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$10 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of $60 and $20 respectively will be awarded to the authors gaining first and second places in the year.

COVER: War artist K. McFadyen's 'Helicopter Resupply, Vietnam 1968', at the Australian War Memorial.

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 261, FEBRUARY 1971

Contents

(Australian War Memorial)

Australian infantrymen on the heights overlooking Tobruk harbour from the south, 22 January 1941.

The Man Who Has Tried to Kill You



What is a prisoner of war? A prisoner of war is a man who has tried to kill you, and having failed, asks you not to kill him.

—Sir Winston Churchill.

Lieutenant Colonel P. J. Cameron
Australian Army Legal Corps

LAST December the *Army Journal* published Lieutenant S. H. Scarlett's prize winning essay entitled 'The Prisoner of Armed Conflict'. It was an interesting and persuasive essay which examined some disquieting aspects of what appeared to its author to be the predicament facing the soldier made captive by the enemy. Not altogether unfairly, the author suggested that the soldier who falls into enemy hands in this day and age may be confronted by a frightening prospect for which his training and experience will find him ill-prepared, and that the law affords him scant comfort in his predicament.

Whilst his essay was persuasive, it was also controversial, and if Mr Scarlett had intended to provoke debate he could not better have set about achieving his end.

Lieutenant Colonel Cameron graduated LL.B. from Sydney University in 1951. He was admitted as a solicitor in 1955 and practised that profession until he joined the ARA in 1967. He has served as DADLS at AHQ and in AFV, for which latter service he was mentioned in despatches. He is at present seconded to the Department of Defence.

The essay contains the ingredients for controversy simply because of this reality: community attitudes toward prisoners of war, their status, the treatment to be accorded them, and the standards of conduct demanded of them as men by the precepts of national honour, military tradition and law, are coloured by an inordinate number of extraneous factors stemming from emotional, political and chauvinistic influences.

The lot of a prisoner of war has never been an enviable one. In ages past the prisoner, whether taken by the enemy by stealth or by stratagem, or in pitched battle, could expect nothing save death, or perhaps worse, enslavement. Today, because for more than a century men of enlightenment have been working to persuade belligerents that prisoners of war are to be afforded a degree of protection and a measure of dignity and legal rights, their conditions have improved somewhat.

By the year 1949 the prisoner of war, once the subject of the every caprice and malice of his captor, had for his protection the provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Prisoners of War. This document (to which for the sake of simplicity I shall refer by the initials GCPW) was one of four international treaties made on 12 August 1949. These treaties have subsequently been ratified by a majority of nations. They are included, in this article, in the phrase 'the Conventions'.

These, the Conventions, represent a considerable proportion of the body of public international law as it relates to warfare and its victims.

Mr Scarlett began his essay with a brief survey of the historical development of what he described as the present rules of public international law governing the treatment of prisoners of war. He meant, of course, GCPW and I have no desire to take exception to anything said in this respect.

He went on to indicate the ambit and operation of various material parts of GCPW, and in the course of doing so, made certain very positive assertions as to the purported effect of the Commonwealth Geneva Conventions Act 1957. I am bound to join issue with him because I am quite convinced that he is gravely mistaken in his views.

Thereafter Mr Scarlett examined the reported evidence of crew members of the USS *Pueblo*, detailing the treatment to which they were subjected during their detention in North Korea, after having speculated upon their status following the seizure of the vessel. Then, having regard to the studied brutality which was inflicted upon them, their reactions to it, and the criticisms levelled at them after their repatriation, the author enquired whether obedience to the American 'Code of Conduct'

may not impose unreal, even impossible, demands upon the ordinary man. He compared the French experiences in defeat in the Indo-China campaign, and in passing made reference to what he saw as the Australian position.

In the ultimate, Mr Scarlett put forward three separate propositions, which I understood to convey the following effect:

One: The *Pueblo* incident raises issues which require abandonment of the term 'prisoner of war' and its replacement by a more appropriate, but less specific term: this he suggested could be achieved by substituting the term 'military captive' with a much extended meaning.

Two: If the use of confessional matter or other information with any political or propaganda significance were made illegal, the risk of mistreatment of prisoners would completely disappear.

Three: Since the American Code of Conduct tends to demand of all men more than all men are able to give, it is pointless to demand its observance. In consequence it is no more than reasonable to substitute for so high an ideal another which enables a prisoner to comply with a maximum of his captors' demands, so that his own welfare is least jeopardized, the enemy is satisfied, and little of military or security importance is disclosed.

There is an engaging logic about these propositions but the present writer is convinced that their implementation would do little, if anything, to ameliorate the lot of the hapless prisoner of war.

Almost before the ink was dry on their pages it became patent that the Conventions were inadequate. The devastating barbarism practised upon UN personnel captured during the Korean conflict at least equalled that of any ever perpetrated in ancient or mediaeval times. Nothing in the Conventions could preclude it, and as events transpired it could be seen that short of punishing offenders among the enemy after victory there is no remedy. Even then, punishing the criminal is less useful than preventing his crime.

It would not be unduly cynical of an observer to state that, if the Conventions are the law, they illustrate very well the notion that without an active police force to supervise obedience of the law, and without universally accepted and impartial judicial tribunals to interpret and apply it, as well as a bailiff to execute the judgements of such tribunals, the law is empty and pointless.

In Australia, the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 ratified the diplomatic accession of the Commonwealth to the Conventions and operates effectively to incorporate them into and to make them part of the ordinary law of the land. However, it is a matter of dispute that this Act has such wide and all-embracing consequences as Mr Scarlett has suggested.

The Act takes effect throughout all the States and Territories of the Commonwealth. It is expressed to have extra-territorial effect, and parts of it are expressed to apply to all persons 'regardless of their nationality or citizenship'. The Act invests the jurisdiction which it confers in the High Court of Australia and in the respective Supreme Courts of each of the several States and Territories.

Since, therefore, the Conventions are part of Australian law, their interpretation will be a matter for the judges of the courts before which matters brought under the Act are heard. This gives rise to one of the more fascinating problems which the Conventions may present if a prosecution based upon their contents is ever acted out.

The Commonwealth's municipal legislation is direct and detailed — it is lawyers' bread and butter stuff; the Conventions are indirect, general and loose. The first reads something like an engineering specification, the second like a quartet of prose poems. It is little wonder that during the Second Reading Speech of the Bill, one member of Parliament, an eminent Queen's Counsel, expressed some doubt as to how readily Australian courts would be able to apply the rules of interpretation to the Conventions, remarking that their language was nothing less than 'turgid'.

If we turn now to Mr Scarlett's contention that an Australian court could try the perpetrators of the alleged My Lai massacre, certain comment must be made.

Section 7(1) of the Geneva Convention Act does not give Australian courts power to try every person allegedly guilty of an offence against the Conventions. Power conferred by this section is strictly limited and clearly would be subject to political control, since no prosecution under the Act can be launched except in the name of the Commonwealth Attorney-General.

Moreover, it is not every breach of the Conventions which may be tried. The section applies only to 'grave breaches', which are defined by a further sub-section as being those offences which are contrary to certain specified articles in each of the several Conventions.

It may be that, if the My Lai massacre did occur in the way in which it is stated to have taken place, it does constitute a 'grave breach'; however, that is quite another matter.

The difficulties which would confront a prosecution are numerous, since it would seem that jurisdiction would only arise in certain limited circumstances, which appear to be as follows:

- When the offender is an Australian citizen, wherever he is alleged to have committed the offence.
- When any person, whatever his nationality or citizenship, is alleged to have committed the offence in Australia.
- When an enemy subject has been captured or has come into the custody of Australian Forces, and is alleged to have committed the offence.

The Act seems to provide a code of law to enable the Commonwealth to try its own subjects and captured enemy personnel who have committed offences contrary to the Conventions, after it has obtained proper jurisdiction over such persons. The Act would seem to give no jurisdiction to try members of an allied force for offences committed contrary to the Conventions in places outside the Commonwealth and its Territories.

Even if this were not so practical considerations would probably render abortive trials of this kind. Unless it were to be instituted and conducted by Australian and American authority in concert, how could any trial of a person other than an Australian, accused of complicity in the My Lai affair, be effective? By what means other than American-Australian co-operation could the prosecution obtain the necessary evidence and compel the attendance and giving of their testimony by witnesses? It is barely possible to contemplate such an extraordinary event coming to pass. It hardly merits serious consideration.

It is of relevance to record that the Argentine did protest after the event in its sovereign territory, of the arrest and removal to Israel of Adolf Eichmann, subsequently convicted and executed for war crimes committed by him. Whilst the protests achieved nothing, they were properly made in accordance with long established and accepted principles of public international law.

The consequences of the 'seizure' or 'capture' (the choice of words depending upon the view which one takes) of the USS *Pueblo* and its crew merits some consideration.

The immediate American contention was that its vessel had been operating in international waters at the time of the incident and it also asserted that the vessel was well outside the twelve-mile limit claimed by North Korea as its territorial waters. What is more, America added, it did not recognize claims for sovereignty over territorial waters beyond three miles from any coastline. In particular, America refused to concede any right on the part of North Korea to take an American naval vessel and its crew into custody, even if there had been an intrusion into what North Korea claimed to be its territorial sea. America rejected outright the North Korea characterisation of the *Pueblo* as a 'spy ship', denying that such a description could give any colour of legality to the seizure of a clearly identified naval ship, openly operated by uniformed personnel.

On the last hypothesis, it is clear that the use of the description 'spy ship' introduces a nice equivocation. Presuming that the *Pueblo* was doing no more than conduct surveillance, whether visual or electronic, it would seem that one could hardly allege this to be 'espionage' in the classic sense of that word, nor would it be reasonable to allege this to be 'spying' in the sense anticipated by the Conventions which, in several places, deal with the status and lawful treatment of spies.

The use of the phrase 'spy ship' was an obvious device, and the incident was to be used, to a greater or less extent, by both parties for their own propaganda purposes.

It is not suggested that the accounts given by Commander Bucher and his crew misrepresent the treatment to which they were subjected. However, one observation is pertinent; the *Pueblo* was virtually unarmed, it was captured intact and its equipment was doubtless of an advanced type, of more than passing interest and value to the North Koreans and their allies. On its own the vessel and its contents were an invaluable prize; its crew was a bonus, but not necessarily a useful bonus.

The crew represented a potential source of information, if it could be tapped. This information, in so far as it related to technical matters concerning the vessel's equipment, would be of some use but need not have been vital. If the equipment were novel or unique its design was all that could matter. If one man can create a device, another can discover eventually how to operate it successfully. Here, time was a factor unlikely to concern the enemy. It would not be vital for him to draw information from his captives without delay. Propaganda rather

than purely military information which could be derived from interrogation of the captain and crew may well have been of more use to the enemy.

However, to what extent North Korea extracted such technical or military intelligence is not obvious. It would seem that the chief efforts of the captors, involving their employment of savage violence, were directed to extorting confessions for use as propaganda material.

Mr Scarlett concluded, after discussion of the incident, and in the light of GCPW (particularly Article 2) that the capture/seizure of the *Pueblo* did amount to an armed conflict. He took account of the views of the American Judge Advocate General in the course of his discussion, and admitted that the matter was not beyond doubt.

His discussion was not unreasonable and does emphasize one point. There is no universally acceptable, independent tribunal competent to make an enforceable judgement in such cases. Whatever the merits of the cause, it is agreed that the incident probably was an armed conflict. This has relevance to Mr Scarlett's suggestion that use of the term 'prisoner of war' be abandoned and that the concept it carries be widened.

Article 4 of GCPW is certainly much wider than its equivalent provision in the earlier treaties. The effect of the law is to confer upon an individual the status of prisoner of war only if he has 'fallen into the power of the enemy' and is in one of the several categories enumerated in Article 4.

Now, if there were an armed conflict clearly there would be two parties, each the enemy of the other. It is equally clear that the crew of the *Pueblo* were 'members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict'. Hence it would seem that this incident calls not so much for an amendment to Article 4, but to Article 2. The definition of 'armed conflict' shrieks for attention

It is not to be taken that this writer necessarily subscribes to the view that Article 4 is flawless — quite the contrary. If it is read in conjunction with the proviso to Article 5, one can form the opinion that the categories enumerated in Article 4 are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Be that as it may, even if they are pirates, human decency should preclude torture of any captives in this day and age. The writer feels that this casts a more realistic light on the views which Mr Scarlett expressed in his first proposition.

