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COVER: Detail from war artist Ivor Hele's painting of C Company, 2/48th Battalion attack on Carrier Hill, Tobruk in April 1941. At the Australian War Memorial.

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 265, JUNE 1971

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
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(Australian War Memorial)

A Free French liaison officer signalling French forces in Fort Khiam, Syria in June 1941 seeking their surrender during an attack by Australian troops. The fort was later occupied by the 2/33rd Battalion. Crouching behind the rock is the Australian official war photographer, Damien Parer.



Captain M. V. Moore
Royal Australian Army Educational Corps

THE People's Republic of China came into being in 1949. There followed a period of very close political, military and economic co-operation with the USSR. However, from about 1956 relations between the two nations began to deteriorate. In 1960 the dispute was brought into the open and increased in bitterness through the following years. Armed clashes which took place in 1969 were thought by several observers to be a prelude to open warfare.

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Russia and China have been traditional rivals for control of territory in Central and Eastern Asia. Tsarist Russia, over some 400 years, expanded its territory at the expense of various Chinese rulers. After 1949 China, with her long history as a great power, was unlikely to accept virtual subservience to Moscow for very long. Such traditional reasons for national antagonisms are easy enough to understand.

The aspect of the dispute which many observers in the non-communist world find hardest to appreciate is the emphasis on ideology and, being little understood, the importance of this element tends to be underestimated. For example, a *New York Times* editorial of 12 January 1964 claimed that the ideological dispute was 'a mere disguise for the historic power struggle between Russia and China now contesting for top influence in the Communist world'. This view fails to appreciate the importance of ideology to the communist. The committed communist bases his policies on his set of 'correct' precepts. For him, the contest 'for top supremacy' is necessarily an ideological conflict.

This article is a brief outline of the main elements of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute.

To understand the dispute it is necessary to understand communist terminology. This involves some knowledge of the basic doctrines of Marx and Lenin.

Karl Marx and his collaborator Frederick Engels took over from German philosophy the theory of the dialectic, which is in essence a theory of causation or development. Dialectical theory holds that development, or progress, takes place as a result of a unity of opposites (today often styled a resolution of contradictions). Development begins from a factor which is challenged by its opposite and from the ensuing struggle emerges a new factor which is itself challenged by its opposite and so on.

Marx applied the dialectical theory to human history. For him, the basic factor in any type of social organization was its economy — the group's means of production. Society, he thought, was totally organized around its means of production and the ownership of those means. Throughout all 'history' (Engels showed that many 'pre-historic' tribes held property in common) ownership of goods and of the means of production has been uneven. Every society has thus been split into classes on the basis of their degree of ownership of the means of production. *Dialectical interaction (or just struggle)* between these social classes has been the basic causative factor or agent of development in

history. The class struggle is simplified in the modern historical era as society splits into 'two great armed camps', the *bourgeoisie* or capitalists, owners of the means of production and the proletariat, the workers who have nothing to sell but their labour.

According to Marx, the proletariat would be increasingly oppressed but would become increasingly organized and aware of its historic role and ultimately would rise in violent revolution, overthrow the *bourgeoisie* and establish its own rule, 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'. This period is also known as the stage of socialism in which the state owns the means of production. It is the historical stage or phase that most of the 'communist' nations of today claim to have reached. It is not, in fact, claimed to be communism.

During the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat private property would be systematically abolished, the remnants of the *bourgeoisie* suppressed and agricultural workers, artisans and lower middle class people all brought into class harmony with the proletariat so that ultimately there would be no social classes. At this point, the whole state apparatus which, to the Marxist, was only ever necessary as an instrument of class oppression, would cease to exist. The state would have 'withered away' and the ultimate stage of all history, pure communism, would have been achieved.

For the Marxist all this is more than a theory. Since the only important causative factors in history are material things — the means of production and the relationships of classes to those means of production (i.e., whether they own them or not) — history itself is said to be a material thing. Being material, history is capable of scientific examination. From this scientific examination one can discover general laws of history and accurately predict future developments. Marx claimed to have discovered *the* general laws and to have predicted *the* future developments. To the communist, Marxist theory is correct. Deviations from it are incorrect. The predicted dictatorship of the proletariat and ultimately the phase of pure communism are inevitable throughout the world.

It is over a century since Marx formulated his theory and it has actually been changed rather little in that period. There have, however, been many debates about the ways in which the various historical stages should be brought about. The only contributor to fundamental Marxist doctrine whose contribution is universally accepted (by Marxists) as correct, is Lenin. It is, in fact, more common and more correct nowadays to talk of Marxism-Leninism than of Marxism.

Lenin was necessarily a man of action. Marx had provided the blueprint for proletarian revolution, Lenin was to make an actual proletarian revolution. Hence much of his writing is concerned with the business of revolution, of weapons, of armies and of tactics. However, Lenin greatly expanded the area of relevance of Marxism by his theory of imperialism. Imperialism, he argued, was the highest stage of capitalism. Capitalists increasingly needed sources of raw material and markets for the products of their greatly increased productive potential. They also needed new areas in which to invest the vast wealth being produced by their new machines. Thus the capitalist nations in the late Nineteenth Century had begun a new rush for colonies. The establishment of these colonies also served to postpone, for a time, the proletarian revolution. Capitalists were now able to exploit the native inhabitants of the colonies to a greater degree than their own proletarians.

Imperialist colonies, according to Lenin, were established purely to be exploited by the *bourgeoisie* who controlled the governments of the colonizing nations. Thus colonies stood in the same relationship to the colonizing nation as did the proletariat to the *bourgeoisie* within nations. So whole colonial peoples, most of whom were engaged in agriculture (and according to Marx therefore outside the main struggle of the modern world) could participate directly in the fundamental historical struggle — the overthrow of capitalism. 'National wars against the imperialist powers . . . are inevitable, progressive and revolutionary'.¹

In fact, after Lenin had achieved power in the Soviet Union, he saw that the proletariat in industrialized nations was unlikely to stage revolutions in the near future. He came to see nationalist colonial revolutions as the main (short-term) hope for expanding the number of socialist nations:

. . . the socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their *bourgeoisie* — no, it will be a struggle of all the imperialism-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries against international imperialism.²

Thus Lenin brought anti-colonial struggles, no matter by whom led, into the Marxist scheme of history. They became 'correct'.

¹ 'The Junius Pamphlet' from Pomeroy, William J., *Guerilla Warfare and Marxism*, International Publishers, 1968, p. 109.

² 'Address to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East', *ibid.*, pp. 116f.

One element of Marxist-Leninist theory which has occasioned particular controversy is the necessity (or otherwise) for armed force in accomplishing the change from capitalism and imperialism to socialism. Not surprisingly, for both Marx and Lenin wrote a great deal, their opinions are ambiguous. Marx, for example, told a meeting of the First Working Men's International that in countries like Britain and the United States, workers would be able to achieve their aims by peaceful methods. However, this is rather against the general tenor of most of Marxism-Leninism. Marx, in the *Manifesto*, ridicules early 'Utopian' socialists because 'they reject all . . . revolutionary action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means'. The tone of the *Manifesto* scarcely suggests peaceful methods:

In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.³

Such, then, is the basic Marxist-Leninist ideology.

There are many elements in the ideological dispute between Moscow and Peking and considerable controversy among expert commentators as to which are most important. One central issue is the influence on Marxist-Leninist theory of the availability of nuclear weapons. Lenin had looked forward to world wars as providing the most suitable conditions for communist revolution since the masses would be armed and their leaders in chaos. (Most existing communist states have in fact been born out of the chaos of, or following, world wars.) Khrushchev came to see that nuclear war was a quite different nature — it might not lead to more communist nations since it might leave no nations (or people) at all. Hence the USSR should not provoke world war but would have to follow, instead, a policy of peaceful co-existence. He put this view forward, as a developed theory, in a long speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956:

It goes without saying that among Communists there are no supporters of capitalism. But this does not mean that we have interfered, or plan to interfere, in the internal affairs of countries where capitalism exists When we say that the Socialist system will win in competition between the two systems this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved through armed interference by the Socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries The principle of peaceful co-existence is gaining ever wider international recognition And this is natural, for in present-day conditions there is no other way out. Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful co-existence

³ Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, *Manifesto Of The Communist Party*, Selected Works, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958, p. 65.

or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way . . . There is, of course, a Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists. This precept was evolved at a time when imperialism was an all-embracing world system, and the social and political forces which did not want war were weak, poorly organized, and thus unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war . . . Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war.⁴

Khrushchev went further than this. He turned to the possibility of the attainment of socialism by parliamentary means which, though rejected by Marx, had begun to seem possible in Italy and perhaps France:

It is probable that more forms of transition to Socialism will appear . . . the implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil war . . . the question arises whether it is possible to make the transition to Socialism by parliamentary means . . . The present situation offers the working class in a number of countries a real opportunity to unite the overwhelming majority of the people under its leadership and to secure the transfer of the basic means of production into the hands of the people . . . The winning of a stable parliamentary majority backed by a mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and all the working people could create for the working class of a number of countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes.⁵

Khrushchev's idea of peaceful co-existence was not really new. After World War II Stalin probably realized the increased necessity for peace. At least Malenkov told the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU (1952), at which Stalin was present:

The Soviet policy of peace and security of nations is based on the premise that peaceful co-existence and co-operation of capitalism and communism are quite possible . . . We have not the least intention of forcing our ideology or our economic system upon anybody . . . 'Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not want to there will be no revolution', says *Comrade Stalin*.⁶

China, too, had agreed to the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence' in an agreement with India in 1954 and at the Bandung Conference of 1955. Thus the Moscow-Peking difference on the issue of peaceful co-existence can be argued to be a difference of degree rather than of principle. But the degree of their difference is very considerable.

This difference, though not yet made public, was already developing. In a speech to a conference of twelve communist nations in Moscow in 1957, Mao made several points which were incompatible with Khrushchev's new position. If the imperialists plunged the world into nuclear war, even if half mankind were killed, he said, the survivors

⁴ from Dux, Dieter, *Ideology in Conflict Communist Political Theory*, Van Nostrand, 1963, pp. 27f.

⁵ from Floyd, David, *Mao Against Khrushchev*, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p. 230.

⁶ from Keesing's Research Report, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, Keesings Publications, 1970, p. 10.

would become socialist. Later in 1957 Mao published his speech 'On The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People'. In it he argues:

The First World War was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. The Second World War was followed by the emergence of the socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism, and there will not be much room left on earth for the imperialists; it is also likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse.⁷

This belief of Mao's, that the essential historical application of Marxism-Leninism is not affected by nuclear weapons, is based on another of his primary beliefs — that it is people, not weapons which are decisive in warfare. In 1946 he made his famous comment on the atom bomb:

The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.⁸

In 1960 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) first made public its differences with the CPSU. The Chinese Party journal, *Red Flag*, published a long series of articles entitled 'Long Live Leninism'. These articles advocated that all revolutionary movements should be supported 'resolutely and without the least reservation':

We believe in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: war is an inevitable outcome of exploiting systems and the source of modern wars is the imperialist system. Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always occur . . . Marxist-Leninists absolutely must not sink into the mire of bourgeois pacifism . . . none of the new techniques like atomic energy, rocketry and so on has changed the basic characteristics of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution pointed out by Lenin, as alleged by the modern revisionists. The capitalist-imperialist system absolutely will not crumble of itself. It will be pushed over by the proletarian revolution in the imperialist country concerned and by the natural revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. . . .⁹

Chinese policy on nuclear weapons and warfare should not be overstated. That China is eager (or at least not unwilling) to precipitate a nuclear war is by no means clear. Many 'China-watchers', in fact, would agree with Gregory Clark that 'The widespread idea that China favours world war has been one of the more successful feats of Soviet propaganda.'¹⁰

⁷ from Zagoria, Donald A., *Vietnam Triangle — Moscow, Peking, Hanoi*, Pegasus, 1967, p. 202.

⁸ 'Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong', *ibid.*, pp. 194f.

⁹ from Floyd, *op. cit.*, pp. 89ff.

¹⁰ Clark Gregory, 'Three Way Stretch', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 December 1969, p. 506.

