produced the concept of total war; mass conscript armies, mass media, and the internal combustion engine. The First World War showed that the defender — in a fortified position consisting of concrete, sand-bags, barbed wire and machine-guns — had the advantage over the flesh and blood attacker.<sup>2</sup>

In the inter-war years blitzkrieg, as it became known, grew up. It was a theory of close co-operation between aircraft, artillery, infantry and armour — a highly mobile force, an all-arms team under one commander — executing concentrated thrusts rather than advances on a broad front. The concept of paralysis would be relied on as against attrition; full-armoured protection would be sacrificed for speed. Offensive campaigns conducted in such a manner, utilizing surprise, speed and initiative, promised once more to wrest control from the defender.

Such a theory could not have become a realistic proposition before the 1930s. It was at that time that crystal-controlled radios were of such a size they were successfully used in tanks and aircraft, for example, Salisbury Plain exercises 1933-34. Until then the mechanism for close co-operation — communication — was not physically possible; all-arms teams could not have been effectively co-ordinated. Tanks, adopting engineering techniques similar to the Walter Christie suspension system, could now travel as fast as lorries, and were considerably more reliable than their clumsy predecessors in the First World War. The fixed-wing

<sup>1</sup> Liddell Hart in his *Memoirs* suggests that it was he who coined the name. p. 164.

<sup>2</sup> *Europe in Arms*, Liddell Hart. 'It was the machine-gun that made infantry advance hopeless and cavalry futile. The next four years were spent in trying to overcome this obstacle.' p. 329.

monoplane, with improved navigational aids, a far more efficient engine and an improved structural design, had greater destructive potential. Wars could now be conducted with devastating mobility.


### Between the Wars

It remained for vigorous enthusiasts to convince politicians of the need to invest in such theories. In Britain, far-sighted theorists theorized, but Britain was not a buyer's market. As one author puts it 'she had more tank literature than tanks'.<sup>3</sup>

Liddell Hart in an article entitled 'The Development of a New Model Army', published in 1926, advocated that fully mechanized 'all arms forces' of division strength, geared to the pace of the fast medium tank, with a tactical, as against Douhet's strategic, airforce<sup>4</sup> flying overhead, were the armed forces of the future. Such visions were an economist's nightmare since, if adopted, would require a complete restructuring of the then conventional army's equipment tables: the cost of upkeep on anything but a small force would be enormous. Britain, who had been the leader in tank technology in the late 1920s, said 'No' to the idea of creating such a force, and merely kept on developing prototypes which, if war did break out, would be manufactured in greater numbers: her ally France could be relied on to carry out a 'holding action' until that time.

### Germany

In Germany, the most recently defeated nation, attitudes were different. The progressive nature of her army, commanded by the efficient General Von Seeckt, enabled Heinz Guderian — an astute



<sup>3</sup> *Tanks*, A. M. Low. p. 57.

<sup>4</sup> Theorists such as Douhet in his classic work *Command of the Air* and the American, Mitchell, were firmly convinced in the 1920s and 1930s that strategic airforces would win the next war: field armies would be useful only in holding actions.

student of Liddell Hart — to develop his own practical procedures in the employment of a mobile all-arms force. Having persevered with Liddell Hart's line of reasoning he was convinced that full mechanization was the German army's blueprint for success—if involved in another war. Whilst in a comparative sense the German army had a sympathetic attitude towards the adoption of new procedures into its SOPs — after all it could afford to be merely a police strength army before Hitler's accession to power — Guderian had an uphill struggle to persuade staff officers that his views were the right ones. Hitler changed things. Shortly after coming to power he was given a tactical demonstration of how the Panzer divisions would work. He, unlike leaders of other nations, was prepared to gamble on their success. At the end of the demonstration he turned to Guderian and said: 'That's what I need, that's what I want to have.'<sup>5</sup>

Guderian's wish was substantially fulfilled; his light fast tank would be the Panzer 3, his fast medium tank the Panzer 4; the training tank was the Panzer 1 whilst the Panzer 2 was introduced as an interim measure because of the delay in production of the main battle tanks.<sup>6</sup> In the air he would be supported by a tactical air force comprised of interceptors (Me Bf 109), dive bombers (Junkers 87), the medium bombers (Dornier 17 and Heinkel 111), and long range fighters (Me 110). On the ground, the 'eyes' of his divisions would be the motorcycle battalions; lorried infantry would deploy for 'mopping-up' operations.