It is convenient to discuss Mr Scarlett's other two propositions as if they were one. There is some difficulty in doing so, since they relate not so much to law as to philosophic and juridical concepts.

Centuries ago torture was recognized as a valued and legitimate technique of criminal procedure: men were compelled to incriminate themselves by use of the thumbscrew and the rack. One might have expected torture to have been abandoned in these supposedly enlightened times. Yet the contrary is manifest and a degree of shock may be felt upon learning of the means used to obtain confessions, and the public trials at which they have been used from time to time.

The term generally applied to forced confessions obtained from prisoners of war is 'coerced confessions', coercion itself being essentially any type of pressure applied by one person to another to force a desired reaction. Coercion is characterized by utter ruthlessness in inducing fear and despair in men isolated from their normal environment, after they have suffered a degree of physical and mental deterioration.

GCPW limits the interrogation of prisoners of war. When questioned on the subject the prisoner must give his full names, rank, regimental or other number and his date of birth. However, the effort to obtain military information from captive enemy has long been regarded as a legitimate war objective and the limits set by GCPW have been disregarded by most in most conflicts. Nothing in GCPW seeks to preclude a captive from disclosing voluntarily to the enemy, truthfully, all information in his possession. Basically this is a matter for domestic service law but one might well have expected the principle to be reinforced by provisions of GCPW.

Coerced confessions, whether true or false, have been used for propaganda purposes. It has been asserted that in Korea only rarely was coercion applied during interrogation directed at eliciting purely military information from prisoners of war for intelligence purposes. Generally the purpose of torture and coercion was to obtain statements for propaganda purposes in the enemy's cold war. What has been said of the experience of the crew of the *Pueblo* tends to confirm that this is the pattern which exists and may be expected to continue.

Mr Scarlett's essay contained more than passing reference to what is known as the American soldier's 'Code of Conduct'. It is not necessary to speculate upon its legal force as a series of orders the breach of which may constitute an offence contrary to military law. It

is, whatever else, a promulgation of the standards of conduct and self-discipline expected of American troops in battle and in war captivity.

Australian military law has not a great deal to say on the subject of prisoners of war. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Army Act, there are provisions which might found appropriate charges against a prisoner of war who voluntarily so conducted himself whilst detained by the enemy, that what he did might amount to treason. In addition, charges might be laid against such a soldier under Sections 40 or 41 of the Army Act, that is to say, acts to the prejudice of good order and military discipline or, perhaps, in unusual circumstances, offences contrary to the civil law of England. These provisions may provide a means of trying an offender, but they do not seem to have been enacted with an eye to the problems of a prisoner of war whose conduct in captivity is seen to merit his trial for a military offence.

Australian Military Order 309A provides that if a member is interrogated he *will* give no more than his number, rank, full name and date of birth. These are indeed the same particulars as he is required by GCPW to give when questioned. This order is not a regulation, is advisory in nature, and is not mandatory. In any event, if a soldier were unaware of the existence of the order, on the basis that it had never been promulgated to him, it would be impossible (in the theory of the law) to sustain a charge against him, were he to disclose more information than the order permits.

The Australian Army observes certain doctrine which is referred to as a code of conduct. Whilst the Australian soldier, who has absorbed the training introduced under this doctrine may be equipped to face the rigours of life as a prisoner of war, with or without intense interrogation and torture and coercion, his training and this doctrine form no part of Australian Military law. What he has been subjected to is a process intended to develop his own innate capacities, rather than anything else. Should an Australian soldier made prisoner of war depart from the high standard demanded of him by his training, he will have committed no military offence, unless it is one which can be identified in terms of the provisions of those sections of the Army Act mentioned previously.

It would appear that in the American services the signing of a false confession is regarded as essentially different from the giving of vital military information, even if the former may be equally as damaging to the nation as is the latter. Certainly, fear of death is not a defence

to a charge of treason or desertion; however, while former American prisoners of war have been tried for misconduct during a period of captivity and for aiding the enemy in various ways, the writer understands that no American serviceman has ever been tried for merely signing a false confession in consequence of coercion.

In these matters, despite the vituperative attacks upon members of the crew of the USS *Pueblo* by certain of their countrymen, some of whom were public figures, courage to face death on a battlefield would appear to demand less of a man than the capacity to withstand degradation, filth, starvation and mental agony in isolation in a prison camp. One way of considering the problem is this; if a prisoner of war is under considerable pressure to sign a false confession, since the fear of future punishment for his doing so cannot equal the fear of immediate death or torture, any deterrent sanction which he may face upon his release is of little effect. At the same time, if he is brought to trial after his release, any punishment contemplated against him must be weighed against the bearing of his acts on national security and the effect which knowledge of his punishment will have on the morale of future prisoners, and on military morale itself.

If it is the case that torture and coercion can be expected to be directed mostly to obtaining only propaganda material, then, in light of the American experience, the demands made by the Code of Conduct are not very much relevant to the third proposition put forth by Mr Scarlett, in so far as it extends to protection of military information.

There may be a case for relaxing the Code's demands in relation to coerced confessions, but whether this is likely to achieve any benefit is problematical. It is in any event a matter of high policy, to be decided in terms of national morality and military law.

It is difficult to draw a line — military information must be protected — the signing of false confessions ought not to be encouraged, and relaxation of the Code's standard might well work both of these results. Moreover, the comparison with the French experience is bad; the French were near defeat in a former colony. It is not easy to compare their means of resolving a problem with those of another nation whose problems are perhaps different and more acute.

Of course, if the use of coerced confessions could be outlawed by international accord, and all purpose removed from their being obtained, the problem would solve itself. This is more than one can

hope. Even in the event of an amendment to GCPW enacting such a change to the existing position, how could it be enforced? If certain belligerents, contrary to law, do not hesitate to descend to a level of inhumanity and brutality which is horrifying to the remainder of the civilized world, why would they pay heed to any other law not consistent with their policies?

It comes to this; certain belligerents, for purposes of their own, will continue to extract from their captives coerced confessions no matter what the law or world opinion may demand. To permit or to encourage the signing of such confessions, by lowering even unduly high standards of self-control and discipline imposed to prevent it, can have no useful effect and would be counter to all accepted principles of conduct. If this does induce an ever present risk that prisoners of war may suffer avoidable hardship, it is perhaps historically inevitable. It is the price which life exacts and even the French system cannot have avoided all hardship. □

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best articles published in the November and December 1970 issues of the journal to:

November: Staff Cadet C. D. Clark (The Sioux Wars, 1854-91) $10.
December: Major M. J. Ryan (Battlefield Surveillance: A 'Radar Plus' Approach) $10.



Personnel Management in the Services

Major G. R. R. Mawer
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps

Introduction

THE readiness of the services to meet operational requirements depends on the effective interworking of materiel and manpower. The techniques for dealing with materiel have been perfected into sciences, but the techniques for dealing with men have not been given the same attention and have lagged behind.

For comparison, consider the attention that has been lavished on materiel. We have established many specialized organizations to deal with evaluation and purchasing, design, development and trial, and of course storage, movement, maintenance and accounting. All of this involves not only massive expenditure on equipment itself but also on the ancillary services related to the equipment.

Few would argue that manpower is less important than equipment, and yet we have seen fit to almost completely neglect development

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After National Service in 1957 the author partially completed a university degree in Economics. Enlisting in the Army in 1959 he graduated from OCS and was posted to 2 BOD Singleton (1960-61) (Adj and QM). Service with 1 RTB (1961-63), 1 BOD (1963-64) and OC 1 BOD (Det) Townsville (1964-66) followed. In 1967-68 he served with HQ FARELF, Singapore. In 1968-69 he was an instructor at the RAAOC Centre, Bandiana and his last appointment was Planning Officer 1 COD. Major Mawer resigned from the Army in October 1970 to take up a position with PA Management Consultants and has transferred to the CMF.

in this area. Manpower planning, manpower management, and even manpower training are not controlled or manned by experts, it being generally regarded in the services that man management and training are fundamental attributes of all NCOs and officers. With this basic premise so firmly imbedded it is not surprising that many ill-trained and unsuitable people are employed in areas where potential loss or gain to the organization is so great.

Definitions, Aims and Principles

The areas considered under the heading personnel management are, Recruitment and Selection, All natures of Training and All natures of Administration affecting service conditions, and inter-relation of individuals within the organization.

Personnel management aims to gain greatest organizational efficiency by collaboration and co-operation. This ensures that adequate conditions, wages and amenities are given to attract and hold suitable personnel, and that these personnel gain a high degree of satisfaction together with fair reward and progress related to individual contribution. When this situation is the basis of understanding, and continuing dialogue ensures that it is maintained, then the aims of the individual and of the organization become mutual aims. A number of guiding principles should be applied in order to achieve most efficient use of human resources. We can only effectively examine ourselves against such principles.

The four major principles which apply to personnel management are:

1. *Justice.* A 'square deal' guaranteed by a clearly defined system covering pay, conditions, promotion, incentives and discipline which is fair to all and provides for updating, with maximum participation of the individual in this process.
2. *Personality.* An employee must be treated as an individual with the 'personal' element being kept in 'personnel' matters. Every job is essential and every individual should be able to derive equivalent satisfaction and dignity from his efforts. Service discipline is no different in broad principle from that applying in many other organizations and should not affect normal courtesy and co-operation. Individuals should never feel lost and helpless within an impersonal organization.

3. *Democratic Principle.* This implies the right to a voice in framing rules and regulations, and the usefulness of suggestion schemes and properly applied constructive criticism of management decisions. It includes the right of appeal without prejudice. Decisions must be given in open court and appeals should not be 'to Caesar against Caesar' going to or through people who are directly or indirectly concerned.

4. *Co-operation.* Co-operation in the working process also includes reasonable participation by the individual in determination of conditions and wages. It ensures that the aims of the individual and the aims of the organization become compatible mutual aims.

It is apparent that current dated and rigid service procedures contravene many of the principles basic to effective management. Necessary improvements could be made without weakening the service system and are examined below.

Recruitment and Selection

Recruitment is an undertaking in direct competition with other organizations to attract capable personnel. A low standard of recruitment and selection is inefficient and uneconomical, but the standard of applicant offering will depend on the comparison with alternative job offers. The services suffer three major disadvantages.

The first is that at present, for a number of reasons, the service generally is not highly regarded. The reasons include lack of sympathy with the services in peacetime, the reaction against authoritarianism represented by the services, and a generally lower image of servicemen who have for some reason entered a 'less desirable' profession when 'better' acceptable alternatives were available. If we were to raise our desirability to a level where we could pick and choose between *suitable* applicants then public acceptability would have automatically changed at the same time.

The second disadvantage is that a person can usually get another job if the present one does not suit him. In the services however the individual is tied to what may become an unacceptable situation. Again we can only raise our standards to attract the recruit and to hold him. It should be possible to allow any serviceman to leave at request on three months notice (which gives him a chance to change his mind

if the request is submitted, for example, during rigorous basic training). If the individual seeks to leave because of a fault in the system then that fault must be put right. The worst possible answer (and one which the potential applicant anticipates) is the alternative of simply forcibly holding the serviceman. Certainly we outlay on training costs, but for a man to leave any job he will normally have been given a good reason. Long term bonding of an employee implies lack of faith in the ability to hold him and is unsound in principle.

The third service problem is that competent personnel of the standards we require for NCO and officer potential are scarce. In any market place one cannot buy quality cheaply and we only get what we pay for, bargains being rare. If we want a more effective full strength service then we simply must be more competitive. The situation cannot be changed overnight, but a completely new system properly publicized (not a minor 'in shop' review) would be necessary to present a new image for genuine evaluation by prospective applicants. This must and will happen in the long term, for the survival of the services, but it should not be left until the damage becomes unacceptably severe.

Selection represents a gleam of professionalism in our system of personnel management. Here at least we do have specialists to handle a specialised task. We are protected from accepting the worst of the applicants but we are still left with selection by screening out those who are unsuitable more than selection between many who are suitable. The dearth of applicants is still the problem in this area.

