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COVER: 'Compree Washing, Madame?' by Hon Lieut Will Dyson, France, 1918. At the Australian War Memorial.

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 288, MAY 1973

Contents

- Communism and the Military Efficiency
of the Soviet Armed Forces **3**
Major C. C. M. Peters
- The Beginnings of the School of Gunnery
at Middle Head, Sydney **28**
Lieutenant Colonel W. St. Pierre Bunbury
- Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit **41**
Editorial Staff
- History of Fort Queenscliff **48**
Major C. A. Cunningham

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(Australian War Memorial)
An Australian motor cyclist passing two abandoned Italian tanks on a road overlooking the harbour at Bardia, Libya,

Communism and the Military Efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces



*Major C. C. M. Peters,
Australian Intelligence Corps*

Only childish people think that the laws of artillery are stronger than the laws of history.

—Stalin*

INTRODUCTION

THE Soviet Union, which emerged from the first successful Marxist revolution, possesses the largest fully-modernized Communist armed force in the world. Most Communist military leaders in other countries have learned much from Soviet failures and successes. The most obvious difference between Communist and Western military philosophies lies in the special place accorded in Communist armies to the role of political officers and to the political doctrine of the State. The effect of this role is often seen to be, on the one hand, over-rigidity and fear, and on the other, occasional strong motivation of soldiers, combined with careful selection and maintenance of the political-military aim.

As a starting point for testing these notions concerning the role of political attitudes in Communist armies, it may be of interest to study the impact of these attitudes upon the Soviet armed forces.

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AIM

The aim of this article is to assess the effect of Communism upon the military efficiency of the Soviet armed forces, from 1917 to the present.

SCOPE

It is believed that totalitarian political behaviour is a feature of Communist society, and therefore, that where such behaviour affects the military efficiency of the Soviet armed forces, it should be considered in this assessment.

For convenience, the period will be divided into:

- The Revolution through to the mid-1930s.
- The Great Purge and the Second World War.
- The post-war period through to the present day.

PART 1: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MID-1930s

An Egalitarian Peoples Army

In August and September 1917 Lenin wrote his pamphlet *The State and Revolution*. In it he forecast the abolition of the bourgeois state and its replacement with a new form of government. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November 1917, therefore, Lenin did not intend to base his army upon the remnants of the army of the Tsar but upon the Bolsheviks' own creation, the Red Guards. This para-military force of 20,000 dedicated Bolsheviks had been used to effect the overthrow of the Provisional Government. The Bolshevik leaders, none of whom had had any formal military training, dreamed of an egalitarian people's army. Military ranks were abolished and volunteers were called for, to join an army in which commanders were to be elected by the soldiers.

From a people exhausted by war only 106,000 responded to the call, the majority of them 'vagabonds of the worst kind'. The recruiting drive was a failure. 'Either give us 300 roubles a month with food, clothing and lodging or we will show the Council of Peoples Commis-

* *Voprosi istorii* No. 12, December 1954, p. 8 quoted in R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 243.


¹ L. Trotsky, *How the Revolution Armed Itself*, Moscow, 1923-25, I, p.14, quoted in M. Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959, p. 391.

sars that we are able to defend our interests,'² shouted a soldier delegate to a conference of Red Army men, indicating the temper of discipline in the Red Army of Workers and Peasants. To Lenin, faced with the prospect of civil war following the peace



Red Guards

with Germany, it must have been clear that the Communist Party's first experiment in the formation of an army had been a failure. Clearly the concept of an egalitarian people's army required some revision. The task was given to Leon Trotsky, who in March 1918 was appointed People's Commissar for War. Trotsky did more than any other man to build the Red Army, and from 1918 to 1924 he demonstrated that, given a flexible practical approach, an accommodation could be found between the Communist ideal of an egalitarian society and an army's morale and disciplinary requirements.



Trotsky

'A real army cannot be run by elected committees and elected officers who may be dismissed at any moment by their subordinates,' observed Trotsky.³ The election of officers was abolished and stern punishments were introduced for miscreants. Compulsory military service was introduced. A Council of Defence was established to centralize authority. But from what source would Trotsky acquire instructors, if not from the disbanded army of the Tsar? Trotsky's response was a practical one. Despite much criticism within the Party, he

² W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution 1917-1921*, New York, 1935, II, p. 26, quoted in Fainsod, p. 391.

³ Trotsky, p. 15, quoted in Fainsod, p. 392.

enlisted 48,000 former Tsarist officers in 1918.⁴ During the Civil War the Red Army was heavily dependent upon these ex-Tsarist officers who held four-fifths of the command appointments in 1919.⁵

Red Commanders and Commissars

The Civil War provided an opportunity for the Party to demonstrate the value of having dedicated Communists in the ranks of their Red Army. In these years the Bolsheviks conducted short four-month command courses from which were graduated 40,000 young 'Red Commanders'. Possibly half of the total Communist Party membership was sent to serve with the Red Army.⁶ In the confused situation of the Civil War, where most of the conscripts were peasants who were unclear as to the objectives for which they were fighting, the missionary zeal of Communists was of practical military value. The military efficiency of a unit came to be measured in terms of the number of Communists in its ranks. Trotsky claimed that: 'The conduct of Communists . . . had a decisive influence for the morale and the military capability of units.'⁷

During the Civil War, Trotsky took over and extended the political commissar system which had been introduced by Kerensky. Commissars were allotted to each unit in order 'to prevent army institutions from becoming nests of conspiracy'. This was perhaps an understandable requirement in view of the large number of ex-Imperial Army men in the Red Army. The commissar was to propagandize amongst the recruits, and was to countersign the orders of the commanding officer. Failure to countersign an order was to be notified to higher authority, and the commissar was only to withhold his signature when he had reason to believe the order was 'inspired by counter-revolutionary motives'.⁸ The commissar was not to give orders and was to 'behave respectfully to military experts'.⁹

Restrained as Trotsky's instructions appear to have been, it seems clear that commissars soon exceeded these limits. In 1920 the Poles

⁴ Fainsod, p. 395.

⁵ L. Schapiro, 'The Birth of the Red Army', in B. H. Liddel Hart (ed) *The Soviet Army*, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1956, p. 27.

⁶ Fainsod, p. 397.

⁷ Trotsky, p. 126 quoted in Fainsod, p. 397.

⁸ Decree quoted in E. Wollenberg, *The Red Army*, London, 1938, pp. 255-6 quoted in Fainsod, pp. 395-6.

⁹ Trotsky's decree dated 5 August 1918 quoted in Wollenberg, pp. 70-1, quoted in Fainsod, p. 396.

invaded the Ukraine. The Red Army counter-offensive took on the nature of a patriotic war which attracted many ex-officers and non-commissioned officers from the Tsar's army who had previously refused to serve with the Reds. According to General Weygand, a French officer who directed the Polish defence, these ex-Tsarist members soon complained of terrorist activities on the part of the commissars, and of the presence of police cordons in the army's rear with the task of shooting deserters. One captured soldier complained: 'In the old days we went forward out of discipline. Now we are doing it because we are scared to get a bullet in the back.'¹⁰ At this early stage, and despite the moderating influence of Trotsky, the morale problems arising from the over-zealous applications of political controls were becoming apparent.

Morale was affected adversely during the 1920s as a result of the increasing authority of the commissars. In 1925, the Central Committee of the Party warned that it was necessary '... to announce that during the past year friction occurred between the commanding and political personnel'. The Central Committee acknowledged the resulting morale problem by stating that such occurrences were 'absolutely intolerable in the Red Army and destructive to its combat abilities'.¹ The Field Regulations of 1929 indicate that the military commander and the commissar held equal responsibility for military and political efficiency, but the military morale disadvantages of this situation were offset in part by improved service conditions for the commanders.²

Proletarian Military Doctrine

An example of Trotsky's practical approach to military problems in the face of Party pressure is shown by his deflation of amateur military theoreticians in the Party who ruminated on proletarian 'military doctrine'. 'We must teach our soldiers personal cleanliness... They must learn their drill properly... make their political speeches short and sensible... clean their rifles and grease their boots. They must learn to shoot, and must help their officers to ensure strict observance of the regulations... if anyone wants to... describe this practical programme as "military doctrine" he's welcome to do so.'³

¹⁰ General of the Army Maxime Weygand, 'The Red Army in the Polish War', in Liddel Hart, p. 49.

¹ Kolkowicz, p. 49.

² Kolkowicz, p. 52.

³ Wollenberg, pp. 157-8, quoted in Fainsod, p. 394.



Marshal Budenny

Following the Polish War, disputes blossomed in the Party over organization and doctrine within the Red Army. The debate regarding organization concerned the question as to whether a regular or a militia-type army should be developed. A compromise resulted. Of more significance to the present discussion was the dispute over doctrine.

Trotsky believed, in common with most officers in Western armies today, that military art included principles which were applicable to all armies, whatever their social background. Some of his opponents, who included

Frunze, a civilian who had risen to prominence as a commander in the civil war, and Red Commanders such as the future Marshals Voroshilov and Budenny, both former Tsarist NCOs, maintained that the Red Army had evolved a new 'unified proletarian military doctrine' based on continuous rapid movement, which they apparently believed to be an exclusively revolutionary characteristic (possibly partly as a result of the example provided by capitalist armies during the World War). The former Tsarist general, Svechin, then serving with the Red Army, accurately predicted that the adoption of such a dogmatic doctrine would inhibit doctrinal debate, and therefore military development.⁴ This dispute was resolved when Frunze became allied with Trotsky's enemy Stalin. In 1924 Stalin had Trotsky removed and replaced him with Frunze as Commissar for War. Strictures in doctrinal debate followed, an illustration of the inhibiting effect of the practice of Communism upon the army.



Stalin

⁴ R. L. Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1954, p. 27.

Effect of Collectivization

During the late 1920s and early 1930s the Red Army expanded and improved, largely due to the drive and professionalism of commanders such as Tukhachevski. One serious limitation to emerge was the effect upon morale of the Party's forced agricultural collectivization campaigns. Millions of peasants who resisted collectivization were dispossessed and maltreated. Their sons called up in the draft were often sullen and unco-operative. The morale problem posed from this situation can be gauged from the fact that according to Tukhachevski 90% of Red Army soldiers in 1935 came from collective farms.⁵ By 1936 the morale problems caused by collectivization had become sufficiently serious for commanders to risk provoking stern counter-measures by demanding that the government modify collectivization in the interests of national security.⁶

National Mobilization

In the field of national mobilization the Party made great progress during this period in preparing the nation for war.

The Imperial Army during the First World War had possessed quite high morale and capability (its losses were attributable to a large extent to a disastrous decision to disperse its forces in an attempt best to satisfy its treaty obligations). However, the Imperial Army had lacked support from the government in that the resources of the country were not fully mobilized for war. The lesson was not lost upon the Communists. Lenin warned: 'The best army in the world is bound to be annihilated unless it is backed up by a strong well-organized Home Front. Let every institution in the USSR treat the Army as a



Marshal Tukhachevski

⁵ M. Mackintosh, *Juggernaut*, Secker and Warburg, London, 1967 p. 76.

⁶ J. M. Mackintosh, 'The Red Army 1920-1936' in Liddel Hart, p. 63.

matter of top-priority.⁷ From the 1920s the Party made every effort to satisfy Tukhachevski's demand that the industrial backwardness of Russia must be overcome if the Red Army was to avoid defeat in future wars. From 1933 to 1938 defence industries expanded two and a half times as rapidly as industry as a whole. Military factories were dispersed and *Osoaviakhim*, the Society for the Furthering of Defence, Aviation and Chemical Warfare, was formed to co-ordinate the defence training of civilians.⁸ These preparations, attributable to the Party, were to prove of great value in the coming war years.

Liberalization

From 1933 the regime became anxious about the anti-Soviet posture of Germany and Poland, and the Japanese threat. An effort was therefore made to develop the armed forces, and military commanders were permitted greater freedom and status. In 1934 commissars were made subordinate to commanders. In 1935 ranks were re-introduced. Officers were granted improved pay and accommodation. The Party may have decided that it could afford to increase the freedom and status of its military commanders because of the higher proportion of commanders of proletarian (urban working class) origin now in the army. By 1934 this proportion had risen to nearly 46 per cent.⁹ Another factor may have been the phasing out of many of the former Tsarist officers, of whom only 4,500 remained by 1930.¹⁰

In this atmosphere of greater freedom, military efficiency flourished. Red Army officers had been amongst the most far-sighted in the world in anticipating the military trend of the 1940s. In 1931 the Red Army formed the world's first parachute troops. Under Tukhachevski's guidance mechanized corps were being formed in 1932, three years before the first German panzer divisions came into being. The British books on mechanized warfare which so inspired certain German officers received a wide circulation in Russia. Liddel Hart was asked to visit Russia as an adviser on mechanized warfare in 1932. In 1933 combined arms exercises were conducted in the USSR, which foreshadowed the German blitzkrieg and great encirclement battles of the next decade.¹

⁷ Quoted by Lieutenant Colonel Serge Andolenko, 'The Imperial Heritage', in Liddel Hart, p. 19.

