

ARMY JOURNAL

Editor: C. F. Coady

Staff Artist: G. M. Capper

Printed and published for the Australian Army by The Dominion Press, and issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of one per officer, officer of cadets, and cadet under officer.

Contributions which should be addressed to the Editor, Army Journal, Directorate of Military Training, Army Headquarters Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers.

\$10 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of \$60 and \$20 respectively will be awarded to the authors gaining first and second places in the year.

The information given in this Journal is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not authorized to receive it.

UNCLASSIFIED

COVER: Detail from war artist G. R. Mainwaring's large canvas 'The 18th Brigade attack on Cape Endaiadere, Buna, December, 1942', at the Australian War Memorial.

ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical review of military literature

No. 242, JULY 1969.

Contents

- 3 Drop Dead Soldier?
Colonel C. Stuart
- 7 China's PLA
Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Zanghi and Major G. F. Boileau
- 21 Plan XVII
Lynette Chaffey
- 34 The Staff System — A Change
Major A. A. Partridge
- 39 India
Captain E. J. Ellis

CROWN COPYRIGHT RESERVED.

No article in this Journal is to be reproduced in whole or in part.

**The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own
and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.**



(Australian War Memorial)

A member of the 2/8th Battalion using a flame-thrower on Japanese bunkers in the Wewak area, 27 June 1945.

Drop Dead Soldier?

Colonel C. Stuart* MC, ED

Royal Australian Army Medical Corps

TODAY in Vietnam, if you are unlucky, you may be hit in a vital area of the body by a high velocity projectile and drop dead. But the chances are much more likely that you will be killed in a road accident in Australia. However, neither of these incidents are related to the subject of this presentation. I am concerned here with you dropping dead from a heart attack, or, medically speaking, of coronary artery disease. It can strike you down in a flash and at any age from 25 to 55, or even later. In fact, it has often been recorded that a patient has just come out of a doctor's surgery having had a complete check up and suddenly dropped dead on the doorstep. A doctor friend of mine dropped dead the other day at the age of 39; another had a severe coronary attack at the age of 45 and his outlook is grim.

How does all this concern the Army? We only enlist fit men and we check everyone over annually. National Servicemen have to be about 120% fit, if there is such a degree of fitness, because we can be so selective.

Heart disease is the major cause of death throughout the world today, and it occurs at all ages. Let me give you some figures. In the USA some 500,000 people die each year from heart disease and there are some 3 million people who suffer from this disease and are 'heart cripples', living under drugs with a very restricted life: nearly 20 million people in America suffer some degree of insufficiency of blood supply to the heart. The disease appears to mark out the most active and responsible groups in society for attack. The heart attack is so common among professional people, executives and men in public office that it has become almost a status symbol. If all men in these groups were forced to retire, as airline pilots automatically do, the shortage of

*Colonel Stuart served with the Indian Army Medical Services (1941-46) and was awarded the Military Cross at Monte Cassino, Italy in 1944. He later served with the New Zealand Medical Corps before joining the RAAMC as a captain in 1953. After CMF service as an RMO and with 1 Special Hospital he was appointed CO 7/13 Field Ambulance in 1958. He became DDMS Western Command in August 1961, a post he still holds.

manpower at the top levels of government, the services, industry and the professions in the United States would cripple the nation.

In Australia there are some 32,000 deaths each year from the disease and a large number of heart sufferers. As this disease affects people in the so called prime of life—in the 35 to 55 age bracket—it becomes a matter of real concern when commanders in the forces and top administrative officers fall into this group. These are the key men in the command and control of an army. It is interesting that many of the American astronauts fall into the 35 to 45 age bracket, and these men must be in the peak of condition both physically and mentally.

The problem is whether or not we can assess or predict if any particular individual is likely to drop dead with a coronary attack, or even have an attack which will make him a cardiac cripple and therefore be of very little real use to the modern army. Or can we prevent such an attack by specific measures? Have we today any special measures or methods which will give us a very accurate assessment of the true condition of a man's coronary arteries? Can we prevent a terminal attack, alleviate the condition or prevent or reverse the progress of the disease?

A number of factors clearly indicate the increased risk of the disease. These risk factors are:

- Increasing age.
- Male sex.
- Family history of coronary heart disease.
- Diabetes.
- Cigarette smoking.
- Obesity.
- Sedentary habits.
- Blood pressure above normal.
- Elevated blood lipid (fat) concentration.
- Electrocardiogram abnormalities.

When more than one risk factor is present the effect is cumulative. Now you soldiers of 35 to 55 just tick off how many of these factors apply to you. The more that apply the greater the chances of developing coronary heart disease and the greater the chance you have of dropping dead without hearing a shot fired in anger. In effect, you have sealed your future by heavy smoking, overeating and sitting at a desk all day.

You will get little personal benefit from all those DFRB contributions. A heavy cigarette smoker has nearly twice the risk of the non-smoker.

The aim of the Army Medical Services is essentially the prevention of disease and the maintenance of health. We do much to prevent disease by our rigid vaccination and inoculation programmes. We protect you from malaria with suppressive drugs. We ensure you are well covered medically in all camps, exercises and in operations against live enemy. If you get wounded in Vietnam your chances of survival and complete recovery have never been better. In fact the Vietnam War is the greatest in history for the high survival rate of a wounded soldier. You can be brought to definitive resuscitation and surgery in a matter of minutes. But if you get a severe coronary attack we can almost write you off: at least you will get a military funeral.

Can anything be done to diagnose this disease in its early stages, and if so can it be actively treated or even cured? I was stimulated to study this disease on a recent visit to the USA where I spent some time at a place called the 'Cleveland Clinics' in Cleveland, Ohio. Here a doctor called Mason Sones Jr. has set up a heart laboratory solely for the purpose of studying the coronary arteries of people of all ages who have unexplained symptoms which suggest coronary disease. He examines all these patients by a complicated technique of placing a catheter in each coronary artery in turn, and under X-ray control and intensification through closed circuit television he injects a substance opaque to X-rays, at the same time taking about 200 feet of 35-mm movie film while the arteries fill and empty. It is quite fantastic and dramatic to watch this man work, and so far he has done over 12,000 of these examinations. Patients are referred to him from all over North America. His results are impressive:

- 30% of patients are shown to have normal coronary arteries, and can go back to full work.
- 30% have minor changes of arterial disease which is of little significance.
- 30%+ have frank evidence of the disease and this group are then considered for surgery, of which several new techniques have been developed with quite remarkable results.

It should be mentioned here that the usual method of testing the heart by an electrocardiogram has some limitations today and complete reliance cannot always be placed on this method.

In summary, soldier, and this applies to all ranks, if you want to live your normal life span and keep the coronary arteries healthy:

- Stop smoking.
- Stop overeating.
- Give up fatty foods.
- Get plenty of exercise—and I don't mean golf once a week.
- Keep your blood pressure down.


and see all your subordinates do likewise. □

BENGAZI—FEBRUARY 1941

A kind of frenzy possessed the Australians now in their utter determination to have Benghazi at once. I cannot conceive that anything would have stopped them from that Wednesday night on. But now hail and rain came that turned the countryside into red mud and slush. Every few kilometres the tracks were blown away by the Italian rearguard, which was fighting only for time and still more time in which to organize and make a stand. Australian engineers slaved at the head of the column until men in their ranks were forced to drop out through sheer exhaustion, while others came forward to take their places. Soon it developed into a contest between the engineers and the squads of Italian minelayers and dynamiters. All that first day after Barce, while the storm still gathered force, the Australians kept flinging boulders into craters along the roads or breaking open new roads along the goat tracks. Kilometre by kilometre—yard by yard sometimes—the troops moved forward. It was a forty-mile-long column of vehicles that crashed over tank-traps and plunged headlong into valleys and across ruined gaps in the railway line. Nowhere could the Italians destroy the way sufficiently to hold them more than an hour or two.

—Alan Moorehead, *The Desert War* (1965)

China's PLA



'Political power grows
out of the barrel of a gun.'

Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Zanghi and Major G. F. Boileau

ON 17 June 1967 the explosion of the first Chinese hydrogen bomb reverberated round the earth, serving notice that the 'sleeping giant' had finally awakened. China-watchers everywhere began to make predictions as to what the future held. Many of these predictions raised the spectre of hordes of Chinese soldiers spilling over the borders of China and engulfing the rest of the world.


The tendency of the Western World to portray opponents as supermen was once again being exhibited. Each success by the opponent tends, through the impact of the mass news media and distorted or pessimistic expressions of views by prominent figures, to become high-lighted as evidence of the opponent's superiority. In time the opponent becomes a ten-foot colossus whereas our personnel, by inference, become puny, poorly-trained and ill-equipped. The Japanese and Germans in World War II, Russia after World War II, the Chinese Communists in Korea, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have all been portrayed as supermen. China has again replaced Russia as the bogey-man of the world.

Does China measure up to this position as the world's bogey-man? The question to be answered is—Are we ascribing to China a role and strength beyond her capabilities or a realistic capability, based upon

facts and figures with a mixture of astute assessment? It is with this in mind that we look at the Chinese People's Liberation Army.*

Control of Armed Forces


Before looking at the organization of the Armed Forces, primarily the Chinese Communist Army, in detail it is useful to know the controlling elements at national level. The control of the Armed Forces is vested in the National People's Congress, or when the Congress is not in session, in its Standing Committee. The Congress elects the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, who is *ex officio* Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the National Defence Council. Based upon recommendations from the Chairman of the People's Republic the Congress chooses the members who will make up the National Defence Council (NDC), a policy making, planning and advisory organization. The Congress also selects the members of the State Council, or 'Cabinet', of which the Minister of National Defence is a part. Overall policy for the Armed Forces is formulated and implemented by the Communist Party through its Political Bureau and the Military Affairs Committee. It can therefore be seen that the Communist Party's Control of the Armed Forces is achieved through the Party's interlocking dominance over the composition of the National People's Congress, its Standing Committee, the State Council, and by the direct party control of the Armed Forces' political organization (Figure 1).



* People's Liberation Army is a collective term used to denote the Army, Navy, Air Force, Public Security and Border Defence Troops of China.

Headquarters, People's Liberation Army

Since our concern is with the military we will look at how the Armed Forces are controlled by the Minister of National Defence. This erstwhile individual, presently Marshal Lin Piao, commands the Chinese Armed Forces through a series of staff departments which carry out the functions normally done by a 'General Staff' (Figure 2). A quick glance



(1) General Staff Department is principal coordinator for combat operations.

(2) General Political Department most powerful - exercises political control and surveillance over policy and personnel; has own separate administrative and command channels paralleling military command channels.

HEADQUARTERS, PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

reveals that there is no 'Army Headquarters' listed. The lack of an 'Army Headquarters' *per se* emphasizes the fact that the present Chinese Military establishment is basically a land force with its support arms and specialized services. The staff departments perform the dual role of serving as an 'Army Headquarters' and as a 'General Staff' for the entire Armed Forces.

Territorial Organization and Control

The establishment of geographic areas such as military regions, districts, sub-districts, and garrison commands facilitates the control of the Armed Forces. There are presently thirteen military regions in China (Figure 3). Military regions that include two or more provinces are divided into military districts.

The Military Region Commander controls the land forces located within his region and he may also command air and naval units in his




Figure 3

region. The Commander is responsible for supervising, training and supporting not only the regular forces in his area but also the militia and special commands. The responsibility for local administration, logistic support, mobilization and conscription, militia and veteran's affairs, in most cases, is delegated to the Military District Commander. There are presently twenty military districts in China and district boundaries usually follow provincial boundaries.


There are at least ten garrison commands in China today and these are established in the principal cities. The Garrison Commander is responsible for the defence of the cities and for the securing of the populace. Units involved in these tasks vary in size from companies to armies. Depending upon the size of the city, the Garrison Commander reports directly to either the military district or military region headquarters.

Armed Forces

The Chinese Communist Army (CCA). The Chinese Communist Army of approximately 2.3 million personnel is drawn from a population estimated at about 800 million people.¹

¹ Based on a projection of the US Bureau of Census Estimate of 760 million people in January 1966 and an annual increase of about 14 million people per year. Of this population base, approximately 190 million would be males of military age.


The CCA is comprised of approximately 35 armies, consisting of 118 divisions — 106 infantry, 4/5 armoured, 3/4 cavalry and 2/3 airborne. In addition there are some 20 artillery and 12 railway engineer divisions.



- (1) Average battalion strength = 300–500 men.
- (2) Artillery allotted as required.
- (3) Division lacks sufficient motor transport for complete mobility.

An army² is usually composed of three or four divisions, depending on its area of deployment in China and would have the usual supporting arms and services attached to it (Figure 4).

The Infantry Division. The basic CCA formation, the Infantry Division, is most commonly estimated at a strength of 12,000 to 17,000 men although Griffith³ appears to hold the division at about 10,000 men.



- (1) Companies about 150 men.

INFANTRY DIVISION


Ignoring the normal uncertainties of estimating the military organizations of a closed society, the variations in estimated strengths may derive in

² 'Army' is a misnomer. The size and scope of this formation compares with a US corps.

³ Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (McGraw-Hill 1967) p. 220.

part from actual variations in establishment. With the CCA dispersed over 3.8 million square miles, ranging from reclaimed land on the coastal areas to the heights of Tibet, and from the jungles of Yunnan to the deserts of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, significant organizational variations must be expected. In its heaviest form the Chinese Infantry Division might appear as shown in Figure 5.