Political aspects do not necessarily assist the situation. Recent local and overseas articles indicate that many expedient decisions such as National Service may never have been fully evaluated. Informed overseas comment in particular contends that direct and indirect costs of National Service, for example, are greater than the costs of improving our conditions to attract a professional full-time service.

Training and Specialization

The function of training is a specialized one but in the services we tend to regard all commissioned and non-commissioned officers as trained in training methods and procedures. Certainly most have some background but usually there is little detailed knowledge and no long specialization. The problem is that we have always wanted the best of both worlds — staff to be both specialists and 'all rounders'. The

result is a rotation of individuals through a series of specializations, often in a haphazard and unplanned manner.

Officers are frequently rotated through many of the fields of operations, quartermaster matters, administration, instructional, and corps specialties in a space of ten or twelve years. They are examined on all of these, and also additional fields in the course of a series of promotion examinations in the same period. Where then is the specialization, the detailed knowledge, the efficient application in any of these individual fields? The answer can only be to provide for more individual specialization over a very limited number of fields, with many of the present aspects being covered only in basic training, and perhaps a short course every few years for background updating.

Career planning is often mentioned but rarely practised. This must become a reality and be made effective by sensible policies of specialization and training. With trained personnel management staff this could be handled efficiently and would avoid the 'sausage machine' approach. Individuals should be aware of the general outline of their career plan, and this outline should have a reasonable degree of flexibility to accommodate individual variations. Individuals could, and should, take up an appointment knowing the probable nature, location and time of the appointment to follow. The introduction of computers to this field to assist the planners would prove as invaluable as it has with equipment, where this aid has now become indispensable.

Promotion and Motivation

Promotion should provide opportunities for betterment within the organization and should be related to the growth in performance, experience and capability of the individual. A promotion system, if properly used, provides both motivation and reward, but if badly used produces many negative results. Where promotion is competitive, an impartial promotions and appeals system is essential if maximum benefit is to be gained.

In the service, our promotion system for other ranks is based on sound concepts but is subject to several faults, which have quite adverse effects. The system is competitive by practical and theoretical examination, with the more important facets controlled centrally to prevent a variation of standards. These aspects are sound. Confidential report forms are, however, self-contradictory and inadequate,

comparison between individuals in different units is inadequate, and the lack of individual information and consequent ability to appeal in relation to these matters is inadequate. The promotion system also ensures that a member who qualifies is almost invariably promoted in the course of time. These aspects are undesirable.

Officer promotion is by qualification, recommendation and time. Any officer capable of obtaining a commission is capable of qualifying. Virtually any officer can reach a minimum standard of application to gain a recommendation. Every officer before gaining promotion then waits for a fixed period of time. A question one may well ask is where is the reward for outstanding application or ability, and where is the incentive to produce anything better than an average performance? Above average individuals are usually required by the system to carry out the more difficult and demanding tasks and may, in material terms, be gaining a lower level of reward than those who are less competent. This promotion system is unsound in principle and produces many negative results. A review of this field is essential as promotion — at least until age 35 — is in essence identical for all individuals, regardless of potential or application.

Command and Administration

We use a line and staff organization with command exercised through a line system whilst special skills are concentrated in staff departments, which in principle advise the line organization. In practice however staff branches take decisions which are binding and there is a tendency to depart from unity of command. Staff branches also develop their own independent hierarchy with channels up and down rather than across. The standards and principles set by branches are unfortunately often established without regard to the effect on other aspects of the service. Co-ordinated control and responsibility is simply not possible with this present system based on historical growth rather than modern and efficient practice.

A complete review of administrative structures and functions is necessary. This should be undertaken by outside experts who can submit a report not biased by vested interests or preconceived ideas. The field is a specialized one and is not appreciably different in the services to outside industry. At this juncture we do not appear to have the capability or machinery within the service to put right even known and agreed problems.

One other major aspect is the lack of development training which we have undertaken in relation to personnel working within staff branches. It is the rule rather than the exception that staff officers have little background in the administrative or logistic decision making fields in which they operate. This is also closely related to earlier comments on specialization, and we certainly do not compare favourably with many well organized industries. With a system which is far from efficient, and staff who are untrained and often unsuited, it is surprising that we continue to operate even at minimum standards.

Conclusions

Personnel management in the service provides rich soil for improvement as it has remained fallow for so long. The principal factors covered indicate the need for urgent review of the system, preferably by an independent international standard organization able to fully evaluate the situation with a view to the introduction of modern practices. This action, together with the development of specialization and expertise in personnel management, would provide the means of obtaining an improved and modern service with better conditions for the personnel who remain our key asset.

If we do not undertake change voluntarily we are likely to be forced to do so by circumstances in a short space of time. The results of delay and then sudden expedient action are likely to be both damaging and inferior. Changes at the Royal Military College could be cited here as a possible example for the future. □

Our Widening Military Doctrine Gap

Colonel Mark M. Boatner III
U.S. Army, Retired

MORE wars have been won by new ideas on the employment of existing weapons and organization than by new weapons. Most of the great captains are famous not for their innovations but for perfecting military concepts and doctrine they inherited. This statement pertains particularly to Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Caesar, Frederick the Great and Napoleon, all of whom stand in the very top ranks of all-time military geniuses.

Now that science and technology can promise almost anything in the way of revolutionary new hardware, the military leader has an embarrassment of riches. This has led him into all kinds of trouble, if we are to believe what the newspapers and Congress are saying. Quite apart from the fact that the public is getting tired of picking up the costly tab for newer and newer weapon systems, we may be actually lowering our military effectiveness by overloading our combat units and higher commanders with innovations they have not learned to use.

This is another way of saying that there is a growing gap between military innovations and the doctrine that enables our forces to use these innovations effectively.

It has also become evident that, although the new process known as 'force development' is supposed to be dictated by concepts and doctrine, this ideal is far from being realized. The military planner was given the task of deciding what the Army wanted in the future, and the research and development people would then undertake to provide the innovations that had been stated as official requirements.

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But the hardware cart continues to pull the horse: scientists, technologists, developers, industrialists and management experts continue to offer the armed forces wonderful new tools they did not know they wanted and for which concepts and doctrine are lacking.

This is the way it always was before the idea of force development was put into effect a few years ago; a new weapon was invented and the military then tried to figure out what to do with it. Nothing would be more foolish than to insist on turning the sequence around immediately and flatly refusing to recognize the existence of any innovation that had not been ordered.

What is truly revolutionary about the military era in which we are living is that science and technology seem able to create almost anything the long-range military planner — the force developer — might think he wants. We almost can order inventions and plot their occurrence on a 'milestone chart'. Furthermore, all this happened during a period of unprecedented economic prosperity and at a time when the public appeared willing to pour unlimited portions of the national treasure into 'national security planning'.

The human mind has lagged in the art of managing its new scientific abundance, and it is in military theory that the soldier has fallen behind the civilian scientists and industrialists he is supposed to be leading in force development. Not only must the military professional assert his leadership in stating military concepts he wants supported by science and technology; he must also face up to the need to teach large numbers of officers and men to employ new materiel effectively.

Let us go back to the statement that new ideas on *employment* are more important than new organizations and new hardware. This is a vital feature of 'doctrine,' one that only the experienced military professional can properly appreciate and one that he must get across to his civilian masters.

France fell so fast in World War II that the brilliance of the German achievement is apt to be overlooked even today. What did the Germans use that was new? 'The German secret weapons were the daring, the speed and the imagination with which they used what they had,' comments a reviewer of two current books on the fall of France in 1940. As for the French, 'military imagination failed them most'.

The Germans took two old weapons — the tank and the airplane — and applied new concepts and doctrine to create the blitzkrieg.

Although the concepts were not fully accepted among the higher German military leaders, they were enthusiastically endorsed by Adolf Hitler and were therefore allowed to be proved.

But the German doctrine supporting these concepts was another matter, and it is to this that the American professional soldier must pay particular attention. The point is quite lost on military amateurs, who simply see the map of France sliced apart by long, curving black arrows. Only the experienced combat veteran can appreciate what is going on within those simple lines on the map. He knows that one arrow kept moving at one particular point because some German platoon leader made a correct decision and crushed an enemy force that otherwise would have stopped his advance. He knows that this platoon leader and his men were more than names on a roster; they were trained soldiers, each a minor weapon system working within a major system, using tools of war that had been in his hands long enough for him to have mastered and following a tactical doctrine that enabled him to function effectively. Multiply this platoon effort many times and all the arrows will move quickly across the map. But years of training were needed to fill the ranks of those platoons with the soldiers of the quality needed for such a military triumph.

Hard as it is to get these military lessons across, they become more comprehensible when put in terms of a spectator sport. Whereas a pro football fan could not fathom why almost any group of soldiers with a little basic training behind them could not have done what the German Army did in France in 1940, he could understand why a championship pro football team would whip a team of college all-stars. The amateur players could match the pros in size, numbers and 'doctrine' in just about any point of comparison. But they would lack the pros' experience in playing together over a long period and under varying conditions.

The example seems childish to anybody who knows anything about American football. Yet when we get into the much more serious game of war we find that military planners brush aside the need for training officers and men in the employment of new techniques and new weapons. 'Training programmes' are included in the development process but in most instances they are little more than familiarization or orientation courses. Returning to the football analogy, this training would be comparable to getting together 11 men of the same size and physical fitness as the pro team, giving them a two-week course of

'intensive training' (have you ever heard of any other kind in our Army?) and expecting them to stand up against the pros. Of course, enough reserves would also be trained to match the depth of the pro club. But how about all the other people who make a football team the institution it has become: scouts, coaches, trainers, spotters, communications men, statisticians and the rest?

When you introduce a new weapon system it is not enough to train the soldiers who will operate and maintain it; you must train the officers who will plan its employment. These leaders not only must learn what the developers can teach them; they must then discover the new system's real capabilities and limitations.

Consider the tank, a revolutionary new weapon when introduced more than half a century ago. However, we still have not worked out a completely satisfactory doctrine on its employment, much less taught our doctrine to all levels of command. Attach a platoon of medium tanks to an infantry company commander for an attack and what would you bet on his following the most fundamental doctrine of armour employment?

How about tactical air support and naval support? Old as the weapons are, there is considerable evidence that ground commanders cannot be trusted to employ them correctly; and by 'correctly' I mean 'in accordance with approved doctrine'. Because of this there could be no true unity of command in U.S. theatres of operations during World War II. Although tanks were recognized as having an infantry-support role and some tanks were attached to infantry units, the Navy and the Air Force flatly refused to allow any appreciable portion of their ships and airplanes to come under the direct command of Army leaders. Why? Primarily because there was no doctrine acceptable to all three services on how they should support each other.

With these doctrinal disputes unresolved more than half a century after introduction of the airplane and the tank into the U.S. armed forces, and centuries after the development of the warship, is it possible to believe that all this revolutionary new weaponry is being absorbed within our armed forces?

These are tremendously complicated weapon systems we are considering, so let's go back into ancient history for a simple illustration of how the military mind formulated doctrine that revolutionized the effectiveness of a simple weapon; the sword. One of man's first weapons was the club, and when science and technology put metal in

the hands of the prehistoric 'force developer' he came up with the sword. The 'doctrine' experts of the day saw no reason why this new weapon should not be wielded in the time-honoured fashion of the club. Presumably they based their training programmes on developing the most powerful swing. But when the Romans came along and started doing some intelligent thinking about tactical doctrine they developed the concept of the short, thrusting sword. Rather than spreading your soldiers out in line to give them enough room for all that swinging and hacking, why not teach them to jab? Creation of the new weapon involved nothing more than what today's developers would call 'product improvement,' but the 22-inch, double-edged Roman short sword revolutionized warfare.

The new weapon had the obvious advantage of higher lethality because a sword thrust does more damage to the human body than a cut and, if the wound is not fatal, it is much more likely to become infected. Time-and-motion studies undoubtedly would prove that the short sword is many times more efficient a killer than the cutting sword. But the big advantage was that the Romans would have many more sword thrusters in a particular stretch of battle line than the enemy had swingers. The swinger faced odds of about three to one, and you can imagine his vulnerability as he wound up a haymaker intended for one of his opponents as all three Romans peered out from behind their rectangular shields looking for an opening.

The most revolutionary military development of the Romans, however, was in tactical organization: creation of the legion. Note that this was the product of professional military thought alone, a brilliant achievement of doctrine without a denarius needed for new weapons or equipment.

