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
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COVER: Detail from war artist B. Fletcher's painting 'Contact made by Delta Company, 7 RAR, Vietnam 1967'. At the Australian War Memorial.

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature


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(Australian War Memorial)

AIF men on duty on one of the patrol boats guarding Malayan rivers in September 1941



and the Armed Services

Major General D. W. Scott-Barrett
British Army

In the old days men had the rack, now they have the press.

—Oscar Wilde

DURING the Crimean War, blood was brought to the living rooms of England by the stark reality of the dispatches of Howard Russell of *The Times*, with their descriptions of carnage and incompetence. Previous campaigns were perhaps as widely criticized at home, but this was the first time that public emotion and fervour were so greatly stirred by the forerunner of today's mass media.

Ten years later, Matthew Brady's photographs, accompanied by the songs of both sides in the American Civil War, not only helped touch the hearts and minds of those at home, but heralded a new public interest in the conditions of war, its causes and ideals. With news travelling

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Major General Scott-Barrett is Commander of the Eastern District. This article was written while he was a Brigadier at the Royal College of Defence Studies.

faster than ever before, in a war which affected the lives of so many of the American people, there was increasing public discussion which resulted in the appointment of war correspondents on newspapers large and small, and led to a stream of reflections from military historians.

This era of new public interest in conflict, criticism of any mismanagement, together with the post-mortems of historians has not only affected the pattern of subsequent wars, but often forced a new pace of military change and thinking. Without the pressure to reform from newspapers, writers and cartoonists, would the scarlet of Sebastopol have still been seen on the South African veld? The public interest and support for the Red Cross in the last two World Wars were a long way from the pre-Nightingale indifference of Scutari.

In the Second World War, the public—kept in touch for the first time by radio correspondents, film news and a most professional corps of press—was always on the watch for any repetition of the subtlety of Gallipoli and the horrors of trench warfare and gas. The world concern over Hiroshima may yet restrain the course of future warfare.

In the last 20 years, there has been a revolution in the speed, breadth and visual impact of communications which has profoundly affected the attitudes of society and has created a new challenge to governments and those in authority. They have found it more difficult to face their responsibilities to meet aggression with force, to explain the need for deterrence, to restrain conflict and violence, and to resist blackmail. With instant and almost total exposure of the backgrounds of unrest relayed to an international audience, there is far more reason to justify publicly the necessary, hard decisions if they are to be understood and accepted, not only at home, but by democratic opinion in the world at large.

Right to Question

In a democracy, the right of an informed public and the media to question the purpose and cost of the armed forces has an increasing effect on their use and recruitment. For all these reasons, it is particularly important that the armed services do not cut themselves off from the society in which they live and which they serve. They must understand how best to use the media to explain their case and to convince their critics—amongst them intellectuals and journalists whose influence

on the young cannot be over-estimated—of the relevance of their task and the reality of the threats they exist to meet.

In this era of news which knows no boundaries, and which can be controlled and used as propaganda by unfriendly nations, the responsibility for explanation can no longer be left to public relations experts alone. The effects of the media now often require the actual course of events to be weighed against their explanation to the public.

Governments, service officers and those in positions of responsibility must understand the ethics, susceptibilities and weaknesses of the profession of journalism, resist taking offence at criticism, and study the possibilities of new developments of communications as they occur. They must remember that the free society of democracy today depends largely on the existence of an informed public which is in possession of the facts and makes considered and reasoned judgements, particularly on issues of national importance.

Multiple Role

The media in our society, as well as informing, see themselves as having a multiple role as watchdogs, judges and independent observers of events. They believe it is to the people, not to the government, that they are ultimately accountable, and it is for this reason that it is so important both the government and the services are seen to welcome their freedom, interest and inquiry. Experience has shown that the services cannot hide their actions by censorship unless vital national interests are at stake.

* * *

By mid-1969, it had become clear to the world that, in one way or another, sooner rather than later, the United States was going to disengage from Vietnam. Whatever the precise terms of that disengagement, whatever the ultimate resolution, the US efforts at counter-insurgency in South-East Asia were coming to an end, with a heartfelt national prayer throughout the United States of 'no more Vietnams!' It is a valid question as to how much of this pressure to pull out, leaving an uncertain security to the United States allies and the cause that had cost it so much, was due to the agony, the bitterness and the tensions suffered by its society in seeing and feeling this war in their homes.

During their involvement in this undeclared 6-year war, the people of the United States had received in their living rooms a constant

stream of television film, statistics, pictures and newsprint about Vietnam. Great optimism and high predictions had so often been followed by heavy casualties and allegations of concealment — and all the time evidence of suffering and needless waste.

This came to the American people in an era of new pressures of economic uncertainty, heightened racial tensions, and a new readiness by youth to question both social and moral values. It seemed a tragedy to many in government and the services that the very real successes, both militarily and in winning the support of the South Vietnamese people, should be obscured by this play on the emotions of those at home.

New Pressure

At the same time, the United States was subjected to a new pressure—that of opinion in the democratic countries openly critical of, and hostile toward, the morality and conduct of the war, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam. Much of this protest was stimulated by a view of the war and its issues as seen from both films and articles controlled and selected as propaganda from Hanoi.

Some of the most effective of these were channelled through partisan countries such as Sweden, giving a neutral veneer to those unaware of the source. An efficient Communist propaganda machine exploited the sympathies of many well-meaning liberals and left-wing sympathizers to publicize the sufferings of North Vietnam, depicted as part of a David and Goliath struggle. The not inconsiderable French contribution to this battle for the opinions of the uncommitted world had a distinct flavour of sour grapes.

Tet Offensive

The Tet offensive in 1968 was the watershed in destroying public support for the Vietnam war, and became instrumental in changing US policy. It was used most effectively by Hanoi to influence democratic opinion and to shock an unwarned and unsuspecting American public with North Vietnam's aggressive fervour and its determination to fight on indefinitely.

Some objectives were selected more for their propaganda value than for their military significance; the United States Embassy in Saigon, near the press centre, was a case in point. The unexpected speed and weight of the enemy attack was at first successful, and was given

enormous publicity throughout the world, but the US forces felt great resentment that their subsequent and significant successes passed relatively unrecorded. This bitterness against the media lasts today.

After Tet, various high-ranking military and civilian officials of the Defence Department still made over-optimistic statements of the success and progress attained by the US forces although the Vietnam insurgents and their North Vietnamese supporters continued to influence much of the South Vietnamese countryside. At every stage, as the United States escalated the war, the enemy forces received better equipment from China and the Soviet Union who were not slow to exploit the division and debates so vividly described by the media in both the United States and the Free World.

One of the most compelling examples of the power of United States and world opinion, fanned and expressed through the media, was the enforcement of a target date by which the United States had to withdraw from Cambodia. However right or wrong the decision to destroy the North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia, and there was military evidence to show that it was right, President Nixon failed to convince the United States and the world that the action was justified.

Perhaps Nixon lacked the Kennedy flair for publicity, but it seemed incredible that he had no equivalent of the aerial photographs of the Cuban missile sites produced so dramatically by Adlai Stevenson in the General Assembly debate on the Cuban missile crisis. To the Free World, to have as a target a 'sanctuary' rather than a 'stockpile' or 'lair' was seen as an unfortunate choice of words and set the tone for a poorly justified case.

Daily Briefing

Since September 1964, every afternoon at five o'clock, seven days a week, many of the 350 journalists covering the war in Vietnam have been to a briefing in the headquarters of the United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon, known widely as the 'MacVee Five O'Clock Follies.' Although often criticized for being uninspiring, using the language of the third sex, and preaching the party line laid out in sheets of mimeographed handout, this daily meeting provided a service to the press and a forum for some discussion. The weaknesses of this system were that large numbers of journalists, photographers and film men were kept living too closely and inevitably vying with each other

for the exclusive news item and that the optimistic statistical jargon used at the briefings often dehumanized the activities of the soldiers and widened the credibility gap.

While there were a significant number of highly qualified journalists in Vietnam, men who had been covering Asia for years, there were many from the world press and television who had little knowledge of the history, politics and background of this complex war or of Vietnamese culture. It seemed a pity that those charged with the responsibility for bringing this conflict to the homes of millions could not have had at least some of the briefing given as a matter of routine to so many thousands of US Government and military officers.

Continuity a Problem

Continuity of reporting was another problem. Six-month tours for 'resident' journalists and one or two weeks for 'transients' were hardly exceptional. A by no means untypical telegram to public relations could read:

Arriving Saigon Thursday morning PanAm Flight One. Please meet and arrange appointments with Bunker, Westmoreland, Komer, Thieu and Ky. Stop. Also representative Vietnamese. Stop. Request travel Danang for interview Walt, Pleiku for quick review montagnard situation and Delta where hope to see Van. Stop. Also interested meeting with Gen Tnang and Major Be if time permits. Stop. Keep Sunday clear since I must file before departure early afternoon that day.

Incredible to believe, some managed this whirlwind tour. Vietnam must really have seemed like a landscape from the window of a fast-moving train to these instant experts.

Another related difficulty was that of sources, for few correspondents knew Vietnamese and not many French although so many of the most worthwhile sources in Vietnam were comfortable only in these languages. What limitations did this lack of language place on correspondents in obtaining and evaluating sources? How much did they depend on other correspondents rather than undertake independent inquiries? How much were they the captives of their Vietnamese assistants or interpreters, and did they question their qualifications and prejudices? How much did the established Vietnamese sources respond out of habit, with outdated comment on the general situation because they had come to believe that correspondents wanted to hear it

that way? These were some of the problems facing the US Government Information Services in its briefings and relationship with the press.

War Crimes

Probably the greatest failure in communication between government, press and army in Vietnam was the army's reluctance, in the early phase of the war, to reveal or discuss any of its dirty linen concerning the allegations of war crimes, such as at My Lai, and its refusal to have the hearings and investigations made public at an early stage. The fact that these incidents were first revealed by Hanoi angered the press, and they resented most strongly the initial denials and subsequent evasions by the army, which put them on the defensive with their readers.

Understandably perhaps the military had initially tried to hide its errors and mistakes, and, when accused, had often been too quick on the draw to try and prove the press wrong; it could well be that the remarkable public support for Lieutenant Calley after his conviction in the My Lai trial, which forced the President to intervene on his behalf, stemmed primarily from the portrayal by the media of widespread lack of discipline and drug taking in the army in Vietnam and the implied smear that he was the scapegoat for many more unrevealed incidents. This does scant justice to the United States Army's ruthless investigation and punishment of such offenders, as witnessed by the numbers serving prison sentences at that time.

By the end of 1967, those working on Vietnam at CBS used the expression 'shooting bloody' to describe the filming they had to do to get on the air. It was not that they were ordered to shoot only war scenes, but, when they shot a political story, or the progress of the pacification programme, as well as war scenes, it would be the action film which the programme producers selected.

American families have seen episodes more gripping than those concocted for entertainment shows later in the evening. They have seen, in color, vivid portrayal of suffering, badly wounded Americans, sacks of dead being loaded for shipment home, and sprawled heaps of small, dead Vietnamese bodies. Latterly, on top of all the bloodshed, have come the interviews with disgruntled draftees referring openly to their use of drugs and condemnation of their country's involvement in Asia. Many believe that this depiction of horror and disillusion has been

the significant factor in turning people against the war which has seemed increasingly pointless.

