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COVER: '25-Pounder In Action' by war artist Ivor Hele.
At the Australian War Memorial.

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 245, OCTOBER 1969

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
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(Australian War Memorial)

A stretcher-bearing party of the 2nd Australian Division bringing a wounded man, under the white flag, from

A Part of Asia?

Major A. R. Roberts

Royal Australian Infantry

Introduction

AMONG the most widely accepted of popular Australian clichés is that 'Australia is a part of Asia'. Its users range from Cabinet Ministers to Communists and it is in danger of becoming one of those stock phrases that form the small change of political word-coining. Historically and culturally, Australia has been not a part of Asia but the farthest extension of European society in that area. Geographically, the phrase is not so much wrong as meaningless. Those who use it seem to think that location is the only factor to be considered. If location were all, then Spain is a part of Africa and Northern Africa a part of Europe. In fact, very much stronger cases can be made for these statements about geographical relationships than for our local variation.

In its origins, this slogan may have been useful as a reaction to Australia's Eurocentric view of the world; as a challenge to make Australians aware of their involvement in South-East Asia. One of the reasons for its continued popularity may be that Australia's experiences in her growth towards nationhood have been so different from those of the South-East Asian nations with whom, in the slogan, she now claims brotherhood. We are one people, with one language, living in one continent with a recognizable common loyalty, a common inheritance of ideas and institutions, universal franchise and equality of opportunity in most fields of human activity. We tend, therefore, to view South-East Asian people as though they are living in Australian conditions and can be judged by Australian standards. Our close relations with our neighbours in the 'Near North' (a much more meaningful phrase) may delude us into thinking that we are accepted as Asian and hence cause us to miscalculate seriously our real influence in South-East Asia. The most important problem facing us today is living with, rather than as a part

Major Roberts graduated from OCS in June 1952. He served with 1 RTB, 1 RAR in Korea, and with 3 Cadet Brigade before posting to UK as SC AAS(L) in 1958. On return to Australia in 1961 he joined 3 RAR and served with that unit as adjutant and company commander until 1966. He is now GSO2, DMT, AHQ.

of South-East Asia. In seeking the solution we must be aware that there is no such thing as a 'South-East Asian Problem' or a 'South-East Asian Outlook'. The area contains countries without any history of unity other than that provided by the European connections of the imperialist age. Paradoxically, when South-East Asia was parcelled up into colonies and spheres of influence, there was more unity than exists today.

Without denying our own cultural heritage, we must recognize the importance of our relations with the individual nations which now occupy the South-East Asian area—a power vacuum which the more highly organized powers, blocs and ideologies of the world are anxious to fill. But, in doing so, we must remember that each country of South-East Asia has its own needs and interests; each nation is busy trying to discover where its needs and interests lie; each nation can be expected to try to serve its own interests in its own way. In this respect, Australia is the same as all its neighbours. By examining our present political, economic and military relations with South-East Asia, this essay aims to show the implications of those relations for Australia's future.

Awareness of Asia

Australia's present-day awareness of Asia, and of South-East Asia in particular, stands in sharp contrast to the indifference towards Asian affairs which characterized the years before and immediately after the Second World War. Until the 1930s, Australian foreign policy was largely determined by Britain. Most of the countries in our 'Near North' were governed either by Britain or other European powers. There was little opportunity and, it seemed, even less need for Australia to develop a foreign policy towards the countries of South-East Asia. Asia, as yet unawakened, seemed less of a danger to Australia than did the intrusion of European powers into the Pacific. The habit of government concentration on domestic issues, made possible by the strength of the United Kingdom and Australia's isolation from the centres of world power, retarded development of an Australian interest in South-East Asia. Not until 1939 did an Australian government decide that it was time to establish any representation at all overseas. The opening of a legation in the United States was followed by the establishment of missions in Japan, China and Canada, though the early stages of the Second World War still found divisions of political opinion in Australia over the relative importance of expeditionary forces for the Middle East and home defence against a vaguely defined 'Yellow Peril'. The southward thrust of the Japanese demonstrated that geographical isolation was no defence; that an Asian power could attack and invade Australian territory; and that British

strength in time of crisis was not great enough to assist in a defensive war east of Suez.

In the great tide of change that swept through the East as war ended, the virtual disappearance of colonial rule and the emergence of many inexperienced, newly-independent states forced a re-thinking of Australian foreign policy. Australia now found itself on the verge of the most unsettled region of the world. We entered the era of the 'good neighbour' policy towards the Asian countries, manifested in the widening of our diplomatic representation in South-East Asia, as well as important economic, technical and educational contributions to Asian countries through the Colombo Plan and other international organizations such as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Our change in policy was based to a large extent on geography; on the proposition that Australia, for better or worse, had to accept that future relations with countries to its north and west would affect its own future development. The only serious threat to Australia's security ever to emerge had come from an Asian nation and only awareness of Asia could ensure her future security. In 1955, Sir Robert Menzies enumerated the aims of Australia's foreign policy as the search for peace with justice; alliances with 'powerful and willing friends'; the raising of living standards, especially those of the less fortunate emerging nations; the defence of the rights of Australia and other nations; and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In her approach to South-East Asia, Australia began with certain advantages which continue to stand her in good stead. Being a comparatively small country in terms of population, she lacks 'Great Power' status. In other contexts this may be a severe limitation; in her approach to South-East Asia it is an asset, since it means that there is no fear on the part of the sensitive Asian leaders that close ties with Australia imply any threat to their own political and economic independence. Australia is not handicapped by a history of imperialist involvement in Asia and, indeed, can show to the newly-emergent countries an example of a nation with a colonial past which has overcome development problems to raise its standard of living to among the highest in the world.

Why Aid to Asia?

Australia has good reason to give aid to other, poorer countries to enable them to raise their own standards of living. Many Australians believe that the simple fact that we, as a rich nation, can afford to help those whose needs are desperate is reason enough for giving. Even those who feel that altruism is insufficient reason for giving foreign aid can

agree that economic development in South-East Asian countries, stimulated by foreign aid, favours political stability and peaceful change in an area where these conditions are vital to Australia. It is true that any quantity of aid that Australia can give is unlikely to appear large by comparison with the total aid needs in the area. However, because Australia has accepted a principle of giving to her needy neighbours, others may follow suit. America is growing increasingly reluctant to carry too many of the world's burdens alone. Australian aid to Asian nations will often bring with it additional American aid geared to our contributions. Our resources in people and finance are limited. Yet we have already been able to offer valuable practical help to Asian countries in overcoming their own technical and educational difficulties. We provide tertiary training in Australia for many thousands of Asian students, who deepen our reservoir of goodwill in Asia as they find themselves well received. One significant feature of Australia's aid which has acted to our advantage has been the absence of repayment obligations. Successive Australian governments have judged that aid in the form of funds and equipment, the provision of experts or the acceptance of overseas students represents a better contribution to the development of our neighbours than loans which add in the long run to their foreign debt-servicing problems. The wisdom of this view is underlined by the difficulties facing Indonesia, following her acceptance of aid carrying heavy repayment responsibilities.

Regional Defence

The idea of 'some form of regional pact for common defence', first proposed by Menzies in 1936 when Attorney-General in the Lyons government finally manifested itself in Australia's commitment to a number of mutual defence arrangements during the 1950s. The Korean War and the Emergency in Malaya showed that Australia must be concerned with developments in Asia but that she could not stand alone. Her defence policy and planning required co-ordination, not only with her 'powerful friends' but with any potential friends in the region. Three major defence arrangements now exist:

1. The ANZUS Treaty of 1951, a mutual security agreement involving Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
2. The SEATO Treaty of 1954, a collective defence treaty signed by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
3. The ANZAM arrangement of 1955, whereby consultative machinery was set up to supervise joint British — Australian — New Zealand — Malaysian action in certain circumstances.

The formation of SEATO, and Australian membership of that organization, aroused bitter criticism from those South-East Asian leaders who saw the extension of such alliances on the NATO pattern to Asia as a threat to their efforts to exclude the continent from one power bloc or the other. Many countries, particularly those which held to non-commitment and non-alignment, felt that a too intimate association could lead to the subjection of their national policies to the demands of the more powerful members of the alliance. The real conflict of opinion between Australia and these countries lay in divergent interpretations of the international situation, for many Asian governments were less willing than the Australian to conclude that a Communist China represented the great danger in Asia. However, events have shown that the results of the policy of Asian accord followed by Australia have not been so seriously marred by these agreements as might have been expected.

Of the three agreements, only ANZUS remains valid in terms of the spirit in which it was drawn up. Few doubt, even today, that the United States would come to the assistance of Australia in the event of direct aggression against the mainland. But the comfortable feeling that aggression in areas not covered by ANZUS would be handled in co-operation with the United Kingdom or SEATO no longer bolsters Australian foreign policy. Of SEATO's eight members, France and Pakistan are apathetic; Britain is withdrawing tangible support and the treaty's main value seems to be as a legalistic framework to justify *ad hoc* military activity in the South-East Asian area by two or more members. ANZAM is not a formal treaty and was based on the concept of a strong British military presence in the Malayan region. By a delicate piece of diplomatic activity which gave Britain formal responsibility for Malaysian defence while leaving Australian forces only vaguely 'associated', Australia avoided an irrevocable break with Indonesia during the period of confrontation. British forces are now withdrawing from Malaysia and Singapore, leaving Australia without a 'front man' in the significant and delicately balanced Malaysian—Indonesian—Philippines region. So far as our meagre military resources permit, we are extending our military responsibilities and our military presence in Malaysia and Singapore. We must take care, however, not to leave ourselves open to identification as 'neo-colonialists', already a handy tag for our enemies in relation to the administration of Papua and New Guinea.

Changing Policies

Mr Holt's 1967 visit to South-East Asia and his statement to the Australian Parliament on his return indicated several significant changes

in emphasis in Australian policy. Our new attitude towards the non-aligned countries accepted their yearnings for national identity, social betterment and economic progress as well as their right to follow the path of neutrality. At the same time, many of these countries were now prepared to accept Australia's right to take its own attitudes in the South-East Asian region and to hold and state viewpoints on Asian affairs, including the Vietnam conflict, without being regarded as an external intruder. Bilateral mutual defence treaties are beyond Australia's capacity; they are even more beyond the reach of most of our Asian neighbours. Hard realism suggests a new trend in Australia's foreign policy towards regional co-operation based on mutual interest rather than on policies of mutual defence. Future Australian initiatives may be directed towards building up broader regional organizations, such as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). A very considerable body of Asian opinion of all shades is devoted to an improved sense of regional identification rather than to an identity of objectives among those living in the region.