In practice China's policy and that of USSR differ mainly in the correct approach to proletarian revolutions and wars of national liberation within non-socialist nations. USSR today tends not to interfere in such 'internal' matters lest she should provoke direct confrontation between herself and USA. China considers that all revolutionary peoples throughout the world should receive active help regardless of the possibility of US nuclear intervention. Such nuclear intervention she considers very unlikely but with the proviso that if nuclear war did break out it would be fatal to capitalism.

China believes that support for revolutionary movements will greatly speed the achievement of total world socialism. The process was made explicit by Lin Piao, China's leading military figure and Mao's designated successor:

Comrade Mao Tsetung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world', then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world'. Since World War II the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of encirclement of cities by rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹¹

The possibility of achieving socialism by peaceful parliamentary means was also taken up in 'Long Live Leninism'. *Red Flag* quoted Lenin:

Not a single great revolution has ever been carried out without a civil war and no serious Marxist will believe it possible to make the transition from capitalism to socialism without a civil war . . . and suppression by force of the most desperate, frenzied resistance offered by the exploiters.¹²

In 1963, in a long letter to the CPSU, the CCP gave a more considered view:

Marxist-Leninist parties must master all forms of struggle and be able to substitute one form for another quickly as the conditions of struggle change It is wrong to refuse to use parliamentary and other legal forms when they can and should be used. However, if a Marxist-Leninist party falls into legalism or parliamentary cretinism, confining the struggle within the limits permitted by the bourgeoisie, this will inevitably lead to renouncing the proletariat Can

¹¹ 'The International Significance of Comrade Mao Tsetung's Theory of People's War', from Schurmann, Franz and Schell, Orville (eds.) *China Readings 3 — Communist China*, Penguin, 1968, pp. 346f.

¹² from Crankshaw, Edward, *The New Cold War — Moscow v. Peking*. Penguin 1963, p. 94.

peaceful transition be made into a new world-wide strategic principle for the international Communist movement? Absolutely not ...¹³

These issues — aid to revolutionary movements in other nations, forms of the transition to socialism and peaceful co-existence — have been fairly widely discussed in the non-communist world since they directly affect non-communist nations. Other elements of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute concern internal policy in nations already communist.

At the 1956 Party Congress, Khrushchev made his famous denunciation of Stalin. He outlined many of Stalin's 'crimes' and denounced him for having led a 'cult of the individual'. China, at first, gave assent to this denunciation. The *People's Daily* in April 1956 said:

Stalin, as the chief leader of the Party and the State made certain serious mistakes in the later years of his work. He became conceited and imprudent and ... took more and more pleasure in the cult of the individual and violated the Party's system of democratic centralism and the principle of combining collective leadership with individual responsibility.¹⁴

Later that same year the *People's Daily* was a lot kinder to Stalin:

All in all, Stalin always stood at the head of historical developments and guided the struggle; he was an implacable foe of imperialism In our opinion Stalin's mistakes take second place to his achievements.¹⁵

In 1963, when the dispute was more open, the CCP itself again raised the issue of the personality cult, probably because a great deal of what had been said about Stalin's personality cult could be applied to Mao:

Over the past few years certain persons have raised the issue of 'combating the personality cult'; that is erroneous and harmful To raise the question of 'combating the personality cult' is actually to counterpose the leaders to the masses, undermine the party's unified leadership, which is based on democratic centralism, dissipate its fighting strength and disintegrate its ranks.¹⁶

It was not until December 1966 that the CPSU began attacking Mao officially and by name. When it did, it was quick to accuse him of a personality cult:

It is understandable that the whole practice of the Soviet party and the other Communist parties which consistently develop the Leninist norms of party life, strengthen the principles of collective leadership and strictly insist on democratic principles represents a danger to Mao Tsetung and his power The most elementary norms and principles are trampled upon in China. The personality cult of Mao Tsetung is pushed to the point of absurdity and idolatry.¹⁷

¹³ CCP letter of June 14 from Floyd, op. cit., p. 411.

¹⁴ 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', *ibid.*, pp. 232f.

¹⁵ 'More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat', (December 29) *ibid.*, p. 244.

¹⁶ CCP letter of June 14, loc. cit., p. 415.

¹⁷ *Pravda* (16 February 1967) from Keesing's, op. cit., p. 102.

The Soviets see the New (1969) Constitution of the CCP as one of the worst excesses of the personality cult. This constitution enshrines Mao as leader. It goes on to name Lin Piao as Mao's 'close comrade-in-arms and successor'. The whole document, according to the CPSU, is no longer representative of Communism but of a new 'monarchical' system.

Another ideological dispute between USSR and China has concerned the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU (October 1961) declared that this was becoming unnecessary in USSR:

The dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable to the USSR from the point of view of the tasks of internal development. The dictatorship of the proletariat will cease to be necessary before the state withers away. *The State as an organization embracing the entire population will survive until the final victory of Communism* As a result of the victory of Socialism in the USSR and the consolidation of the unity of Soviet society, the Communist Party of the working class has become the vanguard of the Soviet people, a party of the entire people.¹⁸

The CCP took up this point in its letter to the CPSU in June 1963:

For a very long historical period after the proletariat takes power, class struggle continues To deny the existence of class struggle in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat is wrong, does not correspond to objective reality and violates Marxism-Leninism. Both Marx and Lenin maintained that the entire period before the advent to the higher stage of communist society is the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . the class difference between worker and peasant exists in all socialist countries without exception . . . it will take a long time to eliminate. And until this difference is eliminated it is impossible to say that society is classless or that there is no longer any need for the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . the dictatorship of the proletariat has to struggle against the enemies of the proletariat and of the people, re-mould the peasants and other small producers, constantly consolidate the proletarian ranks, build socialism and effect the transition to communism¹⁹

China has also often accused the Soviet Union of a return to capitalist-type economy and a bourgeois social order. As USSR has prospered, relative to China, and more consumer and luxury goods have become available, the difference in the life-styles of individual Soviet and Chinese citizens has become more obvious. 'The rotten Bourgeois culture of the West is now fashionable in the Soviet Union and Socialist culture is ostracized and attacked', said a *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* joint editorial in 1964.²⁰ When the CPSU (in 1965) recommended greater freedom for individual enterprises and fuller use of bonus schemes and of the profit motive to improve efficiency, the CCP was quick to attack:

¹⁸ CPSU Party Programme, *ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁹ CCP letter of June 14, *loc. cit.*, p. 414.

²⁰ 14 July 1964, from Keesing's, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

... the new leaders of the CPSU are accelerating the growth of capitalism, developing the private economy, enlarging the private plots, expanding the free market and encouraging free trading Because they are the political representatives of the privileged bourgeois stratum in the Soviet Union ... [they] pursue domestic and foreign policies which are not proletarian but bourgeois, not Socialist but capitalist.²¹

A further important (and, for Mao, quite central) ideological difference between Moscow and Peking derives from Mao's new work on contradictions.

As early as 1937 Mao had greatly extended Lenin's principles of contradiction but he did not publish his work until 1952. Briefly he holds that contradiction exists everywhere and in everything but can be of two types — antagonistic contradiction which can be resolved only by open struggle and non-antagonistic contradiction which can be resolved by peaceful means. The first important practical application of this principle is found in relationships between 'the people' and 'the enemy' and within 'the people'. This is outlined in 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among The People' (1957):

Never has our country been as united as it is today However it would be naive to imagine that there are no more contradictions. We are confronted by two types of social contradictions — contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people The term 'the people' has different meanings in different countries and in different historical periods in each country. At this stage of building socialism, all classes, strata and social groups which approve, support and work for the cause of socialist construction belong to the category of the people, while those social forces which resist the socialist revolutions are enemies of the people. The contradictions between ourselves and our enemies are antagonistic ones. Within the ranks of the people contradictions are non-antagonistic.²²

Mao saw that a great many contradictions all needing resolution still existed within socialist Chinese society. Perhaps the most important was the contradiction 'between the interests of the state, collective interests and individual interests; between democracy and centralism; between those in positions of leadership and those being led, and contradictions arising from the bureaucratic practices of certain state functionaries in their relations with the masses'.²³

It was partly in an endeavour to resolve this type of contradiction that the Commune movement was begun in 1958 as part of the 'Great Leap Forward'. China was to become a country of about 23,000 self-sufficient, internally self-governing communes, small enough for effective direct democracy. The 'Great Leap' and the Communes failed

²¹ *People's Daily and Red Flag* — joint editorial of 11 November 1965, *ibid.*, p. 75.

²² from Schurmann and Schell, *op. cit.*, pp. 43f.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 44.

dismally and Mao himself was in eclipse from about 1959 to 1962. He made a bid to regain power in 1962-63 and soon afterwards launched a new campaign, one of whose main aims seems to have been the resolving of contradictions between democracy and centralism (or, in our terms, the breaking up of an entrenched leadership and bureaucracy). This was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

At the time of the Cultural Revolution it was made clear that Communist society could never settle into any undisturbed Utopia. *People's Daily* had earlier set out explicitly that even in a Communist society 'there will still be contradictions among people, and there will still be good people and bad, people whose thinking is relatively correct and others whose thinking is relatively incorrect. Hence there will still be struggle between people, though its nature and form will be different from those in class societies'.²⁴ It was alleged of former officials who were purged that they thought 'Communist society is a bed of roses without darkness or contradiction'.²⁵

In our terms we could perhaps say that Mao was making sure that his socialist society would not stagnate, as he believed USSR had done. This was to apply too at the personal level. Radio broadcasts during the Cultural Revolution called upon every Chinese to 'make revolution against himself, in his own soul'. This is Mao's theory of perpetual contradiction, often described as 'perpetual revolution', though the theory has not been fully worked out by him.

Finally, it is the fact of Mao's philosophising, as much as his conclusions, which worries the Soviet leadership. Mao claims to be an original contributor to Marxism-Leninism. The CCP Constitution so establishes him:

The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking. Mao Tsetung Thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory Comrade Mao Tsetung has . . . inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism and has brought it to a higher and completely new stage.²⁶

Thus, on any ideological point of dispute, Mao can claim correctness for his own interpretation, whatever it might be. Thus too USSR, which has no ideological leader of Mao's status, has, in a sense, lost initiative and therefore leadership in its own ideology. □

²⁴ from Eastman Lloyd, 'Mao, Marx and the Future Society', *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1969, p. 23.

²⁵ *Peking Review* (12 May 1967), *ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁶ *The Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (adopted 14 April 1969), Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1969, pp. 3ff.



Tomorrow's War in Africa

Major P. G. Francis

The Shape of War

IN an earlier article,¹ an attempt was made to analyse, briefly, the main possible causes of a future African continental war. Looking ahead as logically and unemotionally as possible, these can now probably be reduced to two:

First, the cause which at present appears so obvious — *too obvious* — and which tends to obscure a far larger potential threat in the future. The obvious, immediate cause for conflict is social, or 'anti-colonial,' represented by the present guerilla fighting on the borders of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.

For 'prestige' and 'word opinion' reasons, National Africa must encourage and support this fighting, which is basically fighting for freedom. Yet, in the end, it is doubtful whether a long, guerilla-warfare phase will best serve National Africa's interests. Too much pressure can drive Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and South Africa to fuse into a permanent military *bloc*, determined to fight to the last to preserve

From the October 1970 issue of The Army Quarterly. Reprinted by permission.

their own policies. The final result being either that guerilla campaigns might cease through continuous losses in men and equipment, or that they would have to combine their efforts and launch a full-scale war under a National African Command, which would put too much strain on the available forces and national economies.

Another great defect in relying upon lengthy guerilla fighting to unite Africa and halt unpopular policies in some countries is the opportunity thus given to Communism. No matter that some 'Freedom Fighters' go to Communist countries for their training, or have Communist instructors in Africa, nor that their movements may receive Communist financial aid — the African is not Communist by nature and does not want to be. He has a respect for property and is too individualist to like the true Communist system.

At present, some Africans, who genuinely believe they are fighting for freedom, have to look for help — and arms — from any source. It merely happens that some have to go to those particular sources. Therefore, instead of these local campaigns fusing one day into a very dangerous general explosion, it is possible that certain other factors may produce a completely different future conflict in Africa.