There are some interesting differences between the Chinese infantry division and the Australian division, which numbers just under 15,000 men; e.g., the overall administrative complement. The Australian division, ignoring the organic capacity of the tactical units, has about 2,600 supply and transport, medical, ordnance and electrical and mechanical engineers personnel. The more heavily manned Chinese division has approximately a third of this amount or about 800 Rear Services (administrative) personnel. The Chinese division lacks an organic truck lift capability and its motive power is measured in terms of footpower, not horsepower. Thus, the Australian division is superior in mobility and has a better inter-communication capability. On the other hand the Chinese division is superior in terms of firepower from the FDLs out to about 500 metres. This phenomenon is due to the great number of automatic small arms and mortars which are found in a Chinese infantry unit.



The Armoured Division. There are four or five armoured divisions, each with approximately 100 tanks (Figure 6). The major Chinese AFVs are T34 and T54 medium tanks (the T59 is a Chicom copy of the T54) and JS-2 heavy tanks. The T34, a world War II Soviet-type, mounts an 85-millimetre gun while the T54 mounts a 100-millimetre gun. Both are effective AFVs. The JS-2 carries a 122-millimetre high velocity gun, has good armour and performs well off the road. The division has a two-battalion infantry regiment (APC mounted) and within the armoured

regiment there is an assault gun company which can serve as tracked artillery. The organization provides a degree of flexibility in that it would allow the Chinese to use two self-contained task forces in simultaneous operations. The Chinese armoured division is a relatively lightly armoured unit when compared with the Soviet or US armoured divisions which have about 350 tanks each. It compares quite favourably to the Australian armoured forces which are comprised of approximately 50 tanks per regiment when at full strength.



Medium Tank T-34



Medium Tank T-54

The Chinese armour organization doubtlessly derives from Soviet influence as there is no significant body of Chinese tank warfare experience and little apparent Chinese armoured doctrine.

There is some doubt about the Chinese Army's capacity to fight the armoured formation because of the lack of internal communications.⁴ It is also doubtful that the Chinese would be able to furnish the logistic support necessary for the use of armoured units in sustained mobile warfare.




Figure 7.

- (1) Battalions may, in fact, be organized into two regiments of three battalions each.
- (2) 122 Gun has a range of about 22,000 metres.
- (3) 152 Gun/How has a range of approximately 17,000 metres.

ARTILLERY DIVISION 1.




Figure 8.

- (1) Battalions may be organized into regiments of three battalions each.
- (2) Rocket launchers are multi-tubed (32 tubes per launcher).

ARTILLERY DIVISION 2.

Artillery. The CCA has a variety of artillery formations broken down into three general groups—anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and gun or howitzer artillery divisions. Of most significance to us are the gun and howitzer divisions organized as shown in Figures 7 and 8. The Chinese

⁴ Griffith, p. 221.

employ these artillery units much in the manner of the British and the mixed artillery organization permits flexible artillery groupings. Major equipment consists of Chinese copies of Soviet type material. Normally the artillery is allocated to Army who further sub-allocate it to lower echelons as desired.

In general, the CCA division does not possess as much artillery as a US division but it does have more than the Australian division. The CCA is much better equipped today than it was during the days of the Korean War. The Chinese were quick to learn that a lot of firepower, accurately delivered, was of great value in battle. To date, the only opportunities available to the Chinese for testing its new organization would have been their conflicts with India. The value of information gained from these conflicts would have been slight because of the limited use of artillery in the rather mountainous terrain.

Role of the Army

The Chinese Army, to a much greater degree than Western armies, has always been deeply involved in non-military affairs. It has been, and continues to be, a tool used by the Party in carrying out Party policy. For this reason the army has been involved in building bridges, irrigation dams and dikes, and producing its own food in many areas of China. Since the beginning of the 'Cultural Revolution' in mid-1966, the army has become even more heavily committed in its role of carrying out the Party's wishes as identified and enunciated in Peking. It is not unreasonable to assume that at least 50% of the army is involved in administering provincial affairs, assisting in the restoration of the Chinese school system, planting and harvesting crops, assisting in the collection of grain taxes, day-to-day police activities, 'support-the-left' movements, and myriad mundane affairs not ordinarily related to military duties. This extraordinary involvement in non-military functions could not help but have a deleterious effect on the overall fighting capability of the army. It also gives cause for speculation as to what would happen in China if the army were moved out of its normal deployment areas in order that it might participate in some offensive military adventure in Asia.

Deployment

The Chinese Army appears to be deployed primarily in a defensive rather than an offensive posture, although it is admitted that some of the sites where the troops are now located could easily serve as jumping-off points for offensive operations, for example, the Fukien-Chekiang area opposite Taiwan which contains the heaviest concentration of troops, roughly six or seven armies. There are three or four armies along the

North Korean border and another five or six armies are spread throughout Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In South China, including the North Vietnamese border region, Yunnan province and Hainan Island, there are thirteen or fourteen armies. There are probably two or three armies in the Sinkiang/Tibet areas.⁵ The only Chinese troops out of country are the estimated 30,000 to 50,000 troops⁶ involved in providing assistance to North Vietnam. The army is scattered throughout the length and breadth of China, but it is interesting to note that the distribution of forces is coincident with the most populous areas. Despite the fact that the army is widely scattered and deeply involved in non-military duties throughout the country, it appears to be adequately disposed for defensive operations by Peking in the unlikely event of an attack by external forces. On the other hand, Peking would probably require one to three months in order to outfit and move its units forward in an offensive role, contingent, of course, upon the scope of operations envisioned by the planners in Peking.

Role of the Individual

What of the key link—the soldier—who makes this machine operate? What sort of man is he?

One thing that should be remembered when discussing the Chinese soldier is the fact that about seventy five to eighty per cent of the people lead a rather earthy, spartan life. Generally this type of person is capable of enduring tremendous hardships; has a great ability for moving across country, particularly at night, is skilful in the art of camouflage. He receives an adequate training in the basic military skills such as foot drill, marksmanship, map reading, squad training, night movement etc. Interspersed throughout this military training is, by Western standards, an inordinate amount of time spent in political indoctrination. This training is capable of forging a well-trained soldier who is fanatically brave and hardy. However, there are some flaws in this picture. The overall level of education is quite low. Many soldiers are incapable of reading even the basest form of material. Verbal communication is complicated because of the many dialects existing in China. The majority of soldiers, officers and ORs now lack combat experience. Beneath the 'inscrutable' oriental exterior lies a very emotional individual who can quickly lose faith in his system if the battle goes against his side.⁷ Probably one of the most surprising aspects of the Korean War, from the point of view of the UN

⁵ *Newsweek*, March 1965, p. 21.

⁶ US estimates as reported in various newspapers.

⁷ See *The Chinese Communist Army in Action* by Alexander L. George (1967) for an excellent study on the Chinese Army and the individual soldier.

interrogation specialists, was the Chinese soldier's willingness to talk, albeit his overall knowledge was generally very scanty.

The low level of education limits the extent of technological innovations which can be introduced into the organization, thus preventing the adoption of any startling new military tactics or techniques.

On the other hand, the Western soldiers come from rather affluent societies. Thus, their commanders tend to coddle them by catering to their 'needs'. One only has to look to Vietnam to see the tremendous US logistic effort required in supplying ice cream, ice-cold drinks, hot meals, recreation centres and various items of similar nature. In this respect the Australian soldier is not pampered quite as much as the American soldier. Despite this molly-coddling, however, the Western soldier is a well-educated, adaptable individual with a great deal of ingenuity and a great sense of humour which allows him to poke fun at his system while fighting for the system. Therefore, the only limits on flexibility of tactics and the introduction of new equipment and techniques is the vision of the planners and the resources available for new equipment.

The Nuclear Threat

After 16 October 1964 Western nuclear experts concentrated their attention on the Lop Nor region of Sinkiang province. Since the detonation of her first nuclear device on that October day there have been eight Chinese nuclear tests reported by the United States Atomic Energy Commission. China has decidedly established her claim as a major nuclear power.



Surface-to-Surface Guided Missile SS-3 'Shyster'


Now that China has shown she has the technical know-how we must speculate as to the type delivery system she will use. If one believes that China has missiles as she claims, the missile family would probably be an SS3 (Shyster) or an SS4 (Sandal), both Soviet designed.⁸ These

⁸ Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy claims on page 346 of the *Penkovskiy Papers*, published in 1965, that the Soviets had given conventional missiles to the Chinese.

are single-stage, medium range, ballistic missiles using liquid propellant. They are road mobile and move on a special two-axle trailer. Their ranges are estimated to be 700 nautical miles and 1,100 nautical miles respectively.

What damage can China do with its nuclear arsenal? Most of South-East Asia, India, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, the Phillipines, Taiwan and major portions of the USSR (Soviet Far East) are within reach of Chinese missiles. With every passing day the Chinese nuclear capability gradually builds up and with it grows China's ability to play a game of nuclear blackmail.

The Chinese nuclear stockpile was estimated to contain perhaps 50 warheads at the end of 1967 and was estimated to grow at the rate of 20 plus warheads per year thereafter.⁹ These figures, although optimistic if one considers that the Cultural Revolution must have had a deleterious effect on the missile programme, will serve as a starting point. Work on the H-Bomb and production of reduced-weight H-Bombs able to be carried by missiles must be speeded up.



Surface-to-Surface Guided Missile SS-4 'Sandal'

As yet there has been no deployment of even short-range missiles and present delivery means are limited to a small force of aging bombers. It should be sometime within the 1972-1975 time frame before China obtains a full arsenal of nuclear bombs and warheads, with inter-continental ballistic missiles of about 6,000 miles range in production and actually deployed throughout China. At that stage Chinese nuclear might could threaten most of the world. China's progress in the field apparently was impressive enough to convince Mr Robert MacNamara, former US Secretary of Defence, of the need for the US to establish an

⁹ According to US News and World Report, 3 July, 1967.

anti-missile defence system. The system is expected to be installed by 1975 at a cost of about 3,500 million dollars.

The Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF)

The Chinese Communist Air Force is the second largest communist air force in the world; Russia's being the largest. It has approximately 2,500 planes, most of them rather obsolete MIG15 (Fagot) and MIG17 (Fresco) aircraft. The Chinese do have a limited number of MIG19 (Farmer) and MIG21 (Fishbed) aircraft which are relatively modern when compared with US aircraft such as the F105, F4C and AD6.

In the bomber category the Chinese Air Force relies primarily on the IL-28 (Beagle) — a subsonic twin-jet bomber. It has about 200-400 of the Beagles. It does have some TU-16 (Badger) medium range bombers, capable of bombing targets within a 1,600 nautical miles radius of the Chinese mainland.

In the past the Chinese Air Force has been plagued by the problems of obtaining spare parts to keep its planes flying and the availability of fuel to allow pilots to get in flying time. It is believed that China has, to a large degree, overcome these deficiencies. Chinese aircraft production facilities seem able to provide spare parts — if not replacement aircraft — to keep its force at its present levels and the new oil discoveries in North China have served to alleviate the fuel shortage.

It will be sometime however before the Chinese could ever consider seriously the idea of using its Air Force in an offensive role against one of the major powers such as the United States or the Soviet Union.

The Chinese Communist Navy (CCN)

The Chinese Communist Navy is primarily a coastal defence organization, most of her equipment being motor torpedo boats armed with 'Styx' missiles of the type used by the Egyptians in sinking the *Eilat* in 1967; motor gunboats, minesweepers and submarine chasers. The Navy is about 126,000 men strong including some 28,000 marines and 16,000 naval air personnel.¹⁰ The force does have a limited offensive capability in that it possesses thirty plus submarines, a few of which are the Soviet ballistic missile type. These submarines could pose a threat to enemy supply lines or, for example, against the United States Seventh Fleet if employed in a surprise attack. Besides the submarines the Chinese have 4 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, a dozen frigates and some 60 amphibious landing craft which could be used in an offensive role (such as the invasion of Taiwan). The Naval Air arm uses land-based fighter and

¹⁰ *Jane's Fighting Ships*, 1967-68, p. 54.

bomber aircraft of the type discussed in the Air Force section. Naval air has about 500 planes including about 150 bombers.

Problems to be Overcome

China's biggest problems lie in the area of logistics. The 800 million people in China are difficult to feed in peacetime even though Chinese food production has increased considerably in the last few years, for example, grain production in 1967 was estimated by various sources as being between 190 and 230 million tons.

Internal communications are still an area in which China has deficiencies. Despite prodigious construction efforts China is believed to possess only about 35,000 kilometres of railroad track and 400,000 kilometres of highway. From a military aspect the terrain features and the lack of roads and railways greatly hinder the mechanized movement of men and supplies. These factors might, in wartime, render Chinese forces susceptible to isolation without logistical support. However, these weaknesses are not insurmountable as the Chinese proved in the Korean War.

Conclusion

After reading this brief and necessarily superficial description of the Chinese Army, its role and its soldier, you feel that there is something missing. Where is the ten-foot colossus, the Chinese bogey-man? The picture that emerges is one of a well-trained, hardy, dedicated and patriotic Chinese soldier, armed with a variety of simple and rugged equipments quite suited to the waging of war. Add to this the example given by the Chinese in Korea and in India and one can see that the Chinese soldier is a worthy adversary, but certainly not a superman. □

REFERENCES

The Chinese People's Liberation Army, by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II, U.S.M.C. (Ret.) (1967).