Some critics of Australia's policy of excluding people of non-European origin have suggested that it is not only anachronistic but lowers Australia's prestige in Asia.¹ Perhaps the most cogent defence of the existing policy put forward in recent years was that of the then Minister for Immigration in December 1959.² He rested his case upon the belief that the restrictive policy did far less damage to Asian relations than any other that could be devised. It possessed he said, two great advantages: Australia avoids those problems of racial tension that arise where mixed communities exist, and by avoiding the presence of significant Asian minorities in Australia it eliminates the possibility of conflict arising between Australia and Asian countries with a vested interest in their citizens overseas. He argued that Australia's policy is based on eminently reasonable grounds—the preservation of a high standard of living and the maintenance of a homogeneous society holding to common values. Informed opinion in most South-East Asian countries now appears to recognize and accept this view, particularly since the Australian Government has quietly but definitely liberalized the administration of the basic policy. Events in Malaysia and Indonesia tend to support the validity of the two main advantages claimed for the policy, while Australia's ready acceptance of some 12,000 Asian students each year has helped to modify opinion about the character of the Australian programme.

¹ Denis Warner, *Brisbane Courier Mail*, 16 July 1959.

² A. R. Downer, Minister for Immigration, at a Commonwealth Club luncheon, Adelaide, 4 December 1959.

Trade with Asia

The economic relationship between Australia and the United Kingdom has undergone major modifications which parallel those occurring in the political and military fields. Further drastic changes would be required if the British Government's application to join the European Common Market were successful. As closer relationships with our northern neighbours have developed, economic and trading arrangements in the region have extended. Whereas in the early 1950s only about 15% of our trade was with Asia, we now buy 23% of our imports and sell 33% of our exports there. About half of Australia's imports from Asia originate in Japan and about half of our Asian exports go there in return. However, excluding Japan, only 14% of our exports go to Asian countries and about 8% of our imports originate in the region. Access to markets in South-East Asia, free passage for the 70% of our imports and exports which pass through South-East Asia's maritime regions³ and opportunities for expanded trade in the face of the loss of traditional European markets are essential for Australia's development. We must continue to sell abroad and must increase our sales. Australian export income has been kept at a satisfactory level in the past few years by the rapid economic growth of Japan. Development in the rest of southern and eastern Asia is likely to lead to a greatly increased consumption of wool, coal, wheat, meat, sugar and dairy products—all goods which Australia exports. In this matter, aid and trade are closely related. If we assist South-East Asian countries to attain appreciably better living standards, their consumption of temperate zone food crops and raw materials will increase. Similarly, expansion of the markets in Australia for the developing range of Asian-manufactured goods will give Asians more money to spend on our primary products. Most South-East Asian countries are labour-rich in relation to their other resources, particularly land; we are a land-rich and labour-poor food exporter. Cautious liberalization of the entry into Australia of Asian goods is a reasonable trade policy for Australia, which is certain to be adversely affected if Asian development is too slow to provide acceptable markets.

Two schemes recently introduced by Australia to contribute towards Asian trade and development provide for preferential treatment in the Australian market for a range of manufactured goods from developing South-East Asian countries and insurance cover for Australian investors who decide to participate in local development there. Unfortunately, in no field has the Australian tendency to regard what's right for Mrs Everage as right for everyone been more criticized than in our export

³ T. B. Millar, *Australia's Defence*, Melbourne, MUP, 1965, p. 58.

trade. A recent market research investigation in five South-East Asian countries⁴ showed that lack of understanding of the market and insufficient attention to detail were the main reasons for the absence of Australian products from shelves in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and other cities. Increasing our share of these markets depends primarily upon factual marketing research in the countries where the goods are to be sold, backed up by an intelligent and interested physical presence maintained by manufacturers. Japan wins her South-East Asian markets by meeting these requirements; an Australian determination to do the same would bring us more trade with our natural trading partners. It would also assist in the build-up of the wide range of cultural, social and political contacts necessary for the growth of mutual trust throughout the region.

Conclusion

Australia is fortunate to have developed as a nation at a time when her isolation gave security from many of the dangers present in other parts of the world. Australians came to nationhood, not by revolution, but by evolution. They grew up in a system of working with others to maintain the security of their continent and were able to make the transition to a more complex economy without feeling that they had been exploited. Thus, our problems of security, trade and development differ widely from those faced by most South-East Asian nations. Moreover, Australia today is in a very different situation from many of her neighbours. We are, in general, content with the existing international order; we have no disputes over the sovereignty of the territory we occupy. We can be peace-loving because it suits us to join with others against aggressors and to preserve the *status quo*. But we need to remember that there are other nations, and among them many in South-East Asia, who are not so pleased with the existing order; who had no part in shaping the present state of their world; who want change and who will be restless until change comes about.

The majority of these nations have accepted Australia as a neighbour. Some, such as Cambodia, while differing from us on many points of policy, repose in us a trust they do not give to more powerful countries. We must try to provide the means—political, social, economic and military—to bring about changes in the region in accordance with principles which may not necessarily be our own. Every nation's interests can be reduced in the end to self-interest. We cannot expect to go into

⁴ M. C. Crowley, Director, International Division, Victorian Employers' Federation, *The Australian*, 12 June 1967.

South-East Asia selling Western concepts and Western methods to people who have a history and tradition hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years older than ours and different in origin. Australia may never be able to regard itself as 'part of Asia'. Unless it learns to live with Asia, and with South-East Asia in particular, it cannot hope to be given a voice in establishing the stable and prosperous region it needs in order to survive. ☐

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ANNUAL AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded the annual prize of \$60 for the best original contribution published in the *Army Journal* during the year ended June 1969 to Major W. W. Lennon's 'Engineer Support in Vietnam' (January issue).

The second prize of \$20 has been awarded to Major I. D. McFarlane for his 'The Staff System — A Case For Change' (October issue).

Developing PNG Training Depot



Major J. J. Tattam

Royal Australian Infantry


Introduction

FROM what was once a saksak camp on the banks of the Goldie River, seventeen miles from Port Moresby, there has been developed over the past two and a half years a complex of modern buildings—which include concrete and aluminium barrack blocks, swimming pool, gymnasium, theatre, canteen, officers' and sergeants' messes, chapel, school, medical/dental centre, sports ovals and married quarters for Pacific Islanders and Europeans. This complex is known as the Goldie River Barracks and is now the home of the PNG Training Depot.

Before 1967 the training depot was responsible for recruit training within PNG Command. It was housed in the old saksak camp, where facilities for both training and recreation were extremely limited. Heavy rain and wind often brought training to a halt, whilst playing fields were improvised and restrictive.

Major Tattam graduated from OCS Portsea in June 1954 and served with 17 NS Trg Bn and 1 RAR until 1958 when he became a platoon commander with 3 RAR in Malaya 1958-59. After service with 1 RTB in 1959-60 he joined PIR and served as company 2IC and Adjutant until April 1964. A period as Adjutant of 1 RNSWR (Cdo) followed until he was posted to Vietnam in 1965 where he was OC C Company 1 RAR. In 1967 he commanded the PNG Training Depot, remaining there until his present posting to the Staff College in January of this year.

The training staff of the depot consisted mainly of instructors — Pacific Island Sgts/Cpls — supported by a small administrative staff. It was commanded by a major with a captain second-in-command, an education officer and six recruit platoon commanders.



(Army Public Relations)

Aerial view of Goldie River Barracks.

On 22 March 1967 the first of the buildings in the new complex was taken over and the staff of the depot moved in. Gradually more buildings were finished and although it was far from being completed, the then Minister of State for the Army, The Honourable Malcolm Fraser MP, officially opened the Goldie River Barracks on 27 April 1967.

With this opening the depot was ready to commence an additional role to that of recruit training. This role was:

- To train selected soldiers in the duties of their corps.
- To conduct NCO coaching and promotion courses for all corps in PNG Comd.

OUTLINE ORGANIZATION OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA TRAINING DEPOT

ESTABLISHMENT FIGURES

STAFF 26 Officers
211 Other Ranks

STUDENTS 250 Recruits
100 Course Students

14

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


FIGURE 1.

Organization

With the additional role, and the administrative responsibilities of a major army installation, the organization of the depot was rearranged to that shown in Figure 1. Some of the major changes incorporated in the new organization were:

- The depot now comprised three companies commanded by captains.
- Pacific Island WO/NCOs were added to all corps wings in addition to the Australian instructors.
- A medical officer was obtained.
- A Pacific Island RSM was added as an understudy with a view to assuming full duties by 1969.
- Allowance was made for Pacific Islanders on the establishment to take over from Australians, who were to be carried supernumerary until no longer required.

Major changes underway, the depot was now ready to begin its dual role in the Goldie River Barracks.

Corps Training

On 5 June 1967, the following corps wings began training in the new facilities:

Trade Training Wing — Basic clerical course.
Basic drivers course.


Signals Wing — Operators keyboard course.

In September of the same year the Infantry Wing commenced its first NCO coaching and promotion course. By early 1968 all corps wings of Arms and Services Company were fully operative and the depot had now assumed the responsibility of training most of the Pacific Islanders, instead of their having to travel to Australia, or units trying to make do with on-the-job training.

The requirement to train Pacific Islanders in the duties of their various corps had increased dramatically over the past years with the formation of 2PIR in 1964 and the growth of supporting units such as supply and transport, signals and engineers at Murray Barracks, Port Moresby. Besides saving the money involved in sending soldiers to Australia, it was thought to be more beneficial overall to train the Pacific Islander in his own environment and preferably with Pacific

Islanders as instructors. The results to date have been encouraging, with high standards being achieved at the completion of courses.

The corps wings have also presented the opportunity to study promotion and trade test requirements suitable for the Pacific Islander. In many instances changes in these requirements have now been instituted from the studies conducted at the depot.



(Army Public Relations)

New recruits march past ORs quarters.

The statistics of student attendance at the various corps wings for the period June 1967 to May 1969 are shown in Figure 2:

Trade Training Wing	
Clerical sect	— 133
Catering sect	— 56
Driving sect	— 149
Signals Wing	— 163
Engineer Wing	— 112
Infantry Wing	— 213
Total Students	<u>826</u>

FIGURE 2.

With this number of students, the demand on the relatively small instructor staff is a heavy one—borne mainly by the Australian warrant officers and sergeants and supported by Pacific Island NCOs who are being trained with a view to replacing the Australians as they gain experience. In many instances this has already been done, though the road to a staff made up solely of Pacific Islanders remains a long one. Australian corps schools, and particularly the School of Infantry, have been, and still are, helping to overcome this problem by providing information on methods of instruction, training aids and material, and by actually training the Pacific Island NCOs to become instructors at their respective schools in Australia.

Recruit Training

Recruit training in the new barracks and under the new organization commenced on 7 July 1967. The facilities were in complete contrast to those of the old saksak camp, and include wet weather stations under the living blocks, lecture rooms, theatrette, and modern living conditions comparable to some of the best in the world. These conditions also facilitated additional training in the form of education and civic affairs, which the Pacific Islander still receives in the recruit training stage of his military career.