For instance, while South Africa has comparatively great military might in the air, in missiles and rockets, she cannot unleash these 'first' in the face of world opinion. And, meanwhile, although liberal forces and policies inside the country gain ground only very slowly, the economic factors at least are working in the Africans' favour — as earning power increases and industry must grow in the 'Bantustans.' In the end, economic equality is going to mean political equality. In the same way, while the Portuguese are determined to defend their territory, their huge efforts to win over the Africans have resulted in having to give very definite concessions in return for support. It is a slow process, but we are looking ahead for a decade or much longer, and National Africa might gain much by a long, concerted diplomatic effort to build a bridge and infiltrate into these areas without force, just as the liberal South Africans have been trying to look outwards and extend their diplomatic relations.

However unpalatable these tactics may appear to both sides at present, the future may see some strange allies — as in Europe — in the

¹ 'The Defence of Independent National Africa,' *The Army Quarterly*, October, 1969.

face of a much bigger threat to Africa's peace — the threat of a global war, and Democracy versus Communism. Thus, this is the second — and much the larger — cause for war. And it may be much more likely to split Africa into two *blocs* than any local war against 'colonialism' or 'racialism.'

There are, at present, two diverging trends in National Africa. The West, including especially Congo-Kinshasa, which stretches right across towards the East as well, has already a strong democratic and individualist tradition. These were the first people to absorb, willingly, European education at an appreciable speed, and we see the results in Ghana's very recent return to political democracy after the most successful transitional military government regime. The Francophone countries are determinedly logical and cultured, the Ivory Coast being a particularly good example of a thriving economy and French-styled culture. These countries afford considerable scope to the individual citizen, and still welcome those Western foreigners who can offer technical skills.

East Africa is not quite the same. Kenya has tried hard to achieve this 'open' democratic society after a much harsher colonial period, and has succeeded to some extent, but there is more tendency to violence; below the surface now, but likely to break out later in these countries. Chinese military and/or technical influence appears to be strong in certain parts of East and East-Central Africa, while the main guerilla training camps are in these areas.

It would not appear that the Chinese are generally popular with the Africans, nor is their way of life, and they have received rebuffs in certain quarters. However, they are a people who accept current setbacks if they think that their aims may be achieved in the end, and meanwhile they will continue to try to extend their influence. The African soldier has great national pride, admires physical strength and tends to regard the Chinese as physically inferior. Also, he has greater control over his needs than the average Western European or American, and his constitution and outlook make him resistant, if not immune, to the Chinese type of 'brain-washing' used in Korea on prisoners. Therefore, he could prove a formidable opponent to Communist infiltrators in actual fighting.

The African's normal way of life is exuberant, far removed from the ant-like Chinese Communist system, but he may gradually 'invent' an 'African' Communism suited to his life and people. If so, this would

be more likely to take root somewhere in East or Central Africa than in the West; and, hence, in the passage of time we may see National Africa forming two main *blocs* — one Western Democratic-orientated, and perhaps one Communist-orientated in a special 'African' manner. Should Southern Africa have combined meanwhile in a military or political alliance, then that also could only be anti-Communist, and must require some relations or understanding with Democratic National Africa.

Finally, we have the possibility of global fighting being in progress at some future date, and impinging upon Africa's two potential *blocs* with obvious results.

Beginning now, and taking advantage of the favourable climate, and a youth enthusiastic about aviation, and proud of their fighting forces, there is a chance — a great chance — for National Africa to forge a special, new and natural defence — the 'Air Weapon' in all its aspects. Once in existence, this unified arm would be a powerful factor in welding together the states of National Africa, in discouraging the potential enemy's attack, or in holding and destroying any enemy force which — under global war pressure — might try to land or establish itself in the African continent.

In other words, a fully developed, democratic, National Africa, properly armed, could be a new powerful defender of world freedom.

Battleground and Tactics

Africa is a continent which, ranging geographically from fairly dense 'bush' to savannah and open country, provides terrain for two main types of warfare:

- (1) 'Bush' guerilla fighting, or land battles on a larger scale (as in Nigeria), where wide advances and swift decisions are hampered by both the ground and, during the 'rains', weather — which also then affects air activity. These conditions apply mainly to the West.
- (2) More mobile land and air warfare — on and over desert, savannah, open country, where, in a large-scale war, armour and aircraft could operate most successfully and in mass. These conditions exist North and South, and to a great extent, in East and Central Africa.

In 'The Defence of Independent National Africa' I endeavoured to summarize briefly the threats to peace which could produce future warfare in that continent, ranging from attack from outside in a global war, to conflict between Communist-inspired and Democratic groups, or the Southern *bloc* versus others.

But the shape of future war can be influenced equally by two things, apart from *cause* of conflict: the *terrain* and *tactics* and *techniques* applicable to it.

Africa, then, as a potential battleground, is suited to the two types of warfare above described, or a mixture of both. What, then, of the tactical shape or techniques denoting a typically 'African' war?

It is necessary, briefly, to examine the trends which have emerged in recent wars, and to pinpoint how these impinge upon Africa's inherent tactical condition, and are sure to influence strongly any coming conflict there.

In World War II, it was the Russian campaign which produced, above all, the war of Mass plus Movement, where both *large armies* and *great distances* were involved, showing what could be done on a wider canvas than Western Europe.

Then, in Korea, massive 'high-flying' strategic air superiority and heavy bombing failed to win a really complete victory against a mobile 'Mass-Army' (North Koreans plus Chinese 'volunteers') which could accept huge losses. This was a turning-point when, it might be fair to say, the keys to successful warfare had become *mobility* and *mass*, plus a third factor (even more apparent in Vietnam), the immediate tactical air-strike in close support, but again with a mass of aircraft.

In addition to these factors, the pattern in recent, localized wars has been that the 'Regular' or 'Security' or 'Western,' as opposed to 'Communist' forces have had to adapt even further their training and tactics to guerilla methods, but even with massive and immediate air support have only achieved superiority after protracted battles — and little or no air opposition.

However, although the original Communist tactics of hit-and-run, followed by a set-piece battle only when it suited them, had done much to neutralize the effects of both strategic and tactical bombing, Communist guerilla-type armies without air support have failed to achieve a complete victory. Now, stalemate is being reached, where

neither mass guerilla tactics by themselves *nor* total air superiority on the other side is winning.

What would happen, now, if by some means a *third* factor — *guerilla air warfare* — appeared? This new factor, practically unnoticed in its real significance as yet, has in fact already appeared in Africa.

The Minicon, converted *sports-planes* of Von Rosen, skimming out from Biafra on what were nothing less than hit-and-run 'air guerilla' raids, did damage out of proportion to their size and strength, and were *not* neutralized by superior Nigerian fighter aircraft.

We have now reached the point to calculate how this is going to affect, particularly, a large-scale future conflict in Africa, and what may develop there in only a short space of time, i.e. within ten to fifteen years. Why Africa particularly? Because Africa can be the best proving-ground for this type of warfare.

The reasons are as follows:

- (1) The potential battleground suits the potential battle — land and air guerilla warfare.
- (2) While there is insufficient heavy industry to provide, even within our time scale, a *mass* of locally manufactured or assembled sophisticated military jet aircraft (even in South Africa), there is a basic engineering/productive capacity which can be expanded and developed by using local labour and local materials or locally produced plastics, particularly, to provide a new, light type of aircraft in quantity.
- (3) The climate is highly suitable, over wide areas and over most of the year, for flying training and air operations.
- (4) Given adequate instruction centres and simplified flying training, sufficient aircrew can be trained to man a mass of effective aircraft of simplified construction and instrumentation.

The Air Weapon

Reverting for a moment to my previous article, it was suggested therein that eventually a large, close-support type, combative Army Air Corps, and a small sophisticated combined strategic Air Force, might provide the correct answers to National Africa's total air defence problems.

Now, the requirements of a mass Army Air Corps differ from those of an Air Force, but can be more simply met under conditions where:

- (a) there is an adequate number of volunteers;
- (b) the flying training is simplified and shortened;
- (c) the aircraft are easy to fly, but fast and well armed and can take on a 'superior' enemy by using their own special tactics.

These conditions exist, or can be created in a suitable atmosphere, and Africa particularly lends itself to them. To organize such a force will not only be taking guerilla warfare into the air, but in a way which suits Africa's basic natural conditions already described. Therefore let us consider the needs and development of such an Army Air Corps.

General

- (a) A comparatively *large first-line strength* in aircraft and aircrew.
- (b) *Good reserves* of aircraft, spare parts and personnel.
- (c) Mobility — Quick dispersal to protect against bombing attacks; quick concentration for a sudden punch through enemy ground defences.
- (d) Standardization of aircraft types and engines.
- (e) Continuous liaison and training with the Army in the field. Complete study of, and adherence to, the Army's air support needs.

Aircraft—Main Types

- (a) A fast striker fighter/bomber, simply but strongly constructed.
- (b) A medium 'battlefield transport' helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft suited to several purposes — troop and supply transport, ambulance work, conveying light projectiles and artillery, etc.
- (c) A light helicopter for all types of reconnaissance, battlefield liaison, etc.
- (d) If possible, a small to medium-size, locally produced, general-purpose hovercraft.

Weapons

Rockets, or missiles of the SS-10 variety, locally produced or assembled.

Personnel

Pilots, signallers and gunners.

For specialized army flying, these must be men whose standards of vision and physical condition are good, but who do not need to have extremely high 'examination-passing' ability. There are many such young Africans of inherent mechanical ability and no little ingenuity — witness how a mechanic in the bush often manages to keep a vintage lorry going by various expedients! There is already great interest in flying amongst young Africans, and the present gliding/flying facilities could easily be subsidised and extended to provide reserve pilots.

To summarize, it will be noted that the aircraft types mentioned could be simplified in fuselage design, with the minimum of instruments, and be constructed using both wood and plastics where it is possible to replace more expensive metal.

Training

- (a) Elementary tactical training of A.A.C. units within one country, with the National Army of that country.
- (b) *Advanced* tactical A.A.C. training with *combined units* of several *National Armies*.
- (c) Advanced combined training, of the complete 'supra-national' units the Air Strike Force and the airborne commandos — as suggested in my earlier article, plus liaison with the 'high-flying' strategic air force.

'Air Weapon' Special Tactics

Let us consider the manner in which a combined 'Air/Army' might be used in African continental fighting. To do so, it is necessary, first, to summarize the probable composition of any unified forces, thus:

- (1) The small 'Strategic Air Force' for long-range bombing, and to counter the enemy 'high-flying' fighters.
- (2) The airborne commandos and other special units for individual tasks (mainly strategic).
- (3) The main Army — regular infantry, armour, artillery plus 'guerillas' — irregular forces now coming under the command of the Army.
- (4) The Air Strike Force — the main Army Air Corps — the spearhead and offensive 'cover' to the Army.

The task of the Strategic Air Force would be to damage or destroy communications, and special military targets behind the battle-front, while the airborne commandos and special units followed this up by infiltration and long-range raids, causing some dislocation to the enemy's rear.

The 'guerillas', already skilled in infiltrating through the enemy front, would fight sudden, quickly concluded, pitched battles to destroy individual enemy units selected by Intelligence, by-passing strong-points, and avoiding confrontation with superior numbers, in order to create gaps here and there, and weaken the front to attack the main regular forces.

The main Army, conventional and airborne infantry, and armour, supported immediately overhead by the large Army Air Corps, would then be free to make sudden mass attacks on the more thinly held points of the front, and to move right through and fan out behind the enemy lines when a large gap had thus been created and exploited.

In this fluid type of warfare, only hindered by the denser bush, and by heavy rains at certain periods, it would be possible for both sides to exploit such tactics for some time, but the side having larger and closer air support, more mobile infantry, and adequate armour, wherever armour could be used, would have a large advantage. Further, very close co-operation between long-range assaults to the rear and continual armoured/air attacks to the front and on the flanks could give final success to the side having the most highly integrated army/air system, this 'system' being 90 per cent a matter of physical co-ordination and training — teamwork — not a matter of machinery and ultra-sophisticated radar or aircraft. The creation in fact, of a simple but hard-hitting, mobile, combined mass weapon, backed by good Intelligence, which would be helped and confirmed by the feints and raids of long-range commandos and guerillas constantly infiltrating.

The main advantage in having a low-flying mobile force of light aircraft is that without huge permanent airfields, large sections can be refuelled and rearmed quickly, and aimed at one target after another, as the advancing infantry and armour may require. Moreover, if they have had lengthy training in quick dispersal, and 'hedge-hopping' tactics, and have enough speed, they can avoid heavy losses from both ground-fire and the opposing air forces.