The United States and China in World Affairs, by Robert Blum, edited by A. Doak Barnett (1966).

Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, by Alice Langley Hsieh (1965).

The Role of the Chinese Army by John Gittings (1967) (Oxford University Press).

USAREUR Pamphlet 30-60-1, published by Headquarters, US Army Europe 30 June 1966.

Military Balance 1968-1969, published by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-67, by Headquarters, Department of the Army, (1966).

Time Magazine, 19 February 1965.

Newsweek Magazine, 15 March 1965.

'X Marks Mystery of Mao's A-Arms' by Stanley Karnow, *Washington Post* as published in *Stars and Stripes*, 20 September 1968.

Plan XVII

Lynette Chaffey*

THE German army went to war in 1914 with its operations precisely dictated by the Schlieffen Plan. The French also had their war plan — Plan XVII. The Schlieffen Plan has been judged very critically but also admired.¹ Plan XVII has been criticized but very few words of admiration have been given to it.

J. F. C. Fuller calls it a plan 'of pathetic simplicity', 'a classic example of how a plan should not be devised',² and C. R. M. F. Cruttwell refers to it as 'the notorious No. 17'.³

After the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 French military planning evolved from a strictly defensive doctrine to one of offence.⁴ The caution of the 1870s gradually gave way to unanimous acceptance of the doctrine of *offensive à outrance*. Lieutenant Colonel de Grandmaison expressed it in an extreme form:

For the attack only two things are necessary: to know where the enemy is and to decide what to do. What the enemy intends to do is of no consequence⁵.

One of the most significant events during pre-war military planning was the rejection of General Michel's proposals in 1911.⁶ He anticipated what actually happened in 1914. Michel thought that Germany would, in the event of war, simultaneously mobilize reserve troops with active troops. Furthermore, she would direct her main line of advance through Belgium with a wide attack west of the Meuse. Michel wanted to prepare for this by mixing French reserves with the active formations. He proposed shifting the main body of the French force to the left, leaving only minor forces to defend the Lorraine front.⁷ Although Michel foresaw the boldness of the Schlieffen Plan he was dismissed from his post, which was given to Joffre.

Joffre may have been 'merely a solid shield behind which subtler brains could direct French military policy'.⁸ He would not have been given the position of general-in-chief designate in the event of war if he

* Miss Chaffey graduated from the University of New England in 1967 with a First Class Honours Degree and University Medal in History. Since then she has been tutor in history at the University. Her main interest is in modern European diplomatic and military history.

had not concurred with the prevailing belief in the offensive. However it is beside the point to argue over Joffre's responsibility in initiating and framing Plan XVII.⁹ He adopted it as the basis for his armies' operations in August 1914 and the Plan stood or fell according to the way Joffre put it into operation.

Plan XVII provided for defensive action along France's north-east frontier for the first thirteen days after mobilization. Then the two right-wing armies, I and II, were to attack into Lorraine. The III Army, in the centre, was to attack east of Metz. The V Army on the left was to attack either into Belgium or ahead towards Metz, depending on the direction of the German attack. The IV Army was held in reserve left of centre, reserve divisions buttressed either flank and a cavalry corps was to be placed on the V Army's left to make contact with the British Expeditionary Force.¹⁰

The actual disposition of forces provided for by the Plan of May 1913 had some merits. The IV Army's position made it possible for the commander-in-chief to be flexible in implementing the Plan. The French railway system was well developed and a quick switch of the reserve

¹ 'the basis of Schlieffen's formula for quick victory amounted to little more than a gambler's belief in the virtue of sheer audacity', B. H. Liddell Hart, introduction to G. Ritter's *The Schlieffen Plan*, New York, 1958.

cf. 'The daring of this conception must arouse a reluctant admiration, and it is probably true that if this plan had been carried out in 1914 in its original form and under the direction of an energetic and stubborn commander-in-chief, it would have achieved an overwhelming initial success', G. A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, Oxford, 1955, pp. 279-280.

² J. F. C. Fuller, *The Decisive Battles of the Western World*, Vol. III, London, 1956, pp. 191, 189.

³ C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, *A History of the Great War*, Oxford, 1961, p. 9.

⁴ See Appendix.

⁵ R. B. Asprey, *The First Battle of the Marne*, London, 1962, p. 21.

⁶ Michel was vice-president of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* and general-in-chief designate in the event of war.


⁷ Fuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190. Fuller says of Michel, 'the sole member of the Council who saw clearly what was ahead, and as clearly understood how to meet it, was dismissed'.

⁸ Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Reputations*, London, 1928, p. 19.

⁹ Fuller says that the General Staff supported his promotion in order to use him as a puppet. Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 190. Cruttwell says, 'It is difficult to associate such a wild and premature offensive with this exceptionally calm, even imperturbable soldier'—the Plan reflected the ardent, arrogant spirit of Joffre's ambitious young staff. Cruttwell, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Isselin comments, 'An awareness of his own shortcomings in matters of strategy and tactics, however, persuaded him to give his immediate associates a free hand in their obsession with the fatal doctrine of an offensive à l'outrance. H. Isselin, *The Battle of the Marne*, trans. C. Connell, London, 1965, p. 46.

¹⁰ See map.

army to a decisive scene of action could achieve surprise and give added weight. Moreover the V Army was provided with alternative courses of action depending on the way the action was developing. Flexible planning like this might seem to have conformed to Clausewitz's advice to allow for



'Frictions' in war, the unexpected incidents and unforeseen developments which are likely to arise. As a plan of concentration and deployment, Plan XVII allowed for flexibility and the exercise of initiative. Unlike the Schlieffen Plan it did not dictate the whole course of operations and it gave the commander-in-chief scope to direct his armies as he saw the action developing. The real inadequacies of Plan XVII lay deeper than this. It is possible to see merits in its details, but the basic presuppositions of the Plan are open to question.

At the root of the disastrous outcome of French military operations between the outbreak of war and the retreat prior to the battle of the Marne were serious miscalculations. The French General Staff grossly underestimated the strength of the initial German deployment. It could not believe that Germany was employing reserve troops alongside regular

forces. French generals had a false picture of German strength along the whole line of battle and this led them to make two fatal deductions which they obstinately clung to despite overwhelming evidence against their validity.

The French underestimated the German build-up and, as a result of this, the German direction of attack. There seemed to be no danger of a wide German right-wing sweep through Belgium west of the Meuse and round the French left. The second miscalculation, connected with the first, was that, even if the Germans did undertake a strong right-wing offensive, the more troops they sent to the west the better for the French offensive east and west of Metz. Even throughout the 'battle of the frontiers' Joffre persisted in thinking that the more forces there were on the German right, the weaker the centre and left would be. He thought that the Germans could not have sufficient forces to maintain a heavy concentration in both places at once.

These blunders are all the more reprehensible because the General Staff had sufficient evidence to rectify its mistakes if it had not been too blind to use it. Tuchmann says that the Deuxième Bureau had enough information on the German use of reserves as active troops as to make it impossible for the General Staff to be ignorant of this factor.¹¹ Joffre even admits in his Memoirs that 'we knew that in this plan [the German plan] it was set down that reserve troops will be employed in the same way as active troops'.¹² Joffre also knew of a German General Staff exercise executed in 1906 in which the movement of the German right-wing across Belgium was studied.¹³ There was no need to be acquainted with German military theory to be suspicious of their intentions about invading Belgium. The enormous detraining stations and camps such as Elsenborn established on the Belgian frontier must have been known to the French.¹⁴ French military planners did not reach an objective assessment of their opponent's capabilities and based their plan on misconceptions.¹⁵

¹¹ B. Tuchmann, *The Guns of August: August 1914*, Four Square Edition, 1964, p. 61.

¹² *The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre*, trans. Col. T. Bentley Mott, Vol. 1, London, 1932, p. 145.

¹³ *ibid*, p. 46.

¹⁴ Cruttwell, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1918* Four Square Edition, 1964, p. 167.

¹⁵ Paléologue relates that the French General Staff obtained exact information on the German plan of attacking France via Belgium. In 1904 a German officer is alleged to have offered to hand over the Schlieffen Plan for 60,000 francs (in a letter signed *Le Vengeur*). Albertini considers it a possibility that the *Vengeur* revelations influenced the French Commander-in-Chief, General Brugère, who, at the end of 1905, introduced a variant into Plan XV, to facilitate 'the rapid transport northwards of a considerable reserve force precisely in the case of a

The offensive idea itself is open to question. Even if miscalculations led the General Staff to underestimate German strength, a plan for a frontal offensive with mere equality of force against an enemy who would have the support of a fortified frontier zone was a very risky undertaking¹⁶ The belligerents in World War I were slow to grasp the defensive power of modern weapons. Geographically, and in view of her developed frontier fortress system, there were good reasons for France to adopt a defensive strategy. Plan XVII ignored the difficulties of the terrain where the French soldier was expected to push forward with irresistible *élan*. The high wooded hills of the Ardennes, intersected with valleys and sloping generally uphill from the French side, were unsuitable for the offensive.¹⁷ The country was well suited to ambushes or counterstrokes.¹⁸

The terrain chosen for the scene of the offensive only aggravated French neglect in developing her weapons of war. The Plan ignored the effect of machine-guns, magazine-rifles, and rapid-fire artillery. The flat trajectory of French artillery made it unsuitable for hilly country;¹⁹ the French armies had inadequate good mobile heavy artillery.

The French 75-mm field-gun was unsurpassed in its own field, but French pride in this weapon induced a neglect of other types of artillery.²⁰ Furthermore the French lost much of the benefit of these superb guns by choosing to attack in hilly, wooded country, when the weapon was best suited to open country.²¹ Inadequate co-ordination between infantry and artillery also helped to nullify the effect of the 75s. Nothing had been done to clothe or equip the French soldiers for modern warfare. The French infantry were very conspicuous in their uniforms of

German offensive through Belgium'. According to Albertini, Joffre was 'probably ignorant' of the 1904 *Vengeur* revelations and 'Brugère's successors seem entirely to have forgotten the *Vengeur* document'. L. Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, Oxford, 1965, Vol. III, pp. 418-419.

¹⁶ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 23, 14th edition, article 'World War', by B. H. Liddell Hart, p. 751.

¹⁷ Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

¹⁸ C. Falls, *The First World War*, Longmans, 1960, p. 25.

¹⁹ In his Memoirs Joffre claims to have realized the need for artillery with a curved trajectory. Referring to army manoeuvres in 1912 he says, 'It was once more clearly demonstrated that we had need of pieces giving a curved trajectory'. Joffre, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 33. If he recognized the defect, Joffre had apparently not managed to have it remedied in August 1914.

²⁰ The General Staff attitude to heavy field artillery was adequately expressed by an artillery officer who, commenting on 105-mm. heavy field artillery in 1909, said, 'Thank God we don't have any! What gives the French Army its force is the lightness of its cannon'. Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

²¹ Isselin, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Crutwell, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

red and blue: the military had been horrified at any suggestion of abolishing the *pantalon rouge*.

The French Plan, obsessed with the idea of the offensive, paid little attention to technicalities like these. Reconnaissance was completely inefficient and it came as a surprise to the French to stumble upon German preparations against a French offensive in Alsace: barbed wire, trenches, and gun emplacements. When Joffre ordered the I and II Armies to strike into Lorraine on 8 August 1914 he thought they would be fighting about three German corps. Instead they faced nine infantry corps, a cavalry corps and six *Ersatz* divisions.²² Lateral communications were particularly bad in the Ardennes and it was difficult for commanders to keep in touch with one another. Telephonic liaison between forward observing officers and between infantry and gunners was most inadequate.²³ Even when reconnaissance reports were correct army headquarters often ignored them if they contradicted their own preconceived ideas.

The French campaign on the right was motivated partly by political and sentimental reasons. The national enthusiasm following a rapid dash into Alsace probably counted for more than any strategic considerations.²⁴ This probably helps to account for the neglect of the technicalities which have been mentioned. These defects of Plan XVII are partly explained by its emphasis on concentration rather than actual operations. Joffre himself says in his Memoirs, 'there never was any plan of operations set down in writing . . . I, therefore, decided to limit our studies to a concentration capable of lending itself to any possible plan of operations.'²⁵ Before the Brie Commission in 1919 he said, 'A plan of operations is an idea carried in one's head and not set down on paper . . .'²⁶

The initial operations following deployment according to Plan XVII ended in disaster. It is important however to note one result of this lack of precision about initial operations. The French Plan was based on the offensive just as the Schlieffen Plan was. However, it was essentially a riposte against an initial German move. One redeeming feature of Plan XVII is that it was not based on violation of a neutral's territory as the first stage of aggression. This was not due to a lack of consideration of the problem of Belgian neutrality. Joffre appreciated the value of an immediate move through Belgium but British warnings effectively put

²² Asprey, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

²³ Crutwell, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 16; Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 188; Asprey, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²⁵ *The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 69.