### Birth of the Panzers

Let us now view the growth of the Panzer divisions.


In 1935 the first three (1st, 2nd and 3rd) were raised. They consisted of a Tank Brigade of 16 tank companies; a Motorized Rifle Brigade consisting of 9 infantry companies; an Artillery Regiment; an Anti-Tank Battalion; a Reconnaissance Battalion and an Engineer company.<sup>7</sup> Liddell Hart, in his memoirs, tells us that 'they had been organized on the pattern I had proposed in my 1922 paper, and my 1924 article on "The Development of a New Model Army"'.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Panzer Leader*, H. Guderian. p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> History bears witness to the fact that in the opening campaigns of the Second World War the Panzers 1 and 2 successfully executed tasks for which they were not designed.

<sup>7</sup> This intelligence was obtained from *Tanks of Other Nations — Germany*, Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum, Dorset.


<sup>8</sup> *Memoirs*, Liddell Hart. p. 270.



In 1938-39, prior to the Polish campaign, three more Panzer divisions were raised, the 4th, 5th and 6th. They had the same organization as the previous three except that a further Rifle Regiment was added to both new and old divisions. The new ratio became 16 tank companies to 12 infantry companies. At this time the German army was going through a difficult increase in size.<sup>9</sup> The cavalry and infantry corps did not take kindly to Guderian's Panzer divisions receiving all the new transportation equipment. As a consequence some of this new equipment was diverted from the forming of further Panzer divisions; instead four Light divisions were raised out of cavalry units in 1938, whilst Panzer Grenadier divisions were raised out of infantry units.

Such divisions were the scourge of Guderian, being as they were, the products of rival mobility theories.

I deeply regretted this splitting up of our motorized and armoured strength, but there was nothing I could do at the time to prevent events following their course. The damage then done could only partially be put to rights later on.<sup>10</sup>



<sup>9</sup> —See *The German Army and The Nazi Party 1933-1939*, R. J. O'Neill, pp. 92-93.

<sup>10</sup> *Panzer Leader*, H. Guderian, p. 37.

## Mobilization

On mobilization for the Polish campaign, tank battalions were reduced to three companies, one medium and two light. The fourth was left at home, being responsible for training and depot duties. The proportion was now 12 tank to 12 infantry companies.

The Panzer divisions proved to be an overwhelming success in the course of the Polish campaign. Hitler was delighted, so was his aide-de-camp for the campaign — Rommel. By the addition of 'other arms', three Light divisions were now converted into the 7th, 8th and 9th Panzers. Rommel had his wish—the Fuhrer agreed to his commanding the 7th (subsequently to be nicknamed Rommel's ghost division, since he travelled by night as well as day during the French campaign).

## Statistics

For the French campaign there were 35 tank battalions dispersed among 10 Panzer divisions: Panzer 1, 2 and 3 predominated. They were faced by an impressive array of Allied armour:

German	Allies (British and French)
Light tanks 523 Panzer 1	277 (Vickers Light, Renault AMR
96 Armd Comd veh* — (619)	35)
Light Medium 955 Panzer 2	2510 (Renault 35, Hotchkiss 35,
106 Czech 35(t)	FCM Hotchkiss 39)
228 Czech 38(t) — (1399)	856 (Somua 35, Renault D1&2, Vic-
Fast Medium 349 Panzer 3	kers A9/10 Nuffield Christie).
278 Panzer 4	54 (Matilda MK 1)
39 Armd Comd veh* ch 3.(668)	approx. 500, Matilda Mk 2, Char
HA Inf 11 tons	B1 bis)
HA Inf 30 tons	10 (Char 2C bis)
Heavy Assault (60 tons)	