⁸ Fainsod, p. 404.

⁹ Mackintosh, *Juggernaut*, p. 76.

¹⁰ Fainsod, p. 401.

¹ Liddel Hart, p. 3.

A gap remained between the superior plans of the generals and state of training of the soldiers but by 1936 the Red Army was probably the most advanced fighting force in Europe.

Summary


The experience of the civil war showed that in conditions in which strong patriotic motivation is lacking, a Communist-led army gains in military morale from having dedicated young Communists in the ranks. In the period prior to the Second World War, the Party provided strong support to the armed forces by preparing well for national mobilization.

On the other hand, it was shown that military discipline was unattainable in an army raised on the early Communist ideal of a volunteer force in which there were no ranks and officers were elected. The Party intruded into the field of military doctrine in such a way as to place some inhibitions upon free debate of this subject; and the widespread discontent resulting from the Party's collectivization programme had a lowering effect upon military morale. The introduction of political commissars resulted in military morale problems due to fear, and to friction between commanders and commissars. The Party's recognition of the military problems which followed from close political controls was shown by the loosening of these controls after 1933 in order to allow the armed forces to develop in the face of the foreign threat. The relishing of this freedom for senior officers to exercise their imaginations was demonstrated by the blossoming of the Soviet army, by 1936, into a superior fighting force.

PART 2: THE GREAT PURGE AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The Purge

It was into this highly professional atmosphere of original military thought that the Party intruded in 1937 with the orgy of destruction known as the Great Purge. Within the space of twelve months Stalin murdered or kidnapped fifty per cent of the entire officer corps. Three of the five marshals died or disappeared (including Tukhachevski), in addition to thirteen of the fifteen army commanders; fifty-seven



out of eighty-five corps commanders; 110 out of 195 division commanders; and 220 out of 406 brigade commanders. In all, ninety per cent of generals and eighty per cent of colonels were made victim.² In one year the Red Army had been transformed from a formidable fighting force into a mass of brave men incoherently led by novices and incompetents. As a result it failed in Finland and suffered great losses during the German advance of 1941 before a new generation of commanders were thrown up by war. The reason for the Purge of the military was Stalin's fear that the military leadership might present a serious threat to his authority.

Immediately before the Purge of the military Stalin had re-introduced collective leadership throughout the armed forces down to company level; that is, military commanders were no longer in sole command, but had to share authority with their commissars. Those military commanders who survived the Purge found that every order required the approval of a political officer. The NKVD (the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs, or secret police), the agency which had carried out the Purge on Stalin's behalf, maintained Special Sections with an informant network in every unit, and commanders lived in terror of denunciation. The NKVD had had particularly hostile relations with the army in the past, especially since a dispute which took place over NKVD terrorist activities during the Civil War in Spain,³ and the NKVD had gone about its work during the Purge with enthusiasm. The effectiveness of the Purge in destroying morale can be seen from Voroshilov's comment to Stalin in 1938 on the condition of the army: 'The foundations of discipline and comradeship are crumbling. No one dares to trust his fellow, either superior or



Nikolai Yezhov,
head of the NKVD, 1936-38.

² L. Schapiro, 'The Great Purge', in Liddel Hart, p. 69.

³ Mackintosh, *Juggernaut*, pp. 87-8.

subordinate. I hear the same is true in the navy. Both forces are demoralized.⁴

Stalin's purge had removed the best and most experienced commanders. By late 1937, when the purge had run only a part of its course, 60% of the infantry and 45% of the mechanized forces officers had been purged.⁵ One marshal has described how he arrived at the headquarters of the 30th Division to find the most senior officer there was a captain.⁶ A serious problem arose from the fact that at the time of the Purge the army was undergoing re-organization and re-equipment and many of the replacement officers lacked the background to continue the task. Soviet writers now acknowledge the disastrous effect on military efficiency which the Great Purge had: 'The repressions . . . took place under . . . growing danger of foreign aggression . . . and were directed against the most skilled sectors of the commanding personnel . . . Their destructive consequences . . . were one of the causes of the heavy losses suffered . . . in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.'⁷

Effect Upon the Finnish Campaign

The great damage done to the army by the Purge was demonstrated during the ensuing Finnish campaign and the retreat before the Germans in 1941. Although massively outnumbering the Finns and with complete air superiority and a preponderance of armoured vehicles,⁸ the Red Army required three months to attain a measure of success, at a loss of 273,000 killed. Only 860 Finns were captured while 5,600 Red Army men were taken by the Finns.⁹ A Soviet writer commented: 'The mass repressions (the purges) . . . had a negative effect on military discipline. This became clear especially during the Soviet-Finnish conflict.'¹⁰ Fear and the removal of its experienced commanders had rendered the army so indecisive that commissars were once more abolished and replaced by Assistant Commanders for Political Affairs

⁴ W. Duranty, *The Kremlin and the People*, Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1941, p. 127, quoted in Kolkowicz, p. 57.

⁵ Duranty, p. 127.

⁶ Mackintosh, *Juggernaut*, p. 94.

⁷ I. Petrov, quoted in Kolkowicz, p. 57.

⁸ Mackintosh, *Juggernaut*, p. 116.

⁹ M. Garder, *A History of the Soviet Army*, Revised Edition, Pall Mall, London, 1966, p. 104.

¹⁰ I. Petrov, *Party Development in the Soviet Army and Navy 1918-61*, Voenozdat, Moscow, 1964, p. 336, quoted in Kolkowicz, p. 63.

(*zampolits*), who were to be subordinate to the commanders.¹ Significantly, many purged officers who had not been executed were released and reinstated. Amongst these was the future Marshal Rokossovsky.²

Effect Upon the 1941 Campaign

The Red Army sorely missed Tukhachevski and his generation of leaders prior to the German invasion of 1941. Officers surviving the Purge did not seem to understand Tukhachevski's concepts of mechanized warfare. Shaposhnikov, who became Chief of the General Staff, did not appreciate Tukhachevski's ideas,³ and General Pavlov reported to Stalin following his observations in Spain that, 'The tank can play no independent role on the battlefield.'⁴ Stalin accepted the recommendations for the disbandment of the armoured corps that Tukhachevski had developed.⁵ As a result General Blumentritt was able to comment: 'Although Russian manuals provided for the operation of tank formations, in practice tanks were nearly always used in conjunction with infantry.'⁶ In late June 1941 on the southern front the Russians had an opportunity to use six mechanized corps in conjunction with four infantry armies against the German 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army but the Russian tank strength was frittered away in piecemeal attacks.⁷ The Russians, of course, employed huge tank armies later in the war, after the lessons had been re-learned, and by 1956 nearly half of the Soviet Army's active divisions (excluding those in the Far East) were armoured divisions,⁸ but in 1941 the losses in leadership caused



General Rokossovsky

¹ Fainsod, p. 407.

² Garder, p. 103.

³ Garder, p. 100.

⁴ A. Clark, *Barbarossa*, Penguin, London, 1966, p. 62.

⁵ Mackintosh, *Juggernaut*, p. 98.

⁶ General Gunther Blumentritt, 'The State and Performance of the Red Army 1941', in Liddel Hart, p. 138.

⁷ Clark, p. 79-80.

⁸ Liddel Hart, p. 3.

by the Purge had a serious effect upon the employment of mechanized troops.

The Red Army showed exceptional bravery and stubbornness during the retreat in 1941. This is mainly attributable to the courage and patriotism of the soldiers. It has been argued that the failure of the Russians to collapse



Soviet tanks entering Berlin.

completely in 1941 was assisted by the fact that Red Army units were permeated with over three-quarters of a million NKVD men assisted by a network of informers.⁹ One Russian participant has commented, '... every Russian who lived through the Revolution and the thirties had felt a breeze of hope, for the first time in the history of our people.... We knew that we would die of course. But our children would inherit.... A land free of the invaders; and Time, in which the progressive ideals of Communism might emerge.'¹⁰ These factors suggested that the Party and its ideology could conceivably have played some role in the determined defence of the Red Army. But of greater significance to the events of 1941 was the paralysis of command and fear of independent action which followed directly from the presence of the commissars and the NKVD, linked with the memory of the Purge.



Soviet infantry counter-attacking during the retreat of 1941.

There are numerous examples of lack of Russian initiative in 1941. 'The enemy has broken through! What shall we do?' was the dramatic query often intercepted by the Germans. A reliable high-ranking German mili-

⁹ Colonel Louis B. Ely, *The Red Army Today*, Third Edition, Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1953, p. 160.

¹⁰ Clark, p. 193.

tary source has spoken of the 'Senseless repetition of attacks, the rigidity of artillery fire, the plotting of lanes of attack, and movement without regard to terrain . . . ' In September, 1941 southwest of Briansk ' . . . the same section was attacked by . . . Russian battalions every day for seven days . . . without any apparent reason and without success . . . a captured battalion commander supplied the explanation. In looking through some old files, their new regimental commander had found a top level order to the effect that continuous attacks were to be made . . . in order to ease the pressure on Leningrad . . . he had received a negative answer to his inquiry as to whether these attacks had already been made . . . In the meantime . . . the pressure on Leningrad had long since been relieved.'¹

The destruction of 60 to 70 per cent of field grade officers in the Purge² led to problems in the technical arms when linked with the losses sustained in 1941. Great difficulty was found in finding and training replacement officers.

National Mobilization and Strategic Intelligence

As in the pre-war period, it was in national mobilization that the armed forces were to benefit most from Party organization. By 1941 *Osoaviakhim* had 36 million members and was of great use in the Soviet feat of mobilizing over a million men within a few months of the German attack.³ At the height of the campaign the army was helped by the centralization of control by the Party which ensured enough labour for the production of 2,000 tanks a month.⁴ In later years the Soviet Army benefited by the policy which in 1953 insisted that civilian tractors be built to military specifications and that nine-tenths of the effort in the automotive industry be devoted to the production of trucks suitable for military use.⁵

The Imperial Army had possessed good strategic intelligence. Party intelligence agencies during World War II were at least as good, with the difference that their effectiveness was proven in war. As a result of information received from the Sorge network in Tokyo, Stalin

¹ Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, pp. 214-5.

² H. J. Gordon, 'Artillery', in Liddel Hart, p. 347.

³ Clark, pp. 69-70.

⁴ Manstein, p. 144.

⁵ Ely, p. 146.

could be reasonably sure that no Japanese attack would come in the Far East in late 1941. Therefore, he was able to release the Siberian troops which provided Zhukov's trump card in the Battle of Moscow. Other spy networks of incalculable military value were the 'Lucy' agency in Switzerland and a cell placed in the German Air Ministry. The Germans, for the part, possessed very little reliable information about their enemy (a factor which led directly to the German attack and therefore to ultimate defeat in view of their woeful under-estimation of the latent strength of Soviet Russia).⁶



Soviet ski troops—Battle of Moscow.

Distorted Military Doctrine

Because of the quality of the Party's strategic intelligence, Stalin had been given ample warning of the German attack in 1941. However, as Marshal Sokolovsky has written; '... on the eve of war, certain preconceived notions in Stalin's evaluation of the ... situation led to a number of serious errors in the preparation ... for the impending war.'⁷ In fact Stalin was convinced that Hitler would not break the Stalin-Ribbentrop Pact and as a result no proper preparations were made for defence. The German attacks achieved surprise and resulted in three million Soviet casualties in the first four months of the war.⁸ There was very little co-ordination in the Soviet resistance until Zhukov's success in the Battle of Moscow in November 1941. Since Stalin's refusal to perceive the impending attack was unpalat-



Marshal Zhukov

⁶ Clark, pp. 181-2.

⁷ Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.), *Military Strategy*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1963, p. 147.

⁸ Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, p. 428.

able, his response was to claim that the Soviet withdrawal was pre-planned characterizing it as 'active defence'.

In fact the failure of the Red Army to adopt a defensive posture in June 1941, apart from Stalin's refusal to accept the intelligence provided, may be related to the trespassing of Party ideological concepts upon military preserves. Frunze's 'proletarian military doctrine' had stressed that 'The tactics of the Red Army . . . will be impregnated with activity in the spirit of bold and energetically conducted offensive operations.' Lenin had stressed the primacy of the offensive with regard to revolution. Stalin's strategy was optimistic and offensive. These reasons may underline the fact that pre-war training schedules showed little emphasis on defence and that defence was not recognized as 'a normal aspect of combat' until 1942.⁹

Linked with the false concept of 'active defence' was Stalin's refusal to allow the normal emphasis to be placed upon surprise, which is accepted in most armies as a principle of war. To cloak the effectiveness of the surprise achieved by the Germans, in 1941 Stalin promulgated his dogma of the 'permanently operating factors' which he claimed determined the outcome of any war. These factors were 'the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the armament of the army' and 'the organizational ability of the army commanders'. Surprise was relegated to the status of a 'transitory factor' which could not determine the outcome of war. Stalin argued that the Germans, having lost the advantage gained by surprise, would now lose the war because of inferiority in the 'permanently operating factors'.¹⁰ While little fault can be found with Stalin's premise, the 'permanently operating factors', which became enshrined as 'Stalinist military science', added nothing to Red Army military doctrine because they are self-evident.