²⁶ Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 193, n. 1.

a stop to French plans for any offensive on their left.²⁷ As we have seen, French miscalculations made the General Staff doubt German aggression in a wide sweep through Belgium. In any case, it was vital to the solidarity of the Entente that Britain support France against Germany in the case of war. Plan XVII conformed to the political requirements of the Entente by making no provision for an unprovoked move into neutral Belgium. One only needs to consider the ignominy that Germany incurred by taking the step into Belgium required by the Schlieffen Plan to recognize that, in this respect at least, Plan XVII had its merits. Another factor which helped to make France's actions during mobilization appear unprovocative to British eyes was the ten-kilometre withdrawal. Joffre agreed to this in spite of his commitment to the offensive doctrine. He was quite flexible in his attitude compared with Moltke, who suffered a shattering experience when the Kaiser suggested transferring the German effort from west to east.²⁸

France avoided any blame for precipitating the first acts of war and Britain sent her Expeditionary Force to the Continent. Plan XVII, however, made few specific provisions about co-operation between British and French armies. The lack of inter-allied co-ordination became evident during the 'battles of the frontiers'. Certainly Plan XVII was a French military plan, but it was defective in so far as the role of the British Expeditionary Force was not precisely defined. While the French planned their offensive, expecting British assistance, they also counted on a Russian invasion of East Prussia.

The French Plan was framed against the Franco-Russian military agreement of August 1911. This specified that Russia should concentrate and mobilize her armies as quickly as possible in the event of war. She

²⁷ France was warned against violating Belgian neutrality in 1906 by Lieutenant Colonel Repington, by Lord Esher in 1911 and by Henry Wilson in 1912. Joffre shows how he had seriously considered the problem of Belgian neutrality, especially in 1911 and 1912. In a memorandum of October 1911 he asked, 'is there complete agreement regarding the interdiction against our troops being the first to violate Belgian neutrality?' At a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay in February 1912, Joffre stated, 'Taking the strictly military point of view . . . I then explained to the conference that if we were to conduct our offensive across Belgium . . . the problem presented to us would be simplified . . . Neither in Alsace nor in Lorraine do we find ground favourable for an offensive having immediate decisive results in view. The situation would be infinitely more advantageous if it were permissible for us to extend our left beyond our frontier into the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg . . .' Joffre abandoned any idea of an offensive through Belgium mainly because of the danger of alienating Britain. He says of General Wilson's advice in 1912, that France should not be the first to violate Belgian neutrality because of the effect this would have in England, 'This communication . . . obliged me definitely to renounce all idea of a manoeuvre *a priori* through Belgium'. Joffre, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 41, 50, 54.

²⁸ Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

should begin her offensive even before the concentration of the armies was completed, as soon as the first line forces were in position. Russian forces were expected to cross the frontier on the sixteenth day of mobilization. The French hoped that the Russian offensive would draw off German forces attacking their own armies in the west.²⁹ When Joffre attended Russian manoeuvres in August 1913 the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch assured him that Russia would mobilize and begin her offensive as soon as possible if war broke out. The French Plan and the hope for Russian assistance help to explain why the French General Staff brought strong pressure to bear on Russia on 27 July 1914 to order general mobilization and invade East Prussia as soon as possible.³⁰ Even if Plan XVII and the assumptions on which it was based did not precipitate events in the west in 1914, it probably helped in an indirect way to hasten the mobilization of Russia.

The authors of Plan XVII, in common with almost all military planners, based their plans on the assumption that a war would not last long.³¹ The narrow outlook of the General Staff, and this mistaken assumption, led them to ignore the importance of vital economic resources. Hence the French offensive led to the loss of the important Briey iron-fields in August.³²

At the outbreak of hostilities French mobilization from 2 August onwards progressed smoothly. The seventh corps of the I Army crossed the Alsatian border on 7 August. The French secured Mulhouse the next day but the anticipated brilliant thrust into Alsace came to nothing. The German VII Army put the French forces to a retreat which brought them back close to Belfort on 12 August. Joffre created a new Army of Alsace under General Pau, but, although Pau reoccupied Mulhouse and cleared Upper Alsace of the enemy, he failed to hold enemy forces to their ground in order to assist Dubail and the I Army engaged in the main offensive. By 20 August the Army of Alsace was dissolved. 'The early French operations in Upper Alsace had been unproductive of either political or military advantage and had absorbed forces which might have found more useful employment elsewhere.'³³

²⁹ Joffre says of the Franco-Russian agreement, 'The importance of this agreement is only too evident . . . [it] removed the essential reason which for so long a time had condemned us to a conception of operations marked by such great circumspection', Joffre, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 23.

³⁰ L. C. F. Turner, 'The Role of the General Staffs in July 1914', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. XI, Dec. 1965, pp. 320-322.

³¹ Joffre, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 67.

³² Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 24

³³ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol. 9, 14th Edition, article 'Battles of the Frontiers'—Early Battles in Upper Alsace, (E.W.S.), p. 867.

On 8 August General Instruction No. 1 ordered the I and II Armies under Dubail and de Castelnau to take the offensive into Lorraine, in spite of the fact that the French fighting force would not be concentrated completely before 18 August. The Lorraine offensive was a bitter disappointment. On 20 August the II Army retreated after suffering heavy losses at the battle of Morhange. The I Army was also forced to retreat to the Meurthe after the battle of Sarrebourg.³⁴ However, the retreat of the French armies was less catastrophic than the offensive could have proved. The I and II Armies escaped from a dangerous trap because of the German commander's folly.³⁵

Schlieffen had intended the German forces to fall back before the French offensive into Lorraine. Prince Rupprecht, in command of the German VI and VII Armies in Lorraine, was tempted to counter-attack. Having received permission from an increasingly confused Moltke, Rupprecht did so on 20 August. He pushed the French troops back out of the trap they had almost walked into by following their own Plan. Safer near their own frontier, the I and II Armies were subsequently able to detach troops which helped in the battle of the Marne. The German VI and VII Armies dashed themselves to pieces in the defensive region that Schlieffen had warned against attacking.³⁶

While all his efforts on the extreme right failed, Joffre received reports of a mighty German force on his left wing. Lanrezac, commander of the V Army, perceived the seriousness of the threat to his army. When given notice of the V Army's part in Plan XVII in May 1914, he had pointed out the dangers to his exposed flank if the Germans came down in strength west of the Meuse.³⁷ In the last days before mobilization he had again warned Joffre that if the V Army was once committed to the Ardennes offensive it would be unable to meet the German offensive which Lanrezac was convinced would proceed through Namur, Dinant and Givet. On 8 August Lanrezac impressed the threat of a German right-wing outflanking movement on army headquarters, only to be told his concern was premature.³⁸ Lanrezac's anxiety was increased by his bad relations with Sir John French and his uncertainty of the British Expeditionary Force providing adequate cover on his left.³⁹

³⁴ The eighth corps of the I Army suffered a casualty rate of 50% or more, *ibid.*, — First Battles in Lorraine, (B.E.P.), p. 867.

³⁵ Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 217.

³⁹ On August 17 Sir John told Lanrezac that he would not be ready for action until the 24th.

Joffre did not realize the vastness of the original German deployment nor the boldness of the Schlieffen Plan. Although his IV Army had been placed so that it could be moved either to assist his III or his V Army, Joffre did not utilize the flexibility of this arrangement to counter the real threat. Instead of moving his main forces to meet the main German strength he was determined to carry out the basic offensive move of Plan XVII, the advance into the Ardennes. In spite of reports to the contrary and Lanrezac's uneasiness, Joffre believed the V Army, the British Expeditionary Force and the Belgian army could hold any German advance in the west while his III and IV Armies struck through the German centre and severed the wheeling right arm from its communications.

The idea behind the Plan did have some slight justification. Moltke and Ludendorff were apprehensive about a French breakthrough in Lorraine which might sever the German operation through Belgium from its lines of communications before the right-wing attack was effective against French communications behind the Meuse.⁴⁰ What made the Plan a failure was the strength of the German deployment. Joffre was eventually forced to believe that there was a heavy concentration of German forces on his left. He did not abandon the projected Ardennes offensive because he reasoned that the stronger the German right, the weaker the centre must be. If the main German concentration was not in the Metz-Thionville area, as he first supposed, he thought his chances of breaking the centre even more favourable. Joffre supposed that the blow to the German centre would remove the need for action against the German right.

Joffre finally gave Lanrezac permission to move the V Army into the angle between the Sambre and the Meuse on 15 August to meet the possible threat of envelopment. One corps however was to remain facing north-east to support the IV Army in the Ardennes.⁴¹ Joffre showed initiative in creating the Army of Lorraine under Manoury to protect the III Army's right flank from any attack from Metz. However he was committed decisively to the Ardennes offensive. By 20 August, the Belgian army was retreating on Antwerp, the Lorraine offensive had failed, delay by the British Expeditionary Force was expected and Lanrezac was desperate. Nevertheless Joffre decided to fight in the Ardennes as planned. On 22 August the III and IV Armies were ordered forward 'to attack the enemy wherever met'. It may have been a strategic success for Joffre to bring the enemy to battle while the German III was unable

⁴⁰ Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 54. Schlieffen did not share their apprehension about a French advance beyond the frontier. This would be 'a case of the garrison leaving the fortress just when the siege was about to begin', Schlieffen Memorandum, Dec. 1905, quoted by Ritter, *ibid.*, p. 147.

⁴¹ Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

to take part, as it was behind the IV Army.⁴² But Joffre had underestimated enemy strength and the French armies suffered from all the difficulties of terrain, equipment, and communications discussed above. The two armies were forced back and retired between 23 and 25 August.

While Joffre launched his futile offensive, Lanrezac's V Army and the British Expeditionary Force almost 'put their heads into the German noose'.⁴³ Hausen's III Army was approaching from the east, and Bulow's II from the north, while Kluck's I was heading for the British. French failure in the Ardennes and the retreat of the French armies along the whole line from the Vosges to the Sambre put Lanrezac in a perilous position. A German victory was highly probable if the French V Army was crushed. In this critical situation Lanrezac ordered and executed a retreat by his army after the battle of Charleroi from the angle between the Sambre and the Meuse.

The British force met and fought the German I Army at Mons on 23 August. The engagement was not unsuccessful but Lanrezac's retreat left Sir John French no choice but to withdraw the British army.

Plan XVII was in ruins. The French armies were everywhere in retreat. They had made relatively no impression on the German deployment. The only military benefits derived from the battles prior to 24 August were not due to Plan XVII. Lanrezac's retreat and escape from what might have been a fatal trap was quite contrary to the spirit of the Plan. The repercussions of the Lorraine offensive were due to Prince Rupprecht's counter-offensive, more than anything else. The German right-wing was less strong than it might have been but this was hardly due to French efforts.

Moltke had already increased the proportionate strength of the left wing above what Schlieffen had intended. The abortive French offensive in Lorraine may have influenced Moltke in his decision to despatch *Ersatz* divisions to the left rather than to reinforce his right wing. The very weakness of the French enticed him to visualize a double offensive with decisive actions on both left and right, resulting in a massive encirclement of the French armies. Where he should have used *Ersatz* divisions to watch Antwerp and to invest Maubeuge and Givet, he had to detach corps from his right wing. Moltke sent another two corps east against the Russians on 25 August, further reducing the decisive right wing. The Allies, however, were not to know on 24 August what the consequences of this reduction in strength of the German right would be.

⁴² Article 'Battles of the Frontiers', *op. cit.*, — Battle of the Ardennes (V.L.E.C.), p. 868.

⁴³ Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

The 'battle of the frontiers' was an immense Allied defeat and the armies were falling back before the German advance.

Joffre abandoned Plan XVII and in a report to the Ministry of War on 24 August said, 'Our object must be to last out as long as possible, trying to wear the enemy out, and to resume the offensive when the time comes.'⁴⁴ The French Plan had required its own offensives as a riposte to German action but the direction of attack had been completely misguided. Perhaps Joffre's main contribution to the battle of the Marne was to realize that he needed to regain the initiative and begin again, with Plan XVII completely shattered.

The misconceived direction of attack, provided for by Plan XVII, meant that the Germans had already penetrated into France before Joffre abandoned the Plan. In spite of the Allied recovery and resumption of offensive action on the Marne in September, the decisive failure of Plan XVII contributed to the prolongation of the war. The German forces had advanced so far that the occupation of French territory and the deadlock of trench warfare followed throughout the next four years.

APPENDIX 1

French Military Planning, 1870 to 1914.

After the Franco-Prussian War the French army thought only in defensive terms. General Séré de Rivière supervised the rebuilding of the frontier along the line Belfort-Épinal-Toul-Verdun. This defensive strategy relying on a strong fortress system altered as the eastern railway system was improved and new high-explosive shells were developed in the 1880s. The latter made the forts more susceptible to assault, making a rapid concentration of the armies further forward necessary.¹ General Miribel's Plan VIII of 1887 was based on the defensive-offensive idea. General Bonnal emphasized the wisdom of a strategic defensive in the 1890s. Plans XIV and XV produced between 1898 and 1906 were mainly concerned with covering the Lorraine frontier and intercepting any German move to penetrate the chain of fortresses. Ritter says the first impetus to modify French strategic plans came from intelligence reports in 1904 and 1905 pointing to the German General Staff's intention of making an envelopment from the north-east.² Nevertheless General de Lacroix's Plan XVI of 1909 assumed that the major German attack would be through Lorraine.

The French Army was involved in political and military dissensions throughout these years. General Boulanger's abortive *coup*, the Dreyfus

⁴⁴ Asprey, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

case, and General André's activities caused disruptions and splits within the army. Nevertheless, confidence in France's military position increased. The railway system was improved and the 75-mm field-gun was developed. The bonds between Russia and France and England's entry into the Entente helped change French military planning.