Once the major involvement of the United States was decided upon, did the government give sufficient thought to working with those in charge of the media as to how, without censorship, a war could be fought against an enemy who rigidly and selectively controlled all aspects of news and had the support of world communism to spread its propaganda? Vice President Agnew's attempts to criticize the unfettered freedom of the media, and make them a scapegoat, were bitterly resented.

Publicity or Information

At a lower level, did the army in Vietnam provide the right briefing and escort for camera crews and journalists? While many commanders and headquarters appointed public information officers, they often did not have the training and ability to transmit the background of their commanders' views and resorted to official jargon and rhetoric, and sometimes irritated the press by trying to feed them publicity instead of information.

In the future, the military must understand that it is fundamental to their ability to fight a limited war without censorship that confidence and mutual respect with the press be achieved. The dangers of the double-edged weapon of censorship are illustrated by the attempt by the South Vietnamese to conduct their recent operations in Laos in early 1970 with a total ban on the press which has only convinced world opinion that these were a military disaster with heavy casualties. Correspondents may need to be controlled on grounds of security, but complete denial of access, as recently imposed in East Pakistan, can lead to disastrous treatment by the world media.

The flooding of a far-off theatre of war with large numbers of *journalists and film makers, some with little experience of the background of the war*, poses a problem in their selection and briefing which must be recognized by editors. If confidence between the press and the military is to be achieved on the ground, it is important that the generally high standards of fair reporting are always maintained. Was it fair, as sometimes occurred, to the army or to the public, to send a confirmed pacifist to cover the war, and not inform either of his viewpoint?

Television's Impact

Since the impact of television may have been decisive in forcing withdrawal, it is essential that the armed forces learn to live with the power, speed and impact of this means of communication. They must work with those responsible to attain a new close co-operation and understanding, both on the ground and in the studio.

At present, the television news editor sits in his office in New York, surrounded by five television screens, and is a long way both physically and mentally from the Pentagon in Washington and the official spokesman and release. Surely, the army must come closer. The silence of General Abrams after the harrying of General Westmoreland by the world's media is perhaps understandable, but, if the media are a weapon in this war, and used as such by Hanoi, is he right?

To most people in Northern Ireland, the months of clashes after 1968 seemed inevitable. The high unemployment, arbitrary allocation of housing, and political backwardness were all issues for vigorous discussion within both the Protestant and Catholic communities, particularly among the young. Their historic division—kept alive by segregated education, Protestant marches and Catholic processions—had polarized at the extremes the prejudices of an organized minority on both sides. For some years, the outside influence and window on the world of British press and television programmes seen throughout Ulster had played a major part in highlighting the bigotry and bitterness and in drawing comparisons with conditions of 'one man one vote' and the greater prosperity on the other side of the Irish sea.

Londonderry—1968

The first reappearance of flame in the smouldering fire of unrest was the violence which occurred in Londonderry on 5 and 6 October 1968. At a protest meeting in Queens University, Belfast, a few days later, a group of radicals decided that the impact of the publicity both inside and outside Ireland, depicting the fervour of protest and the heavy-handedness of the police during the recent riots, had so roused public support and sympathy for the cause of civil rights that it warranted a far more militant policy.

From this moment, a permanent protest group, the Peoples Democracy Movement, with some outside revolutionary influences, led the new campaign for action. Their first target was to pressurize Britain

to disarm the hated 'B' Specials. This was the start of a sustained effort through press, radio and television by the Catholic minority in Ulster to draw attention to the grievances and fears of their community. Their cause soon gained vocal support from the powerful Irish lobby in the United States, from Southern Ireland and from the large Irish population in Britain kept informed by their own newspapers.

On the other side, the Protestants, with their deep-rooted fear of being eventually outnumbered by the increasing Catholic population, and their intense loyalty to the Crown, strongly resented the open appearance of the Republican flag and the raising of money for civil rights in the United States. This indignation encouraged rumours and fear of the IRA whose history of sabotage, reprisals and unprovoked attack underlined the threat to an insecure border following the disarming of the B Specials.

New Weapon

With the shout to the world from the Catholic militants, the Protestants stood fast on their ancient rights to march. The drums and banners of the Orange Lodges were still exultantly paraded through the streets, their numbers swelled by their Scottish brethren. This was the continuation of an old battle fought skilfully by relatively few extremists on both sides, using the new weapon of publicity to gather the maximum pressure from outside support for their cause.

In the series of clashes which took place between October 1968 and August 1969, the hard-pressed Royal Ulster Constabulary endeavoured to separate the two factions. The enmity between the Catholics and the almost entirely Protestant armed police force, who were tough in dealing with the increasingly organized protesters, destroyed confidence in the police and the due course of law in certain Catholic urban areas. The appearance of television cameras sometimes increased the violence, bringing it to the outside world. Certainly, the *Irishman's love of a fight was given an extra relish by the presence of film crews and attendant crowds.*

In April 1969, the British Government decided to reinforce the small permanent garrison of 2400 British soldiers and sent another battalion to help guard key installations. Soon after their arrival, the well co-ordinated and violent attacks in Londonderry's Bogside and the Falls Road in Belfast, *simultaneously with scenes at Lurgan, Dungannon and Omagh,* stretched the police to the limit, and they suffered

heavy casualties. The crunch came in the control by police when, in August, the violence led to burning buildings, overturned buses and widespread injury.

Honeymoon Period

Savage inter-communal war was only stopped by the intervention of the British Army who succeeded in achieving a temporary calm. They were much helped in this by the balanced support of the British media who took General Freeland's lead, making it clear that this was only a honeymoon period unless both governments moved quickly to deal with the sources of discontent.

During August, the army strength was increased to 10,000 men, most of whom were forced to live under extremely primitive conditions, undertaking long, tedious patrols and guards in a police role. Their good humour and morale were helped by the knowledge that those at home were being shown a picture which recognized both the value and discomfort of their job. As predicted, the honeymoon was soon over, and those behind the protest, considering the promised reform from Stormont too slow, soon saw value in publicly discrediting the impartiality of the troops.

By early September 1969, a series of small but vicious incidents between the two factions were only restrained by the use of CS gas by British troops, and, from then on, they became the targets for crowds of jeering youths, insults, stones and petrol bombs. Their disciplined restraint was quite remarkable, and it was only in July 1970, when bullets were flying from both sides, that the army showed its teeth by the selective use of firepower. During the subsequent arms searches in the Falls Road, the wild allegations of sacrilege, looting and intimidation created enmity between the army and the Catholics, with memories of the 'Black and Tans' revived.

Respect and Friendship

In August 1970, during the Belfast floods, the prompt assistance and goodwill of the same soldiers rescuing those whom they had previously searched, and the publicity this received, did much to restore a measure of respect and friendship certainly not there in the 1920s. Unfortunately, to the extremists on both sides—and, in particular, the IRA—the good-humoured forbearance of the British soldier endangered

the impetus of their causes, and, in the early months of 1971, renewed and vicious incidents were perpetrated to try and provoke strong retaliation.

In comparison with Vietnam, there was little problem of security of information, and, with this freedom, the press centre set up by General Freeland had two features new to the British Army. The first was his direction that all major units and all brigade headquarters should appoint a full-time officer for public relations duties. They provided a swift and accurate stream of information direct to the centre when incidents arose, helping the hearts and minds campaign at the lowest level and acting as guides to journalists and camera crews.

The second was that, by bringing the public relations staff into the discussion and planning stage of operations, he was able to achieve a new confidence in the authority and background of the statements from the centre, the information being handled on a joint civil, police and army basis.

Policy of Freedom

A policy of freedom in encouraging young officers and soldiers to be filmed brought excellent results, due to their careful briefing, natural good sense and the responsibility of the media. With the exception of the troops' anger at the immediate acceptance by some well-known British journalists of the other side's account, and the wide publicity given to the accusations of looting and brutality after the Falls Road searches, the British Army has recognized the fairness of the reporting of their attempts to prevent bloodshed in this part of the United Kingdom.

There is a certain disappointment, however, that their considerable voluntary efforts, despite the bottles and stones, to assist young people in sports and clubs and to promote goodwill have been little seen at home. Recently, such factors as the murder of three young Scottish soldiers, vividly brought home to people through their television screens, and the sight of soldiers enduring the curses of screaming women, and petrol bombs and stones thrown by gangs of uncontrolled children has created a surge of support for the army throughout the remainder of Britain, and an acknowledgment that the army's restraint is more politically mature than the tactics of the extremists. As a result, the extremists have been driven to individual acts of terrorism and violence which are tending to alienate moderate world opinion.

As both sides have become aware that the publicity of their cause is likely to have a major effect on its future, the media have played an increasingly significant role. With publicity as a weapon, it is important that the security forces in their task of keeping the peace are even more conscious of the need to present their unbiased behaviour, which can only be achieved if they can convince the newsmen of this truth, and do not get irritated by small inaccuracies and pinpricks.

Emphasis on Impartiality

While newsmen rightly attach importance to stirring governments to action by showing the fervour of protest, the special problem in Ulster is that, if bloodshed is to be avoided, it is necessary that the impartiality of the troops be given equal emphasis. It must be remembered that it is the aim of the extremists on both sides to discredit the security forces to a world audience, and thus justify their own use of violence. In an educated, volunteer army, with its soldiers, families and friends all watching television, so different from the 1920s, the power of the media to encourage goodwill and sustain restraint cannot be overestimated.

* * *

Many of those outside the industry feel that, after 20 years of television, society has seen the best and worst of its effects; this is not so. The speed of change and the public appetite for each new development in television has seldom been accurately forecast, particularly in Britain. The viewing habits of this country must surely increase with more choice of channels and watching made easier by larger screens that may, in time, become a cinerama curved wall in the living room.

Many of the young are already being conditioned by the far wider use of television for education in such schemes as the Open University, the link-up of London and Glasgow schools on closed-circuit television, and the hundred terminal network in Leeds University. The United States and Japan have even bigger plans.

The next development, already advertised, will be the wide sale of a special converter to enable cassettes of taped, filmed programmes to be shown through existing sets. The educational and entertainment possibilities are phenomenal since it is probable that these cassettes will be distributed through lending libraries and viewing clubs which, besides drawing television yet further into people's lives, will produce a new

thirst for material. To meet this demand, there will be a diversity of film units bringing more subjects under scrutiny, and, while this development may not have a direct influence on conflict, it will probably promote more viewing of its causes and background.

When people can select programmes from sources other than the established networks, and the nature of television begins to approach publishing, the present BBC 'Charters and Directions' by which Parliament tries to exercise a degree of control will have lost much of their power. The possibility of censorship in a conflict situation will be reduced even further, and any barriers against 'lack of programme balance' by this means will be removed.

A final long-term thought for the future is the probability of television being linked by telephone line through computers to produce a dial-a-programme capability and visual telephoning. The United States has already had successful trials.

Satellite Communications

Far more important as a potential influence on the seeds of conflict is the spread of visual communications by satellite. Already in some areas, the scenes and techniques of unrest can be instantly exchanged, with the Black Power and anti-police techniques of the United States seen and shared in Notting Hill, Manchester and Bermuda.