Summary

There is evidence that a few soldiers during the heroic resistance of 1941 may have been inspired by the ideal of Communism; and it has been suggested inconclusively that the presence, at the Party's insistence, of over three-quarters of a million NKVD men within the military ranks may have helped prevent a complete collapse. The most important role played by the Party in support of the armed forces lay

⁹ Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, pp. 66-7.

¹⁰ H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, Atlantic, London, 1959, pp. 6-7.

in the effective mobilization of the nation, including the provision of sound strategic intelligence.

However, the effect of the Party's Great Purge was temporarily to destroy the leadership capability within the Soviet armed forces. This contributed strongly to the humiliations and losses of the Finnish campaign and the 1941 invasion by the Germans. Once again the Party demonstrated recognition of the military problems of close political control by, in late 1941, abolishing commissars and making political officers subordinate to military commanders, in order to permit the recovery of the Army after 1941, only to reinstate the importance of political officers in 1945. The Party distorted Soviet military doctrine, in order to save face for Stalin, in a way which was to provide difficulties for the Soviet armed forces in the post-war years.

PART 3: THE POST WAR PERIOD TO THE PRESENT DAY

Distorted Military Doctrine

Suvorov, whose genius the Party has acknowledged, once said: 'Tactics without military history is tantamount to groping in the dark.'¹ The importance with which the Soviet Army views military history is shown by the fact that the 'Historical Administration' is one of the six branches of the General Staff.² Most professional soldiers will acknowledge that a study of military history is essential to military art. It is of course, axiomatic that, since future generations of soldiers will base their judgement upon case histories, military history must be presented honestly. Yet an instructor at the Frunze Military Academy in the post-war period stated: 'Frequently it was difficult to perform honest work because the Party line tended to draw lessons only from Red victories, often neglecting the wealth of important material contained in those accounts which dealt with Soviet defeats.'³

One such defeat which the Party in the immediate post-war years would not permit to be studied in depth was the Soviet retreat of 1941, which was cloaked in the myth of 'active defence'. Following Stalin's death an official publication aptly summed up the military training problems which resulted: 'Singing praises to active defence, to its incor-

¹ Liddel Hart, pp. 15-17.

² Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, p. 198.

³ Louis B. Ely, *The Red Army Today*, Harrisburg, 1949 p. 10, quoted in Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, p. 59.

rect interpretation as pre-planned, leads not only to distortion of the factual military events of 1941, but also to idealization of this form of struggle, to incorrect orientation of our military cadres on the possibility of its repetition in future war.⁴

The great danger which arose from 'Stalinist military science' was that from 1942 to the death of Stalin ten years later Soviet officers feared to discuss military doctrine lest they be accused of being at variance with Stalin's dogma. During this period the Soviet Union was building its nuclear arsenal, and nuclear war became a possibility. Yet, because of the fear to recognize the importance of surprise, no doctrine appears to have been developed in this period to cater for the possible requirement to carry out a surprise nuclear attack in order to anticipate an impending attack by an opponent—the 'pre-emptive strike'. The Stalinist view is typified by one writer who claimed that the 'adventuristic and anti-scientific theories of "atomic blitzkrieg", "lightning", "aerial" wars, etc., are alien to the military science of a socialist government.'⁵

The rigidity in the Soviet military approach arose from Stalin's and therefore the Party's belief that the outcome of war, as with any other large scale human event, was predictable in terms of the 'laws of history'. 'Only childish people think that the laws of artillery are stronger than the laws of history,' said Stalin.⁶ From these beliefs arose Stalin's 'permanently operating factors'. The first cautious challenge to Stalin's constricting dogma appeared six months after his death. Major General Talenski, the editor of the official publication *Military Thought*, stressed the importance of the armed conflict itself as well as that of the 'permanently operating factors', and admitted the importance of surprise by refusing to 'exclude the possibility of a decisive defeat in a limited time of one or another opponent.'⁷ That the fresher military atmosphere was relished is shown by the fact that over the next two years *Red Star* alone printed approximately fifty articles on nuclear weapons and atomic energy. This followed a seven years' silence on these subjects.⁸

⁴ *Military Thought*, No. 3 March, 1955, pp. 7-8, quoted in R. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, Atlantic, London, 1958, p. 70.

⁵ Colonel I. V. Maryganov, *The Advanced Character of Soviet Military Science*, Moscow, 1953, p. 37, quoted in Dinerstein, p. 34.

⁶ *Voprosy istorii* No. 12, December 1954, p. 8, quoted in Kolkowicz, p. 243.

⁷ Dinerstein, pp. 39, 44.

⁸ Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy*, p. 64.

Stalin's inhibiting doctrine on surprise was finally laid to rest in 1955 in an important article by Marshal Rotmistrov entitled 'On the Role of Surprise in Contemporary War.' This article called for 'pre-emptive' nuclear attacks if required.⁹ Finally, if it were needed, General Shatilov left Western observers in no doubt as to the new Soviet philosophy on surprise by threatening: 'Knowing the savage character of the aggressors, we cannot ignore the plans they are hatching . . . It would pay the immoderately warlike generals and admirals of the imperialist camp to remember that atomic weapons as well as surprise action are double-edged weapons and that it is hardly sensible to jest with them.'¹⁰



Marshal Rotmistrov

Promotion According to Political Acceptability

A limitation on the efficiency of the armed forces in post-war years, especially during the Krushchev period, arises from the fact that amongst commanders of ability, it has often been the case that those who receive the warmest tributes from their political officers have been selected for promotion. Between 1958-60 Krushchev demobilized 250,000 officers and promoted a great many new generals. Part of the aim of the changes was to bring about greater political compliance within the armed forces. Some demoralization was the result, Marshal Malinovski complaining of this cult of the 'new', in which 'not even regimental commanders are assured of remaining in their positions'.¹



Krushchev welcomes reinforcements to Stalingrad 1942.

An example at the higher level of the emergence of those with the 'correct' political views was shown by the elevation of the so-called 'Stalingrad Group' of

⁹ Kolkowicz, p. 119.

¹⁰ Lieutenant General B. S. Shatilov, 'An Important and Noble Theme', in *Literary Gazette*, 28 May 1955, quoted in Dinerstein, p. 191.

¹ J. Erickson, *Soviet Military Power*, Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies, Whitehall, London, 1971, p. 13.

senior officers on Krushchev's accession to power in 1955. These officers, of whom the best known are Marshals Malinovski, Konev, Chuikov and Krylov, had occupied command appointments during the battle of Stalingrad. During this period they became associates of Krushchev while the latter was the political supervisor of the South Western Theatre in 1942-43. Krushchev interceded for these officers against what was alleged to be too close control over them by Marshal Zhukov and other military members of the *Stavka* (High Command). While Zhukov was in the ascendancy in the immediate post-war years many of these officers were dispersed to outlying commands. Soon after Krushchev's accession to power Zhukov was deposed as Minister for Defence and the Stalingrad Group were promoted to positions of authority. In return, the Stalingrad Group generally supported Krushchev even in measures designed to further restrict the military initiative of the armed forces, although a split later developed on these issues.²



Soviet infantry advance at Stalingrad.

It can be argued that even in western countries generals rise and fall in accordance with current political attitudes, but the history of the Stalingrad Group shows that there is a greater tendency for this phenomenon under the Communist regime in the USSR, where there is no constitutional machinery available for periodic changes of government and ruling coalitions rise and fall depending upon the effectiveness of their lobbying. The morale and military effectiveness of senior officers must be affected by the emphasis on political activity rather than military efficiency.

Resentment of Political Controls

One effect of the Great Purge may have been to remove permanently any danger of 'bonapartism': of a direct threat to the regime from the armed forces. By the commencement of the Purge most officers were Party members. By 1955 Party membership was virtually a requirement for promotion above company level,³ and the contrived

² Kolkowicz, pp. 220-9, 251, 259-78.

³ Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, p. 242.

heavy influx of *Komsomols* (Communist Youth League members) ensured that 77 per cent of the army as a whole were members of the Party or its affiliates.⁴ Eighty to ninety per cent of officers now are Party or *Komsomol* members.⁵

However, despite the high level of Party membership in post-war years it is clear that a conflict has continued between the officers' attitudes as Party members and those as soldiers, sailors or airmen. Much of their criticism has been related to the lack of initiative shown by military commanders because of political controls. 'We feel that, if the commander is kept in fear because of possible undesired consequences of his bold and well-intentioned activities, there will be no way to imbue him with the necessary self-reliance,' says Vice Admiral Chalyi.⁶ Marshal Zhukov, as Minister for Defence, removed *zampolits* from company and battalion level, only to see them reinstated after his fall. His successor, Malinovski, called constantly for an easing of political interference in military training. In 1958 he rebuked the political officers: 'If you interfere with the commander's work, if you go over his head, the result will be destructive, and will end in disorder, and where there is disorder there is conflict, struggle, catastrophe'.⁷ In 1961 Marshal Krylov, in a clear reference to the frustrating presence of political officers, wrote '... the growing role of mobility in military operations sharply elevates the importance of firm and uninterrupted control of the forces. That is why it is necessary to have... a commander who is able to use his full authority boldly, decisively, without looking back over his shoulder...'.⁸



Marshal Malinovski

⁴ R. L. Garthoff, 'The High Command and the General Staff', in Liddel Hart, p. 262.


⁵ Lieutenant Colonel David C. Miller, 'Soviet Armed Forces and Political Pressure', in *Military Review*, December 1969.

⁶ Chalyi, 'On the Independence and Initiative of Naval Officers', in *Voenizdat*, Moscow, 1959, p. 8 quoted in Kolkowicz, p. 146.

⁷ Kolkowicz, p. 129.

⁸ Marshal Krylov, 'Strengthen Authority to Command in Every Possible Way', *Red Star*, 27 September 1961, quoted in Kolkowicz, pp. 159-60.

Marshal Krylov's complaint has been echoed in recent years by many who argue that the complexity of command and speed of modern operations would allow little time for discussion with political officers before decisions are required to be made.⁹ Others contend that the sub-unit is now more important on the battlefield than in the past; that group loyalty is now more important than ideology; that there is therefore no room for those who do not have a strictly military task to carry out; and that political officers are now redundant.¹⁰



Early Soviet Sattelite launch

These attitudes have in part developed because of the great increase in the proportion of engineers and technicians amongst officers, now totalling 45%, including over 80% of the officer strength in the Strategic Missile Forces.¹ These technical officers have been criticised for lack of political consciousness.²

Reaction of Party Organs

In the face of this criticism, the Party has argued that the tension of nuclear war will make political work more important in the maintenance of morale.³ Since 1967 the Party has campaigned strongly to increase its internal control over the armed forces⁴, and has proposed a 'unified theory of troop control', suggesting that modern command methods should be both military and political in character.⁵

⁹ D. Holloway, 'Soviet Military Cybernetics: Social and Political Problems of Troop Control' in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute for Defence Studies*, December 1971, p. 61.

¹⁰ Erickson, p. 89.

¹ Holloway, 'Soviet Military Cybernetics', pp. 59-60.

² Erickson, p. 14.

³ Holloway, 'Soviet Military Cybernetics', p. 61.

⁴ Alfred L. Monks, 'Evolution of Soviet Military Thinking', in *Military Review*, March 1971.

⁵ D. Holloway, *Technology, Management and the Soviet Military Establishment*, Adelphi Papers No. 76, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, April, 1971, p. 26.

Increased Independence of the Armed Forces

Despite the debate about the desired degree of political influence within the armed forces, there is no doubt that since the death of Stalin the armed forces have attained a much greater degree of independence within the Soviet state. Since 1953, the post of Minister for Defence has been filled by a professional military officer.⁶ The present Minister, Marshal Grechko, deals directly with the political leadership rather than through civilian intermediaries. In return for Army support for the present ruling group, the Army is able to argue for its own interests, and therefore, no doubt to improve military efficiency.⁷ It has been argued that the political control apparatus within the armed forces has itself been largely militarized in attitude, so that the armed forces tend to present a relatively united front to the Party leadership.⁸

Summary

No evidence arises from the post-war period to show that the influence of the Party has been helpful to military efficiency. On the other hand, the development of military doctrine was hindered until the death of Stalin by the fear of officers to express themselves lest they be in conflict with 'Stalinist military science'. This was particularly harmful in the new nuclear age in that surprise was not accorded its proper place as a principle of war. During the Krushchev period military morale suffered from an especial rash of promotions according to political acceptability. The Party has attempted to maintain its political controls within the armed forces, but there has been continued resentment of these. The military morale problems resulting from political controls have been shown by the strong arguments advanced within the armed forces that there is less place for political influence within the modern Soviet armed forces, which themselves have become increasingly independent within Soviet society over the past few years.

CONCLUSION

Few factors have emerged from this study to show that the effect of Communism upon the military efficiency of the Soviet armed forces has been beneficial. The civil war period demonstrated the military

⁶ Miller, pp. 65-6.