General Michel presented his plan to the War Council in 1911. His suggestions to move the bulk of the French forces to the left ready to meet the German offensive which, he was convinced, would consist of a wide sweep through Belgium, and to incorporate reserve troops into active formations, were shelved. Men like Grandmaison, Foch and Castelnau now represented military thinking. They placed all their hopes on the *offensive à outrance*. The army again thought of recovering Alsace and regained confidence in its own striking powers. Bergson's philosophy may have had some influence on military doctrine. It emphasized instinct and intuition rather than reason, and stressed *élan vital*.³

At the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* General Joffre produced two Variations on Plan XVI, then, in May 1913, Plan XVII was adopted. Only a stray protest was made against the military's total commitment to the offensive. The Field Regulations of October 1913 proclaimed that 'The offensive alone leads to positive results' and that 'Success comes . . . to him whose will is firmest and morale strongest'.⁴ The authors of Plan XVII paid no heed to protests like Colonel Grouard's in his book *La Guerre eventuelle*, published in 1913. He said, 'It is above all the German offensive through Belgium on which we ought to fix our attention . . . we can say without hesitation that if we take the offensive at the outset we shall be beaten'.⁵ Warnings of German intentions could not dissuade the authors of the French Plan that they should abandon the projected offensive on their own right into Lorraine and in to the Ardennes. The French went to war relying on the *élan* of the soldier and the virtues of the offensive. □

¹ R. B. Asprey, *op. cit.*, p.19; Joffre, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 26.

² G. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³ 'This attitude towards military operations has been linked with the Bergsonian philosophy with which it was contemporaneous. The essential content of both propositions is an attempt to claim the superiority of instinct . . .', H. Isselin, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁴ Quoted by B. Tuchmann, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁵ Quoted *ibid*, p. 61.

The Staff System

A Change

Major A. A. Partridge*

Royal Australian Infantry

A case for a change in the Australian Army Staff System is made in a paper prepared by Major I. D. McFarlane and published in *Army Journal* No. 233 October, 1968. Essentially the case is made on three points:

1. The diminished need for a staff system identical with that of the British Army—a bi-sectional system.
2. The change in relative importance in categories of military activity or staff functions and the need to effect a better balance between them—that is, the need for a multi-sectional system.
3. The need for rational simplification to facilitate rapid mobilization and efficient performance of essentially civilian management oriented personnel.

These points are cogent reasons for change.

The nature of the change proposed by Major McFarlane however needs to be critically examined and some alternatives which could be more acceptable to the Australian Army evaluated.

Major McFarlane proposes that we adopt outright the United States Army Staff System. If this was acceptable thinking the reasons for adoption of the US Staff System might closely parallel those

* Major Partridge is a professional engineer with the Electricity Commission of NSW. From 1954 he was engaged in various engineering appointments in the Commission's Western Transmission Region until 1963, when he returned to the Commission head office in Sydney. In 1965 he was appointed Assistant Regional Transmission Engineer Sydney West, and in 1969 returned to headquarters as Planning Engineer Transmission. He was commissioned in the CMF with the University of Technology Regiment (now University of NSW Regiment) in 1953. While stationed at Lithgow he was OC 25 Coy LAD RAEME, but transferred to the 6 NSW Mounted Rifles and to the Corps of Infantry when he moved to Orange in 1958. He transferred to the Eastern Command Staff Gp in 1960 and since 1964, when he transferred to Sydney, has held various staff appointments on HQ comm Z. His current appointment is DAQMG Maint.

which led to our adoption of the British Army Staff System. This is not the case and is not acceptable because:

- We do not belong to the American Empire and therefore are not wholly committed ethnically and emotionally to any action on which the Americans may embark.
- We are now a larger, more self sufficient nation and are becoming able to support on our own a complete force of combat and logistics troops.
- We might fight beside other nations—including Britain.

The main argument for adopting the US Staff System is one of convenience, in that the United States is the nation most likely to be our principal ally in the event of a major conflict. There appears to be no direct pressure for us to conform with our staff system, and on the basis of critical evaluation or cutting our cloth to suit our purse, a staff system which is operationally and economically most suitable to us, and as far as practicable co-ordinates with likely allies, is more likely to obtain approbation and respect from our mighty partner.

Accepting the basic thesis of required change, some benefit can be obtained by examining the American Staff System and selecting the features which may be profitably adopted or varied to a more acceptable form. The Americans have five staff functions or categories of military activity:

1. Personnel Administration.
2. Intelligence.
3. Operations and Training.
4. Logistics.
5. Civil Affairs.

This certainly expands and gives better balance between activities when compared with our present bi-sectional system. Some argument could be advanced for adding to or curtailing the list; however, the debate would be unprofitable if it were accepted that flexibility was to be an integral part of the system; that is, we should be able to add a function if the need arises, as is happening today for example with the special requirements of air transportation—or as is required on a small headquarters, combine functions in the interests of economy.

The Americans, in their nomenclature, allocate the numbers 1 to 5 to their staff functions. This has the advantage of:

1. Quick easy reference
2. Low grade security

but has these disadvantages:

1. Loses simplicity—the code has to be learned
2. Infers order in the numbers which
 - (a) may tend to establish precedence of staff functions
 - (b) gives numerals to titles when there could be better use for numerals in conveying other information.

It would appear that the best means of referring to staff functions is by letters or in speech by letter groups. Using the five staff functions previously mentioned these letters could be:

<i>Function</i>	<i>Letter</i>	<i>Speech Letter Group</i>
Personnel Administration	P	pers
Intelligence	I	int
Operations and Training	O	ops
Logistics	L	logs
Civil Affairs	C	ca

This proposition could no doubt be greatly improved by a detailed study. 'Logistics' for example might be best replaced by a term akin to the more commonly known civilian categorization of 'Stores and Transportation' and 'Intelligence' might best be replaced by a more descriptive term such as 'Enemy Studies'. The essential aim of such a study would be to enhance the simplicity and ready understandability of the terminology.

In indicating staff postings the Americans in their system make no indication of rank. No doubt this practice is based on the assertion that the staff represent the commander, and therefore rank indication in titles of staff postings is of no consequence; however, it is always helpful to know what level of officer is speaking and this is often a guide to:

- The importance or priority to be given to the matter.
- The possible security classification of the matter.
- The need to brief superiors on the subject.

There is benefit therefore in retaining the Australian system of ascribing rank numbers to staff officer postings. In this manner, adopting the staff functions and their references previously discussed, the officers on a task force headquarters become:

<i>Name & Rank of Posting</i>	<i>Present Abbreviation</i>	<i>Proposed Abbreviation</i>	<i>Speech Group Proposed</i>	<i>Letter</i>
Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (Major)	DAA&QMG	P&L2	pers & logs 2 or, pers & L2	
General Staff Officer Grade 2 (Major)	GSO2	02	ops 2	
or more correctly this would be—		0&I2	ops & int 2	
but would almost certainly be abbreviated to—		02 or	ops 2	
General Staff Officer Grade 3 (Captain)	GSO3	03	ops 3	
General Staff Officer Grade 3 (Int) (Captain)	GSO3(Int)	I3	int 3	
Staff Captain Administration	SCA	P3	pers 3	
Staff Captain Quartering	SCQ	L3	logs 3	

Already this proposition demonstrates considerable simplification which would materially enhance smooth staff working on rapid mobilization of non-regular officers.

In the American Staff System a letter is applied to indicate the formation level of the staff posting. Two of these are:

- S for task force or battalion level,
- G for divisional level.

Applied to the Australian staff context this has certain advantages:

- It gives an immediate knowledge of the headquarters to which an officer is posted.
- It is the level at which contact is made with allied forces, and therefore is the point of strongest argument for paralleling with the American system.

The disadvantages are similar to those in applying a number to staff functions. These are; it is a low grade coding, requires memory and lacks basic simplicity. However, the level has changed, there are not so many formations to be coded and the letters do not conflict with the staff function

letters. If the formation level letters were used the Task Force HQ officer postings then become:

TF DAA&QMG becomes SP&L2

TF GSO3(Int) becomes SI3 etc.

Our system of ascribing to formations, numbers which do not conflict at adjacent levels, allows the system to be rounded off. A complete identification can be given by adding the numeral ascribed to the formation or unit, thus giving complete understanding to the nomenclature. Thus for 8 TF HQ the GSO3(Int) or G3(Int) 8 TF becomes 8S13, and this may be foreshortened within our army to 813 without loss of understanding.

If the foregoing propositions were accepted we would have an essentially simpler, more direct series of staff functions, and a simpler reference system without inbuilt mystery. We would have obtained the economy of flexibility in staff functions in that, on small headquarters functions could be combined and on large headquarters additional functions could be added or existing functions divided. It would be axiomatic that the head of each staff function would report directly to the chief of staff or to the commander.

In concluding, a case has been made by Major McFarlane for a change in the present staff system, but whatever the proposition a new staff function and nomenclature system must be formulated to suit the particular needs of the Australian Army. It is considered that some of the requirements of the new system must be:

- Selection of categories or staff functions which are balanced and reasonably compatible with the systems of potential allies.
- Selection of names of staff functions which are self-explanatory — particularly to civilian management orientated personnel.
- Preservation of rank identification in posting terminology.
- Deletion of coding in terminology except where it appears essential for compatibility with allied systems at points of contact with those systems (e.g., formation level identification).

This approach will give to a new staff system the required balance, efficiency and simplicity. □

India

A School for Democracy in Asia

*Captain E. J. Ellis**

Royal Australian Armoured Corps

BACKGROUND

BRITAIN always took the view that partition of the Indian sub-continent would be a grave mistake and strove to avoid it. The latent division became inevitable when the Indian Congress refused Jinnah's moderate demands for some Muslim autonomy. Congress saw a modern state that was secular, tolerating all religions and binding its people in a unity to which religious beliefs were irrelevant. The Moslem League pressed demands which became unreasonable, for its concern was to ensure that Islam should not become lost in a predominantly Hindu state, however secular its intent.

The resulting partition has done great harm to the sub-continent. It has left Pakistan a weak and vulnerable state, yet responsible for the major defence burden of the traditional North-West and North-East Frontiers. The effective defence of both these areas requires close liaison by the two armies, yet there has been no willingness to co-operate. In the economic sense partition has led to an expensive misuse of resources at a time when both countries are straining under vital national development programmes. It has also distracted them politically and diplomatically. Pakistan altered a definite pro-Western posture, as shown by her willingness to join SEATO, to one critical of western policy and of amiable relations with China. India has mellowed a stringently 'neutral' policy to become increasingly dependent economically upon the West.

In the Far East, India is the country next in importance to China. Both are new nations, having emerged in the post-war world. India's

**Captain Ellis joined the Royal Australian Armoured Corps in 1953. In 1956-57 he was attached to the 1st King's Dragoon Guards during the Malayan Emergency. He entered the Officer Cadet School, Portsea in 1958 and graduated the next year winning the following major prizes: the Governor-General's Medal, the Military Board Prize, the Field Prize, the Staff Prize and the Skill at Arms Prize. During confrontation with Indonesia he served with the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars and performed the duties of the British Military Intelligence Officer with the Sarawak Constabulary. Since returning to Australia he has been Adjutant, 1st Armoured Regiment and an instructor at Armoured Centre.*

rise to nationhood led to an upsurge of national emotion and aspiration in other colonial peoples, particularly in Asia, and has conferred upon her a kind of *de facto* leadership of these nations in world affairs. India is of extreme importance in the world for two main reasons:

1. The sheer size of her population of some 500 millions which, together with other underdeveloped resources, makes her a potentially great power.
2. She has assumed the mantle of leadership in the uncommitted Afro-Asian bloc which commands so many votes in the UN and whose goodwill is increasingly a main prize in the diplomatic contest between Communism and the West.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

The Constitution made India a federal republic with a parliamentary system of government. The President, who is indirectly elected for a term of five years, is the executive head of the Union, but real executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, which is collectively and continuously responsible to the House of the People (LOK Sabha), elected directly every five years on the basis of universal adult franchise.

The Parliament has a second House, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha). Twelve of its members are nominated by the President and the rest elected by the State Legislative Assemblies on a quota basis—one third of its members retiring at the end of every second year. The Vice-President is elected for a term of five years by an electoral college consisting of the members of both Houses of Parliament, and he acts as the *ex officio* Chairman of the Council of States and also as President when the latter is unable for any reason to discharge his functions.

The system of government in the States closely resembles that of the Union; the Governor is appointed by the President and is rightfully Head of State. Once again however real executive power is vested in a Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the State Legislative Assembly, again directly elected on adult franchise.

Indian leaders gave early proof of political vitality by preparing and promulgating a long and complicated Constitution in three crowded years. This contrasts with continuing constitutional uncertainty in other South-East Asian countries even after twenty years. India has safeguarded Indian unity while allowing expression of regional differences in a secular non-communal state. The Union of States is based on a strong Federal Centre in which the Union Government is the final constitutional power to interpret the national good. It has wide powers over defence, foreign affairs, communications, and economic and social planning. Furthermore,

if the President believes the security of India is endangered or that the constitutional machinery of a State has broken down, he may take over the functions of the State. Five States, including the Punjab and Kerala, have already had periods of President's rule. This is not federalism as we know it in Australia, yet it stops a good deal short of unitary government. It is a combination producing results in Asia and may well prove to be a blueprint for Asian Democracy. Many observers discern signs of a distinctive Indian, and therefore Asian, style of parliamentary Government.