\* Did not carry the main armament of their class, only machine-guns

It would be outside the scope of this article to go into the individual 'assets and liabilities' of the tanks taking part, on both sides, for the Battle for Flanders. It will suffice if I summarize the points made by J. Wheldon in *Machine Age Armies*. They are as follows:

- Germany held superior strength in only the lightest and least formidable class, the one least useful for making assaults on well defended positions.

- The Germans were heavily out-numbered in gun barrels, because the Panzer 1 was only armed with a machine-gun and the Panzer 2, of which they had the greatest number, carried a tank gun of 20-mm calibre and a machine-gun.
- The Allies had 277 tanks armed with a machine-gun; all the rest — (3,876) — carried a gun of 40-mm calibre or larger. The Char B1 carried two guns, a 75-mm howitzer and a 47-mm cannon.
- All the Allied tanks, except the A9 and A13 cruisers, wore armour thicker than their opposite class in the Panzer forces. The British Matildas I and II and the French Char B were virtually impenetrable to all German tank cannon, while the maximum thickness of the German plating (30-mm on the frontal plates) was penetrable by every Allied armour-piercing cannon.
- The only real advantages enjoyed by the German panzer troops were a relatively high cruising speed of about 15 to 20 mph on roads, long range reliability, and superior radio communications, and these obtained only against some of the Allied machines.

I think this will convince the reader that it was not through overwhelming firepower (let us leave the air supremacy factor out of it for the time being) that the Germans were successful. Wheldon does not mince words on this point:

In evaluating the blitzkrieg successes the Allied war leaders divided the credit between the German Air Force and the Panzers, crediting both with tremendous massiveness, vast numbers and colossal power of destruction... and from 1940 to the present day, politicians, generals and the writers of popular histories have perpetuated the myth that the German successes derive from 'overwhelming superiority of heavy armour'.<sup>11</sup>

### **Advanced Strategic Theories**

In essence, there was a clash of theories in France of 1940. Guderian's 'all arms force' won the day. Where British and French theory differed from that of Guderian and Liddell Hart, was in the employment of AFVs. The Allies had implicit faith in the infantryman's anti-tank gun, and moulded their armoured theory accordingly: first, they considered that the main brunt of the fighting would be carried by infantry divisions, therefore they had a requirement for heavily armoured infantry tanks that were geared to the pace of the infantryman, the

<sup>11</sup> *Machine Age Armies*, J. Wheldon. p. 82.



Char 2c bis(Fr), Char B1(Fr), Matilda Mk 2(Br), Matilda Mk 1(Br). Secondly, they adopted General Fuller's idea of independent tank forces, comprised of fast medium tanks, the Somua 35(Fr), Renault D1 & D2 (Fr), Vickers A9/10(Br), and the Nuffield Christie(Br). Ironically for the Allies very few were used in such a role at the time of need; instead they were dispersed in dribs and drabs to act as single support units; a static role for which they were never intended.

How did this happen? The conclusion we must reach is that the Allies failed to appreciate the true significance of the Wehrmacht's campaign in Poland. That,

even though it was inevitable that Germany with her new modern army would emerge as the victor, she won her fight with a fair degree of skill: Guderian's Panzer divisions had successfully put into practice Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect offensive.<sup>12</sup>

It is the persistent pace, coupled with the variability of the thrust point, that paralyses the opponent. For at every stage, after the original breakthrough, the flexible drive of the armoured forces carries simultaneously several alternative threats, while the threat that actually develops into a thrust takes place too quickly for the enemy's reserves to reach the spot in time to stiffen the resistance there before it collapses... it is high-speed 'indirect approach' to the enemy's rear areas — where his vital but vulnerable organs of control and supply are located.<sup>13</sup>

Such a technique, with its concentrated armour spearhead trading on shock effects, paralysis, and dislocation had been conclusive. This technique was not just a mere extension of the old form of tank warfare, — but a complete new theory with a limitless potential. — With the aid of technology the flexibility and range of the fully mechanized Panzer divisions were of such a magnitude that not only did they change tactical planning, but also strategic thought.