There are signs that the high priority given by the Soviet Union to its satellite communication programme is directed toward creating a new television educational service to assist some of the less developed nations and increase its world influence. This view of one way of life, relayed first into the schools, will inevitably be answered by similar schemes from the West. The present crowds pressed against the windows of television shops in Singapore, seeing other standards of life, are only forerunners of the village groups of the future. The fact that the first Chinese space success circled the earth proclaiming 'The East is Red' spotlights the future use of this means to influence men's minds from far away.

So far, the competition of television in Britain has done surprisingly little to discourage the sale and reading of newsprint, maybe partly due to the flexibility of Fleet Street in changing the pattern and layout of its newspapers. With the acceptance that the main news has already been seen on television, there has been more critical analysis, questioning

of accepted institutions and traditional values encouraging personality cults both of journalists and figures in the news. Depth of interest and exposure of subjects has been increased by the diversity of special sections, supplements and magazines, many in colour.

By their quickly published critiques of television programmes, some seen as a result of previews and the wide coverage and forecast in weekend papers, close links between Fleet Street and television are maintained. Television staff has been mainly recruited from journalists, and the close scrutiny of newspapers plays a part in influencing those who direct the television programmes.

Tabloid Format

Future publishing trends, with more photographic printing, will favour the tabloid format in which the off-beat photograph and comment will be used even further to catch the eye. As a result of these developments, all those concerned in the control of conflict, and the services, must expect even further exposure, and be organized and ready to reply.

The Times Correspondent, Sir, is a lying blackguard.—Lord Raglan, 1854.

They are a set of dirty newspaper scribblers who are a pest and shall not approach me.—General Sherman, 1864.

Having seen from recent history the far-reaching and proved influence of the media on the army and its tasks, it would be madness if these sentiments found any sympathy in our army today. Are the echoes still there?

Thank God the bloody Press have gone.—Officers overheard by a *Daily Mirror* journalist, 1970.

Taking into account that, when they meet, the interests of the army and the press are seldom the same, the only possible productive relationship for both sides to aim for is to achieve trust and confidence, within a set of agreed ground rules, at all levels. The journalist, a realist in a hard, competitive world, expects to come up against sensible safeguards and conditions and does not respect weakness. The army officer, used to an ordered, tidy and hierarchical society, is often initially suspicious of the more casual, free thinking and probing approach of the reporter.

Inaccurate Portrayal

In spite of the mass of good publicity, the soldier frequently remembers and resents those occasions when there have been either a prejudiced or inaccurate portrayal of his chosen profession by a press to which, after all, he has no direct reply. At such moments, the essential place of a free and questioning media in a democratic way of life can be lost sight of, and he buttons up in self-defence. It is important that, keeping a sense of proportion, he does not exaggerate the motives of the press for 'sensationalism and increased circulation,' any mention of which immediately puts their hackles up.

It is up to the soldier to create the best possible relationship by approaching the press within a framework of positive, constructive thinking rather than as an unpleasant chore. He must not become irritated by pinpricks, but hang on to his sense of humour and realize that both good and bad must come out. Nothing must be too much trouble to give the journalist the facts, to win his respect, his confidence in the good and to put the bad in perspective.

Discussion of the effects of press and television in the army can so often be reduced to a review of public relations, the handling of press inquiries, publicity for recruiting or a snipe at unfavourable plays and articles, regretting the army's impotence to reply. Like all institutions in a democracy, the army does not expect to escape close scrutiny and some criticism since, being responsible for some half million individuals, soldiers and their families, there is a vast potential for human interest stories. While to have a good information service and to answer queries quickly and openly is essential, there is now a far wider angle to be considered. Under the threat of the spotlight from an increasingly penetrating visual exposure, there is a need for a more outward looking mental attitude and readiness to explain.

Periodic Examinations

With this in mind, nearly every aspect of army life should be periodically examined and questioned for its relevance to be seen by a largely youthful and critical audience. Of course, under some circumstances, and particularly in a major conflict, control of journalists and camera men can be achieved, but this must be carefully thought out well in advance, and be seen to be justified.

To put this subject in its right perspective in military thinking, it is now possible that 'Publicity' should rate a heading in the format of operational instructions of similar importance to 'Intelligence,' with its specialist staff treated by commanders on an equal footing. Certainly, publicity must be considered as a legitimate weapon of war and of part of everyday life in the army.

Influence of Military Historians

The lessons of recent history, if considered in the light of the growing tide of mass communications, with its ability to cross frontiers and continents, its power to educate, entertain, excite and inflame, show a wide and increasing impact on the seeds and course of conflict. Military historians have always influenced service thinking and development; now, with new means of spreading discussion and with virtually no gap in time between the battlefield and the memoir, there is a far greater need for those in responsibility in our society to consider the implications and possibilities of the media in relation to all forms of future conflict and in its control. The military involvement in Suez, Vietnam and Ulster each show a landmark in separate aspects of these influences and point to important lessons which require more study and action.

* * *

In Vietnam, the precipitate withdrawal of US forces—and, therefore, much of the credibility of US world leadership—was largely due to the pressure on the last two Presidents by a sickened public who for too long had been fed on a diet of films of bloodshed, vast destruction and anguish, without the balance of convincing explanation. Perhaps most of this was due to the unfettered freedom of world newsmen in the battle area, poor official releases and a publicity-conscious and vocal anti-war lobby; all this when fighting an enemy who rigidly controlled its own media and exploited propaganda wherever possible. While it is easy to be critical of this far-off war, it is not in its conduct, but in the explanation of it to the United States and the watching world that the greatest failure has occurred.

Ulster poses an entirely different problem, with publicity being used by both sides as a weapon to fan the flames of an ancient historical and religious quarrel. Nearly every incident has been staged with an eye to the publicity it will receive and the pressure that this will exert on opinion in Britain and Eire. The army, helped by a responsible press,

has so far prevented a bloodbath and retained stability, but, unless the Stormont government acts quickly to speed the essential social reforms, at the same time safeguarding Protestant security, it will be at the mercy of the media-conscious extremists who will exploit further violence.

Retain Creative Freedom

The increasing power of the media to give pleasure to millions, to broaden horizons and to educate is a boon to mankind, but there is wide apprehension that, in a democracy, the knocking of its established values, the dramatic presentation of violence, comparisons of social unrest and susceptibility to radical influences shown constantly on television will not only create conflict, but make it difficult to control. Totalitarian regimes, recognizing these dangers, rigidly restrict their press and television and use them for propaganda.

In the United States and Britain, the freedom of the communicators to probe authority, to expose injustice, to give political balance, and to stand up for the underdog is fundamental. This freedom presents difficulties of control by governments when they require support for the tough and often unpopular decisions necessary to confront international pressures and deal with conflict. Without censorship, which can only be justified when vital national issues are at stake, control must mainly lie in keeping the best possible relationship with all those who are concerned with the media.

The mainspring of the media is their need to provide a lively stimulus, and, to do this, they must retain their sense of creative freedom. In the last analysis, what really matters is to encourage good editorial control and the same sense of integrity and responsibility in all young journalists which generally exists at the top of this profession. To keep the 'balance' in what they say, it is important that those in authority are accessible to journalists to ensure that they are well informed of the necessary facts.

Finally, it is the army who has to bear the brunt of conflict and who is vulnerable to misrepresentation with its need to use force, the demands of security and its traditional silence. There are changes required in attitudes of mind and training to ensure that they can continue to be used effectively, be respected at home and ready to deal with conflict wherever and whenever it should occur, as surely it will. □

Aborigines in the First AIF



Lieutenant C. D. Clark
Australian Intelligence Corps

IN all accounts of Australia's brief but active military history, one area of discussion concerning Australia's manpower effort which is rarely, if ever, mentioned is the sacrifice made by this country's aboriginal population. Although not a major contribution in terms of actual numbers, the service of these truly native Australians in the army becomes quite significant when the background of social conditions and racial attitudes of the times is considered.

Aborigines are said to have served with the colonial contingents sent to South Africa during the Boer War,¹ but documentary evidence to verify this appears to be non-existent. Information regarding the 1914-1918 War is, fortunately, more substantial. Thanks to the efforts of the New South Wales branch of the RSL, details of past aboriginal members of the First Australian Imperial Force were gathered late in 1931; after *Reville* used this information to compile rolls² for the three Eastern States, the file was placed in the collection of the War Memorial in Canberra. It is mainly upon the data contained in that file³ that this article is based.

During the First World War, according to the RSL survey, just under three hundred aborigines from New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria enlisted in the AIF, and roughly one-third of these were

¹ H. Gordon, *The Embarrassing Australian*, 2nd Edition, (Melbourne, 1965), p. 12

² *Reville*, November 1931, p. 22, and January 1932, p. 20.

³ Australian War Memorial, classified file No. 533.

made casualties (see Fig. 1). As was acknowledged however, when these figures were first published, the list is 'no doubt not free from omissions'⁴ and an examination of the original lists reveals a number of obvious errors and duplications, as well as several suspect entries.

It should also be noted that the survey counted all those men of traceable aboriginal ancestry, and therefore included quarter-castes and 'octoroons', as well as full-bloods and half-castes. This factor was probably significant in determining the ease of acceptance the aboriginal

FIG. 1

	Qld.	NSW	Vic.	Total
Killed and died	18	20	6	44
Wounded and gassed	27	32	—	59
Returned	106	56	24	186
Total	151	108	30	289

digger found among less-enlightened white diggers. Since few bore distinctively aboriginal names, prejudice and antagonism often tended to depend on the prominence of the aboriginal soldiers' racial features; certainly those of only partial extraction, being virtually indistinguishable from their white comrades-in-arms, had few problems. Just how superficial racial prejudice could be in any case, can best be seen in the instance of one Victorian half-caste, a machine-gunner in the Third Division, who was informed that one of the men on the troopship *S.S. Ascanius* objected to eating at the same table as an 'abo'. The threat of 'a bloody smack on the snout' as a proof of equality brought an apology the next day. As the aborigine amusedly recalled years later: 'Next day he came looking for me, and we sat down to eat together. He turned out to be the best mate I had on the ship. We went through a fair bit of action together, and we stayed good friends after the war until he died.'⁵

Certainly it is wrong to place undue emphasis on this aspect, for only four men out of three hundred were full-blooded natives (one of these—Jack Dunne of New South Wales—being an American negro), and all four appear to have gained a measure of acceptance which should be seen as underlining the relative unimportance of that particular problem. Private Douglas Grant of New South Wales became the best-

⁴ *Reveille*, January 1932, p. 20.

⁵ Gordon, *op. cit.* pp. 36-37.

known aboriginal serviceman after being captured at the first battle of Bullecourt and held as prisoner of war in Germany; Private William Esdale of Queensland, was killed in action on 7 July 1916 and was 'probably one of the first soldiers of that unit [the 47th Battalion] who made the supreme sacrifice in the face of the enemy'⁶; William Rawlings from Victoria, a private in the 29th Battalion, was also killed in action, but not before earning a Military Medal.