Military training of the indigenous recruit is to DP1 standard, as with Australian recruits. The training facilities of the new barracks in the form of two 25 metre ranges, a grenade range, a 10 lane static and 5 lane mobile DART electrical mechanical target system, and the various recreational mediums available, are also in complete contrast to those which the current recruits' predecessors endured before 1967. Together with the educational facilities, they provide the means by which the staff of the depot produce a soldier citizen ready to take his place in the units within PNG Command.

In many instances, good educational results at the end of recruit training have led to the soldier with the necessary qualifications being selected for further training at the PNG Military Cadet School, now located at Lae. After further training some have the possibility of attending the Officer Cadet School, Portsea.

Pre-OCS Wing

The PNG Military Cadet School was developed at the depot from the pre-OCS wing, which was created as an experimental group by Brigadier I. M. Hunter, commanding PNG command in 1967, as a

source of service entries of Pacific Islanders to the Officer Cadet School, Portsea. This proved successful, with five soldiers being selected to attend direct from the training depot in January 1968, and one other in July of the same year. Four of the five entries are now commissioned officers serving with the PIR. In May 1968, the PNG Military School accepted its first students from the depot; there were forty-eight in number.



(Army Public Relations)

Brigadier I. M. Hunter inspecting recruits at the PNG Training Depot passing-out parade in December 1968.

Sport

Sport has always played a major role in the life of the Pacific Island soldier and with the excellent recreational facilities afforded, the staff, students and recruits are now organized to play most major sports such as soccer, rugby, Australian rules, basketball, cricket and swimming. The recruits form the greater number in the depot so inter-company competitions are organized over a three-monthly period; in this way all sports are covered within a six-monthly cycle.

In April 1968 teams from the depot were entered in the Port Moresby open reserve grade competitions in rugby, hockey and Australian rules. Of these, the rugby team won the grand final and the Australian rules team was defeated in the first final. The hockey team, after early setbacks, played impressively towards the end of the season to record some good wins.

The representative teams from the depot comprise mainly Pacific Islanders, with Australians as players and coaches. This ability to play together has been developed through a long association of working together in the common bond of soldiering, not only in the sense of learning to defend one's country but also in helping the people of that country to help themselves.

Civic Action on the Kokoda Trail

The administrative staff of the depot, besides its constant on-the-job training, was introduced to civic action work in November 1967 as a means of giving the staff an opportunity to participate in active patrol work and training. The depot was allocated the area of the Kokoda Trail as part of the PNG Command Civic Action Programme.

Patrols were organized on a three-monthly basis and the area of operation was centred round three main villages on the Trail — Menari, Efogi and Nauro. These villages are isolated, not only one from the other, but also from their district and sub-district headquarters.

The village councillors requested that assistance be given in the form of training one of their men as a medical orderly, and the Menari councillor also requested that help be given in the construction of an airfield, which would enable the villagers to fly out their fruit and vegetables for sale in Port Moresby. Efogi and Nauro are already able to do this. Both these requests were met after approval was obtained from the Administration.

A young lad from each village was brought back by a patrol early in 1968 and trained for three months by the medical officer of the depot. Each was then returned to his respective village with the next patrol into the area. By the middle of the same year, all three villages had constructed a new 'house sick' and were receiving limited stocks of minor medical needs from the Department of Health in Port Moresby.

The airstrip at Menari was a major task and required specialist planning. The engineer officers of the Arms and Services Company in



(Army Public Relations)

Signallers on keyboard operator's course.

1968, in conjunction with the Department of Civil Aviation, drew up the plans for a sixteen hundred foot airstrip. Work commenced in 1968 and the bulk of the earth moving is being done by the villagers with hand tools. This may seem a slow method but it involves the people in the development of the airfield and they are therefore prepared to accept it as something they worked for, rather than a gift from the Administration or the Army. The completion date for the airstrip is expected toward the end of 1969.

Conclusion

The training depot has now established itself as a major unit within PNG Command. Since early 1967 it has continued to build upon the fine tradition established by the recruit training company, working in the old saksak camp. It is now a unit with the additional role of training Pacific Island soldiers in the duties of their corps and NCO coaching for all corps in PNG Command.

There is still much to be done in PNG Training Depot and the current commanding officer and staff are working to this end. ☐

OTHER WARS

In general, the terror of battle is not an abiding impression, but comes and goes like throbs of pain; and this is especially the case with veterans who have learned to know when there is pressing danger and when not; the moment a peril has passed they are as tranquil as if it had never come near. On the present occasion I was not as yet conscious of any emotion which could be called fear. I was still ignorant of the great horrors of battle, and buoyed up by the excitement of a rapid advance. A regiment of well-drilled green-horns, if neatly brought into action, can charge as brilliantly as veterans.

— John William De Forest, *A Volunteer's Adventures: A Union Captain's Record of the Civil War*.

In Defence of Academic 'Ignorance'

General Hamilton H. Howze
United States Army (Retired)

I am longing to meet one simple soul that doesn't want to know everything. One weak happy naive consciousness that thinks higher education is either rot or has never heard of it.
— Gertrude Stein

MY title is misleading and the quotation from Miss Stein too strong. But there's a point to be made.

I recently had the pleasure of hearing a most capable young officer, stationed at West Point, tell of the current doings there. I was struck by the apparent severity of academic requirements now, the wide choice of electives available to the cadets, and, in particular, by the heavy demand among prospective graduates for post-graduate schooling, at civilian universities, which would provide them masters degrees and doctorates.

I take issue, in part, with this demand for graduate schooling. I am pretty apologetic about doing so; it is easy for someone of my age to fall behind the times. On the other hand it is not necessarily true that the 'times' are in all respects correct.

We come at once to the matter of what is education. I would define it as understanding—of whatever the subject might be. I would call Daniel Boone a highly educated woodsman even if, as alleged, he couldn't spell 'bear'. His education was inadequate to running a computer or designing an airplane, but his function was that of opening the wilderness—an important thing to do—and for that he had ample education.

Why do the graduating cadets yearn so for higher academic degrees? If it is to equip them for specific scientific and military specialities, I should say it is justified, provided, of course, the individual careers are to be devoted to those specialities. If the purpose is to equip the officer

From *Army Magazine*, June 1969. Copyright 1969 by Association of the US Army and reproduced by permission. General Howze is vice president for product planning of the Bell Helicopter Co. He retired from the Army in 1965 when he commanded the United Nations Command and US Eighth Army in Korea.

to get out of the Army with better job prospects, it is not justified. If it is simply a matter of brain-training, the judgment is somewhat more difficult to make, although it should be fully understood that there are other ways of exercising the intellect.

The real concern in all this is whether we are overlooking the principal requirement, which is that our country shall continue to have available, to lead its military forces, men with the highest quality of *military* education. And it should be fully understood that the art and the associated sciences of troop leading, in and out of combat, impose very demanding requirements on their practitioners.

It is also true that the tasks of command are sometimes poorly executed. There is an unexpressed opinion among junior officers that the job is an easy one, whereas it is in fact complex and difficult. More failures would be apparent if, among military units, there was the sort of competition as exists among industrial competitors—and more precise ways (profit-and-loss statements, for example) to measure performance.

The Army's military school system is a good one, susceptible mostly to the criticism that it doesn't teach tactics and training methods as well as it might. But it is nevertheless a fairly extensive system, enforcing periodic up-dating of the people who go through it. Its graduates are pretty well-educated men. Army officers seem to have no trouble dealing on an intellectual level with their peers in business and industry.

And some results of that school training, taken with service in the *line of the Army*, have been spectacular. It has produced giants among men, truly national and international leaders of enormous stature. But what were the university degrees of Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, George Patton, Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridway and Maxwell Taylor? Yet who would say they were not superbly educated men? Theirs was (and is) the education—in military science and leadership—which their country direly needed, and their names will remain forever prominent in its history.

I do not for a moment disparage the value and influence of formal scientific education; I mean only that true military understanding is by far the greater quality among professional soldiers. The recent emphasis in the Army on the civilian post-graduate diploma is, I think, partly misplaced, but no one would contend that a continuing education of Army officers is not essential. It is simply important that the best of them be educated in the right subject.

I am now a member of a highly technical industry—helicopter manufacture. And do you know who the engineers look to in the Army

for primary guidance? I assure you that it's not the Army's graduate aeronautical engineers nor its civilian technicians who, of course, do a valuable job in their fields. But *primary* guidance comes from the Army's operators, the ones who understand the environments and frustrations and problems and dangers of military operations. Those are the fellows the design engineers build helicopters for.

There is one other thing that is hard to express in these days of pragmatism and debunking and the repression of practically all emotions except those of dissent:

Most officers will remember the closing advice of Karl von Clausewitz to the crown prince in that priceless little book, *The Principles of War*, that 'A powerful emotion must stimulate the great ability of a military leader . . . Open your heart to such emotion. Be audacious . . . in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end, and fate will crown your youthful brow with a shining glory, which is the ornament of princes, and engrave your image in the hearts of your last descendants.'

Is 'glory,' in truth, as reprehensible as we have lately made it out to be? To a professional soldier, glory is much more than adulation by the crowd. It is indeed an emotional thing, all mixed up with duty and tradition and patriotism. General MacArthur was a glory hunter; he didn't wear that beat-up old cap for nothing, and neither did he scribble that farewell speech to the Congress casually on the back of an envelope. He sought, and gained, his place in history. And is our country the worse for that?

Should this nation lose the capacity of producing commanders of the line—straight tactical leaders capable of direction in the arena of battle—then shall the possibility of war and the dangers of actual war both vastly increase. Someone else has written in this magazine that 'If we recognize war as an evil which we have not yet learned to prevent, and if we recognize the exertion of force as the only means of making war, we seem forced to the conclusion that there is no virtue in exerting the force ineffectively.' Seems reasonable.

The best leaders are not developed by suppressing their emotional involvement. There is no shame in an aspiration for glory earned by courage, persistence, loyalty to one's men, love of outfit and love of country, and professional understanding—the last, one might say, being sometimes known as education. □

Sources of Contemporary Australian Military History

Gavin Long, OBE

ON the upper level the main sources of modern military history, whether Australian or not, or contemporary or not, are likely to have much the same form as the main sources of political or diplomatic history, namely files of letters and telegrams and minutes and such like, and fully-organized reports. The writing of reports is indulged in after military operations to a greater extent than is usual in civil business but that is only a difference in degree. Below that level, however—the level of the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and the senior commanders—some of the sources of military history in the wider sense are of a kind not paralleled, I think, in other sorts of history. Like a ship at sea, each military unit and formation and each branch of a large staff is obliged in war to keep a diary, and these diaries will normally form the main part of the source material of a modern military historian if he is writing in some detail.