In Europe, at the present time, army/air co-operation in the sophisticated sense may have reached a high level, but how large are the

current peace-time Army Air Corps, and their equivalents, and how large are their reserves? Obviously, this must depend on how expensive are the aircraft being used — and we know that, in Europe and the USA, most aircraft *are* expensive.

To exploit the advantages of Africa's open spaces and favourable climate, it would be necessary to create mechanically simplified, standardized, aircraft to suit the tactics described, to form an elastic mass, a force which could be pivoted back and forth in battle, quickly dispersing to avoid lethal bomber and fighter attacks, quickly concentrating to hammer and punch through ground defences — again a matter of timing and training, rather than expensive equipment. And, as described, Africa's natural conditions favour the creation and testing of such a force. Operating with the help of a high-altitude *élite*, strategic fighter force, small in numbers but high in quality — and still less expensive than twenty different National Air Forces, each consisting of a few, difficult to replace, ultra-modern aircraft!

Finally, we may consider, logically, the 'unification' prospects of an All Africa defence — without either the undue optimism or pessimism of emotional involvement. An African diplomat recently remarked to me that it was far easier to obtain concerted action by a number of African countries than to obtain total *National agreement* inside one (in some cases, at least). Yet exactly the same could be said of Europe, after hundreds of years of Western education and attempts at grouping and 'unification' by peaceful means, but as NATO has proved, international *military co-operation works*, so military unity first in National Africa could mean complete peaceful, political unity one day. □

War Surgery



in

Vietnam



*Colonel D. R. Leslie, ED, QHS
Royal Australian Army Medical Corps*

A symposium on war surgery was held at the school of Army Health, Melbourne late last year and was attended by some eighty specialist medical officers of the ARA and CMF, the RANR, the RAAF Reserve, and from Melbourne teaching hospitals. The opening address was given by Colonel D. R. Leslie, ED, QHS, MS, FRCS, FRACS, Consulting Surgeon to AHQ since 1959, and Chairman of the Honorary Staff of the Royal Melbourne Hospital. An experienced war surgeon, having served with an AGH in the Middle East and with forward surgical teams on the Kokoda Trail, in the Wau-Salamaua Campaign and in Borneo, Colonel Leslie has visited Vietnam on three occasions as Consulting Surgeon and on one of his visits he demonstrated major surgical techniques on Australian casualties at 1st Australian Field Hospital at Vung Tau. The following is the text of his address.

GENTLEMEN: This seems an appropriate time for a symposium such as this because we are at the moment in a unique position. Over the last few years we have had the opportunity for studying the surgery of trauma; an opportunity which is possibly unique in both military and civil experience. We must therefore at this stage collect and record our thoughts as they may have future application in both fields. Now, as I say, our experience is unique in military experience in the Australian Army hitherto, and it is quite a different experience from that which pertains in civil life in the handling of trauma.

First, the differences from previous experience in military surgery. It has been geographically static and tactically secure. In the 1939-45 war, and I believe in most previous conflicts, there was movement. The military medical installations stayed in one place perhaps for a few months and then moved on; often it was only for a few weeks or a few days.

The initial surgery of trauma was usually carried out under improvised conditions, and the whole structure moved on, even within a few days. We have had the advantages in this conflict of being on the one site for several years. This has been a safe site from the point of view of enemy action and it has allowed us gradually to develop a satisfactory environment for good surgery, an environment which has not previously been available. We did not know quite what we wanted at Vung Tau when we started off, but gradually, as a result of suggestions and stimulus from many of you who are to talk later today and tomorrow, the environment has been improved to that which, while certainly not perfect, is a better environment for good surgery than we have ever known in war surgery before. The second way in which it differs from previous conflicts is the way in which the casualties are brought to us.


The kind of evacuation of casualties we previously employed was very different to that of today. If you were wounded on Shaggy Ridge you had to be really fit to survive. If we had had helicopters in those days to winch someone out of a bad situation, many people who died then would have been saved. If you had a severe wound in that situation you would probably not have featured as 'Died of wounds'; you would have been 'Killed in Action', because you would not have reached the RAP.

If you, as a military surgeon, want to get good statistics, if you want to show how clever you are at saving people's lives, then you want to get onto a line of communication like that one from Shaggy Ridge, because by the time they reach you probably several hours have elapsed, and they have had a bumpy old journey, and they have got to be pretty fit to get into your hands. Under these conditions there is a sort of 'natural selection of the lines of communication'—bad ones will have died off before they reach you, so that you get good statistics for the ones you do treat.

If you want to get bad statistics and show yourself up as a bad surgeon, then you want to pick these people up by helicopter severely

wounded, and before they have quite had time to die you want them landed on your doorstep. That is when the challenge really comes, and that is what is happening at Vung Tau now.

If somebody were wounded under these New Guinea conditions he would have faced a very difficult line of evacuation—for hours at a time. He would eventually have reached the 'luxury' of a forward operating facility—in a tent, where the surgeons would have chased up the battalion to be within a few hours of his situation to help with his immediate surgery. Eventually he would get back to the greater 'luxury' of a native hut type hospital with mud all over the floor but a luxury compared with what he had been through.



The activities to be discussed today are carried out as part of the work of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, in the 1 Aust. Field Hospital. The accompanying illustration shows a covered way leading to the reception and triage area, with operating theatre and intensive care unit in the same complex.

The availability and determined work of the DUSTOFF helicopter services, provided largely by the Americans but also, particu-

larly at night, by the RAAF* has revolutionized the collection of casualties. They are picked up often within minutes of being wounded. They are carried rapidly and gently to a good facility where they can be treated. This is something which at the moment we do not have in the civilian handling of trauma.

A third way in which our present situation differs from what we have known before is the development in resuscitation and anaesthesia, which have allowed us to do things that we could not previously have contemplated, particularly with the determined way in which the seriously wounded patient is not allowed to die. People move in on him and save his life and hand him over to the surgeon to patch him up.

A fourth way in which the present situation differs from that in previous campaigns is the way in which (as General Gurner pointed out) we have been able to call on the top of the profession in civilian surgical practice in Australia to go up and work for relatively brief periods. This has allowed us to bring to bear on the sick casualty those skills, in abdominal surgery particularly, which are gained by constant practice in civilian life and which have not been so readily available in previous conflicts. Previously in war surgery the surgeon would spend months sitting around, parading, doing route marches, everything except surgery; and then for a brief hectic period he would be busily engaged in surgery. At the moment we are able to get people from civilian surgery somewhere, and put them straight into activity in Vietnam. They know their way around the abdomen; they can operate on the seriously wounded people with considerable confidence.

Now those are the ways in which our present experience differs from previous military experience. It differs also from the way in which we handle road casualty accidents in civilian life in Australia in three main ways, and I do think we produce better results in the saving of injured people than those which are possible in the civilian situation as it exists today.

If someone were severely injured in a car accident at Bacchus Marsh, he would not have nearly as good a chance of survival as if he received exactly those same injuries somewhere in the Long Hai hills. This is due to three main factors.

The first is the helicopter facility. In Vietnam, there is a helicopter standing by in radio communication; when he is injured, it is

* RAAF now provides complete DUSTOFF services.

told; it comes, picks up the casualty, and whizzes him off. At Bacchus Marsh you would wait until some passing motorist rings the police; they get an ambulance; it arrives perhaps in half an hour. You are bumped around for an hour or an hour and a half getting to hospital, stopping at traffic lights, swinging around corners; and this, of course, is quite an ordeal that the patient has to survive.

The second thing is the physical provision of a satisfactory triage area adjacent to the operating theatre and intensive care complex at Vung Tau. Although it is not ideal, it is structurally and geographically much better than that which is available in most big hospitals in



our cities in Australia. This is something. We can regard the Vung Tau set-up as a sort of 'trial run', or 'pilot study' to show what can be done in civilian hospitals and I am sure that those of us who work in civilian hospitals will have to insist that the same facilities are provided in our civilian hospitals.

And, thirdly, the other big advantage that our activities at Vung Tau have over the civilian handling of casualties is that we have a team who are standing by at the site; and what is more, they are warned by the helicopter pilot that he is coming in, and he will be there in 10 minutes, and he will be carrying three stretcher cases, one of whom

has an abdominal wound, one has a compound fracture of the femur, and the chap with the abdominal wound is 'pretty crook'. Immediately the siren blows, people move to their appointed tasks around the reception and triage area and they are ready to jump on them as soon as they hit the ground.

As you know, this cannot be said for any of our casualty departments in the big hospitals in Australia. What usually happens there is that an ambulance turns up, somebody opens the doors, a resident is found and he sees what is inside. If it is a seriously injured person, he has got to get on the phone and ring up the surgeon of the day, and get him in from somewhere or other. The whole system is not geared up to this kind of activity.

We have, therefore, a unique set of circumstances for carrying out surgery on battle casualties at 1 Aust. Fd. Hospital. We have never had such good circumstances before, and may never have them again; but, while they exist, we are exploiting our advantages to the full. Much can be learned from our work at Vung Tau that can be applied to improving the management of road traffic casualties in Australia. □

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best articles published in the March and April 1971 issues of the journal to:

March: Captain J. F. Crossman (Whatever You Say) \$10.

April: Major E. J. O'Donnell MC (War is Cruelty) \$10.



*General Baron Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg
German Army, Retired*

Translated by Captain W. Fladun, RAAEC

THE heading was deliberately chosen. One can only look as far as the horizon. This study is therefore a limited one: the alternative requires writing a book.

In front of us is a map of the world. The task is a difficult one. Some people were fortunate; they studied the everchanging global strategies from London when the British Empire still existed and were at the centre of its control. Even they realized the limitations of their endeavour. One is sadly reminded of Faust's painful conclusion: 'I can't even "assume to know" something worth knowing.'

What follows is a number of pieces, separated from a mosaic. It is supported by the sound appraisals of qualified friends abroad who are experts in military and political fields. A conscious attempt has been made to stay well clear of prefabricated assumptions generally made by prejudiced continental public opinion makers and supporters.

For the time being let us, with considerable self-restraint, set aside some of the more general topics which are not too clear as yet, but will have decisive weight in the not too distant future. One of these is the attempt to gain control of outer space. So far, the contenders are the USA and Russia. Their comparative potentials may be considered as being equal. There is no answer to the question whether or not their chosen fields of research will lead to specific military gains. Anyone who seeks refuge in agreements and treaties to prevent possible military applications lives in the clouds. It seems that there are many who are ignorant of how treaties, pacts and neutrals were dealt with during World Wars I and II by England, USA and Russia, not to mention Germany. Napoleon used the simple formula: *commande, par les circonstances*.

Another self-imposed restriction in our study concerns the 'Blue Continent', the oceans and sea beds. The negotiations over these — to any armament industry important questions — and the treaty that followed did not achieve more than an agreement to disagree. The Russian delegation did not neglect to bring up the accusation of 'capitalistic imperialism and its aims in the exploitation of the sea-bed'.

Finally, we will not explore the known importance of the Arctic. The existing strategic importance of the Antarctic is also becoming clearer by the increasing number of scientifically and economically significant expeditions, and by the number of countries who show military curiosity. Again, treaties are of doubtful value when it comes to protection against misuse in a large scale conflict. Let's wait and see.

Mao's Domain

Not long ago I put a most difficult question to a friend. He is a diplomat of noted expertise and represented an Asian nation in Moscow for some years. The question; 'Looking ahead, five to ten years hence, would it be reasonable to say that the order of world importance of the great powers would be: 1. Red China. 2. USA. 3. USSR.' The answer: 'It would be more correct to assign second place to the USSR and the third to the USA'. This reply to an intentionally confined, generalized question provides compelling grounds to make some comments on Red China.

During the tempestuous stages of development of this giant some serious setbacks must be expected as being unavoidable. They can only

be seen as the childhood diseases of a new, quickly changing Asian world. The unrest that showed itself in the cultural revolution and in the planning of workers' universities may well be compared with the restlessness that struck at the social order of the Roman world 2,000 years ago and brought Christianity in its wake.