Rawlings was not the only one to be decorated for gallantry, and Private Harry Thorpe of the 7th Battalion, also a Victorian, was awarded the MM but similarly was killed in action. Private Frank Stewart, a New South Welshman in the 5th Pioneer Battalion, was mentioned in despatches on 16 March 1919 for 'gallant and distinguished service in the field'. The highest decoration won by any of the aboriginal servicemen was that of Corporal A. Knight of the 43rd Battalion whose record of bravery, which had caused him to be wounded twice, earned him the DCM.

Knight was, in fact, one of only three men who held rank among the New South Wales aborigines. Both of the others were killed in action: Christopher Henry Gage, a corporal with a Lewis Gun section in the 54th Battalion, was killed in Belgium on 26 September 1917, while Lance-corporal John Arthur Firebrace, serving in the 59th Battalion, was only twenty-one when he met his death in France in 1918. As information for Victoria and Queensland is not as complete as for New South Wales, it is unknown the total number of native servicemen who achieved promotion, or the overall percentage this represents.

Likewise the number of aborigines from the other two states who were made prisoner of war remains unknown, but three men from New South Wales were captured and remained interned until the Armistice: Archibald Johnson of the 35th Battalion, who was taken prisoner on the night of 4 April 1917 at Villers-Bretonneux; and William Williams, captured at Albert and held in Belgium. Certainly most famous of the aboriginal PWs was Douglas Grant, a full-blooded aborigine who served in the 13th Battalion as No. 6020. Born in the Herberton Ranges of Northern Queensland sometime around 1885, Grant was known among his own people as Poppin Jerri.⁷ He was about twelve months old when

⁶ *Reveille*, November 1931, p. 22.

⁷ *ibid.*, January 1932, p. 20.

taken by Mr R. Grant during a raid on a native camp by a punitive expedition from Cairns. Both his parents were killed in the clash, and a native trooper was about to dash the child's brains out against a tree when Mr Grant rescued him and brought him to Lithgow to his parents' home, where the child was adopted. In his foster home, the child was given a good education and trained as a draughtsman, and there also he acquired his foster-father's thickly burred Scottish accent. He was considered an intelligent, articulate and striking man, and apart from his skill as a draughtsman he was a clever sketch artist and penman. He won first prize at the 1897 Queen's Diamond Jubilee Exhibition with a coloured drawing of a bust of Queen Victoria. In addition he developed skills as an accomplished taxidermist, and dabbled with several writing efforts.

Initially his attempts to enlist in 1915 from Belltrees, Scone, were frustrated by the Aborigines Protection Board, who refused him permission to join the AIF at the very point of his sailing for France. A second try six months later from Annandale in Sydney saw his posting to the 13th Battalion, but his active service was terminated by his capture at Bullecourt. Perhaps the confusion of his captors might be judged from a story often told by Grant himself, recounting the confusion which surrounded him with the Allies. During a visit to his foster-father's home village in the Orkneys, he began a conversation about the weather to a lass behind the counter of a store. As he chatted on in his best highland brogue, the girl listened, unbelieving, before she suddenly ran to the rear of the shop, shrieking: 'Mither, come quick. Here's a poor wee Scottie come back from Australia, and he's been burned black.'⁸

Grant's period in captivity would have been the envy of practically every man serving in the trenches of the Western Front, for, as Gordon says, 'In a prison camp outside Berlin, Grant became thoroughly famous. He was regarded as a prize capture as well as a considerable curiosity. Doctors measured and photographed his skull, scientists and anthropologists invited him to the *Berlin University*, and the sculptor Rudolf Markoeser modelled his bust in ebony. Mainly because he was such an unmistakable figure, he was given comparative freedom in Berlin late in the war; the reasoning was that it would have been useless for him to try to escape anyway.'⁹ One German scientist who later visited Aus-

⁸ Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 27.

tralia recalled Grant, saying: 'I first met the man in 1918 in a south Berlin suburb, while I was working with the Royal Prussian Photographic Commission. Our objective was to collect material on languages, songs and dialects among the Allied prisoners, and of course we regarded Grant as something of a prize. In fact he was not very useful for any study of the Australian aboriginal; he had been removed from the tribe, and he regarded the natives with almost as much curiosity as we did. Like his fellow prisoners, though, we quickly learned that he was a man of superior intellect. He was a gentleman, and very honest, and he was appointed by the prisoners themselves to be in charge of the receipt of all the Red Cross parcels which made their drab life tolerable.'¹⁰ A fellow-prisoner during those years said of Grant: 'He had the quickest mind I ever saw, and he was quite aggressively Australian. I remember once going past a recreation hut in the prison camp, and hearing Grant's voice booming out. I went in, and found him addressing a crowd of Englishmen, trying to persuade them to migrate to Australia as soon as the war ended. Then later, after we got out of boob and went to England, we were the guests at a rather formal dinner. Douglas Grant, the black man, was the only one among our lot with the courage and confidence to get up on his feet and make the necessary responses on our behalf.'¹¹

Grant was certainly a rarity, for his education was vastly superior to that then available to aborigines in Australia. Although details of the pre-war occupations of the native servicemen from New South Wales are known in about only 80% of cases, it is clear that of these a mere 8% occupied jobs involving any sort of recognized skill. The overwhelming majority were bluntly classified as 'labourers' or 'station hands', or involved in 'general bush work'. Equally clear is the fact that the great majority of these men returned to their former jobs after the war, and sank back into the despairing existence of life on the aboriginal reserves. Perhaps these were really the lucky ones, for such had always been their lot and few hoped or aspired to much else. But men like Douglas Grant showed promise of greater things and found it harder to readjust, and when Grant died in 1951 he was sadly disillusioned and unhappy. He had always been an outcast from his own people, yet no matter how well he accepted the values of white

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 28.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 28.

Australian society he failed to gain acceptance in return, and he died broken and utterly rejected.

Nonetheless, the war produced many tragedies, and much more suffering for aboriginal families in Australia. For example, the Coe family, who sent four sons (or possibly five) to war, only one of whom returned unscathed while two others returned wounded or gassed. Or the three Firebrace brothers, only one of whom returned alive. Or the two Gage brothers, like the two Lester brothers, all killed in action. Or yet again the case of the Slater brothers, both privates in the 20th Battalion in France, where one was killed and the other gassed in mid-1918. Others were lucky; for example Henry Lloyd, who survived two bullets in the right hand, another two in the right leg, a bayonet thrust through the left arm, and half a dozen broken ribs from collapsing sandbags. And surely Thomas Lyons, somewhat curiously listed as 'a Native of Condobolin', might have been thought to be tempting fate after being wounded on three separate occasions.

Against the exploits of millions in the pageant of heroic, but largely wasted, effort that was the First World War, the contribution of a mere three hundred men might seem to pale to insignificance. Yet it is indeed worthy of note that, at a time when the aboriginal population were not even deemed eligible to be included in a census, black Australians were serving within the ranks of the army. It was not until the Second World War that the son of one of the veterans of 1914-18¹² achieved the distinction of being the first aborigine to become a commissioned army officer. The exploits of Lieutenant Reg Saunders in New Guinea¹³ appear in Long's Volume VII of the Official History, while his service as a company commander in Korea, including at Kapyong, can be read in Bartlett's *With the Australians In Korea*.¹⁴ Gordon's biography of Saunders, *The Embarrassing Australian*, offers a reasonable, if somewhat propagandist, account.

The history of aborigines serving within the army is virtually as long as the history of the Australian Army itself. Today, as in 1914-18, aboriginal servicemen are contributing to Australia in their own characteristic way, quietly and unobtrusively. □

¹² The father was Chris Saunders, of Portland, Victoria.

¹³ Saunders's younger brother Harry, a friend of Private Bruce Kingsbury, VC, was killed in New Guinea, fighting with the 2/14th Battalion to recapture Gona Mission, on 29 November 1942.

¹⁴ N. Bartlett (ed), *With the Australians in Korea*, 3rd Edition, (Canberra, 1960).



THE MADISON AVENUE FORMULA FOR A VOLUNTEER ARMY

*Major L. G. Peters
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps*

'Fellers of Australier,
Cobbers, chaps and mates,
Hear the b - enemy,
Kickin' at the gates!
Blow the b - bugle,
Beat the b - drum,
Upper-cut and out the cow
To Kingdom b - come!'

THIS cry in 1908 by C. J. Dennis had no more effect than on recruiting than it would now, and 1910 saw conscription introduced in this country. It was unpopular then, it is unpopular now, and the political leaders on both sides of the House are no doubt keen to find a way to achieve a large enough army by voluntary enlistment only. To serving soldiers the solution is both obvious and attractive — raise pay and keep raising it until everyone wants to join up!

This solution suffers from that universal malady — the ruination of many a brilliant scheme — insufficient funds. It also fails to provide one facet of the employment incentive which has become more prominent lately. This is the matter of status, or to give it its modern name, image.

The Army does not currently enjoy the social status that it should. This is because no one has fully disabused the Australian public of its belief that, in peace, soldiers have nothing to do; that preparing for war involves only pressing a rifle into the hands of the mythical Australian bushman, and that professional soldiers are therefore idle and unskilled misfits. Higher pay then appears unjustified to many. The problem is therefore to improve the Army's image.

Commercial firms have a not dissimilar problem to this — how to raise their status in the eyes of the buying public, and/or how to attract that public to their products. The techniques they use for these two aspects are similar and well known. The commercials on television and radio, the advertisements in newspapers and magazines, and the hoardings interfering with the view from our highways, are as much a part of modern life as the motor car and frozen food. The vast industry that produces these is typified by the advertising agencies and high pressure public relations firms of Madison Avenue in New York.

In their language, the Army could be described as 'a multi-faceted nationwide service organization having the largest payroll with the broadest spectrum of trades and skills in the country; a self-contained firm offering service at short notice anywhere in Australia or overseas, with close cost-control and quality assurance measures to keep prices low for you the customer'. It therefore seems logical that the Army should use the techniques of Madison Avenue. Some people will say that we already do; that we have our own Public Relations Corps, and that we have recruiting advertisements in newspapers and periodicals, and on television. This is true — but compare the activities of our PR with the aggressive, success-oriented methods of Madison Avenue; compare the TV and printed commercials of, say, the cigarette distributors, with the pedestrian versions that we hope will attract favourable attention to the Army.

Major Peters graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1959 into the RAAOC. After a variety of jobs with 2 BOD and 1 Comp Ord Coy (forerunner of the AOD), he was attached to 7 Fd Sqn when it was sent to Borneo during Confrontation in 1964. He was then transferred to Headquarters FARELF as Australian LO on the DOS FARELF staff. In 1966 he returned to AHQ Melbourne to DOS (Ord 1) until MGO Gp (Canberra) was raised. He was DADOS MGO Gp and Staff Officer to the MGO in Canberra until 1968 when he attended the Division II Army Staff Course at RMCS Shrivenham in the UK. Returning to Australia in 1970 he was TSO2 (Armament) at Army Design Establishment until he attended Staff College, Queenscliff in 1972, when this essay was written. In January 1973 he became Director of Supply in the newly formed Headquarters PNG Defence Force.

As any Madison Avenue advertising man will admit (perhaps not in quite the same words) the last thing we need to be is as honest and accurate as we are in our portrayal of Army life and prospects. We should be appealing to the dreamer, the Walter Mitty that is in all of us. Does any smoker complain when the lighting of his 'passport to international smoking pleasure' fails to produce the bevy of glamorous girls and the exotic sports car? Do housewives boycott the supermarket when their washpowder fails to provide its crop of lemons? Are any of us really surprised when our after-shave lotion fails to give us our way with any female who comes within range?