I see three principal reasons why development of modern military doctrine is lagging behind hardware development. First, from my experience as chief of the office created in the Pentagon to 'manage doctrine' throughout the Army, I can say that the word 'doctrine' is used by professional soldiers in so many different connotations as to have become virtually meaningless. Next, military concepts and doctrine are in the domain of theory and speculation, where today's busy professional soldier is not at his best. Finally, the formulation of doctrine has become institutionalized.

Doctrine is defined as that which is taught, put forth as true. Note immediately that although gospel is doctrine, military doctrine

should not be taken as gospel in the sense of being absolute truth, much less fact. Doctrine is guidance.

Although it may fall considerably short of infallibility, doctrine nevertheless must be published and widely distributed, for without it an army is only a mob. Military leaders often fail to understand the importance of timeliness in promulgating doctrine; they incline toward delaying its publication too long in misguided efforts to massage it into perfection. In other types of military planning we have long since learned that any fairly good plan, if promptly published and well executed, is preferable to a vastly superior plan that comes out too late or that is poorly executed. We must learn to look on doctrine in precisely the same way.

Doctrine is of no value until it becomes indoctrination. Being defined as something which is *taught*, it cannot truly exist until it has been *learned*. If an inspector wants to investigate whether the Army's higher authorities have properly done their duty of formulating doctrine, his work will have to be in the field and not in the Pentagon's library.

As I have pointed out, officers often use the word doctrine to mean so many different things that the term is apt to become meaningless. When a single office was established to assure that doctrine was co-ordinated, many agencies complained that they could not have somebody else dictating their 'doctrine.' Logistics, air defence, intelligence and almost every other functionally constituted staff office argued that only they were qualified to prescribe their own doctrine.

A useful distinction was therefore created between 'big' and 'little' doctrine. 'Little doctrine' would pertain to procedures and techniques that were best worked out by specialists in certain organizational fields such as intelligence and logistics, to smaller organizational units of the Army and to weapon systems. 'Big doctrine' would have to do with broad areas of operational and organizational concern in which doctrine had to be standardized; it would insure that 'little doctrine' supported the Army as a whole. The dividing line between these two kinds of doctrine cannot be any more accurately drawn than the line between tactics and strategy, but the same sort of useful distinction can nevertheless be made.

The principles of war may be looked on as the crystallization of all doctrine.

How is a military concept distinguished from a doctrine? For our purposes, a concept may be defined as a thought or opinion

(Webster) that evolves into doctrine or that shapes doctrine. Military leaders might formulate the concept, for example, that in any future war all manoeuvre battalions should be air-mechanized. If this seems to be a wild idea, look back into military history and see how long it took military leaders to accept the proposition that trucks could be used in war for other things besides hauling supplies. Starting with the approved concept, all branches of the Army could start formulating suitable doctrine to support the air mechanization. So, although 'concept' sounds vague it gives the general direction that doctrine will take. The 'commander's concept of operations' is, of course, familiar to military men, but 'concept' in the sense just illustrated is strangely lacking in the vocabulary of those who have 'doctrine' on the tip of their tongues.

To get our terms lined up in their proper sequence, concepts breed doctrine, from which techniques and procedures are evolved. The distinctions are meaningless to the man in the fox-hole, but they must be grasped by senior officers whose business it is to develop our armed forces. They must be grasped by civilian officials of the Department of Defense, particularly the scientific and technological people who keep expressing astonishment over the military leader's lack of wild-eyed enthusiasm about the newest proposal to automate the battlefield.

Military concepts and doctrine are in the domain of theory and speculation, where professional soldiers are not distinguished by their performance. We are men of action — doers — not philosophers or pipe-puffing scholars. This is perhaps fortunate in most respects but it also explains why the doctrine gap is widening.

'Technological development is now proceeding at an accelerating rate, but without the guidance it should receive from a reasonably firm philosophic and conceptual foundation,' wrote Brig. Gen. F. P. Henderson, USMC, retired, in a study made for the Radio Corporation of America four years ago.

Military leaders have become so preoccupied with technological solutions that they have neglected their proper business. It may very well be that logistical, intelligence and communications systems are more than adequate, technology having done its job well, but the military leader calls for more, more, more. This is apparent even to the industries that have a selfish interest in heeding this call; the previously quoted RCA study expresses this criticism of military leadership: 'almost all effort continues to be devoted to the physical tools of command [and

control], with very little attention given to the critical examination of the continuing validity of the long-existing concepts, institutions and methods of command'.

One result, for which only military leaders can be blamed, is that field headquarters have become so fat with the people needed to man these new electronic wonders and so heavy with equipment that they are practically immobilized. Command and communications troops account for almost 20 per cent of the total strength of the ROAD division. Additional capability of military communications systems becomes overloaded as fast as it is created. Look at the unimportant and verbose messages that constitute the bulk of this traffic and you will see what the military expert should be doing instead of his calling for greater communications capacity.

Technology has been called on to solve many other military problems that should have been solved by better doctrine. Instead of training our men to fight at night, we ask science and technology to turn night into day by giving us expensive illumination and night vision devices. Instead of reducing logistical wastage, we demand greater logistical capacity. Instead of attacking the human weaknesses in the decision-making process, we buy more computers and contract for more studies.

Technology has done all it can for us until we close the doctrine gap. This means that new hardware cannot be used until we develop the software to handle it, and by software I mean the military brains.

Realizing that existing procedures were failing to furnish the creative thought needed to develop military forces in the era of scientific and technological explosion, the Army reorganized several years ago. The Combat Developments Command (CDC) and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) were created. Within the Army Staff the old G3 function of operations and training was split, a new agency being created to deal with 'force development' and designated OACSFOR (Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development). Some time later the Army chief of staff saw the need for a single office to pull together all matters pertaining to Army doctrine — 'big doctrine' — and a Concepts and Doctrine Division was created within the OACSFOR.

Enough time has now passed to say that the organizational solution has not narrowed the doctrine gap. The Army Materiel Command met the Army's materiel requirements; the flow of hardware continued.

But the Army has not reached the ideal of developing concepts, doctrine and sound materiel requirements to give it the hardware it should have. The Combat Developments Command was quickly swamped with more requirements for studies than it could handle. The OACSFOR was caught up in day-to-day business from which it was supposed to be relieved when the G3 eagle was split. The Concepts and Doctrine Division found itself formulating instant doctrine in response to urgent demands arising in accordance with Parkinson's Law, and the new office was soon immersed in duties quite alien to those it was created to handle. Tighter centralization of doctrine had the adverse effect of causing field commanders to pass doctrinal problems to the Army Staff and CDC that they should have solved themselves. AMC could not wait for CDC to develop doctrine and therefore had to do it itself.

In other words, the formulation of doctrine has become 'institutionalized', as the cultural anthropologists use the term. An institution has two main elements: function (for example, education) and form (a school). It becomes institutionalized when it gets so involved with form that it fails to perform its function.

I have attempted to explain what military doctrine is and why it is vitally important. Because the military profession tends to be 'hardware oriented' I have stressed that we should become more 'doctrine oriented' and that more can be done with military brainpower than with expanded research and development and production capacity for materiel. I have lightly touched the nerve of institutionalization and indicated that reorganization has not solved the problem of getting the hardware cart back behind the concepts-and-doctrine horse. Affluence and centralization of authority have widened the doctrine gap rather than narrowing it. Military effectiveness has been dangerously lowered rather than raised by the super-abundance of new procedures and new materiel showered on units in the field.

What is the solution?

There is no quick, painless way to straighten out problems that have been growing through the years. If you want a magic solution you would have to start by finding a military genius to be secretary of defense and giving him a free rein for several years.

His first step should be to freeze all key assignments within the Department of Defense, prohibit any reorganization and to inform all personnel to get out their office charters and job descriptions and to start doing what they had been told to do.

Overstaffing would be solved by attrition and replacements would be provided by moving existing staff people up the ladder within their own offices and commands. The purpose of this job stabilization, if it is necessary to explain it, is to make people make the existing system work. Maybe it is unworkable, but who knows? Nobody has ever really tried.

Assignments would be frozen within field commands for the same reason, and the flow of new materiel and procedures would be virtually halted.

A series of strategic movements and field exercises within the United States would be started within a reasonable period and continued indefinitely. The immediate purpose would be to find out how much of the stuff now loaded onto field units could be moved and maintained in working order for any protracted period. The ultimate purpose would be to test doctrine, leadership and materiel at all echelons, just as a war would do, but without killing people and furnishing the enemy with our abandoned materiel.

No matter how miserably a leader failed initially he would be forced to stay in his assignment and do the best he could. For one thing, this would force his superiors to practise the art of developing leaders rather than requisitioning them.

If we really would like to see what kind of an army we have developed since World War II, with all the resources put at our disposal by a booming economy and a technological explosion, we would simulate a war. We would test *results* of our past work before continuing to charge onward in what may be the wrong direction. Among the features of personnel doctrine I would particularly like to see tested long enough to give valid results would be the short tour, the inflated staff and the phrenetic style of management. I suspect our career management policies have developed an officer corps of sprinters instead of the distance runners we might need in a war.

It would take a military genius in the position of secretary of defense to assure that these tests were conducted honestly and that the results were evaluated correctly. He would have to be a man of rare patriotism and be dedicated to forming an effective defense establishment — a kind of Cincinnatus who would use his dictatorial powers for the national good and then return to his farm.

A major source of funds for these field exercises would accrue from savings in studies and travel. Civilian and military staff officers

would not be permitted to take to the field in droves to observe our simulated war until the units in the field had been given time to start solving their own problems. They would stay in Washington, catch up on their work and sweat over how the field commanders were making out with all the innovations the Department of Defense had given them to use.

As for the study programme, officials would be forced to start studying their own problems. The men responsible for making decisions would form the study groups believed necessary to assemble the information and make the recommendations for these decisions. This would not only eliminate most of the criticism of the study programmes as they have been conducted in the past; but it would almost automatically eliminate unnecessary studies.

In line with the basic concept in this simulated national emergency, the Combat Developments Command and its 30-or-so institutes would have their charters and personnel frozen. Most of the funds for contract studies and travel would also be frozen, and they would be given no new tasks.

With such an approach it would take about three years for everybody to catch up with his work and start doing his job properly. After this time it should be possible to see how much of our existing doctrine is valid because it works, how much of it is not valid and how it should be corrected.

If any major reorganization of the U.S. military institution proves to be required after this test there should be a series of inquiries to fix the blame on the people responsible for it. We should approach this investigation exactly as if we had had these deficiencies revealed during a war. It would be announced that after the next major reorganization, personnel would once more be frozen in their assignments and the entire procedure repeated.

If the simulated war proved that our doctrine was fundamentally sound (as we have been chanting for years), there would be no changes made. Personnel would be rotated, and the secretary of defense would announce that tests of this same nature would be repeated periodically in future years.

It is a military chestnut that at the beginning of every war we 'throw away the book'. This is supposed to be a humorous observation, but it means that we admit failure in the field of doctrine. It is no

excuse to say that our doctrine proved to be 'fundamentally sound'; it does not matter whether 'the book' was thrown away because it was no good or because it had not been taught well enough. Publication of doctrine is merely one step in its evolution; it does not actually exist until it has been taught and learned at all echelons where it is needed. □

BASIC PRINCIPLE

In the matter of providing forces the Ministers and some of their advisers took an unduly long time to realise the basic principle that a nation which desires to possess effective military strength when it is most needed must produce its own military equipment. If it decides to buy or borrow its armaments from another nation it may find that such equipment is not available when most wanted. A nation which is dependent on another nation for basic military equipment is likely to find itself militarily a satellite of that country.

—Gavin Long, *The Final Campaigns* (1963).

The Chaplain in the Service of the Soldier

Senior Chaplain J. Hughes. ED
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IN the year 1815 the British War Office put into circulation throughout the Army a publication called *The Soldier's Account Book.* To all intents and purposes it was that most precious possession of an enlisted man — his paybook. On the sample forms accompanying this awesome publication the name of 'Thomas Atkins' appeared, used solely by way of illustration, and bearing no relation or reference to persons alive or dead. But from 31 August 1815, to the advent of the Americans, who preferred the label 'Brits', the United Kingdom's soldier, as far as the British Army's nomenclature was concerned, was 'Tommy'.