The Premier of Japan was quite right when a year ago he stated, in Washington of all places, that the current time in history is the beginning of the 'Pacific Era'. The never ending change in this area must include the high probability of armed, in addition to social and economic, conflict. The withdrawal of the USA from the Asian mainland may be seen as a first stage in this development. This is of principal significance. Thus the stage is cleared for the battle that will establish either Chinese or Russian supremacy over the continent of Asia; this will not be decided by border incidents and ideological arguments.

The current military potential of Red China, as much as we know of it, was discussed in last year's review. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Peking and Moscow does not solve any issues of importance. Both sides may gain from it. The ideological rift remains. Should it be brought to its logical conclusion, it won't be concluded by the sprinkling of rose water. Such a military test of strength may well result in the very first massive use of atomic weapons. At present, it is too early for Red China. In foreign relations, China is ascending; she is making new 'friends'; Canada, Italy, soon to be followed by Persia and more interestingly, perhaps Australia. China's foreign policy, governed by military considerations, pursues realistic and possible aims in her relation with Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Yemen, Tanzania and Zambia. They are of military and political importance. Whether or not Red China possesses intercontinental missiles of practical, effective use to her, is still not known. In any case, India is already within easy reach, and in time the sensitive centres of Russian power will also come within the radius of that reach. The highways to Nepal and through Afghanistan, built by Chinese engineers with Chinese money, are already of first class strategic importance. The scale with which to weigh China's growing nuclear capability must be large; how large remains to be seen.

Japan

The developments in the Eastern marginal areas of Asia require a look at the reconstruction of Japan's military power. Japan's re-birth

after her total defeat in 1945 can only be described as phenomenal. Japan is today the third wealthiest nation of the world. This economic development was accompanied by a very small and totally insufficient development of her defences. In the last decade, only 1% of Japan's national gross product was devoted to the protection of the world's fastest growing economy. Japan now faces the problems of how to protect this rapidly increasing affluence and at the same time, not to offend wide circles of public opinion in many countries. To emphasize the point, more than 400,000 tons of petroleum, iron ore and coal are shipped daily through the Straits of Malacca alone and the Japanese industry is dependent upon these raw material imports.

The term 'Self Defence Force' is not just a convenient phrase affording camouflage. Japan, after her bitter experience in World War II has great interest in restricting herself to pure self-defence. In a military sense, the potentially most dangerous threat she has to face comes from the submarine. The Soviet Union would be able to deploy more than a hundred submarines in Japan's waters. For that reason, anti-submarine defence has the highest priority and her navy and her fleet air arm are designed to meet that requirement. In nuclear armaments, Japan is not a match for her Chinese neighbours.

The withdrawal of US forces from the Asian continent that has begun, and the withdrawal of British Forces east of Suez that is still argued about, complicate Japan's defence problems. It is understandable that after Hiroshima the majority of the Japanese are not in favour of a resurgence of militarism. But as a distinguished Japanese parliamentarian said: 'We are now able to afford guns as well as butter.' The military budget for 1970 has already been increased substantially. A high official of the Japanese Defence Department commented shrewdly: 'There is no need to let other countries know our thoughts.' It is of some interest to know that Japan builds her own submarines and tanks. The latest in aircraft she still procures from the US. In foreign affairs she is flexible. The defence treaty with the USA is still in force but is subject to termination at one year's notice, if so desired. There is no anti-Chinese trend apparent in her foreign policy.

Russia

Forty years ago I was a guest of the Red Army in Moscow. On entering the hotel one saw a wall map of gigantic dimensions which showed very impressively the size of Soviet Russia compared with the

rest of Europe that cling to her like a tail to an elephant. Later, at the 'House of the Red Army', one was surprised to see the extraordinary display of matters Chinese. As a soldier, trained and schooled to European conflicts and affairs, this struck me as strange.

Today, the only military force on par with the Russians in armaments is the USA. However, the USA has lost her former military, economic and political dominance; geographically the security afforded her by the oceans is also gone. She has, furthermore, tied herself down with too many military and political obligations.

At the Pentagon, those who have the experience and responsibility are pursued by two nagging worries; first, the rapid growth of the Soviet fleets and the direct, straight-forward effort to gain supremacy at sea; secondly, the threat by Soviet missiles in a possible conflict. One only has to look at the world famous book *Jane's Fighting Ships*, to have reason for thought. The editor-in-chief presses home the point by adding, 'No more is the Soviet Union reliant on imitations; she is inventive and forges ahead...' Her presence in the Mediterranean can easily result in a shift of the political balance and can upset the *status quo* of all European, Near Eastern and African nations that border onto that sea.

By mid-1970 the inventory of Soviet nuclear submarines was estimated to be in excess of one hundred. Recently, the Soviet Union has begun to build diesel powered submarines again. The North American east and west coasts can be threatened by Soviet submarines equipped with long distance range missiles. Regarding surface ships, the inventory looks like this: 2 helicopter carriers, 20 to 24 cruisers, 110 to 120 destroyers and frigates, 92 ocean going escort vessels, 150 patrol boats armed with rockets and at least 100 large sized landing ships.

Another notable aim of Soviet armament development and the headache of her potential enemies is progress in missile weaponry, especially in one new weapon that is thought to have the necessary range and effectiveness to destroy the US Minuteman ICBM system deep in its subterranean concrete silos. Theoretically, that provides the Soviets with the ability to knock out, with a surprise first blow, a substantial portion of the American's nuclear missile arsenal. On land however the Kremlin's strategic thinking is concerned with the East, and there is Red China.

To achieve supremacy at sea, the direction of effort points toward the Indian Ocean. Red China is not an immediate major threat. Seen from Moscow, there is little danger to be expected on the Western flank. In view of the increasing parity in nuclear arms it is most difficult to believe that either the USA or the USSR would risk a nuclear war in support of an ally.

Soviet politics may or may not succeed in splitting NATO or in causing American loss of interest in the defence of her West European bridgehead; there is still another way open that promises success in weakening or eliminating altogether the defences of all nations in the West; an all out effort to gain control of West Europe's oil supply. These serious attempts can be clearly seen at present. The Soviets are establishing a direct and effective influence over the oil exits — Egypt, Libya and Algeria. It is hard to imagine how the economists and general staffs of the West plan to have a continuing oil supply in a conflict, to provide the life blood for industry and the armed forces. The economy is already totally dependent on oil. That is in peace time. These African countries have full control of the oil supply lines and can decide at will to shut them down or to keep them open. When Russia has achieved operational control in the Indian Ocean and can thus interfere with shipping around the Cape, no matter how much oil is stock-piled in the West, it will last a very short time only; during a non-nuclear conflict at best a few months.

To count on oil supply from Canada or the USA amounts to wishful thinking. First, the US requires all of her production for her own high rate consumption. Secondly, transport to Europe via the North Atlantic route, uneconomical in peacetime, is out of the question in a future war. Exploitation of all European domestic fields, including those recently discovered, would not yield anywhere near enough to satisfy the urgent needs. Europe can thus be made to die of thirst. From Europe's point of view it is political idiocy to try and prevent delivery of arms and equipment to the Union of South Africa, arms that South Africa needs to carry out her task as guardian of the important tanker route, along which Europe's oil is carried.

The Indian Ocean

The following conversation could well have taken place inside the Soviet Admiralty recently:

'Comrade Admiral, the Supreme Soviet has directed me, upon your assumption of duty, to brief you on the general principles that guide Soviet Naval policy within the general frame-work of our overall planning.

'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has, in her current thinking, little interest to permit herself a third world war. It would be almost impossible to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. If war, then only by proxy, between smaller nations, and we will support those who offer us the best prospects of long term advantage. This explains our present position in the Arab/Israeli conflict.

'Fortunately our system allows us to build as many ships and aircraft as we need to protect our land masses; there is no restriction placed on us.

'Our leaders' policies now aim at gaining and retaining naval supremacy in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the entire Indian Ocean. You know of course that, apart from space exploration, our naval construction programme has the highest priority.

'The Anglo-Saxons are well aware of this new situation in the Indian Ocean. So far, their counter measures consist of planning talks and consultations very much in keeping with their democratic system, an increase in good-will visits to ports there, and the search for and development of fleet bases, as far as they are still available to them.

'Australia, perhaps to some extent motivated by her possession of extraordinary mineral resources and their economic attractiveness to others, has increased her defence spending considerably.

'The very powerful navy of the US finds it difficult to assign a strong force to the Indian Ocean, as her commitments in the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Mediterranean are already severely taxing. The British fleet, still a first class fighting force that must be reckoned with, is forced to economise out of financial considerations and has several strategic tasks already — above all the protection of the motherland. Since 1948 she has gradually shut down her bases in India, Ceylon, Aden, Somalia and Tanganyika, thus moving out of the Indian Ocean area. The port of Mombasa in Kenya will probably remain open to her as long as Kenyatta is still alive.

'Our maritime moves in the Indian Ocean area are slow; intentionally so: we can afford to be. They are progressing according to plan. We also have adequate air cover. In Egypt alone we have, among a number of fields six for our own exclusive use.

'Only in 1970 did we assign a reasonably sized Soviet squadron of seven warships and four submarines to the Indian Ocean and Red Sea area, after our deliberately slow beginnings. They operate from Hodeida in the Yemen, from Berbera in Somalia, also from Aden and the Island of Socotra. We hope to be able to develop Mauritius too in the future. Thirteen visits by our warships were made to this member of the British Commonwealth in 1970 alone.

'With the eventual re-opening of the Suez canal — and this is included in our policy aims — we gain another marginal advantage in that our submarines can enter the Indian Ocean without having to be sailed from as far as Vladivostok.

'By the way, I must mention the singular success we have had with our Indian Ocean policy in regard to India. Our financial aid to India is only surpassed by that to Egypt. Since 1945, India bought four submarines, one submarine tender, five anti-submarine escorts, two landing ships and numerous smaller units from us. We also helped in the construction of her submarine base.

'In conclusion I must also mention that our commercial shipping activities in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf have increased by four hundred per cent.

'Finally, Comrade Admiral, you should know that Nasser when he last visited Moscow negotiated a secret treaty with us that includes the provisions for continued Soviet-Egyptian co-operation beyond the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

'And now, something else. The Union of South Africa stands guard over the Western entrance to the Indian Ocean. Some ten thousand ships sail the Cape route every year. Great Britain has a treaty with South Africa that allows her to station ships of her fleet at Simonstown. Due to ignorance or racial fanaticism, an argument rages over the racial policies of South Africa. It is absurd, but it suits us. It is difficult to understand but the British Government under Wilson actually fostered the disagreement.

'Comrade Admiral, I will come back once more to the possibilities in the Indian Ocean that are open to our government without involving us in any risk of armed conflict directly. All we are doing means moving ourselves into a strategic position that will now and in the future control one of the world's important and busy sea routes.

'The Union of South Africa, because of her laws of general conscription to military service, together with Rhodesia, is able to protect

herself on a land front against black Africa. This will still be true when the rail line from Dar-es-Salaam to the Rhodesian border, built by the Red Chinese, is completed and increased support for black Africa is available from China. However, the Union would be in difficulties if she had to protect her long coast lines and shipping routes when at the same time her land borders were threatened and she had to defend them also. This is fully realized in Pretoria.

'These are the guidelines the Supreme Soviet has decided on for your priority tasks. I think however that I should mention to you, Comrade Admiral, another aspect that has also been the topic of discussion by the Supreme Soviet in their formulation of the political concepts of action. The bottleneck between West Africa and Brazil has always played a role in the thinking of British sea strategists. Nowadays, these narrows would be easily blocked if one had the help of a state on the African west coast and could establish a submarine and air base there. Again, oil supply to Europe could be cut here and African exports, for instance from Nigeria, could also be effectively stopped. Apart from the situation we have created in the Mediterranean, we would then be able to strangle West Europe's oil supply in such a fashion that her defences are weakened and our Western flank is absolutely secure.'

Conclusion

Let us discontinue this study fragment. Among other topics, we have not mentioned the foreboding future of South America, nor have we mentioned NATO. A close look at German defence policy is also not included. In this respect, may I express the hope that some of what has been said here be read by those who insist on forming public opinion on military and political matters in what remains of the fatherland.


A prophet counts for nothing in his own country, according to the wisest of all books. Therefore, I would like to conclude with some extracts from correspondence with qualified observers of current world affairs from other lands and continents.