How many shapely girls have you ever noticed in any of our recruiting ads? Everyone else who advertises has discovered that sex sells. No advertising executive can consider himself qualified until he can successfully incorporate a pretty girl, preferably in a bikini, into the advertising copy for *anything*, including spanners, ball bearings, socks and a preparation for the relief of rectal itch in cattle. Somehow this fact has escaped the writers of our advertising material. It would be very easy to incorporate girls into Army commercials. We do have, after all, the WRAAC and the RAANC. This would give the Madison Avenue trained advertiser ample excuse to show every soldier at all times surrounded by girls of the Raquel Welch stamp. This would certainly improve the image of the WRAAC and RAANC. Readers of *Playboy* magazine will vouch for the likely effectiveness of a full page in a glossy colour magazine showing a soldier engaged in some routine activity being frankly and warmly regarded by one or two passers-by (lovely young women of course) over the caption, 'What sort of man joins the ARA?'

Consider the possibilities of a series of TV commercials in which some of the handsome young people doing the smoking, drinking, driving, shaving, washing, eating, breath-sweetening, flying etc. are Army personnel. This might assure our acceptance as normal members of society. Consider the advertising value in areas where Army people are traditionally more involved than civilians — polishing boots (why hasn't Nuggett thought of this?), washing and ironing uniforms, dusting furniture, being punctual, having clear throats (for RSMs), being clean shaven, etc. Co-operation with the appropriate manufacturer would gain us plenty of PR at reduced cost. This should appeal to the Treasury.

Could our Public Relations Corps handle this? What about a Media Liaison Section staffed by Army people trained by attachment to Madison Avenue firms? This would enable another neglected aspect of Army PR to be carried out by the journalists in our current organization. This is, to provide answers to many of the adverse news items, letters and interviews which give the loud minority the opportunity to put their ill-formed views. Such things as these, when not officially or demi-officially challenged, are accepted by the public as the truth. The Army has previously been unfairly criticized or inaccurately portrayed simply because the newsmen failed to seek an official version.

You will have noticed that where a large private firm receives some adverse publicity in the news or in published letters there soon appears a rebuttal signed by the firm's chairman or public relations officer. This aggressive seeking out and rectifying of adverse publicity is a good way of preventing the slippage of the image previously created, and is something we should further develop as soon as possible.

While they are not always taken seriously, the techniques of the Madison Avenue advertising and PR men, and their local equivalents, are the basics of propaganda. We are facing an enemy who is expert in the use of propaganda and he has learned from Vietnam that we are not good at using it to keep our own public opinion on side. Therefore it is time we became better at this propaganda business, not only to increase our recruiting rate but to let us win the propaganda battle. □

MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the \$10 prize for the best original article in the December 1972 issue of the journal to Major S. N. Gower for his contribution 'The Darwin Firings of Rapier'.



New Guinea Volunteer Rifles

ANYONE glancing at the nominal roll of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR) would be excused for thinking that Australia had maintained a Foreign Legion at its northern outposts in January 1942. Such names as Lars Waldemar Bergstrand, Carlo Lugarno Cavalieri, Bruno Chou Lai, Allistair Stuart Fraser-Fraser, Francisco Trojaolo and Hubert Behrendorff appear and are an indication of the cosmopolitan nature of this volunteer movement.

When Army Headquarters, on 4 September 1939, issued the necessary order for the raising of this unit, men from Europe, the British Isles, New Zealand, Australia, and Asia, men who had their homes and livelihood in the Territories and were aware of the menace of Japan, hastened to join. Chan Kim Thai was a rifleman; Shui Hong, a lieutenant.

Prior to the beginning of the war, Australia had scrupulously observed its undertakings to the League of Nations and had refrained from making any defence preparations in the Mandated Territory. In spite of the limitations imposed by the mandate, the Returned Soldiers' League Sub-Branches took a vigorous lead in demanding that at least some effort should be made to arm and train those residents who wished to be better prepared to defend themselves and their homes. Colonel J. Walstab, the Police Superintendent at Rabaul, visited Melbourne in August 1939 and discussed the matter fully with Army HQ. Largely because of his efforts, it was decided to form a militia-type battalion in New Guinea.

Originally, the strength of the battalion was limited to 20 officers and 400 other ranks but the establishment was increased in June 1940 to 23 officers and 482 other ranks. The enthusiasm in the early days stemmed mainly from returned soldiers of the 1914-18 War, but by mid-1941 the unit had lost much of its zest, many of the youngest and most ardent members having gone away to join the AIF and the other services. The remoteness of many areas was a disadvantage inherent in the unit's organization. But, in the latter half of 1941, a growing realization of the danger of war in the Pacific and of the increasing peril of the Territory led to a revival of interest.

Headquarters of the NGVR was originally at Rabaul and companies and sections were located at Wau, Salamaua, Lae and Madang. Fit men between the ages of 18 and 50 were accepted. Enlistment was for a two-year period and there was no pay except for an allowance of £1 per year, made for each efficient member—an efficient member being one who put in 20 full days of training and who qualified in handling small arms. The standard of rifle shooting was very high. The first Commanding Officer was Lieutenant Colonel C. Ross Field, the Public Works Director at Rabaul and the Adjutant was Lieutenant J. J. Mullaly.

The uniform consisted of khaki shirts and trousers, made up locally from material sent from Australia. The Army supplied felt hats, bandoliers and leather belts, boots and puttees. Brass 'NGVR' shoulder badges were worn. Arms available for training consisted of rifles and some Vickers and Lewis machine-guns. In mid-1940, two Army Instructional Corps instructors, Warrant Officer (later Major) D. H. Umphelby and Warrant Officer Barnard, were sent up and brought the training more into line with current AMF practice.

With the arrival at Rabaul in April 1941 of 'Lark Force' (2/22nd Battalion, AIF, plus components) NGVR's role became subsidiary and in August its headquarters was transferred to Bulolo on the mainland. Colonel Field relinquished command, and Major (later Colonel) W. M. Edwards was promoted to command. One of the most enthusiastic of the early volunteers, Edwards revitalized the unit on the goldfields and many new recruits came in. War with Japan was imminent and the strength of NGVR on the eve of the outbreak of war was 12 officers and 284 other ranks.

Immediately Japan attacked, Major General B. M. Morris, commanding the 8th Military District, was authorized to place the

battalion on full-time duty, but only a small group was then called up and it was not until 21 January 1942 that the battalion was actually mobilized. The Japanese attacked Rabaul from the air on the 20th, and in the early hours of the 22nd effected a landing. When the Japanese came, seventy-four members of NGVR were in Rabaul under the command of Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Carr, the CO of the 2/22nd Battalion. They manned medium machine-guns and mortars and fought until resistance was of no further avail, sharing the fate of other prisoners-of-war.



(Australian War Memorial)

Members of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles display a Japanese flag captured at Mubo on 21 July 1942.

On the mainland, the NGVR was organized as a group of 'independent companies' (not to be confused with AIF companies of the same name, within whom the NGVR later operated) at Wau, Salamaua, Bulolo and Lae. On 21 January, at about noon, Coastwatcher Pursehouse reported from Finschhafen that some 60 Japanese aircraft

were headed towards Lae and Salamaua. These divided and struck simultaneously at the two towns. Systematically and efficiently the Japanese caused destruction and confusion at Lae. Seven civil aircraft, which were on the ground when the Japanese arrived, were wrecked.

As the enemy planes flew away, two Australian Wirraways from Rabaul dropped down out of the clouds where they had remained concealed and landed on the airfield. Major E. W. Jenyns, second-in-command of NGVR, went to see the Administrator, Sir Walter McNicoll, who had been working from Lae for some time in anticipation of the final transfer of the capital from Rabaul. Sir Walter agreed that a state of emergency existed and told Jenyns to 'take over'.

Five Japanese fighters, diverted from the main force, destroyed three Junkers at Bulolo but, turning east again before they reached Wau, missed five aircraft on the field there. At Salamaua, where Pursehouse's report had not been received, the raiders took the town completely by surprise. They destroyed one RAAF and 10 or 12 civil aircraft on the ground.

With the knowledge that a Japanese landing at Salamaua was imminent, and with the NGVR on full-time duty, there was a general agreement that all civilians should leave the town. This occurred on 24 January when two parties, one led by District Officer N. Penglase and the other by the Director of District Services and Native Affairs, R. Melrose, departed overland towards the Lakekamu River, and by sea, respectively.

After their departure, the only Europeans left in the town were six RAAF men, manning a signals station and six men of the NGVR. Meanwhile, other scratch NGVR platoons prepared to defend vital points in the area, with their headquarters at Mubo. A platoon which went to Salamaua found the small group there in difficulties, due to local disorders. Lae now had a company strength of men.

On 7 March 1942, five enemy aircraft raided Lae, which had been laid waste, and Captain H. M. Lyon, OC of the group, got word that a big convoy was headed in his direction. He himself stayed in the town with four men to await events while the rest of his men made for Nadzab, destroying on the way the one remaining petrol dump at Jacobsen's Plantation. At 4.45 a.m., on the 8th, the Japanese came ashore and Lyon, his men and three New Guineans, turned their backs on the lost town and went up the main road towards Nadzab.

That same morning the Japanese landed at Salamaua, and the bulk of the NGVR platoon fell back across the Francisco River, leaving behind a few men to demolish the aerodrome and fire the petrol dump. As Captain A. G. Cameron and his runner, Lance-Corporal Brannelly—two of a small party of 2/22nd Battalion survivors—were falling back, Brannelly shot an enemy soldier at point-blank range, probably the only Japanese casualty from land action in the landings at either Lae or Salamaua. After the rear party had crossed the bridge over the




(Australian War Memorial)

A secret tree-top observation post, used for observing Japanese movements near Salamaua, New Guinea, August 1942.

Francisco, and when the Japanese appeared on its approaches from the Salamaua side, the NGVR men destroyed it. Most of them then took the track back to Mubo.

The Japanese displayed no hurry to move inland. On 18 March, a party of 60 marched to Komiatum, destroyed the NGVR stores dump there and returned to Salamaua. On the Lae side, the

invaders kept to the township area. This pause on the part of the enemy gave the New Guinea men time to meet new problems. These men of the NGVR were the only representatives of the law and order previously maintained by the administration.



(Australian War Memorial)

Salamaua, viewed from an NGVR observation post above Nuk Nuk.

With civil government gone, they assumed responsibility for several thousand indentured labourers recruited from many outlying districts by planters and others, and now unable to return to their homes. The NGVR established depots and fed them and they became the first of the army of carriers and labourers so vital to the Allies during the fighting that followed.

Colonel Edwards was most interested to know what the Japanese were doing in Salamaua, so Corporal (later Major) J. B. McAdam, with a party of six men, edged so close to the enemy that scarcely a Japanese movement escaped them—they scouted into the very fringes of the garrison and only their superb bushcraft, hardiness and courage ensured their survival.