India's will is strong, sustained by a sense of great achievements since Independence. Her friends point to her as a school for Asia, with her vital parliament and her free democratic plan for social and economic development — the Asian alternative to Communism. Independence created tremendous problems of unifying and stabilizing the nation, the preparation of a constitution and the creation of a political system, and at the same time feeding the people while sustaining and expanding the economy. India has achieved most of these immediate tasks whilst exhibiting a political stability which represents a refreshing change from the usual SE Asian pattern.

Free Elections

The first important test for Indian Democracy was the holding of general elections on the basis of universal adult franchise. This seemed a hazardous act of faith in a country almost completely illiterate and with little previous political experience. Yet nearly all foreign observers who came to study them reported that the elections were fair and free by recognized Western democratic standards. The Congress Party has been returned to power each time elections have been held which has permitted a political viability unknown in most countries of SE Asia. At the same time, it has not been necessary to outlaw the indigenous Communist Party which in one state, Kerala, enjoyed a period of government as a result of a free election.

Fundamental Rights and Liberties

Another crucial test for democracy was the fate of fundamental rights and liberties under the new government. In most Afro-Asian countries individual freedom has been the first casualty of political independence. The Courts, Press, Universities, political parties of all views, and trade unions appear as independent as in any Western Democracy.

COMMUNISM

It is popularly believed that India exhibits many factors considered ideally prerequisite to the spread of Communism. How is it then that

India has been able to resist such a fate? In part it is due to a widely held misconception about the nature and appeals of Communism in backward countries. Communist appeal and Communist strength are sometimes believed to be the result of poverty, oppressive domestic government or frustrated nationalism. Examples from contemporary history refute this view. For instance, when it went Communist, Cuba was one of the most literate Latin-American countries with a standard of living much higher than the average. The State of Kerala in India, where the Communist appeal is strongest, enjoys the highest rate of literacy in India. Singapore is considerably richer than the State of Trengganu on the east coast of Malaya. There is a well developed Communist underground in Singapore but nothing of significance in Trengganu. The Indian nationalists had been frustrated for decades prior to the achievement of independence, but Communist influence during the struggle for independence was not of consequence. On the other hand, Ceylon gained her independence the easy way and Communism there exerts more influence than in India. In the new African states no Communist party worthy of the name emerged, despite a long tradition of frustration. Even in the Republic of Haiti, where there is degrading poverty, extensive ignorance and an atrociously oppressive regime, these conditions have not produced a Communist government. All these examples do not prove or disprove that there is some relationship between poverty, nationalism and misgovernment and the rise of Communism. A relationship exists but it is not a direct one. It is a function of the peculiar appeal Communism is able to make to each individual national group within the framework of the overall national environment.

In the Indian experience two factors appear to lessen the appeal of Communism. Firstly, the challenge from the Communist Party is different because of its international affiliations. These have always been abhorrent to the surge of national fervour which in itself brought about independence. To many Indians conversion to Communism represents the substitution of British Imperialism by Russian Sovereignty in the country.² Secondly, Communism is in conflict with Ghandian precept that worthy ends, for example National independence, can only be achieved through worthy means. The Communist tenet, so rapidly demonstrated in practice, that the end justifies the means is anathema to most Hindus.

Twice in modern times the Communist Party has earned the disapproval of the general Indian peasantry. In the first instance its support

¹ Goh Keng Swee: 'The Nature and Appeals of Communism in Non-Communist Asian Countries'.

² Walter T. Wallbank: *A Short History of India and Pakistan*, p. 257.

had not begun to disintegrate. Nowhere in India could the Communists create a secure base in which to set up a visible Communist Government to gain prestige and attract loyalty. It could not build up a Red Army.

In the general elections of 1957 the Communists polled so heavily in the State of Kerala that they were able to form a government. Two years later they were dismissed by the Federal Government when a movement of protest, organized by the voters on Gandhian lines, paralysed the Administration in Kerala. In the elections which, under constitutional law, followed in six months, the Communists suffered a crushing defeat; partly because of their past record and partly because of the intense nationalistic spirit brought into play by China's action on India's northern frontiers at this time.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

At Independence India decided on a foreign policy in which it was declared:

- India would follow an independent policy, avoiding the power politics of groups aligned one against another.
- India would uphold freedom for independent peoples and oppose racial discrimination wherever it may occur.
- India would work for international co-operation and goodwill without the exploitation of one nation by another.³

An Independent Policy

India's policy has given rise to the term 'neutralism' in so much as she has avoided military alliances with either the Communist bloc or the West. That India intends not to withdraw from international affairs but to pursue positively her policies is evident from the prominent part she has played in every important issue at the UN and in particular:

- The Korean Armistice.
- The Indo-China Armistice.
- The Arab/Israeli Armistice in 1956.

India's main aspiration is to give economic reality to the political freedom she has achieved. To do this she must have peace, and she is striving for an area of peace in SE Asia.

³ K. M. Panikkar: *The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty*. Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1946, p. 44.

India sees participation in Communist or Western Alliances as the importation of outside antagonisms into Asia. For this reason, she was violently opposed to US military aid to Pakistan and to Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO. It is also the root of India's dislike of, and refusal to join, SEATO.

One could instance India's actions over Kashmir, Tibet, Nepal, the Princely States, and the Enclaves as being in disregard of this policy of peace but to do so is to lose sight of the factual importance of these areas to India's existence as a nation.

SEATO

The contest between Communism and the West in SE Asia has largely taken the form of a struggle to win the confidence and goodwill of the noncommitted countries. The West has been trying to persuade them to become members of SEATO, which the Communists have been attempting, by propaganda, and diplomatic means, to prevent. India contends that, since they create fears and tensions which themselves breed aggression, military alliances are more dangerous than helpful in the attempt to obtain peace and security. The adhesion of most SE Asian countries to India's viewpoint over the last few years is seen as a measure of both her diplomatic prowess and of Communist success. At present these countries are attempting the achievement of economic progress by democratic means and their success has been slow and uncertain. To their north China is using methods which seem surer and swifter and which emerge as most appealing should democratic means fail.

ATTITUDE TO PAKISTAN

There are four main questions giving rise to dispute between Pakistan and India:

1. Pakistan's departure from neutrality in foreign affairs.
2. The post-partition refugee problem.
3. Use of the waters of the Indus tributaries.
4. Kashmir.

Pakistan's Departure from Neutrality in Foreign Affairs

The defence of India and South-East Asia had been the responsibility of Great Britain for the 150 years preceding independence and partition. The whole area of the Middle East, South-East Asia and the great Indian Ocean basin was guarded by British sea power. Following the liquidation

of British rule a new defence arrangement became essential for what an Indian publicist has defined as 'the Indian Ocean area with Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Tibet as the outer northern ring constituting the real security region of India'.⁴ This same scholar, just before the grant of Independence, pointed to Soviet power controlling all of the Eurasian heartland and insisted that only by the organization of the maritime rim of Asia in an alliance with Great Britain could Russian power in South-East Asia be contained.

While India and Pakistan have not made specific bilateral alliances with Britain, they have continued to be members of the unique association of nations now termed the Commonwealth. In addition, Pakistan joined two regional alliances; the Baghdad Pact for the defence of the Middle East and SEATO for the protection of South-East Asia from aggression.

Unlike India, Pakistan has not been able to carry on an independent policy in world diplomacy: the friend of all and the recipient of all. She has not had behind her the same resources in industrial potential, population, and extent of territory as her neighbour. Pakistan has felt too insecure. She has inherited the main burden of defence in the North against a potential foe—Russia. Under British control the burden on the north-west frontier was an all India responsibility. Furthermore, Pakistan has not had friendly relations with India since 1947. On several occasions the two countries were on the brink of war; and in Kashmir actual undeclared hostilities have, on two occasions, been carried out between the regular forces of the two countries. In contrast to India's concern Pakistan's foreign policy has had three main objectives:

1. Security from attack that may materialize in the North.
2. Adequate defence from her more powerful neighbour in the event of war.
3. A position of comparative bargaining strength vis-a-vis India in the long drawn out dispute over Kashmir.

Immediately after independence it seemed likely that Pakistan would follow the same non-alignment policy carried out by India. In 1950 Liaquat Ali Khan accepted an invitation to visit Russia. Instead he went to the United States and Canada. Apparently it was the Prime Minister's tactic to use the possibility of Russian ties as a means of exerting pressure on Western nations, especially in obtaining support in Kashmir. But by 1952 it was apparent that Russia had definitely taken

⁴ Quoted in K. C. Kundra: *Indian Foreign Policy: 1947-1954*. Bombay: Vora and Co, Bombay 1955, p. 53.

the side of India in the Kashmir imbroglio. For the next decade Pakistan definitely moved away from a policy of non-alignment in the direction of closer relations with the West, especially the United States. Then, following China's aggressive action on India's Northern borders in 1962, Pakistan warmed towards Peking. In the 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, China demonstrated open support of Pakistan by applying pressure on India's frontiers.

Post-Partition Refugee Problem

Over six million people poured into the India Punjab, with as much of their movable property as they had managed to take away in their hasty flight to safety. They had left behind their bank accounts, their fertile canal-irrigated colonies and their homes. Their immediate rehabilitation was made more difficult by the fact that the land vacated in India by the Muslims, who had fled to Pakistan, was often unirrigated and the Muslims who had left were much poorer than the newcomers. This made it impossible to give the refugees land and homes in any way equivalent to those they left behind. There was much bitterness at Pakistan's refusal to pay compensation for the difference in value of evacuee property or to let refugees return to Pakistan to collect their belongings and liquidate their assets.⁵

On the whole the refugee problem was handled remarkably well in India. At one time the Indian Union was running 160 camps accommodating as many as 1,250,000 homeless refugees. A tremendous amount of food, tents, clothing, medicine, and other supplies had to be provided. Housing schemes and programmes of vocational and technical training were worked out, and hundreds of thousands were settled on the land. However, a very large number remained stranded and homeless in the cities. It was natural that they should become restless and disgruntled with the government. Furthermore, tension at times mounted between the newcomers bent on obtaining jobs and the old residents who saw their employment jeopardized.

While the rehabilitation of refugees in northern India was relatively easy, in West Bengal, by contrast, the situation is to this day very far from satisfactory. At the time of partition, because of Ghandi's presence in Bengal, no massacres and no exchange of population took place there as it did on the north. Some 13 million Hindus remained in East Pakistan. Suddenly, in 1950, hundreds of thousands of terrified Hindus poured into Calcutta and the problem became acute. By the end of 1950 three

⁵ Taya Zinkin: *India*. Thames and Hudson, p. 92.

and a half million Hindus had fled to India from East Pakistan for safety because of their treatment by the Muslim authorities. Since the Muslims of West Bengal were not migrating to Pakistan on the same scale there was literally nowhere to accommodate the refugees.

What happened in 1950 happened again in 1964 when communal riots flared up first in East Bengal, followed by riots in West Bengal, followed again by riots in Dacca—capital of East Pakistan—in which at least 1,000 Hindus were killed, and followed yet again by riots in Central India in which many Muslims died. With each communal riot more Hindus leave East Pakistan for good, adding to the congestion of Calcutta and the surrounding countryside, bringing fresh bitterness with them to poison Indo-Pakistan relations, and reminding the Muslims in India that they are a minority whose security can at any time be threatened by the behaviour of the authorities in Pakistan.

Indus Waters

This dispute concerned the six tributaries of the Indus which pass through Indian territory in the Punjab before flowing into Pakistan. Under a partition agreement India was to use the three eastern ones whilst waters from the three western tributaries were to pass unrestricted to Pakistan. This necessitated construction of link canals by Pakistan, with Indian financial assistance. In the interim Pakistan was guaranteed access to her former sources now entirely subject to Indian control.

The question of financial help became entangled in the overall compensation dispute as a part of the general financial settlement between the two countries. In 1954 India announced plans for its great Bhakra Dam scheme which, though vital to Indian economic development, threatened the Pakistani guaranteed waters before the link canals had been completed. India claimed that Pakistan had had sufficient time and should no longer delay her plans. After years of study and negotiation, the quarrel was settled in 1960 by mediation of the World Bank.

Kashmir

Twice in the past twenty years the Kashmir dispute has brought India and Pakistan to undeclared war. In the first crisis following partition the fighting was confined to the disputed region of Kashmir but in the second, during August and September 1965, the fighting spread all along the borders of West Pakistan, and involved air operations against East Pakistan as well.

Kashmir is a frontier state bordering on both Pakistan and India, a state in which the ruler was Hindu while the great majority of the

people were Moslem, and a state through which several of the great rivers of the Punjab flowed: Kashmir was perhaps bound to present a major problem. The situation arose when the Maharajah failed to decide the question of accession during the vital pre-partition months of 1947. Finally, in October, after marauding North-West Frontier tribesmen had attacked the country, he decided for accession to India. In fact, accession was made a condition of Indian aid which he could not refuse. Indian troops were flown in to restore the situation but soon Indian and Pakistani troops were engaged in a serious conflict in the Vale of Kashmir. The UN negotiated a ceasefire line which left the rich and populous Vale of Kashmir in Indian hands on the understanding that a plebiscite would be held to determine the wishes of the population. Although the Indian Government pledged itself to do so the plebiscite has not been held. Pakistan, confident of the support of the Moslem majority has been eager to see the plebiscite conducted whilst India, feeling that time is on her side, continually finds grounds for postponement. It is now doubtful if India intends to risk its authority at the polls.