<sup>12</sup> *Weapons and Tactics*, T. Winteringham, p. 168, argues that: 'It was with an elaboration of Captain Laffarque's doctrine of infiltration that the Germans so effectively broke through the British position in March, 1918.' Perhaps it was from Captain Andre Laffarque that Liddell Hart first conceived his 'expanding torrent'.

<sup>13</sup> *Memoirs*, Liddell Hart, p. 164.

The lesson the Allies failed to learn from the Polish campaign was that when two armed nations of equal strength face each other on the ground, then the destruction of the 'will to resist' of the opposing forces can be far more successfully achieved by utilizing the psychological factor of uncertainty of location and speed of movement as against the conventional mode of bloody attritional battles. Although exceptional, Rommel's march from Ardennes to Brittany in the subsequent Flanders campaign shows how effective such principles of military strategy can be:<sup>14</sup>

His expenditure of capital was 42 dead tanks and something under 3,000 men killed, wounded or missing. The gain was nearly 100,000 prisoners and more than 300 guns, 450 tanks and armoured cars and 7,000 other forms of transport — trucks, cars and horse-drawn vehicles.<sup>15</sup>

Concerning this feat some would say he took reckless risks, others, that he was incredibly lucky. Either way it demonstrates my point — the nature of blitzkrieg. In France 1917-18 the German army had suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties in fighting over the same piece of ground. In France 1940, they covered an average of 20 miles a day, with the minimum of casualties.<sup>16</sup>

### Morale

Morale plays a significant part in the success of such strategy:

A French car came out of the side turning from the left and crossed the road close in front of my armoured car. At our shouts it halted and a French officer got out and surrendered. Behind the car there was a whole convoy of lorries approaching in a great cloud of dust. Acting quickly, I had the convoy turned off towards Avesnes. Hanke swung himself up on the first lorry while I stayed on the cross-roads for a while, shouting and signalling to the French troops that they should lay down their arms... several of the lorries had machine-guns mounted and manned against air attack. It was impossible to see through the dust how long the convoy was, so after 10 or 15 vehicles had passed I put myself at the head of the column and drove on to Avesnes.<sup>17</sup>

A French column captured by two German officers and an armoured car. This of course is an extreme example, for in 1939 the Poles, with even less equipment, had fought most courageously.<sup>18</sup> In most instances it was but two or three motor-cyclists, the scouts of the armoured

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<sup>14</sup> *Both To Lose A Battle*, A. Horne, and *Rommel*, R. Lewin, vividly portray his exploits by revamping his own letters compiled by Liddell Hart in the *Rommel Papers*.

<sup>15</sup> *Rommel*, R. Lewin. p. 26.

<sup>16</sup> Rommel's 7th Division covered in excess of 150 miles in one day in his dash towards Cherbourg. *Rommel*, R. Lewin. p. 25.

<sup>17</sup> *Rommel Papers*.

<sup>18</sup> On page 3 in his book *Panzer Battles 1939-45* Mellenthin tells that their cavalry 'charged our Panzers with sabres'.

columns who, in seizing village petrol pumps from which their foremost Panzers could be refuelled, made possible the Wehrmacht's dash across France.