The Japanese knew they were there and on one occasion a searching party actually passed beneath the telephone line, but failed to see it. As the local people were being condemned for assisting the Australians, McAdam withdrew his men to avoid further trouble for them. Other posts of the same nature were established along the Markham and Heath's Plantation to watch the Japanese. Little the enemy did escaped the notice of the watchers.

The men of the NGVR had filled a large gap in the period up to late May—they had kept touch with the invaders. On the 23rd of that month, the first troops to share their task arrived. Flown from Port Moresby to the Bulolo Valley, the 2/5th Independent Company, AIF, arrived to co-operate with the NGVR. These two units, plus some details from Port Moresby, a mortar platoon and a group of reinforcements for the widely dispersed No. 1 Independent Company, formed Kanga Force, with the role of a 'limited offensive' and the object 'to harass and destroy enemy personnel and equipment in the Markham District (including Salamaua in that area)'.

Major N. L. Fleay, OC Kanga Force, considered there were 2,000 Japanese at Lae and 250 at Salamaua, as against 700 men under his own command, of whom only 450 were fit for operations—a pitifully small number to meet any one of the possible Japanese threats. To forestall these, Fleay proposed to engage the Japanese by raids designed to inflict casualties, destroy equipment and to hamper their use of Lae and Salamaua as air bases. Accordingly, he issued orders for raids on Heath's Plantation and Salamaua and, as the need for action was urgent, directed that the one on Heath's was to take place first.

As it transpired, however, the Salamaua raid was made first. It could be planned quickly and in great detail, as a result of the work of Corporal McAdam's scouts.

In the early hours of the morning of 29 June 1942, 71 members of the 2/5th and the NGVR killed at least 100 Japanese at a cost of three men slightly wounded. The raid was an outstanding success and thoroughly disturbed the Japanese, who sent fighting patrols up to 90 strong into the foothills. The raid also made them draw on their garrison at Lae to reinforce their perimeter at Salamaua.

The raid on Heath's Plantation at Lae, equally well-planned and carried out by 58 strongly-armed men, was successful, but barking watch-dogs warned the enemy of the raiders' presence and the operation was robbed of the element of surprise that had been so valuable at Salamaua. In this raid, the leader, Major T. P. Kneen, was killed and two men wounded.

As a result of these guerilla raids, the men were in good spirits, although many of the NGVR were sick with fever and the number of fit men dwindled steadily. The most serious problem, however, was one of supply. Food was not getting through and, in this regard, the guerillas were totally dependent on the local supplies. Japanese air raids, intimidation tactics, and the difficulty of getting rations forward to feed carriers had a cumulative effect and threatened to stop any activity on the part of the Australians. The shortage of tobacco was a particularly irritating problem.

In the months that followed, attention was focused on the Battle of the Owen Stanleys, but the NGVR continued to man posts overlooking the Japanese although their numbers were shrinking. They fought splendidly, true to the tradition they themselves had established. 1942 was their year. By the early months of 1943, too few were left to be effective. In view of their specialized knowledge of the country and its problems, the remaining members were distributed throughout ANGAU (Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit) and the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles lost its identity.

The members of the NGVR had come from many walks of life. Some were too old to join the AIF, some medically not fit or employed in restricted occupations. But they fought well and still found time for important administration and for laying down an organization of local labour that later grew to be a most important contributory feature of the success of the Allied campaign in New Guinea. □

—C.F.C.



The Australian Army Service Corps

From Federation 1901 Until
The General Reorganization
Of The Commonwealth Forces 1912

Lieutenant Colonel G. H. Browne, ED
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

PART 2

In 1907 the Commonwealth Forces of NSW assembled for their annual training during the months of March and April. The ASC was deployed as follows:

No 1 LH Supply Colm with 1st LH Bde at Casula, near Liverpool.

No 2 LH Supply Colm with 2nd LH Bde at West Maitland.

No 1 Infantry Supply Colm with 1st Inf Bde at Liverpool.

The Garrison Company with the Garrison troops at Sydney.

A chronicler of the times describes the roles ASC played in these camps:

The transport allotted to each supply column consisted of 6 waggons and 12 horses.

The two supply columns (1 L.H. & 1 Inf) for the encampments at Liverpool and Casula, proceeded to their destinations by march route leaving Sydney (Victoria Barracks) at 9 p.m. on the 27th, and arriving at Liverpool at 6 a.m. on the 28th March, when camps were pitched, supplies taken in, and all necessary arrangements made for the troops. . . .

On Wednesday the 3rd of April, the whole of the troops left camp for two days manoeuvres, each brigade accompanied by its supply column carrying one day's supplies, the regimental waggons conveying blankets, W.P. sheets, entrenching tools, and cooking utensils. The Army Service Corps had 6 water carts with semi-rotary pumps fixed on tripods, and lengths of hose for filling water carts. . . .

The troops bivouaced for the night at Cairn's Hill, close to the Sydney Water Supply Canal on the Bringelly Road. Early next morning the troops had breakfast and moved out of the bivouac at 8 a.m. for the second day's manoeuvres, and the whole of the transport, after collecting stores, returned to camp. On Friday the 5th of April, the camp was struck at 9.30 a.m. when the whole of the available transport (24 waggons) was employed removing the equipment to the

station. By 5 p.m. that day the whole of the equipment was trucked at Liverpool station and at 10 a.m. on the 6th the Liverpool-Casula Camp was a thing of the past, as the Army Service Corps, after completing its work, returned to Sydney by road. . . .

Major Selwyn Smith, commanding the Corps, was an assistant Director, and Lieut. Lyons (S.O.) was Divisional Transport Officer.⁵

Major-General J. C. Hoad, Inspector General for the Commonwealth Forces wrote of the ASC in his Annual Report for 1907:

The efficiency of the Army Service Corps has been well maintained. The personnel are good, and all ranks have worked hard to satisfactorily carry out the duties required of them.⁶

Eight-day camps⁷ were held in NSW in 1908 over the Easter period 17-24 April. No 1 Infantry Transport and Supply Column carried out both transport and supply duties at Liverpool, aided by the NSW Garrison Company ASC who supported Fortress Command units such as Australian Garrison Artillery units. Percentage attendance of ASC at the camp was 95%.

The militia establishments and the officer appointments for 1908 as shown in the Military List of 1908⁸ were as follows:

AASC NSW

Permanent Section
Quarter-Master

Lyons, Capt (Hon) M. McD. (5-10-07).

Militia Establishments
Transport and Supply Columns

No 1 Light Horse

No 2 Light Horse

No 1 Infantry

NSW Garrison Company

⁵ Holdsworth, A. A. Captain, 'The Australian Army Service Corps', *The ASC Quarterly*, vol. 2, April 1907—October 1908, pp. 164-66.

⁶ Hoad, J. C. Major-General, 'Annual Report for the Year 1907 by the Inspector General,' *Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers General, Session, 1907-08*, Victoria: Government Printer, 2 April 1908, p. 119.

⁷ Bartlett, C. F. Lieutenant Colonel, *Annual Continuous Training Report, 1907-08*, Sydney: 25 May 1908, pp. 2, 3.

⁸ *The Military Forces List of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1908*, Melbourne: Government Printer, 1 August 1908, p. 64.

OC

Smith, Major R. S. (22-6-05)

No 1 L.H. Tpt and Sup Colm

Tedder, Capt J. G. VD

Charlton, Lt J. R. (19-5-08)

McKelvey, 2/Lt M. T. (1-10-07)

No 2 L.H. Tpt and Sup Colm

Martin, Capt E. F. (24-12-04)

Wooten, Capt. W. F. (21-1-08)

Stephens, Lt R. J. (19-5-08)

No 1 Infantry and Sup Colm

Smith, Capt P. W.

McMorland, Capt A. VD (20-3-05)

Cureton, Lt P. (19-5-08)

Collins, 2/Lt C. R. (18-2-08)

NSW Garrison Company

O'Donnell, Capt A. G. (24-3-08)

Munro, 2/Lt E. J. (5-5-08)

A memorandum⁹ on the progress of the military defence of Australia since federation, written in 1909, is of interest in the development of the corps. The memorandum pointed out the progress of the Army Service Corps which at the time of federation was represented by 136 of all ranks in NSW, and 30 in Victoria. During the seven years 1901 to 1908 the corps had been increased to an annual establishment of 27 officers and 258 ORs, organized in:

Three Light Horse Transport & Supply Colms.

Two Infantry Transport and Supply Colms.

Two Garrison Companies.

⁹ *Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, General Session, 1909*, 'Memorandum on Australian Military Defence and its Progress since Federation', Victoria: Government Printer, 8 December 1909.

Four Detachments—Garrison Details.

The above increase, however, did not complete the units required to make the brigades of the field force self-contained and to complete the general scheme as laid down by Major-General Hutton at federation. Still required by 1909 were:

Three Light Horse Transport and Supply Colms.

Three Infantry Transport and Supply Colms.

The memorandum also raised the old problem of the adequacy of transport and equipment as well as the suitability of the types of transport. It was pointed out that in time of war the field force and garrison troops would require transport vehicles, exclusive of guns, ammunition waggons, and limbers, to the number of 2,000, and about 10,000 horses, exclusive of those provided for themselves by members of the forces. In time of peace, too, a certain number would also be required for training.

The cost of purchase of the necessary vehicles and harness for war was estimated to exceed £200,000. Such a sum was quite obviously out of the question. In any case, the army could not afford sufficient vehicles even for training purposes in peace.

It had been the practice to obtain transport vehicles and horses, and, in some cases, drivers as well, for those units that could not supply their own. These had been obtained by means of annual contracts in each military district.

This system was not satisfactory and had been under criticism since the early days of the NSW ASC. The horses were almost invariably those used in cities and were not accustomed to rough country work. Furthermore, only a limited number of contractors tendered, resulting in charges so high that it was more expensive, in many cases, to hire four draught horses from a contractor than to obtain the services of a driver, waggon, and four horses from an individual farmer.

Rather remarkably, the types of local transport and horses for use by the army were carefully investigated in 1908, not by the ASC, but by members of the Australian Intelligence Corps in each state. The Federal Government voted £3,000 to carry out a practical test of local vehicles as a substitute for the ordinary military pattern vehicle.

The problem of adapting suitable types of vehicles for use by the commonwealth forces had for long been exercising the minds of the army. No country had, to this time, attempted to provide vehicles for war in times of peace, except those vehicles of a very special technical nature. The maintenance and the cost of providing all such vehicles would, of course, be prohibitive. However, Section 67 of the Commonwealth Defence Act empowered the federal authorities in time of war to requisition all vehicles and horses necessary for transport purposes.

As previously noted the Intelligence Corps had investigated the types of vehicles used by civilians that could prove suitable for military purposes, but the investigation appeared to have produced insignificant results. In an address by Lieutenant Colonel Legge, QMG¹ of the Commonwealth forces to the Coachbuilders Association in Adelaide 1909 on the question of some sort of standardization between civilian and military vehicles he said:

. . . the carriage and waggon builders . . . could help materially . . . by helping to standardize types of vehicles. If certain vehicles could be settled upon as those particularly useful for military purposes, the more those types were standardized the better for the defence of Australia; because the more there would be to choose from . . .