⁷ J. Erickson, 'The Army, the Party and the People: (1) U.S.S.R.', in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, September 1970.

⁸ Fritz Ermath, 'Soviet Military Politics', in *Military Review*, January 1968, p. 33.

value to a Communist-led army of a dedicated band of young Communists in the ranks, but this lesson applies necessarily only to conditions in which strong patriotic motivation is lacking. There are extremely doubtful claims that the insidious effect of fear of the NKVD men, inserted into the armed forces at the Party's insistence, may have added to the determination of the defence against German invasion; and there is evidence that a few during this heroic defence may have been inspired by the ideal of Communism. By far the most useful contributions of the Party to military efficiency have been in the support provided to the armed forces by thorough mobilization of the nation for war, and in the field of strategic intelligence. These important contributions will be repeated in any future war.

On the other hand, there is much evidence to show that the effect of Communism in practice has been to hinder the development of the Soviet armed forces both in morale and doctrine. The dilemma of the Party has been as to how a strong armed force could be fostered in the face of the inhibiting effect upon morale of the requirement for close Party supervision. This dilemma has been illustrated by the alternating periods of liberalization and political repression within the armed forces: from 1933 in the face of the growing foreign threat, and in 1941 following the disaster of the retreat before the Germans, political control was relaxed to allow the armed forces to develop to cope with the threat; both of these periods were followed by repression, in 1937 with the Great Purge, and in 1945 by renewal of the influence of political officers. Throughout, the commissar system and the presence of secret police have led to fear of independent action which has on occasions proved disastrous in war. Morale crises reached their peak as a result of the catastrophic effects of the Great Purge. Finally, throughout the history of the armed forces, from Frunze's 'proletarian military doctrine' to the sterility and falsehoods of 'Stalinist military science', the ability of the Soviet armed forces to train for war has been hampered by Party intrusion into the field of military doctrine.


Do these conclusions justify the notions which are commonly held regarding the role in Communist armies of political officers and the political doctrine of the State? This study shows that, in the case of the Soviet armed forces, the notion that this role results in over-rigidity and fear has been correct. However, apart from the experiences of the conditions of civil war, which are not likely to confront the Soviet armed forces again, Communism seems rarely to have been important in the

strong motivation of soldiers. Communism as a motivating force, and the notion that strong political controls result in careful selection and maintenance of the political-military aim, are probably more important in Asian Communist armies, and in conditions of revolutionary warfare, than seems to be the case in the Soviet armed forces.

The growing independence of the armed forces within Soviet society in recent years, coupled with strong arguments advanced that there is less place in the modern Soviet armed forces for political controls, suggests that, internally, the armed forces will remain free of stifling Party influence for some years. This freedom should persist until once more, as in the past, a political ruling group emerges which does not require the political support of the armed forces, but sees the independence of the armed forces as a serious potential threat to its own authority. □

The more I have seen of war the more I realise how it all depends upon administration and transportation. It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles and wars are only won by taking risks.

—Field Marshal Lord Wavell.



The Beginnings of The School of Gunnery at Middle Head, Sydney

Lieutenant Colonel W. St. Pierre Bunbury, RA.

IN 1885 applications were called for at Home for four officers, one from the Royal Engineers and three from the Royal Artillery, to go as military instructors to New South Wales. Those selected were Captain C. Penrose, R.E., Major E. G. H. Bingham, myself, and Lieutenant C. Milward.

My first job was to go to Newcastle to Armstrong's works to make myself familiar with some 6-inch E.O.C. guns on disappearing hydro-pneumatic carriages—complicated affairs. That was the last I saw of them. They duly arrived at Sydney soon after I did, but when I left, three years later, they were still on the wharf. The story was circulated that the finance authorities claimed that duty must be paid on them; the Defence authorities refused to pay. Anyway, there they remained: whether they were ever mounted I know not, but almost my last job, with Major Penrose, was designing emplacements for them.

The story of the appointment of these 'Imperial Officers' had its origin a long way back. When the paternal British Government decided, in 1870, that money might be saved by withdrawing the Imperial troops from the Australian colonies their attitude was cavalier. It amounted to this: 'You can keep the guns and ammunition and look after yourselves, and be damned to you.'

There seems to have been some little disagreement over the appointments to the commands in the new defence force of New South Wales. This was especially the case in regard to the chief command, the candidates being Colonel Richardson, a former infantry officer, who

had seen service in the Maori war, and Colonel Roberts, an ex-RA officer, who had served in the Crimea and had been, I believe, senior to Richardson in the service. The chief command was given to Richardson, and Roberts was given command of the artillery. From this time on there was a continuing feud between the two, each, of course, having political partisans behind him.

It was Colonel Roberts' desire to have out from Home a few regular artillery officers to take temporary command of the batteries and to instruct the officers and men in their duties. (Victoria, South Australia and Queensland already had some Imperial officers). Richardson, however, would have none of this and was able to defeat all Roberts' endeavours to that end. Then came the episode of the Sudan contingent of which Richardson went in command. Roberts saw his chance and prevailed on the New South Wales Government to ask the War Office for the services of four artillery officers. He expected to have them duly installed in their commands and to confront Richardson on his return with the *fait accompli*. Unfortunately for his scheme the Sudan show fizzled out, the contingent returned and reached Sydney a fortnight before we did. It was then too late for Richardson to stop us, but his counterstroke was masterly. Immediately on our arrival he gazetted us all to his personal staff.

So, for some months, in spite of Bingham's expostulations we did nothing for the artillery or engineers, but rode about in full dress in Richardson's train whenever, which was often, he made an inspection or 'reviewed' some portion of his command. The only satisfaction I got out of this was in finding that the two officers of his staff that I rode between could not ride for nuts, and that by tickling my horse up and making him dance and theirs also I could reduce them both to the condition of clinging with both hands to the pommels of their saddles. However, one useful and interesting job fell to me at that time. Richardson wanted a military survey made of the country between Randwick and Botany Bay with a view to manoeuvres, and this was entrusted to me. A very keen officer of the partially paid artillery, whose name to my regret I have forgotten, a surveyor by profession, wished to learn military map-making and volunteered to accompany me. There was no map of any sort of the ground available, so he brought a theodolite and dumpy level out to fix a number of trig points for reference and taught me their use. I also learnt what a large number of different snakes there are in New South Wales.

This sort of thing could not continue, so finally Bingham took matters into his own hands, got some important members of the Legislative Council to bring the matter up in their House, and himself threatened to write to the War Office a full statement of the case and request that we should be withdrawn. The *Sydney Bulletin* also, I remember, took a hand and, whilst expressing the greatest admiration for the beauty of our uniforms, suggested that the display was a rather expensive one for the colony. This brought matters to a head and the Premier (I think Mr Dalley) took us away from both Richardson and Roberts and placed us directly under the Colonial Secretary, from whom from that time onwards we received every support.

Then we were able to get a move on. I was entrusted with the job of starting a School of Gunnery at Middle Head. Milward was allotted the training of the field batteries (partially paid ones, I think), whilst Bingham exercised general control and was our first line of defence against the two Rs and the politicians. He had his hands full but managed admirably.

The starting of the school was no light job. I found everything in a ludicrously deplorable condition. There had been, I believe, a battery or detachment of the permanent artillery maintained at Middle Head in charge of the guns and stores: what else they did I do not know—probably a little gun-drill only, for of repository stores there was an almost complete dearth. Most of the required skidding, etc., we had to make up locally from gum tree wood of which nobody could tell us the breaking strain. I remember one little episode which throws some light on the prevailing discipline. Almost the first time I went down to the Head I noticed a sentry withdraw the tampion from one of the 80-pounder guns and hastily replace it when he saw me. My curiosity aroused, I examined into the matter and found in the bore of the gun two bottles of beer with which he had proposed to solace himself during his lonely watch!

The permanent artillery had a bad name at that time for indiscipline, but I did not find it so. The composition of the force was very mixed; a number were Australian-born but the majority were, I think, men who had come out to the colony from Home and, failing to make good, had sought refuge in enlistment. A considerable number were deserters from the British Navy and Army.

Apart from small offences, such as being late on parade and such like, I met throughout my time with only one case of insubordination

and that was in the first course. I had been most fortunate in obtaining the services of Sergeant-Major Tristram, who had been an instructor in the School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness. Besides being a first-class instructor he was most useful in other ways. He had a thorough knowledge of the antecedents of most of the men and kept me posted as to who were the deserters.

It was my custom towards the end of a course sometimes to fall out the officers and tell off one of the NCOs to carry on. One day at repository drill the NCO told off refused, saying: 'I came here to be taught, not to teach.' My reply was: 'Very well, corporal — if that's the discipline they taught you in the Guards the sooner you are sent back to them the better;' and I put him under arrest. Next morning he had disappeared for good. There was no recurrence of that offence. No doubt he and other deserters were doubtful as to what powers an Imperial officer had over them and were a little disturbed at my apparent knowledge of their antecedents. I think, however, that the real cause of the indiscipline among the men at Paddington Barracks was that the men were fed up with dull routine work that to them had no apparent object, that little or no interest was taken in them by anybody, and that they had no respect for officers who knew no more of their work than they did.

The absence of facilities for getting drink at Middle Head may also have had some influence. But the opinion I formed of the Australian soldiers was that, for an officer who took an interest in his men and knew his job, they would do anything and would give him no trouble, but a slack or incompetent officer had better step aside and make way for better men.

The work done at the School was normal drill on the various types of gun in use and repository drill, dismounting and moving ordnance, etc., and lectures on elementary gunnery. Practice also, when we could get ammunition.

Bingham and I both disliked the rigidity of the drill book and Shoeburyness work with its insistence on exactness in the numbers of the detachments and correct lists of stores, and we accustomed the men sometimes to work with both reduced numbers and a deficiency of stores.

At the end of the last course, in 1887, I think, we did an experimental and very interesting job. Two 10-inch R.M.L. guns of 18 tons were to be moved from open emplacements at the top of George's Head

to the casemated battery at the foot of the Head. The easy but longer way was to take them along the hilltop to the road, down this to Middle Head, and thence by the fairly level pathway to the battery, but Bingham and I decided that it would be excellent training for the men if we took one gun straight down the hill through the bush to the battery, employing the men from the course just finished for the work.

So this we did, cutting a way through the bush and making a track for ourselves as we went along. The snag was a rather sharp rocky drop about the middle of the hill. There lay at Middle Head four large 40-foot skids which had been used by the contractors for mounting the two Armstrong 10-inch guns, and we decided to shoot our gun down this plane on them as watered skids. A somewhat chancy experiment, but the arrangements were well made and it was an impressive sight to see this monster sliding smoothly and gaily down the skids. But then the question was, where would it stop when it left the skids and took the ground?

The other gun was sent round the long way and the job entrusted to Lieutenant Bridges*, who carried it out very efficiently.

I cannot clearly recollect the strength of the parties sent through the course, but judging from photographs I think it was thirty, with two or three officers. For the first course I had only the valuable assistance of Sergeant-Major Tristram. Later on we took on Sergeant Lynch, Sergeant Molyneux and another sergeant whose name I have forgotten, as assistant instructors. Sergeant Lynch, in particular, became a remarkably good instructor, but all three men were most keen and useful. After Lieutenant Bridges had been through we took him on also. He was an exceptionally able and cultivated man, head and shoulders above anyone else in the NSW Artillery and probably with few superiors anywhere. I only remember one other outstanding officer, Captain H. P. Airey, a middle-aged man who did very well indeed in his course. He afterwards managed to get himself attached for a time to the British Army in India, saw service in Burma and distinguished himself there.

I have mentioned the Sudan Contingent and, though it was disbanded before I arrived, I was concerned in the aftermath of it in two cases. When the field battery that accompanied it returned, the question

* *Later Major General Sir William Throsby Bridges, the 'father' of the 1st AIF, who was mortally wounded at Anzac on 15 May 1915.*

arose as to what was to be done with its saddlery and equipment. The artillery said that it belonged to the Contingent and was no concern of theirs. The General argued that as the Contingent was broken up it was no concern of his and that as artillery material it belonged to them. Finally it was dumped in a shed behind the guard room at Victoria Barracks. Here anyone wanting a strap or two helped himself to it till there was little left but the heavier parts of the harness. At last notice was taken of the deficiencies. If I remember rightly, some unfortunate NCO in charge of the Guard was accused of being the culprit. A Court of Enquiry into the loss of equipment was then ordered to be held, of which I was appointed President. The enquiry showed that no one knew what had been stored there: there was no equipment ledger; no one knew what equipment the battery had taken with it, or what had been brought back. So naturally we had to report that there was no evidence upon which the blame could be attached to any individual. This report I signed to protect the other two members, subalterns of the artillery, from unpleasant consequences, and against all precedent I attached a personal report of my own, pointing out that as both the major-general and the colonel had inspected the barracks at least once, and the battery commanders several times since the defalcations had commenced, none of these officers could be held free of negligence. Bingham suppressed this, but showed it privately to the Colonial Secretary, who concurred.