Rudyard Kipling wasn't slow to attach the name 'Tommy' to one of his many poems based on a great deal of experience with the British Raj in India.

> For it's Tommy this and Tommy that, an 'Chuck 'im out, the brute'
> But it's Saviour of his Country' when the guns begin to shoot!
> Then it's 'Tommy this' and 'Tommy that' and 'Tommy 'ow's yer soul?'
> But it's 'thin red line of 'eroes' when the drums begin to roll!
>
> We ain't no thin red 'eroes, nor we aren't no blackguards too,
> But single men in barricks, most remarkable like you.
> And if sometimes our conduck isn't all your fancy paints,
> Why, single men in barricks don't grow into plaster saints!

Submit Kipling's 19th Century doggerel to a 1971 behavioural scientist, and he would lose no time in distilling from this mixed brew most of the presuppositions surrounding the trade of the soldier — the prejudices and hypocrisies, consciously and unconsciously present in the

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attitudes of the community; the pressures and perils, both external and internal, in the life of the soldier; the glaring inconsistencies and the significant tensions experienced by the man in uniform.

Religion comes into Kipling's doggerel also, you will observe — 'Tommy, 'ow's yer soul?' But this spiritual solicitude is soon overwhelmed by the ghastly demands of armed combat. Tommy recoils in fury before any attempt to view him either as hero or saint. He denies, or seems to deny, that he belongs to any other order or type but that of normal human being. And pleads with the world not to forget it.

Perhaps Tommy recognizes the deep truth of which Francis Quarles spoke:

> Our God and soldier we alike adore
> When at the brink of ruin, not before,
> After deliverance, both alike requited,
> Our God forgotten and our soldiers slighted.

What is the chaplain doing in all this? The illusions, the prejudices, the hypocrisies, the contradictions? What's he doing mixed up with war? I believe it is a fair question. Within the minds of many ministers it is clearly a puzzling contentious question.

I would not be surprised if some of the world-wide uncertainties regarding the role of minister in today's church situation are not also spilling over, as it were, into the area of military or service chaplaincy. Not long ago a prominent minister in Melbourne loudly denounced from his pulpit the anachronism of the Army chaplain. (*Herald* 29 May 1970).

'WRONG TO PUT THE PADRE IN UNIFORM'

'By becoming members of the Armed Services, ranks, and ribbons and all, they are identifying the Church with the military system to a degree beyond that to which the Church is prepared to go in its official pronouncements.

'They commit a non-committal Church to an endorsement of the Military System. Being both ordained ministers of the Church and inducted Officers of the Armed Services, they are the Church's living *imprimatur* upon the military.'

The Reverend Bruce Silverwood's objection appears to be against the uniform. His counsel to us all is:

'Let ministers and priests, who are so inclined, be chaplains to servicemen and women, but let them be, as they are in hospitals and

factories, civilian ministers and priests, who go to a place where there are people to serve, without identifying themselves with the institution to which these people belong'.

He got a reply, of course, in 'Letters to the Editor' of 2 June 1970 from no less a person than Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell, a paragraph of which read:

'The history of the RAA ChD has names like Booth, Riley, Rentoul, McCarthy, McKie and many others, including that redoubtable band of chaplains that the Salvation Army has given the services. All these men experienced the greatest devotion and loyalty from the men they served. They were simple and uncomplicated people who set no great store on trappings of rank, who could see no conflict between the teaching of the Church and the demands of a chaplain, and who abhorred pettyfogging doctrines. They saw their task clearly and didn't need to have it spelled out in some abstruse formula'.

What that task was, and is, should have been clear to Reverend Silverwood if he had stopped to remember what he was told by a senior chaplain of Southern Command whom he consulted in his perplexity.

This senior chaplain said: 'There are men and women in the Armed Services sometimes with their families. Some are there by their free choice, others are there by conscription. Some ministers and priests have a gift for working with people in that situation, just as others have a gift for working with people in suburban churches or factories or schools or prisons. They may be belligerent or pacifist. That's not the point. The point is that their calling is to work with people as priests or pastors, and that they can work well with people in that situation.'

Personally, I would have liked to put the rationale of the chaplain in a more positive theological setting. I should like to assure any man who enquires 'Why a chaplain in the Army? ', that the padre has but one justification for his role, and that is found in the compassion of Christ. As long as there are men and women broken and lost in body, mind or soul, there, in Christ's name, will the Army chaplain seek to minister to them.

I would hesitate to claim that such an answer settled finally the complex implications inherent within Army chaplaincy. But the authentic padre will hold out his hand and his heart to soldiers simply because they are men in need, 'most remarkable like ourselves' as

Kipling's soldier perceived. And, in a sense, his ministry is no more concerned, in the primary meaning, with the issues of pacifism or patriotism, than the practical help of the Good Samaritan had to wait upon the theological verdicts of the Jerusalem Sanhedrin before becoming effective.

Now, how shall the authentic padre serve the soldier? The Apostle Paul claimed, rather immodestly we fear, that he 'became all things to all men'. If the chaplain follows literally this example he must, in dealing with Army personnel, find himself in some peculiar circumstances indeed. The chaplain can be some things to some men; doubtful it is that he can be all things to all men.

The Soldier's Privacy — Respect It

I place this number one on a padre's list of 'musts' in dealing with army personnel, because there are few objects more irritating than an interfering chaplain.

The fact that a man is a citizen and does not sacrifice his basic rights as a citizen is uppermost in nearly all official military writing. This being so, he is entitled to the sanctity of his home life, his family life, his private life. If the Dig really wants you to know, he will tell you, but not before he subjects you to his own particular evaluations with regard to your integrity as a man and a chaplain, specifically in that order.

The unique relationship which only the trusted chaplain enjoys with the troops is a confidence born of mutual respect. I know when Sir Arthur McIlveen, the beloved Salvation Army padre, was made a knight, the Rats of Tobruk Associations around Australia were ecstatic in their congratulations. Their joy and pride in him in verse and vocal tribute was as generous as it was uncensored. He was a man who knew how to keep his own counsel, to act in the function of a real shepherd of souls, but to push no doors of confidence and trust open until they had been opened from within.

The Soldier's Duty — Support It

'Duty then is the sublimest word in our language. Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more. You should never wish to do less.'

This inscription, which is attached to the likeness of Robert E. Lee in Washington's Hall of Fame, has probably been defaced by now

by some anti-establishment protest marcher. It may be a 'dirty word' in the minds of some, but it is a concept with which, as the services well know, it is dangerous to tamper.

Every person within the Army has to face and formulate his own attitude to whatever responsibilities constitute his particular and individual duty. One of the miracles you will frequently witness is the alcoholically inert wreck of the night before transformed into a reasonably alert soldier on the 'morning after' Parade, ready to grasp with determined, if somewhat trembling hand, the duties of the day.

It is a wise chaplain who realizes right from the start that the Army listens to reasons, but turns an ear totally deaf to excuses. He is an even wiser chaplain who thoroughly supports experienced regimental commanders at all levels, and offers no comfort to the wily soldier who tries to exploit the chaplain's influence or position for his own unworthy ends.

Regimental commanders, who exercise their functions only at the price of accepting full responsibility for all their words and actions, are usually thoroughly glad to work with the chaplain who knows, and accepts, the lines of demarcation which detail the spheres and function of both commanders and chaplains.

By and large, ministers have a bad reputation with social workers, as far as the civilian community is concerned. Ministers have a bad reputation because of the imbalance of their real desire to help people; their sympathies and their compassions outweighing the very necessary caution and checking when any hard luck story personifies itself in front of them.

This situation is magnified a thousand times in the Army. Let the chaplain, therefore, determine that he will offer neither aid nor comfort to the man who is trying to dodge his duty and, at the same time, is bereft of any good reason why he cannot do his job.

The Soldier's Family — Care For It

Occasionally I am asked by groups outside the Army to speak about the work of our department. I am assured that people who hear of the organization and personnel set aside to aid the welfare of soldiers' families are astonished that such detailed organization and supervision should be available.

The 'Family Liaison Organization' is a clear illustration of the caring responsibilities undertaken. Chaplains of this command who have worked with Major Cruickshank (better known as FLO) over the years are highly appreciative of her tremendous labours for the welfare of wives and children of serving members. She brings to her duty, devotion, diligence and dedication. I am amazed at the trouble she takes in dealing with all manner of difficult people and circumstances.

The Army depends upon this department very much for specialist assistance. Not always are CMF padres able to resolve easily the tensions created by an ever increasing responsibility in this area of family welfare, and the demands of his local church and parish. But we can be very certain that the soldier on overseas service is deeply grateful for visits that are made.

It helps enormously to know that personal problems arising from separation anxieties can be helped by trained people on the spot. Here surely is an area of human need where the capacities, training, and experience of a pastor can find effective expression.

The Soldier's Need — Analyse It

I believe the verb I have used is valid. 'Analysis' is called for in dealing with the problems of a soldier. The life he is called upon to lead is a life within a very unnatural context. He must learn to adjust himself to camp life, to training courses, to frequent movement and changes. Upon Army marriages quite distinctive stresses are placed, not least of which are those arising from the unsettling effects of frequent postings. Many a married couple have known but a few years actually being together in one place under one roof in a pattern of many years of Regular Service.

Overseas service may bring some extra financial increments but if the man is in battle areas or remote from mailing facilities, such an uncertain, unknown, unpredictable situation imposes strains for which many a bride has never bargained.

The needs of a soldier are complex and multiple. The chaplain as counsellor can help him recognize both the nature and the priority of these needs and, as far as possible out of his own experience and right of access to specific forms of help, can be of utmost aid to the man.

Most of a soldier's needs affecting his physical welfare can be met by the existing Army structure. Yet, for all the official channels that do exist, it is still useful for a chaplain to arm himself with outlines of rehabilitation and repatriation benefits and procedures. The same applies to educational and domestic benefits available. It's surprising how many soldiers complain that they just did not know such and such a solution to their problem was possible. Not so surprising however, when so little of the administrative structure ever impacts upon the private soldier's awareness — sometimes, we fear due to the thickness of his skull, sometimes because he is never involved during his Army career with anything beyond his own immediate interests.

Personal needs are something again, and these will range through the entire spectrum of family problems to difficulties arising from his own capacity to meet the demands laid upon him. Most of the compassionate cases the Army deals with have a considerable percentage of problems arising from inadequacies within the personality of the soldier or his home folks. None of the various forms of irresponsibility encountered, financial, sexual, domestic or military, should ever cause the lifting of ecclesiastical eyebrows. Like a worthy medical officer, we are called to accept men as they are for what they are.

Moral and spiritual needs can and must be met. Actual fighting in battle areas shatters a merely theoretical religion. When men face danger and death, deepest questionings are in their minds. There is no context where the worthiness of conventional religion is exploded by stark realities, as in combat experience.

Padre Studdert Kennedy's book, *Lies,* which ran through eighteen reprints from 1919 to 1937, reflects a traumatic experience this magnificent chaplain had in the trenches of Flanders and, while his words refer to World War I, none of the relevance has been expunged by any subsequent military struggle. Kennedy's words almost ignite the pages on which they are written.

'Once for all', writes Woodbine Willie, 'let me state here my conviction that War is pure undiluted filthy sin. I don't believe that it has ever redeemed a single soul — or ever will. Exceptional souls have found their glory in it and have let it shine before men, but the War only brought it to light, it did not make it. The only power that War possesses is the only power that any evil thing possesses, which is the power to destroy itself. If this World Wide War has done us any good, it is because in its flames a certain number of old and soul-killing lies

have perished self-destroyed. In the blood, the mud and the stench of the battlefield, they worked themselves out to their final absurdity, while the guns roared laughter from behind. Often and often the 8-inch guns have seemed to me to yell out above the rattle of the barrage, 'You fools, you fools!' From the bottom of my heart, I believe that this work of destruction, however painful it may be, must be accomplished to the bitter end to lead the children of our generation to the worship of the true God.'

The bitter irony of history and the nature of unregenerate mankind has seen to it that his generation's children were plunged into an even more diabolical war, the title of which, 'World War II', is comment enough. And that their children are entangled in the military morass of South-East Asia.