### Luftwaffe

There is no denying that the German soldier was well trained and fully conversant with the capabilities and weaknesses of his equipment:

The German medium tanks were not armoured to withstand tank duelling. To cope with enemy tanks in large numbers tank crews co-operated closely with highly mobile anti-tank gun teams, and on being attacked by the enemy tanks, were trained to retire slowly through their own anti-tank screen. While this fire checked and confused the enemy, the German tanks worked round the enemy flank.<sup>19</sup>

Yet, without air supremacy, blitzkrieg would not have been possible. By May of 1940, the Luftwaffe had reached peak efficiency. First, it had profited from its involvement in the Spanish Civil War:

- Their original Me Bf 109s were underpowered.
- Interceptors needed 20-mm cannons not machine-guns.
- They had developed effective operating procedures for dive-bombers in close support of armoured columns.
- The 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, as Hitler had pointed out, could be used as successfully against enemy tanks over-running a forward air-strip, as against aircraft.

Secondly, the Polish campaign had been a full dress rehearsal for France. What it was like to be without air cover in that campaign has been vividly portrayed by one of their generals:

Every movement, every troop concentration and all march routes were taken under annihilating fire from the air... it was hell come to earth. The bridges were destroyed, the fords were blocked... continuation of the battle would have been nothing but holding out, and to have remained in position would have posed the imminent threat that the German Air Force would have turned the whole place into a graveyard, since anti-aircraft in any form were completely lacking.<sup>20</sup>

### France 1940

In the past some of our military historians and writers have not bothered to question the authenticity of the statement that, whilst the Messerschmitt was inferior to the Spitfire, it was superior to the Hurricane. In some instances this was not so; the Australian, Clisby, and the New Zealander, Kain, of the RAF, in their shooting down in the battle

<sup>19</sup> *Machine Age Armies*, J. Wheldon p. 64: for the Flanders campaign — the Battle for France — even the tank crew's blood were matched.

<sup>20</sup> *Luftwaffe*, A. Price, p. 40: General Kutrzeba: Commander of the Polish Army at Poznan.

for France of many Me-109s, adequately demonstrated that whilst the Hurricane could not match the Messerschmitt's speed and cannon-power it was more than equal to an Me 109 in a dog-fight, since it could out-climb and out-maneuvre its opponent. Indeed it was so effective that in the subsequent Battle for Britain, Me-109s were forced to hunt in pairs against lone Hurricanes: only if they achieved tactical surprise, or the odds were great, could the Messerschmitt best a Hurricane in experienced hands.

Such an appreciation casts a new light on the performance of the French Air Force in May 1940, since the Dewoitine 520 was rated by the RAF as being slightly better than the Hurricane. Dr Cordier, in his article 'Blitzkrieg in the West: 1940',<sup>21</sup> would agree with such an opinion, the 'Dewoitine 520 and the nimble pleasant handling Bloch 152 Interceptor proved a match in combat against their German counterpart'<sup>22</sup>. Why then did we lose air superiority as quickly as we did in France in 1940?

Having interviewed a war-time pilot who was there,<sup>23</sup> I consider that one of the main reasons given by Dr Cordier as to why the French Air Force was so ineffective — 'they were caught in a comprehensive change of equipment'<sup>24</sup> — to be highly spurious. In direct contrast to the British squadrons they were grounded after three days of fighting. Whilst the official reason given was that the German Vieling<sup>25</sup> anti-aircraft guns had reduced their operational strength to approximately 80 aircraft, I submit that perhaps the real reason was one of morale.

### Conclusion

The Germans won the battle for France in 1940 because they had profited from their previous campaigns, their troops were well trained, endowed with the will to win, and had, above all, up-dated their theories to meet the technological improvements of the age. They employed their armour far more successfully, carrying out bold strategic strokes for which they had been designed:

a torrent-like process of advance, either swerving round resistance or piercing it at a weakened spot — in which case the tank torrent contracts in pouring through a narrow bridge and then expands again to its original breadth.<sup>26</sup> □

<sup>21</sup> *Armor*, February 1967. 'Blitzkrieg in the West: 1940'.