Meanwhile, India has kept tight control over Kashmir and acts as though permanent accession is presumed. She has incorporated the State in several branches of her administration; has pressed on with a vigorous development of public works; and has heavily subsidized the sale of wheat—the staple food. India's case for her claim to Kashmir is based on these principles:

- That the modern state must be secular and that therefore the fact of Moslem predominance has no real bearing on the issue.
- That self-determination by plebiscite is not the best method of deciding such issues, since the legitimate interests of large neighbouring populations might be ignored.
- Kashmir is most important to India's defences, positioned as it is on a vulnerable part of the Chinese border. It is important to Pakistan's defence too; but India must bear the main responsibility for defence of the sub-continent.

India's claim has been viewed in some disfavour due to her deliberate flouting of UN instructions, particularly regarding the plebiscite and incorporation into the Indian Union. India often pleads a high moral attitude and the renunciation of the use of force in world affairs which has led to her actions over Kashmir being interpreted as high-handed.

The partition of Kashmir has been suggested but neither party will agree to this since both desire the Vale of Kashmir, the most fertile part, in which lies Srinagar the capital.

In 1965 both parties seemed to lose patience and war developed once more. China, in open support of Pakistan, threatened the Indian frontier and a major armed conflict seemed likely. But with China not prepared to venture beyond a border skirmish and eager for pure diplomatic gains, the conflict over Kashmir was brought to an uneasy halt. The incident brought the problem no nearer solution.

Freedom and Opposition to Racial Discrimination

India has continued to be a loyal supporter of the Commonwealth connection and the very creative act of retaining India in the Commonwealth as a republic has made possible the post-war Afro-Asian transformation of the old empire. As a leader of this bloc India has brought about the censure of both South Africa and Rhodesia for their policies of racial discrimination.

India is determined that account will be taken of Asian views in international affairs and ensures this by her leadership of the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN. The Trusteeship Council has formed one platform for this policy, much to the irritation at times of the colonial powers and of Australia in New Guinea. India insists that the needs of Asian and African countries should be met through United Nations action rather than through imperfect international schemes such as the Colombo Plan.

Freedom from exploitation and racial discrimination is a basic tenet in the 'Panch Shila' agreements for peaceful coexistence, which India has signed with several Asian countries including China.

International Co-operation and Goodwill

Through the skilful hands of Nehru, India has been behind the Afro-Asian group of nations in the UN. Again, it was Nehru who was the dominant figure in the Colombo Plan group of nations (Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan) and his contribution was decisive for the success of the Afro-Asian Conference of 29 powers at Bandung in 1955.

Because of its policy of coexistence India strives to narrow the gap between the Communists and the West. This policy is seen as an expression of Nehru's own belief that Communist aggression has been provoked by fear and he therefore contended that it was a mistake to try to counter it by means of military alliances. These, he claimed, would serve only to aggravate the basic fear and tend to result in further aggression. He argued that the avoidance of alliances would dispel Communist suspicions and should be replaced by discussion with Com-

munist governments and by setting an example of reasonableness and fairness which the Communists would be compelled to match. To this peaceful end he actively promoted discussion.

Peaceful means rather than resort to strength and physical violence is traditional in Indian history, having deep roots in many Indian religions and figuring prominently in Congress actions, notably Ghandi's 'passive resistance' campaigns.

However, most observers regard the Indian policy as optimistic, when they reflect that the more conciliatory the West has shown itself the more eagerly has Communism taken every advantage offered, without the least concession in return. India has shown signs of tacit recognition of this fact since China's aggressive behaviour on her northern frontiers in 1960 and 1965. Though not warming to the idea of military alliances India has accepted Western military aid and has become less critical of Western policy.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Colombo Plan V. SUNFED

In recent years Communism and the West have become more and more active in the field of economic aid. Both Russia and China have promised, and in some measure provided, aid to many countries. The main instrument of Western Aid has been the Colombo Plan. The Afro-Asian bloc, under Indian leadership, regards this donor-recipient relationship as undignified and has pressed for distribution through an international agency. Their representations led to a UN resolution calling for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). In 1965 the Special Fund was included in the UN Development Programme (UNDP). This, however, is based almost entirely on US donations, is extremely modest in scale, and has not resulted in the aid India envisaged, nor has it replaced the Colombo Plan.

India's Nuclear Outlook

On the whole Indian leadership has been opposed to any idea of nuclear arms development, on economic if not on moral grounds. Amongst the reasons for this attitude have been Indian traditions of non-violence and peace so powerfully expounded and preached by Mahatma Ghandi and a recognition that the development of nuclear weapons is both unproductive and tremendously expensive, whereas the peaceful exploitation of the atom has limitless potential for producing wealth. For

a democratic country like India, nuclear arms development is a long and difficult process and is dependent upon the assistance of outside countries for both vital technical know-how and foreign exchange. Up until now it has been held neither morally justifiable nor politically wise to divert national effort to a programme of such massive dimensions as the manufacture of nuclear arms.

Most observers are now however in no doubt that India has embarked upon a nuclear weapons project, and may soon be exploding her first nuclear device. She has refused to recognize the nuclear non-proliferation pact sponsored by Russia and the US for the reason that China is not bound by it. They argue here, as they have in support of China's admission to the UN — China just cannot be ignored. India would not like to accept a treaty which heaps all the controls, all the limitations, and all the prohibitions on non-nuclear countries, and would like to have a *treaty which embodies an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear countries.*

The key to India's change in posture hangs almost entirely on developments in mainland China, for amongst Red China's recent significant achievements is her capability to build a nuclear device. Another factor is the militarization of Tibet, which brings dangers from central Asia to India's frontiers in a manner unprecedented in history, for invaders have in the past descended only through north-western routes. Airpower has added to this danger.

The North Indian Plain, containing the country's densest population areas as well as a large number of vital points, comes within striking distance of conventional bombers which Red China possesses. There is ample evidence to suggest that the strike capability of Red China is improving. This will eventually include better bombers and a sizeable stock of missiles, capable of reaching areas beyond the northern plain.

Agitation for the change in nuclear policy has come from the younger generation, and students in particular; the intellectuals, the strategists, the writers and thinkers on power politics, and the ultra nationalists who vigorously point to the dangers of military backwardness and inferiority in relation to a powerful and belligerent neighbour.

Recent endeavours by the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Ghandi, to improve Sino-Indian relations have included a demonstration of readiness to talk about their border problems. The Chinese have ignored her. Peking continues to give encouragement to hill tribes like the Nagas who seek independence from the central government. With the 1962 invasion still fresh in India's memory China is seen as a distinct military

threat. Only last year China's Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, openly warned his armed forces in Tibet to be prepared for a border war with India. China's continuing threat to India's frontiers and her friendly posture towards Pakistan seem aimed at maintaining pressure on the Indian Government for some time to come.

SUMMARY OF POLITICAL SUCCESS

India's success in the political sense may be summarized as:

- The establishment of a political system based on parliamentary government responsible to the voters at free universal franchise elections.
- Viable government which has set the stage for continuing social, economic and political advancement of her peoples.
- The containment of Communism.
- The establishment of a definite Foreign Policy.

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND USSR

India, China, and Russia — Common Ground

There is strong Asian similarity between India and China though geography, politics and economics make them potential rivals in Asia. They share common ground in their reaction against imperialism and racial discrimination, at least as exemplified by others. India has strongly supported China's entry into the United Nations. Like the Russian experiment before it, the new economic world of China is a source of encouragement to Indians. Hatred of colonialism and the fascination exerted by a collectivist system likewise draws India to Russia, and because colonialism is associated in Asian eyes with colour and racial discrimination Russia is not regarded as 'colonialist'.

CHINA

Tibet and the Northern Frontier

In 1947 the Indian Government inherited the British interests in Tibet, which were concerned mainly with security of India's northern frontier. Although in the 19th Century no serious military threat existed in Northern India there were other reasons for British interest. In the first place unrest among the people of southern Tibet could have made it necessary for the British to maintain expensive garrisons along the whole Indo-Tibetan border of 1,800 miles. Secondly, if Chinese farmers had been encouraged by the Manchu Government to settle in southern

Tibet it would have been difficult to prevent their overflow into Assam and Bengal. In 1914 the British Government arranged the Simla Conference, at which Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was recognized, but it was agreed that no Chinese settlers were to be permitted and that British trade agents and Indian troops were to remain to protect and encourage trade with India.

Armies of the People's Republic of China attacked Tibet in 1950, and in 1954 the Chinese and Indian Governments signed an agreement on Tibet which was intended to continue trade and cultural intercourse with India. India retained agencies in Tibet but withdrew her troops. Since then a more positive attitude of the Peking government has resulted in an increasing proportion of Tibetan trade moving towards China.

Peaceful Coexistence

At this time the Panch Shila, or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, was drawn up and signed between India and China. The five points listed in this document have become the basis of many such agreements signed bilaterally between China and other SE Asian countries.

The five points are:

1. Recognition of national sovereignty.
2. Non-aggression between signatories.
3. Non-interference in each other's affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful coexistence.

This agreement was confirmed and elaborated at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and is intended to regulate relationships between the bilateral signatories.

Such anxieties as the Indian Government might have felt following China's annexation of Tibet did not prevent it from doing all it could in the international field to make the world understand China's problems. Obvious instances of this are India's persistent efforts to have China admitted to the UN; its vote against the UN resolution branding China an aggressor in Korea; and her refusal to attend the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in 1951 on the grounds, amongst other things, that China was not represented.

After Tibet — Chinese Expansion in the 1960s

The Chinese built strategic roads through the uninhabited territories on the mountain border between Tibet and India, chiefly in Ladakh.

Discovery of these roads early in the 1960s and the presence of Chinese troops led to serious tension, resulting in armed clashes between the two countries. China finally withdrew from advanced positions she established but retained the territory she claimed. This confrontation of China and India had important results amongst which were:

- A very marked upsurge of nationalistic sentiment in India, which served as a unifying force in an otherwise disunified country.
- An acceleration of India's growing friendliness towards the West, which provided India with military equipment.
- Pakistan cultivating friendly relations with China.

During the height of the 1965 Kashmir war China put pressure on India in the northern frontier region; widely interpreted as assisting Pakistan. Certainly Pakistan has emerged as the Asian nation with the best Chinese relations but astute observers believe that China's concern was to show Asia that the previously diplomatically isolated India is a 'paper tiger', and no serious rival for Asian leadership.

Relations with USSR

Under Nehru's leadership India seemed destined for warm relations with Russia, for as a young man he displayed a marked attraction to Communism and the socialist ideal. After a short visit to Moscow in 1927 he wrote, 'Whatever its faults, Communism is not hypocritical and not imperialistic.' On his return he attempted to persuade Congress at its annual session into accepting a socialist, anti-imperialist policy. A much alarmed Gandhi was careful thereafter to harness his young colleague's impetuosity.

When he finally assumed the full mantle of Indian Prime Ministership Nehru pressed forward with the implementation of a socialist pattern of society based on socialism, industrialization, scientific progress and planning; to be brought about strictly by democratic processes. The necessity for planning the society had great appeal for Nehru and he was naive enough to ascribe it as solely a Communist virtue. He had been profoundly impressed by the way in which the Russians had managed to become the world's second largest power and instinctively saw in their example a model way to develop India's resources and 'to control the forces of nature to serve the legitimate needs of man.'⁶

In 1956 Mr Krushchev and Marshal Bulganin made their celebrated visit to India. Russian Policy was clearly to woo India as an ally, because

⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru: *The Discovery of India*, p. 520.

it wanted her vote in the UN and because it saw in Indian neutrality a force which it could use against the West. The old charge that India had allowed itself to be used as a puppet by the West was dropped and Russian propaganda became seductive. The Russians instigated an aid programme which included a huge steel mill and military aircraft construction installations. So important is the Indian influence sought that these projects continued despite China's aggressive action on India's borders both in 1962 and 1965.

In a subtle way the interests of the Indian Communist Party were sacrificed for the hidden interests of Russia. Khrushchev and Bulganin applauded India's progress and in Calcutta, Bombay and New Delhi they saluted the efforts made by Nehru to secure world peace. Congress had become respectable in the eyes of Communism's world leaders, making it almost impossible for their Indian comrades to attack the Congress Party as reactionary and a tool of the West.

The Russians also took an unambiguous stand in favour of India over the Kashmir question, declaring that Kashmir was now one of the States in the Indian Union, and castigated Pakistan for her alliance with the United States. Whilst Western support in 1962 was much more immediate and extensive than Russia's it was clear that Russia disapproved of the Chinese attack. This must have heartened India who does not want either to add Russia to her enemies or to lose the Russian veto in her favour over Kashmir at the UN.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Problem

India's leaders faced appalling problems in their endeavour to develop European standards of civilization in their immense, terribly backward country. Economic development has been not so much a problem of raising the desperately low living standards of India's 500 million people, as of expanding production and output so as to maintain present standards in the face of an annual 3 million increase in population. More sources of employment are needed merely to prevent millions from starving. Mechanization of agriculture and large scale irrigation are necessary. These require huge industrialization to generate employment. To achieve this improvement India has first had to find the answers to her problems of uniting her unique mixture of races; of combating complete illiteracy and superstition; of wiping out the caste system; and of weaning the people from worship of the cow, which in itself vitiates Indian agriculture.