Maybe a chaplain who published such searing views as 'Woodbine Willie', would be soothed and sedated by an RMO and told that he would feel better for a rest. But basic reactions in the minds and souls of men are the same in Vietnam as they were in Tobruk or Passchendaele. Men turn to the padre on active service for some sort of answer to these inbuilt, appalling calamities and contradictions. There is a voice that cries:

> Prepare a road for the Lord through the wilderness,
> Clear a highway across the desert for our God.
> Every valley shall be lifted up; every mountain and
> hill brought down.
> Rugged places shall be made smooth
> And mountain ranges become a plain.
> Thus shall the glory of the Lord be revealed,
> and all mankind together shall see
> for the Lord himself has spoken.

How mighty is the ministry of the chaplain who can take the spiritual bruises and burdens of soldiers upon his own heart and translate Isaiah's vision into meaningful consolation, hope and understanding.

The Soldier's Gratitude — Be Grateful For It

George MacDonald said, 'To receive honestly is the best thanks for a good thing.' And as far as my experience goes, 'privilege' is the uppermost word in a chaplain's mind whenever he tries to assess the meaning of his ministry.

To be in the service of the soldier of all ranks and under all conditions is both arduous and exacting. No man is spared from the temptation to believe, at times, that it is a singularly thankless task. No

diagnosis is more erroneous, in the wider view, because it is for the chaplain that men reserve their own specific emotion of love and respect.

General Rowell, in that same letter that I have previously quoted, included these two comments:

'Many a battalion commander will freely acknowledge that his two best officers from the aspect of the morale of their units have been a good chaplain and a good doctor.' He adds:

'I suppose my special example of devotion in a chaplain would not commend itself to Mr Silverwood. I was not very far away from the scene on Gallipoli in 1915 when Andrew Gillison, his unit being under the gravest pressure. threw away the brassards he usually wore, took up a rifle with which he was an expert shot, and gave to the 14th Battalion the service that was to cost him his life.

'On re-reading Mr Silverwood's article, I wonder whether he was writing with his tongue in his cheek and was merely using the Chaplain's Department as a whip with which to beat the Churches into coming out for a stronger policy against any type of War. If this is so, I can only be sorry that he has chosen such a noble service as his medium.'

And, it is a noble medium isn't it? For all the shortcomings inseparable from the frailties of our human natures, the men of the past and present who are God's servants in uniform know that it is their calling and opportunity to serve that ennobles the RAA ChD.

And when the Dig slides up to you as though he was going to sell you a dubious postcard, and to your surprise mutters, 'Thanks Pard', what you do is accept the dignity and honour he is affording you. With a grin, answer him, 'She's right mate' and walk away with a sense of wonder and thanksgiving in your heart, that God should give to you and I a freedom to be a chaplain in the service of the soldier at home and on active service. □

LEADERSHIP

& the Australian Army Officer

Major W. L. H. Smith
Royal Australian Infantry

Introduction

NOMINALLY the Australian Army places great stress on leadership qualities in the selection, training and professional advancement of its officers. Evidence to this effect is the importance accorded leadership qualities in officer candidate selection, the teaching of leadership theory at RMC, OCS and OTU and the requirement to assess and report on an officer's leadership ability annually in his Confidential Report.

On the surface it would appear that Australian Army officers fully understand the importance of cultivating and maintaining high standards of leadership and are well equipped to gauge and implement this requirement. Yet is this really the situation today? A closer examination of the system of leadership training reveals considerable cause for doubt.

First, the one and only prescribed textbook for teaching leadership in officer schools is the outdated Military Training Pamphlet, *Leadership* (Provisional) 1957, which does not take into account the findings of modern psychological research into the complex phenomenon of leader-

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Major Smith graduated from OCS in 1956 and was posted to 16 NS Trg Bn as a platoon commander. From 1958 to 1963 he was platoon commander and assistant adjutant with 2RAR, in Australia and Malaya. A period as instructor at OCS followed and he became Adjt MUR in late 1965. As a company commander with 9RAR (1967-69) he saw service in South Vietnam followed by a period as GSO2 (SD) HQ AFV. Major Smith attended Staff College, Queenscliff in 1970 and at present is attached to HQ Field Force Command, Auckland, New Zealand.

ship. The only guide for post graduate assessment or guidance is *ATI* 3-1 which is most vague and undemanding of officers in the application of leadership training. In fact no cohesive or progressive leadership training is given officers to fit them for future appointments or ranks.

Before the validity and importance of this criticism can be evaluated it is essential to try to understand and define leadership generally and military leadership in particular.

Leadership Theory

Defining leadership is no simple task as there are as many views on its function as there are researchers and writers on the subject. According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* (Fifth Edition), it is: 'the ability to lead; the dignity of office or position of a leader'. All authorities accept the basic premise that leadership is a phenomenon of group behaviour and that it involves the influence that the leader of the group exerts on the remainder of the group. What they don't seem to be able to agree upon is the cause of leadership or the factors involved in creating it. The following quotations serve to illustrate this diversity of opinion.

Cecil Gibb, an eminent Australian psychologist and acknowledged world authority on the subject, terms it: 'A function of personality and of the social situation, and of these two in inter-action.'[1] Prominent American social scientist C. L. Shartle adopts the view that a leadership act, 'is one which results in others acting or responding in a shared direction. Leadership therefore is judged in terms of what others do'.[2] Harry Truman characteristically phrased it in his own terse style when he said that: 'A leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don't want to do, and like it.'[3] Joseph Olmsted, another American researcher, expressed it a little more dramatically when he termed it as, 'a type of highly personal, inspirational relationship between leader and followers'.[4]

Throughout the ages military commanders have not been averse to penning their own definitions on what constitutes leadership. These range from the succinct edict of Sir Ralph Hopton in 1643 — 'Pay well, command well, hang well,'[5] to that of Marshal Foch — 'That gift of

[1] Cecil A. Gibb, 'Leadership', *Handbook of Psychology*. (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1959) p 917.

[2] C. L. Shartle, *Executive Performance and Leadership*, (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1958) p. 392.

[3] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, 1955.*

[4] J. A. Olmsted, 'The Skills of Leadership', *Military Review*, March 1967, p. 62.

[5] Sir Ralph Hopton, *Maxims for Management of an Army*, 1643.

command which can still animate the troops at the last stage of exhaustion.'[6]

Perhaps the most representative of the military leaders' opinions and that most suited for inclusion in this paper, is that of Sir William Slim who expressed leadership as 'that combination of persuasion, compulsion and example which makes men do what you want them to do.'[7] The official definition for the Australian Army is that contained in *Leadership*. It reads— 'The art of influencing and directing men to an assigned goal in such a way as to obtain their obedience, confidence, respect and loyal co-operation.'[8]

To quote the many more eminent and reputable civil and military authors' definitions would only serve to highlight the obvious fact that there is no unanimity of thought among them as to what actually causes this unique inter-play between men.

The second conclusion to be drawn from examining these definitions is the difficulty of defining leadership in quantitative terms. If we accept Gibbs' definition, what is the formula for determining what percentage is personality and how much is social situation? How do we measure Olmsted's 'highly inspirational relationship between leader and led', and what scale does Shartle use to judge leaders in terms of what others do? Similarly, if it is basically a personality function as Truman, Foch, Hopton and Slim suggest, how do we teach it as an art as suggested by our official textbook?

The formulation of each of these theories can be attributed to whatever factor the author considers to be most instrumental in governing the leadership function.

Authors like Slim, Foch, Truman and Olmsted could be classified as proponents of the theory that leadership capacity is a product of personality. This being so, it follows that all that is required of an organization is to determine those traits of personality required of prospective leaders within the organization and then select candidates who appear to possess the required traits. This is largely the yardstick used by armies throughout the world and each has its own set of leadership qualities or traits. The list of desired essential officer qualities varies between nations to the same degree as the desired list of principles of war and shall not be debated here.

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[6] Ferdinand Foch, *Precepts*, 1919

[7] Field Marshal Sir William Slim, *Courage and Other Broadcasts* (Cassell and Company, London) 1957 p. 38.

[8] *Leadership* (Provisional) 1957, (AHQ Melbourne), p. 5.

The salient point of the personality traits school of thought is that certain people are blessed with leadership qualities and, correctly trained to apply their capacity, they will provide leadership within their assigned group under all circumstances. Although the *Leadership* pamphlet rejects the hereditary leader concept it does advocate the need for officers to develop prescribed personality characteristics.[9] Officer function in most armies is based on this premise, yet how valid is it?

As a result of his research Gibb concluded that 'there are indicators that certain traits such as intelligence, surgency, dominance, self-confidence and social participation are frequently found to characterise leaders of various types in a variety of situations.'[10] He adds further weight to the personality factor when he states, 'there is every reason to believe that member personalities do make a difference to group performance and that they affect that aspect of group behaviour to which the leadership concept applies'.

There is however a growing body of psychological opinion which claims that it is not yet possible to determine leadership traits even if leadership is a personality function. J. P. Guilford makes the point that, 'while various leadership studies have produced various dimensions of traits, the assumption of a leadership syndrome or leader type has been called futile. No consistent pattern of traits has emerged'.[11] As a result of his Ohio State University tests in 1958, Shartle concluded that 'we still cannot say that there is an *élite* body of men destined for leadership regardless of the organizational circumstances in which they find themselves'.[12]

While the 'Great Man' theory, long advocated by Western society, appears to be going out of vogue it is not surprising that it stayed with us so long. After all, the intellectual *élite* in society has, for the most part, come from privileged social groups. 'Since this *élite* has in the past written most about leadership, we should expect that most writers would have sought to show natively determined characteristics as responsible for the occupancy of leadership regions.'[13] This aspect will be amplified in relation to military leader selections elsewhere in this paper.

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[9] *Leadership*, p. 27.

[10] Gibb, p. 916.

[11] J. P. Guilford, *Personality* (McGraw Hill, N. Y.) 1959, p. 470.

[12] Shartle, p. 392.

[13] Cooper and McGaugh 'Interaction Theory', *Leadership* (Penguin) 1969, p. 247.

From this divergence of research opinion it can be assumed therefore that the validity of the personality traits factor in assessing leadership is dependent upon there being a consistent commonality of traits in those in leadership positions. As has been shown, there is learned doubt that such commonality has been proven.

The second concept of what constitutes or produces leadership is termed the Situational Theory. This is a more general concept embracing all factors within a total setting. In other words, the leadership produced is determined by such things as the physical setting, the social situation, the nature of the task or problem and the working environment. This implies that different sets of circumstances require different types of leadership and that it will be the dictates of the task and the structure of the organization that will determine the leadership requirement rather than the personality of the man in charge.

For instance, within the groups which habitually or characteristically operate in crisis situations a certain pattern of leadership is exhibited. The designated leader of such groups is in a fixed position of authority and his followers are trained and disciplined to react promptly and without discussion. Examples of such leadership (often termed headship) can be found in rifle platoons, fire brigades, ships' crews and operating theatre teams. A different type of leadership would be required in organizations where members of the group are required to share in the leadership function or to evaluate or question the tasks assigned by the leader. Examples of this are Staff Colleges and laboratory research establishments where, in both cases, there is more than one correct solution to a problem posed.

To test the situational leadership theory Ohio State University researchers carried out an interesting study on a small group of United States naval officers. They concluded from their tests that an officer's leadership performance in a given job can be predicted by his performance in his previous job and by his predecessor's performance in the given job. This led Shartle to the observation 'that less than half of an officer's leadership performance could be ascribed to the man and a little over half to the demands of the job'.[14]

This could logically be developed into a theory that the job tends to determine the leadership requirement rather than either the individual or the organization. Thus the number of leadership options open to say a battalion commander, who spends most of his time in decision making and co-ordination, are limited purely by the demands of his

[14] Shartle, p. 94.

job. From personal experience gained by serving under a number of battalion commanders, this approach is a little difficult to accept. There is however much to recommend in the situational theory. Reaction type organizations such as the services and other para-military forces require authoritarian leaders if they are to function effectively. This fact does tend to make the leadership requirement in these organizations distinctive and situational because of the nature of their tasks and the hierarchical structure of their organization.

The third approach to the problem of explaining the phenomenon is called Functional Leadership. This method combines both the personality and situational factors discussed and adds a third determinant called 'group needs'.