Shortly after the return of the Sudan Contingent the CO of the field battery which accompanied it brought rather serious charges of insubordination against Captain H. P. Airey and Sergeant Lynch, and I think some others. Apparently on arrival in the Sudan Airey had gone to the General or some senior British officers and had represented that, as they were a scratch lot and had no training as a field battery, they were useless as artillery, but might do useful work if turned into mounted infantry and the CO was peeved about this. The charge against Lynch I don't remember. The court managed somehow to smooth matters over and exonerate everybody, but my only reason for mentioning the matter is this — after most of the junior officers had been through our course, Bingham represented to the Colonial Secretary that it was incongruous that when the junior officers and many of the NCOs and men were now fairly well trained, the battery commanders should remain knowing nothing whatever of gunnery, and recommended that they also should be put through a gunnery course. Disregarding very

rigorous opposition, this was ordered and two went through, the third being medically excused as he was incapacitated by gout or rheumatism from taking any active exercise. All three, by the way, were now lieutenant-colonels; the commander of the battery that went to the Sudan had been promoted for his service, and the other two as consolation for having been left behind, so honours were easy.

Thus it transpired that when the CO of the Sudan battery went *through his course he found that his sergeant instructor was that same Sergeant Lynch* against whom he had brought charges. It says much for Lynch that he made no attempt at all to use his position to get any of his own back.

In 1887 I got my substantive promotion to captain in the Royal Artillery and the local rank of major while serving with the NSW Artillery. I duly received my local commission as major but by a clerical slip it had been dated 1807 instead of 1887. The authorities thought I was flippant and seemed hurt when I solemnly called attention to the fact and enquired if it was to carry back pay.

The armament of the different batteries at Middle, George and South Heads consisted, if I recollect right, of 10-inch R.M.L. guns of 18 tons, 9-inch of 12 tons and 7-inch (I feel sure there was at least one of this calibre, for I remember that it was insufficiently rifled and when fired you could watch the shell turning over and over towards the end of its flight), 80-pounder, converted R.M.L., and 68-pounder S.M. guns. But the gems of the collection were two 10-inch Armstrong R.M.L. guns of 25 tons, of great length, a type which had been rejected by the Home Government on that account. To load them they had to be traversed through an arc of 90 degrees, depressed and loaded from a long gallery. They had great penetrative power, a range of about 8,000 yards and when all went well shot with great accuracy. But all did not always go well, as we learnt to our cost.

On account of the length of the cartridge and in order to ensure combustion of the whole charge, the cartridge was made up in two parts, the rear part having a perforated metal cylinder down the middle to enable the flash to reach the front part of the cartridge. We had with difficulty, in face of much opposition, got permission for our courses to fire a certain, very limited, amount of live ammunition from the heavier guns. (I believe that any practice carried out before that had been only from the 68 and 80-pounders).

The 25-ton guns were mounted to fire over open sights through the opening between the Heads, so their field of fire was thus much restricted. Bingham had managed to have a position finder got out from Home which would enable them to fire over the Heads. On receiving it we set out a target and duly started to do some experimental firing with it, Bingham and I directing the fire from the position finder on South Head. The first two shots were quite satisfactory, close to the target; with the third we heard a terrific crash behind us and the shriek of fragments over our heads: the shot had hit the rocks about half-way up the head. No one was hurt, but one fragment lodged in a chapel door outside the reservation and another fell in close proximity to a party of picnickers. The laying was found to be correct so evidently the ammunition was at fault and firing was at once stopped.

The badly frightened civilians made a great to do about the matter and, of course, the newspapers took it up; for a time there was a bad slump in the stocks of the Imperial officers and they were distinctly unpopular. A court of enquiry was at once ordered, but unfortunately the only people competent to carry out the enquiry were the presumed culprits themselves. Accordingly, Bingham, Penrose and myself were appointed a committee to enquire into the matter and we co-opted the Government chemist to assist us.

It turned out that the metal cylinder passing through the rear half of the cartridge had set up some destructive chemical action on the powder adjoining it, so that only half the charge had exploded. This discovery involved examination of all the remaining ammunition of that type, which in its turn involved an examination of the method of storage and the magazines.

This revealed an appalling state of affairs. The magazine, a relic of former days, was a large chamber which had been cut deeply into the South Head. It was approached by a narrow trench and was closed only by a wooden door. A contractor doing some blasting work outside the reservation had been allowed (so he alleged, though this was denied by the CRA) to store a whole row of barrels of blasting powder along this passage, the powder he required being taken as it was needed from the foremost barrel open for the purpose, a nice train being laid to the magazine to be set off perhaps by a flash of lightning.

We found, also, that there was no lobby to the magazine, and no floor-cloths or magazine slippers; when ammunition was required a

gunner was just sent in as he was to fetch it out. There appeared, moreover, to be no record of any sort of what the magazine contained except that for the heavy guns which had been added comparatively recently since the formation of the NSW defence force. So we had the whole magazine turned out and found it full of an immense assortment of various kinds, not only the cartridges for the heavy guns, but a great number of barrels which had contained cartridges for the 68-pounder smooth bores left behind by the Imperial Forces. Many of the bags had decayed and the powder was lying loose in the barrels. At the bottom of one barrel in which, however, the material was not decayed, we found when it was emptied a layer of percussion caps. Presumably the barrel had originally contained these and had not been properly emptied before the cartridges were put in. There were also, at the back of the magazine, boxes which were found to contain live shell for the 68-pounders, and there were also many boxes of 'Boxer' fuses. The marks upon these boxes showed that they had been sent out to the colony at the conclusion of the Crimean War. All this mix-up was, of course, as it had been left by the Royal Artillery, and was not to be laid at the door of the NSW Artillery except that apparently nothing had been done to ascertain what had been left in the magazine, and ammunition received later was just piled in front of the old stuff.

All this turned out to be for our advantage. There had been great difficulty in getting any ammunition allowed us for practice for the courses. We now pointed out that all the ammunition should be tested and the ancient stuff expended. This was approved, so we broke up all the old cartridges and re-made them, made up fresh cartridges with the loose powder and that obtained by emptying the shells, and by 'testing' and 'expending' it were able to give opportunities to the whole of that course and the following ones to get some practice. We were able also to train a certain number of selected men in magazine duties and the care and making-up of ammunition. It was a remarkable thing that we found all this old powder in clean, bright and serviceable condition, though most of it must have been at least thirty years old. I cannot remember what happened to the 25-ton ammunition, but have a vague idea that the metal cylinders were removed and replaced by cardboard ones.

In addition to the school at Middle Head I had also a good deal of instructional and lecturing work to do with the partially paid artillery

in various places. I was immensely struck with the keenness of all ranks, considering the deficiencies of equipment and the little interest that seemed to have been taken in them by anybody, and the degree of efficiency they had obtained was most praiseworthy.

The fortnight's Easter encampments I look back upon with the greatest pleasure. Bingham entrusted me with the work at South Head where I had the P.P. batteries from Newcastle, Bulli and Wollongong in my charge, whilst he took charge at Middle Head and kept me free from interference from the CRA there.

A keener or more intelligent lot of men one could not wish to work with. I have no hesitation in saying that at the end of our last encampment in 1888 they had attained a degree of efficiency far surpassing that of the Scottish militia to which I was appointed adjutant on my return home. To give an instance of their keenness: two years after I left Australia I received a letter and photographs from the CO of the Newcastle batteries, Major Kirkcaldy. He told me that the Sydney Government for reasons of economy had then abolished the Easter camp at Middle Head, so the batteries at Newcastle had got up a camp locally at their own expense, and he sent me these photographs to show me that they were endeavouring to keep up the work I had taught them. I hold them among my greatest treasures and an ample reward for the work with them.

I have mentioned the conflict of views between General Richardson and Colonel Roberts and the opposition that our reforms met with at times. But it must be understood that this was purely official and did not in the least affect our social relations; we received from both of them the same kindness and hospitality with which we were treated on all sides during our stay in Sydney.

That we found a terrible state of affairs and inefficiency in many directions from an artilleryman's point of view cannot be gainsaid, but it was understandable, and there is much to be said in extenuation. The chief blame lay in the first place with the Home government, which did nothing whatever to assist the New South Wales Government when it withdrew the Imperial troops. If a cadre of officers and other ranks had been left behind to help start and instruct the Colonial defence forces, that state of affairs would never have arisen. As it was, the colony was left to collect for itself a fresh lot of officers and men, mostly inexperienced. There seems also to have been much political

dispute over the question of having a defence force at all and something like a year, I believe, elapsed before this was done. Then the system adopted for providing for the officers lent itself to inertia: there was no retirement scheme, no pensions, no purchase money to be recovered on retirement. Thus, the senior officers had every inducement to hang on to their jobs as long as life lasted, and according to the custom of the country they enlisted political support to help them to do so. There was thus little or no prospect of promotion for the junior officers, and there was no honourable regimental tradition to uphold. Some slackness was therefore almost inevitable.

Above all, there was a sense of unreality about the whole business. The politicians in England had not yet learnt to make 'gestures' and to say to other nations 'kindly go first'. A three-power standard at sea was claimed and maintained — Britain was supreme on the ocean. Unless the British fleet was wiped from the seas, no attack on the colonies was possible. Moreover, there was no enemy to do the attacking: Germany had not yet turned her eyes towards sea power; Japan was not yet a power of any sort; Russia was then regarded as the one potential enemy, but it had a negligible fleet and its nearest base was at Vladivostok, at the other end of the Pacific. Then, too, at Sydney, as at home, when the financial powers desired to economise the first steps towards that end were taken at the expense of the defence force.

Small wonder then if the permanent artillery was looked upon, and looked upon by itself, as being maintained chiefly as a military background to the police force. 'Spit and polish' were the twin gods still reigning over the services at home and to these the NSW Artillery duly did obeisance. In turn-out and on the barrack square there was not much fault to find with them.

That sense of unreality I felt very strongly myself: when, to stimulate the interest of officers in coast defence, I prepared lectures giving an imaginary account of a naval attack on Port Stephens, supposed to be fortified, I knew I was imagining a vain thing. These lectures were afterwards published by the NSW Government, and a copy, I think, was sent to the Royal Artillery Institute in England. I had studied the bombardment of Alexandria and knew, what was not then generally known, that Sir Michael Seymour had reported that after the bombardment the British fleet, had it then met an enemy, had not sufficient ammunition left to carry on a fight for three hours.

Also, to make sure that the tactics I attributed to the fleet were not absurd, I submitted a draft to a naval friend of mine — Admiral Tryon's flag captain. He reported to the effect that 'if any Naval Officer could be found who was such a damned fool as to pit his fleet against forts, he would probably do it on the lines you suggest.' Yet we did it in 1914.

In 1888, when my three years' engagement expired, the NSW Government was bent on economy and decided to prolong the services of only one engineer and one artillery officer, so Milward and I went back to England.

So ended three of the happiest years of my life. I look back now with unalloyed pleasure to my service in Sydney, to the extreme kindness and hospitality I met with on all sides, and to lasting friendships then made. Not least do I feel intensely proud that I was permitted to take a part, however small, in laying the foundations of what was to expand ultimately into the Australian Army that helped the Mother Country so valiantly and efficiently in the Great War. □

An article on the School of Artillery from 1885 to 1956, by Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Watt, RAA, appears in the *Australian Army Journal*, January, 1957. In this article Colonel Watt gives a few extracts from the foregoing narrative by Lieutenant Colonel Bunbury.

The story of the receipt of Colonel Bunbury's narrative is, in itself, of special interest. Captain E. W. Latchford—then an instructor at the Small Arms School, Randwick, NSW, after a distinguished career in the AIF (he died in Melbourne at the age of 72, a colonel on the retired list)—received in February, 1934, a letter from Colonel Bunbury, who wrote: 'Let me introduce myself as the father of the Noel Bunbury you served with in Siberia . . . I don't know if he ever told you that I was one of the first batch of the Imperial officers who went out to Sydney (1885-88), now nearly half a century ago, a time I remember as being one of those I enjoyed most in my long life. But very few of the many friends I made there now remain. I look back with pride and pleasure to having laid some of the foundations of the now great and war-proved Australian Army. I founded and ran for nearly three years the first school of gunnery at Middle Head. Quaint and very amusing were some of our first experiences with the Old NSW Artillery as we found it. I trust, e.g., that a sentry on the South Head Battery no longer kept a supply of bottles of beer rammed down the M.L. guns to solace him in his solitude . . . My first house was at Milson's Point and now must lie under the approaches of the Harbour Bridge. For nearly three years I went out by the guard boat some six days a week to Middle Head in the morning and tramped back in the evening to take a boat at Mosman's Bay. I gather most of that place is now built over and suppose that the masses of flannel flowers that grew near Middle and George's Head have now disappeared, and the wattle . . . If you get the chance of coming across a little book, *Early Days in Western Australia*, you will learn what Sydney looked like to my father in 1835.'