- a. In answer to a question put to an Asian observer: 'Is Western Europe in a period of moral disintegration or is this condition only a symptom of the post war period?' The answer given: 'We expect that logic and good sense will prevail and that a

“United Europe” will eventually become a reality.’ Let’s hope that the moral decline, so apparent during the last years, is curable.

- b. In a letter from a neutral European country, this is said: ‘I watch the crab-like movements of Europe with some concern. In its direction there is a definite curve to the left. National borders do not seem to act as a restrictive barrier against this at all. The moral disintegration of the bourgeois burst the dams so that now not even the social-democrats are able to control and discipline their left wing factions.’ Radicalism is dangerous, as experience has shown. It seems that material affluence, now achieved, is hard to digest.’
- c. A military expert from Pretoria writes: ‘If there are people on other planets, looking at the Earth, they must be shaking their heads saying: “Well, those people there must be really mad. The monkey business they carry on with in running their affairs indicates that there is no such thing as a civilized society in existence there.”’
- d. From a letter, from Australia written in 1970: ‘Perhaps we are both in the rearguard of an age that is coming to an end; an age in which chivalry, good manners, respect for others and personal honour were highly prized virtues. Personally I think that one can not hold modern youth entirely responsible. There are too many of the older generations who, by their example, by their conduct in politics and commerce, by their pursuit of power and wealth, provide modern youth with the very worst models.’
- e. In a British newspaper an essay on current public affairs included this quotation: ‘Discipline without freedom is despotism and freedom without discipline in anarchy.’ We also find the English politician and philosopher Edmund Burke quoted there. In his *Observations on the French Revolution* he writes: ‘There are nations that had dignity. There are nations that are in danger to lose their dignity — that is the worst of all revolutions.’ □

Posting Turbulence



*Lieutenant Colonel M. R. Ramsay
Royal Australian Corps of Signals*

RELAXING the other night after a rigorous eight hours at AHQ, I said to the second-in-command, 'Do you know what posting turbulence is?'

She stopped cleaning the frypan in astounded silence, 'Do I know what it means! Twelve houses in eleven years, three telephone installation fees, the baby speaking Chinese before she spoke English; and remember when they stored the washing machine on top of the buffet'

Lieutenant Colonel Ramsay graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1956 and later graduated with honours in electrical engineering (communications) from the University of NSW. He has filled various regimental and staff appointments in signals, the most recent being GSO2 Signals HQ FARELF in Singapore and Officer Commanding 110 Signal Squadron in Vietnam. He is now AAG EDP at AHQ Canberra. Colonel Ramsay wishes it known that this article is published with the permission of his wife, on the clear understanding that all characters, including the narrators, are fictitious.

'Okay, okay, I asked the wrong question. Do you know why it happens—why we in the Army are posted so often?'

'To keep the removalists in business, of course; and probably to keep the Department of Supply busy. After all, the government believes in a balance of private and public enterprise.'

'Now that's not a good answer, my dear, for a wife who has suffered several promotion courses. Let's have a professional analysis of why it happens. There are wives even more youthful than you in the Army, perhaps with only one or two moves behind them. Perhaps we could write an informative article for them in the *Army Journal*.'

I could see the appeal on behalf of fellow sufferers was working. Frypan cleaning ceased and the old 'Aim, Factors, Courses, Plan' syndrome was in operation.

'Well', she said, 'let's work out why *they* have moved you. You were pretty green when you graduated, weren't you. I suppose those first few postings were to teach you a few things. You wouldn't accidentally ask for 50 trucks to move 100 men to the rifle range nowadays, would you?'

'Let's not make it too personal.'

'It didn't take your latent brilliance too long to show through. Remember it wasn't long before you became a "key person" and had to replace that poor chap at the School in a hurry when he had a heart attack.'

'Yes, I suppose we couldn't really blame the Army for that. At least the move meant promotion, even though it was in a hurry. And the extra pay after a few months paid for the lawn I had sown just before the move. Old Beezle moved in after us didn't he?—I'll bet that lawn was loaded with skeleton weed after his ministrations.'

'You'll never be a general if you wander off the point. Why else have *they* moved you?'

'Ah, there was that twelve-month course in Victoria. What a freezing time that was. You could classify that as a hardship tour, couldn't you. I suppose everyone going there has to be replaced by someone else, so that must cause some turbulence every year.'

'That would apply to every fixed-term posting wouldn't it, including the good ones. We didn't mind moving to Singapore, did we, but someone else had to move into your job to allow us to go.'

'Pity we ever came back. I guess all the extra good jobs and the bad ones need to be fixed tours. Vietnam was a bit of both, wasn't it. Now that must be a major cause of turbulence, with 6,000 coming and going every year. There are 12,000 posting orders for a start, probably with a lot of other "chain reaction" moves in Australia.'

'It must; I was talking to Mrs Treaclekeys yesterday—you know—the wife of the signals operator in the next street. He's done a tour in Vietnam, but he is moving to Sydney next month to replace a national serviceman who is going to Vietnam. I wonder why they don't swap national servicemen one for one to reduce regular turbulence?'

'They do replace national servicemen one for one normally, but with 8,000 of them entering and leaving the Army annually it's impossible to keep the two streams entirely separate. I happen to know that Lance Corporal Treaclekey's new unit is already undermanned — it operates twenty-four hours a day, so they would have to shift someone in quickly, regular or national serviceman.'

'Is the Army that short of men, even with 16,000 national servicemen?'

'It's still at least 4,000 short — about 10%. Imagine a football team playing with a couple of men short. All the others have to run around a lot more to plug the gaps. That's really what is happening in the Army now.'

'Some don't do too much running around. Look at Jim Horsecart. He's been in his job for eight years hasn't he.'

'Now fair go, my dear. Jim was getting old when Korea was on —and he left half his right foot on a Chinese mine there. You wouldn't expect the Army to move him in his last few years of service would you, even if he was fit enough for any job.'

'No, I don't really mean it. We should be thankful we are young, fit and able to tackle a wide variety of Army postings. We might even go to America or the UK sometime.'

A brief silence ensued, while I decided it best not to comment.

'I think there will always be moves in the Army. It's in the nature of the game. It's just that at the moment, with Vietnam, and undermanning, even with national service, there is too much. Did I tell you they are going to computerize postings in an effort to make some reduction?'

'Computerize them! Spare us! Don't the Services use each other's computers sometimes? You'll end up in a frigate or a bomber by mistake — or you'll be sent to a private's or a brigadier's job.'

'Now that's a typical reaction. The computer doesn't do the posting itself. It simply provides for more accurate and up to date information to posting officers. They still make the decision, but they make it with a fuller knowledge of all the soldier's circumstances. They won't send me to a frigate—if they make me a brigadier it's obvious that it will be for good reason!'

'Perhaps it is a good idea. But how does the computer find out all this information?'

'It has to be told. Although the computerized personnel system is in its infancy, it is already noting a lot of facts about all of us. Once the computer is told something, it doesn't forget it. Provided the soldier tells it, through his unit orderly room, about all the latest additions to his family, it will always remind the posting officer how many children the soldier has and what their ages are when he is considered for posting.'

'Does it remember marriage dates?'

'I suspect that question—it could be instructed to remind officers a week before their wedding anniversaries—but it has more important things to do. For instance, it will eventually record how many removals each member has had, as part of a system to ensure that posting turbulence is evenly shared.'

'Wouldn't the computer also hinder the posting authorities by bombarding them with too many facts? I have heard that even posting authorities are human.'

'That can be a danger. But you can ask it specific questions; say, for a list of substantive sergeants who speak Indonesian, have served in Vietnam between two and four years ago, have not been moved for two years and who have less than four children all of whom are under fourteen. It will be able to answer this question in an hour or two, even though it has to search the whole Army for two or three such people. The only paper used would be a couple of sheets. Throwing the same question at a company of chief clerks would probably cause a mutiny, apart from raising the annual stationery vote.'

'To get back to the main point, I don't mind being posted if it is really necessary; I still dislike all the worry and expense though.'

'Well postings aren't going to reduce much until we have all the people we need and until the present war is over. It's the Army's job to fight the war and there will probably be a few more of them before we retire.

'However, we have two big hopes on posting turbulence; first that computer assistance to the "posters" will reduce turbulence to the absolute minimum necessary and second that the great wall of financial resistance to better housing and better reposting benefits will be well and truly breached.'

'Perhaps there is something in the new Chinese proverb, "He who breaks great wall should remove debris in computer tape boxes, thereby preventing reconstruction".'

'Well spoken! Let's get some paper and start the article with that quotation. It's from Mah Kma H'n isn't it? Or was it Djn Kor T'n?' □

OTHER WARS

In camp our army experienced much suffering and loss of strength. Drawn almost exclusively from rural districts, where families lived isolated, the men were scourged with mumps, whooping-cough and measles, diseases readily overcome by childhood in urban populations. Measles proved as virulent as smallpox or cholera. Sudden changes of temperature drove the eruption from the surface to the internal organs, and fevers, lung and typhoid, and dysenteries followed. My regiment was fearfully smitten.

—Lieutenant General Richard Taylor of the U.S.
Confederate Army, *Destruction and Reconstruction* (1877).

REVIEWS



THE FOOT SOLDIERS, by William Crooks (2/33rd Australian Infantry Battalion A.I.F. Association 1971, 528 pages).

Reviewed by Colonel G. O. O'Day.

AFTER an elapse of a quarter of a century the story of an unusual infantry battalion emerges from the memories of World War II. The 2/33rd Australian Infantry Battalion, 'Hamburger Bill's Own' as it was known, irreverently at first but affectionately later, was one of three battalions formed in England in 1940 after Dunkirk from elements of the 6th Division, corps troops and reinforcements comprising Austral Force. After traversing 6th and 9th Divisions on paper it arrived in the Middle East in March 1941 as part of the 25th Brigade, 7th Division—minus one rifle company waiting for it in Palestine. (Of the two other battalions, the 2/31st remained with the 2/33rd in 25th Brigade and the 2/32nd went to the 9th Division). The third battalion of the 25th Brigade was the 2/25th. The 2/33rd Battalion was also unusual in that, as part of the 25th Brigade, the unit belonged to a division which in five years of existence saw its three brigades fighting together under the one command only in its final operation — Balikpapan.

The story of the battalion penned by Bill Crooks, who was an original member of the 72nd Battalion (which became 2/33rd), covers events from the days when the unit started training with 26 rifles, 14 bayonets and two privately owned pistols; through the Middle East, Australia, New Guinea and Balikpapan, before returning home for disbandment. Although written when memories are recognized as dimming, through his own war-time notes, those of other members of the unit, and backed by the resources of the Australian War Memorial, Crooks has produced a fine tribute to a well-blooded AIF battalion. With adequate illustrations, maps and anecdotes it has a personal touch which should appeal not only to the generation presented in its pages, but to those who respect the Australian soldier, at his best as an infantryman, regardless of the area of conflict or generation.

The story of a battalion through which passed over 3,600 men in nearly 300 weeks of existence, sustaining 430 casualties, traverses training and defensive tasks during the Battle of Britain, where the unit had its first casualty, through the boredom of defence in the tail-end of the Western Desert at Mersa Matruh and on to that bitter and seldom publicized campaign in the Middle East — Syria; a campaign which the last Inspector-General of the Foreign Legion, General Jacques Lefort, described to this reviewer in Laos in 1967 as one which left in the minds of legionnaires deep respect for the tenacity, ability and courage of the Australians; a memory which remained through the Legion's later campaigns of World War II, Korea, Indo-China and Algeria. Here Bill Crooks speaks with feeling of the long term effect which the deliberate attempts to play down the conflict between the predominantly Australian and tyro force, and the professional French on ground over which detailed defensive preparations and rehearsals had been progressing for more than a year, had on the 7th Australian Division.

Returning to an Australia awakened suddenly to the Japanese threat the 'Silent Seventh' were unknown to the public at large until they became involved in the first successful thrust in New Guinea in 1942. Then followed the first large scale air transported operation of modern war in the Markham and Ramu Valleys, from which so many lessons were learnt to be later applied in Burma and post World War II, but which for the 2/33rd opened in tragedy when a Liberator bomber crashed on D Company inflicting some 140 casualties. Finally, the 2/33rd Battalion went ashore in the last operation of the war — Balikpapan — where, despite naval, air and ground support not seen by Australians up to that time, although commonplace to the Vietnam veteran of today, the footsoldiers were required to extract individual Japanese, fanatical to the last, at a cost of 82 casualties.