In his book, *Training for Leadership*, [15] John Adair explains group needs in terms of objectives which all corporate entities or social organisms strive to fulfil. He starts by making the observation that each working group develops a distinctive corporate life, different from others even in the same organization, which he calls a 'group personality'. However, despite their distinctive personalities, each working group shares certain common needs, the first of which is to achieve the common task. In order to achieve this end the group must work as a cohesive team and this requirement gives rise to written or unwritten, formulated or unconscious rules for members designed to promote and maintain this unity. This need is called the team-maintenance need. The last need, according to the theory, is that of the individual members of the group who each satisfy, or fail to satisfy, their personal physical, social and vocational needs by participating in the group.

According to the functional approach the personality of the designated leader in turn influences the group needs and the inter-action of the two produces the group personality. The type of leadership produced is then largely determined by the situation under which the group operates. Functional leadership is therefore a product of the inter-action of leader personality, group needs and situation.

These then are the commonly accepted theories on the factors which constitute leadership. What conclusions can be drawn from the evidence available to date to explain just what leadership is and does?

The first conclusion would appear to be the importance of the personality of the leader. There is evidence to suggest a certain commonality of personality traits among those in leadership positions, but

[15] John Adair, *Training for Leadership* (MacDonald, London) 1968.

the reliability of using this pattern as a sole guide in determining leadership potential is at least questionable. The point is that all schools of thought would appear to agree that the personality of the designated leader does affect and influence the attitudes and needs of the followers in the group.

A second conclusion appears to be that leadership functions vary according to the nature of an organization and that leaders within an organization function according to the level and demands of their roles within the organization. Similarly, the type of leadership required or expected is dependent upon the situation in which it operates.

The most valid conclusion, and unfortunately the most unsatisfying one, is clearly that no one has yet produced a satisfactory theoretical formula to explain what constitutes leadership. However, what is important, and this is the aspect most concerning social scientists today, is the work being done to measure the influence of the variables which are known to be involved in the process. These would seem to be: (1) the personality of the leader, (2) the followers with their attitudes, needs and problem, (3) the group itself, and (4) the situations as determined by physical setting, nature of task and the like. From an Army aspect this implies teaching officers the importance of these four aspects both theoretically and when related to a military setting, in order to most effectively utilize their leadership capabilities under varying circumstances.

The question then becomes one of whether or not our sole official guide to leadership, the 1957 pamphlet, does in fact fulfil this requirement? In the first instance it rejects the hereditary personality traits philosophy and suggests the development of a set of desirable personality characteristics.[16] So it would seem that it accords great importance to developing desirable traits in designated leaders, although how an officer is to develop intelligence along with loyalty, honour and responsibility is never explained.

The individual social and physical needs of the followers are briefly covered,[17] but not the importance of satisfying group needs. It does recognize the situational factor as a determinant in leadership behaviour, both in the nature of the task[18] and the category of appointment held within the organization.[19]

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[16] *Leadership* pp. 6, 26, 27.
[17] *Leadership*, pp. 10-11.
[18] *Leadership*, p. 7.
[19] *Leadership*, p. 8.

What it does not do, in the opinion of the author, is stress the importance of the personality of the leader upon the group, nor does it highlight how the inter-action of the three variables — leader, group needs and situation — will produce entirely different leadership problems and styles. This fact must be realized by officers if they are to learn how to adapt and apply their leadership function to meet the constantly changing settings and groups that they will encounter in their careers.

This criticism will be linked with those contained in the next section on military leadership and presented in the training segment as a suggested new approach to the military leadership problem.

Military Leadership Requirement

The application of leadership within the armed forces is a complex and interesting study; first, because it must be exercised within the confines of an authoritarian command structure; secondly, because the Army is a large multi-levelled organization offering opportunities for a wide range of situational influences and, thirdly, because the leaders must come from within the system itself.

An Army officer is uniquely placed in regard to power and influence over his subordinates in rank. By virtue of the command system which operates in this formal hierarchy, he is a designated leader by law. This type of leadership has been termed headship in so far as the leader is appointed from outside the group and is a designated leader rather than one elected or chosen from within the group by virtue of his group stature.

At this point it becomes necessary to examine command in relation to leadership. According to *Leadership,* command may be defined as 'the authority which an individual in the Services lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of his rank and posting. The exercise of this command is supported by the code of discipline provided in Military Law'.[20] Stated more simply, an officer has the power to order non-officers to do tasks and, provided he does not contravene the code of military law, to punish them if they do not obey. The merit or otherwise of such a command system will not be debated here but it is unlikely that any thinking person would quibble with the necessity for such a system in an army. This then being the case, is there any requirement for leadership and, if so, how should it function?

Command, or the exercise of power granted by the formal hierarchy, generally functions in routine situations. It is continuous and

[20] *Leadership.*

regular and is usually sufficient to ensure adequate performance because participants expect and accept such behaviour. In contrast, leadership is concerned with the non-routine. Essentially it occurs when issues of morale and change arise and where the official command is inadequate. Therefore positions of hierarchical importance are inextricably bound to leadership in the Army but are not one and the same. A good officer, realizing the difference, invokes leadership when command is not sufficient.

Good commanders throughout history have always appreciated the bond between the two. Stonewall Jackson in his letter of instruction to commanding officers at Winchester, Virginia in November 1861 stated, 'If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well'.[21] Even politicians occasionally recognize the difference. In addressing the German *Bundestag* in 1957, Defence Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss proclaimed, 'An army cannot be administered. It must be led'.[22]

This connection between the functions of command and leadership is well expressed in Chapter Two of the *Leadership* pamphlet.[23] It also states the requirement for officers to understand and apply the theory of leadership and to study the causes of human behaviour, although the pamphlet itself does little to suggest how, in practice, this should be done. The situational variant upon leadership imposed by regimental, staff or command appointment is also recognized, but the pamphlet does not highlight the essential differences in leadership behaviour which are required in these situations in a highly stratified organization.

In any large hierarchical organization like the Army, the amount of influence, power and authority vested in leaders varies enormously. Accordingly, so too do the behavioural patterns of those that exercise them. Psychological behavioural studies have revealed that there are three major factors affecting leader influence in hierarchical organizations; the leader-member relationship, the nature of the task and the power of the leaders' position.[24] [25]

[21] Stonewall Jackson, 'Letter of Instruction to Commanding Officers' November 1861.

[22] F-J Strauss, 'To the German *Bundestag* 1957'.

[23] Leadership, pp. 7-8.

[24] F. E. Fiedler, 'Leadership'—A New Model', *Leadership*, (Penguin) 1969, p. 232.

[25] D. C. Pelz, 'Leadership Within an Hierarchical Organization', (ibid), p. 339.

The effects of the first two factors have already been discussed. Briefly stated, the leader-member relationship is largely dependent upon the degree to which the leader is either task oriented or group oriented and to what degree he can identify with the group to help them achieve their goals. A striking example of this contrasting leader behaviour is the Regimental Sergeant Major. To the soldiers he appears wholly task oriented, while to the unit warrant officers and sergeants he represents the influence, prestige and pinnacle of the NCO ranks.

The effects of the nature of the task are readily apparent. If a task is highly structured and clearly defined, such as those normally allotted a rifle platoon, the leader can prescribe each step of the operation and the sequence in which it will be performed. Any man who fails to perform his job correctly can be spotted and corrected and, if necessary, disciplinary action can be initiated against an offender. This is not the case however in running an intelligence office where sometimes the task may be vague and unstructured, like determining enemy intentions or evaluating new developments in a strategic situation. Here the leader neither knows nor can he control the steps necessary to achieve a successful result. This situation develops different leadership behaviour from that required in the first example.

The last factor which influences leader behaviour is the power of the leader's position. This involves not only his power within the group but his power status outside the group. A platoon commander has considerable direct power within the platoon but very little power in the control and management of his company. A Corps Director on the other hand occupies a position of stewardship, which implies limited direct power over the activities of the members of his corps, but carries considerable influence in Army Headquarters in matters which affect his corps and the roles of its members.

At this stage of the study of applying leadership to the Army several conclusions can be drawn. The first is that leadership is a necessary adjunct to command in an organization which functions primarily on non-routine tasks in non-routine settings. The second is that the complex and multi-level structure of the Army creates diverse demands for all forms of leadership, ranging from headship to low-level situational demands. The further removed from soldiers an officer becomes and the higher the level he attains the more likely he is to become task oriented rather than group oriented. This is because within the organizational setting leadership behaviour will vary according

to the personality relationship, the nature of the task and the power of the designated leader.

According to Hemphill, 'leader behaviour is determined in large part by the nature of the organization in which it occurs. It is relative to the population characteristics or, in other words, to the national attitudes and needs of the followers'.[26] This aspect of leader behaviour being relative to national characteristics is not mentioned in the official textbook yet there is a wealth of information available to substantiate that Australians, and Australian soldiers in particular, have distinctive characteristics and attitudes. It is therefore important that military leaders should understand the characteristics and attitudes of the potentially large and diverse section of the Australian community who serve in the Army in peace and war. Possession of this knowledge then becomes another officer leadership requirement.

While it is difficult to define the Australian ethos, most historians and contemporary commentators would agree that our society displays certain characteristics which could be termed national. Our unique cultural and social environment can be readily traced through our brief history. Our origin as a colony with harsh convict overtones, our evolvement into nationhood in isolation and our political stability are the prime factors in shaping our attitudes.

Without delving into these causes in depth it is generally conceded that Australian society is egalitarian in the sense that it is not a strictly ordered society, but rather a formless, materialistic one in which money, or the possession of it, is the main criterion for classification. Our attitudes are largely ones of distrust of politicians, dislike of police, delight in defrauding government, and a universal lack of deference for insignia or position as a mark of quality. It would also be true to say that Australians genuinely despise authority, although they may be more conditioned or indifferent to it than they realize.

Because of the nature of Australian society we have not developed a traditional military caste leadership as has the United Kingdon from which we have liberally borrowed in evolving our officer system. It would therefore be very wrong for Australian officer leadership training to neglect the study of the essential character of the troops officers are required to lead. It would be equally wrong to borrow the leadership philosophies of other national armies and endeavour to

[26] J. Hemphill, 'Situational Factors in Leadership', (Ohio State University Research Project, 1949), p. 3.

implant them in our own system without due regard to their social origin or our own special leadership requirement.

A brief comparison of the officer background of the British Army with that of Australia's makes this disparity of leadership requirement and traditional outlook apparent. The following statistics were taken from C. D. Otley's article, 'Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite'.[27] From statistics compiled from the period 1870-1959, evidence of affiliation with the power caste show that an average 46% of the officer caste *élite* were related by birth or marriage to members of the economic, military, political or administrative *élite*. Similarly an average 44% of the military *élite* were born into the nobility or gentry classes while an average of 32% married into the nobility or gentry classes. 51% were boarders, 55% attended public schools, 16% attended private schools or had private tutors. An average of 39% were sons of military *élite* in a self perpetuating caste system. No examples of working class origins were found.

This then shows the inextricable link of the professional British officer with the 'Establishment' in a self perpetuating climate of leadership by birthright and tradition in a country with clearly divided class distinctions. It is therefore not surprising to find that British Army leadership thinking, nurtured in such a climate, has long tended to support the 'Great Man' concept mentioned earlier.

Compare this to the situation in the Australian Army. As a result of his 1961 survey, Encel stated 'that a compilation of parents occupation and educational environment (public versus state school), suggests that senior officers of the Army and RMC classes from 1911-1961, came predominantly from lower middle class origin with the professions and business some distance behind'.[28]

It is not surprising, considering our social attitudes, that such a system as the British one would not be tolerated by Australians. In his study Encel stated evidence of our general attitude toward it; 'A widely held view in both world wars that British officers, accustomed to instant and unquestioning obedience from other ranks, were unable to handle Australian troops, who did not care for the outward show of obedience and were liable to react unfavourably to orders which were demonstrably stupid. The notorious refusal of Australian soldiers to

[27] C. D. Otley, 'Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite' (Van Doom, *Armed Forces in Society*, Mourton and Coy, The Hague 1968), pp. 84-108.