This tremendous struggle is taking place in open competition with Communist China. India is trying to achieve by democratic processes

what China is attempting by the more ruthless methods of Communism. The members of the uncommitted Afro-Asian group of nations view the outcome of this contest as highly significant to their future choice between Democracy and Communism.

Economic Resources

India has huge manpower resources. However, 70% of the people are directly dependent upon agriculture, a fact which makes land and rainfall India's two most critical resources. The land is poorly distributed and production methods primitive, often due to cultural and religious conservatism.

Industrialism is conditioned by a restricted distribution of coal, and lack of oil, resulting in much importance being placed upon the development of hydro-electric power. The sources of the latter are often far from suitable industrial sites. Other natural resources, amongst which iron ore is prominent, are sufficient but remote from suitable refineries. However, the steel mill at Jamshedpur is outstanding and India's steel output eclipses that of Australia.

India has considerable potential for a nuclear programme to generate power for peaceful purposes. Four nuclear power projects have been undertaken to date, using natural uranium from indigenous sources. At the completed Bombay reactor there is a plant for the extraction of plutonium, together with a unit to treat the highly reactive waste. This places India in the category of half a dozen countries of the world possessing similar facilities. Other reactors, either completed or nearing completion, are at — Madras, which does not have coal — Rajasthan, which is deficient in hydro-electric power — and Maharashtra, an advanced state, which needs more power than the customary sources can provide.

To enable economic development to continue, sacrifices are being called for and Congress hopes to obtain them by democratic means — China, on the other hand, can dictate its people. Except in one or two states Communism is not an important force in India at present but the English-educated element controlling Congress is small amidst the Indian masses and economic upset could conceivably win the Communist Party an overwhelming following almost overnight in such an immature electorate.

If population continues to grow at the same rate as production then development, in spite of increased production, will have no effect on the present average standard of living. It is for this reason that develop-

ment policy advocated family limitation and provides facilities for its application.

The economic effects of the Sino/Indian and Kashmir crises are far-reaching for India. From the moment India embarked on a major armaments programme her economy has been faltering. There have been food shortages, amounting to famine in some parts, shortages of foreign exchange, and reductions in planned targets for industrial development. India has become increasingly dependent upon United States aid.

The Five Year Plans

The first aim of an independent India has been one to overcome poverty. In their plan for social and economic development they have made their goal a more even distribution of economic power by greatly increased State control and management in heavy industry, and capital projects such as steel, coal, transport and power. To date they have completed three in a continuing series of five-year plans aimed at doubling the National Income by 1967-68 and per capita income by 1974.

India's five year plans are formulated within the framework of the Directive Principles of the Constitution. Their purpose is to ensure to the people of India adequate means of livelihood, the right to work, to education and to some minimum standards of living. It was feared that without planned development the government would not be able to realize these objectives; the argument being that in an undeveloped country, if there is to be a social content to political freedom, the initiative for development has to be taken, in the main, by the government. The Indian plans are 'elastic' so that if target dates are not achieved for a planned period the completion date is merely carried forward into the next plan period and, when necessary, projects are dropped altogether. It is therefore possible to prune, when circumstances demand, without too much loss of face. This was done in 1958 due to lack of foreign exchange, and in 1963 due to Chinese aggression.

The First Plan 1951-56

During the First Plan period an enormous requirement existed for the rehabilitation of millions of refugees displaced by partition. In this time India concentrated upon building up her secondary industries and improving agriculture. The long term objective was to initiate a process of continued growth. To finance initial projects Congress indulged in a fateful gamble, involving a serious risk of inflation, by more than doubling the note circulation. This gamble succeeded largely because of a series

of good harvests and an increased factory output which matched the expansion of currency.

Unfortunately no start was made on increasing steel production, for which India is exceptionally well endowed. Instead, many major multi-purpose, and therefore long range, irrigation and power generation schemes were commenced simultaneously. Irrigation, which holds a traditional preoccupation for Indian Governments, was increased so as to relieve the peasants' dependence upon the monsoon. The combined establishment of irrigation projects and complementary hydro-electric power schemes has been a continuing process throughout each of the plan periods.

Attention was also directed to the extension of the transport system which had become run down during World War II. As well as railways, the government gave emphasis to road improvement through the programme for national highways. However, main highways are but one aspect of the transport rehabilitation programme; equally important are village approach roads. Most Indian villages are remote from national highways and therefore markets. Yet, if agriculture is to become an economic industry, it is essential that producers should have easy access to such markets. With their road policy, Indian planners seem to have forsaken the substance for the shadow.

The aims of the First Plan had been modest. The results exceeded all hopes of the planners. National income rose 18.5 per cent in the period; agriculture increased 22 per cent; industrial production by 39 per cent; production of capital goods by 70 per cent and that of intermediate and consumer goods by 34 per cent. The First Five Year Plan was therefore successful in a way which vindicated and confirmed Nehru's faith in planning. There were however three very favourable conditions peculiar to this particular period. First, the weather was propitious. With the exception of small, localized droughts in some areas, there were bumper crops almost everywhere. Secondly, the Korean war created a demand for India's exports. Finally, as a result of World War II credits, India was not short of foreign exchange with which to pay for imports of machinery, raw materials and food. Only the most optimistic planner could have expected these advantages to continue indefinitely without seeking alternatives.

The Second Plan 1956-61

The Second Plan set out to broaden the socialist pattern of society in which State development of heavy industry, especially new steel works, created a short cut round the traditional 'capitalist' stage of development.

In agriculture, so important a part of social transformation in Asia, the aim was to create co-operative village management and land reform to abolish landlordism. Although the boom created by the Korean War had now passed and despite less favourable weather India was able to embark upon its Second Plan with much of its wartime accumulation of foreign exchange intact. This tremendous advantage permitted Indian growth to continue unchecked in the years before the democratic world as a whole realized it had a vested interest in India's success.

This plan was more sophisticated than the first and Congress prepared to spend twice as much on it. Much of the expenditure was set aside for heavy industry, notably steel, and the transport, electricity, iron ore and limestone required for a five-fold expansion of steel production. In their attempt to raise further the standard of living and reduce the inequalities in income and wealth Congress had to contend with creating jobs for the 10 million more people coming into the labour force in 1961 than in 1956.

Three State steel plants, each capable of producing one million tons of steel, were completed; one at Bhilai, with Soviet assistance; one at Rourkela, with German assistance; and one at Durgapur, with British assistance. In addition, the two private enterprise steelmills, at Jamshedpur and Burnpur, were doubled in the plan period. This decision to concentrate on steel was sensible and should probably have been taken earlier for steel provides the very sinews of industrial development. Furthermore, India had been importing a lot of steel whilst actually possessing huge deposits of high grade iron ore located close to coal and water. This, coupled to a very cheap labour force and a considerably skilled middle class from which to develop the necessary technicians, created a potential to produce steel cheaper than any other country in the world except Australia. At the beginning of this period India was producing 1.3 million tons of steel a year. When it had ended the total had climbed to 6 million tons annually.

Late in the Second Plan period foreign exchange reserves diminished, due to increased imports as a result of crop failures, and the increasing costs for spares and imported raw materials. Assistance was sought from all friendly sources and the World Bank formed the All-India Club comprising most of the major industrial countries of the West. Aid from these sources, and Communist countries, allowed the period to conclude without any serious slowing down. Income had risen 20 per cent against the planned 25 per cent; agricultural production by 20 per cent; and industrial production by 41 per cent. Although investment in the public sector of the economy had fallen seriously short of the planned amount,

investment in the private sector had exceeded expectations, which reflected the Indian citizens' faith in the country's ability to succeed.

The Third Plan 1961-66

Under the Third Plan an all out effort was made to employ and feed the population whilst introducing measures to halt its phenomenal growth. Agricultural policy aimed at self sufficiency in foodstuffs. Employment was greatly increased and the basis laid for full industrialization. Compulsory education was commenced and a vigorous family planning educational scheme was launched in an attempt to lower the annual increase of population, so as to ease the labour force problems expected in later years. Once again, planned increase in national income was to be 25 per cent for the period. In all the cost of this Third Plan was to exceed that of the Second by a little more than half.

Serious handicaps to progress presented themselves almost from the outset. Failure to achieve production targets for coal and rolling stock under the Second Plan led to grave transport problems in this new period. This directly affected steel production and the generation of thermal power. Miscalculation of the number of mouths to be fed was revealed when census figures put the annual increase of population at 2.8 per cent against the 2 per cent anticipated. To add to these already mounting difficulties, Chinese aggression in 1962 forced defence expenditure to increase three-fold by 1964. Finally, when the United States announced severe restrictions in its foreign aid programme, upon which India had come to heavily depend, it was recognized that planned objectives were beyond reach and pressures to trim the plan became extreme. As a result, Congress concentrated upon agriculture and activities such as the production of fertilizers, thereby shrinking expenditure of foreign exchange.

Results So Far

Although India's struggle against mass poverty and economic inequalities has yet to win decisive victories, advances have been made in several directions. Each of the Five Year Plans carried out so far has achieved moderate success. In the countryside, the pernicious system of absentee landlordism has been abolished and various measures taken to guarantee security of tenure and ownership to farmers. The stranglehold of private moneylenders on peasants is now largely broken and advances in social services are already showing results in a falling death rate and an increase of life expectancy.

While agricultural development is clearly still unsatisfactory, good progress is shown in the growth and diversification of industry. There

are signs of extraordinary vigour in the private sector of the economy. Wherever power and raw materials have been made available entrepreneurial energy has taken full advantage to produce more and more manufactures which previously had to be imported. Industrial production has increased 100 per cent and the actual growth built up in the economy has laid the basis for a major industrial expansion of the self-sustaining kind. This is particularly true in the production of iron ore, coal, steel, power and machine tools.

Unhappily, for the greatest challenge to India's future comes from the increase in population, the problem of unemployment and under-employment continues as acute as ever. This is due in part to defects in planning and execution, but more fundamentally to the phenomenal increase in population, running at the moment at 3 million per annum.

INDIA'S FAILURE AS A DEMOCRACY IN ASIA

India's failures as an example of Democracy in Asia are not so much total as they are slowness to succeed. The principal area in this regard is her slowness to develop a particularly significant constitutional opposition, thus providing India with a two-party system so necessary for the true development of parliamentary democracy. The chances of a powerful and democratic opposition to the ruling Congress Party emerging in the immediate future is still rather slender. The Congress Party is democratic-socialist oriented and should the time come that its more conservative-democratic elements break away to join the other right wing parties, an effective opposition could evolve. Until 1964, the Communists held the second highest total of seats in both the Federal and State Parliaments. However, an ideological dispute split them into two groups in the Lok Sabha thus making the Swatantra the largest opposition party in Parliament. But after more than twenty years a truly effective opposition has not yet emerged.

Another area of concern is the malignant Caste system of Hinduism. The Government has not yet been able to establish the equality promised by the Constitution to the scheduled Castes and Tribes. Caste is a most complex and elusive problem. Only the most sanguine observer would give the Government much chance of quickly overcoming 5,000 years of Hindu conservatism, prejudice and superstition, but some progress has been made. 'Untouchability' has been legally abolished and its practice is forbidden in any form. Seats are reserved in Parliament for their representatives and a special officer has been appointed to investigate and report regularly to the President on the working of welfare programmes. There are

encouraging signs that barriers amongst the higher castes; the Brahmins, Warriors and Merchants are weakening, but in many areas, particularly the conservative rural communities, the 'Untouchables' remain outcaste in Hindu society.

One issue intrinsically capable of threatening Indian unity is multi-lingualism. Whilst the Constitution laid down that 'the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script' it was found necessary to retain English as an interim universal tongue. This problem led to the reorganization of states on linguistic bases and specific guarantees were made to linguistic-cultural minorities in each state. Congress policy contemplates the day when Hindi may serve as a medium for expression amongst all elements of the composite culture of India. It has postponed an original target date of 10 years post-independence to 25 years, during which English shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of the Union and for which it was being used immediately before the Constitution came into being. This step has been largely successful in allaying suspicion and antagonism amongst the non-Hindi-speaking states but has done little else to solve the problem of multi-lingualism.

Another trenchant quest is for a solution to the rapid growth of population, which in itself threatens democracy, political stability and economic progress. The death rate has fallen significantly whilst the birth-rate has remained much unchanged. In 1956, planners foresaw for the first time, that without effective check on population increase, economic development would never catch up with mass poverty. The Central Family Planning Board came into being the same year and by January 1963 8,500 clinics had been set up, mainly in rural areas. Some £A27 million was spent during the Third Five Year Plan period, but related to the size of the problem efforts so far are inadequate. There is no real Hindu religious objection to birth control, and whilst regarding children as God-given, most recognize that families can be planned. The cause of the problem is ignorance and a conservatism which has come to expect a new birth almost every year. There appears little hope of success unless some cheap and effective oral contraceptive can be produced on a huge scale and distributed free in rural areas.

So many South-East Asian observers contend that India, as an example of Democracy in Asia—whilst moderately successful—has overall been too slow in bringing relief and material benefits to her peoples compared to China. Nor has she been able, they point out, to build in comparable time the national strength needed to compete with

China, and they wonder what might have been under more authoritarian methods.

The importance of India's example lies in the undeniable fact that she demonstrates to the uncommitted nation-states of South-East Asia that a choice between Communism and Democracy does exist for them and that conversion to the former may not be inevitable. At the same time, by assuming the unaligned international status she professes, India has provided leadership for these countries in the United Nations which assures them of consideration in world affairs. □