Latchford sent a copy of Colonel Bunbury's letter to his friend, Len Wade,* then a lieutenant at the School of Artillery, with a note in which he said: 'Yesterday I received a letter from the father of an Indian Army officer with whom I served in Siberia and with whom I still correspond (Major Bunbury, 13th Frontier Force Rifles). I have been in the habit of sending him the special issues of *The Sydney Mail* which he evidently passes on to the 'old man'. . . . The old chap is evidently the founder of your noble Institution. . . . Noel Bunbury, who was a very fine cove . . . had mentioned to me in 1919 that his family had associations with Sydney, but, like lots of other details, it has slipped out of my recollection. On reading extracts of the letter yesterday to Major J. J. L. McCall, he suggested that I get in touch with John Whitelaw, who might be interested. . . .'

Major J. S. Whitelaw, who retired in 1951 as a major-general after a distinguished career in both wars, was then Chief Instructor at the School of Artillery. He at once wrote to Colonel Bunbury and asked him if he would put down his recollections of his service in Sydney in 1885-88, and received the narrative which is published above. Writing to *Stand-To*, General Whitelaw, out of what he terms an 'imperfect recollection' after nearly thirty years, said: 'Accompanying it were a few photographs of the aiming of the casemate battery at George's Head, and one of himself which was framed and lying at the School of Artillery, South Head, and I believe was later transferred when the School moved to North Head. Shortly after my successor at the School of Artillery was doing his gunnery courses in England, and I sent him Colonel W. St. Pierre Bunbury's address in Farnborough and suggested he call and make his number with W. St. Pierre. He did so. He reckoned that the old gentleman would be of great age, and probably an invalid, but found him robustly discussing a bottle of port after lunch with, I think, his elder brother.'

• *In a letter to the Editor of Stand-To, (from which this article is taken), three months before his death, Colonel Latchford said: 'My old friend, Len Wade, now passed on, one of the finest, was regarded as the best field artillery instructor in Australia. I understand that a picture of Colonel Bunbury was in the School of Artillery mess, but nobody there knew who it was until Len Wade received my letter.'*

Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit

THE difficulties arising from a divided civil and military control in the territories of Papua and New Guinea during the hazardous early weeks of 1942, particularly after the Japanese air raids of 3rd and 5th February on Port Moresby, were resolved by the suspension, under the National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations, of the civil administration of those areas. In accordance with those Regulations, a Military Commander was authorized to do all things necessary for the defence of the territories.

War Cabinet's approval of the temporary cessation of civil government in Papua was gazetted in Canberra on 12th February 1942, and, two days later, the Administrator, the Hon. H. L. Murray, CBE, published a Gazette Extraordinary stating that civil government had ceased at noon that day. On the following day he left for Australia and Major General Basil M. Morris assumed administrative control.

Within a few months the Japanese were in control of at least half of the 186,540 square miles of the territories. The problem of maintaining most of the functions of civil administration, therefore, was a formidable one and without the help of many former officers of the administration would have been impossible. General Morris was able to report that, by October of 1942, law and order had been re-established and every district still in the hands of the Australians was competently staffed and patrolled.

Early in March 1942, Morris posted most of the officers of both civil administrations, and many other men experienced in the territories, to two new army units—the Papuan Administrative Unit and the New Guinea Administrative Unit. The two units were merged on 21st March and became the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit—or ANGAU, a name familiar to all servicemen during the next four years.

The functions of ANGAU were to assist in winning the war; to police the territories and to preserve law and order; to look after the welfare of the inhabitants; to preserve their loyalty to the Crown and enlist their assistance in the common cause; to produce food and

plantation crops for Allied requirements and to maintain all possible assets. It was the desire of General Morris to be able to present to Australia when the war was over an area thoroughly policed and governed, with a loyal, healthy and co-operative native population—an area with its natural assets and industry reasonably intact.

The character of ANGAU had to be a military one from its origin. Although it included many former local civilians, its members were all Army personnel. It could neither feed nor clothe itself except through the Army. It was a unit formed of competent men of experience and technical ability. General Morris said it could, with justice, be described as 'the territories in uniform' and the existence of ANGAU was limited by the duration of the war. Every member was a soldier first, and he had to be prepared at any moment to drop his pen for a rifle and defend the office or the plantation (not as a plantation, but as part of his country).

The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit consisted of a Headquarters and two branches—District Services and Production Services. District Services policed the area, maintained law and order, was concerned with the welfare, feeding, clothing and health of all its inhabitants and provided and controlled native labour. Production Services provided the food required by the native people, transport for the men of the District Services and those working the plantations, and technical direction. The branches were complementary.

The policy of the Production Branch of ANGAU was primarily to produce the maximum output, while maintaining non-producing areas. In the case of rubber, the most valuable commodity, all bearing trees were preserved. The War Establishment of ANGAU included experienced inspectors, managers and assistants, an economic botanist, an agricultural chemist and an entomologist. It also included enlisted men members who were owners and shareholders of plantations.

In the administration of the Territory, areas formerly known as 'Divisions' and 'Districts' were changed to 'Districts' and 'Sub-Districts' and the titles 'District Officer' and 'Assistant District Officer' replaced 'Resident Magistrate' and 'Assistant Resident Magistrate' respectively. The duties of the District Officers and those under their control were maintenance and control of the native population; location and eradication of fifth column activities and movements; provision of labour;

provision of assistance to Allied airmen forced down and the capture of crashed enemy airmen. District Officers were also responsible for the command and administration of Native Police, army wireless stations, plantation staffs and labour. Additionally it was necessary for the District Officers to keep in close liaison with the fighting troops, to establish standing police patrols on vital routes, aerodromes and other localities not otherwise guarded, and to ensure that native gardeners produced sufficient food to maintain themselves, plus 50 per cent. Offensive action was to be avoided unless the situation left no other alternative.

With the re-introduction of law and order and the distribution of food and tobacco, the native people returned once more to the scene of operations and were employed in a variety of ways to enable troops to be released for more important duties. Native houses were constructed for use as stores, ships were unloaded, metal was quarried for roads and



(Australian War Memorial)

An ANGAU party carrying signal equipment inland from Waiwai, New Guinea, October 1942. Its mission was to establish a spotting station in the Oro Bay area.

aerodromes, and dispersal bays constructed for aerodromes. Plantations were manned and after the Japanese landing at Buna the local people were engaged as scouts, stretcher-bearers and carriers of supplies to the troops. As early as October 1942, despite the loss of a considerable area of the territories to the enemy, over 7,000 native people were actively employed on operations and thousands more were required and subsequently furnished.

As time went on, ANGAU expanded. Additional orders under the National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations were introduced and the work of helping to win the war went on. An Administrative Instruction of 7 February 1944, altered the constitution of ANGAU so that it conformed somewhat to the organization of a Division, with a General Officer Commanding and possessing 'G', 'A' and 'Q' branches. On 8 April 1944, another important change took place with the formation of three Regional Headquarters, which were to be secondary only to General HQ. The three regions were to be known as Northern, Southern and Islands and the Regional Commander was to be responsible for all ANGAU activities in his region. This did not alter the functions of HQ, ANGAU, which was responsible for the administration of both territories. The districts included in each region were:— Northern: Sepik, Ramu, North Markham, South Markham. Southern: Fly River, Purari, Lakekhamu, Moresby, Samarai, Trobriands, Tufi, Mambare. Islands: Manus, New Britain, New Ireland and Bougainville.

One of the most important branches of ANGAU was that of the Native Labour Service. The District Officers were responsible for the accommodation and control of all native workers in Native Labour Camps; organization of working parties; allocation of officers in charge of native labour and native labour officers; and supervision of labour in their allotted tasks. The Native Labour Service on Regional HQ was responsible for policy, subject to direction of Administrative HQ; the recording and consolidation of all labour contracts; administration of all native labour throughout the districts; and repatriation and leave.

HQ, ANGAU, was responsible for the administration of the Papuan Infantry Battalion and New Guinea Infantry Battalions when they were not in an operational role and was regarded as analogous to an infantry divisional headquarters, maintaining all records for Australian and native personnel. HQ, ANGAU, was responsible for the provision of recruits to the native battalions and the keeping up to



(Australian War Memorial)

A member of ANGAU supervising the cutting of bridge timber near Lae, March 1944.

strength of the Depot Battalion from which reinforcements were selected by the commanding officers of the battalions.

In the employment and treatment of native labour, army laws were similar to those of peacetime. Those laws provided for a scheme under which the native worker made a contract or undertaking for a definite length of time with certain rates of pay. The standard of food, medical attention, clothing and housing and the standards of general care and treatment were set out. On the other hand it was laid down that the native worker should faithfully carry out his part of the bargain—work properly and carry out orders. If either broke the contract there were provisions for punishment by the courts of the territories. With so many native workers employed by the Army, ANGAU became responsible for those requirements and if a native person failed in his duty he was dealt with by the District Officer. Persons in authority, such as Native Labour Overseers, could not administer punishment other than in a minor form.

The training of native workers to assist in the medical care and treatment of the population had been instituted by the pre-war administration. This scheme was continued and expanded by ANGAU. Trainees, chosen for their enthusiasm and adaptability, were engaged for three years. Recruits from Papua had to be able to read and write English while those from New Guinea had to read and write pidgin.

In order to hasten the rehabilitation of native communities, an ANGAU Administrative Order of 31 August 1944, restricted the numbers recruited for employment by the army to 30 per cent of the adult population of any village and, as far as practicable, workers had



(Australian War Memorial)

An ANGAU controlled trading post at Kairuku Station, Yule Island.


to be employed in their home district. A survey was conducted with a view to repatriating such labour as was necessary to restore the availability of 70 per cent of the effective male population in each village. A native worker who had completed his term of service would be

repatriated to his village and would not be re-signed for service until the expiration of three months unless he otherwise desired it.

ANGAU, under Major General Morris, had charge of all territory freed from the enemy from early 1943 until the end of October 1945.

A new Administration, in charge of Colonel J. K. Murray, as Administrator, was created under the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act of 1945-46; and it began to function in Port Moresby at 3 p.m. on 31 October 1945. ANGAU headquarters, under General Morris, then moved on to Lae. Thenceforward, all territory southward of the Markham River was in care of the Provisional Civil Administration, and the remainder was in the care of ANGAU. Step by step, the remaining districts of New Guinea, as they were declared free from enemy personnel (thousands of whom were roaming the countryside), were handed over to Civil Administration. ANGAU finally ceased to function on 24 June 1946, and most of its trained personnel were transferred to the Civil Administration. □

—C.F.C.



History of Fort Queenscliff

*Major C. A. Cunningham
Royal Australian Artillery*

THE history of Fort Queenscliff dates back to the days of the Crimean War (1853-56), when Britain and her allies were at war with Russia. However, the history of Queenscliff goes back even further.

Although the Borough of Queenscliffe, which includes the towns of Queenscliff and Point Lonsdale and the islands of Swan Bay, was not established until 1863, its history commenced over half a century before. In 1803 a convict, William Buckley, escaped during an unsuccessful attempt to settle at Port Phillip. Buckley wandered the western shores of Port Phillip Bay with the blacks and is said to have established his home in a cave. 'Buckley's Cave' can still be seen in the cliffs near the Point Lonsdale Lighthouse.

Major Cunningham was commissioned into the Royal Australian Artillery in June 1952 after attending the first course at the OCS. He was posted to various regimental appointments and served with 105 Fd Bty in Malaya (1955-57). In December 1958 he returned to the OCS, as the Artillery Instructor, where he served for three years. His next appointment was as Adjutant of 13 Fd Regt in Adelaide (1962-64). He attended the Australian Staff College for the 1965 Course and was then posted to HQ W Comd as DAAG (1966-67). In 1968 Major Cunningham was posted to the Australian Staff College where he spent four years as the GSO2. During this period he edited a publication, History of Fort Queenscliff and the Australian Staff College, from which this article is taken. In 1972 he was posted to his current appointment of SO2 (Ops) HQ 2 Spt Gp, N Comd.

The earliest known references to settlement in the Queenscliff area were made in 1841 when four pilots of the Government Pilot Service, two freemen, a convict boat keeper and two boats were established at Shortlands Bluff where the Fort now stands. The general area was opened up in 1852, as a seaside resort for the rapidly expanding populations of Melbourne, Geelong and Ballarat.

The earliest moves connected with the establishment of Fort Queenscliff came in the early 1850s. At that time the Victorian Parliament was becoming anxious about the defences of Melbourne and Port Phillip Bay. There was much argument about whether the heads should be fortified. In 1854 a Select Committee of the Legislative Council was formed to enquire into the question and in July 1858 a Royal Commission on the defences of the colony was appointed. Initially, the fortification of an area from Point Ormond to Williamstown was favoured but eventually, in 1859, the fortification of the heads and the enrolment of additional volunteers was recommended. The main recommendations of the commission were that a militia formation of some 3,000 troops be raised in Victoria; the colony to be divided into districts with limitations as determined by the Government. This force was to consist of Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Infantry and some naval militia.

Conditions of service are of interest. The force was to be a volunteer body, but if insufficient volunteers were forthcoming, the ballot was to be resorted to in such districts as deemed necessary by the Government. Service was in terms of three years and ages of enlistment and service 18-50 years old. Boys over 10 years of age and attending a school receiving Government aid, underwent one hour of training a week.