[28] S. Encel, 'Militarism in Australia', Van Doom, ibid, p. 128.

salute British officers when off duty was the cause of many incidents in World War I.'[29]

There is also evidence that in the past we have endeavoured to ape the British officer attitude and received predictable public reaction. John Hetherington, in his book, makes the point that, 'regular officers were treated by their Government and by the Australian public as more or less of an unnecessary evil'.[30] This comment can be partially attributed to our national and, hopefully, dying belief in the effectiveness of the Citizen Military Forces. 'A history of citizen military effort in two world wars has further contributed to the low esteem enjoyed by the professional soldier', [31] (underlining added).

On the basis of the evidence available it would therefore seem that in a country with an egalitarian, materialistic ethos, feudal attitudes toward leadership by an hierarchical officer caste *élite* would not be tolerated. It is essential then that Australian officers develop a leadership behaviour attitude that is relevant to the society from which they receive this leadership privilege. This is even more pertinent today when governmental attitude condones the maintenance of regular combat units, supported by the National Service Act.

In the past the image of the regular officer has suffered from the traditional citizen soldier concept of defence. This dependence upon the citizen soldier tended to perpetuate the national contempt for the unegalitarian characteristic of authoritarianism and professionalism which the regular officer epitomised.

Necessity of course played a decisive part in moulding these attitudes and military traditions. Because of our limited resources, sparse population, incapacity to defend ourselves and reliance upon citizen forces in emergency, we developed different traditions from countries possessing large and well equipped armies. Our lack of resources for instance led to the placing of great emphasis on the bravery and resourcefulness of the individual soldier or the small independent unit. Our official war histories graphically convey this aspect and are unique because of it. Our sparse population could not sustain regular units, hence our reliance upon citizen soldiers and our general lack of regard for professionals.

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[29] Encel, p. 129.

[30] J. Hetherington, *Australia — Nine Profiles*, (F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne 1963), p. 4.

[31] Encel, p. 129.

Today we are moulding a professional army and engendering a new tradition of military service. If our officers are to be capable leaders in this new army their leadership behaviour must relate to national needs and national attitudes. Professionalism and technique are not sufficient incentive to soldiers to follow if the leaders have no regard of soldiers' needs. This requires identification with the soldiers and a recognition that it is leadership more than command which builds and retains motivation of Australian soldiers. In terms of leadership theory, the function of the officer is to embody and give expression to the population needs and wishes and to contribute positively to the satisfaction of these needs. When he fails to perform this function, an officer no longer leads. And he fails as soon as the soldiers see his needs and his goal to be divergent from their own.

Considerable care has been taken to examine leadership theory and to relate it to the Australian Army requirement. This has been done to see how effectively we teach and employ this important function of control. The importance of such a study was effectively summarized by Hemphill when he wrote: 'Both layman and scientist agree that if we can understand the selection and training of leaders we can begin to take adaptive steps toward controlling our own social fate.'[32] How much importance do we accord leadership training in the Army?

Implications for Leadership Training

As a result of the examination of leadership theory and its relevance to the Army officer, certain essential leadership requirements have emerged. If an Australian officer is to fulfil his leadership function he must be aware of and endeavour to apply these essentials. This requires an understanding of:

- The theory of group leadership.
- The essential causes of human behaviour.
- The variable leadership demands in a large functional organization.
- The causes of leader behaviour.
- The characteristics of Australian soldiers.

There are two distinct avenues open for imparting this knowledge to officers. The first is at the officer cadet level where theory and experimental practice should be introduced, while the latter is the post-graduate, commissioned period in which advanced theory and experience should be encountered and evaluated. Ideally leadership training should

[32] Hemphill, p. 3.

be continuous, progressive and tailored to meet the functional demands of the stratified army organization. This is not the case in the Australian Army.

The officer cadet needs to be given an understanding of the part leadership plays in the daily life of an officer. He needs to be able to understand its relationship to command, how to recognize it in others and himself and most importantly how to apply it so that as a subaltern he will lead rather than just command. This training can only take place in an environment which encourages and provides opportunities to develop the skills of leadership.

In the practical sense our officer training institutions do foster this development by such techniques as competitive group activities including sport, frequent rotation of group activity command appointments, initiative and quick decision exercises and the honour system of punishment expiation. The provision of a cadet establishment within the college establishment creates a realistic framework for relating command to leadership. It is in the realm of leadership instruction however that our officer schools least meet our officer requirement.

Cadets at RMC, OCS and OTU receive formal leadership instruction based solely upon the contents of '*Leadership* (Provisional) 1957'. It has already been conceded that this pamphlet does serve in many ways as a good introduction to the study of leadership. It introduces potential officers to the study of individual human behaviour, the theory of leadership and the military application of it. The sections on morale and man management for junior regimental officers are pertinent and basically sound. However, the point has already been made that the pamphlet is outdated in certain respects.

In the first place it does not highlight how the variables of leader personality, individual and group needs and situation inter-act to produce differing leadership requirements. It does not show how officer leadership behaviour in a structured, functional organization is largely dependent upon the requirements, nature and level of the appointment. The pamphlet references, 'Conduct of War 1950' and 'Training for War' are both British and both obsolete. The only references to group behaviour and attitudes are British. No mention is made of distinctly Australian attitudes, needs or characteristics, all of which affect leader attitudes in the Australian Army.

In Chapter Two the textbook states that it is impossible to enumerate the leadership characteristics which will be common to all military situations, because in modern warfare officers will be placed

in a wide variety of situations. This is certainly valid. Yet, in Chapter Five, the book details thirteen essential personality characteristics required of officers to command successfully. This is justified on the grounds that these characteristics are required to maintain discipline and status. It would appear that the pamphlet would be on less contentious ground if their personality traits were re-classified as officer code of conduct requirements. They certainly are not all prerequisites for officer selection, as knowledge, endurance, courage and loyalty would be extremely difficult to assess in candidates under our current 'negative factors' selection board system. Similarly they can not all be classified as leadership performance indices as many officers appointments severely limit the options open to the incumbents to display them.

From this it can be seen that there is a need to re-edit and update the leadership curriculum of our officer schools to suit the needs of Australian officer candidates. This need was probably realized when the leadership book was written or it wouldn't have been labelled 'Provisional' in the first place!

Time does not permit us, nor is it desirable, to fully acquaint cadets with the application of leadership to staff and higher command appointments. This aspect is one which should be covered in post-graduate officer training. *ATI* 3-1 recognized this need but its call to the organization and officers to fulfil this need is both ill-defined and undemanding.

Corps schools are made responsible for teaching leadership theory and man management. Commanding officers are made responsible for continuation training of their officers by discussion and assessment. This is all very fine but what guidelines are laid down to ensure this training is effective and applicable?

In the first instance the basic reference remains the leadership pamphlet, which has been shown to be unsuitable for this purpose. In the second instance no distinct differentiation is demanded in post-graduate school syllabi to ensure progression from officer cadet school study. This would in fact prove extremely difficult with *Leadership* 1957 as the sole reference. No provision is made to improve officer knowledge of the behavioural sciences.

The services of Australian Army Psychology Corps could be profitably invoked in a number of ways in this respect. For instance, statistics could be made available to show the areas of greatest morale concern in recruit training, regimental service in both peace and war areas and in specialist or more sedentary units. New methods of leader

practice in business and other armies could be introduced and debated. New theories on group behaviour in hierarchical organizations could be examined and reflected upon. Most importantly, the needs and attitudes of Australian soldiers, both individually and in groups, should be specifically examined and related to officer leadership behaviour.

We nominally stress the importance of leadership. Evidence has been produced to show its particular relevancy to the Australian Army yet no criterion is laid down in *ATIs* 3-1 or 1-2 as to the percentage of officer time to be devoted to its study in any institution nor is provision made to develop officer capacity by leadership testing.

There are several avenues open for junior regimental officers to substantially improve and test their leadership capacity. One of these is adventure training. This means sponsoring and supporting Army participation in such activities as mountaineering, exploration, cross country travel in remote areas and similar schemes in which small groups organize and embark upon adventures which offer a challenge to the adventurous spirit and a realistic test of leadership. They need not be costly, lengthy or elaborate and can easily be tailored to unit or sub-unit training programmes as a variety to stereotyped exercises and repetitive training cycles. Many areas in each state could be used to achieve a particular purpose in this regard while New Guinea offers a perfect setting for such activities. It is close enough to afford administrative support and under-developed enough to test those qualities we most wish to assess in our efforts without engaging in hostilities.

Another method of leadership testing is the annual 'skill at arms' competition. This is a formation competition designed to test the operating efficiency, resourcefulness and endurance of arms and services sub-units and their commanders. It can be made an all embracing test or be restricted to particular skills or techniques. Its main aim should be to confront the junior commander with a series of situations to be overcome against the clock in a competitive atmosphere. Such competitions have been run by 28 Brigade in Malaysia and have been welcomed as challenging, realistic tests of leadership, morale and efficiency. To Australian battalions, winning of the Skill at Arms Trophy was a more gratifying and prized achievement than the winning of any of the sporting trophies.

ATI 3-1 also implies that by the time an officer completes Corps 3 requirement he has completed his leadership learning. This is not a valid assumption. Majors and lieutenant colonels occupy the most influential levels of power directly associated with leadership of regi-

mental soldiers. They need to be given an opportunity to re-evaluate themselves and their roles as leaders. We tend at this level to stress professional competency in terms of tactics, staff work and logistics yet do not encourage senior officers to re-evaluate their own schemes of junior officer training or to examine the changes in personal leadership style which their own present and possible future appointments may call for.

Provision should be made in the course requirements at this level to formally and critically study the current Army doctrine on leadership and to equate it to the rules and responsibilities of Army leaders. Such a study would doubtless benefit the individual officer and would contribute a great deal of worthwhile information to the Army, because the students are those most directly concerned in the mass application of that doctrine within the Army.

With regard to assessment of officer leadership by commanding officers, much evidence has already been produced to show that our current doctrine is at least tenuous and at best obsolete in this respect. In order to pass judgement, an assessor must have regard to the personality traits of the officer, the nature of his appointment, the level of his power to influence others and the composition of the group he commands. The assessor must also take into account the situation obtaining during the period under review in order to determine what opportunities it afforded for leadership influence by the subject officer. And what yardstick does the commanding officer use to assess leadership capacity or potential? Is it the thirteen leadership traits of an officer or is it the morale indicators of the unit or sub-unit? More likely than not he relies on his own experience, the reaction of the soldiers to the officer in question and the degree to which the officer has fulfilled the wishes of the commanding officer in the running of his particular group.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to examine the Australian Army officer leadership requirement and its implication for officer leadership training. In order to determine the requirement, leadership theory has been examined to try to find a basis for leader selection and to gauge the effects of leader behaviour on group performance. In particular this involved a study of leadership in large functional and hierarchical organizations. The findings from this examination were then related to the military setting in order to see how the organizational

structure and command system influenced leadership function and officer behaviour.

The officer leadership requirement was found to be multi-purpose because of the multiplicity of situations, tasks and groups an officer must encounter as a result of the posting and promotion system. The Army was found to be a large functional organization with clearly structured levels of influence and power requiring leadership performance in a wide variety of tasks within differently sized and composed groups under highly variable situations. Officer behaviour was found to be dependent upon the power and real influence of an officer's appointment and upon the leadership options open to him in that appointment. This varied according to whether the task was highly structured and easy to control or whether it was vague and unstructured.

A factor common to all these qualifications was the requirement for officers to understand the relationship of leadership to command. So, too, was the need for officers to be aware of the group needs and national characteristics of Australian soldiers.

In essence, the Australian Army officer leadership requirement is an officer who is trained in and understands the essential causes of human behaviour, the national characteristics of Australian soldiers, the theory of leadership, and the variable demands of the large functional organization he serves.

The implication for officer leadership training resulting from this requirement is the need to select and progressively train officers to fulfil their leadership function. This implies teaching rudimentary leadership theory and behavioural causes based upon currently acceptable texts. It means progressively preparing officers to meet the leadership demands and situations imposed by higher rank and appointment by making available time for instruction and reflection at appropriate stages in their careers. It also means revising our attitude toward practical leadership oriented initiative training and testing. Finally, it means re-examining our system of leadership assessment to incorporate more searching and meaningful standards which reflect the diversity of leadership requirement throughout the Army.

These then are the training aspects which need to be re-appraised if the Australian Army is to accord leadership training its rightful precedence in the role of its officer corps. The particular role of the Australian Regular Army and the particular needs of the Australian soldier demand appropriate officer leadership. □