It is as though, in a government department, there were recorders at work day by day collecting copies of key documents, compiling statistics, recording oral instructions, confidences, progress of work, telephone conversations, visitors and so on.

This is not to say that every military unit in fact keeps a comprehensive record of this kind. All should. Some do. Some don't.

A British war diary—and that means also an Australian one—is in monthly parts and at the end of each month one copy of that month's diary and a duplicate copy of the previous month's diary are sent to Army Headquarters. The duplicate is made and its despatch delayed for a month in case the original is lost—a real possibility in war. For

This article is a revised version of an address delivered to the Canberra and District Historical Society and is reprinted from the October 1963 issue of Stand-To. Mr Long, the General Editor of the Australian Official History of the 1939-45 War, died in October of last year.

example, a big batch of AIF diaries were in a ship that was sunk in the Suez Canal in 1941. They were salvaged and much of what they have to say is still readable. (Top-copy typing will survive long immersion in water.) But the delayed delivery of duplicate diaries guards against such accidents or worse ones.

The opening pages of a war diary contain a day-by-day account of the month's events entered on a printed form which has spaces for the place, the date, a 'summary of events', references to appendixes, and 'comments'. In the diary of a unit with an imaginative and conscientious intelligence officer or a commanding officer with a sense of history these forms will be only a small part of a diary which, in a busy month, may be three inches thick or more. The remainder of the wad of papers will include copies of signals, strength returns, company and patrol reports, statistics of various kinds, letters, orders routine and otherwise, reports by specialists such as the medical officer and so forth.

The reports of regimental medical officers are often specially valuable. The medical officer must watch the physical and mental condition of the unit as a whole and his reports may sometimes give the historian glimpses of a state of affairs not indicated elsewhere in the diary. For example, the diary of an infantry battalion approaching Wewak in 1945 records how the unit had been pressing on and efficiently carrying out each task that it was set, but suddenly the medical officer's report contains statements such as 'Exhaustion, nervous strain and malaria now uncontrollable' and 'CO informed that the battalion could no longer carry on'.

In practice the war diaries of units in action vary very greatly. At one extreme is the diary that answers almost every conceivable question; it mentions individuals freely, includes company and platoon reports of eventful actions, marked maps, copies of signals and sometimes even sketches and photographs; and contains a lively and detailed narrative and uninhibited comment. At the other extreme is the diary that has none of these attachments and whose narrative is brief, formal and perhaps ambiguous. Sometimes the conditions of a campaign impose limitations. For example, in the Owen Stanleys in 1942 it was sometimes impossible to carry typewriters, duplicating machines and bundles of tracing paper. One important unit diary for that period is written in pencil in a sixpenny exercise book.

In general the Australian war diaries improved as the war went on. There seem to have been two reasons for this. One was that, as time

2/14 Bn. A.I.F.

WAR DIARY

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence
 Summaries are contained in U.S. Regs., Part II.
 and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages
 will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Errors leading not required).

Army Form C. 2118

Unit 2/14 Aust Inf Bn.

Commanding Officer Lt Col W.G. CANNONED

Month and Year Jun 1941

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
JEZZINE	24	0930	News received of about forty enemy MGs occupying posn and forming rd block at DEIR MACHMOUCHE Cheshire Yeo were reported to have matter in hand 9 Pl A Coy had been ordered to stand by at 0630 hrs and were later moved by rd to A Coy 2/31 Bn, to attack the BLOCKHOUSE area.	
		1034	9 Pl observed on 1284 surrounding BLOCKHOUSE.	
		1055	Enemy commence shelling BLOCKHOUSE.	
		1115	9 Pl driven off 1284 by strong opposition from Gr and MG fire.	
		1145	Enemy reported to be holding ridge around BLOCKHOUSE with our Inf about 500m north of the cliff face known as the SPHINX.	
		1400	Lieut O'DAY and those left of 9 Pl returned from attack on 1284. They reported having been driven off the ridge by an enemy bombing party who operated from behind good rocky cover and could not be engaged by SA fire. He stated that with a larger supply of grenades and additional TSMG (he had 3) in preference to grens the op would have been more successful.	
			He was already carrying 90 gren among 30 men and considered rifles could have been replaced by extra grens.	
		1430	Throughout the day little or no infm as to location arrived at BHQ from the Coys this lead to a decision to allot one member of the int sec to each coy to report to BHQ at the conclusion of or at a decisive stage in ops.	
		1430	Lieut CHRISTOPHERSON arr at BHQ in an exhausted condition. He reported having been on the objective with B Coy but did not know the location of the remainder of his Coy(C). He believed that B & C Coys were assembling near 1538 feature. Acting on this report the Adjt went to 1538 and contacted Capt RUSSELL, Lieut EVANS and 170rs. The former believed that a pl of C Coy was located on KHARRATT - later confirmed by Capt LAMDALE, who ordered withdrawal of this Pl towards 1500 feature at 1630 hrs our arty having commenced to shell the feature. Capt RUSSELL was ordered to hold the eastern approaches to the valley south of point 1528 and arrangements were made to do this with the few tps available. It appeared that a large proportion of B Coy and 14 pl of C Coy were casualties, the remaining tps were very tired and had few rations but had access to water from a running stream. The RAP was located at A Coy 2/31 Bn and Sgt DOUGHERTY of B Coy collected 15 Ors B & C Coy there and brought them back to 1538 via the road. The RMO reported evacuating 24 battle casualties from B & C Coys incl Lieut P.J. KYFFIN. 2/31 Bn RAP reported having evacuated 12 Ors of our 9 Pl	

passed, intelligence officers and draughtsmen were better trained or selected—for example, by 1945 most of the mapping done within the units was quite evidently being done by professional draughtsmen or trained commercial artists. The square pegs were in the square holes. Of course, from the outset, a big proportion of intelligence officers from unit level upwards were university graduates; and by August, 1945, more than 2,000 officers and NCOs had passed through the School of Military Intelligence in Australia. A second reason is that, as the war grew older, the soldiers saw themselves more clearly as playing a part in big events which would be recorded in their nation's history.

A special virtue of military orders and reporting is that they demand a degree of precision and concision that is desirable but not always attained in all government and business administration. Also reports are often required from quite junior people: young pilots of aircraft, for example, corporals or privates on patrol, or private soldiers who have made an escape through enemy territory. These produce narratives that are sometimes most stirring, sometimes amusing, sometimes very touching. I am sure few could read without emotion some of the escapers' tales printed in their own words in our volume that describes the operations in Greece and Crete, or some of the first-hand accounts of patrols and adventures in our New Guinea volumes.

Often one will find vivid description in these reports and narratives. Here are some examples:

By an NCO in Greece in 1941: The officer stood out in the open directing the fire, the crews crouched behind the shields and fed and fired the guns while everything the enemy had was being pelted at them. It looked like a drawing by someone who had never been to a war

A Private Carroll set out from Crete after the surrender of the forces there in a fishing boat with six feet of driftwood as a mast and a sail made from some ancient canvas he had found lying about. After eight days at sea, when he was almost exhausted and half-blind, he saw land. He was now steering with one hand and bailing with the other.

When the boat filled and overturned and the mast smashed a hole in the bottom, my dreams of sailing into Alexandria went with it. Tying my tunic to the rudder clamps I fixed the water tin, almost empty now, across my shoulders and struck out for the shore. It took me seven hours to reach land, swimming, floating and surfing. From the crest of the waves I could see the breakers pounding on the rocks and dashing spray feet into the air. This was about the closest call I'd had up to date and I had a terrific struggle to try and keep from being carried on to the rocks and retain my hold on the tin. If I couldn't find a place to go in, I thought it might serve to take the impact, giving me a chance to scramble clear before the next wave hit me. Fortunately I was able to work

my way along to a small patch of sand and came ashore, the breakers spinning me around in all directions. I had to crawl on my hands and knees, feeling too giddy to walk.

Here are a few sentences from a private soldier's long narrative of the experiences of an infantry company, during the taking of Beaufort in North Borneo, in rather a stately style:

Starcevitch is possessed of a method of approach which in itself must be most disconcerting to an enemy. Firmly and confidently believing that he can never be hit, he walks into an enemy post preceded by a single and unbroken stream of pellets. He is quite unmoved by returning fire and stops only when the enemy has been annihilated.

Now and then a commander or intelligence officer uses the war diary to vent his indignation. I suppose that most of us from time to time experience a desire to write a letter to the newspaper. We comfort ourselves that we might thereby inform an ignorant public or stir administration out of its lethargy, but perhaps—like that radio character 'Disgusted' of Tunbridge Wells in 'Take it from Here'—a main object is simply to blow off steam. The officer who writes indignant comment in his war diary cannot hope by so doing to achieve prompt reforms or dispel ignorance in high places because it is most unlikely that anybody will read what he has written until the historians come across it years afterwards. He probably knows that he is writing (*a*) to get something off his chest and (*b*) *pour l'histoire*—and a good thing too. Comments written in this mood are likely to be most illuminating, and may help the historian even if they were not allowed to help the war effort.

This sort of thing: the commander of a brigade at Balikpapan in 1945 is writing:

Fourthly: I might mention the flamethrowing tanks which were to have been available but for some reason or other were not put on a ship at Brisbane. As it was we didn't want them, but it might have been different. It appears as though some individual was to blame for their non-despatch, and such an oversight is criminal. I'm afraid the only way to eliminate such errors is to shoot someone.

A battalion commander whose unit was taken to the assault on Brunei Bay in a ship on which 488 troops were squeezed, 400 being on an open deck already crowded with vehicles, a ship that had only six latrines and twelve wash basins, wrote for the war diary during the fortnight at sea:

In almost six years of war the writer has never seen troops subjected to more deplorable conditions and on 10th June, after a fortnight of inactivity subjected to the full extent of existing climatic conditions, overcrowded, and with far less than minimum adequate sanitary and washing arrangements, they are expected to carry out an assault.

The existence of the war diary gave another CO of a battalion which had to some extent lived off the country at Derna in 1941, and been criticised by the staff for so doing, a chance of writing:

So long as senior officers and headquarters' messes see nothing wrong in laying in supplies of food and drink it will be difficult to deal with the man who takes a bottle of wine. There can be no solution until the people who ought to know better set an example.

The war diary gave an infantry brigadier on New Britain in 1945 an opportunity of mentioning in his account of the move to Jacquinot Bay: 'High spot of the trip was the annoyance of base officers who, after watching from armchairs on the wharf the heavily-laden troops embarking, brought their armchairs out by DUKW and expected the working parties to carry the chairs up with weapons, ammunition and fighting stores as deck cargo. The chairs were sent back ownerless to the wharf.'

No doubt administrators in the civil services and in business suffer comparable irritations and frustrations, but, as far as I know, they have no official diaries in which to blow off steam about them.