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>23</sup> A pilot of No. 26 Army Co-op Squadron (RAF). They lost 14 out of their 18 aircraft (and crews) in the first five days.

<sup>24</sup> Dr Cordier, *Blitzkrieg in the West*. p. 50.

<sup>25</sup> 4 x 20-mm cannons on Panzer I tank chassis.

<sup>26</sup> *Memoirs*, Liddell Hart, p. 164.

# BOOK REVIEWS



OUR FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, by Lieutenant A. L. Graeme-Evans. Coudrey Offset Press Pty Ltd, Adelaide, 1973.

*Reviewed by Major D. N. Candow, AHQ, Canberra*

AS far as I am aware, *Our First Twenty-five Years* is a unique book. Unique in the sense that no other Australian Army unit, CMF or otherwise, has published its history on its silver anniversary. Certainly it is the first University Regiment to do so.

In writing a unit history, even when unit diaries have been diligently maintained, there must still be many difficulties and frustrations which beset an author in piecing together a unit's past activities. In this instance, without the aid of such a diary, or even a scrap-book, the task which confronted the author in collating the Adelaide University Regiment's twenty-five year history must have appeared insurmountable. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Graeme-Evans has written a book, which must surely reflect credit on his tenacity and dedication. For this, the reader and in particular every 'AURIAN' should be grateful.

Having had the privilege (and pleasure) to serve as Adjutant of the Adelaide University Regiment for two and a half years, qualifies me, I believe, to say that in themselves university regiments are a unique 'lot'. AUR is no exception. Its role, its organization and many of its problems are quite different from any other CMF or regular unit in the Australian Army. I venture to say, because so few of us have had

any association with a university regiment, that *Our First Twenty-five Years* will prove to be of interest, if for no other reason than to gain an insight into what makes a unit such as the Adelaide University Regiment the viable entity that it is. In particular, this book will dispel any myths, sometimes unpleasant, and invariably based on hearsay, which are perpetrated against university regiments.

It shows quite clearly the active part the Adelaide University Regiment has played as a unit of the CMF and, just as importantly, the way it has successfully entwined itself with the University of Adelaide and the civilian community of South Australia.

The book opens with the raising of the Adelaide University Regiment in 1948 and traces chronologically the unit's activities through its twenty-five year history. It will be of interest to the reader to learn why the regiment was raised in the first instance; to recall the international tension which still existed at that time; to realize that in 1948 there were some 1,500 ex-servicemen on the University of Adelaide Campus undertaking tertiary rehabilitation training; and to understand the problems associated with establishing the unit, of finding it a home and of getting its first recruit.

From its humble beginning, the author (himself a member of the regiment), describes, a little disjointedly perhaps, the unit's activities from its first home training parade to its first annual camp training of 80 strong, through the busy years of the Korean War and compulsory National Service training when its strength rose to 515 all ranks. He goes on to show how the unit's strength declined, though not its spirit, during the lean years which followed, until the impact of the re-introduction of National Service was again felt on the commitment of Australian forces to the Vietnam conflict. He correctly concludes by suggesting that with the repeal of National Service training in 1972 the regiment will once again go through a 're-occurring phase' with which it is familiar.

The author has successfully and often humorously described, with ample illustrations, the highlights of the Adelaide University Regiment's history: the presentation of Colours; the winning on several occasions the coveted RSL Trophy awarded to the most efficient CMF unit; the close association with its affiliated regiment, the 2nd Royal Irish Rangers; the unusual history of its Pipe Band; the success of its Rifle and Pistol Club; its busy camp training periods; and the many problems

and frustrations it faced in achieving its primary role of producing officers for the CMF.