Another good thing from the point of view of his (Army) Department would be the standardization of the axles boxes and various parts of vehicles. If this were done, in time of war the effecting of repairs would be a much easier matter; and it would be of benefit to the manufacturers because they would not have to keep such a varied assortment of ironmongery.²

A great deal of time appears to have been spent in seeking a suitable type of military general service waggon for Australian conditions. The imperial general service waggon, at the time, was considered the one that came more closely than any other waggon to satisfying the requirements of the military authorities. This vehicle was designed to carry a load of 30 cwt under the severe conditions of active service, its main features being simplicity of construction, ability to travel over uneven ground, a fairly short turn, and so constructed that it could be easily dismantled for transport by train or ship.

Realizing the problem of lack of suitable vehicles, the Commonwealth Government afforded the opportunity of the Carriage and Waggon

¹ Lieutenant Colonel Legge, 'Transport Vehicles for Military Purposes', *The Australasian Coachbuilder and Wheelwright*, 15 April 1909, pp. 31-36.

² *ibid.*, p. 33.

Builders Association of Australia in 1909 to inspect one of the imperial general service waggons. After their inspection they reported that:

... we think the design to be one which claims the close attention of the trade as an example for a light general purpose farm waggon . . . there is no reason why, with slight modification, such a waggon should not largely take the place of the heavier and more expensive patterns now in general use. This waggon could be used in any part of Australia, and for most purposes. It is a modification of the German waggon.³

Much argument ensued as to the suitability of the German waggon. Some argued that in most parts of Australia there was very little resemblance between what Australia called the German waggon, manufactured in Australia, and the actual German waggon as made in Germany. From actual drawings of both types it would seem that the principal point of difference between the German and Australian models was in the methods of supporting the sides and the size of the front wheels.

An article by a Captain H. G. Reid of the ASC on the matter of vehicles stated:

One of the weakest spots in the present defence scheme is the lack of transport arrangements. The waggon of the country is a heavy spring vehicle and the popular types of vehicles differ considerably in the various States . . . No steps have as yet been taken to fill this long felt want of technical vehicles for 1st line Transport, but once the bill is passed the provision will no doubt be taken in hand at once. It is also very probable that in order to get the farmer and others to adopt a uniform pattern harness and waggon suitable for military purposes, the Government will approve of the payment of a subsidy or a registration fee. . . .⁴

The editor of the *ASC Quarterly* did not agree with the earlier remarks of the Carriage and Waggon Builders Association as to the Australian waggon being a modification of the German model. He stated:

The Coachbuilder and Wheelwright correspondent (15 July 1909 issue) says that the (Australian) wagon is 'an adaptation of the German model', but this statement is hardly correct, as the normal German military vehicle is a full lock wagon, suitable only for work on the good roads of north-western Europe. This is probably only another instance of the common belief that everything good in the military line must bear the well known 'made in Germany' label! It is also suggested that this vehicle might prove extremely valuable as a light farm wagon, but we fear that its small carrying capacity for bulky goods would render it of little value for that purpose.⁵

³ 'The Draughtsman', article (author not named) in *The Australasian Coachbuilder and Wheelwright*, 15 July 1909, p. 104.

⁴ Reid, H. G. Captain, 'The Australian Army Service Corps', *The Army Service Corps Quarterly*, 10 January 1910, pp. 456-57.

⁵ Editor's Footnote, 'The Australian Army Service Corps', *The Army Service Corps Quarterly*, 10 January 1910, p. 457.

Leaving the transport problems and turning to the supply aspects of the corps, there appeared to be much similarity between the Australian supply accounts and the British. The British used the AB 55 for indents for rations whilst the AASC used Forms J.4 (a), J.4 (b) and J.4 (c).

During annual camps, supply officers were made responsible to ensure that units did not overdraw their entitlements. The scale of rations, set out below, was very similar to the British field service scale, but the Australian considered himself hard done by unless he received his 2 lb of meat daily.

*Scale of Rations at Camps.*⁶ Daily ration per man: 1 lb bread or 1 lb of biscuit. $1\frac{3}{4}$ lb fresh meat or 1 lb preserved meat or salt fish. $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. coffee. $\frac{1}{32}$ oz pepper. 8 oz mixed vegetables, or 2 oz cheese, or $\frac{1}{6}$ lb jam. 1 lb potatoes. 3 oz sugar. $\frac{1}{2}$ oz salt. $\frac{1}{4}$ oz tea. Rice, Sago, Brandy.

Straw for tents. 10 lb per officer or soldier.

Candles. 1 per bell tent. 2 per marquee tent.

Forage. Oats 40 lb bushel and per bushel 12. Chaff oaten per 2,240 lb 7 lb. Bran per bushel of 20 lb 6/7lb. Firewood per 2,240 lb.

Wheel Horses (Draught). Oats 14 Hay 10.

The strength of the AASC⁷ on 30 June 1910 stood as follows:

NSW Permanent AASC	15
„ Militia AASC	151
Vict „ „	61
Qld „ „	52
SA „ „	27
WA „ „	9
Tas „ „	5

but the estimates for 1911 allowed for increases to the establishments

⁶ *ibid*, p. 455.

⁷ *Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, General, Session, 1910*, 'Memo by Minister of State for Defence on the Estimates of the Defence Dept for Financial Year 1910-11', Appendix D, p. 137, Melbourne: Government Printer.

to bring them up to the following strengths: Victoria 146, Queensland 70, South Australia 52, Western Australia 26 and Tasmania 23.

In a very interesting address⁸ to the United Service Institution in 1910, Major T. B. Dibbs, Reserve of Officers, raised the whole problem of the supply and transport system in a democracy like Australia. He suggested that, because of the wide experience of the British ASC, an experienced British officer be sent to Australia to assist the Australian Service Corps. Dibbs believed that if Australia ever took the field in dead earnest then an efficient transport and supply system should be capable of being started at the press of the button.

The Minister for Defence . . . will have but to press a button to start the machinery of supply and transport in any part of the Commonwealth. Keen and competent officials—be they civilians or otherwise—with their willing and capable workers will assemble at their allotted places; horses will be harnessed, oxen will be yoked, wagons, automobiles and pack animals will be laden; railways will be taken over . . . all according to a plan drawn out and severely tested by many mobilizations in time of peace.⁹

One of the audience, Major Kelly,¹ Australian Instructional Corps, raised the subject of the use of mechanical transport, particularly as the registration of motor vehicles appeared to have commenced in NSW in 1910. Kelly thought such registration would be of immense value to the army in times of mobilization especially in relation to the requisitioning of mechanical transport. He also believed that the army depended far too much on horse transport.

A thing that has often exercised my mind is the adaptability of motor vehicles to transport. The Military handbooks still depend upon horse transport far too much. For First-line Transport the motor lorry could not be used, but I do think that in New South Wales there are very, very few places, none that I have been to, where the roads could not be tackled by a modern motor. The motor would be of use chiefly in bringing forward supplies to advanced depots. For Regimental Second-line Transport it could not be used so much, but up to that point the elaborate and complicated nature of Military Transport could be very much simplified by the use of motors.²

Dibbs replied to this comment briefly by stating that the whole matter of automobile transport was still in its infancy, offering no

⁸ Dibbs, Major T. B., 'The Organization of An Australian System of Supply and Transport', *Journal and Proceedings of the United Service Institution of NSW for the Year 1910*, Sydney: vol. 22, pp. 155-175.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 166.

¹ *ibid.*, p. 168. Comment in reply to Major Dibbs' address.

² *ibid.*, p. 168.

further information on the use of motor vehicles by the Australian Military Forces.

Field Marshal Lord Kitchener's visit to Australia in 1909 was to have far reaching consequences for the Australian defence system. Kitchener's recommendations³ were that compulsory universal training should be extended to the 26th year of age and that the best way of organizing a citizen army was to divide the commonwealth into areas, from which military units would be drawn.

Practically all the recommendations of Kitchener's were adopted in the Defence Act 1903-10. The commonwealth thus became the first British dominion to establish compulsory training.

As a result of the Act, Australia was divided into over 200 training areas, each under the supervision of an area officer. The numbers of men under training would vary in accordance with the area population. Every ten areas were grouped under a superior officer responsible in peacetime for the co-ordination of training. He was termed as the brigade major for the units within the designated areas. At the end of 1911 approximately 12,000 troops were in training in NSW.

Lyons⁴ considered that under universal training it would be necessary to organize transport in the various brigade training districts, not only for the units formed in those districts, but also for the great body of transport for use on lines of communication. Lyons also echoed Dibb's previous belief that transport resources had to be organized in peace so as to be ready for war. Lyons, with vast experience in the Australian Army Service Corps, was by this time looking ahead to the period when the conditions of universal training would mean alterations in the transport requirements. It was already laid down in the peace and war establishments that the first and second line transport of an infantry brigade comprised about 211 waggons and 785 horses; and of a light horse brigade, 132 waggons and 516 horses. To enable the two light horse brigades and the one infantry brigade comprising the mobile force of this state to take the field on a war footing would require

³ Kitchener, Field Marshal, 'Defence of Australia'. Memorandum, *Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Paper, Session, 1910*, Melbourne, Government Printer, pp. 83-104.

⁴ Lyons, Captain M., 'Military Transport in Australia', *Journal and Proceedings of the United Service Institution of NSW for the Year 1911*, vol. 23, pp. 70-82.

approximately 500 waggons and 2,000 horses. This would be the minimum number and did not provide for replacing animal and vehicle casualties.

In addition to the first and second line transport of units, there would be the requirement at the base to maintain the supply of garrison troops and carry out the task of forwarding stores and supplies.

Lyons⁵ reckoned that the requirement for the existing establishments would be about 1,000 waggons and 4,000 horses to cover all services. From this it would be easy to calculate that in five or six years time, when the state of NSW would have eight brigades under the reorganization of universal training, that additional horses and waggons would be needed.

Despite the difficulties that seemed to lie ahead certain developments, favourable to more efficient transport organization, were slowly taking place. Conditions in the rural areas were altering, settlements becoming closer and the agriculturalist replacing the pastoralist, with the result that wheeled transport was becoming more plentiful, with a better class of transport horse being more easily obtained.

On the other hand, in the larger cities and towns, motor vehicles were slowly replacing horse transport. Lyons saw the use of motor transport as a distinct advantage over horse transport for work at a base and on suitable portions of the line of communication. Lyons said:

We have, however, in Australia a large and continually increasing number of motor waggons which are eminently suitable for the base and line of communication transport work, and might, under favourable conditions, be used for supply columns, and even second line regimental transport. The importance of our resources in this direction cannot be overlooked, as motor transport must, in the near future, form an important factor in our transport organization.⁶

The organization of transport for the military was a running sore for the AASC as well as units. Generally auxiliary transport that had been hired to assist brigades in camp during 1910 and 1911 had been fraught with difficulties. Waggon parts were not interchangeable as the transport consisted of spring carts, light waggons and lorries and many of the vehicles were unable to stand up to the harsh conditions imposed by military manoeuvres. Furthermore, it was very difficult for regi-

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 72.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 76.

mental commanders to train their transport as no transport officer or trained personnel were attached to the regiments. It was considered that every regiment should have its own highly trained transport officer and properly trained soldiers.