In the Geelong District the numbers raised for the militia were:

Cavalry — A troop	67
Artillery — One company	133
Infantry — One battalion (six companies) —	422

It would appear that no great difficulty was found in raising the Cavalry and Artillery units.

At this time, 1858-59, all that was established at Shortlands Bluff (later Fort Queenscliff) was a sandstone sea wall. This wall is still in position south of the Library Block. It was apparently built to assist in keeping the Bluff firm along the bay front where it was proposed to mount heavy armament. Later it was decided to raise the Queenscliff Artillery as part of the volunteer forces of Victoria.

In 1860 the citizens of Queenscliff enthusiastically volunteered to man three 64-pr muzzle-loading cannons as part of the overall defence scheme. These guns were located somewhere close to the area now occupied by the main syndicate block. The arguments over the best method of defending Melbourne and Geelong continued, and later in 1860 an officer was sent out from England to report on the Defences of Port Phillip.

In his report, among the recommendations made for the Port Phillip Defences, were the following, concerning armament and installations:

Shortlands Bluff—The construction of a fort, mounting six heavy-rifled guns, to be made secure from a *coup de main*.

At about 300 yards SSW of Shortlands Bluff an open battery of five heavy-rifled guns to be placed so that the fire of all could be concentrated on the entrance and the basin of water within the Heads.

Point Nepean—The construction of a fort, mounting eight heavy-rifled guns with a defensive barracks behind and secure from a *coup de main*.

Swan Island—An open battery of four heavy-rifled guns, a torpedo harbour and engine-house.

South Channel Shoal—A battery of 12 heavy-rifled guns mounted in a casement stone fort.

The original scheme was 'codified' by Major General Sir Peter Scratchley in 1876. Despite these recommendations, it was not until 1882, following Russian ventures into South Australian waters, that the Government decided to do something further about the building of defences at the Heads. In that year, work started on Fort Queenscliff, together with Crows Nest, Swan Island, Fort Nepean and others. It was appreciated that all fortifications should be able to withstand assault from the land as well as the sea, and all the main forts should be self-contained so as to be able to withstand siege. The landward defences of Fort Queenscliff included a gorge or moat, a wall with loopholes, a keep and a bridge. The walls and keep are those that stand today and were almost completed by 1884.

The forts at Port Phillip Heads are briefly described in Parliamentary Papers of the period as under:

Fort Queenscliff

An open work with a loopholed wall and 'gorge' containing barracks for the Permanent Artillery (the 'gorge' has always been known locally as the 'MOAT'). The approved armament at Fort Queenscliff consisted of two 9.2-inch and three 6-inch breech-loaders, with a variety of rifled muzzle-loaders, quick-fires and Nordenfeldt machine-guns.

Crows Nest

At a site on the foreshore between Cottage by the Sea and Riptide Motel, a small work with stockade, enclosed gauge-guns to sweep the bay between Nepean and Lonsdale and a QF gun to command the Narrows and basin with the Heads.

Swan Island

An open work with stockade enclosed 'gorge' wall, nine entanglements and musketry redoubts, with two Nordenfeldt machine-guns (12 barrels). Also as the Headquarters of the Permanent Submarine Miners (later RAE), a torpedo harbour with engine-room.

Point Nepean

A miniature 'Gibraltar' with a large amount of bomb-proof cover, with barracks for detachments. It is of historical interest that Australia's first shot in the Great War was fired, from a six-inch BL Mark VII gun on this station, across the bows of the German vessel, *SS Pfalz*, forcing her to heave to and be captured. (This occurred on 4 August 1914, shortly after the declaration of war). Except that it had no rifled muzzle-loaders, Nepean's armament was similar to that at Fort Queenscliff.

Fort Franklin

An open battery with one 10-inch BL gun mounted on a special naval carriage, two five-inch BL guns and one 4.7-inch QF gun, with barracks for a battery of artillery. This fort covered the examination anchorage where suspect vessels were boarded and searched in time of war.

South Channel

A small casemated stone fort containing a test room for mines, encircled with open piles to repel boat attacks and a central breastwork with two machine-guns and a low musketry parapet protecting the rear. Larger guns were also approved for the fort.

Eagles Nest

A small work at the end of the Point Nepean isthmus. One 10-inch BL gun and one 14-pr QF.

The scheme for the defence of Port Phillip was:

- Defence of the entrance: Nepean, Queenscliff and Crows Nest Batteries.
- Defence of the West Channel: Swan Island Battery in conjunction with a minefield.
- Defence of the South Channel: Franklin and South Channel Batteries and the minefield controlled from South Channel Fort.

The fortifications and armaments around Port Phillip Bay were finally completed by 1891. It is of interest that at this period the Port Phillip Heads area was the most heavily fortified in the British Empire, south of the equator.

In addition some nine naval vessels were also involved, including HMVS *Cerberus*. It is understood that should the enemy fire be severe, *Cerberus* was to retire inside Pope's Eye and, with the protection afforded by the barrier of rocks, gallantly continue the battle. The hull of HMVS *Cerberus* can still be seen half submerged near Half Moon Bay (Black Rock).

At Fort Queenscliff, barbed wire entanglements were placed around the front of the old wall on the bay side on the far side of the south moat. These were replaced and strengthened considerably during the Great War and the Second World War, the wire then used being of a much heavier type. Many of these entanglements still remain today.

During the period of construction of the Fort, the post office for the district was moved to its present site in the town, and a police station was built on the present site in Gellibrand Street. At the time, construction of the Fort was deemed urgent and most of the local fishermen and farmers were employed on the excavations and buildings. Wages for one man with a horse (or bullock) and a dray were 14/- per day—good pay in those days.

During 1935-36 when A, B, C and D blocks were being built, the moat was filled in at the main, east and west gates to provide solid roadways into the Fort. This did away with the drawbridge effect which was till then provided by the wooden bridges leading in over the moat.

During 1952 the moat was for the main part filled in, except on both flanks of the Fort where portions still exist. The soil for this task was taken mainly from the large mound which protected the range-finding stations, which are still a prominent feature opposite the main entrance. The labouring work was carried out by Italian migrants. The wooden single-storied buildings, constructed in 1891 on the sites which A and B blocks now occupy, were erected as temporary accommodation. They remained in use until 1936. Model Room 1 was the first building used as a barrack room although it was originally intended as a drill room. Later, it housed the gymnasium and canteens. At the same time galvanised iron buildings were erected on the site of the present D block and QM Store block and for many years these were the home of the engineers after the company was transferred from the Swan Island Depot.

THE GARRISON

The Garrison as such dates from 1882, when work on the Fort started and the local Queenscliff volunteer gunner company was disbanded and reformed as part of the Victorian Permanent Artillery. After Federation in 1901, the Victorian Permanent Artillery became the Royal Australian Artillery, part of which manned the Fort until 1947. The volunteer company (known as 'Stubbs Tigers') had been commanded by one Captain Stubbs who became the first officer commanding the Victorian Artillery in this district.

The title of the artillery units in Victoria has been successively Victorian Artillery, Victorian Permanent Artillery, Victorian Regiment of Royal Australian Artillery, then after Federation in 1901, the Royal Australian Artillery, the Royal Australian Garrison Artillery (as distinct from the Royal Australian Field Artillery) and finally as at present the Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery.

In the early days, the physical standard of the garrison was particularly high, and many gunners, after serving a five-year term, joined the Victorian Police. The garrison was in fact, until the early thirties, the main recruiting ground for that force.

Over the years keen rivalry existed in the garrison between gunners and sappers, particularly in sporting activities (and also the 'Leather-necks', as all soldiers were known, and the 'Squids' who were and are the local fishermen). The sappers, always in the minority as regards numbers, were convinced of their superiority in general, possibly because

a sapper was ranked as an 'Artificer' being enlisted as a tradesman of some kind, and, therefore, on a slightly higher rate of pay than a gunner. Gunners have never conceded that such a view was correct. In later years this friendly animosity died down and practically vanished during the Second World War when many an engineer found himself transferred to the artillery in coast defences.

A Royal Australian Artillery Band was raised and maintained at Fort Queenscliff over a long period. This Band was much in demand for important State and Civic occasions in Melbourne and elsewhere, and of course for any public entertainment in the town. A Commanding Officer's parade was held each Wednesday and the Garrison, complete with band, marched through the town providing a colourful spectacle which was much appreciated, reminding all and sundry that Queenscliff was a 'Garrison' town.

By 1946 Coastal Artillery had become outmoded, and in that year, Fort Queenscliff became the home of the Australian Staff College.


A DESCRIPTION OF FORT QUEENSCLIFF

The Main Gate

The landward defences of the Fort were started in 1882 and were completed by about 1885. The existing walls are the original ones and are constructed of bricks made from locally quarried lime and sandstone. The walls are fitted with iron loopholes to permit the defenders to cover all the likely landward approaches. Running along the length of the wall, on the inside, was a mound of earth, 8 to 10 feet wide, which allowed riflemen to move up to positions in rear of the loopholes and fire from the kneeling or lying position. Outside the walls was a gorge or moat over which was a bridge at this main gate and a smaller bridge at the East Gate. The gorge was never intended to be filled with water; it was merely a deep ditch designed to make more difficult the attackers' task of scaling the wall. The support for the massive wooden door which could be closed over the main gate can still be seen above the inside of the gate. The gate was closed at night, the only entrance then being a small door cut in the main gate.

The East Gate

The East Gate was always a subsidiary entrance to the Fort. Just inside the gate was a small stone building which was originally used as the Queenscliff morgue. This building was removed in comparatively recent times.



Aerial view of Fort Queenscliff

The Keep

The brick building incorporating part of the western and northern walls is known as the Keep. Originally the Keep served primarily as a watch tower, being permanently manned by an NCO and seven gunners. The Keep was self-contained in that it had stocks of food, water and ammunition stored permanently in an underground chamber. An ammunition lift enabled ammunition to be hoisted from below ground to both floors and to the roof. The Keep was furnished with a stove and sleeping quarters.

Well (near Lecture Room)

The provision of water for the garrison, when under siege, was essential; consequently several large fresh-water wells were constructed at the time the walls were built. This well is one of the largest and contains a large volume of brackish but drinkable fresh water. It is one of many wells inside the Fort walls.

Two-Storey Stone Building

The stone buildings originally constructed in 1856, comprised the lighthouse keeper's quarters, the Queenscliff Post Office, Police Station and Court House. This was prior to the construction, in 1882, of the landward defences. Later, these buildings were used as married quarters for members of the garrison and as offices. The southern portion of the building was used as married quarters until 1930. Currently the building houses the Commandant's office, the offices of the directing staff, the orderly room and College Headquarters. The small signal gun on the lawn outside the Commandant's office is Spanish in origin, but its history is unknown.

The Old Signal Station

The wood and brick construction is the original pilot and light keepers signal station. This was probably built in the 1850s. Originally only the wooden portion existed but when the brick buildings in the Fort were constructed it became necessary to raise the whole building so that an uninterrupted view of the Bay and Rip could be obtained. Hence in about 1927 the lower brick portion was built and the wooden building raised onto it. In about 1922, an eight-foot Barr and Stroud rangefinder was installed by the Army as part of the Fort fire control system. This building is now used as a store by the Lighthouse Service.

The Black Lighthouse

The black lighthouse was erected on its present site in 1863 from stone quarried and shaped in Scotland. The stone was shipped out to Australia and then assembled by local and convict labour. The light is now operated by electric power, but has a standby gas system which automatically operates in the event of a power failure. As the black lighthouse is within the Fort area, the State has a perpetual right-of-way from the East Gate to the lighthouse area.

Moat (near the North Magazine)

The original gorge or moat still exists at this portion of the wall. At the eastern end of the moat are the remains of one of the early gun emplacements. It is thought that a 14-pr QF was mounted here, but it could have been an RBL 80-pr mounted in 1879. In any event, the gun was served by local volunteers from Queenscliff area. The underground magazines, for the service of this particular gun, were probably constructed later and comprised both a shell store and propellant magazine.

Old Observing Station and Lookout

This observing station, only portion of which still remains, was used as an auxiliary observation post and contained a rangefinder. From here a good view of the Bay, from Swan Island to Fort Nepean, could be obtained.

Saluting Battery

A saluting battery of four 14-pr guns was mounted on this site in 1922. In 1894 these guns were part of the armament of Fort Queenscliff but were finally removed in 1945. Until the mid-1930s they were equipped with one-inch sub-calibre tubes for drills. These had a propellant of black powder of 19th century vintage, and in the latter stage of their life produced some astonishing ballistic performances. The fall of short reports were generally hilarious as, of two successive rounds, one might just drop over the cliff and the other produce a tiny splash well beyond the target. The present guns, four 3-pr Hotchkiss, were installed in 1960 to mark the 100 years association of the Fort with the town of Queenscliff.