There seems to be a fairly widespread conviction that somehow or other in war unpalatable truths are expunged from the record.

The existence of the typewriter, of carbon paper and the various sorts of duplicating machines make it extremely difficult in these days to suppress a significant document or part of it. I know of hardly any instances where this has been attempted and I doubt whether such an attempt has been successful except on the rarest occasions. One such effort was made in the Australian Army records in 1940. In his first report as commander of the 6th Division General Blamey, annoyed that the citizen forces had provided so few recruits for his division, and seeking reasons for this, wrote some sweeping criticism of the Government, of the militia generally and of its commanding officers in particular. When the report reached headquarters these critical passages were blacked out. It is arguable that the criticism of the Government was improper and, of the militia, unfair, but whether these should have been obliterated is another matter. If unit war diaries were read by the brigade commander and then the divisional commander and, so on, along the chain of command until they arrived at Army headquarters, and each commander obliterated anything he considered inaccurate or indiscreet the records would lose much of their value. But I mention this incident not with the object of discussing the rights and wrongs of it but to illustrate how difficult it is to

suppress official documents under modern systems of administration. It happened that Blamey—for what reason we can only guess—included a copy of that first report as an appendix to his next one and so the first report got into the records unblemished. Indeed quotations from the unexpurgated report were in proof in a volume of the war history before we knew of the existence of the bowdlerised copy.

I referred earlier to the unit war diaries as 'the main source' of contemporary military history. Let me now qualify that by adding that it is likely that for some phases the main sources will not be the war diaries at all, but the memoirs or private papers of individual participants or perhaps the notes of interviews with them, or their written replies to specific questions, or their comments on draft narratives.

And probably the present-day historians of nineteenth century wars will rely as much on private papers as on official ones. Anybody who to-day set out to rewrite the history of the war in the Crimea would be greatly dependent on the many published memoirs and collections of letters, some of the best of which have appeared in print only in the last few years.

The main sources of those parts of Dr Bean's two Anzac volumes that deal with the actual operations on the battlefield are his own notebooks recording his observations and the interviews he collected either on the spot or in the next three or four years. Bean's volumes in their turn were the main source relied upon by the British official historians when dealing with the Anzac fighting and thus principally from Bean's notebooks are derived either directly or indirectly all subsequent historical accounts so far as they deal with the Anzac operations, up to and including Alan Moorehead's recent book on Gallipoli.

For certain phases the present group of Australian war historians are largely relying on records of interviews and on other private narratives. In our histories of three Middle East campaigns, and of the operations in Papua in 1942-43 we have sometimes leant on such resources as heavily as the unit war diaries and other reports.

In their big series of volumes on the American Army in World War II the American official historians are using similar material. The method Bean had employed in World War I of interviewing participants on a large scale was introduced into the United States Army in 1943 by S. L. A. Marshall, soldier, journalist and writer on military affairs,

Down the road empty jeeps, or jeeps loaded with men hitch-hiking back, tumbled briskly along. Now & then a jeep wld come along the road at a little more than walking pace, carrying a bandaged, blanketed wounded man lying on a stretcher, or with a less seriously wounded man sitting in the seat beside the driver, grinning bravely, cigarette in mouth.

Up the track, on most days, parties of reinforcements climbed, sweating, and with the hot flush under the eyes that weary, hot men show. It was a stern introduction for these boys, some of them only a few days out of Australia. In one party two men had slipped, crossing the Siki Creek, and were coated in mud. All were loaded like pack horses when they set out on the long climb from the coast to the fwd inf posns. Old hands they passed on the track shouted "Chuck it away!", "You'll never carry all that up there!" Then respirators would be unstrapped and thrown into the bush; steel helmets dumped by the roadside; mosquito nets thrown aside. As usual, units said that the casualty rate among these reinforcements was high.

A few graders were at work along the road. Near Jivevaneng a grader uncovered a grenade. A jeep driver boldly chiselled it out of the mud with a stick, and as it came unstuck it began to smoke. The driver dodged behind his jeep, but nothing more happened. The driver advanced once more and threw the grenade into a slit trench and went off to tell the engineers. Nearby, just off the cleared patch in the long grass, the American major who commanded the rocket machine found a booby trap left by a coy of Bn - a grenade with a trip wire. The pin was almost out, so he cautiously slackened the wire and left it at that.

Near Jivevaneng a grader, widening & giving a camber to the road, revealed the remains of a Jap. At intervals along the road the smell confirmed the theory that the Japs had lost more than the counted dead, and that there were bodies in the undergrowth that had never been found.

As General Editor, Gavin Long was responsible for collecting material, not only for the three army volumes of the history he was to write, but for other volumes in the series. This photograph is of a page of his diary relating to operations on the Sattelberg track, afterwards used by David Dexter in 'The New Guinea Offensives'.

who was appointed to the US Army Historical Section; and it was later carried out by teams of interrogators.

The American Chief Historian, Dr Kent Roberts Greenfield, has recently expressed the opinion that even the most honest memory quickly fades and becomes distorted and quotes a remark by Sir Ian Hamilton that 'on the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms.'¹ Our experience is that memory of battle incidence does not fade so quickly, and, indeed that it may be more profitable to interview rested men rather than weary ones. Bean has declared that he 'found it useless, for the most part, to seek trustworthy accounts from wounded or overstrained men.'² Both he and his successors found that for even a few years afterwards participants such as company and platoon commanders and air crew were able to give lucid and extremely detailed accounts of their own actions and observations and that these generally tallied closely with the other first-hand evidence. It is the job of a company commander, for example, to notice exactly what is going on around him. I have sat with some company commanders for up to three hours while they talked on and on describing in precise detail a long action that took place some time before and perhaps extended over several days.

It is a fairly safe working rule, however, to assume that *all* second-hand evidence of such events is inaccurate. By the time a story has been repeated by someone who heard it from someone else it has probably begun to get into fancy dress. One does not classify as second-hand evidence, however, a narrative or a log compiled at the time as a result of purposeful face to face interview, or of telephone conversations, and later included in a report or war diary.

What I said earlier about the vivid detail in some of the reports of junior officers and other ranks applies equally to the notes of interviews with them. Again and again these enable the chronicler to give movement, precision and colour to a narrative previously so held as to be perhaps hard to follow.

Here is a sergeant describing from memory a night attack by his company in Syria three years earlier. This may illustrate also the memory for detail possessed by many young soldiers.

We began the advance from Niha at 2100 hours. Night was bright but not full moon. Native guide to take us off the high feature. Advance was very

¹ K. R. Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army* (1954), pp. 11-12.

² C. E. W. Bean, *The Story of Anzac*, Vol 1, Second edition, p.xxix.

slow owing to the gorges and precipices and our route very long. Behind the coy. we had about four mules with ammo. and rations. These lost us in the first two hours. About 0230 hours we were about 1000 yards from Badarane. When about 400 yards from Badarane heavy fire from 4 or 5 Hotchkiss about 250 yards away. All the fire was on fixed lines as it was going overhead and landing behind us. We pushed on to the left side of the Badarane hill which was covered with olives. The attack was over 200 yards, up hill, terraces 2ft. 6in. high. The only hold-up was on the right flank where French strong post with Hotchkiss and two riflemen. Gordon won his VC here. On his own initiative charged the post with rifle and bayonet . . .

A company commander on Milne Bay:

The main thing at Milne Bay was the conditions. The close country so different from the open desert. The wet. When we got back every man had bad feet—white and soft. The skin would come off at a touch . . . I saw a lad lying in a one-man pit with his arms on the parapet, head on arms and the whole rest of his body submerged. It rained every day and night. Mud was waist deep just short of Rabi through the swamp and on west side of No. 3 Strip. Elsewhere it was knee or ankle deep.

A company commander talking about how part of his battalion was cut off in the Owen Stanleys in September, 1942:

After several attempts to break through decided it was impossible and withdrew to left to make Menari next day. We'd been carrying our 13 stretcher cases with us, with eight men working on each stretcher. So far no food or water for two days. We bivouacked in a gully alive with screaming cicadas and lit up with the phosphorous of decaying trees.

[Day later] Track ended and from then on we cut our way, 100 yards every quarter-hour, lawyer vine, bamboo and secondary growth. We had eight machetes, otherwise used bayonets . . .

[Day later] No food except occasional banana or leaves for four days.

[Split into five groups of 25 each.] We had our first meal when we shot a pig in a village on 14th September—first food since 6th September except occasional green banana. We burnt the pig meat on our bayonets. On the 14th also a chap shot a cockatoo; every bit was eaten including the bones . . . Next time we ate meat was 18th September.

There are three sorts of source material that, as our work proceeds, become larger and more valuable; unit histories, individual memoirs, and the work of official war historians in other countries. Thirty-six units of the Australian Army in World War II have published histories, several of them being first-rate books which in the hands of enterprising publishers might have been very widely read, as some English formation histories have been. As for memoirs, however, though the Australian Navy produced a surprisingly large number and the Air Force produced a few, notably D. E. Charlwood's remarkable book *No Moon Tonight*, the soldiers produced very few indeed—or perhaps I should say very few have been published. David Selby's *Hell and High Fever*, which at last found a publisher in 1956, is one of the few Australian soldiers' tales of the Pacific war, not counting books produced by prisoners of the

Japanese. In 1959 Peter Ryan's *Fear Drive My Feet* appeared. There have also been a few fine novels based on front-line experience: Tom Hungerford's *The Ridge and the River*, for example.

When work on our war history was beginning one wondered anxiously how much we would be able to find out about the enemy's side of the story: what documents would survive. Who would own them, who would translate them?

For the collection and translation of German documents we in Australia have been largely dependent on work done by United Kingdom authorities, particularly the Enemy Document Section of the Cabinet Office, and the Air Ministry; and by our colleagues in New Zealand. Our interest in the details of German operations is of course fairly limited: campaigns in North Africa in 1941 and the last half of 1942, operations in Greece and Crete. For Greece and Crete we possess copies of translated reports that enable us to name the individual units and sub-units that our own troops encountered on this day or that. Indeed we can write about what was happening on 'the other side of the hill' in Crete in about as much detail as we can write about our own side. The collection and publication of Rommel's papers added greatly to everyone's knowledge of what the German leaders were thinking and doing in North Africa. And since the war a host of German generals have published memoirs. Only a few of these directly interest the Australian historian, and in any event they should, in my opinion, be used as historical source material with some caution. It is a British custom after every war to disparage our own commanders and praise the enemy's. However, our own commanders usually win the most battles and they certainly, as a rule, write more honestly about them afterwards. I don't think that we are likely to have from a German commander a memoir as frank and lucid as, for example, Lord Cunningham's *A Sailor's Odyssey* or Lord Slim's *Defeat Into Victory*.