From Lieutenant Graeme-Evans' book, there emerges two striking facets about the Adelaide University Regiment: first, its unquestionably high *esprit de corps* and secondly, the dedication of its officers and NCOs and enthusiasm of its soldiers. It is timely that such a history should be published when there are distant rumours of disbanding university regiments. What a tragedy this would be. It is so obvious from *Our First Twenty-five Years* how effective the Adelaide University Regiment has been, not only in giving military training to the university undergraduate, but also in the less tangible, but no less important task of fitting him for his future role as a community leader. □

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#### MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the \$10 prize for the best original article in the August 1973 issue of the journal to Mr Donald Jender for his contribution 'Vietnam and the Western Military System'.

# Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

## Staff College Crest

I refer to Major M. C. N. D'Arcy's letter in the August 1973 issue of *Army Journal* in which he raises the issue of my inadequate use of the description of the Staff College Crest. I would like to thank Major D'Arcy for his information but point out:

- a. the description used in my article was not intended to enable a herald painter to reproduce the crest (obviously this has already been done), and
- b. the full blazon (as quoted by Major D'Arcy) is of course on record at the Australian Staff College.

The description used by me was intended for the layman (the majority of the readers of *Army Journal*) and any 'looseness' taken with the use of the expression 'heraldic terms' is regretted.

Headquarters  
2 Support Group  
Gona Barracks  
Kelvin Grove Qld.

Major C. A. Cunningham

## Portrait in Oils

Purely as a matter of interest I would like to advise Major Warren Perry (*Army Journal* p. 22, August 1973) that the portrait in oils of Lieutenant General Sir Edward Hutton by Tom Roberts hangs in the anteroom of the Officers Mess, Victoria Barracks, Paddington NSW.

Headquarters  
2 Cadet Brigade  
Training Depot  
Carlow Street  
Crows Nest NSW.

Major C. Norris



## A HARD ACT TO FOLLOW

**T**HE columnist who was first to write 'a miss is as good as 1.609 344 kilometres' was at least original. But that was a long time ago.

Really, hasn't enough mileage (a 'wit' would be unable to resist the temptation to add, '...er, kilometrage') been extracted from the gag?

'Will the Dog on the Tucker Box be 8.046 720 kilometres from Gundagai?'

'Will cowboys wear 45.460 9 litre hats?'

'Will we sing "I'd walk 1 609 344 kilometres for one of your smiles"?''

No. No. No. Singers will continue to black their faces and croon 'I'd walk a million miles...' People will continue to say 'a miss is as good as a mile.' Scholars will not feel constrained to rewrite Shakespeare, Milton, Dickens and Scott — any more than theologians found it necessary to rewrite the Bible to exclude reference to cubits.

Our literature, our music, our colloquialisms will not be violated. Writers know this, of course. But, when one has a commitment to write a column or fill 'x' column inches,\* then what the hell, why not do the metric bit — again?

Before horseracing weights and distances were converted (they were imperial until August last year; one could be forgiven for not remembering, so accustomed have we become to the metric units), one columnist wrote that the public would be bewildered. Distances would become 1064.40, 1408.176 and 1911.094 metres!

And how's this for keen wit: 'Can you imagine any person in his right mind cheerfully hailing the barman with: "Hey, Joe — gissa two hundred and eighty-five, will ya?" ?'

There's more. Much more. How about:

'Imagine trying to express the integrity of a solid citizen in terms of his being "all wool and 0.914 metre wide."'

'Give him 25.5 millimetres and he'll take 0.914 metre.'

'Pity the poor girl when her vital statistics are 863.6, 609.6, 863.6.'

'Pity the poor racing commentator... "and now, with less than 201.164 metres to go..."'

'Pity the poor housewife, asking for 226.796 2 grams of tea, 453.592 37 grams of butter and 568.261 2 millilitres of milk.'

Pity us all. *Enough. Enough.*

Isn't it about time we laid the gag to rest? Like 1.828 8 metres under?

*\*From 1 July column inches are to be replaced by column centimetres.*

—From *MCB Newsletter*, March 1973.