The Inspector-General, Major-General G. H. Kirkpatrick, had much to say about the AASC in his 1911 Annual Report⁷ to Federal Parliament. The year's training had given no scope for the employment of supply columns and there had been too great a tendency to rely on the contractor. Many supply officers could not account for the supplies they had, either on the ground or in the waggons. However, for the most part the transport columns were well marshalled. There was one notable exception to this when the baggage of the Sydney garrison troops brigade, on 19 April, did not arrive into bivouac until five hours after the troops had already arrived.

First line transport, i.e., machine-guns, SAA, and tool carts, could not be properly improvised from civilian vehicles. Kirkpatrick considered it necessary to procure these vehicles for the army and provision was made on the estimates for the construction of six to be completed by 31 July 1911. The German wagon, the subject of earlier controversy, was thought to be a suitable vehicle for use in the second line, and as uniformity in type was desirable, every encouragement was to be given to farmers to use such vehicles.

Kirkpatrick was well aware that as the road systems improved and mechanical transport came into use in the country areas, the present system of supply would have to be modified. Because the contractors did so much of the work in supplies it was difficult to obtain sufficient technical training for the supply officer. Other observations made by him are of interest:

In the Depots seen by me, the issue work of a standing camp was well done, but I think in each camp, practice in selecting, slaughtering and dressing beasts, and in establishing field Bakeries, is required . . . Forage should be carefully examined. I found no case in which the oats had been weighed, and I advise officers be instructed in the method of doing this. . . .⁸

⁷ Kirkpatrick, G. M. Major-General, 'Military Forces. Extracts from the Annual Report, 30 May 1911', *Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, General Session, 1911*, pp. 24-30.

⁸ *ibid*, p. 29.

With the introduction of universal training the strength of the militia Army Service Corps would be greatly increased. This would result in increased supply work due to the greater numbers going into camps and consequent greater transport commitments. Better training would be required for the AASC, and, as much of this fell to the permanent section AASC, there was a good case for augmenting the small number of permanent instructors in the Army Service Corps.

By 1 January 1911⁹ the organization and distribution of the AASC was as follows:

FIELD FORCE

	Est		Annual 1910-11
	War	Peace	
<i>1 LH Bde NSW</i>			
No 1 LH Tpt & Sup Colm	104	44	44
<i>2nd LH Bde NSW</i>			
No 2 LH Tpt & Sup Colm	104	44	44
<i>3rd LH Bde Vic</i>			
No 3 LH Tpt & Sup Colm	104	44	44
<i>4th LH Bde Vic</i>			
No 4 LH Tpt & Sup Colm	104	44	44
<i>5th LH Bde Qld</i>			
No 5 LH Tpt & Sup Colm	104	44	44
<i>1 Inf Bde NSW</i>			
No 1 Inf Tpt Sup Colm	115	38	38
<i>2nd Inf Bde Vic</i>			
No 2 Inf Tpt & Sup Colm	115	38	38
<i>Qld Inf Bde</i>			
No 3 Inf Tpt & Sup Colm	53	17	17
<i>5th Aust Bde</i>			
No 6 LH Tpt & Sup Colm	104	44	44

⁹ *The Organization and Distribution of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia*, Melbourne: Government Printer, 1 January 1911.

FIELD FORCE

	Est		Annual 1910-11
	War	Peace	
<i>W.A. Bde</i>			
No 4 Inf Tpt & Sup Colm	62	17	17
<i>Tas Bde</i>			
No 5 Inf Tpt & Sup Colm	56	17	17

GARRISON TROOPS (ORGANIZATION and DISTRIBUTION)

	Est		Annual 1910-11
	War	Peace	
<i>Sydney Fortress</i>			
NSW Garrison Coy (part)	34	34	34
<i>Newcastle Defences</i>			
NSW Garrison Coy (part)	6	6	6
<i>Victoria</i>			
Port Phillip Fortress			
Vic Garrison Coy	20	20	20
<i>Qld</i>			
Lytton Defences			
Qld Garrison Details (part)	6	6	6
<i>Qld</i>			
Thursday Island Defences			
Qld Garrison Details (part)	3	3	3
<i>S.A.</i>			
Port Adelaide Defences			
S.A. Garrison Details	8	8	8
<i>W.A. Defences</i>			
Fremantle Defences			
W.A. Garrison Details	9	9	9
<i>Tas</i>			
Hobart Defences			
Tas Garrison Details	6	6	6

Reorganization¹ of the Australian Military Force was about to occur again in 1912. No major reorganization had been necessary since Hutton's moulding of the separate states military forces just after federation, into the Commonwealth Military Forces. The Federal Government now believed that the time was opportune for the adoption of the recommendations of the Sub-Conference on Imperial Defence, of 1909, that the organization of the overseas dominion forces should be modelled as far as possible on that of the Imperial Regular Army. Up to this time the Australian forces had been organized in the form of light horse brigades and mixed infantry brigades with their respective quotas of auxiliary arms attached.

The new organization of the army and the division of Australia into military districts meant a great expansion of the forces, with a corresponding increase in the Australian Army Service Corps. The corps was to be reorganized into light horse companies and infantry companies instead of the light horse and infantry transport and supply columns, and they were to be increased in strength by transfers from the senior cadets.

The final promulgation of the regimental lists² prior to the reorganization of the AASC columns into companies shows the following postings:

AUSTRALIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS
2nd MILITARY DISTRICT (NSW)

Permanent Section	Date of Appointment
<i>Quartermaster</i>	
Lyons, Capt (Hon) M. McD.	5-10-07
<i>Officer Commanding</i>	
Smith, Major R. S.	22-6-05

¹ 'Report by the Minister of Defence on Universal Training', *Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, Session, 1912*, Melbourne: Government Printer, 1912.

² *The Military Forces List of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1912*, Melbourne: Government Printer, p. 89.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS
2nd MILITARY DISTRICT (NSW)*No 1 Light Horse Transport & Supply Colm*

Tedder, Major J. G. VD	2-5-10
O'Donnell, Capt A. G.	24-3-08
Charlton, Capt J. R.	1-7-10
Cureton, Capt P.	1-11-10
Fitzpatrick, 2/Lt A. L.	20-12-09
MacKenzie, 2/Lt A. K.	3-10-10

No 2 Light Horse Transport & Supply Colm

McMorland, Major A., VD	2-5-10
Martin, Capt. E. F.	24/12/04
Stephens, Capt R. J.	1-11-10
Reynolds, 2/Lt C.	14-12-08
Millner, 2/Lt T. G.	3-10-10

No 1 Infantry Transport and Supply Colm

Smith, Major P. W.	13-2-11
McLaughlin, 2/Lt J. H.	3-10-10
Stevenson, 2/Lt W. O.	3-7-11
Dunningham, 2/Lt P.	18-9-11

NSW Garrison Company

Munro, Lt E. J.	1-7-10
Oatley, 2/Lt A. H.	4-9-11

Like the first ten years of the growth of the corps from 1891 to 1901, the second ten years had witnessed its continued progress from the reorganization caused by federation to the next reorganization of 1912. The corps had battled shortages of equipment, limited finance, too few trained personnel, poor transport vehicles and the like but, under the command of Major Selwyn Smith, had persevered in its task, supporting the army in all transport and supply aspects to the very best of its ability. The second ten years had been worthy successors of the first and had established the corps as an indispensable and integral part of the Australian Military Forces. □

OTHER WARS

North America, 1777: Hitherto events in North America had been the concern of the salons rather than the barracks; for, from the military point of view, the initial operations appeared insignificant to European onlookers. The numbers involved were small. Of the population of the thirteen colonies only one-third comprised American patriots; one-third was indifferent, and one-third remained loyal to England. Only one in twenty-five of the Americans, excluding the loyalist third, ever took the field, and Washington seldom had more than 10,000 men under arms at any one time.

Furthermore Washington himself was, as late as 1775, 'not conscious of the wish for independence'; while on the British side, General Sir William Howe had actually voted in the House of Commons against his Government's policy toward the colonists, and his colleague Major-General Earl Cornwallis had done likewise in the House of Lords. Indeed it seemed that the commanders in the field were really averse to committing their troops whole-heartedly to battle, hoping fondly that the politicians would in the meanwhile compose their differences without the irrevocable breach of all-out war. Until he left America on 24th May 1778, Howe actually maintained a correspondence with Washington, whose last letter to him read:

'General Washington's compliments to General Howe—does himself the pleasure to return to him a dog which accidentally fell into his hands and, by the inscription on the collar, appears to belong to General Howe.'

—S. J. Watson, *By Command of the Emperor.*

Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir,

Centenary of Birth of Former CGS, Major General Sir Julius (Henry) Bruche, KCB, CMG (1873-1961)

The one hundredth anniversary of the birth of General Bruche, a former Chief of the Australian General Staff, occurred on 6 March 1973. I think it would be appropriate to mention this fact in the *Army Journal*.

He was originally a Militia officer in the Colony of Victoria, having been first commissioned in Lt Col Robert Robertson's 1st Bn, Victorian Rifles in May 1891. In civil life he practised as a solicitor in Melbourne. Then in July 1898 he was appointed to the Permanent Staff of the Military Forces of the Colony of Victoria. He served in the South African War and the War of 1914-18. In October 1931 he succeeded Major General W. A. Coxen in the post of CGS. In due course he was placed on the Retired List in April 1935 and succeeded, as CGS, by Major General J. D. Lavarack.



The Army in General Bruche's time provided few opportunities for men of his calibre. He was a tall, imposing figure in uniform; he was a man of wide education; he was a good public speaker; he spoke audibly and with clarity, distinctness and decisiveness. In the course of his career he attracted enemies as well as friends and he never forgot

the individuals in either group. He spoke highly of the efficiency of his first CO, Lt Col Robertson and told me a story about him. One day Lt Bruche was conducting a small scale tactical exercise with his platoon — or whatever a subaltern commanded in the 1890s — and, contrary to the tactical doctrine then current, he deployed his men in open or extended order. Robertson, a man well over six feet tall, rode up on his horse in a fury and in a deep, booming voice called out: 'Mr Bruche! Do you want a whole b... paddock in which to deploy.' He expressed his opinions of persons and things with a refreshing forthrightness. He was probably about 80 years of age when he was greeted in the street by another elderly gentleman with the words: 'You fined me five bob in South Africa.' And in one short, crisp sentence Bruche replied: 'I am sure you deserved it.'

In retirement he did charitable work in an inconspicuous way. He was a good citizen as well as a good soldier by the standards of his time. Lady Bruche still lives in South Yarra — aged, I believe, about 92 years.

Eaglemont
Victoria

Major Warren Perry, RL

Camouflaged Combat Uniforms

I address a communication to you as a request for help.

A few years back I found that there is no known publication in the world which deals with camouflaged combat uniforms as used by the world's armed forces. I have therefore set out to compile an Identification Pamphlet on this subject.

I am seeking information and colour photographs of camouflage uniforms, I am willing to pay the costs to any person who can obtain or supply me with either colour photographs or colour slides of camouflage uniforms. Should any person be able to help with information on this subject I would appreciate it if they could advise where the camouflage uniform was photographed, makers details etc, if possible.

I am interested in all/any camouflage uniforms, no matter how common it may seem to someone else.

P.O. Box 292
Choma, Zambia
Central Africa

J. Llewelyn Jones