The Japanese staffs at home and in the field destroyed many of their papers at the end of the war, although not as many as they pretended. As a result we are dependent for our knowledge of their high-level story largely on post-war interrogations of senior officers and on reports written, partly from memory, at the request of Allied commanders. If this was all we knew of the Japanese story the outlook would be grim for an Australian historian seeking details of operations in New Guinea. Fortunately so many Japanese documents were captured during the war that we are able to reconstruct their plans and the story of their operations in fairly close detail. We have not only multitudes of orders

and messages but many extracts from the diaries and letters, often very emotional, of private soldiers. These enable us to give glimpses of the conditions under which the Japanese troops were living and some idea of how they felt about it all.

Indeed, probably the Australian and American historians are now writing about some Japanese operations in the field in the South-West Pacific in more accurate detail than at this stage Japanese historians could achieve.



War historians Dr A. G. Butler, Gavin Long and Dr C. E. W. Bean at the Australian War Memorial in 1945.

One of the most stimulating aspects of a contemporary war historian's work is that official war historians in other countries are writing histories that overlap his own and, with some of them at least, he may arrange to exchange drafts and engage in argument. For example, the volumes published by United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australian war historians on Middle East campaigns were each read in draft by the historians of the other two countries and reached their final form only after voluminous discussion into which, in the aggregate, dozens of people were drawn: army, navy and air historians; diplomatic and political his-

torians; research assistants; commanders from field marshals downwards. In these exchanges our New Zealand colleagues set the pace, and established a very high standard of frankness and fervour. Our London colleagues too sometimes argued with much ardour. Seldom have we failed to reach agreement on the facts.

All this is surely very healthy, and fairly new in national historiography (although Bean in Australia and Edmonds in England, the official military historians of World War I, exchanged drafts of all overlapping volumes in the period between the wars). An account of this co-operation between national historians with illustrations of the kind of controversy that developed, and the outcome, could, I am sure, form a valuable chapter in the story of historical writing.

Incidentally, as a result of these exchanges, the historian is informed fairly promptly of high-level discussions and decisions in the other countries of which his own leaders were unaware at the time. For example, much that is of importance to Australian history, political as well as military, and was hitherto unsuspected by Australians, has appeared or will appear in the British six-volume series entitled *Grand Strategy*, and in the American Army's history of the South-West Pacific Area.


Inevitably the author of contemporary history if he knows some of the originators of his source material and something of the events it records will tend to assess it more confidently than will the historian who is writing about his ancestors. I think, however, that the senior American army historian carried the point somewhat too far when he wrote that:

The mass of records that has survived is so enormous as to make it increasingly doubtful whether history can be successfully written except by the generation that has created the records and known how to use them selectively. I am convinced that unless history is written promptly it cannot be written either correctly or adequately.³

I think we should not allow our enthusiasm for the sources of contemporary history and the conditions under which it is written to go quite as far as that. At the same time I'm sure that all working in this field believe that the advantages the contemporary historian enjoys outweigh his handicaps. □

³ Greenfield, p.6.

AMF Gold Medal and ASCO Prize Essay Competition



Eligibility to Compete

Officers and other ranks of the active and reserve lists of the Australian Military Forces are eligible to enter the competition.

Subject

Competitors may select their own subject of a military nature.

As essays may be published in the *Army Journal* or similar unclassified publications they are not to contain classified material.

Sections

There are two sections:

- (a) Senior — for officers;
- (b) Junior — for other ranks.

Prizes

The AMF Gold Medal and \$100 will be awarded to the better of the winning essays from each section provided it is of a sufficiently high standard.

\$50 will be awarded for the best essay in each section provided it is of a sufficiently high standard. In the case of two or more essays of equal merit from the same section, this prize money may be shared.

Submission of Essays

- (a) Essays are to be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate. Units are to provide typing assistance where so requested.
- (b) Length of essays is to be between 3,000 and 5,000 words.
- (c) Authorship is to be strictly anonymous. Each competitor is to adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with the motto and section identification typewritten on the outside and his name and unit address inside.
- (d) The title and page number of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay must be quoted.
- (e) Essays are to be addressed to the Secretary of the Military Board, Army Headquarters, Canberra, ACT, 2600. The envelope is to be marked 'AMF Gold Medal and ASCO Prize Essay'.

Judging

Essays will be judged by at least three referees appointed by the Chief of the General Staff.

The decision of the referees will be final. They are empowered to recommend that the AMF Gold Medal Essay and the ASCO Prize of \$100 be not awarded if, in their opinion, no essay submitted is of a sufficiently high standard.

A prize of less than \$50 may be awarded to the winning essay in either section if, in the opinion of the referees, the standard of the essay does not warrant the award of the full amount.

Promulgation of Results

The results of the competition will be promulgated in AAOs and in a notice to AROs for display on unit notice boards.

Closing Date for 1969 Competition.

The closing date for the 1969 competition is 31 March 1970 and results will be announced by 30 June 1970. ☐

The Antarctic Treaty in Operation

Raymond J. Barrett

THE Antarctic Treaty has now been in force for over seven years, and the 10th anniversary of its signing is approaching. It was signed in 1959 and entered into force in June 1961. The signatories were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR, United Kingdom, and United States.

Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland have also adhered to the treaty. However, they are not full participants because they have not, thus far, conducted the substantial scientific research activity in Antarctica required to qualify.


The treaty was hailed at the time of its signing as a novel and significant example of international co-operation. It reserved Antarctica for 'peaceful purposes only' and banned from the continent 'any measures of a military nature' and any nuclear explosions or the disposal of radioactive waste material. In addition, the various claims of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica were frozen for at least 30 years—the minimum validity of the treaty.

In effect, the signatories dedicated the continent to scientific research and pledged themselves to co-operate to the greatest extent feasible and practicable in such research. Perhaps most noteworthy was the inclusion in the treaty of a system of reciprocal open inspection to guarantee the faithful fulfilment of those stipulations.

Mr Barrett is Deputy Chief of the Programme Staff, Office of International Conferences, Department of State. A US Foreign Service officer, formerly assigned to the American Embassy in Madrid, he has served at American Embassies in Mexico City, Managua, Dublin and Cairo. He has also served with the Office of East and Southern African Affairs and was US Secretary of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence—United States and Canada, in Washington, D.C. A frequent contributor to the Military Review, this article is reprinted from the March 1969 issue of that journal.

Non-Military Activity

Research and other activity under the treaty are entirely non-military, but the actual experience is of considerable interest to the armed forces. Increased knowledge of polar environments is obviously useful. Also of concern are such matters as meteorology, oceanography, terrestrial magnetism, and global communications, all of which are affected by research in Antarctica.



Experience gained in logistic support of the US programme in Antarctica has provided an opportunity to develop logistic techniques suitable for this inhospitable environment. In a more general sense, any

practical progress in international inspection procedures is of interest and value to military and other officials concerned with international security problems.

Consultative Meetings

The expectations inspired by the signing of the Antarctic Treaty have been fully justified. Its terms are complied with scrupulously, and to date not one difficulty or complaint has occurred. The signatories meet together every two years to examine matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica and make recommendations to the signatory governments designed to carry out the principles and objectives of the treaty.

Some 64 such recommendaions have been made to date, and most of them have been placed in effect by the treaty signatories. Consultative meetings have been held in Canberra, Buenos Aires, Brussels, Santiago, and the most recent in Paris in November 1968. Each nation informs the other signatories in detail regarding its proposed activities in Antarctica for the coming year. The exchange of information has been thorough and useful.

The scientific research carried out in Antarctica has had a profound impact in many areas of knowledge. It has, in a short time, made valuable contributions to such sciences as glaciology, meteorology, oceanography, marine biology, geology, and upper atmosphere physics. Knowledge in these areas is basic to projects of such importance as possible climatic control of the planet, the multiplication of food resources, and improved means of communication.

During the 1967-68 season, for instance, the US Antarctic Research Programme carried out a great variety of scientific projects. This programme is funded by the National Science Foundation and headed by the Director, Division of Environmental Sciences, National Science Foundation. Projects were carried out in the following disciplines: upper atmosphere physics, meteorology, biology, glaciology, seismology, gravity, magnetism, ocean sciences, geology, infra-red surveys, geodesy, and cartography.

The United States also exchanged scientists or carried out co-operative investigations with Argentina, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. Approximately 200 scientists participated at one time or another during the 1967-68 programme. These scientists came from universities, Government agencies, and private research organizations across the United States.

One highlight of the 1967-68 programme was the commissioning of permanent facilities to support US research in the Antarctic (formerly

Palmer) Peninsula. The station is located at Arthur Harbour on Anvers Island and replaces temporary structures used since 1965. The new facility is designated Palmer Station and was formally commissioned on 20 March 1968.

Another outstanding event was the successful completion of the programme to drill through the icecap. This work was done at Byrd Station by engineers from the US Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory. The bottom of the icecap was reached at 7,100 feet—a depth considerably less than that calculated earlier from seismic soundings.

Also part of the US Antarctic Research Programme are the activities of the USNS *Eltanin* which is carrying out continuous systematic studies of the Antarctic seas. To date, it has completed 31 major cruises. This US naval ship, a former ice-strengthened cargo vessel, was converted in 1962 into a multi-disciplined Antarctic research ship. It is operated for the National Science Foundation by the Military Sea Transportation Service. It has an endurance of 10,000 miles, and carries a complement of 49 officers and men and a scientific complement of up to 38.

The vessel is equipped to carry out scientific investigations in marine biology and geology, geophysics, oceanography, hydrography, meteorology, and upper atmosphere physics.

The National Science Foundation also has a new research ship especially designed for work in the Antarctic area. The 125-foot sloop—named *Hero* after that of Nathaniel B. Palmer who has been credited with being the first American to view the Antarctic mainland in 1820—was launched in March 1968. It is a diesel-driven, but sail-equipped, wooden, trawler-type ship which will supplement the facilities at Palmer Station. The *Hero* serves as a floating laboratory for both marine and terrestrial investigations. In particular, it provides the first access to many coastal areas of the Antarctic Peninsula.

Impressive progress has also been made in protecting the fauna and flora in the treaty zone which includes all land and water south of 60 degrees south latitude. The treaty included provision for protecting the living natural resources in the Antarctic area. There were 28 specific recommendations made at the Santiago meeting. The Ross seal and fur seal, in danger of extinction, are to be preserved wherever they occur.

In addition, 15 geographic areas have been defined where maximum protection is given to colonies of other birds and animals. Among these are the emperor penguin, the giant petrel, the Antarctic petrel, the fulmar, and the elephant seal. Also singled out for protection are points of

ecological interest where there are concentrations of the microfauna and flora that are the basis of the Antarctic ecosystem.