The technique of recall presented in the section describing Bill Crook's journey back over the Owen Stanleys in 1969 provides an unusual touch which should appeal not only to those who were there in 1942 but also to the reader of the story.

One possible criticism which can be offered of this history is that whilst covering movement, operations and recreation of the battalion and its Association, it gives little insight to the beginnings of what is now known as civic action or civil aid — the major problem for today's soldier in Vietnam. The 7th Division was the only Australian formation which became involved in this task — restoring Dutch sovereignty in the East Indies in 1945 and operating amid the stirrings of Indonesian

nationalism, with emerging guerillas. Yet the lessons learnt get scant mention outside official records. We seem determined to draw so little from past recorded experience even though this task is one of the most difficult facing the soldier, whose training is essentially designed to counter a visible and armed enemy.

On the dustcover the publishers suggest that this may well be the last of the World War II histories.* If this should prove to be true it would be a tragedy. It seems strange that Australian units which took part in what could have been the last of the world wars have shown such reluctance to record the events which preceded the emergence of Australia as a modern burgeoning industrial nation. This is true particularly of the 6th Division, from which the 2/33rd Bn originated, but applies to the units of all divisions which fought the Italians, Germans, French and Japanese; in deserts, mountains and jungles; developing the traditions handed down by the 1st AIF, and in turn passing them to the young soldiers who have so capably represented Australia since in 'limited wars'. Perhaps it is an Australian characteristic that we choose not to record military events for history, relying rather on passing down memories in the smoky atmosphere of clubs, associations and social gatherings; covering the highlights only and, to our loss, losing the detail which is so vividly presented by Bill Crooks in this fine history. □

THE ARMY IN PAPUA-NEW GUINEA, by Robert J. O'Neill (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 10. A Publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University. 31 pages, \$1.50).

Reviewed by Colonel D. F. W. Engel, HQ PNG Command, Port Moresby.

THE full title of this publication is *The Army in Papua-New Guinea — Current Role and Implications for Independence*. By virtue of his military and academic experience, Dr O'Neill is well qualified to write on Army matters, and this pamphlet is a welcome addition to the very limited literature currently available on a subject which is of vital importance to the future of Papua-New Guinea and of Australia.

*There are in fact a number of important unit histories in course of preparation. For example, histories of the 6th Cavalry Regiment, the 2/1st Battalion and the 2/43rd Battalion.—Editor.

The pamphlet commences with a brief history of the Pacific Islands Regiment, and then describes the present composition and disposition of the Army in the Territory, with a note on Navy and Air Force elements also located there. It then explains the Army's present tasks and activities and discusses its future role, the problem of a military *élite*, the Army and politics after independence, and Australia's future defence interests in Papua-New Guinea. This is a wide field to cover in a small publication and Dr O'Neill has confined himself to a brief statement of facts and of the principal schools of thought concerning them. Generally speaking, he has not made positive conclusions but rather has presented a range of arguments from which the reader may draw conclusions for himself.

The Army's main tasks are listed as defence against external enemies, the maintenance of internal law and order and the training of loyal non-political soldiers. The two latter topics are discussed quite thoroughly but, in his examination of the defence problem, the author skims rather lightly over the strategy and tactics of national security. This is unfortunate because it is these factors which should determine the shape and size of the defence structure required. Also under defence he examines Civic Action at length. Although important, this task is one the Army has imposed upon itself and is not a reason for its existence.

In the section on Maintenance of Internal Law and Order, Dr O'Neill gives an excellent explanation of the relationship between the Army, the Territory Administration and the Australian Government with respect to the use of the Army in aid to the civil power. He covers this both in general terms and with specific reference to the July 1970 Mataungan affair. The pamphlet is worth reading for this section alone.

In discussing the Army's future, Dr O'Neill presents the views of some politicians and academics towards the Army and its role in an independent PNG. He has, perhaps, given too much emphasis to what he calls 'the general line of Pangu (Party) thinking at the moment'. My own view is that very few people or groups in or out of TPNG have thought about defence policies in real depth. There is some discussion in the Territory of defence forces and of the Pacific Islands Regiment, but very little about the aims, policies and structure required in the defence system of an independent PNG. The purpose of such discussion seems to be more to create political capital than to find the answers to a complex problem. Nevertheless, the views presented in the

pamphlet give a good guide to the present thinking of non-military people in the Territory about their Army and about defence.

Perhaps the most important section of the pamphlet is that on Australia's future defence interests in New Guinea. This is a matter on which there is much current debate and on which some firm policy is urgently required. The author covers briefly the major factors involved and suggests that Australia has a real interest in the defence of PNG, not only for reasons of her own long term security, but also to create a good national image on the world stage.

Recent events in the Australian Parliament and consequent discussion on the use of the Army in aid to the civil power in TPNG have thrown an intense spotlight on the nature and role of the Army in the Territory. Unfortunately, much of the discussion was uninformed and much of the spotlight was misdirected. Dr O'Neill's pamphlet, published early in 1971, received wide publicity and seemed to initiate a spate of press articles on the Army's present role and future in the Territory. In many cases, Dr O'Neill's writings were misquoted or taken out of context, and those who have read these articles should make it a point to read the original.

Many people write and speak as though the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR) constituted the whole of the Army in TPNG. In fact, the PIR is two under-strength infantry battalions without a Regimental HQ, and although very efficient, it is far from being the whole of the Army. Over 50% of current strength in the Territory is distributed in administrative, logistic and training units without which the PIR can neither exist nor function, and 70% of the employment positions in those units are already filled by indigenes. Further indigenization and development of the administrative machinery, so that it will suit the Territory's needs and abilities, are matters to which the Australian Army is devoting considerable energy. The building of an Army requires much more than simply manning infantry battalions with indigenes.

Whether or not PNG is to have an Army when it is independent is a question for Government to decide. However, any Army it has must be part of a total defence structure and this latter takes a long time and much effort to create. Dr O'Neill's concise and informative pamphlet gives some indication of the problems involved, both in the Territory and in Australia. It is recommended to all who are interested in Papua-New Guinea and its future. □

Letters to the Editor

Divergent Opinions

Sir,—A. J. Sweeting in his review of *No Memory for Pain*, page 53 of *Army Journal* No. 262 March 1971, states that the 7th Division has Sturdee and the Australian Prime Minister Curtin to thank for not being landed in Java and that the landing of any part of the Australian Force in Java was a blunder which probably would never have occurred, had Blamey been present at the time.

This statement does not tell the full truth, and is unfair to Lavarack who did his utmost to prevent the landing of our first flight of troops from the *Orcades*, and only agreed to the landing when he received instructions from Australia to obey Wavell's orders. Wavell was the Supreme Commander of the ABDA theatre (American, British, Dutch, Australian) with his headquarters at Lembang on the Bandoeng Plateau. At this time I was BGS, i.e. Chief of Staff of 1st Australian Corps, and accompanied Lavarack with a small advanced HQ of 1 Aust. Corps.

On 27 January 1942 we arrived at Bandoeng, and Lavarack and I reported to Wavell's Headquarters at Lembang, where Wavell explained the situation and said the 7th Australian Division was to be deployed in Southern Sumatra, and the 6th Australian Division in the waist of Java. Lavarack said he did not agree with the corps being split, and was bound to refer the matter to Australia, which he did. Australia replied stating that we were to obey Wavell's orders, but to press for the divisions to be united as soon as the situation permitted.

On 31st January we moved our headquarters from an hotel in Bandoeng to a small hotel in Tjisorea which was a few miles from Bandoeng, but 2,000 feet higher. The main airfield was at Bandoeng where US Air Force Flying Fortresses (B17s) were stationed, and these aircraft used to bomb enemy targets, fly to the Philippines and bring back Americans. It was an obvious target for Japanese aircraft, and a few days later we looked down from our headquarters and witnessed a very heavy Japanese air attack on the airfield and town at Bandoeng.

From the 1st to 3rd February Lavarack and I carried out reconnaissances in Southern Sumatra by air and road of Palembang, Air-

fields P1 and P2, oil refineries Pladjoe and Sungi Gerong on the Moesi river, Banka Island and Pakenbaroe, two hundred miles north of Palembang. The Japanese had air and naval superiority, the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* had been sunk, and the Japanese were advancing on Singapore.

On 8th February Lavarack and I, with the Commander 7th Armoured Brigade, reconnoitred Central Java, and on completion were told that the 7th Armoured Brigade would be diverted to Burma.

On the night 8th/9th February the Japanese breached the defences of Singapore and established themselves on the island. On 12th February the situation in Singapore had deteriorated—the *Orcades* was at Oosthaven in Southern Sumatra, where the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion, under Blackburn, landed. On 13th February the situation on Singapore was precarious and Australia was advised accordingly.

The fall of Singapore would alter the whole basis of our plans and we were now strongly against the employment of the 7th and 6th Australian Divisions in Sumatra and Java, and advised Australia. On 15th February Singapore fell, and Lavarack won his point with GHQ who agreed to the re-embarkation of the 2/3rd MG Bn. in the *Orcades*, which then returned to Java. On 17th February Lavarack refused to agree to the landing of our troops from the *Orcades*, and referred the matter to Australia, who replied stating we were to obey Wavell's orders, so the 2/3rd MG Bn, 2/2nd Pnr. Bn, 2/6th Fd. Coy and 105 Gen. Tpt. Coy were to land and guard five airfields and these troops, together with 2/3rd Res. MT Coy, and 2/2nd CCS were left in Java. As Chief of Staff to Lavarack, I wrote the reports and signal messages with strong recommendations against our troops being landed in Java, and I consider the part we played was our most important contribution to our army during the war. Furthermore, I submit, no general could have done more than Lavarack.

7th Australian Division was diverted to Colombo and then 7th Division, Corps Troops and part of 6th Division sailed in transports unescorted on various routes across the Indian Ocean to Australia, many landing at Adelaide. After landing in Australia these troops were moved to Northern New South Wales and Southern Queensland, and after a period of training in hilly forest country, went to New Guinea where they stopped the Japanese advance and drove the Japanese back to the north coast to Buna, Gona and Sanananda.

Last year I was asked to be a Consulting Editor to the Reader's Digest *Illustrated Story of World War II*, and I read the proofs of the portions relating to the AIF, of which I had some knowledge. Referring to the chapter headed 'The Java Sea Fiasco' by Ronald McKie, I stated that whilst ABDA Navy suffered grievous losses, and we lost H.M.A.S. *Perth*, the action of our naval forces was of the very greatest importance to Australia, and I had the following paragraph included in the chapter:

Although the battle was a catastrophe for the Allies, the A.B.D.A. Force kept Japanese ships tied up in the Indies, allowing the returning Australian 6th and 7th Divisions safe passage from Colombo to Australia, in unescorted troopships.

A few Japanese raiders in the Indian Ocean could have caused great losses to us and this aspect is mentioned by Artie Fadden in his book, wherein he states that our Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, was so worried over the great risks run by our returning troopships that he had sleepless nights. It was these troops that stopped the Japanese advance in New Guinea.

In conclusion, I submit that Blamey could not have done more than Lavarack, and whilst credit is due to Curtin and Sturdee, great credit should go to Lavarack for the strong recommendations and reports which we forwarded to our government, and for Lavarack's refusal for any of our troops to be landed until told by our government to obey Wavell's orders.

Lt. General Sir Frank H. Berryman,
KCVO, CB, CBE, DSO. □

Point Piper, NSW.

Sir,—General Berryman, in his rejoinder to my review of Dum Norris's *No Memory for Pain* (*Army Journal*, March issue, p. 53) seems to be bringing to bear his heavy artillery on me for something which I did not say.

In his opening paragraph he says that I state 'that the 7th Division has Sturdee and the Australian Prime Minister, Curtin, to thank for not being landed in Java'. In fact, I wrote in part that 'if Churchill had had his way the 7th Division, still not tactically loaded, would have been landed in Burma in time to take part in the arduous retreat to India. The 7th Division has Sturdee and the Australian Prime Minister, Curtin, to thank for being spared that ordeal.'

I do not think that General Lavarack would have laid claim to any part in changing the destination of the 7th Division from Burma to Australia. In fact Lavarack first learnt that the 7th Division was destined not for Burma but for Australia when he arrived at Laverton from Java on 23 February 1942. As Lionel Wigmore records in *The Japanese Thrust* Lavarack asked General Sturdee who met him when he should be leaving for the front again.