Fountain

The present brick buildings built in 1936 replaced the original barrack blocks erected in the early 1880s. These buildings are at present

used by students as living quarters, studies and syndicate rooms. The present grassed quadrangle was originally an asphalt parade ground. The fountain was erected in memory of Colonel Fetherston who was the Principal Medical Officer to the Victorian Military Forces and Surgeon to the Royal Victorian Artillery and later the Royal Australian Artillery. He died in 1901.

Generator Room and Light Passage

The Generator Room housed kerosene engines driving generators and battery-charging facilities which supplied all electric power for the Fort, including power for all searchlights. The entrance to the Light Passage, a 67-foot underground passage which connected all the searchlights mounted in the face of the cliff at each gun emplacement, can be seen from this location. The lights and generators were the responsibility of the RAE not the RAA.

6-Inch Mk VII Emplacements

Three 6-inch Mk VII guns were emplaced in 1909, when all the old armament except the 14-pr and 6-inch Vavasseurs were dismantled. At this time the Swan Island Battery was also dismantled and the island handed over to the Navy. Each 6-inch gun emplacement had, underground, its own propellant magazine and shell store. Shells were raised into emplacements by means of a hand operated ammunition lift. In addition to each gun's fighting light (searchlight), stationary lights were located at Fort Queenscliff, Crows Nest and Fort Nepean; these could completely illuminate the whole of the entrance to the bay.

Command Post

This rectangular white concrete structure is of World War I origin.

Guard Room

The guard room is the original one built in the 1880s when the main fort was constructed. The brass bell also dates back to the original construction of the fort. It was used primarily as an alarm bell. The three cells behind the guard room earned notoriety when, before World War I, a number of 15-year-old youths were briefly incarcerated there for failing to fulfil their compulsory cadet service requirements under the 1910 Defence Act. This ceased abruptly when brought to the attention of the Federal Parliament, then in Melbourne.

HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN STAFF COLLEGE

On 5 July 1938 Colonel H. D. Wynter and his staff assembled at Victoria Barracks, Sydney, to prepare the training syllabus for the new Command and Staff School.

The objects of the school were:

- To instruct commanders and staff officers in minor strategy, tactics, staff duties, and administration in the field.
- In conformity with the principles laid down in the training manuals of these subjects, to ensure uniformity of method in their application and a uniform standard of tactical thought throughout the Australian Military Forces.
- To give senior officers of all arms an opportunity of exchanging ideas on training and administration.

Courses were to be included for militia officers, although the school was primarily for the permanent staff. Accordingly the Command and Staff School, from which the Australian Staff College eventually emerged in 1946, was officially opened in Sydney on 8 August 1938 by Mr H. V. C. Thorby, the Hon. Minister for Defence. Twenty-nine major-generals, brigadiers and colonels assembled to receive a week of instruction from 8-13 August 1938.

During his vote of thanks to the Minister, Colonel Wynter included the following remarks:

In the study of strategy and tactics, we shall endeavour to obtain recognition of principle. We shall hope to attain that; not by a metaphysical examination of the principles themselves but by the study, as practical as it can be made, of problems on the ground, on the map and on a cloth model representing the ground.

Side by side with and as an essential part of the study of the art of the general—the art of the commander, in the intellectual sphere, it will be our aim to ensure that teaching shall not become formal nor solutions stereotyped and that the practical facts of every case shall govern decision.

It is thus that the Command and Staff School hopes to influence, throughout the army, the production of trained minds capable of instinctively applying principle to the interpretation of and to decisions upon the varying factors which affect strategy and tactics, which, reduced to their simplest meaning are the command and leadership of troops in war.

The original staff of the school, in addition to the Commandant, Colonel (later Lt Gen) H. D. Wynter, CMG, DSO, were Major (later Lt Gen Sir William) W. Bridgeford, MC and Major (later Brig) R. G. H. Irving. In addition the following officers were attached to the Directing Staff (DS) for the duration of the course:



OFFICIAL OPENING—COMMAND AND STAFF SCHOOL—8th AUGUST, 1938.

- BACK ROW:—Brig. G. A. Street, M.C., Col. F. P. M. Solling, M.C., Col. J. J. Murray, D.S.O., M.C., V.D., Lt.-Col. F. H. Berryman, D.S.O., Brig. E. F. Lind, D.S.O., V.D., Col. S. G. Friend, Brig. R. M. Stodart, V.D., Brig. A. R. Allen, E.D., Col. A. K. Wendt, Col. A. C. Fawtrel, C.B., D.S.O., V.D., Brig. J. L. G. Johnstone, V.D., Brig. V. H. Gatliff, D.S.O., V.D., Brig. M. B. B. Keatinge, M.C., V.D., Brig. N. M. Freeman, D.S.O.
- MIDDLE ROW:—Brig. A. S. Allen, D.S.O., V.D., Lt.-Col. S. F. Rowell, O.B.E., Brig. H. C. de Low, D.S.O., V.D., Brig. J. M. A. Durrant, C.M.G., D.S.O., Brig. G. V. Moriarty, M.C., V.D., Brig. W. H. St. Clair, D.S.O., V.D., Brig. J. Craven, D.C.M., E.D., Brig. J. Hill, M.C., E.D., Col. F. B. Hinton, M.C., Brig. A. Jackson, O.B.E., V.D., Brig. S. G. Savige, D.S.O., M.C., Brig. F. P. Derham, D.S.O., V.D., Brig. L. J. Morshead, C.M.G., D.S.O., E.D., W.O. (I.) W. L. Cleland.
- FRONT ROW:—Lt.-Col. W. Bridgeford, M.C., Lt.-Col. E. C. P. Plant, D.S.O., O.B.E., Maj.-Gen. J. L. Hardie, D.S.O., O.B.E., Maj.-Gen. E. A. Drake-Brockman, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., The Hon. The Minister for Defence, Mr. H. V. C. Thorby, Col. H. D. Wynter, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commandant, Lt.-Gen. E. K. Squires, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., Maj.-Gen. O. F. Phillips, C.M.G., D.S.O., Maj.-Gen. I. G. Mackay, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., Maj.-Gen. J. D. Richardson, D.S.O., V.D., Maj. R. G. H. Irving.

Lt Col (later Maj Gen) E. C. P. Plant, DSO, OBE, (DMT)

Lt Col (later Lt Gen Sir Frank) F. H. Berryman, DSO, (Asst DMO)

Lt Col (later Lt Gen Sir Sydney) S. F. Rowell, OBE, (DMO and I)

Most of Australia's senior officers during the Second World War attended the first course. In the first 17 months nearly all the CMF officers who subsequently held commands in 6 and 7 Divisions, AIF, attended the school.

Courses were included to meet the needs of junior staff officers and officers holding regimental appointments. A number of demonstrations and tactical exercises were conducted for Staff Corps officers, and examinations for promotion for both Staff Corps and CMF were held.

The School occupied the buildings in Victoria Barracks, Paddington, previously vacated by the Royal Military College. During the period August 1938 to July 1940, 18 two to three weeks courses were run at Paddington, handling a total of 360 officers of ranks from captain to general. When these buildings were required for other military purposes, the Command and Staff School was moved to Duntroon in October 1940. Special buildings had to be constructed but all other existing facilities were adequate. The School had its own training staff and was directly responsible to Army Headquarters. Administration was under the Commandant of the Royal Military College.

On 15 April 1942 the School was reorganized and became the Staff School (Australia). Also on this date the Royal Military College and the Staff School (Australia) were amalgamated under the one command for the purpose of administration and supervision of training. Consequently the title 'RMC and SS (Aust.)' is often seen in official records. However, the Staff School retained its own team of instructors. The first courses conducted at Duntroon were of 12 weeks duration. In August 1942 the School was divided into two wings: the Senior Wing for Grade One appointments and the Junior Wing for Grade Two appointments. A total of 495 students passed through the School whilst it was located at Duntroon.

The Staff School was transferred to Cabarlah, near Toowoomba, Queensland in September 1944 for two reasons: first to enable it to work in conjunction with other army establishments in Queensland, and second so that the Royal Military College could concentrate on its primary task of training Staff Cadets. After transferring to Cabarlah a third

wing was added for Grade Three Officers. This third wing was originally the First Australian Army Junior Staff School.

At the end of hostilities, the Federal Government decided to substantially increase the strength of the post-war Regular Army and Cabinet approval was obtained for the establishment of a Staff College in Australia. On 27 February 1946 the Staff School (Australia) was renamed the Australian Staff College. However, it was not until April 1946 that authority was issued to raise the College and it was decided to move to Queenscliff in Victoria. Pending the move, however, the camp at Cabarlah was required for other purposes and as an interim measure, in June 1946, the Australian Staff College moved to the School of Infantry, Seymour, a long established training area some 60 miles north of Melbourne. Here one six-month course was run from June to December, 1946. Later in December the College moved to its present home at Fort Queenscliff.

The 1947 Course was of 10 months duration and courses remained at that length until 1961. The 1961-62 Course was of 18 months duration, and a second 18-month course was conducted in 1963-64. Between these two courses, from 3 February 1963 to 30 March 1963 a Junior Staff Course was conducted for 28 students and a Senior Officers Course for 15 students from 22 April to 10 May 1963. In 1965 the course was reduced to 11 months.

The DS has grown from a Commandant and five Lt Col Instructors and an Administrative Staff of three officers, in 1946, to a Commandant and 16 Lt Col Instructors and an Administrative Staff of five officers. The DS now includes two Lt Cols attached from the British Army, one from the New Zealand Army, one from the Canadian Army and one from the United States Army.

An officer from the Indian Army attended the No. 10 Course (Australian Staff College) and overseas student representation continued in 1948 when two officers from the United Kingdom and one from Canada completed the course. Since then students from Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Fiji, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States of America have attended. In addition, at least one student from the Commonwealth Public Service and one from the RAAF have attended each year. A student from the RAN attended the course in 1963-64 and each year since 1968. A total of 1,130 students had

attended the Australian Staff College at Fort Queenscliff as at December 1972.

The students of No. 10 Course were the first to be awarded 'SC' Certificates for attending the Australian Staff College. A similar award was made to the graduates of No. 11 Course. Later the 'SC' was converted to the now familiar 'psc'.

In 1965 a Tac 5 assessment (requirement for promotion to Lt Col) was introduced for students who were substantive majors at the commencement of the course. Of the eligible students, 15 qualified. The assessment was continued in 1966 with 25 of the eligible students qualifying. In March 1967 the assessment was no longer a part of the Staff College course.

The Staff College Crest

Hanging in the Officers Mess of the Australian Staff College are several plaques presented to the Staff College by various sister colleges and allied armies. In 1956 it was decided to produce a plaque with the Australian Staff College Badge mounted on it, and in the course of this planning the idea developed of incorporating in the then current badge more Australian features.

The old badge was similar to the original Staff College Camberley crest. This badge was designed in 1868 by Captain (later Maj Gen) J. N. Crealock and Bt Major (later Lt Col) A. S. Jones. It included an English Barn Owl perched on crossed swords about which was entwined ivy leaves and a scroll bearing the Staff College motto. It was adapted for Australian use in 1947 by adding below the motto a war boomerang bearing the words 'Australian Staff College.'

A design, based on the Camberley badge but including an Australian Powerful Owl and gum leaves instead of ivy, was prepared in 1957 by the Staff College Draughtsman and sent to Mr Garrett in the Directorate of Ordnance Services. His reaction was that, from the heraldic point of view, there were several unsatisfactory features in the provisional design, and drew several new designs, one of which was selected as the basis of the new badge. Significant features were that the swords were crossed behind the owl; the swords points serving to connect the crown to the rest of the badge and symbolizing support for and guarding of the crown. The new badge was approved by Army Headquarters on 7 January 1959.

The new design can be described in heraldic terms as:

- St Edward's crown guarded and supported by two crossed swords,
- below, an Australian Powerful Owl perched on a scroll bearing the Staff College motto, and
- underneath, an Australian war boomerang bearing the word Australia.

The Staff College motto *Tam Marte Quam Minerva* has been freely translated by many authorities. The two principals of the motto are Mars and Minerva. Mars was the father of Romulus and ancestor of the Romans. He is the Roman god of agriculture and war. *Marte* which appears in the motto is derived from Mars and can be translated as fighting or fight. The swords appearing in the crest are symbolic of Mars. Minerva, the daughter of Jupiter, is the goddess of wisdom and patroness of the arts and sciences. The owl was the favourite bird of Minerva.

The other words of the motto *quam* and *tam* provide the link between the ideas associated with these two gods from Roman mythology. *Tam* can mean: so, so far, to such a degree, so . . . as, so . . . that and *quam* can mean: how, in what may, as. Taking the meaning of *tam* and *quam* and the ideas associated with Mars and Minerva an attempt at free translation could result in:

- 'As much by fighting as wisdom', or
- 'By arts and science as well as by war'.

Other authorities have freely translated the motto as:

- 'By fighting as much as by writing',
- 'By kill as much as by skill',
- 'With understanding and with force of arms', and
- 'Practical as well as theoretical soldiering here'.

The translation which pleases the Australian Staff College most is, 'By Arts and Science as well as by War'. □