These measures are of great importance because they are directed toward maintenance of the biological equilibrium in the Antarctic area. The research of recent years has shown that the alteration of natural conditions in the waters of Antarctica can affect the biological balance as far away as Ecuador.

Because of the many severe problems encountered, logistics has also been an area of mutual concern. The United States has frequently furnished logistics information to other signatories requesting it. The signatories also exchange data regarding airfields in Antarctica for emergency use. The telecommunications experts discussed their problems at a 1963 meeting.

A symposium on logistics, sponsored by the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, was held in August 1962 at Boulder, Colorado. The committee is a non-governmental group that provides scientific advice regarding research in Antarctica. Experts from the signatory countries met in Tokyo from 3 to 8 June 1968 to exchange information on the present state of knowledge about logistics in the Antarctic.

Tourism

Another topic that the signatories are finding it necessary to consider is tourism. It may seem absurd to speak of tourism in the Antarctic, but its very desolation and mystery apparently attract travellers looking for something different. As early as 1958-59, tourist flights were made from Chile over the Chilean bases on the South Shetland Islands and the Palmer Peninsula.

On other occasions, tourists actually visited Antarctic bases by traveling on Chilean ships that served as floating hotels during their brief stays in the area. In summer, the Chilean bases are easily accessible from Punta Arenas on the Strait of Magellan; the round trip takes only six to eight days.

The provision of the Antarctic Treaty that has attracted the most interest is probably that which authorizes national teams to inspect any area in Antarctica to verify compliance with the prohibitions against military uses. Inspection teams dispatched by a signatory have complete access at any time to all areas of Antarctica. The only prior requirement for sending out an inspection team is the notification of the names of the team members to all the other signatories.

The treaty provides that all areas of Antarctica—including all stations, installations, and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes of personnel in Antarctica—shall be open at all times to inspection by observers designated by signatories. Signatories are also authorized to carry out aerial observation at any time over all areas of Antarctica.

The United States, in September 1963, was the first to announce intention to conduct an inspection in Antarctica, and stated that she would welcome inspection of her stations by other signatories. Observers were appointed by the Secretary of State and cautioned that states active in Antarctica had been co-operative with the United States in matters relating to the continent, and that the US policy was to preserve this co-operative spirit.

Although the United States was the first to announce intention to make inspections, New Zealand was the first actually to do so. Two New Zealand observers visited the McMurdo Sound, the South Pole, and Byrd Stations in 1963. They reported that everything appeared to be fully consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. Australia and the United Kingdom each sent one observer in December 1963 to three US stations.

Two groups of US observers conducted inspections in January 1964. One group of three observers visited two Argentine, two Chilean, and two United Kingdom bases located in the Antarctic Peninsula area of West Antarctica. This US group was transported by a US Coast Guard ice-breaker. The other group of four US observers visited the New Zealand Scott Station near McMurdo and two Soviet Union stations in East Antarctica—Mirnyy and Vostok. US aircraft based at McMurdo Station were used for their transportation. In addition, the US observers carried out aerial photographic and visual observations of the French station, Dumont d'Urville.

The exercise of the right of inspection is particularly significant because of the territorial claims of several countries. These countries are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, but neither the Soviet Union nor the United States recognizes any of these claims. The right of inspection and its implementation are also significant because of the USSR's general resistance to inspections. The co-chairman of the Soviet delegation to the conference in Washington that drafted the Antarctic Treaty observed that the Soviet Union could agree to unlimited inspections in Antarctica 'where inspections cannot be used against national security.'

The inspections have been carried out without prejudice to the spirit of goodwill and co-operation that exists among expeditions in Antarctica. The 1966-67 US observer team reported that they 'were cordially welcomed at each station and full co-operation was extended' and that 'the spirit of cordiality and co-operation, which the treaty fosters, was evident throughout.' In fact, the sense of mutual confidence has been strengthened by the inspection results stressing that no evidence of any violations of the treaty has been found.

The Antarctic Treaty has thus been a success in practice and spirit. It has served as a model for the United Nations Outer Space Treaty on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space and would seem to be an excellent example of co-operation among nations and a step toward a peaceful world. □

MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the \$10 prize for the best original article published in the July 1969 issue of the journal to Captain E. J. Ellis for his contribution 'India'.

Water Divining

Witchcraft or Fact?

Captain K. D. Nelson, RL

THERE have been a few advocates in military circles for water divining—or dowsing, and recent droughts have contributed to a revived interest in this controversial topic. It has been related that during World War II the British Army used professional diviners to locate water in North Africa. Between world wars a distinguished British sapper officer, Brigadier-General R. F. Sorsbie¹, wrote that engineers would be wise to consult a well-known water diviner and collate the information obtained with available geological data. In view of the abundance of conflicting opinions on divining, it could be appropriate at this time to review the subject.

The science and art of divining dates back to the earliest days of man. It is claimed that the rod of Moses, which provided the ancient Israelites with water in the desert was, in fact, a divining rod. The first written record of divining appears in a Latin folio, Sebastian Munster's *Cosmographiae Universalis* (1550) which contains an interesting illustration of a diviner with an uplifted *Virgula Divina* (divining rod) striding purposefully up a hill in search for minerals. For in the Middle Ages minerals, as well as water, were located by divining rods, and indeed, in some cases, criminals. It was claimed that in 1692 a certain Jacques Aymer used his rod to trace the authors of a murder and robbery at Lyons down through the Rhone Valley and finally apprehended one culprit at Breucaire, a distance of about 150 miles. The man was charged and immediately confessed. It appears that in mediaeval times the diviner could follow a criminal like a black tracker.

The use of the rod for mining appears to have been first employed in Saxony, and was later brought to England during the reign of

Captain Nelson graduated from the University of Wales where he gained the Colonel Page Prize in Engineering. He initially served with the Royal Air Force and was later commissioned in the British Army. He joined the Reserve of Officers (RAE) in 1952 and returned to the Active List in 1953 with the 22 Construction Regt. RAE (SR). Captain Nelson saw active service in Burma during World War II and was at the siege of Imphal.

In civil life he is Engineer-in-Charge, Farm Water Supplies with the Soil Conservation Authority of Victoria, has published over twenty technical articles and papers and is co-author of *The Dictionary of Applied Geology*.

Elizabeth I. Price, in his standard work (1778), claimed that nearly all mines in Cornwall were discovered by the divining rod.

Some supporters of divining have attributed practically magical powers to the rod. Henry de France², for example, claimed that he was able to ascertain whether certain buried articles of silver had been removed from a site. His claims for water location are somewhat more cautiously framed, and he warns the potential diviner that 'it is useless to look for water where geology tells us there cannot be any'.

The divining rod passes under a variety of names such as *Virgula Divina*, *Baculus Divinatorius*, *Caduceus*, or 'Mercury's Wand', 'Jacob's Rod', 'Aaron's Rod', or Dowsing Rod. In earlier days the popular form was a forked branch of hazel, willow, or holly. During this period it was considered necessary for a forked twig of hazel to be cut about sunset or sunrise, by a man standing in a specific position, ensuring that the sun's rays passed through the fork of the twig.

Nowadays apparently any twig will suffice, although some diviners appear to favour watch springs, fencing wire, whale bones, or similar devices. Other dowsers prefer the pendulum which is a polished stone suspended by a string; the direction of rotation (i.e., clockwise or anti-clockwise) and its speed having a certain significance to the holder. Some, like Gataker, had a splendid disregard for all such appendages and employed their hands only.

Tompkins, a very well-known Wiltshire diviner, relates how he discovered his power. He first watched a professional diviner at work and then cut himself a similar white thorn twig. He took the twig to his own farm and:

After walking a distance of eighty yards or so, I suddenly felt a running or creeping sensation come into my feet, it went up my legs and back and down my arms, which caused me to look to see what had happened. I noticed the rod began to rise in my hands. I gripped it still tighter to prevent it, and kept walking; still I found the sensation got stronger and stronger, and that I was being led in a zig-zag course, the twig at the same time exercising a greater determination to turn up. So strong had this influence become that I was powerless to keep it down, and eventually after proceeding some distance farther, it attained a vertical position and revolved over and over. So great was this sudden and unexpected pressure or influence on me that I fainted and became very ill, and I at once threw the rod away thinking Old Harry was not far off.³


In spite of condemnation by scientists and geologists, supporters of divining have come from many highly educated people, including

¹ Sorsbie, R. F. *Geology for Engineers* (1938)


² de France, H. *The Modern Dowsers*

³ Tompkins, B. *Theory of Water Finding by the Divining Rod* (1893)


churchmen. Many attempts have been made to justify divining. One is based on the belief that the muscles of an individual, possessing a sensitive nervous system, can act on the rod and thus guide him onto the site of water. Other people believe the rod is not so important, but the presence of ground-water reacts and manifests itself on the nervous system of the diviner. Again, some attribute the divining power to certain magnetic or




hazel twig



watch spring



fencing wire



stone pendulum

DIVINING DEVICES

electric influences, or to variations in atmospheric influences, or to variations in humidity and temperature. These influences could be regarded as similar to those that appear to affect some sensitive people before a storm. Another suggestion is that diviners possess supersensitive hearing which enables them to 'hear' underground streams. Tompkins

felt that he was influenced by electricity, and that if he stood on insulating material he lost his power. It is interesting to note that other diviners claim that if they were insulated from the ground, but not aware of it, they were successful. This suggests that the knowledge of insulation was really the inhibiting factor.⁴

Henri Mager⁵ believed that it was the rod itself that responded to an external force and claimed that all bodies (including water) emitted lines of forces which were in turn recorded by the divining device. Mager's claims were summarily dismissed by the US Geological Survey. A. J. Ellis⁶ stated that: 'In all its weird history no more extravagant and absurd claims were ever made for the divining rod than those which are maintained at the present time by H. Mager'.

It must be remembered that, in many areas, the dowser's success was due to the existence of a widespread aquifer, consequently water may be easily obtained anywhere in the district. However, the divining rod is tested only where it indicated water and not in instances when a negative result is obtained, although water might exist on the site. Hence in these areas a very high success rate is inevitable.

Even in areas familiar to the diviner, the chances of success appear to be a matter of luck, and often so unsuccessful that Ackermann in his *Popular Fallacies* (3rd Edition 1923) is justified in including 'that water divining is usually successful' in his list of popular delusions.

Any leisured reader who wishes to further study the subject should obtain the pamphlet entitled *The Divining Rod: A History of Water Witching* (US Geological Survey Department 1917) which contains a bibliography of nearly 600 books.

Over one hundred years ago, the celebrated British civil engineer, William Smith (the 'Father of English Geology') related how he tramped with a diviner on the Mendips. Smith surreptitiously dropped a pebble each time water was located and on the return journey, over the same belt of ground, the test was repeated; none of the previous findings were indicated but new locations were discovered. Later William Smith slyly concluded that 'as the water had changed its situation at all points, it would be imprudent to spend money following it.'