Sturdee then astonished me with the information that the whole set-up was now changed (Lavarack wrote in his diary) and that the whole of I Aust Corps was now ordered to Australia, by arrangement though not agreement between the British and Australian Governments.

Whether or not the landing of Blackforce in Java would have occurred had Blamey been present at the time must remain a matter for speculation. Brudenell White, who had been Birdwood's chief of staff and later Chief of the Australian General Staff, considered that Blamey, on his appointment as G.O.C. 6th Division in 1939, was the only Australian general available who would be able to cope with the political aspects of the task of a commander of a Dominion force overseas and, particularly, would be able to preserve its integrity abroad. Gavin Long in *To Benghazi* states that 'White feared that unless a man was chosen who could deal firmly with such problems the Australian division would soon be split up into brigades by the British Commander in the area and the force would begin to lose its identity and unity'. Events in 1940-41 in the Middle East, when Blamey was in the main successful in resisting such efforts to split his force, and in 1942 in the Netherlands East Indies when Lavarack was not, seem to have proved Brudenell White's judgement to be correct.

Australian War Memorial
Canberra

A. J. Sweeting

Practical Philosophy

Sir, — Please allow me to make the observation that I found the article 'The Chaplain in the Service of the Soldier' in February's *Army Journal* quite absorbing.

Senior Chaplain Hughes expresses a simple, practical and realistic philosophy which even I can understand. I have no doubt that so can the average soldier (and airman).

Department of Air
Canberra

Air Commodore D. D. Hurditch.

William C. Quantrill

Sir,—In his excellent article 'War is Cruelty' (*Army Journal* April 1971) Major O'Donnell makes a brief reference to the Kansas-Missouri operations by guerilla bands, and the actions of William C. Quantrill. He has treated a very complex situation and personality in simple terms for the sake of brevity and in so doing has introduced errors of fact and interpretation.

The Kansas-Missouri border warfare began years before the Civil War, and continued after the war had ended. Quantrill's raid on Lawrence was not part of the 'total' aspects of the Civil War but a reprisal raid against the 'Jayhawkers'—Union supporters who were based in Lawrence and led by Jim Lane, a United States Senator and confidant of Lincoln.

Clarke Quantrill eventually became a bandit and murderer, and doubtlessly deserved his penultimate and inevitable fate, but he had attributes which in other times and in other circumstances may have made him famous instead of infamous.

At the time of the Lawrence massacre he was twenty-six years old, undisputed leader of a guerilla band of about five hundred outlaws, an exceptional cavalry tactician, master of the ambush and counter-ambush, and a chivalrous, and brave man. In 1862 he had espoused the Confederate cause, and had applied for a colonel's commission in the Confederate forces but was refused. In the Lawrence massacre, no woman or child was harmed on Quantrill's special orders but 142 men were murdered by his band of 450 which, by the way, included Cole and Jim Younger, and Frank and Jesse James, who were to become infamous in later years as outlaws and murderers. Lane escaped the massacre, only to commit suicide in 1866 under the threat of exposure of corrupt practices as a senator.

The action at Baxter Springs was purely a military action in which Quantrill's band wiped out a Union detachment of 100 men.

Eventually, internal rivalries and dissension over the division of spoils of their various raids led to the disintegration of the guerilla band, and in May 1865 with only about 20 loyal followers left, Quantrill was surprised by Union Forces and was mortally wounded. He died on 6 June 1865 in Louisville.

His ultimate fate was hardly deserved. In 1887 Quantrill's mother, by bribery, had his remains exhumed so that she 'could take them to

the family burial ground in Ohio'. Instead of reburying them in the family plot she sold his bones for souvenirs!

As Wellman,¹ to whom I am indebted for this version of Quantrill's life, remarked 'Quantrill was no good. But the ghoulish mother, who sold her son's bones as curios, could hardly have been much better.'

Army Headquarters
Canberra.

Brigadier A. G. Cairns □

The Sudan Campaign

Sir, — As I have been researching the history of the Sudan Campaign for some time I was very interested to read C. F. Coady's article 'The First Campaign' in the March issue of the *Army Journal*. Incidents like the sending of the Sudan contingent are becoming increasingly more important to historians trying to interpret nineteenth century Australian history. It is with this in mind that I venture to add a few notes, comments and corrections to Mr Coady's article and Staff Cadet Clark's article of January 1970, which may be of interest to readers.

Mr Coady seems to suggest that William B. Dalley had proffered help which New South Wales was not empowered to give and that within the constitution, New South Wales was not empowered to enlist soldiers for overseas duties. This in fact was one of the arguments used to oppose the contingent, even the government, including Dalley, openly admitted this was so. In actual fact this may be a false assumption. If there were no specific provisions for the enlistment of troops for overseas service there were equally none proscribing such a course. Normal constitutional precedent seems to be that where a written constitution exists, as in the case of New South Wales, government action in any field is permissible unless specifically proscribed or limited. There is more to it than that; under section one of the NSW Constitution of 1856 the government had power to make laws for

'... the peace, welfare and good government of the
said Colony in all cases whatsoever...'

limited only by the *Colonial Laws Validity Act* of 1865 and the States' position in the Empire in a pre-Statute of Westminster era. The State

¹ Paul I. Wellman, a noted historian of the American West. Author of *A Dynasty of Western Outlaws* and other works.

had already recognized its ability to send forces to fight for the Empire by passing the *Military and Naval Forces Regulation Act* of 1871 (34 Vic.no. 19). In fact only four years prior to the Sudan Campaign the *Imperial Army Act* of 1881 (44 & 45 Vic.Ch. 52) clearly recognized that the colonies had power to raise forces for overseas service when it provided, under section 177, that such forces should come both under the scope of the *Army Act* and the *Mutiny Act*. The *Army Act* further provided that under section 189 para. ii & iii such forces could be placed on active service by the governor without the consent of parliament if it was not in session: a concept which had been earlier embodied in the *NSW Volunteer Force Regulation Act* of 1867 (31 Vic.no. 5). The regular component of the force, amounting approximately to two hundred men had, of course, already been provided for under the *NSW Military and Naval Forces Regulation Act* of 1871 which bound them to serve Her Majesty anywhere. The additional volunteers are covered except, perhaps, in the eyes of legal purists, by the *Volunteer Force Regulation Act 1867* and *Imperial Army Act 1881* even if the contingent's supporters were unaware of these facts. Any ambiguity or doubts about the forces position were cleared up by the government when it passed the *Australian Military Contingent Act* (48 Vic.no. 28) which declared the contingent to be a force within the meaning of the *Military and Naval Forces Regulation Act 1871*. It is noteworthy that no constitutional alterations were considered necessary. On the question of the legality of providing finance for the contingent, provided that the government paid out no more money than that previously allocated for defence, prior to the meeting of Parliament, no problem existed.

The point on which Dalley was most criticized, and rightly so, was his failure to call parliament together until three weeks after the departure of the contingent, as well as perhaps the pledging of money without consulting parliament. Yet I think most would agree with Dalley when he argued that patriotism and duty cannot be weighed solely in terms of the pocketbook.

One other problem which has resulted in the spread of many misconceptions has been just how effective both the contingent and the enemy were. The fact that so little Australian blood was shed perhaps obscures the true effectiveness of that force. In statistical terms the New South Wales Contingent made up nearly seven per cent of the total force available to General Graham at Suakin and almost ten per cent of the combat infantry, a quite significant total.

The Australians were noted amongst British officers for their willingness to undertake lonely and dangerous outpost and patrolling duties. Probably most surprisingly, the Australian force's drill was thought by some British officers to be better than the Guards' Regiments — an admission indeed.

Those critics who saw the campaign in terms of British forces slaughtering defenceless savages were very far from the truth, as indicated in the quotation from the *Bulletin* in C. F. Coady's article. Rarely in the battles of the campaign were the odds less than three to one in favour of the Arabs. More importantly, the Arabs were armed with modern Remington repeating rifles as opposed to the single shot Martini-Henry rifles of the British force, which were frequently cursed with faulty ammunition. At the Battle of McNeil's Zeriba 22 March 1885, the Arabs broke a British Square, a feat that not even Napoleon had managed at Waterloo. When it is considered that artillery and the new automatic weapons played an almost negligible part in these battles it is astonishing to read of the large number of enemy casualties, attributable no doubt to superb British fire control.

For those who follow the fortunes of Australia's mounted and armoured regiments, this campaign has a number of important associations. Fifty Australians were drafted from the contingent to form half a company of the five company strong Camel Corps. These men were involved in many exciting, yet largely unrecorded, scuffles with the enemy. One story that has been recorded indicates the Australians' enthusiasm. Two Australian Cameliers sighting two of the enemy (who promptly decamped into the scrub) and regardless of the possibility of ambush immediately dismounted and gave chase. The enemy were eventually apprehended after a two-hour hunt. The Australian Camel Corps also provided escorts for Major T. S. Parrott of the New South Wales Engineers while he conducted his very important topographical and geological survey of the Suakin area for the British Army.

The Royal New South Wales Lancers also owe something to this campaign, for Colonel J. S. Richardson was so impressed with the performance of the 5th Royal Irish Lancers that on his return to Sydney he converted the Sydney cavalry troop to Lancers. The blue uniform with the scarlet plastron of the Irish Lancers was adopted, though khaki eventually replaced the blue sections of it. It has been said that if the campaign had lasted into the spring, General Graham

was going to ask that New South Wales send a cavalry unit to join the contingent.

As C. F. Coady notes, the contingent was not a failure for it showed that the colonies would stand by Britain in times of trouble. For Australians, it meant more than that, it symbolized the end of the road for those who believed that Australia could survey the rest of the degenerate world from a position of splendid isolation. No longer was the theory politically tenable that Australia could be part of the British Empire and still be neutral in any general conflict in which Britain became involved. It represented the triumph of harsh political realism over a Utopian dream, for with the Suakin affair the dream of an Australian Monroe Doctrine disappeared forever.

UNSWR
Kensington NSW

Lieutenant D. J. Deasey □

Two Significant Points

Sir,—After reading 'Notes on Company Operations in Vietnam' by Major R. F. Sutton in the March *Army Journal*, two of his points covered struck me as rather significant. The first was 'Sleeping Position — For a laugh or not?' In World War II, whilst serving with the 2/12th Battalion, 18th Brigade, I knew of several people who used to do this and some of the FOOs attached also carried it out. Whilst serving with AATTV, I noticed the CO of the 2/3 Battalion 3 Regiment used to do the same. After a while I did, and found it very convenient for quick orientation.

With reference to sentries escorting their relief back to the sentry post, why this has never been incorporated in Chapter 7, Section 27, Para. 13 of *Infantry Training*, Vol. 4, Pt. 2 I do not know. Again this has been done in units for years and, without coming the old soldier too much, it happened in World War II. Perhaps the new look Army thinks it smacks too much of discipline and not enough of permissiveness to do this. Whilst an instructor at Jungle Warfare School Kota Tinggi in 1959-62 we taught this and stressed the point in our lectures on 'Defence and Relief of Sentries by Night'. Whilst CSM of 1 ARU at Nui Dat in 1967-68 many a soldier, much to his disgust and horror, found that he was charged 'With Leaving His Post Without Being Properly Relieved', because in some cases he woke his relief and went to bed; the relief went back to sleep and claimed he had never

been wakened. In other cases the sentry went back to his post, waited a short time, woke his relief the second time and then off to bed, still without his relief at the post. Sometimes the relieving sentry, unaccompanied, got lost and wandered about the company area.

I am not an advocate of Charge Reports but feel that in lots of cases a fine of some dollars may well bring home the point that a little care and thought, plus the inclusion in the manual of Major Sutton's recommendation on Relief of Sentries will save lives. Sooner and better teaching and a few dollars fine when necessary, than an official telegram KIA. After all, what value in terms of dollars can be placed on a soldier's life?

9 RQR
Bundaberg,
Queensland.

Warrant Officer H M. Kelly

It is pleasing to note the interest shown in articles recently published in the Army Journal. An important feature of any journal is the reaction of its readers and 'Letters to the Editor' is a gauge of this reaction as well as a medium for differing views and opinions.—
Editor.