Possibly the most valuable evidence for assessing the claims of water diviners is information gathered by the Water Commission and

⁴ Nelson, A. *The Divining Rod* (1948)

⁵ Gregory, J. W. *Water Divining*

⁶ US Geological Survey 'Water Supply Paper' (1917)

Irrigation Commission (NSW). The results were given in a table (reproduced below) in a paper by W. H. Williamson, senior hydrogeologist of that commission.⁷

BORES CONSTRUCTED BY THE WC&IC BETWEEN 1918 AND 1945
(1945 was the last year in which such records were kept)

	Divined Number Sunk	Per Cent	Not Divined Number Sunk	Per Cent
Bores in which supplies of serviceable water estimated at 100 gallons per hour or over were obtained	1,291	70.4	1,516	83.9
Bores in which supplies of serviceable water estimated at less than 100 gallons per hour were obtained	185	10.1	96	5.3
Bores in which supplies of unserviceable water were obtained	87	4.8	61	3.4
Bores—absolute failures, no water of any kind obtained	269	14.7	133	7.4
TOTAL	<u>1,832</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>1,806</u>	<u>100.0</u>

(In about half these cases, the landholders required the bores to be sunk on a divined site)

These bores were drilled for settlers in central New South Wales and the high success of all drilling was partly due to the existence of the Great Artesian Basin. The settlers were entirely free to employ diviners or select their own sites.

From the table it is interesting to note that:


- 3,638 bores were sunk, of which about half were divined and half not divined.
- For divined bores, the absolute failures were twice as high as that for non-divined bores.

The following quotation from *Military Engineering Volume VI* is, perhaps, apt as a concluding note: 'The finding of a supply of water for an army in the field is too serious a matter to be left to the indefinite powers of a water diviner'.⁸ □

⁷ Williamson, W. H. 'Water Divining — 1969'

⁸ *ME Volume VI* 'Water Supply & Petroleum Installation' (1956)

REVIEWS



THE COLD WAR AS HISTORY, BY LOUIS J. HALLE. (Chatto and Windus, 1967, \$7.80).

Reviewed by Major J. R. MacPherson, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada.

LOUIS J. Halle's book is an attempt to portray the events of the Cold War in historical perspective. It is an ambitious undertaking, and only history can judge its success.

The basic theme of the book is that events and circumstances control men more often than men control events. 'History', says Halle, 'is like a Shakespearean tragedy'. Rejecting the ideological view of the conflict as being 'in essence, a myth', he adopts a sympathetic approach to both sides, and portrays the issues in terms of national interests, and the historical and contemporary influences which lay behind those interests.

Mr Halle's portrayal is enlivened by his explorations of the thoughts, motives and personalities of the policy makers on both sides. Many of his observations are based on personal experience in the US State Department, but when dealing with many Communist leaders he is forced to some conjecture. This, however, is soundly based and his conclusions are difficult to fault. He distributes praise and blame impartially. He strongly condemns, for example, the policies of John Foster Dulles, but also points out the personal characteristics and the situation on the American political scene which led to them.

The author lays the blame for the Cold War on the destruction of the balance of power in Europe after World War II. He points out the motives, based on history, which led the Soviets to exploit the situation, with the resulting counter-action by the West. From here he leads the reader through the major events which followed, outlining the practical motives of both sides, and reinforcing his theme that once events reached a certain point, inevitable reactions were forced on the leaders involved. He refuses to accept the 'good versus evil' approach and, in fact, considers that the ideological interpretation often obscured the real issues, led to dangerous situations, and prevented achievement of a *détente* on those occasions when one appeared possible. In keeping with this approach, he rejects the theory of a

Moscow-directed conspiracy for world domination, in terms of Soviet national interest.

The author also concludes that the current US involvement in South-East Asia is based on a misapprehension, but points out that 'however unwise its origin', it has become an inescapable commitment.

Mr Halle fixes the end of the Cold War, as a historical period, at the Cuban crisis of 1962. He makes no bold predictions for the future, but sees hope that in the major crises to date both sides have refrained from nuclear violence.

Mr Halle's detachment is admirable, and his book well written and interesting. He is sometimes repetitive, but to good effect. Whether or not one agrees with all his conclusions, his thought-provoking analysis is highly recommended to the military reader or student of world affairs. □

THE MONTGOMERY LEGEND, BY R. W. THOMPSON. (Allen and Unwin, 1967, \$5.40).

Reviewed by Major K. J. Bladen, Royal Australian Infantry.

THIS book examines the foundations and the substance of the legend surrounding Field Marshal Montgomery, his Western Desert Campaign and the turn of the tide in 1942.

In the summer of that year both the British Prime Minister and the British people needed a 'champion' in the field—a 'conquering hero' plain for all to see and acclaim. Churchill needed a victory to prevent Britain being relegated to a minor role by the sheer weight and power of her great ally. It is, in the author's view, one of the ironies of history that Montgomery should have been the chosen instrument in that fateful hour since he became a legend and legends tend to obscure rather than reveal the true facts of history.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I seeks to show that Alamein was an unnecessary battle fought on a second-hand plan to finish off an already defeated enemy. Although the author evidently wrote the book partly out of a desire to see justice done to General Claude Auchinleck, he does him little service in trying to show that Auchinleck would have fought the Battle of Alam Halfa in the same way and even more decisively than did Montgomery. Auchinleck certainly stopped Rommel but he never looked like regaining the initiative against him, stretched and weak though Rommel then was.

Part II gives a critical picture of Montgomery as a commander but it is not a good caricature; anyone who knows Montgomery would probably fail to recognize it and in many respects Mr Thompson is way off the mark. The following examples are typical of the author's description: 'Montgomery was completely formed as a soldier at the end of World War I. He did not grow after that. He became increasingly efficient but he did not absorb a new idea . . . There was only one view and it was his view . . . He was at times incapable of accepting ideas from outside unless an opportunity was arranged for him to present them as his own.'

Part III purports to be a critical study of Alamein. The author infers that if Montgomery had planned the battle better there would have been less hard fighting. He also levels criticism that the battle did not go exactly as planned; battles seldom do. Some just points of criticism are made however, particularly about the grouping of the infantry and armour in different corps and about the failure of the immediate pursuit.

Part IV continues with a critical account of the operations on to Tripoli and Tunis and briefly with Sicily and Italy but the author's gibes at Montgomery's publicity tend to blur the picture of the battles.

Although the author writes in compelling and sometimes brilliant fashion, the reader is not left with the idea that he has set out objectively to find the truth and impartially assess Montgomery's ability. Mr Thompson castigates Montgomery for a multitude of sins, among them for his 'ponderous methods and elaborate precautions', for 'his obvious pleasure in himself' and for his belief that there was 'only one kind of training, his training, only one kind of fighting, his fighting . . .'

Despite its controversial nature most readers should find *The Montgomery Legend* both refreshing and informative. The book deserves to be widely read and is thoroughly recommended to all readers in general and Army readers in particular. □

THE OBSERVER'S FIGHTING VEHICLES DIRECTORY, WORLD WAR II, edited by Bart H. Vanderveen (Frederick Warne and Co Ltd, London and New York, 1969, pp. 340. 25s.)

DEPENDING on one's point of view, the title of this book could be misleading. Though AFVs, both wheeled and tracked are included, it

deals mainly with 'B' or 'soft skin' vehicles and as a comprehensive catalogue of these it fills a need that has so far been unsatisfied.

To try and cover these vehicles in the combatant services of World War II is a mammoth task. It is greatly complicated by the necessity of sorting the impressed vehicles from those built for Navy, Army and Air Force purposes and of recognizing the myriad modifications that were carried out officially and unofficially.

The author, Bart Vanderveen, apart from a personal interest in the subject, is a member of an organization that has produced a number of books on motor cars, ranging from Cugnot to modern times.

The Observer series of books cover a variety of subjects from veteran cars to postage stamps. This book is an excellent addition to the series, though in reality it is a better, larger version than those produced before. It has some 900 illustrations, most of them photographs, on glossy paper and is well bound in cloth of an appropriate 'olive drab'—with a coloured dust jacket.

The book is divided into sections for the USA, Britain, British Commonwealth, USSR, Germany, Italy and Japan. Each section is sub-divided into sub-sections covering the different types of vehicles. Accompanying the illustrations are technical details and each sub-section has general notes on the particular class of vehicle referred to.

Surprisingly, there is no section devoted to France who, at the beginning of the war, had some outstandingly interesting vehicles. As the Germans used captured vehicles and the industries of occupied countries were producing for the Wehrmacht, names such as Renault, Citroen, Peugeot and Unic appear in the German section.

Experts in a particular field may be able to fault sections, but the information supplied, as shown by a check in the relevant war-time catalogue, is remarkably accurate. In some instances it is more informative than the catalogue. The US catalogue, for instance, lists: 'Carriage, motor, Howitzer, 75-mm, M.8 (SNLC 127)' yet this book tells us that the M8 was a modification of an M5 light tank mounting a 75-mm gun.

A great deal of trouble has been taken to get to the source, so much so that the photograph illustrating one particular Australian vehicle is the identical photograph appearing in the war-time 'Directorate of Mechanical Vehicles' catalogue.

There are many weird and wonderful vehicles illustrated; some of which never got beyond the prototype stage. In it are those fascinating Italian artillery tractors, to be found adorning vehicle parks during the

desert campaign. One finds the early open Volkswagen and a later modification that so closely resembles the present day 'beetle'; and the stages through which prototypes progressed to become known as the 'jeep'.

One surprising fact to emerge from a study of the book is that the fire engines and crash vehicles in the British services during the war were Austin, Bedford, Crossley, Ford, Karrier or Leyland, but not Dennis, whose fire engines are to be found all over the world. Dennis only supplied vehicles for other purposes.

In the 'Tracked Combat Vehicle' section for Britain, mention is made of the 'Matilda', but none is shown, which is a pity as this was in all probability the best known Infantry tank of the war, certainly the one most affectionately remembered by Commonwealth infantrymen.

For the vintage enthusiasts the appearance of hallowed names such as Tatra, Horch, Wanderer, Adler, Austro-Daimler, OM, Ceirano, Bianchi, Steyr and Spa will please though, sad to relate, no mention is made of the World War I Rolls Royce armoured cars, some of which were still in service in Iraq at the outbreak of World War II.

Since World War II there has been a spate of 'car' books and the ones appearing these days rely for sales on a hitherto unpublished photograph or the description of an unusual vehicle, amongst a lot of material and illustrations that have been hashed over for years.

This book is a complete departure into a sphere that has been neglected and the editor and publishers are to be congratulated, if only for quitting the well-trodden path.

It is an excellent book and of great interest and value to all types of people, from schoolboys to the experts. — G. M. C. □